Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Paul Johnson, Petitioner v. Matthew Tepper
Supreme Court briefFeb 15, 2024
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FEB 1 5 2024
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OFFICE OP "'HE CLERK
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Supreme Court of tlje ®mtetr &tatra
PAULJOHNSON
Petitioner,
v.
MATTHEW TEPPER
Respondent.
On Petition For Writ of Review
To The Texas Supreme Court
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Paul Johnson
Petitioner pro se
130 Marcus Rd
McDade TX 78650
512-698-6827
pjpxmcd@earthlink.net
1
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the United States Supreme Court will
review the actions of a Texas Court of Appeals, which
departed from its role as a neutral arbiter by engaging in
advocacy for a governmental entity against a pro se
plaintiff, violating the principle of party presentation by
raising issues and arguments sua sponte, unaddressed by
either party.
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
o
No.
1
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW..........
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS......................................
3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................
3
CITATIONS OF OPINIONS................................
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.....................
5
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED....5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..........................
6
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION..... 11
CONCLUSION
13
14
APPENDIX.....
Texas Supreme Court denial of petition for review.
14
App. 1
Petition for Review to the Supreme Court of Texas.
14
App. 1-27
Court of Appeals denial of rehearing. App. 27-28.
14
Response to Motion for Rehearing. App. 28-37... 14
Letter requesting response to motion for
14
rehearing. App. 37....................................................
14
Johnson’s Motion for Rehearing. App. 38-47,
Court of Appeals Memorandum Opinion. App. 4814
56
Johnson’s Appellant’s Reply Brief. App. 57-72... 14
14
Tepper’s Appellee’s Brief. App. 73-100.......
14
Johnson’s Appellant’s Brief. App. 101-121.
3
Order declaring Johnson to be a vexatious litigant.
14
App. 122-123
14
Tepper’s Bench Brief. App. 124-129.
Johnson’s Response to Vexatious Litigant Motion.
App. 130-139................................................................. 14
Tepper’s Motion to Determine Johnson to be a
Vexatious Litigant. App. 140-149.............................. 14
Portion of hearing transcript where Judge
Campbell determines the five cases. App. 150-151.... 14
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
7
American General Fire and Cas. Co. v. Weinberg
7
Department of Human Resources, u. Wininger ....
10
Goss v. Lopez........................................................
9
Greenlaw v. United States...................................
11
In re Stephen Casey..............................................
11, 12
McGee v. McFadden.............................................
Pont Nemours and Company v. Collins Securities and
8
Exchange Commission v. Collins.............................. .
8
Texas Nat. Bank v. Karnes............................................
8
Vawter v. Garvey............................................................
CITATIONS OF OPINIONS
On 1/24/2023 Tepper filed a Motion to Determine
Johnson to be a Vexatious Litigant. (App. 140-149).
On 1/29/2023 Johnson filed a Response to Vexatious
Litigant Accusation and Motion for Sanctions (App. 130139).
4
On 3/1/2023 Tepper filed a “Bench Brief for Hearing
to Declare Paul Johnson a Vexatious Litigant” (App. 124129).
On 3/1/2023 Judge Carson Campbell issued an order
declaring Johnson to be a vexatious litigant (App. 122-123).
On 4/19/2023 Johnson filed Appellant’s Brief (App.
101-121).
On 5/26/2023 Tepper filed Appellee Matthew
Tepper’s Brief (App. 73-100).
On 6/13/2023 Johnson filed Appellant’s Reply Brief
(App. 57-72).
On 8/7/2023 the Court of Appeals issued its
Memorandum Opinion (App. 48-57).
On 8/22/2023 Johnson filed Motion for Rehearing.
(App. 39-48).
On 8/23/2023 the Court of Appeals requested a
response to the motion for rehearing (App. 38-39),
On 9/5/2023 Tepper filed Appellee Matthew Tepper’s
Response to Motion for Rehearing (App. 28-38).
On 9/7/2023 the Court of Appeals denied Johnson’s
Motion for rehearing (App. 27-28).
On 10/23/2023 Johnson filed Petition for Review to
the Supreme Court of Texas (App. 1-27).
On 12/1/2023, the Texas Supreme Court denied
Johnson’s petition for review (App. 1).
5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court
is invoked pursuant to Rule 10 of the Rules of the United
States Supreme Court. The Court should grant certiorari
in this case as a Texas Supreme Court decision has
implicated a significant federal question, thereby
conflicting with established precedents of the United States
Supreme Court concerning the fundamental principle of
party presentation.
The opinion in question was rendered by the
Seventh Court of Appeals on August 7, 2023. A subsequent
Motion for Rehearing before the Seventh Court of Appeals
was denied on September 7, 2023. A Writ of Review was
sought from the Texas Supreme Court, which was denied
on December 1, 2023. This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
timely filed on or before February 29, 2024, adhering to the
time constraints stipulated by the Rules of the United
States Supreme Court.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Constitutional provisions involved are from the
Fourteenth Amendment, the portion pertinent to this case
is that States must provide due process and equal
protection of the laws:
“No State shall... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” which should
prohibit discriminating against pro se litigants and ensure
fairness in legal proceedings.
6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case concerns an appeal of an order declaring
Petitioner Paul Johnson (Johnson), to he a vexatious
litigant (App. 122-123). Johnson had filed a slander suit
against Respondent Matthew Tepper (Tepper) and then
Tepper filed a motion to have Johnson be declared a
vexatious litigant (App. 140-149). Johnson non-suited the
slander case but continues to appeal the order declaring
him to be a vexatious litigant.
When the case was appealed to the Seventh Court of
Appeals of Texas (COA), they issued a Memorandum
Opinion on August 7, 2023, (App. 48-56), which will
hereinafter be referred to as The Opinion. The Opinion
was not based on the issues or arguments of the parties,
but the COA acted as a party advocate for Tepper, creating
findings that the lower court never found, and raising
issues and defenses for Tepper that had not been raised or
argued in the lower court.
The lower court found five specific “qualifying cases”
orally at the hearing that they used against Johnson (App.
150-151). The lower court refused to issue written findings
about the cases they used, so the orally stated cases in the
record are the cases that needed to be supported on appeal.
Johnson’s brief to the COA effectively debunked the
lower court’s qualifying cases (App. 101-121), so to bolster
Tepper’s ease, The Opinion sua sponte came up with five
different “qualifying cases,” (App. 51-53).
The Opinion also sua sponte raised the issue of
absolute immunity for Tepper to lie under oath and make
false and defamatory statements against Johnson because
the lies were made under oath while giving testimony at a
semi-judicial proceeding (App. 54-55). Tepper had not
raised that argument in the lower court, nor in his brief to
the COA. The Opinion came up with the argument of
7
absolute immunity, by independently researching the
record and sua sponte coming up with issues and
arguments that were not before the Court of Appeals.
The Opinion also sua sponte made the argument
that Johnson did not preserve his issue of constitutionality
because Johnson had not presented that argument to the
trial court (App. 55-56). Tepper never made that argument
nor cited any authority for it, so Tepper had already waived
that issue because it was not properly briefed.
The Opinion issued was based on unassigned error,
errors that had not been presented to the court by either
party. The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly found
that to be error:
“The Court of Appeals based its
judgment on a point neither party had
assigned, i.e., on unassigned error. The court
itself found what it obviously regarded as
fundamental error. In so doing, it erred.”
American General Fire and Cas. Co. v.
Weinberg, 639 S.W.2d 688, 25 Tex.Sup.CtJ.
405 (1982), Supreme Court of Texas.
“By reversing on this unassigned error,
the Court of Appeals erroneously elevated a
pleading defect to the status of fundamental
error....Therefore, the application for writ of
error is granted and, without hearing oral
arguments, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed and this cause is
remanded to the Court of Appeals for
disposition of points of error properly
presented thereto.” Department of Human
Resources, v. Wininger, 657 S.W.2d 783 (1983),
Supreme Court of Texas.
8
“We reverse the Court of Appeals’
attorney’s fees judgment because it was based
on unassigned error.” Texas Nat. Bank u.
Karnes, 717 S.W.2d 901 (1986), Supreme
Court of Texas.
“The ground set forth by the Court of
Appeals for reversing summary judgment was
not raised by Garvey in either his response to
Vawter’s motion for summary judgment, his
brief to the Court of Appeals, or his
application for writ of error to this court...This
court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals’
judgment, holding that it had erred by raising
grounds for reversal sua sponte.” Vawter v.
Garvey, 786 S.W.2d 263 (1990), Supreme
Court of Texas.
The Federal Courts use the terminology of party
presentation instead of unassigned error, but the United
States Supreme Court routinely prohibits decisions being
made that do not follow the principle of party presentation:
“...the reports relied upon by that court
included a variety of data and economic
observations which had not been examined
and tested by the traditional methods of the
adversary process. We are not cited to any
statute, rule, or decision authorizing the
procedure employed by the Court of Appeals.”
Pont Nemours and Company v. Collins
Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 97 S.Ct. 2229, 53 L.Ed.2d
100 (1977), United States Supreme Court.
“In both civil and criminal cases, in the
first instance and on appeal, courts follow the
principle of party presentation, i.e., the
parties frame the issues for decision and the
9
courts generally serve as neutral arbiters of
matters the parties present....Courts do not,
or should not, sally forth each day looking for
wrongs to right. We wait for cases to come to
us, and when they do we normally decide only
questions presented by the parties.” Greenlaw
v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d
399, 554 U.S. 237, 8 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7716,
21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 421, 76 USLW 4533,
2008 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9297 (2008),
Supreme Court of the United States.
“...we now hold that the appeals panel
departed so drastically from the principle of
party presentation as to constitute an abuse of
discretion. We therefore vacate the Ninth
Circuit’s judgment and remand the case for an
adjudication of the appeal attuned to the case
shaped by the parties rather than the case
designed by the appeals panel....In our
adversarial system of adjudication, we follow
the principle of party presentation....in both
civil and criminal cases, in the first instance
and on appeal...we rely on the parties to
frame the issues for decision and assign to
courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters
the parties present.” United States v.
Sineneng-SmithI, 140 S.Ct. 1575, 206 L.Ed.2d
866 (2020), Supreme Court of the United
States.
In Johnson’s case, the COA was anything but a
neutral arbiter. Since The Opinion was based on issues,
arguments, and evidence that Johnson was never allowed
to challenge, Johnson was not granted his Constitutional
privilege to challenge a court’s ruling, thus denying
Johnson due course of the laws.
10
“The Fourteenth Amendment, as now
applied to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its
creatures.,..words of the Due Process
Clause...require that deprivation of life,
liberty or property by adjudication be
preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.
The fundamental requisite of due process of
law is the opportunity to be heard, a right that
has little reality or worth unless one is
informed that the matter is pending and can
choose for himself whether to...contest....No
better instrument has been devised for
arriving at truth than to give a person in
jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it.” Goss
v. Lopez, 8212 898, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729,
42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975), United States Supreme
Court.
Johnson had no opportunity to challenge the five
different cases the COA found sua sponte. Johnson had no
opportunity to challenge the issues the COA sua sponte
considered, argued and cited, of absolute immunity and
preservation at the trial court. Thus, The Opinion denied
Johnson his constitutional due process of law.
11
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
Granting Petition for Certiorari in this particular
case is extremely important because Johnson has already
been given a life sentence of not having access to the
courts.
Even though not deferring the sanctions of a
vexatious litigant order until the appeals are over is an
abuse of discretion (In re Stephen Casey, No. 18-0289
(2019), Supreme Court of Texas, “We therefore granted
relief directing the trial court to modify the sanctions order
to defer payment of the monetary and performative
sanctions until rendition of final judgment, thus allowing
the merits of the sanctions order to be determined on
appeal.”), in this case the judge abused his discretion and
did not defer the monetary or non-monetary sanctions.
They have already caused Johnson to nonsuit the
underlying slander case because he could not pay the
monetary sanction. Johnson has also been denied access to
the courts to file a simple Consumer Protection Act suit in
a Justice of the Peace court, and other filings in district
court.
Not granting certiorari in this case will deny
Johnson access to the courts for life, and Johnson never
had an opportunity to challenge the issues and arguments
that the COA sua sponte made without party presentation.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized its
obligation to intervene when lower courts err, especially
when the lower courts’ errors deprive pro se litigants of
their constitutional right, to due process and access to the
courts.
In McGee v. McFadden this Court recognized that
reviewing bodies may too often turn their decisions into a
rubber stamp when a pro se litigant is involved. This Court
12
was considering litigation that originated determining a
Certificate of Appealability.
“A court of appeals might
inappropriately decide the merits of an
appeal, and in doing so overstep the bounds of
its jurisdiction. A district court might fail to
recognize that reasonable minds could differ.
Or, worse, the large volume of COA requests,
the small chance that any particular petition
will lead to further review, and the press of
competing priorities may turn the
circumscribed COA standard of review into a
rubber stamp, especially for pro se litigants.
We have periodically had to remind lower
courts not to unduly restrict this pathway to
appellate review.” McGee v. McFadden, 139
S.Ct. 2608 (2019), Supreme Court of United
States, (internal citations omitted).
In Johnson’s case, when the COA erred and made
their determination on issues that were not before the
court, the Texas Supreme Court, because of the small
chance that any particular case would lead to further
review, and because Johnson was a pro se litigant, turned
appellant Johnson’s Petition for Review into a rubber
stamp of the faulty COA opinion (App. 1).
Just as the United States Supreme Court did in the
McGee case, it appears to be time to remind the Texas
Supreme Court not to unduly restrict that pathway for
appellate review. Without this writ, Johnson will never get
to exercise his constitutional right to challenge the issues
and arguments that the COA sua sponte made to turn that
court away from being a neutral arbiter and turned them
into a party advocate for Tepper.
Johnson has a constitutional right to be able to
challenge the issues, arguments and evidence that the COA
13
sua sponte used against him. Denial of this Petition for
Certiorari will forever deprive Johnson of that
constitutional due process of law.
CONCLUSION
Granting certiorari is essential to safeguard the due
process rights of litigants in Texas. The practice of Texas
Courts of Appeal deciding cases based on issues and
arguments they invent, rather than those presented by the
parties, undermines the integrity of the judicial process.
Therefore, Johnson respectfully requests this Court to
grant certiorari and remand the case to a Texas Court of
Appeals for adjudication solely on the issues raised by the
parties, ensuring fair and impartial consideration of the
matter at hand.
Respectfully submitted,
/si 'Paul Mm&w
Petitioner, pro se
130 Marcus Rd
McDade TX 78650
512-698-6827
pipxmcd@earthlink.net
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