Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Charles R. Hays, Petitioner v. United States

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPENDIX A: Opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

(Jan. 12, 2024) ......................................................... 1a

APPENDIX B: Opinion of the United States

District Court for the Central District of

Illinois (Sept. 10, 2021) ........................................... 7a

APPENDIX C: Judgment of the United States

District Court for the Central District of

Illinois (Sept. 10, 2021) ......................................... 21a

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APPENDIX A

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

_________________

No. 22-3294

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHARLES R. HAYS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 3:20-cr-30021 — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.

_________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 6, 2023 – DECIDED

JANUARY 12, 2024

_________________

Before FLAUM, SCUDDER, and KIRSCH, Circuit

Judges.

KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. After stopping the car

Charles Hays was driving, officers observed Hays’s

passenger possessing methamphetamine and a

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smoking pipe. Officers searched the car’s interior,

finding a screwdriver in the center console but no

drugs. An officer then searched under the car’s hood

and found methamphetamine in the air filter. The

only issue on appeal is whether the officers had

probable cause to search under the car’s hood,

including inside the air filter. Because the automobile

exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant

requirement authorizes officers to search a car

without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe

it contains contraband, including all parts of the car in

which there is a fair probability contraband could be

concealed, we conclude they did.

I

The following facts are not in dispute. In October

2019, Illinois State Police (ISP) Inspector Evert Nation

received information that a male subject known as

“Chuck” was distributing methamphetamine in

Christian County, Illinois. That same month, ISP

agents were surveilling a suspected drug trafficking

location in Christian County and observed a man

driving a silver Cadillac arrive at the location. The

agents determined that the car was registered to

Brenda Berger, and the driver, Charles Hays, was her

son.

On October 15, 2019, Inspector Nation spotted the

Cadillac traveling toward Taylorville, Illinois, and

noticed that the vehicle did not have working

taillights. Inspector Nation notified the Taylorville

police chief, Dwayne Wheeler, of his observation.

Chief Wheeler located the Cadillac and, after noticing

its illegal tints and observing it cross the center lane

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twice, initiated a traffic stop with help from Officer

Jeremy Alwerdt.

During the stop, the officers identified the driver as

Hays, and Officer Alwerdt recognized the passenger,

Tamera Wisnasky, from previous encounters and

knew she had an outstanding arrest warrant. When

questioned, Wisnasky falsely identified herself as

Kayla. Officer Alwerdt noticed that Wisnasky was

attempting to conceal something in her right hand,

which he recognized as a glass pipe used to smoke

methamphetamine. Officer Alwerdt then went to grab

Wisnasky’s hands, at which time he observed her

shove something in her mouth. At Officer Alwerdt’s

demand, Wisnasky spit out the object, and he

identified it as a plastic container carrying suspected

methamphetamine.

Wisnasky was consequently

arrested. Meanwhile, Chief Wheeler directed Hays to

get out of the car. During questioning, Hays looked

nervous, falsely identified Wisnasky as Kayla, and

stated that he had been arrested before and gone to

prison for drug possession.

At that point, the officers decided to search the

Cadillac. The officers did not find contraband inside

the passenger compartment but spotted a screwdriver

in the center console, which they knew could be used

to hide drugs in traps within vehicles. An officer then

searched under the hood, including inside the air filter

(a screwdriver is used to open the air filter housing

box). In the air filter housing, he found a bag

containing methamphetamine.

Following indictment, Hays moved to suppress the

evidence obtained during the traffic stop, which the

district court denied.

Hays pleaded guilty to

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possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or

more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), reserving his right to appeal

the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

On appeal, Hays argues that the officers did not have

probable cause to search under the hood and in the air

filter.

II

We review the district court’s probable cause

determination de novo. United States v. Williams, 627

F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 2010).

Under the automobile exception to the Fourth

Amendment’s warrant requirement, officers may

conduct “a warrantless search of a vehicle … so long

as there is probable cause to believe it contains

contraband or evidence of illegal activity.” United

States v. Washburn, 383 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2004)

(citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–56

(1925)). It is well settled that officers can search a car

without a warrant where there is probable cause to

believe that illegal substances are present. See, e.g.,

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300–02 (1999)

(holding that officers could conduct a warrantless

search of a car where they “had probable cause to

believe there were illegal drugs in the car”); United

States v. Johnson, 383 F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 2004)

(finding probable cause to search a car, including the

trunk, without a warrant where the officer discovered

a controlled substance which had fallen out of the

defendant’s hat). During the traffic stop, officers saw

Wisnasky in possession of a pipe for smoking

methamphetamine and methamphetamine itself, and

officers knew that Hays was recently seen at a known

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drug trafficking location. True, as Hays argues, the

officers observed Hays’s passenger, rather than Hays

himself, with methamphetamine. But we previously

held that under the automobile exception, an officer

had the authority to conduct a warrantless search of a

car when he discovered the passenger in possession of

contraband. United States v. McGuire, 957 F.2d 310,

314 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Once Trooper Newman

discovered that [the passenger] was transporting

open, alcoholic liquor … he had probable cause to

believe that the car contained additional contraband

or evidence.”); see Houghton, 526 U.S. at 304–05

(rejecting a driver/passenger distinction and noting

that a vehicle’s driver and passenger “will often be

engaged in a common enterprise … and have the same

interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their

wrongdoing”). Thus, the officers had probable cause to

search the car’s interior.

Further, officers may search all containers within a

car “where they have probable cause to believe

contraband or evidence is contained.” California v.

Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991). In other words, “[i]f

probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully

stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of

the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object

of the search[,]” Houghton, 526 U.S. at 301 (quotation

omitted) (emphasis in the original), “including closed

compartments, containers, packages, and trunks,”

Williams, 627 F.3d at 251. To justify probable cause

for a search, “[a]ll that is required is a fair probability

of discovering contraband.” Id. at 252. This is true

“without qualification as to ownership” of the

containers searched. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 301. Once

the officers began searching the car’s interior, they

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discovered a screwdriver in the center console but

nothing else to suggest that the screwdriver was a tool

of Hays’s trade. Based on their experience, the officers

knew that the screwdriver could have been used to

hide methamphetamine in the vehicle.

Thus,

considering the circumstances leading up to and

during the stop “viewed from the position of a

reasonable police officer,” United States v. Hines, 449

F.3d 808, 815 n.7 (7th Cir. 2006), the officers

reasonably found a fair probability that the area under

the hood, including the air filter, could contain

methamphetamine. See United States v. Eymann, 962

F.3d 273, 286 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Probable cause to

search a vehicle exists ‘if, given the totality of the

circumstances, there is a fair probability that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a

particular place.’”) (quotation omitted); see also United

States v. Patterson, 65 F.3d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1995)

(finding probable cause to search behind a vehicle’s

tailgate panel where officers observed missing screws

from the tailgate interior and a drug-sniffing dog

alerted to the odor of drugs).

AFFIRMED

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APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHARLES HAYS,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

) Case No. 20-cr) 30021

)

)

)

OPINION

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:

Before the Court is Defendant Charles Hays’ Motion

to Suppress (d/e 33). Hays seeks to exclude all

evidence resulting from a traffic stop conducted on

October 15, 2019. Hays argues that evidence seized

from a search of his entire vehicle must be suppressed

because the initial traffic stop was unlawful, the stop

was unreasonably prolonged, and the subsequent

warrantless search of the vehicle was unlawful. For

the reasons below, the Court DENIES Hays’ motion.

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I.

BACKGROUND 1

On October 15, 2019, law enforcement with the

Central Illinois Enforcement Group had been

conducting a drug investigation in Christian County,

Illinois. Agents had received information regarding a

male subject from Centralia, Illinois, named “Chuck”

that had been supplying methamphetamine in the

Christian County, Illinois area. Agents were

conducting surveillance on a suspected drug target

location, when they observed a Silver Cadillac arrive

at the location with Illinois registration BK92409. A

male suspect exited the vehicle. After determining

that the vehicle was registered to Brenda Berger,

agents checked Brenda Berger’s Facebook page and

were able to determine that the male suspect was

Charles (“Chuck”) Hays, Brenda Berger’s son.

At approximately 6:02 p.m. on October 15, 2021,

Inspector Jeff Brown contacted Illinois State Police

(ISP) Inspector Evert Nation and told him that the

same Cadillac was just seen at a suspected drug target

location in Pana, Illinois. Inspector Brown and

Inspector Nation went to conduct surveillance at that

location. At approximately 6:15 p.m., while Inspector

Nation was on his way to Pana, Illinois, he observed a

Silver Cadillac and identified it as the target vehicle.

In his report, Inspector Nation states that he noted

that the vehicle did not have any working tail lights at

The Court relies on the law enforcement reports filed in docket

entry 37, as well as the parties’ briefs for the relevant facts. The

majority of the facts taken from these reports appears

undisputed, but the Court notes where Hays may contest the

underlying facts.

1

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that time. However, Hays’ Motion, he notes that the

video evidence does not show that his tail lights were

off. The parties agree that the vehicle’s headlights and

tail lights were turned on by the time of the traffic stop

described below.

Inspector Nation contacted Taylorville Police Chief

Dwayne Wheeler and told him about the vehicle and

the equipment violation he had observed (no tail

lights). Inspector Nation advised Chief Wheeler that

he should pull the vehicle over for any traffic

violations. Inspector Nation also either told K9 Officer

Alwerdt to be on standby or advised Chief Wheeler

that K9 Officer Alwerdt was on standby.

Shortly thereafter, Chief Wheeler got behind the

Silver Cadillac as it drove down the road. Chief

Wheeler’s report states that he noticed that the vehicle

had illegal tints on the side-windows and that he saw

the Silver Cadillac cross the center line twice. Again,

as noted by Hays, this alleged traffic violation did not

occur while the dash camera was recording. Chief

Wheeler notified Inspector Nation of the traffic

violations and told Inspector Nation that he would

stop the vehicle. Chief Wheeler activated his lights,

which also activated Chief Wheeler’s dash camera.

Chief Wheeler pulled over the Silver Cadillac in a

Family Video store parking lot. Officer Alwerdt pulled

into the parking lot as well.

Chief Wheeler approached the driver’s side, and

Officer Alwerdt approached the passenger side. The

driver was identified as Hays. Chief Wheeler advised

Hays about the tints on his vehicle and asked for his

driver’s license and insurance. Chief Wheeler ran

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Hays’ driver’s license and found that the license was

valid and clear.

Meanwhile, Officer Alwerdt identified the female

passenger as Tamera Wisnasky. Officer Alwerdt knew

Ms. Wisnasky from previous law enforcement contact

and knew that there was an outstanding warrant for

her arrest. When Officer Alwerdt asked Ms. Wisnasky

for her name, she provided the false name of “Kayla.”

Officer Alwerdt asked her to get out the vehicle and

noticed her right hand was attempting to conceal

something. He asked Ms. Wisnasky to show him her

hands, but she refused. Officer Alwerdt then grabbed

Mr. Wisnasky’s right hand and found a blue glass pipe

used to smoke methamphetamine. When Officer

Alwerdt went to grab Ms. Wisnasky’s left hand, she

shoved something in her mouth. Officer Alwerdt then

grabbed her jaw and told her to spit it out. She then

spit out a greenish-clear plastic case. Inside the case

was a crystal like substance suspected to be

methamphetamine.

The substance field-tested

positive for methamphetamine, with a weight of

approximately 2.9 grams. Ms. Wisnasky was put in

handcuffs and placed in the back of a squad car.

Chief Wheeler asked Hays to get out of the vehicle,

and he was placed in handcuffs. The report indicates

that he was not under arrest, but just detained “due to

the circumstances.” Hays’ Motion states that Chief

Wheeler said “I’m just detaining you because of what’s

going on right now, ok?” Motion at 2 (d/e 33). Chief

Wheeler asked Hays to tell him the female passenger’s

name. Hays also gave the false name “Kayla” for Ms.

Wisnasky and stated that he was just dropping her off.

Chief Wheeler then asked if Hays had ever been

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arrested, to which Hays stated he had been arrested

for possession and he went to prison.

Law enforcement then proceeded to search the

vehicle. One officer found a screw driver in the center

console of the passenger compartment. An officer

asked Hays whether anything was in the car. Hays

answered no and also stated repeatedly that it was not

his car. Law enforcement found no contraband inside

the passenger compartment of the vehicle, but, after

opening the hood of the vehicle, found a zip-lock bag

inside the air filter that contained a white crystal-like

substance suspected to be methamphetamine. The

substance tested positive for methamphetamine,

weighing approximately 62.3 grams.

Hays’ Motion also highlights additional dialogue

during the search that was captured by the dashcamera footage but was not in the reports. During the

search of the passenger compartment, Officer Alwerdt

states that, if they do not find anything on the first

search, then they will impound it. Chief Wheeler asks

Officer Alwerdt “Do you want to have your dog go

around?” Officer Alwerdt says “No, we already found

it,” presumably referring to the methamphetamine

found on Ms. Wisnasky. Overall, from the start of the

traffic stop until the methamphetamine was found in

the air filter, approximately 40 minutes passed.

After the stop was complete, Hays was released

pending further investigation. On March 4, 2020, a

federal grand jury charged Defendant with, on or

about October 15, 2019, knowingly and intentionally

possessing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine

with the intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (Count One); on or about November

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27, 2019, knowingly and intentionally possessing 5

grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to

distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §

841(b)(1)(B)(viii) (Count Two); and on or about

November 27, 2019, knowingly and intentionally

possessing a firearm in furtherance of the drug

trafficking crime charged in Count Two, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Count Three). Indictment

(d/e 7).

On August 17, 2021, Hays filed this Motion to

Suppress (d/e 33), in which Hays seeks to suppress the

drugs at issue in Count One of the Indictment. The

Government filed its response in opposition on August

19, 2021.

II.

ANALYSIS

Hays argues that the evidence from the October 15,

2019 traffic stop should be suppressed because it was

the result of an illegal traffic stop, the warrantless

search of the vehicle was unlawful, and the stop was

unreasonably prolonged. However, the Court finds

that the initial traffic stop was lawful, and, even if it

was not lawful, Ms. Wisnasky’s outstanding arrest

warrant qualified as intervening circumstances.

Further, the Court finds that the later warrantless

search of the vehicle was justified under the

automobile exception. Hays’ remaining arguments

are irrelevant to the evidence recovered in the search.

A.

The Initial Traffic Stop was Lawful and,

Even if it Had Been Unlawful,

Intervening Circumstances Justified the

Stop and Subsequent Search.

A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is a

“seizure” of the occupants of the vehicle and, therefore,

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must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth

Amendment. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60,

135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (citing Brendlin v.

California, 551 U.S. 249, 255–259, 127 S.Ct. 2400

(2007)). An officer only needs “reasonable suspicion”

that the person being stopped has broken the law. Id.

A traffic stop is also lawful if the officer has probable

cause to believe a traffic violation occurred. Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10, 116 S.Ct. 1769

(1996) (affirming trial court’s finding of probable cause

for traffic stop, regardless of officer’s subjective

motivation, where defendant’s truck was stopped at

stop sign for an unusually long time before turning

suddenly without signal and driving off at an

unreasonable speed). “Probable cause exists when ‘the

circumstances confronting a police officer support the

reasonable belief that a driver has committed even a

minor traffic offense.’” United States v. Simon, 937

F.3d 820, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S.

Ct. 824 (2020) (quoting United States v. Cashman, 216

F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2000)). The officer’s subjective

motivation for making the stop is irrelevant to the

Fourth Amendment analysis. Simon, 937 F.3d at 829;

see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.

Here, Chief Wheeler’s report indicates that he

conducted a lawful traffic stop based on his reasonable

suspicion and/or probable cause to believe that Hays

had committed the traffic violations of operating a

vehicle without the required use of headlights and tail

lights, see 625 ILCS 5/12-201(b) (requiring use of

headlights and tail lights “during the period from

sunset to sunrise, . . . and at any other times when,

due to insufficient light or unfavorable atmospheric

conditions, persons and vehicles on the highway are

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not clearly discernible at a distance of 1000 feet.”) 2;

improper lane usage, see 625 ILCS 5/11-709(a) (“A

vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely

within a single lane and shall not be moved from such

lane until the driver has first ascertained that such

movement can be made with safety.”); and illegallytinted side windows, see 625 ILCS 5/12-503(a-5)

(prohibiting window tinting on windows immediately

adjacent to the driver with certain exceptions).

Hays argues that the dash camera footage shows

that one can see through the back window of Hays’

vehicle. Accordingly, Hays does not believe it was

likely that the windows were illegally tinted. The

report, however, only mentions the side-windows as

being potentially illegally tinted, so this point is

irrelevant. Hays’ Motion also argues that the dash

camera footage does not show any traffic violations.

However, the report indicates that the dash camera

was turned on after the violations were observed.

Assuming the officer’s accounts of the observed traffic

violations are credible—which Hays does not clearly

challenge in his motion—there was probable cause to

pull Hays over for committing the traffic violations.

Even if the initial traffic stop was unlawful, the

“evidence seized as a result of [an] unlawful traffic

stop may be introduced into evidence at trial if

intervening circumstances establish that the evidence

came about without ‘exploitation of that illegality

[and] instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to

Sunset on October 15, 2019 occurred at 6:21:15 p.m. See Gov’t

Resp. at 4 (d/e 36) (citing https://sunrisesunset.org/us/springfieldil/2019/10).

2

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be purged of the primary taint.’” United States v.

Johnson, 383 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting

United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 520 (7th Cir.

1997)). Courts are required to examine “three factors

when determining whether sufficient attenuation

exists to dissipate the initial taint of unlawful police

conduct: (1) the time elapsed between the illegality

and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the presence of

intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and

flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Johnson, 383

F.3d at 544 (citations omitted).

Here, during the traffic stop, Officer Alwerdt

recognized the passenger, Ms. Wisnasky, as someone

with an outstanding criminal warrant. The Seventh

Circuit has found that “in the unusual case where the

police, after a questionable stop, discover an occupant

is wanted on an arrest warrant” the intervening

circumstances exception may apply. Green, 111 F.3d

at 523. In Green, the police stopped a vehicle after it

had come from a residence of an individual wanted on

a federal warrant. Id. at 517. Officers believed that

the occupants of the vehicle might have knowledge of

the whereabouts of the wanted individual, but the

Seventh Circuit found that this did not amount to

reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. Id. However,

during the course of the stop, the officers discovered

that the passenger of the vehicle had an outstanding

warrant. Id. After arresting the passenger, the

vehicle was searched incident to arrest and crack

cocaine was found in two separate bags in the

passenger compartment of the vehicle. Id. Despite the

lack of reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, the

Seventh Circuit found the subsequent search lawful

due to the discovery of the outstanding arrest warrant

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of the passenger: “It would be startling to suggest that

because the police illegally stopped an automobile,

they cannot arrest an occupant who is found to be

wanted on a warrant—in a sense requiring an official

call of ‘Olly, Olly, Oxen Free.’ Because the arrest is

lawful, a search incident to the arrest is also lawful.”

Id. at 521; see also Johnson, 383 F.3d at 544 (agreeing

with defendant’s concession that once law enforcement

identified defendant as a person known to the officer

to have an outstanding arrest warrant, the officer had

probable cause to arrest him independent of the

circumstances of the initial stop). Like Green, the

subsequent identification of Ms. Wisnasky as someone

with an outstanding arrest warrant justified the stop

and the search.

B.

The Warrantless Search of the Entire

Vehicle Was Authorized Under the

Automobile Exception.

“Although warrantless searches are generally per se

unreasonable, they are subject to ‘a few specifically

established and well-delineated exceptions.’” United

States v. Reedy, 989 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 2021)

(citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S. Ct.

1710 (2009)). One exception to warrantless searches

applies when an occupant of the vehicle is arrested:

“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent

occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within

reaching distance of the passenger compartment at

the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the

vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”

Gant, 556 U.S. 332 at 351. Additionally, under the

“automobile exception,” “[t]he police do not need a

warrant to search a vehicle when they have probable

cause to believe it contains evidence of criminal

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activity.” Edwards, 769 F.3d at 514 (internal citations

omitted). Probable cause is a low standard and exists

when, “based on the known facts and circumstances, a

reasonably prudent person would believe that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the

place to be searched.” United States v. Richards, 719

F.3d 746, 754–55 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). A

“fair probability of discovering contraband” is enough.

Id. at 755.

Here, the area under the hood of the vehicle was

certainly beyond Ms. Wisnasky’s reach. However, Ms.

Wisnasky was arrested for possessing drugs and it was

reasonable to believe the vehicle contained evidence of

the offense of arrest. Moreover, the Court finds that

the search was justified under the automobile

exception because law enforcement had probable

cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of

criminal activity. Ms. Wisnasky, a passenger in Hays’

vehicle, was arrested and found to be in possession of

2.9 grams of methamphetamine and a blue glass pipe

used to smoke methamphetamine. Possession of these

items—along with knowledge that the car had just

been at a suspected drug target location, that Ms.

Wisnasky was wanted on an outstanding warrant for

drug possession, that Ms. Wisnasky had given a fake

name, and that Hays had a criminal conviction for

drug possession—gave officers probable cause to

believe that a drug crime had been or was being

committed and that evidence of the criminal activity

would be in the vehicle.

Moreover, law enforcement was authorized to

search the entire car for evidence of the crime because

there was probable cause to believe that evidence of

the drug crime could be found anywhere in the car.

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See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 F.3d 538, 545–

46 (7th Cir. 2004) (law enforcement officer’s “discovery

of a banned substance (drugs) on Johnson’s person

clearly provided him with probable cause to search the

trunk of the vehicle, including any containers (i.e., the

briefcase) therein, since the officer had a reasonable

basis for believing that more drugs or other illegal

contraband may have been concealed inside.”); United

States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2173

(1982) (“We hold that the scope of the warrantless

search authorized by [the automobile] exception is no

broader and no narrower than a magistrate could

legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable cause

justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it

justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its

contents that may conceal the object of the search.”).

The Court also notes that Officer Wheeler’s report

states that a screw driver was found during the search

of the passenger compartment. Alone, the presence of

the screw driver would not have provided any probable

cause for a search. But, combined with the evidence of

criminal activity that the officers already had, the

presence of a screw driver in the passenger

compartment further bolstered law enforcement’s

probable cause to search under the hood of the vehicle.

This is because it gave them further reason to believe

that evidence of a drug crime may be hidden not just

within the passenger compartment, but also under the

hood of the car in a place only accessible by using a

screw driver. Finally, Hays does not dispute that once

officers discovered additional methamphetamine

under the hood of the vehicle, they had probable cause

to arrest Hays, the driver. See, e.g., Maryland v.

Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 373 (2003).

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Hays’ motion argues he was de facto arrested during

the search of the car and that the search cannot be

justified as a search incident to his de facto arrest

because the officers did not have reason to believe that

the vehicle contained evidence of his alleged traffic

violations. While it may be true that searching the car

for evidence of the traffic violations would not have

been lawful, this argument is also irrelevant in light

of the probable cause to search the car for evidence of

criminal activity relating to drug crimes. Similarly,

Hays’ argument that the traffic stop was unreasonably

prolonged ignores the intervening events—including

the outstanding arrest warrant for Ms. Wisnasky and

the discovery of drugs in his passenger’s possession—

that justified extending the stop and conducting the

search. See also, United States v. Walden, 146 F.3d

487, 490 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that officers were

justified in prolonging the traffic stop to investigate

illegal activity other than that activity for which the

car was stopped when they had “reasonable suspicion

that the occupants of [the] vehicle [were] engaged in

other illegal activity”). And, even if law enforcement

was not justified in detaining Hays during the search

of the car, nothing was found on Hays’ person or as a

result of his detention prior to his later lawful arrest

upon finding the methamphetamine in the air filter of

his vehicle. Accordingly, the Court finds that the

warrantless search of the car was permissible under

the automobile exception. Therefore, the evidence

obtained as a result of the search is admissible.

C.

Hays’ Request for

Hearing is Denied.

an

Evidentiary

“A defendant who requests a suppression hearing

must present definite, specific, detailed, and

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nonconjectural facts . . . demonstrating that there is a

disputed material issue of fact.” United States v.

Clark, 935 F.3d 558, 568 (7th Cir. 2019) (internal

citations omitted). “Reliance on vague, conclusory

allegations is insufficient.” Id. The facts in this matter

are largely uncontested. Hays only raises vague

allegations regarding whether the initial traffic stop

was justified. Further, as explained above, the search

of the vehicle was lawful due to intervening

circumstances even if Hays had not committed any

traffic violations. Accordingly, the Court finds that no

material disputed issues of fact exist and the request

for an evidentiary hearing is denied.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Defendant Charles Hays’

Motion to Suppress (d/e 33) is DENIED.

ENTERED: September 8, 2021.

FOR THE COURT:

s/ Sue E. Myerscough__

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE

21a

APPENDIX C

FILED

DEC 16 2022

CLERK OF THE COURT

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF

ILLINOIS

AO 245B (Rev. 09/17)

Judgment in a Criminal

Case

Sheet l

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Central District of Illinois

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA

v.

CHARLES R. HAYS

)

)

)

)

)

)

JUDGMENT IN A

CRIMINAL CASE

Case Number: 20-30021001

USM Number: 23059-026

Nathan A. Frisch

Defendant’s Attorney

THE DEFENDANT:

☑ pleaded guilty to count(s) 1, 2, and 3

☐ pleaded nolo contendere to count(s)

which was accepted by the court.

22a

☐ was found guilty on count(s)

after a plea of not guilty.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Title & Section

Nature

Offense

of Offense

Ended

Cou

nt

21

USC

§§ Possession of 50 10/15/2019

841(a)(1)

and Grams or More of

841(b)(1)(A)(viii) Methamphetamin

e with the Intent

to Distribute

1

21

USC

§§ Possession of 5 or 11/27/2019

841(a)(1)

and More Grams of

841(b)(1)(B)(viii) Methamphetamin

e with the Intent

to Distribute

2

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2

through 7 of this judgment. The sentence is

imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of

1984.

☐ The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s)

☐ Count(s) ___________________ ☐ is

☐ are

dismissed on the motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the

United States attorney for this district within 30 days

of any change of name, residence, or mailing address

until all fines, restitution, costs, and special

assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid.

If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must notify

the court and United States attorney of material

changes in economic circumstances.

23a

12/14/2022 ______________

Date of Imposition of

Judgment

s/ Sue E. Myerscough ____

Signature of Judge

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH,

U.S. District Judge ______

Name and Title of Judge

12/16/22 ________________

Date

24a

AO 245B (Rev. 09/17)

Judgment in a Criminal

Case

Sheet 1A

Judgment—Page 2 of 7

DEFENDANT: CHARLES R. HAYS

CASE NUMBER: 20-30021-001

ADDITIONAL COUNTS OF CONVICTION

Title

Section

& Nature of Offense

18 USC §

924(c)(1)(A)(

i)

Offense

Ended

Possession

of

a 11/27/2019

Firearm

in

Furtherance of a

Drug

Trafficking

Crime

Cou

nt

3

25a

AO 245B (Rev. 09/17)

Judgment in Criminal Case

Sheet 2 — Imprisonment

Judgment—Page 3 of 7

DEFENDANT: CHARLES R. HAYS

CASE NUMBER: 20-30021-001

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of

the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a

total term of:

180 months.

This term consists of 120 months on

Count 1 and 60 months on Count 2, to run

concurrently, and 60 months on Count 3, to run

consecutively to the sentence imposed in Counts 1 and

2.

☑ The court makes the following recommendations to

the Bureau of Prisons:

1. That the defendant serve his sentence at FCI

Greenville, IL, or otherwise in a facility as close to

Taylorville, IL, as possible.

2. That the defendant serve his sentence in a facility

that will allow him to participate in the Residential

Drug Abuse Program (RDAP) and that will maximize

his exposure to educational and vocational

opportunities.

☑ The defendant is remanded to the custody of the

United States Marshal.

26a

☐ The defendant shall surrender to the United States

Marshal for this district:

☐ at ________________ ☐ a.m.

☐ p.m.

on

_____________________.

☐ as notified by the United States Marshal.

☐

The defendant shall surrender for service of

sentence at the institution designated by the

Bureau of Prisons:

☐ before 2 p.m. on _____________________.

☐ as notified by the United States Marshal.

☐ as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services

Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant

delivered

on

___________________________________

to

___________________________________

at

___________________________________, with a certified

copy of this judgment.

________________

UNITED STATES

MARSHAL

27a

By

___

DEPUTY

UNITED STATES

MARSHAL

28a

AO 245B (Rev. 09/17)

Judgment in a Criminal

Case

Sheet 3 — Supervised Release

Judgment—Page 4 of 7

DEFENDANT: CHARLES R. HAYS

CASE NUMBER: 20-30021-001

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, you will be on

supervised release for a term of:

5 years on each of Counts 1, 2, and 3, to run

concurrently.

1. You must not commit another federal, state or local

crime.

2. You must not unlawfully possess a controlled

substance.

3. You must refrain from any unlawful use of a

controlled substance. You must submit to one drug

test within 15 days of release from imprisonment

and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as

determined by the court.

☐ The above drug testing condition is suspended,

based on the court’s determination that you

pose a low risk of future substance abuse.

(check if applicable)

29a

4. ☐ You must make restitution in accordance with 18

U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A or any other statute

authorizing a sentence of restitution. (check if

applicable)

5. ☑ You must cooperate in the collection of DNA as

directed by the probation officer.

(check if

applicable)

6. ☐ You must comply with the requirements of the

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act

(34 U.S.C. § 20901, et seq.) as directed by the

probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any

state sex offender registration agency in the

location where you reside, work, are a student, or

were convicted of a qualifying offense. (check if

applicable)

7. ☐ You must participate in an approved program for

domestic violence. (check if applicable)

If this judgment imposes a fine or restitution, it is a

condition of supervised release that the defendant pay

in accordance with the Schedule of Payments sheet of

this judgment.

The defendant must comply with the following

conditions:

1. The defendant shall not knowingly leave the federal

judicial district in which he is approved to reside

without the permission of the Court.

2. The defendant shall report to the probation office

in the district to which he is released within 72 hours

of release from custody. He shall report to the

probation officer in a reasonable manner and

frequency as directed by the Court or probation officer.

30a

3. The defendant shall follow the instructions of the

probation officer as they relate to his conditions of

supervision. He shall answer truthfully the questions

of the probation officer as they relate to his conditions

of supervision, subject to his right against selfincrimination.

4. The defendant shall notify the probation officer at

least ten days prior to, or as soon as he knows about,

any changes in residence or any time he leaves a job

or accepts a job.

5. The defendant shall permit a probation officer to

visit him at home between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and

11:00 p.m., at his place of employment while he is

working, or at the locations of his court-ordered

treatment providers. Visits may be conducted at any

time if the probation officer has reasonable suspicion

to believe that the defendant is in violation of a

condition of supervised release or if he or a third party

has reported that he is unable to comply with a

directive of the probation officer because of illness or

emergency. During any such visit the defendant shall

permit confiscation of any contraband observed in

plain view of the probation officer.

31a

AO 245B (Rev. 09/17)

Judgment in a Criminal

Case

Sheet 3A — Supervised Release

Judgment—Page 5 of 7

DEFENDANT: CHARLES R. HAYS

CASE NUMBER: 20-30021-001

ADDITIONAL SUPERVISED RELEASE TERMS

6. The defendant shall notify the probation officer

within 72 hours of being arrested or questioned by a

law enforcement officer. This condition does not

prevent him from invoking his Fifth Amendment right

against self-incrimination.

7.

The defendant shall not knowingly meet,

communicate, or otherwise interact with any person

whom he knows to be a convicted felon or to be

engaged in, or planning to engage in, criminal activity,

unless granted permission to do so by the Court.

8. The defendant shall not knowingly possess a

firearm, ammunition, or destructive device as defined

in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4) or any object that he intends

to use as a dangerous weapon as defined in 18 U.S.C.

§ 930(g)(2).

9. The defendant shall not knowingly be present at

places where he knows controlled substances are

illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered.

10. The defendant shall not purchase, possess, use,

distribute, or administer any controlled substance or

psychoactive substance that impairs physical or

mental functioning, including street, synthetic or

designer drugs, or any paraphernalia related to any

controlled substance or psychoactive substance, except

as prescribed by a physician. He shall, at the direction

32a

of the U.S. Probation Office, participate in a program

for substance abuse treatment including not more

than six tests per month to determine whether he has

used controlled or psychoactive substances. He shall

abide by the rules of the treatment provider. The

defendant shall pay for these services, to the extent he

is financially able to pay. The U.S. Probation Office

shall determine the defendant’s ability to pay and any

schedule for payment, subject to the Court’s review

upon request. The defendant shall not be deemed

financially able to pay if, at the time he begins

receiving substance abuse treatment, he would qualify

for Court-appointed counsel under the Criminal

Justice Act.

11. The defendant shall refrain from excessive use of

alcohol, as defined as the legal limit of impairment in

the stated in which he is located.

U.S. Probation Office Use Only A U.S. probation

officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by

the court and has provided me with a written copy of

this judgment containing these conditions.

For

further information regarding these conditions, see

Overview of Probation and Supervised Release

Conditions, available at: www.uscourts.gov.

Defendant’s

Date

Signature

33a

AO 245B (Rev. 09/17)

Judgment in a Criminal

Case

Sheet 5 — Criminal Monetary

Penalties

Judgment—Page 6 of 7

DEFENDANT: CHARLES R. HAYS

CASE NUMBER: 20-30021-001

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary

penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

TOTALS

Assessment

JVTA

Assessment*

Fine Restitution

$ 300.00

$

$0.00

$ 0.00

☐ The determination of restitution is deferred until

_________. An Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (AO

245C) will be entered after such determination.

☐ The defendant must make restitution (including

community restitution) to the following payees in the

amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee

shall receive an approximately proportioned payment,

unless specified otherwise in the priority order or

percentage payment column below. However,

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims

must be paid before the United States is paid.

34a

Name

of

Payee

TOTALS

Total

Loss**

Restitution

Ordered

Priority or

Percentage

$

0.00

$________________

☐ Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement

$ ________________

☐ The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine

of more than $2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid

in full before the fifteenth day after the date of the

judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the

payment options on Sheet 6 may be subject to penalties for

delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

☐ The court determined that the defendant does not have the

ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:

☐

☐

the interest requirement is waived for the

fine ☐

restitution.

the interest requirement for the ☐

restitution is modified as follows:

fine

☐

☐

35a

* Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub.

L. No. 114-22.

** Findings for the total amount of losses are required

under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18

for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994,

but before April 23, 1996.

36a

AO 245B (Rev. 09/17)

Judgment in a Criminal

Case

Sheet 6 — Schedule of Payments

Judgment—Page 7 of 7

DEFENDANT: CHARLES R. HAYS

CASE NUMBER: 20-30021-001

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant’s ability to pay,

payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is

due as follows:

A

☐

☑ Lump sum payment of $

immediately, balance due

300.00

due

not later than __________________ , or

☐ in accordance with ☐ C, ☐ D, ☐ E, or ☐ F

below; or

B

C

D

☐ Payment to begin immediately (may be

combined with ☐ C, ☐ D, or ☐ F below); or

☐ Payment in equal

________________

(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of

$

________________

over

a

period

of

________________ (e.g., months or years), to

commence ________________ (e.g, 30 or 60 days)

after the date of this judgment; or

☐ Payment in equal

________________

(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of

$

________________

over

a

period

of

________________ (e.g., months or years), to

commence ________________ (e.g, 30 or 60 days)

after release from imprisonment to a term of

supervision; or

37a

E

F

☐ Payment during the term of supervised

release will commence within _______________

(eg., 30 or 60 days) after release from

imprisonment. The court will set the payment

plan based on an assessment of the defendant’s

ability to pay at that time; or

☐ Special instructions regarding the payment

of criminal monetary penalties:

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if

this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of

criminal monetary penalties is due during the period

of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties,

except those payments made through the Federal

Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility

Program, are made to the clerk of the court.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments

previously made toward any criminal monetary

penalties imposed.

☐ Joint and Several

Defendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case

Numbers (including defendant number), Total

Amount, Joint and Several Amount, and

corresponding payee, if appropriate.

☐ The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

☐ The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):

☐ The defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest

in the following property to the United States:

38a

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1)

assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution

interest, (4) fine principal, (5) fine interest, (6)

community restitution, (7) JVTA assessment, (8)

penalties, and (9) costs, including cost of prosecution

and court costs.