Amicus Curiae Brief — Damon Landor, Petitioner v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 3, 2025

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No. 23-1197

In the Supreme Court of the United States

________________

Damon Landor,

Petitioner,

Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public

Safety, et al.,

Respondents.

________________

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

________________

BRIEF OF THE BRUDERHOF, CLEAR, THE JEWISH

COALITION FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, AND THE SIKH

COALITION AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONER

________________

John A. Meiser

Meredith H. Kessler

Counsel of Record

Domenic Canonico

LINDSAY & MATT MOROUN

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLINIC

Notre Dame Law School

1338 Biolchini Hall of Law

Notre Dame, IN 46556

(574) 631-8722

mhollan4@nd.edu

Counsel for Amici Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE................................ 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 3

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 5

I. Like RFRA, RLUIPA mirrors § 1983’s language,

which authorizes damages for civil-rights

violations ............................................................. 5

II. The possibility of damages protects against

the mooting of meritorious religious claims .....11

III. Damages are vital to protect religious

minorities in prisons and jails ..........................18

A. Religious minorities are particularly

likely to suffer mistreatment in prisons and

jails ...............................................................18

B. Injunctive relief is insufficient to protect

religious minorities’ exercise .......................23

CONCLUSION ..........................................................26

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Ali v. Stephens,

822 F.3d 776 (5th Cir. 2016) .................................. 21

Alvarez v. Hill,

667 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2012) .................... 14, 15, 24

Apache Stronghold v. United States,

95 F.4th 608 (9th Cir. 2024) .................................... 5

Baranowski v. Hart,

486 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 2007) .................................. 13

Barnett v. Short,

129 F.4th 534 (8th Cir. 2025) .......................... 10, 11

Beck v. Lynaugh,

842 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1988) .................................. 12

Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. 520 (1979) ................................................ 24

Ben-Levi v. Brown,

136 S. Ct. 930 (2016) .............................................. 19

Boles v. Neet,

486 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) .............................. 25

Brown v. Peyton,

437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971) .................................. 8

Burke v. Clarke,

842 F. App’x 828 (4th Cir. 2021) ..................... 13, 14

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,

573 U.S. 682 (2014) .............................................. 5, 7

Chance v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just.,

730 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2013) .................................. 22

Charles v. Verhagen,

348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003) .................................. 21

Colvin v. Caruso,

605 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2010) ............................ 11, 14

Conley v. Branston,

489 F.2d 1472 (Table), 1988 WL 61509

(6th Cir. 1988) .......................................................... 8

Cotton v. Cate,

578 F. App’x 712 (9th Cir. 2014) ........................... 22

Crowder v. Lash,

687 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1982) .................................... 8

Curtis v. Loether,

415 U.S. 189 (1974) ................................................. 7

DeHart v. Horn,

390 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2004) ..................................... 6

DeMarco v. Davis,

914 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2019) .................................... 9

Diaab v. Green,

794 F.2d 685 (11th Cir. 1986) ................................ 12

Employment Division v. Smith,

494 U.S. 872 (1990) .......................................... 3, 5, 9

Estes v. Clarke,

No. 7:15-cv-00155, 2018 WL 2709327

(W.D. Va. June 5, 2018) ................................... 19, 22

Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs.,

503 U.S. 60 (1992) ............................................... 6, 7

Firewalker-Fields v. Lee,

58 F.4th 104 (4th Cir. 2023) .................................. 14

iii

Gardner v. Riska,

444 F. App’x 353 (11th Cir. 2011) ......................... 13

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao

do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) ....................... 10, 21

Grayson v. Schuler,

666 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2012) .................................. 21

Haight v. Thompson,

763 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2014) .................................... 5

Hewitt v. Helms,

482 U.S. 755 (1987) ................................................ 17

Heyward v. Cooper,

88 F.4th 648 (6th Cir. 2023) .................................. 23

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,

723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) ................................ 5

Holt v. Hobbs,

574 U.S. 352 (2015) .............................................. 5, 7

Incumaa v. Ozmint,

507 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2007) .................................. 14

Jerry v. Francisco,

632 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1980) ..................................... 8

Johnson v. Baker,

23 F.4th 1209 (9th Cir. 2022) ................................ 23

Jones v. Williams,

791 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2015) ................................ 16

Kauffman v. Johnston,

454 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1972) ................................... 12

King v. Zamiara,

788 F.3d 207 (6th Cir. 2015) .................................... 9

Knight v. Thompson,

797 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 2015) .................................. 5

Knowles v. Pfister,

829 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 2016) .................................. 22

Koger v. Bryan,

523 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2008) .................................... 5

Korte v. Sebelius,

735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013) .................................... 5

Landor v. Louisiana Dep’t of Corr. & Pub. Safety,

93 F.4th 259 (5th Cir. 2024) (en banc) ............ 18, 26

Linehan v. Crosby,

346 F. App’x 471 (11th Cir. 2009) ......................... 13

Lozano v. Collier,

98 F.4th 614 (5th Cir. 2024) .................................. 14

Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI,

839 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2016) ..................................... 5

Mayfield v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just.,

529 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2008) .................................. 22

McFadden v. Lucas,

713 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983) .................................... 8

Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura,

477 U.S. 299 (1986) .................................................. 6

Moussazadeh v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just.,

703 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2012) .................................. 13

Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr.,

372 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2004) .................................... 6

Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr.,

814 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1987) .................................. 8

New Doe Child #1 v. Cong. of U.S.,

891 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2018) .................................... 5

Norwood v. Strada,

249 F. App’x 269 (3d Cir. 2007) ............................. 16

Owen v. City of Independence,

445 U.S. 622 (1980) ................................................ 18

Owens v. Kelley,

681 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1982) ................................ 8

Owens v. Schuette,

No. 2:24-cv-10787, 2024 WL 4469086

(E.D. Mich. Oct. 10, 2024) ................................ 15, 16

Patrick v. LeFevre,

745 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1984) .................................... 8,

Quarles v. Thole,

No. 20-cv-697-NJR, 2022 WL 425362

(S.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2022) .......................................... 16

Ramirez v. Collier,

595 U.S. 411 (2022) .................................................. 7

Rendelman v. Rouse,

569 F.3d 182 (4th Cir. 2009) .................................. 16

Rich v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,

716 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 2013) .................... 11, 13, 14

Robbins v. Robertson,

782 F. App’x 794 (11th Cir. 2019) ......................... 21

Saleem v. Evans,

866 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1989) .............................. 12

Sause v. Bauer,

585 U.S. 957 (2018) .................................................. 8

Schlemm v. Wall,

784 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2015) .................................. 22

Selby v. Caruso,

734 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2013) .................................. 15

Selby v. Caruso,

No. 2:09-cv-152, 2012 WL 7160402

(W.D. Mich. Aug. 16, 2012) .................................... 15

Selby v. Caruso,

2:09-cv-152, 2013 WL 623046

(W.D. Mich. Feb. 20, 2013) .................................... 15

Singh v. Goord,

520 F. Supp. 2d 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ......... 15, 21, 23

Singh v. Goord,

No. 05-cv-9680, 2010 WL 1875653

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2010).......................................... 15

Singh v. Goord,

No. 05-cv-9680, 2010 WL 1903997

(S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2010) ........................................ 15

Singh v. Lynch,

460 F. App’x 45 (2d Cir. 2012) ............................... 15

Singh v. United States,

No. 24-6027 (D.N.J. filed May 10, 2024) ............... 23

Smith v. City of Jackson,

544 U.S. 228 (2005) .................................................. 7

Sutton v. City of Philadelphia,

21 F. Supp. 3d 474 (E.D. Pa. 2014) ....................... 21

Swift v. Lewis,

901 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1990) .................................... 8

vii

Tanzin v. Tanvir,

592 U.S. 43 (2020) .............. 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 17

U.S. Navy Seals 1-26 v. Biden,

27 F.4th 336 (5th Cir. 2022) .................................... 5

United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle,

453 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1971) ................................... 12

United States v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,

828 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2016) .............................. 22

United States v. Sanchez-Gomez,

584 U.S. 381 (2018). ............................................... 14

Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski,

592 U.S. 279 (2021) ................................................ 17

Walker v. Baldwin,

74 F.4th 878 (7th Cir. 2023) .................................. 20

Walker v. Baldwin,

No. 3:19-cv-50233, 2022 WL 2356430

(N.D. Ill. June 30, 2022) ........................................ 20

Wall v. Wade,

741 F.3d 492 (4th Cir. 2014) ............................ 14, 23

Warner v. Patterson,

534 F. App’x 785 (10th Cir. 2013) ......................... 14

Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck,

504 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2007) ..................................... 6

Wolfel v. Morris,

972 F.2d 712 (6th Cir. 1992))................................. 17

Young v. Coughlin,

866 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1989) ............................... 8, 12

viii

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 1983 .......................... 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) ............................................... 6

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) ............................................... 6

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) .......................................... 6, 16

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) .............................................. 10

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A) ........................................... 6

Other Authorities

City of N.Y. Dep’t of Corr., Directive 3261

(Sept. 10, 2012) ...................................................... 20

Ga. Dep’t of Corr. Pol’ys & Procs. 106.08 (2020) ...... 20

Ga. Dep’t of Corr. Pol’ys & Procs. 106.12 (2022) ...... 20

Ga. Dep’t of Corr. Pol’ys & Procs. 106.13 (2012) ...... 20

H.R. Rep. No. 106-219 (1999) ...................................... 9

Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N. Busick, Sex,

Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An Empirical Study

of Federal Religious Freedom Cases,

48 Seton Hall L. Rev. 353 (2018) ........................... 19

Miss. Dep’t of Corr., Inmate Handbook (2023) ......... 20

Muslim Advocates, Fulfilling the Promise of Free

Exercise for All: Muslim Prisoner Accommodation

in State Prisons 47–48 (July 2019)........................ 19

N.Y. Corr. Cmty. Supervision Directive No. 4202

(May 11, 2023) ........................................................ 20

Okla. Dep’t of Corr. Pol’ys & Procs. OP-030112

(2022) ...................................................................... 20

Okla. Dep’t of Corr. Pol’ys & Procs. OP-22.13

(2006) ...................................................................... 20

Religion in Prisons—A 50-State Survey of Prison

Chaplains, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Mar. 22, 2012) .......... 19

Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearing

on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the

Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,

106th Cong. 111 (1999) ............................................ 9

S.C. Dep’t of Corr. Policy PS-10.05 (2015) ................ 20

Sarah Netter, Sikh Activists Upset over Inmate’s

Haircut, ABC News (Oct. 6, 2008)......................... 22

Sikh Coalition, Complaint to U.S. Department of

Justice, Civil Rights Division re: Surjit Singh

(May 24, 2021) ........................................................ 25

Sikh Coalition, Legal Victory: Sikh Prisoners Can

Maintain Kesh (June 10, 2011) ............................. 22

Sikh Coalition, Urgent Action Requested: Save

Satnam Singh’s Hair from Being Forcibly

Cut (Apr. 1, 2006) ................................................... 22

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Enforcing

Religious Freedom in Prisons (Apr. 2025)............. 19

Va. Dep’t of Corr. Operating Proc. 841.3 (2023) ....... 14

Zhen Zeng, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Jail Inmates

in 2023—Statistical Tables (Apr. 2025) ................ 15

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) .............................................. 24

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici curiae are religious communities and

organizations committed to promoting and protecting

religious freedom. They submit this brief to ensure

that substantial protections for religious exercise—

like those Congress enacted in the Religious Land Use

and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000—are

faithfully interpreted to protect religious minorities’

free exercise of religion in prison.

The Bruderhof is a Christian community stemming

from the Anabaptist tradition. The Bruderhof was

founded in 1920 in Germany in the aftermath of World

War I. During Hitler’s reign, the community was

targeted for its conscientious refusal to support

Hitler’s militaristic and genocidal policies. Eventually,

the Bruderhof left their homes in Germany and fled to

England before immigrating to Paraguay and later to

the United States, attracted by this nation’s founding

principles of tolerance and liberty. The Bruderhof’s

interest in this case arises from its belief that freedom

from government coercion is essential for people of all

faiths in matters of sincere religious practice. From its

own experience, the Bruderhof knows the value of

court-enforced standards for religious freedom that

offer protection from the vagaries of political

majorities.

Creating Law Enforcement Accountability &

Responsibility (CLEAR) is a legal nonprofit and clinic

1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici curiae affirm that no counsel

for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no

person other than amici curiae, their members, and their counsel

made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.

at the City University of New York School of Law.

CLEAR’s mandate is to support Muslim and all other

clients, communities, and movements nationwide that

are targeted by local, state, or federal government

agencies under the guise of national security and

counterterrorism. CLEAR was founded in 2009 and is

housed at the City University of New York School of

Law, within Main Street Legal Services, Inc., the

clinical arm of the law school. CLEAR represented the

plaintiffs in Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43 (2020).

The Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty is a

nondenominational organization of Jewish communal

and lay leaders who seek to protect the ability of all

Americans to freely practice their faith and to foster

cooperation between Jewish and other faith

communities in the public square.

The Sikh Coalition is a nonprofit and nonpartisan

organization dedicated to ensuring that members of

the Sikh community in America can practice their

faith without bias and discrimination. The Sikh

Coalition defends the civil rights and civil liberties of

Sikhs by providing direct legal services and

advocating for legislative change, educating the public

about Sikhs and diversity, promoting local community

empowerment, and fostering civic engagement

amongst Sikh Americans. The organization also

educates community members about their legally

recognized free exercise rights and works with public

agencies and officials to implement policies that

accommodate their deeply held beliefs. The Sikh

Coalition owes its existence in large part to the effort

to combat uninformed discrimination against Sikh

Americans after September 11, 2001.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court must make clear that monetary

damages are “appropriate relief” in suits brought

against state officials in their individual capacities

under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act. RLUIPA’s text follows 42 U.S.C. § 1983’s

and should be interpreted to afford the same remedies.

Before Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872

(1990), § 1983 broadly permitted monetary damages

to be awarded in First Amendment free-exercise

claims. After Smith, RLUIPA simply restored this

remedy to incarcerated religious claimants. The

restoration of that remedy is a central component of

the broad protections for religious freedom that

Congress enacted in RLUIPA. The denial of such a

remedy would undermine those protections and

distort the statute Congress passed, rendering it out

of step with both the pre-Smith regime it sought to

restore and RLUIPA’s sister statute the Religious

Freedom Restoration Act.

Damages are critical not simply to hold officials

liable for the full extent of the harms they cause, but

often to ensure accountability at all by protecting

inmates’ meritorious claims from becoming moot

before they can be adjudicated. Most concerning,

without damages, prisons can strategically moot

RLUIPA cases before a prisoner can receive relief,

such as by strategically transferring the prisoner or

altering the burdensome behavior to avoid a ruling on

the merits of its actions. And even prisoners’ rightful

release or a prison’s good-faith transfer decisions can

effectively insulate violations from judicial review.

Either way, many inmates’ claims will never be

vindicated without monetary damages. Damages thus

ensure that prison officials are held accountable to

their federal obligations and incentivize them to take

these rights seriously.

These protections are especially critical for

members of minority religions. Prison policies

commonly fail to protect many minority religious

practices. Individual officers do little better, routinely

showing ignorance, skepticism, hostility, or outright

discrimination toward adherents of minority faiths.

That mistreatment often happens too quickly for

aggrieved prisoners to prevent it through injunctive

relief. And religious minorities are often a small

number of those jailed, lacking the numerosity

required to sustain a class action to protect their

religious exercise more broadly. For those prisoners,

judicial relief often rests on damages or nothing.

An inability to receive monetary damages does not

just imperil individual plaintiffs; it breeds systemic

problems too. Unburdened by the threat of damages,

prisons have little incentive to improve their policies

and protect prisoners from future abuse. Damages

provide the necessary incentive—enabling inmates to

vindicate their own rights and to demand that prisons

fix unlawful policies to better respect such rights in

the future.

This Court should confirm that monetary damages

are “appropriate relief” to ensure that these promises

of RLUIPA are fulfilled.

ARGUMENT

Like RFRA, RLUIPA mirrors § 1983’s

language, which authorizes damages for

civil-rights violations.

Congress enacted RLUIPA to “provide very broad

protection for religious liberty” in prisons and jails.

Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356 (2015) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Before Employment

Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), courts

routinely permitted religious claimants to vindicate

their free-exercise rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Smith largely foreclosed that relief for neutral and

generally applicable government policies. In response,

Congress enacted RFRA and RLUIPA, converting

what was once a constitutional right into a statutory

one. These statutes functionally restored the preSmith protections, complete with a remedial scheme

that tracks § 1983’s own. See Pet.Br. 7–8; Tanzin v.

Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 46–49 (2020) (interpreting

RFRA).2 Critically, in other words, RFRA and

This Court has recognized that RFRA and RLUIPA are

“sister statute[s]” that should be interpreted similarly. Burwell

v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 730 (2014). The Courts

of Appeals have done the same. See, e.g., Apache Stronghold v.

United States, 95 F.4th 608, 614 (9th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (per

curiam); U.S. Navy Seals 1-26 v. Biden, 27 F.4th 336, 348 n.12

(5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam); New Doe Child #1 v. Cong. of U.S.,

891 F.3d 578, 587 n.2 (6th Cir. 2018); Mack v. Warden Loretto

FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 304 n.103 (3d Cir. 2016); Knight v. Thompson,

797 F.3d 934, 946 & n.9 (11th Cir. 2015); Haight v. Thompson,

763 F.3d 554, 562 (6th Cir. 2014); Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654,

682–83 (7th Cir. 2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723

F.3d 1114, 1138 n.13 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v.

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); Koger v. Bryan,

523 F.3d 789, 798 (7th Cir. 2008); Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of

RLUIPA restored not only the substantive protections

of pre-Smith law, but also the judicial remedies

available to vindicate those rights. Tanzin, 592 U.S. at

48–51.

One of those protections is a damages remedy.

Indeed, RLUIPA authorizes private suits to obtain all

“appropriate relief” against state and local

governments, their officials, and “any other person

acting under color of State law.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc2(a), 2000cc-5(4)(A). As this Court has held for RFRA,

that includes monetary damages against individual

officers because such damages were available under

§ 1983 and RFRA “uses the same terminology as

§ 1983 in the very same field of civil rights law.”

Tanzin, 592 U.S. at 46–49 (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub.

Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 70–71 (1992) (presuming that

damages are “appropriate relief” unless Congress says

otherwise). RLUIPA uses the same text as RFRA—

“appropriate relief” against a person acting under

color of law—in the same context. Compare 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-2(a), 2000cc-5(4)(A)(iii) with 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000bb-1(c), 2000bb-2(1). Moreover, “[t]he phrase

‘persons acting under color of law’ draws on one of the

most well-known civil rights statutes: 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. That statute applies to ‘person[s] . . . under

color of any statute,’ and this Court has long

interpreted it to permit suits against officials in their

individual capacities.” Tanzin, 592 U.S. at 48 (citing

Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299,

305–06 & n.8 (1986)). Accordingly, this Court should

Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353 (2d Cir. 2007); DeHart v. Horn,

390 F.3d 262, 274–75 (3d Cir. 2004); Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr.,

372 F.3d 979, 987 (8th Cir. 2004).

hold that RLUIPA, like RFRA, “reinstated pre-Smith

protections and rights” and thus that “parties suing

under [RLUIPA] must have at least the same avenues

for relief against officials that they would have had

before Smith.” Id. at 492.

This Court’s RLUIPA precedents reinforce that

conclusion. “[W]hen Congress uses the same language

in two statutes having similar purposes, particularly

when one is enacted shortly after the other, it is

appropriate to presume that Congress intended that

text to have the same meaning in both statutes.”

Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005)

(opinion of Stevens, J.). As this Court has recognized,

the “sister statute[s]” RFRA and RLUIPA are clear

examples, and indeed they are so similar that this

Court often uses their case law interchangeably.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 730

(2014); see also, e.g., Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411,

426 (2022) (citing RFRA case in interpreting

RLUIPA); Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 362 (2015)

(same).

RLUIPA should thus be interpreted to embrace the

longstanding rule that damages are appropriate relief.

See Pet.Br. 18–20. This interpretation is neither

surprising nor unusual. Damages, after all, are “the

traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law.”

Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) (emphasis

added). For centuries, damages have been awarded as

appropriate relief against both counties and their

officials; in fact, the general presumption is that such

relief is available unless Congress clearly says

otherwise. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 70–71, 76.

That general rule has special force in the context of

civil-rights suits against local governments and their

officials. “There is no doubt that damages claims have

always been available under § 1983 for clearly

established violations of the First Amendment.”

Tanzin, 592 U.S. at 50 (citing Sause v. Bauer, 585 U.S.

957 (2018) (per curiam) and Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of

Corr., 814 F.2d 1252, 1259 (8th Cir. 1987)). Before

Smith, courts often entertained damages suits under

§ 1983 for claims similar to those RLUIPA now

vindicates. The Fifth Circuit, for example, allowed the

possibility of damages for the forceable cutting of a

religious beard. McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 148

(5th Cir. 1983). The Ninth Circuit did the same. Swift

v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1990). The Fourth

Circuit permitted the possibility of damages when

officials denied a Muslim prisoner permission to

distribute Arabic dictionaries to assist Qur’an study.

Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1233 (4th Cir. 1971).

And the Seventh Circuit permitted damages for a

Christian prisoner denied access to the Bible and the

prison chapel. Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1001

(7th Cir. 1982).3 To this day, even after Smith, § 1983

3 See also Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567, 568 & n.1 (2d Cir.

1989) (allowing Muslim prisoner’s claim that officials had

prevented him from attending religious services to continue,

although his injunctive claims were moot); Conley v. Branston,

849 F.2d 1472 (Table), 1988 WL 61509, at *1 (6th Cir. 1988) (per

curiam) (reversing dismissal of Cherokee prisoner’s damages

claim that officials prohibited him from wearing a religious

headband); Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 155–56 & n.2 (2d

Cir. 1984) (sustaining a damages action when officials denied

recognition of prisoner’s religion, although injunctive claims were

mooted when prisoner was transferred); Owens v. Kelley, 681

F.2d 1362, 1370 (11th Cir. 1982) (reversing summary judgment

on prisoner’s First Amendment claims and noting that the county

could be held liable for damages); Jerry v. Francisco, 632 F.2d

allows damages in similar actions for free-exercise

violations. Tanzin, 592 U.S. at 50; see, e.g., DeMarco v.

Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 389–90 (5th Cir. 2019)

(recognizing that damages may be available under

§ 1983 for a prison’s destruction of an inmate’s Bible);

King v. Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207, 213–16 (6th Cir. 2015)

(awarding damages under § 1983 against prison

officials for First Amendment violations).

Nothing in RLUIPA’s text or history suggests it

discarded this longstanding rule. On the contrary, as

its text makes clear, RLUIPA restored protections

that Smith had weakened by extending RFRA’s

remedial scheme to additional contexts. Cf. Tanzin,

592 U.S. at 50 (“RFRA made clear that it was

reinstating

both

the

pre-Smith

substantive

protections of the First Amendment and the right to

vindicate those protections by a claim.”). And the

House Judiciary Committee stated that this language

was meant to “creat[e] a private cause of action for

damages, injunction, and declaratory judgment, and

creat[e] a defense to liability, and provid[e] for

attorneys’ fees.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-219, at 29 (1999).

The Committee also clarified that “[i]n the case of

violation by a state, the Act must be enforced by suits

against state officials and employees.” Id. That

understanding is consistent with testimony Congress

heard from leading remedies and religious liberty

scholar Douglas Laycock, who explained that

“[a]ppropriate relief includes declaratory judgments,

injunctions, and damages.” Religious Liberty

Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1691 Before

252, 255 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (reversing dismissal of

prisoner’s free-exercise damages claim although injunctive

claims were moot).

the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. On

the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 111 (1999) (statement of

Douglas Laycock, University of Texas Law School).

Just as RFRA and RLUIPA set out the “same

standard” for judging the merits of a claim, Gonzales

v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546

U.S. 418, 436 (2006), both statutes’ “appropriate

relief” language should be read to mean the same

thing. That is, both statutes should be interpreted to

“provide[], as one avenue for relief, a right to seek

damages against Government employees.” Tanzin,

592 U.S. at 44; see also Barnett v. Short, 129 F.4th 534,

539–40 (8th Cir. 2025) (following Tanzin’s analysis to

hold that “RLUIPA’s reference to ‘appropriate relief’

encompasses damages”).4

4 If anything, the availability of monetary damages is even

clearer under RLUIPA. First, the connection between RLUIPA

and the background expectation of individual damages is even

more obvious than under RFRA. Because RFRA now governs only

federal officials, in Tanzin, the Court had to assure itself of the

continued “salien[ce]” of the specific § 1983 remedial scheme

against state and local officials that the statute sought to

replicate. Tanzin, 592 U.S. at 50. To be sure, the Court

determined that § 1983’s backdrop was still apt and that RFRA

thus permits damages against federal officers. See id. But that

connection is all the more obvious for RLUIPA, which applies

specifically to state and local officials exactly like § 1983 itself.

Moreover, unlike RFRA, RLUIPA includes a provision that states

it is to be “construed in favor of a broad protection of religious

exercise, to the maximum extent permitted.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc3(g) (emphasis added). If there were any doubt—and there is

not—about whether damages are “appropriate relief” against

government officials, the statute makes clear that the question

must be resolved in favor of greater protections.

II.

The possibility of damages protects against

the mooting of meritorious religious claims.

A damages remedy is not only compelled by

RLUIPA’s text; it is essential to the coherent and

effective functioning of the remedial scheme RLUIPA

creates.

As this Court observed with respect to RFRA, in

many cases a “damages remedy is not just

‘appropriate’ relief’”—it is “the only form of relief that

can remedy some . . . violations.” Tanzin, 592 U.S. at

51. In Tanzin, the Court cited examples of religious

harms that occur only once and therefore can be

redressed only through a monetary award. See id.

(citing cases concerning “destruction of religious

property” and “autopsy of son that violated Hmong

beliefs”). That need for monetary damages is

particularly acute for inmates. Even apart from onetime harms like those referenced in Tanzin, prisoners

often need damages to redress recurring violations.

That is because claims for prospective injunctive relief

in prisons and jails are frequently mooted by the

release or transfer of the plaintiff, see, e.g., Colvin v.

Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010), or by

changes in institutional policy, cf., e.g., Rich v. Sec’y,

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 716 F.3d 525, 532 (11th Cir. 2013).

Because “opportunities for injunctive relief will

frequently be fleeting” for inmates, “damages are even

more ‘appropriate’ than they otherwise would be.”

Barnett, 129 F.4th at 540. The availability of at least

nominal damages allows otherwise meritorious

religious-liberty claims to proceed even when the

possibility for injunctive relief becomes moot.

Before Smith, the Courts of Appeals regularly

permitted prisoners to seek damages under § 1983

against prisons that denied access to religious

services—even after transfers or releases mooted their

claims for injunctive relief. For example, a Muslim

inmate denied access to prayer services was able to

seek damages after his release mooted his claim for

injunctive relief. Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567, 568

n.1, 568–70 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Patrick v. LeFevre,

745 F.2d 153, 156 n.2 (2d Cir. 1984) (damages claim

for prison’s refusal to recognize Nation of Islam as a

valid religion not mooted by prisoner’s transfer).

Similarly, a Nation-of-Islam prisoner could continue

his damages claim for a prison’s failure to

accommodate December Ramadan observance even

after he was transferred to another prison. Diaab v.

Green, 794 F.2d 685 (Table) (11th Cir. 1986)

(unpublished), appended to Saleem v. Evans, 866 F.2d

1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Beck v. Lynaugh,

842 F.2d 759, 761–62 (5th Cir. 1988) (free-exercise

damages claim live while injunctive relief moot);

Kauffman v. Johnston, 454 F.2d 264, 266 (3d Cir.

1972) (per curiam) (similar); United States ex rel.

Jones v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 147, 150 (3d Cir. 1971)

(same).

The ability to vindicate these rights even after

transfer or release not only offers a remedy to those

prisoners harmed, but the prospect of liability is also

an important catalyst for policy changes to ensure that

others will not be similarly aggrieved. For example,

prior to a RLUIPA suit, the Virginia Department of

Corrections provided religious items through the

commissary, including items related to Christianity,

Judaism, Islam, Sikhism, Odinism, and Wicca. Burke

v. Clarke, 842 F. App’x 828, 831 (4th Cir. 2021). But it

did not offer items related to Rastafarian worship, and

the Department’s list of approved religions specified

that Rastafarians, in particular, were required to

abide by grooming standards. Id. When a Rastafarian

inmate refused to cut his dreadlocks, he was consigned

to solitary confinement. Id. His requests for religious

items and holy day meals were summarily denied:

“Can’t. Don’t have any of this.” Id. at 832. Only after

that litigation, which ended in settlement, Virginia

now lists a Rastafarian crown in its list of approved

religious items. Va. Dep’t of Corr. Operating Proc.

841.3, attach. 6 (2023). It also has removed the

language specifically directing Rastafarian inmates to

follow the general grooming demands. Id. attach. 1.

Without damages, prisons can instead strategically

moot cases to evade merits decisions and ultimately

resist necessary policy corrections—or legal

accountability at all. For example, the Florida prison

system refused for years to provide kosher diets to pro

se litigants, but as soon as a prisoner acquired counsel,

it attempted to strategically moot a case by changing

its policy. See Rich v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 716

F.3d 525, 532 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Gardner v.

Riska, 444 F. App’x 353, 354 (11th Cir. 2011); Linehan

v. Crosby, 346 F. App’x 471, 472 (11th Cir. 2009). The

Texas prison system took a similar tack, litigating a

pro se kosher diet case to judgment while trying to

moot or settle a kosher diet case by a represented

prisoner. See Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just.,

703 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2012) (represented

plaintiff); Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 116 (5th

Cir. 2007) (pro se plaintiff). Prisons can also escape

liability for RLUIPA violations by releasing or

transferring inmates, strategically or otherwise. See,

e.g., Firewalker-Fields v. Lee, 58 F.4th 104, 113–14,

118 (4th Cir. 2023) (holding moot RLUIPA claim of a

Muslim prisoner denied Friday Prayer after transfer

because “[RLUIPA] only provides equitable relief”);

Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 287–89 (6th Cir. 2010)

(deeming case moot when prisoner was transferred

shortly after filing suit for denial of kosher diet);

Warner v. Patterson, 534 F. App’x 785, 788–89 (10th

Cir. 2013) (holding moot RLUIPA claims of an Odinist

prisoner denied religious items because he had been

released).5

Some prisoners spend years under offending

policies only to find that redress is unavailable.

Consider a Sikh prisoner who litigated a case against

New York prison officials for four years before he was

released from prison. Though the court had previously

ruled that the prisoner may succeed on his RLUIPA

claims at trial, it ultimately declared those claims

mooted by his eventual release. Singh v. Goord, No.

05-cv-9680, 2010 WL 1875653, at *1, *5 (S.D.N.Y.

Mar.

2010), report

and

recommendation

adopted, No. 05-cv-9680, 2010 WL 1903997 (S.D.N.Y.

May 10, 2010), aff’d sub nom. Singh v. Lynch, 460 F.

To be sure, courts have sometimes applied a mootness

exception when prisons voluntarily change policies or transfer a

prisoner. See, e.g., Rich, 716 F.3d at 532; Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d

492, 497–98 (4th Cir. 2014); Burke, 842 F. App’x at 835–36;

Lozano v. Collier, 98 F.4th 614, 620 n.2 (5th Cir. 2024). But these

exceptions are often narrowly applied and thus unavailable to

many prisoners. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1064–65

(9th Cir. 2012); Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 288–89 (4th

Cir. 2007). They are especially unlikely to apply to released

prisoners because the law operates on the assumption that they

will not reoffend and thus not again be subjected to the offending

conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. 381,

391 (2018). And because mootness exceptions are flexible, a court

may decline to invoke them for a variety of other reasons. Such

mechanisms thus offer little recourse for many prisoners and do

not obviate the need for damages remedies.

App’x 45 (2d Cir. 2012); Singh v. Goord, 520 F. Supp.

2d 487, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Even worse, a prison in

Michigan held a Christian prisoner under appalling

conditions in solitary confinement at least 23 hours a

day for nearly thirteen years without access to any of

the group religious services his faith required. Selby v.

Caruso, 734 F.3d 554, 556–57, 561 (6th Cir. 2013). But

eighteen months after he filed his pro se complaint,

the court declared the inmate’s RLUIPA claims moot

because officials had returned him back to the general

prison population, though no “significant event . . .

convinced prison officials to release” him. Id. at 558,

561; Selby v. Caruso, No. 2:09-cv-152, 2012 WL

7160402 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 16, 2012), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 2:09-cv-152, 2013 WL

623046 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 20, 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d

in part, 734 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Alvarez

v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012) (Native

American prisoner in RLUIPA litigation for eight

years before learning his claims mooted by his release

five years before final judgment). Prisoners serving

shorter sentences are even less likely to see their cases

to completion. And in jails, where the average length

of detention is just over one month, RLUIPA’s

protections are often entirely illusory without a

damages remedy. See Zhen Zeng, Bureau of Justice

Statistics, Jail Inmates in 2023—Statistical Tables

(Apr. 2025), http://bit.ly/3HDjVnt; see also, e.g., Owens

v. Schuette, No. 2:24-cv-10787, 2024 WL 4469086, at

*5–6, *8 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 10, 2024) (dismissing

RLUIPA claims for declaratory and injunctive relief

after inmate was transferred from county jail to state

facility to serve his sentence).

Inmates with religious dietary needs often suffer

acutely when their rights are not respected. Such

inmates face a “Hobson’s choice” between eating or

violating their faith. Norwood v. Strada, 249 F. App’x

269, 272 (3d Cir. 2007). Yet, despite the drastic harms

that result when religious inmates are not given

appropriate meals, prison officials all too often escape

liability without the possibility of monetary damages.

Consider an Orthodox Jewish prisoner in Maryland

who was refused a kosher diet and lost 30 pounds

because officials “told him that it was his choice not to

eat the [non-kosher] food.” Rendelman v. Rouse, 569

F.3d 182, 184–85 (4th Cir. 2009). Officials transferred

the prisoner, and his RLUIPA claims were thus

mooted. Id. at 187–89. Another inmate was likewise

refused a kosher diet but was released from prison

during litigation—so he, too, was barred from making

a RLUIPA claim. Quarles v. Thole, No. 20-cv-697, 2022

WL 425362, at *1, *3 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2022).

Similarly, a Muslim inmate was forced to cook pork in

violation of Islamic teaching or face disciplinary

action. Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th

Cir. 2015). Yet his RLUIPA claims were moot because

he had been released during the pendency of his

appeal. Id. at 1031, 1031 n.4.

For all these inmates—who suffered flagrant

violations of their beliefs—damages were not merely

“appropriate relief,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a), they were

the only relief.6 It “would be odd” to “construe

[RLUIPA] in a manner that prevents courts from

6 Some of these cases also presented First Amendment claims

for damages under § 1983 that were allowed to proceed. But such

claims cover a narrower set of violations, given the diminished

constitutional protections that exist under current free-exercise

jurisprudence. Limiting prisoners’ religious-liberty claims to this

narrower avenue under Smith would negate the entire point of

RLUIPA. See supra Part I.

awarding” the only relief possible in these cases.

Tanzin, 592 U.S. at 51. And it would be odder still to

construe the statute—which authorizes suits against

officials in both their official and individual

capacities—to eliminate the only form of relief that

would require Congress to allow suit against an officer

in his individual capacity in the first place. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-5(4)(A); see Tanzin, 592 U.S. at 47–48.

Individual-capacity suits, which are the only

mechanism to allow damages in many contexts, would

be wholly unnecessary if injunctive and declaratory

relief were all that is available. See, e.g., Wolfel v.

Morris, 972 F.2d 712, 718–19 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding

that a suit for damages under § 1983 must be brought

against state officer in his individual capacity but a

suit for injunctive relief may be maintained against

him in his official capacity).

Even nominal damages are important to this

remedial scheme. They would remedy violations of

“not easily quantifiable, nonpecuniary rights,” like

haircutting. Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279,

289 (2021). Nominal damages also “‘affec[t] the

behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff,’”

forcing prisons to take religious practices seriously. Id.

at 291 (alteration in original) (quoting Hewitt v.

Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987)). Indeed, damages in

any form ensure that prisoners may vindicate their

otherwise meritorious RLUIPA claims—and, in turn,

prevent

government

officials

from

escaping

accountability for even these egregious violations of

federal rights.

III. Damages are vital to protect religious

minorities in prisons and jails.

Damages under RLUIPA are vital to protect

religious minorities in particular. Just the possibility

of damages incentivizes prison officials to “err on the

side of protecting” rights. See Owen v. City of

Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980). Landor’s case

is but one vivid example of how underrepresented or

disfavored religious believers suffer without damages:

prison officials “literally thr[ew] in the trash” the

controlling Fifth Circuit “opinion holding that

Louisiana’s policy of cutting Rastafarians’ hair

violated [RLUIPA] before pinning Landor down and

shaving his head.” Landor v. La. Dep’t of Corr. & Pub.

Safety, 93 F.4th 259, 260 (5th Cir. 2024) (en banc)

(Clement, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en

banc). Only damages can deter such outrageous

conduct in the future.

A. Religious minorities are particularly

likely to suffer mistreatment in prisons

and jails.

Religious minorities disproportionately suffer

religious infringements in prison. They are—by

definition—a small percentage of total prison

populations. Given that reality, prison officials are

less likely to understand and respect religious

minorities’ beliefs and are often less motivated to

dedicate resources to accommodating them. Worse,

some officials betray skepticism or outright hostility

toward these beliefs and practices.

A 2018 analysis revealed that over half of all

prisoner decisions involved non-Christian religious

minorities. Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N. Busick,

Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An Empirical Study

of Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48 Seton Hall L.

Rev. 353, 376 (2018). That is so even though it is

estimated that only one-third of prisoners are nonChristian. See Religion in Prisons—A 50-State Survey

of Prison Chaplains, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Mar. 22, 2012),

https://bit.ly/3X8E5uU; see also U.S. Commission on

Civil Rights, Enforcing Religious Freedom in Prisons

86–87 & tbl. 2.6 (Apr. 2025), http://bit.ly/3UW7wy0.

Prison officials often fail to offer adequate

accommodations to these individuals because they are

simply unfamiliar with their faiths and their needs.

Take, for example, a prison that denied a Jewish

prisoner permission to form a three-person Torah

study group because, as it (mis)read Jewish law, a tenperson quorum was required. Ben-Levi v. Brown, 136

S. Ct. 930, 932, 934 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting from

denial of certiorari); see also Estes v. Clarke, No. 7:15cv-00155, 2018 WL 2709327, at *5–6 (W.D. Va. June

5, 2018) (prison defending its decision to deny an

Orthodox Jewish prisoner rabbinical supervision for

kosher meals on the grounds that it believed Orthodox

Judaism did not require it). A recent survey of federal

cases showed that Muslim prisoners likewise

routinely face opposition to their dietary restrictions,

prayer, and Ramadan observance. See Muslim

Advocates, Fulfilling the Promise of Free Exercise for

All: Muslim Prisoner Accommodation in State Prisons

47–48 (July 2019), https://bit.ly/4aJoXY0. Or consider

Walker v. Baldwin, where prison officials forcibly cut

a Rastafarian’s dreadlocks, claiming that they had

“never heard of Rastafarianism, and they were

unfamiliar with Rastafarian beliefs and practices.”

No. 3:19-cv-50233, 2022 WL 2356430, at *2 (N.D. Ill.

June 30, 2022), aff’d, 74 F.4th 878 (7th Cir. 2023).

Other prison policies betray a similar ignorance.

Some policies are simply too generic, lacking much

guidance on what accommodations might be requested

and how they should be handled. See, e.g., Miss. Dep’t

Corr.,

Inmate

Handbook

(2023),

https://bit.ly/3RyqLwj

(listing

religious

accommodations for diet, grooming requirements, or

authorized personal property); City of N.Y. Dep’t of

Corr., Directive 3261, app’x A (Sept. 10, 2012),

https://bit.ly/4bJdQzl (listing few approved items in its

RLUIPA guidance). And policies often have gaps in

guidance specifically related to minority faiths. See,

e.g., S.C. Dep’t of Corr. Policy PS-10.05 (2015) & OP22.13 (2006) (offering Rastafarians no religious

exceptions to the grooming policies); Ga. Dep’t of Corr.

Pol’ys & Procs. 106.08 (2020), 106.12 (2022), 106.13

(2012) (offering special guidelines regarding Islam,

Wicca, and Native American spirituality, but no other

religions); Okla. Dep’t of Corr. Pol’ys & Procs. OP030112, attach. B (2022) (not specifically listing any

approved Hindu spiritual items); N.Y. Corr. Cmty.

Supervision Directive No. 4202, at 12 (May 11, 2023)

(offering only a “Kosher Diet as an alternative

religious meal option for multiple religions”). These

gaps make it more likely that prisoners will face

resistance in receiving accommodations. For example,

while a prison in Illinois admitted some exceptions to

its dreadlocks ban, a member of the African Hebrew

Israelites of Jerusalem was forced to cut his religious

dreadlocks. See Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450,

451–52 (7th Cir. 2012). Likewise, a Wisconsin prison

policy did not list prayer oil as an approved item for

Muslim inmates, so the prison wrongfully denied a

Muslim prisoner’s request for it. Charles v. Verhagen,

348 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2003).

Prisons also lack motivation to improve policies

that fail to accommodate less-common religious

traditions because they may rarely detain a prisoner

of that faith. For instance, when New York’s guidance

did “not address the Sikh faith given the relatively low

number of Sikhs incarcerated to date,” a prison denied

the Sikh prisoner a number of accommodations.

Singh, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 508.7

Prisons likewise fail to dedicate resources to

accommodate religious minorities because of cost and

other administrative concerns. For example, a prison

in Texas wrongfully denied a Muslim prisoner

permission to wear a kufi at all times, arguing that

otherwise “every Muslim inmate will wear a kufi.” Ali

v. Stephens, 822 F.3d 776, 796 (5th Cir. 2016); cf.

Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 435–36 (dismissing this “classic

rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history”).

Similarly, an Orthodox Jewish prisoner in Virginia

was improperly denied kosher meals with rabbinical

supervision because the prison argued that it would be

cost-prohibitive. Estes, 2018 WL 2709327, at *6–7; see

United States v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d

1341, 1349 (11th Cir. 2016) (denial of kosher meals for

cost-containment); see also Cotton v. Cate, 578 F. App’x

7 Prison officials are less likely to respect religious practices

when prison policies do not expressly account for them. But even

when prison policies mandate certain accommodations, prisoners

may still not receive them. See, e.g., Robbins v. Robertson, 782 F.

App’x 794, 797 (11th Cir. 2019) (involving an inmate’s claim that

prison officials “failed to observe its own regulations” regarding

food service, leaving him undernourished); Sutton v. City of

Philadelphia, 21 F. Supp. 3d 474, 478, 481 (E.D. Pa. 2014)

(holding moot claims for injunctive and declaratory relief where

an inmate was denied the vegetarian meals that aligned with his

religious practice, although the prison policy offered it).

712, 714 (9th Cir. 2014) (denial of Kemetic diet to

Shetaut Neter practitioner to maintain “simple food

service”).

Worse, religious minorities may face skepticism,

discrimination, or outright hostility because their

practices are not as well-known or readily accepted as

those of other religions. For example, a Texas prison

denied a Native American prisoner permission to

possess locks of his deceased parents’ hair for religious

reasons out of fear that the “privilege of receiving

something other inmates are not allowed” could “breed

animosity” with other prisoners. Chance v. Tex. Dep’t

of Crim. Just., 730 F.3d 404, 418 (5th Cir. 2013).

Another denied an Odinist prisoner the ability to

study runestones because they “could be used to

gamble, pass secret messages, and identify gang

members.” Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 529

F.3d 599, 616 (5th Cir. 2008). In both cases, the Fifth

Circuit called into doubt prisons’ purported security

justifications. See Chance, 730 F.3d at 418; Mayfield,

529 F.3d at 616. The Seventh Circuit has likewise

rejected similar arguments that minority religious

symbols could be mistaken for gang signs. See Knowles

v. Pfister, 829 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 2016) (Wiccan

pentacle); Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362, 366 (7th

Cir. 2015) (Native American headband).

In one striking example, prison officials in Nevada

prevented a Muslim inmate from using scented oil for

prayer because they believed it was “not really that

important to his worship practice,” although they

allowed nonreligious scented items. Johnson v. Baker,

23 F.4th 1209, 1213–15 (9th Cir. 2022). In New Jersey,

prison officials trampled a Sikh inmate’s holy turban,

smeared it with spilled paint, and threw it away.

Singh v. United States, No. 1:24-cv-06027, ECF 1

(D.N.J. filed May 10, 2024). In New York, prison

officials imposed limitations on a Sikh inmate wearing

a kara, a steel bracelet his faith required him to wear,

for fear it could be used as a weapon—even though the

prison’s own captain of security testified that it posed

“no more of a security risk than a metal crucifix, which

is allowed by the prison.” Singh, 520 F. Supp. 2d at

500. That same prison also denied the Sikh inmate a

proper-sized cloth for his religiously mandated turban

even though prisoners were permitted other, larger

sheets and religious materials. Id. at 502. In Ohio,

prison officials refused to allow Muslim prisoners to

gather congregationally during Ramadan, even

though Christians were permitted to congregate for

communion and other services. Heyward v. Cooper, 88

F.4th 648, 660 (6th Cir. 2023); see also Wall, 741 F.3d

at 494 (prison policy required Muslim inmates to

“provide some physical indicia of Islamic faith” to

participate in Ramadan).

All told, many prisons are unaware of minority

religious practices, lack guidance that addresses

them, and sometimes flatly challenge religions with

which government officials are less familiar—or

perhaps less comfortable. This uniquely threatens

religious minorities in prisons. To be sure, prisons are

not expected to have comprehensive knowledge of

every religious practice. But religious minorities

disproportionately face challenges that majority

religious adherents do not.

B. Injunctive relief is insufficient to protect

religious minorities’ exercise.

Injunctive relief is plainly insufficient to remedy

the unique violations that incarcerated religious

minorities face. These individuals are less able than

members of majority religions to rely on class actions

that avoid mootness. And they often suffer profound

harms that happen too quickly for injunctive relief in

an individual case. So courts seldom have the

opportunity to issue binding guidance on what

RLUIPA requires for these faiths.

Religious minorities are particularly susceptible to

gamesmanship because few coreligionists may be

incarcerated in a given prison at the same time. This

lack of numerosity precludes class actions, which can

keep prison litigation live even when all the named

plaintiffs’ claims have become moot. See, e.g., Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 523, 526 n.5 (1979) (holding

that a conditions-of-confinement class action

remained live notwithstanding that all the named

plaintiffs were transferred or released). Because class

actions are permitted “only” when “the class is so

numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), the smaller a

religion is, the less likely its adherents are to be able

to avail themselves of class actions to vindicate their

rights. See, e.g., Alvarez, 667 F.3d at 1064 (holding

RLUIPA claim moot because an inmate’s release from

prison generally moots injunctive and declaratory

relief claims “unless the suit has been certified as a

class action” (cleaned up)).

Moreover, some grave violations of minority

prisoners’ religious tenets are too swift for injunctions

to prevent. For example, prison officials in Arizona

forcibly restrained a Sikh prisoner and shaved his

beard over his objection. See Sikh Coalition,

Complaint to the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil

Rights Division re: Surjit Singh (May 24, 2021),

https://bit.ly/4bL80hc. He had never before cut his

beard in any way, and the forced shaving “caused him

deep shame and mental trauma, including severe

depression.” Id. at 2. Sikh prisoners routinely face

these harms.8 Similarly, a prison warden in Colorado

refused to accommodate an Orthodox Jewish prisoner

who needed to leave the prison premises for surgery.

See Boles v. Neet, 486 F.3d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).

The inmate asked to bring his yarmulke and tallit

katan because his faith forbids him from walking more

than four cubits during daylight hours with his head

uncovered and not wearing certain religious

garments. Id. at 1179 n.2. The official denied the

request, and the inmate delayed surgery rather than

violate his beliefs. Id. at 1179. Without damages, there

is often no redress at all for these abrupt and serious

injuries.

Landor’s case is a particularly shocking example of

RLUIPA’s inadequacy without damages. As Judge

Clement highlighted, Landor’s complaint could hardly

allege a more obvious RLUIPA violation, yet Landor

had no opportunity to seek an injunction. Landor, 93

F.4th at 260 (Clement, J., concurring). Without

damages, Landor cannot vindicate this egregious

violation of his rights—and the Louisiana Department

of Public Safety and Corrections has little incentive to

See, e.g., Sikh Coalition, Urgent Action Requested: Save

Satnam Singh’s Hair from Being Forcibly Cut (Apr. 1,

2006), https://bit.ly/3V4QwFq (Sikh prisoner with no disciplinary

record forced to cut beard); Sikh Coalition, Legal Victory: Sikh

Prisoners

Can

Maintain

Kesh

(June

10,

2011),

https://bit.ly/4e7r9Lw (Sikh inmate received multiple sanctions

for keeping beard); Sikh Activists Upset over Inmate’s

Haircut, ABC News (Oct. 6, 2008), https://bit.ly/3V4KB2V (Sikh

prisoner repeatedly forced to cut beard).

change its ways. This perverse result cannot be what

Congress meant when it passed RLUIPA.

Like Landor, many inmates of minority faiths

suffer injustices that injunctions and declaratory

relief simply cannot remedy. Damages are necessary

to protect them from prisons’ mistreatment and

disregard.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, amici curiae urge the

Court to reverse.

Respectfully submitted,

John A. Meiser

Meredith H. Kessler

Counsel of Record

Domenic Canonico

LINDSAY & MATT MOROUN

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLINIC

Notre Dame Law School

1338 Biolchini Hall of Law

Notre Dame, IN 46556

(574) 631-8722

mhollan4@nd.edu

Counsel for Amici Curiae

September 3, 2025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.