Motion for divided argument — Oklahoma, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 24, 2025
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Nos. 23-1067, 23-1068
In the Supreme Court of the United States
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al.,
Respondents.
PACIFICORP, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al.,
Respondents.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PETITIONERS’ JOINT MOTION FOR DIVIDED ARGUMENT
MITHUN MANSINGHANI
Counsel of Record
LEHOTSKY KELLER COHN LLP
629 W. Main St.
Oklahoma City, OK 73102
(512) 693-8350
mithun@lkcfirm.com
Counsel for Petitioners
State of Oklahoma and
Oklahoma Department
of Environmental Quality
MISHA TSEYTLIN
Counsel of Record
TROUTMAN PEPPER
LOCKE LLP
227 W. Monroe Street
Suite 3900
Chicago, IL 60606
(608) 999-1240
misha.tseytlin@trouman.com
Attorneys for Petitioner PacifiCorp
Additional counsel listed in signature block
Pursuant to Rules 21 and 28.4 of this Court, Petitioners in Case
Nos. 23-1067 (State Petitioners) and 23-1068 (Industry Petitioners)
jointly move for divided argument. Petitioners request to divide their 30
minutes of argument time, with the State Petitioners receiving 20
minutes and the Industry Petitioners receiving 10 minutes.
State
Petitioners each filed separate petitions for review of the denial of their
State Implementation Plans (“SIP”) in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, see generally Pet.App.9a, and although
they have several counsel representing them, they have agreed to have a
single counsel present oral argument on their behalf before this Court.
Similarly, Industry Petitioners filed separate petitions for review in the
Tenth Circuit and have several counsel representing them, see generally
id., and they have agreed to a single counsel to represent all Industry
Petitioners at oral argument before this Court. Granting this motion
would not require the Court to enlarge the overall time for argument.
1. This Court has often allowed private litigants and government
entities to divide argument. Ohio v. EPA, 144 S. Ct. 691, (2024) (Mem.);
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. DOL, OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 746 (2021) (Mem.);
United States v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 416 (2021) (Mem.); Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 398 (2019) (Mem.); Trump
v. NAACP, 140 S. Ct. 398 (2019) (Mem.); Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist
Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 951 (2019) (Mem.); Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n
v. Blair, 139 S. Ct. 783 (2019) (Mem.); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo.
Civ. Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 466–67 (2017) (Mem.).
2. While all Petitioners share the goal of having the regional Courts
of
Appeals
deciding
local
and
regional
issues,
including
the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) actions on SIPs, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)(1), State Petitioners and Industry Petitioners bring different
interests and perspectives to the case. State Petitioners have sovereign
and governing interests in regulating emission sources within their
respective States (including state enforcement of the SIPs and their
regulations) and preserving the cooperative-federalism scheme that the
Clean Air Act requires. Industry Petitioners provide power generation,
transmission, and delivery in the affected States and employ thousands
of workers. As the parties regulated by SIPs, they ultimately bear much
of the economic cost imposed by Clean Air Act regulations.
3. Reflecting those distinct interests, the two groups of Petitioners
have been consistently aligned on the need for SIP decisions to be heard
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in regional courts. While the State Petitioners and Industry Petitioners
make complementary arguments, there are important differences such
that neither group can represent fully the interests of the other. See
Stephen M. Shapiro, et al., Supreme Court Practice 777 (10th ed. 2013)
(“Having more than one lawyer argue on a side is justifiable . . . when
they represent different parties with different interests or positions.”).
Allowing State Petitioners and Industry Petitioners to argue in this case
would enable the Court to hear from two groups with unique insights on
a matter of exceptional importance to States, businesses, and the public.
4. State Petitioners and Industry Petitioners present different
approaches to EPA’s (mis)application of Section 307(b)(1)’s third
sentence. This sentence provides a narrow exception to the default venue
rule created by Section 307(b)(1)’s first two sentences. That exception
requires challenges to a “locally or regionally applicable” EPA action to
be filed in the D.C. Circuit “if such action is based on a determination of
nationwide scope or effect” and EPA “finds and publishes that such action
is based on such a determination.”
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
State
Petitioners and Industry Petitioners present different understandings of
3
this sentence, although they all agree that venue is proper in the Tenth
Circuit under either approach.
Beginning with State Petitioners, they argue that a “locally or
regionally applicable action” is “based on” a “determination of nationwide
scope or effect” within Section 307(b)(1)’s third sentence, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)(1), if “the ultimate justifications on which EPA’s locally or
regionally applicable action is based [ ] cover the entire country or
necessarily result in consequences throughout the whole nation,” States
Br.43 (emphasis added). According to State Petitioners, the actions here
are not within the venue provision’s exception because “[t]he core
findings that made the difference as to whether any given plan was
approved or disapproved” were “unique to each State’s submission,” not
nationwide. States Br.44-45.
While supportive of the States’ position, Industry Petitioners, for
their part, believe that a “locally or regionally applicable action” falls
within Section 307(b)(1)’s third sentence “if EPA decides to issue a locally
or regionally applicable action’ ‘based on’ that action’s ‘nationwide scope
or effect’ (and then publishes that finding).” Industry Br.47–48 (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)). As then-Judge Kavanaugh explained, Section
4
307(b)(1)’s third sentence only applies if “‘otherwise locally or regionally
applicable regulations have a nationwide scope or effect.’” Industry Br.48
(quoting Am. Rd. & Transp. Builders Ass’n v. EPA, 705 F.3d 453, 455
(D.C. Cir. 2013)).
State Petitioners’ and Industry Petitioners’ interpretations of
Section 307(b)(1)’s third sentence are different, although, as noted, they
each support venue in the regional courts if the Court applies either of
their interpretations. State Petitioners’ approach to Section 307(b)(1)’s
third sentence considers EPA’s “ultimate reasons” or “ultimate
justifications” for taking the “locally or regionally applicable action” at
issue,
asking
whether
those
“ultimate
reasons”
or
“ultimate
justifications” are of a “nationwide” “scope or effect.” States Br.40–41,
43, 45 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (emphases added)).
Industry
Petitioners’ approach to Section 307(b)(1)’s third sentence looks to the
“locally or regionally applicable” action itself, asking whether EPA issued
that action based upon its determination that the action itself has “a
nationwide scope or effect.”
Industry Br.47–48 (quoting Am. Rd. &
Transp. Builders Ass’n, 705 F.3d at 455).
5
Petitioners respectfully submit that this Court would benefit from
exploring both of these approaches to Section 307(b)(1)’s third sentence
at oral argument, which can most effectively occur by having the
proponents of these different approaches present argument.
5. For all the reasons discussed above, the State and Industry
Petitioners believe that allowing both groups of Petitioners to participate
in oral argument would materially aid in the resolution of this case.
Accordingly, Petitioners move for divided argument, with the State
Petitioners receiving 20 minutes and the Industry Petitioners receiving
10 minutes.
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Respectfully submitted,
/s/Mithun Mansinghani
/s/Misha Tseytlin
GENTNER DRUMMOND
Attorney General
GARRY M. GASKINS
Solicitor General
JENNIFER L. LEWIS
Deputy Attorney General
OKLAHOMA ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S OFFICE
313 N.E. 21st Street
Oklahoma City, OK 73105
MISHA TSEYTLIN
Counsel of Record
JEFF P. JOHNSON
KEVIN M. LEROY
KAITLIN L. O’DONNELL
EMILY O’ BRIEN
TROUTMAN PEPPER
LOCKE LLP
227 W. Monroe Street
Suite 3900
Chicago, IL 60606
(608) 999-1240
misha.tseytlin@trouman.com
MITHUN MANSINGHANI
Counsel of Record
LEHOTSKY KELLER COHN LLP
629 W. Main St.
Oklahoma City, OK 73102
(512) 693-8350
mithun@lkcfirm.com
CARROL WADE MCGUFFEY
TROUTMAN PEPPER
LOCKE LLP
600 Peachtree St. N.E.
Suite 3000
Atlanta, GA 30308
MICHAEL B. SCHON
DREW F. WALDBESER
LEHOTSKY KELLER COHN LLP
200 Mass. Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
MARIE BRADSHAW DURRANT
Vice President and General
Counsel
CHRISTIAN C. STEPHENS
Senior Attorney
PACIFICORP
1407 North Temple
Suite 320
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
Attorneys for Petitioner PacifiCorp
Attorneys for Petitioners State
of Oklahoma and Oklahoma
Department of Environmental
Quality
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DEREK BROWN
Attorney General
STANFORD E. PURSER
Solicitor General
OFFICE OF THE UTAH
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Utah State Capitol Complex
350 N. State St., Ste. 230
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
MEGAN BERGE
SARAH DOUGLAS
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
700 K Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
AARON M. STREETT
J. MARK LITTLE
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
910 Louisiana Street
Houston, TX 77002
WILLIAM L. WEHRUM
WEHRUM ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW LLC
1629 K St., N.W., Ste. 300
Washington, D.C. 20006
Attorneys for the Oklahoma
Industry Petitioners
EMILY C. SCHILLING
HOLLAND & HART LLP
222 S. Main St., Ste. 2200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
H. MICHAEL KELLER
ARTEMIS D. VAMIANAKIS
FABIAN VANCOTT
95 South State Street
Suite 2300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
KRISTINA R. VAN BOCKERN
AARON B. TUCKER
HOLLAND & HART LLP
555 Seventeenth St.,
Ste. 3200
Denver, CO 80202
EMILY L. WEGENER
General Counsel
UTAH ASSOCIATED MUNICIPAL
POWER SYSTEMS
155 North 400 West
Suite 480
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Counsel for Petitioner
State of Utah
Attorneys for Utah Associated
Municipal Power Systems
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ALAN I. ROBBINS
DEBRA D. ROBY
WASHINGTON ENERGY
LAW LLP
900 17th St. NW
Suite 500-A
Washington, D.C. 20006
Attorneys for Utah Municipal
Power Agency
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