Opposition Brief — Mississippi District Council for Assemblies of God, Petitioner v. Kevin Beachy, et al.
Supreme Court briefSep 27, 2024
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No. 23-1030
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
__________________________
MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT COUNCIL ASSEMBLIES OF GOD,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN BEACHY, EDDIE KINSEY,
ANDRE MULET, AND KRIS WILLIAMS,
Respondents.
__________________________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT
__________________________
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
__________________________
Malcolm Jones
831 E. Scenic Drive
Pass Christian, MS 39571
E. Joshua Rosenkranz
Rachael Jensen
Duncan Hosie
ORRICK, HERRINGTON &
SUTCLIFFE LLP
51 West 52nd Street
New York, NY 10019
Robert M. Loeb
Counsel of Record
Thomas M. Bondy
Edward Williams
ORRICK, HERRINGTON &
SUTCLIFFE LLP
2100 Pennsylvania
Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20037
(202) 339-8475
rloeb@orrick.com
Counsel for Respondents
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Mississippi Supreme Court
properly applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine by declining to decide ecclesiastical questions
relating to an intra-church property dispute, and
remanding the parties’ property dispute to the state
trial court to be decided under neutral, secular principles.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ........................................ i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................... iv
INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................. 3
The Church Chooses to Disaffiliate from
the General Council of the Assemblies
of God .............................................................. 3
The District Council Brings This Suit
Against Pastor Beachy and the
Church’s Trustees........................................... 5
The Mississippi Supreme Court Reverses
the Trial Court’s Grant of Summary
Judgment and Remands for
Adjudication of the Property Dispute ............ 6
REASONS TO DENY CERTIORARI ....................... 9
I.
The Petition Improperly Seeks To Invoke
This Court’s Jurisdiction Over An
Interlocutory State-Court Order. ..................... 11
II. The Claimed Split Is Not Implicated Here
And Is Illusory In Nature................................. 16
A. The decision below would have been the
same regardless of whether the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bears
on a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. ...... 19
iii
B. The majority of Petitioner’s cases giving
rise to the claimed split have nothing to
do with whether courts must reach
ecclesiastical questions in deciding
intra-church property disputes. ................... 21
C. There is no split among courts on how
to apply the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine to intra-church property
disputes. ........................................................ 24
III. Certiorari Is Also Unwarranted Because
The Decision Below Is Correct. ........................ 28
A. Civil courts are not required to reach
questions of church governance. .................. 29
B. The property dispute was properly
remanded to be decided under neutral
principles of law............................................ 31
CONCLUSION ........................................................ 33
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.),
126 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 1997)..........................21, 23
Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-S. Bend
Diocese, Inc.,
796 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. 2003)............................23, 26
Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the
Diocese of Colo.,
289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002)........................22, 26
Celnik v. Congregation B’nai Israel,
131 P.3d 102 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006)................23, 26
Church of God in Christ, Inc. v.
Cawthon,
507 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1975)................................27
Church of God in Christ, Inc. v.
Graham,
54 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 1995)............................25, 27
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975)............................ 12, 13, 14, 15
Episcopal Church Cases,
198 P.3d 66 (Cal. 2009) ........................................28
Flynt v. Ohio,
451 U.S. 619 (1981)........................................12, 15
v
Fonken v. Cmty. Church of Kamrar,
339 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1983) .........................25, 27
Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin. of
United Methodist Church v.
Superior Ct. of Cal.,
439 U.S. 1369 (1978)......................................21, 22
Hyung Jin Moon v. Hak Ja Han Moon,
833 F. App’x 876 (2d Cir. 2020) ...........................23
Jefferson v. City of Tarrant,
522 U.S. 75 (1997).................................... 11, 13, 14
Johnson v. California,
541 U.S. 428 (2004)........................................12, 16
Jones v. Wolf,
443 U.S. 595 (1979)....................... 7, 10, 16, 17, 24,
25, 27, 30, 31
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am.,
344 U.S. 94 (1952).................................... 16, 17, 29
Kim v. True Church Members of the Holy
Hill Cmty. Church,
187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 515 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) .........28
Market St. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal.,
324 U.S. 548 (1945)..............................................11
McRaney v. N. Am. Mission Bd. of S.
Baptist Convention, Inc.,
966 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2020)................................33
vi
Mt. Helm Baptist Church v. Jones,
30 So. 714 (Miss. 1901) ........................................17
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,
539 U.S. 654 (2003)..............................................15
Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical
Lutheran Church of the Unaltered
Augsburg Confession of Worthington,
877 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 2016)........................22, 26
Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440 (1969)..............................................24
Rutland v. Nelson,
857 F. App’x 627 (11th Cir. 2021) .......................23
Schmidt v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi,
18 So. 3d 814 (Miss. 2009) .............................30, 32
Seattle’s Union Gospel Mission v. Woods,
142 S. Ct. 1094 (2022)..........................................19
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. &
Can. v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976).................................. 16, 19, 29
Smith v. Charles,
24 So. 968 (Miss. 1899) ........................................17
St. Joseph Catholic Orphan Soc’y v.
Edwards,
449 S.W.3d 727 (Ky. 2014) ............................22, 26
vii
Sustar v. Williams,
263 So. 2d 537 (Miss. 1972) .................................17
Tea v. Protestant Episcopal Church in
the Diocese of Nev.,
610 P.2d 182 (Nev. 1980) .....................................28
Watson v. Jones,
80 U.S. 679 (1871).............................. 16, 19, 20, 24
Winkler v. Marist Fathers of Detroit, Inc.,
901 N.W.2d 566 (Mich. 2017) ........................22, 26
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1257 .......................................... 3, 9, 11, 16
Rules and Regulations
S. Ct. R. 14.1(g) .........................................................12
1
INTRODUCTION
When religious entities are in conflict and turn
to a civil court for resolution, the Constitution and
this Court’s precedents delineate clear rules about
what role the civil courts can play. Those rules are
commonly referred to as the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine. That doctrine essentially requires civil
courts to abstain from opining on matters of faith
and church governance, such as who is the rightful
pastor of a congregation, whether a person was fairly
excommunicated from a church, or whether a church
is properly complying with governing religious tenets. Under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine,
courts typically dismiss lawsuits in which an individual sues to challenge the ecclesiastical decisions
of a religious organization. However, there are some
limited disputes between religious entities that
courts typically do address, such as intra-church
property disputes like the one at issue in this case.
Such intra-church property disputes can sometimes
involve adjacent ecclesiastical questions relating to
church governance and adherence to the tenets of
the faith. In those circumstances, this Court holds
that a civil court can either decide the dispute based
on secular, neutral principles of law, or else defer to
the highest ecclesiastical authority (assuming who
possesses that authority is clear or uncontested) to
answer the ecclesiastical questions.
The Mississippi Supreme Court resolved the dispute between the parties here in a manner consistent with this Court’s precedent on the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. Citing this Court’s
precedents and its own, the Mississippi Supreme
2
Court abstained from deciding any ecclesiastical
questions and remanded the property dispute for the
trial court to resolve based on neutral, secular, statelaw principles. This Court and courts throughout the
country are in broad agreement that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine permits the approach that
the Mississippi Supreme Court took in this case.
The Petition raises a number of irrelevant and illusory disagreements among state and lower federal
courts that are not implicated in this case and not
worthy of this Court’s review. For example, the Petition frames the issue presented as whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bears on a court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction. But that question has no
relevance to this case. The Mississippi Supreme
Court, citing not only this Court’s cases but also its
own precedent pre-dating the application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to the states, would
have declined to reach the ecclesiastical questions in
this case whether it had “jurisdiction” to do so or not.
And, given this Court’s express endorsement of lower
courts’ abstaining on religious questions while resolving property disputes based on neutral, secular,
state-law principles, it is no surprise that the Petition cites no case holding that state courts are required to reach the ecclesiastical questions presented
in an intra-church dispute. Rather, to the extent the
Petition cites cases in which courts adopted different
approaches to resolving intra-church disputes, those
cases simply reflect the flexibility this Court has afforded the states in resolving these kinds of cases. So
not only is the issue presented by the Petition irrelevant, it is also not the subject of disagreement in the
lower courts.
3
Furthermore, as a threshold matter, the Petition
itself suffers from a basic jurisdictional infirmity: the
decision below is an interlocutory order of a state
court—not a final judgment—and this Court thus
lacks jurisdiction to review it under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257.
For these reasons, the Petition should be denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Church Chooses to Disaffiliate from the
General Council of the Assemblies of God
The Gulf Coast Worship Center (“the Church”) is
a Christian church in Long Beach, Mississippi. In
November 1988, the Church applied for recognition
and became a “General Council Affiliated Assembly,”
affiliated with the General Council of the Assemblies
of God (the “General Council”). Pet. App. 3, 245, 250.
The General Council’s constitution and bylaws provide that a local church affiliating with the General
Council maintains “the right of self-government under Jesus Christ, its living Head, and shall have the
power to choose or call its pastor, elect its official
board, and transact all other business pertaining to
its life as a local unit.” Pet. App. 74 (emphasis added). The affiliating local church also “shall have the
right to acquire and hold title to property, either
through trustees or in its corporate name as a selfgoverning unit.” Id. And the “fact it is affiliated with
The General Council of the Assemblies of God shall
in no wise destroy its rights as above stated or interfere with its sovereignty.” Id. (emphasis added).
4
In 2017, Kevin Beachy, the Church’s Pastor,
with the support of his congregation, decided not to
renew his credentials as an ordained minister of the
General Council. Pet. App. 2, 4. On March 15, 2017,
Pastor Beachy informed the District Council—the
entity that sits below the General Council—that he
and the Church intended to exercise the sovereign
right (maintained under the General Council’s constitution and bylaws) to disaffiliate from the General
Council. Pet. App. 2, 4.
The next day, the District Council wrote a letter
to Pastor Beachy that the Church was being placed
under District Council supervision. Pet. App. 255.
The letter did not dispute the right as a “sovereign
church” to disaffiliate, but stated that the District
Council had to be given notice and a chance to address the members of the congregation to make its
case. Pet. App. 4-5, 255-56.
The Church responded that in previously affiliating with the General Council, it retained its status
as a “sovereign, autonomous, self-governing and selfdetermining body.” Pet. App. 262. The response continued that, based “upon the overwhelming support
of the congregation and based upon much prayer
with serious and thoughtful consideration of their
actions and consequences, the Board and the Church
Congregation have decided that they do not wish to
hold another business meeting to reconsider its decision of disaffiliation.” Pet. App. 263.
5
The District Council Brings This Suit Against
Pastor Beachy and the Church’s Trustees
In November 2017, the District Council sued
Pastor Beachy and members of the Church’s board of
trustees in Mississippi state court seeking to gain
control of the Church, its property, and its pulpit.
Pet. App. 3, 5. Pastor Beachy and the Church trustees moved to dismiss, arguing that the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine prohibits civil courts from adjudicating the ecclesiastical questions at issue in the
case. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
Pet. App. 5-6, 35-45.
The District Council then amended its petition
and sought a declaration that: (1) the Church’s disaffiliation vote was void; (2) the Church “has been under District supervision since March 16, 2017”; and
(3) the Church’s property was “intended to be held in
trust and under the control of the District Council.”
Pet. App. 6, 276. The District Council also sought “an
injunction barring [Pastor Beachy and the trustee
defendants] from claiming any position of authority
or, in any way, preventing District supervision of”
the Church, including the District Council’s ability to
install a new pastor of the Church. Pet. App. 277.
Discovery ensued, and on May 15, 2020, the District Council moved for summary judgment. Pet.
App. 7. In response, Pastor Beachy and the trustee
defendants disputed the District Council’s characterization of the facts, including the validity of the District Council’s attempt to place the Church under the
District Council’s supervision and the existence of a
trust in the District Council’s favor regarding the
6
Church’s property. Id. The Church further argued
that the Church was never lawfully subjected to the
District Council’s supervision, that the Church had
the authority to hold the disaffiliation vote, and that
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prohibits the
trial court from adjudicating the governance issues
raised by the District Council. Id. On the same day,
Pastor Beachy and the trustee defendants moved for
summary judgment and moved to dismiss the District Council’s claims, asserting (among other things)
that the Church’s property does not belong to the
District Council and no trust exists regarding the
Church’s property. Pet. App. 7-8.
The trial court granted the District Council’s motion for summary judgment. Pet. App. 8. The trial
court held that Pastor Beachy and his congregation
had “no authority to take any action” to disaffiliate.
Pet. App. 39; see Pet. App. 7-8. The trial court further ruled that the Church had been under the District Council’s supervision since March 16, 2017, and
the District Council controlled all of the Church’s real and personal property. Pet. App. 9, 39.
The Mississippi Supreme Court Reverses the
Trial Court’s Grant of Summary Judgment and
Remands for Adjudication of the Property Dispute
The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
the District Council and remanded for further proceedings. Pet. App. 1-34. The court held that the trial court erred in making “a judicial determination of
whether [the Church] is to remain a member of the
7
General Council and under its control.” Pet. App. 13.
The court held that the trial court’s judicial inquiry
“intrudes into the affairs of church government.” Id.
Accordingly, the trial court should not have reviewed
whether the “actions taken by Defendants during the
congregational meeting on March 19, 2017, are void.”
Id.
The court reached this result by directly drawing
on this Court’s cases concerning the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine, as well as Mississippi precedent
predating the application of the doctrine to the
states, which the Mississippi Supreme Court explained “preclude[] judicial review of claims that require resolution of strictly and purely ecclesiastical
affairs.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
court explained that “matter[s] of internal church
government” are among the topics a court cannot resolve as they are “at the core of ecclesiastical affairs.” Id.
The court further held that, in contrast, the
property dispute between the parties was not outside
of the trial court’s authority to decide. Citing this
Court’s decision in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595
(1979), and its own precedent, the Mississippi Supreme Court explained that this intra-church property dispute may be resolved based on neutral
principles of law, without running afoul of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. Pet. App. 14-15. The
court detailed how neutral principles would apply
here: “In order for the District [Council] to gain ownership of the property, [the trial court] must demonstrate either an actual transfer of property …, an
express trust, or clear and convincing evidence evinc-
8
ing an intent on the part of the local congregation to
create a ‘trust’ in favor of the denomination.” Pet.
App. 17 (cleaned up).
Analyzing the record, including affidavits, deeds,
and property records, the court concluded that the
District Council had not at this stage demonstrated
either a transfer of the Church’s property or an express trust in its favor. Pet. App. 18. The court also
determined that there is an unresolved fact issue as
to the existence of an implied trust that precluded
summary adjudication of that issue. Pet. App. 18-19.
The court, accordingly, reversed the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment in the District Council’s
favor on the property dispute and remanded the
property dispute for further proceedings regarding
the existence of an implied trust. Pet. App. 19-22.
Justice Maxwell specially concurred. Insofar as
the case involved “questions for the church, not the
civil court,” he underscored that “it was error for the
chancellor not only to entertain these questions but
also to enter summary judgment” on “these ecclesiastical matters.” Pet. App. 22. His concurrence also
stressed that the majority opinion correctly declined
to “resolv[e the] sharply contested factual disputes
surrounding the District’s relationship with [the
Church],” and that the trial court could resolve the
“disputed facts” on remand concerning the “District’s
claim that [the Church] intended for its property to
9
be placed in trust under the District’s control.” Pet.
App. 23.1
REASONS TO DENY CERTIORARI
The Petition raises no issues warranting this
Court’s review and should be denied for at least
three reasons.
First, the interlocutory state-court order at issue
is not a final judgment, as required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257, and does not meet any of the exceptions to
the final judgment requirement. The Mississippi Supreme Court issued no final decision in this case, but
rather remanded the property dispute for further
proceedings in the trial court. Accordingly, the Petition improperly seeks to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction at this interlocutory stage of the case.
Second, contrary to the Petition’s arguments,
lower courts are properly applying the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine. Petitioner asserts that there is
an important dispute among the courts about
whether the doctrine bears on a court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction. But the characterization of the
court’s ruling here as jurisdictional had no bearing
on the disposition of the case. And the claimed conflict likewise has no bearing on the only question actually presented by the Petition—whether courts
Justice Ishee also concurred in part and dissented in
part. Pet. App. 23-24. Chief Justice Randolph dissented, Pet.
App. 24, arguing that the Church’s notice of disaffiliation was
“void” and that, in his view, “control of [the Church] vested
with the District Council.” Pet. App. 34.
1
10
may decline to reach ecclesiastical questions adjacent to an intra-church property dispute, and instead
remand the property dispute to be resolved based on
neutral state-law principles, if possible, as the Mississippi Supreme Court did here. Such a remand is
fully consistent with this Court’s decision in Jones,
where this Court specifically endorsed a neutralprinciples approach as a proper option for deciding
intra-church property disputes. 443 U.S. at 602-04.
The Petition does not identify any case holding that
courts must reach every ecclesiastical question presented in a dispute, notwithstanding Jones. And,
thus, the Petition does not identify any conflict on
the only question relevant to this case.
More generally, Petitioner’s framing of the question myopically focuses on whether lower courts use
the word “jurisdiction” in abstaining from reaching
ecclesiastical questions, while ignoring the widespread agreement among the courts that certain religious disputes are improper for civil courts to
address, and the similar agreement that, under
Jones, it is a proper option to resolve intra-church
property disputes using neutral, secular principles
under state law. Id. The Petition also ignores the
fact that, even if some courts choose to decide intrachurch disputes by reaching ecclesiastical questions
and deferring to the highest ecclesiastical authority,
there is no requirement that courts must do so in all
cases. And indeed, such a requirement would contradict this Court’s decision in Jones.
Third, there was no error here. The Mississippi
Supreme Court properly applied the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine. Consistent with this Court’s
11
precedent and its own state-law principles, it refused
to opine on predominately ecclesiastical questions
between the parties regarding the propriety of the
disaffiliation and the District Council’s attempt to
place the Church under its supervision. The court,
however, remanded the property dispute for the trial
court to adjudicate using neutral, secular principles.
That is fully consistent with the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, and the Mississippi Supreme
Court’s fact-based reversal of the trial court’s issuance of summary judgment provides no basis for this
Court’s review.
I.
The Petition Improperly Seeks To Invoke
This
Court’s
Jurisdiction
Over
An
Interlocutory State-Court Order.
The Petition cites 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) as the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. That statute provides
for this Court’s review of “[f]inal judgments or decrees” by a State’s highest court. But the decision below is not a final judgment. The Mississippi Supreme
Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment in Petitioner’s favor, dismissed the claims
it determined would entangle the courts in questions
regarding ecclesiastical governance, and remanded
the rest of the case for further proceedings in the
state trial court. See Pet. App. 21-22.
To constitute a “final judgment,” a decision must
“be final as an effective determination of the litigation and not of merely interlocutory or intermediate
steps therein. It must be the final word of a final
court.” Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75, 81
(1997) (quoting Market St. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of
12
Cal., 324 U.S. 548, 551 (1945)). The final judgment
rule precludes review in circumstances like these,
where claims “remain[] to be determined by a State
court.” Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619, 620 (1981) (per
curiam) (quotation marks omitted).
Petitioner does not invoke an exception to the final judgment rule, and it should not be permitted to
sandbag Respondents by doing so for the first time
on reply. See Johnson v. California, 541 U.S. 428,
431 (2004) (per curiam) (“A petition for certiorari
must demonstrate to this Court that it has jurisdiction to review the judgment.”) (citing S. Ct. R.
14.1(g)).
In any event, none of the recognized exceptions
applies. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
479-87 (1975).
(1) The first exception applies when the federal
issue, having been decided by the state’s highest
court, is conclusive and the outcome of the case is
preordained on remand. See id. at 479. In such cases,
the judgment on the federal issue renders the case
complete “for all practical purposes.” Id. That is not
the situation here. Petitioner continues to press its
property claim under neutral principles of law, and
the trial court is still faced with fact-finding on that
claim and its ultimate resolution.
The Petition cryptically posits in a footnote that,
unless this Court intervenes, “the trial court will be
powerless to meaningfully resolve the property dispute” before it because “no court can decide who controls the Worship Center.” See Pet. 10 n.1. But under
13
the terms of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s remand, the trial court is tasked with deciding who
owns the disputed property under neutral principles
of law—including whether an implied trust interest
in the property exists in Petitioner’s favor. See Pet.
App. 17-22. It is possible for Petitioner on remand to
win control of the property on its state-law claim,
under neutral principles, if it can make the required
showings. Thus, the first exception does not apply.
(2) The second exception is limited to circumstances where the federal issue “will survive and require decision regardless of the outcome” of the case.
Cox, 420 U.S. at 480. That is also not the situation
here, as “[r]esolution of the state-law claims” on remand “could effectively moot the federal-law question raised here.” Jefferson, 522 U.S. at 82.
Petitioner seeks review of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision requiring dismissal of Petitioner’s claims for a declaratory judgment regarding
its purported authority over the Church, including
the validity of the Church’s disaffiliation vote and
the validity of the District Council’s attempt to place
the Church under its supervisory control. See Pet.
App. 11-14, 21. But Petitioner seeks to adjudicate its
purported authority over the Church as a means of
gaining control of the Church’s property. See Pet. 10
n.1. If Petitioner prevails on the property dispute on
remand based on neutral principles of law, then its
claims for declaratory relief will be moot.
(3) The third exception applies only to circumstances “in which later review of the federal issue
cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the
14
case.” Cox, 420 U.S. at 481. That is also not the case
here, as Petitioner may seek certiorari on the federal
issue after final judgment on the property dispute if
that dispute is resolved against it. See Jefferson, 522
U.S. at 82-83 (this Court may review an interlocutory decision on a federal question after final judgment).
(4) Finally, the fourth exception is limited to circumstances in which: (i) “the party seeking review
here might prevail on the merits on nonfederal
grounds, thus rendering unnecessary review of the
federal issue by this Court”; (ii) “reversal of the state
court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any
further litigation on the relevant cause of action”;
and (iii) “refusal immediately to review the state
court decision might seriously erode federal policy.”
Cox, 420 U.S. at 482-83. The Petition here fails at
least the latter two criteria.
a. Petitioner plainly cannot meet the last criterion. As we detail below, there is no conflict among the
courts as to whether courts may decline to reach ecclesiastical questions in an intra-church property
dispute, and in selecting their approaches to resolving these disputes, the lower courts are adhering to
the federal policies announced by this Court. There
is thus no need to bend the jurisdictional rules to
protect a federal policy—there is no such policy at
risk here.
But even if Petitioner were correct regarding
what it claims to be an entrenched split among lower
courts on the federal issue, then one more court
weighing in on the question is hardly an emergency
15
requiring this Court’s immediate intervention. Pet.
11-20. Resolution of the issues presented here can
await final judgment “without any adverse effect upon important federal interests.” Flynt, 451 U.S. at
622. Indeed, “[a] contrary conclusion would permit
the fourth exception to swallow the rule. Any federal
issue finally decided on an interlocutory appeal in
the state courts would qualify for immediate review.”
Id.
b. The Petition also fails the second factor. Reversing the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision
would not be “preclusive of any further litigation on
the relevant cause of action.” Cox, 420 U.S. at 48283. The Mississippi Supreme Court would still need
to adjudicate the ecclesiastical governance questions
it determined the trial court should have abstained
from deciding. The Petition challenges the Mississippi Supreme Court’s determination that the trial
court should have abstained from deciding whether
the disaffiliation vote was void and whether the District Council validly placed the Church under its supervision and control. Reversing the Mississippi
Supreme Court’s decision on the federal issue would
thus leave additional issues to be resolved on remand—namely, whether the trial court was nonetheless correct in awarding Petitioner summary
judgment on questions regarding its authority over
the Church. Because “reversal of the state court on
the federal issue would” not “be preclusive of any
further litigation on the relevant cause of action,”
id., the fourth exception does not apply. See Nike,
Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 659-60 (2003) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
16
“Compliance with the provisions of § 1257 is an
essential prerequisite to [this Court’s] deciding the
merits of a case brought here under that section.”
Johnson, 541 U.S. at 431. Because no basis exists for
this Court to exercise jurisdiction at this stage, this
Court should reject the Petition as jurisdictionally
barred.
II. The Claimed Split Is Not Implicated Here
And Is Illusory In Nature.
The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine codifies an
important constitutional principle: the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment bars a civil
court from answering “strictly and purely ecclesiastical” questions. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S.
& Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976)
(quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1871)).
The doctrine protects the autonomy of religious institutions “to decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well
as those of faith and doctrine.” Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N.
Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). But this Court has
clarified that a civil court can and should generally
resolve an intra-church property dispute. See Jones,
443 U.S. at 602 (“The State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property
disputes.”). Under Jones, the civil courts can do so
either by application of neutral state-law principles,
where possible, or instead may choose to defer to the
highest ecclesiastical authority (where that hierarchy is clear or uncontested) on the relevant ecclesiastical questions. Id. at 602-03. “[T]he First
17
Amendment does not dictate” which option to follow.
Id. at 602.
And while the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
originated in the First Amendment, Mississippi has
recognized an equivalent bar under state law against
courts exercising “ecclesiastical jurisdiction” for over
a century. Mt. Helm Baptist Church v. Jones, 30 So.
714, 716 (Miss. 1901); see also Sustar v. Williams,
263 So. 2d 537, 540 (Miss. 1972) (“Long before the
Federal Government began to draw the rights of the
states into its centralized jurisdiction by the ‘process
of absorption’ this Court had a rich heritage in the
protection of religious freedom,” including by “refus[ing] to interpret ecclesiastical dogma”); Smith v.
Charles, 24 So. 968, 968 (Miss. 1899) (courts cannot
decide “contest between two factions” of a church
based on which faction followed the faith of the
church).2 And like this Court, the Mississippi courts
have long similarly recognized that intra-church
property claims can be properly resolved by applying
neutral principles of state law. Mt. Helm Baptist
Church, 30 So. at 716.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has had no trouble following this basic guidance for more than a
century, and no case from this Court (or any other
2 Watson v. Jones was decided “before judicial recognition
of the coercive power of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect
the limitations of the First Amendment against state action.”
Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 115. It was not until 1952 that this Court
held that ecclesiastical abstention “must now be said to have
federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of
religion against state interference.” Id. at 116.
18
court identified by the Petition) has brought into
question the Mississippi courts’ authority to abstain
from reaching ecclesiastical questions while attempting to decide property disputes using neutral, statelaw principles. But because the decision in this case
used the word “jurisdiction” twice in declining to
reach the ecclesiastical questions in this case, Petitioner now claims that this Court’s review is necessary to resolve whether the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine “deprives courts of jurisdiction to enforce
the ecclesiastical decisions of religious authorities in
an intra-church dispute.” Pet. i. Even if there were a
meaningful split on this issue, this case is not a
proper vehicle for addressing it because the use of
the word “jurisdiction” in the decision below made no
material difference in this case.
Whether the Mississippi Supreme Court lacked
jurisdiction or simply elected not to exercise it in declining to reach the purely ecclesiastical questions in
this case is not material here. Either way, the court
elected not to reach those questions as part of its
own long history of protecting the freedom of religious institutions to make their own ecclesiastical
decisions and remanded the property issue to be addressed under neutral state-law principles. This
Court expressly endorsed such an approach in Jones
and provided courts with the option to avoid reaching ecclesiastical questions. That option would be a
dead letter if courts were required to reach and defer
on all ecclesiastical questions presented in intrachurch disputes. And indeed, the Petition cites no
case in which a court has held that state courts may
not decline to reach ecclesiastical questions. Instead,
Petitioner’s claimed split largely features cases that
19
do not involve intra-church disputes at all, and other
cases where courts were simply choosing between
two proper options this Court specified in Jones for
addressing intra-church property disputes. Thus,
any diversity in how courts choose to resolve these
disputes simply reflects the flexibility this Court has
afforded the states and the circumstances of particular cases, not a genuine split.
A. The decision below would have been the
same regardless of whether the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bears
on a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
Based on the Mississippi Supreme Court’s use of
the term “jurisdiction” at the tail end of its decision
that the trial court should not have addressed the
predominantly ecclesiastical issues in this case, Pet.
App. 13-14, 21, Petitioner attempts to place the decision here on one side of a purported split between
courts that view the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine as bearing on subject-matter jurisdiction and
those that do not. Pet. 16-20. But the Mississippi
Supreme Court did not discuss, much less decide,
that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprives
courts of subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, it used
the term “jurisdiction” in a manner that is consistent
with this Court’s and other courts’ use of the term to
convey the basic principle that civil courts may not
opine on ecclesiastical questions in intra-church disputes. See, e.g., Watson, 80 U.S. at 732-33 (repeatedly using the term “jurisdiction” in describing courts’
lack of authority to decide ecclesiastical matters);
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713-14 (same) (quoting
Watson, 80 U.S. at 733-34); Seattle’s Union Gospel
20
Mission v. Woods, 142 S. Ct. 1094, 1096 (2022)
(mem.) (Alito, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari) (“As early as 1872, our church-autonomy
cases explained that ‘civil courts exercise no jurisdiction’ over [ecclesiastical] matters[.]”) (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 733).
At least as far as this case is concerned, whether
the Mississippi Supreme Court’s reference to jurisdiction connoted subject-matter jurisdiction in the
technical sense is a matter of semantics, with no material difference to the case’s outcome. Either way,
the result in this case would be the same—
Mississippi state law provides that courts should decline to reach ecclesiastical questions where possible
and resolve intra-church disputes based on neutral
principles. And, as we detail below, there is no confusion among the lower courts as to the propriety of
the Mississippi Supreme Court’s approach. See infra
II.C.
The question actually presented by the decision
below is simply whether the Mississippi Supreme
Court could abstain from reaching the disaffiliation
and authority issues, and remand the case to the trial court to adjudicate the property issues based on
secular, neutral principles. The answer to both of
those questions is yes. See infra III. Those rulings
implicate no conflict and are fully consistent with
this Court’s precedents.
21
B. The majority of Petitioner’s cases giving
rise to the claimed split have nothing to
do with whether courts must reach
ecclesiastical questions in deciding
intra-church property disputes.
Trying to portray a conflict among the state and
federal courts on whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bears on courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction, Petitioner cites over a dozen cases that are
unhelpful for two reasons.
First, those cases arise in the wholly distinct
context in which individual plaintiffs sue to challenge the ecclesiastical decisions of religious organizations—such as excommunicating members,
terminating ministers, or denying applicants admission to a parochial school. See, e.g., Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328, 332-33 (4th Cir.
1997) (declining to adjudicate claims by former executive director of religious non-profit terminated because of lack of funds). These kinds of disputes are
materially different from an intra-church dispute between two organizations that each claim sovereign
religious authority for their ecclesiastical decisions.
As then-Justice Rehnquist explained, while
“[t]here are constitutional limitations on the extent
to which a civil court may inquire into and determine matters of ecclesiastical cognizance and polity
in adjudicating intrachurch disputes,” “this Court
never has suggested … [they] similarly apply outside
the context of such intraorganization disputes.” Gen.
Council on Fin. & Admin. of United Methodist
Church v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 439 U.S. 1369, 1372
22
(1978) (order denying stay). The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is “premised on a perceived danger
that in resolving intrachurch disputes the State will
become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs.” Id. at 1373. This concern is
precisely what animated the Mississippi Supreme
Court’s decision to abstain from deciding the ecclesiastical questions in this case. Understandably, the
doctrine does not have the same implications when a
case does not present an intra-church property dispute, and thus, roughly half of the cases cited in the
Petition are irrelevant.
Second, all of the individual-plaintiff cases cited
in the Petition unsurprisingly come out the same
way—declining to second guess the ecclesiastical decisions of the defendant religious organizations.3
3 On Petitioner’s side of the purported split, not one of the
cases “enforced” a church’s ecclesiastical decision. See Bryce v.
Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 657-59,
660 (10th Cir. 2002) (courts cannot adjudicate claims by lesbian
former youth pastor regarding church debate on homosexuality); Winkler v. Marist Fathers of Detroit, Inc., 901 N.W.2d 566,
576 (Mich. 2017) (remanding claims brought by dyslexic student suing parochial school for determination of whether claims
require reaching ecclesiastical questions); Pfeil v. St. Matthews
Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Unaltered Augsburg Confession of Worthington, 877 N.W.2d 528, 542 (Minn. 2016)
(“[A]djudicating [plaintiff’s] claims would excessively entangle
the courts with religion and unduly interfere with [the
church’s] constitutional right[s].”); St. Joseph Catholic Orphan
Soc’y v. Edwards, 449 S.W.3d 727, 736, 738, 740-41 (Ky. 2014)
(remanding with order to dismiss because “when religious issues permeate” a dispute, courts “are without authority to adjudicate” and “must abstain from hearing the case”);
23
Whether the courts do so because they choose to “defer” to the religious organizations or simply because
they choose to abstain from deciding ecclesiastical
questions, the bottom-line effect is the same. And not
one of these cases involves a court using the doctrine
as a sword and becoming an arm of the church to
“enforce the ecclesiastical decisions of church authorities,” Pet. 12. Rather, they respect the religious autonomy of the church by declining to disturb the
ecclesiastical decisions the church made.
For both of these reasons, these cases fail to
show any “split” as to whether courts are required to
adjudicate the ecclesiastical questions presented in
an intra-church dispute.
Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-S. Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d
286, 294 (Ind. 2003) (declining to apply state blacklisting and
tort law to communication between church officials); Celnik v.
Congregation B’nai Israel, 131 P.3d 102, 107-08 (N.M. Ct. App.
2006) (“[T]he dispute … is precisely the type of religious debate
that the church autonomy doctrine is intended to protect from
judicial review.”).
Likewise, in the cases that are cited for Respondents’ side
of the purported split, the courts declined to review ecclesiastical issues. See, e.g., Rutland v. Nelson, 857 F. App’x 627, 627-29
(11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of claim regarding religious disciplinary proceedings because they are
“purely ecclesiastical in character”); Hyung Jin Moon v. Hak Ja
Han Moon, 833 F. App’x 876, 879-80 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary
order) (declining to adjudicate who is the proper leader of a
church because church leadership is an ecclesiastical question);
Bell, 126 F.3d at 332-33 (declining to adjudicate claims regarding termination of director of religious organization).
24
C. There is no split among courts on how
to apply the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine to intra-church property
disputes.
Consistent with this Court’s articulation of what
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine requires, as
well as its own precedent, the Mississippi Supreme
Court declined to reach the ecclesiastical questions
related to this intra-church property dispute and
remanded for the trial court to adjudicate the property dispute using neutral principles. The Petition
identifies no case holding that courts must reach the
ecclesiastical questions presented in intra-church
disputes. And thus, there is no split on the propriety
of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s approach.
There is no dispute that, as far back as 1871,
this Court has consistently held that in an intrachurch dispute, a court cannot opine on purely ecclesiastic questions. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 733 (“civil
courts exercise no jurisdiction” over a matter “strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character,” such as
“a matter which concerns theological controversy,
church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the
conformity of the members of the church to the
standard of morals required of them”). And the law
is clear that courts may resolve intra-church property disputes by reference to neutral principles of state
law without reaching related ecclesiastical issues.
See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-04; see also Presbyterian
Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)
(“First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized
when church property litigation is made to turn on
25
the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”). In Jones, this Court
explained that civil courts have a choice in deciding
intra-church property disputes. 443 U.S. at 604-05.
They may elect to resolve issues related to such a
property dispute by using neutral principles of law if
they can; but they also may choose to defer to the
highest ecclesiastical authority if that authority has
spoken (and where the church hierarchy is sufficiently clear or uncontested). Id.
Whether a court attempts to resolve a propertyrelated question using neutral principles or through
deference is a matter of state law, and the choice is
often guided by how those principles apply to the
particular case. See, e.g., Church of God in Christ,
Inc. v. Graham, 54 F.3d 522, 525-26 (8th Cir. 1995)
(Missouri resolves intra-church property disputes using neutral principles of law where possible, as permitted by this Court); Fonken v. Cmty. Church of
Kamrar, 339 N.W.2d 810, 813, 816 (Iowa 1983) (acknowledging courts are free to choose between neutral principles and deference to the highest
ecclesiastical authority, and employing both). The
cases cited by the Petition as presenting a conflict in
the handling of such property disputes simply reflect
the flexibility this Court has afforded the states in
choosing their own approach, as well as differences
in state law and the facts of each individual case.
The Petition says that eleven courts “have held
that it is proper to exercise jurisdiction and enforce
the ecclesiastical decisions of church authorities
within hierarchical denominations.” Pet. 12. But, of
course, courts are free to do so in appropriate cir-
26
cumstances and where suitable under their own
state law. This Court held as much in Jones. To the
extent the Petition suggests instead that courts like
the Mississippi Supreme Court instead must decide
intra-church disputes by enforcing the ecclesiastical
decisions of church authorities within hierarchical
denominations, it misunderstands both Jones and
the authorities it cites. No case the Petition cites on
the opposite side of the purported split conflicts with
the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision.
First, as discussed above, supra II.B, six of the
cases the Petition cites on its side of the purported
split4 are irrelevant because they do not have anything to do with an intra-church property dispute.
Instead, they involve the distinct context of individual plaintiffs suing to challenge the ecclesiastical decisions of religious bodies. And anyway, none of
these cases stands for the proposition that courts are
compelled to adjudicate ecclesiastical questions by
enforcing the decisions of church authorities.
Second, the six remaining cases5 that do involve
intra-church disputes also do not conflict with the
Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision. To the extent
Petitioner is claiming that these jurisdictions say
that courts are required to reach all ecclesiastical
4 See Bryce, 289 F.3d 648; Winkler, 901 N.W.2d 566; Pfeil,
877 N.W.2d 528; Edwards, 449 S.W.3d 727; Brazauskas, 796
N.E.2d 286; Celnik, 131 P.3d 102.
5 The Petition refers to eleven jurisdictions, but because it
cites two cases from California, there are twelve total cases the
Petition cites for its side of the purported split. See Pet. 14.
27
questions presented and defer to the highest ecclesiastical authority in intra-church property cases, this
Court’s Jones decision says otherwise. 443 U.S. at
605. And not surprisingly, the cited cases do not contradict Jones.
For example, the Iowa Supreme Court, like the
Mississippi Supreme Court here, acknowledged that
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine required it not
to decide any intra-church dispute based on its own
interpretation of religious doctrine. See Fonken, 339
N.W.2d at 812-13. But it determined that it could resolve the church property dispute before it based on
either deference to the highest church authority in a
hierarchical church, or, in the alternative, based on
neutral principles. Id. at 816. Ultimately, the Iowa
Supreme Court determined that under either the
compulsory deference approach or the neutral principles approach, the outcome in that case would be
the same. Id. at 819. Thus, there is no split between
the Mississippi Supreme Court’s and the Iowa Supreme Court’s decisions. Both acknowledged that the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine forbids them from
opining on religious doctrine, but that they could resolve the church property dispute by relying on one
of the two approaches approved by this Court.
The remaining cases involving intra-church disputes cited by Petitioner also reflect courts electing
between the two proper options identified by this
Court. See Graham, 54 F.3d at 526 (resolving church
property dispute based on neutral principles);
Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. Cawthon, 507 F.2d
599, 602 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing this Court’s
precedent and holding that “as a church of hierar-
28
chical polity,” hierarchical church “established its
right to possession and control” of property);6 Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66, 70 (Cal. 2009) (acknowledging that “[s]tate courts must not decide
questions of religious doctrine” and “[a]pplying the
neutral principles of law approach”); Tea v.
Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Nev.,
610 P.2d 182, 184 (Nev. 1980) (citing Jones and
electing to apply the deference approach, noting that
it is “not constitutionally impermissible”); Kim v.
True Church Members of the Holy Hill Cmty.
Church, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 515, 524 (Cal. Ct. App.
2015) (preferring the neutral-principles approach,
where possible, in property disputes).
These cases merely reflect the flexibility this
Court provided courts in Jones—not a split in authority. And none dictates that courts must reach all
ecclesiastical questions presented in an intra-church
dispute. All told, Petitioner’s claimed split is illusory.
III. Certiorari Is Also Unwarranted Because
The Decision Below Is Correct.
The Mississippi Supreme Court correctly applied
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in declining to
wade into the ecclesiastical dispute between the
Church and the District Council. Pet. App. 11-14.
6 Notably, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Cawthon precedes
this Court’s instructive decision in Jones. Nevertheless, the
Fifth Circuit’s decision still does not animate a split because
deference to hierarchical church authorities remains one of the
options available to lower courts.
29
And it correctly reasoned that the church property
dispute could be resolved in accordance with neutral
principles. Pet. App. 14-22. Both of those decisions
are consistent with this Court’s teachings on how to
properly apply the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
in resolving intra-church property disputes between
religious entities.
A. Civil courts are not required to reach
questions of church governance.
As this Court has long held, matters of church
governance are quintessential ecclesiastical questions. See, e.g., Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 115-16. State interference into these domains targets the “religious
law and polity” comprising the core of religious belief, and courts lack secular standards to decide
these questions without implicitly or explicitly evaluating tenets of a faith. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at
709. If the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is to
have any effect, it must protect religious institutions
from judicial meddling into how they structure their
affairs.
The decision below reflects this framework and
vindicates the larger constitutional principle advanced by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.
Drawing on both this Court’s precedent and its own,
the Mississippi Supreme Court observed that “[t]he
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine recognizes that the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment precludes judicial review of claims that require resolution of strictly and purely ecclesiastical questions.”
Pet. App. 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). It
then noted that ecclesiastical governance issues like
30
the “[t]he alteration of a parish,” are “at the core of
ecclesiastical affairs.” Id. (citing Schmidt v. Catholic
Diocese of Biloxi, 18 So. 3d 814, 822 (Miss. 2009)).
Accordingly, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that “a judicial determination of whether [the
Church] is to remain a member of the General Council and under its control intrudes into the affairs of
church government.” Id. In declining to “undertake
the adjudication of this internal church matter” and
voiding “[the trial court’s] determination” regarding
the validity of the disaffiliation vote and the District
Council’s attempt to place the Church under its supervision, the court sought to avoid inserting secular
courts into questions that are “predominately ecclesiastical in nature.” Pet. App. 13-14. This was a
straightforward and correct application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.
No case from this Court provides that courts
must reach and decide all ecclesiastical questions
presented in a dispute. Indeed, such a requirement
would obviate the purpose of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, as well as this Court’s decision in
Jones. After all, “the promise of nonentanglement
and neutrality inherent in the neutral-principles approach” would be a nullity if, notwithstanding this
Court’s approval of the neutral-principles approach
in Jones, litigants could “insist as a matter of constitutional law that whenever a dispute arises over the
ownership of church property, civil courts must defer” to an ecclesiastical authority on all related ecclesiastical issues. Jones, 443 U.S. at 605-06. In
declining to reach the ecclesiastical questions in this
case, the Mississippi Supreme Court sought to decide this intra-church dispute “free … completely
31
from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine,
polity, and practice.” Id. at 603. That approach is, at
a minimum, permitted by this Court’s precedent.
B. The property dispute was properly
remanded to be decided under neutral
principles of law.
The Mississippi Supreme Court’s remand of the
property dispute was correct and provides no basis
for this Court’s review. The Petition barely addresses
the Mississippi Supreme Court’s remand of the
property dispute for further proceedings in the trial
court. Despite the fact that the property issue commanded much of the attention of the decision and
briefing below, the Petition limits substantive discussion of this issue to a two-sentence footnote, urging that it is impossible to decide the property
dispute in this case without first reaching the related ecclesiastical questions. See Pet. 10 n.1. Petitioner
is incorrect, as the Mississippi Supreme Court remanded the property dispute to be decided under
neutral principles of law, as this Court explicitly
permitted in Jones. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 604 (“We
therefore hold that a State is constitutionally entitled to adopt neutral principles of law as a means of
adjudicating a church property dispute.”).
In resolving intra-church property disputes,
courts may rely “on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers
and judges,” rather than “questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.” Id. at 603. Courts regularly turn to these objective and well-established
principles to resolve the sort of property dispute at
32
issue in this case. And the Mississippi Supreme
Court is in accord. See Pet. App. 14-21. “Mississippi
has adopted the ‘neutral principles of law’ approach
for resolving church property disputes”—one of the
two permissible approaches to resolving these kinds
of disputes under this Court’s decision in Jones. Pet.
App. 16 (quoting Schmidt, 18 So. 3d at 824); see also
supra II.C (discussing the flexibility this Court gave
lower courts in Jones). In Mississippi, the neutralprinciples approach typically “allows courts to examine evidence respecting the deed and chain of title of
real property being claimed by the competing parties.” Pet. App. 17.
In this case, these neutral principles of law must
be applied to what are at this point “sharply contested factual disputes.” Pet. App. 23 (Maxwell, J., concurring). As the Mississippi Supreme Court
recognized, the current record at this stage of the litigation does not show that there was “an actual
transfer of property from [the Church] to the District” Council, or that the elements for the creation of
an express trust were met. Pet. App. 18. Accordingly,
the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that
there was insufficient evidence in the record to establish “whether the District has a resulting trust
interest in the property.” Pet. App. 19. And it determined that a fact question exists as to whether there
is an implied trust in the District Council’s favor.
Pet. App. 19-21. Given the ongoing factual disputes,
and the Mississippi Supreme Court’s conclusion that
the state-law property question can likely be resolved based on neutral principles of state law, Petitioner’s rush to have this Court treat this case as
turning on constitutional issues is premature, at
33
best. At this “early stage of the litigation,” when “it
is not clear that” the property dispute “will require
the court to address purely ecclesiastical questions,”
the proper course is to first allow the trial court to
decide the non-ecclesiastical questions. McRaney v.
N. Am. Mission Bd. of S. Baptist Convention, Inc.,
966 F.3d 346, 349, 351 (5th Cir. 2020) (remanding on
grounds that dismissal based on the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine was “premature” and “[a]t this
time, it is not certain that resolution of [the] claims
will require the court to interfere with matters of
church government, matters of faith, or matters of
doctrine”).
In short, the Mississippi Supreme Court properly
determined that summary judgment was improper
and remanded the property dispute to be resolved
under neutral principles of law. That fact-based ruling furnishes no ground for further review, even if
this Court did have jurisdiction over this interlocutory matter.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny
the petition for a writ of certiorari.
34
Respectfully submitted,
Malcolm Jones
Robert M. Loeb
831 E. Scenic Drive
Counsel of Record
Pass Christian, MS 39571 Thomas M. Bondy
Edward Williams
E. Joshua Rosenkranz
ORRICK, HERRINGTON &
Rachael Jensen
SUTCLIFFE LLP
Duncan Hosie
2100 Pennsylvania
ORRICK, HERRINGTON &
Avenue, NW
SUTCLIFFE LLP
Washington, DC 20037
51 West 52nd Street
(202) 339-8475
New York, NY 10019
rloeb@orrick.com
September 27, 2024
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.