Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Maude Laroche-St. Fleur, Applicant v. Board of Bar Overseers of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

No. ZZATOS

In the Supreme Court of the United States

MAUDE LAROCHE-ST. FLEUR

Applicant,

Vv.

BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF.

MASSACHUSETTS, et al.,

Respondent / Compiainants.

EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR STAY OF JUDGMENT

PENDING THE FILING AND DISPOSITION OF A PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

On Application for Stay of Judgment Pending Petition for

Writ Of Certicrari to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

To the Honorable Ketanji Brown Jackson

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States

and Justice for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ©

Maude Laroche-St. Fleur, Pro Se

PO Box 79

Roslindale, MA 02131

(857) 891-2520

MLAROCHEST @ GMAIL.COM

FEB -3 2023

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S.

PARTIES OT THE PROCEEDINGS AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Applicant, Maude Laroche-St. Fleur, was Appellant in the court below;

Respondent in the Board of Bar Overseers Proceedings; Appellant in the State

Appellate Courts in 2017 and 2019; Plaintiff in the Suffolk Probate and Family

Court since 2014; and Plaintiff and Appellant in the federal courts below.

Respondents include the Board of Bar Overseers of the Supreme Judicial

Court of Massachusetts in its capacity of performing its duties.

Respondents also include Rodney S. Dowell, in his official capacity as Bar

Counsel of the Board of Bar Overseers of the Supreme Judicial Court of

Massachusetts.

Respondents also include Robert M. Daniszewski, in his official capacity

as Assistant Bar Counsel of the Board of Bar Overseers of the Supreme Judicial

Court of Massachusetts.

Finally, Respondents include Joseph S. Berman, in his official capacity as

General Counsel of the Board of Bar Overseers of the Supreme Judicial Court of

Massachusetts.

All Respondents were Appellees and Complainants in the court below.

The proceedings below are:

1. In the Matter of Maude Laroche-St. Fleur, 490 Mass. 1020 (2022).

Opinion Affirming Suspension of Applicant's Law License, Entered Oct. 27, 2022

2. In the Matter of Maude Laroche-St. Fleur, BD-2022-012. Order of the

Single Justice Suspending Applicant's Law License for 18 months, Entered

March 25, 2022

3. Bar Counsel v. Maude Laroche-St. Fleur, No. C1-16-0004 (Board of Bar

Overseers of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 2016)

4. Laroche-St. Fleur, Maude v. St. Fleur, Sr., James, No. 14D1029DR

(Suffolk Probate and Family Court, Mass. 2014))

5. M.L.-S.F. v. J.S.F., No. 2016-P-1108 (Mass. App. Ct., 2016)

6. Maude Laroche-St. Fleur v. James St. Fleur, Sr., No. FAR-2547 (Mass,

2017). Denial of Application for Further Appellate Review, Entered Sept. 14, 2017

7. M.L.-S.F. v. J.S.F., No. 2018-P-1151, (Mass. App. Ct. 2019)

8. Maude Laroche-St. Fleur v. James St. Fleur, Case No. 18-P-1088,

(Mass App. Ct. 2019)

9. M.L.-S.F. v. J.S.F., No. FAR-26963, (Mass. 2019). Denial of Application

for Further Appellate Review, Entered Sept. 13, 2019

10. M.L.-S.F. v. J.S.F., No. FAR-26964, (Mass. 2019). Denial of Application

for Further Appellate Review, Re-entered Sept. 13, 2019

Related Proceedings are:

1. SF v. Budd, No. 21-cv-10078-DJC (D. Mass. 2021)

2. M.L.-S.F. v. Kimberly S. Budd, et al., No. 21-1685 (1st Cir. 2022)

Proceedings in this Court are:

1. M.L. - S.F. v. Kimberly S. Budd., et al., No. 22M54. Denial of Applicant's

Motion to Direct the Clerk to File Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Out of Time (One

Day Late), Entered January 9, 2023

2. Maude Laroche-St. Fleur v. Board of Bar Overseers of the Supreme

Judicial Court of Massachusetts, No. 22A640. Grant of Applicant’s Motion for

Extension of Time to File Petition for a Writ of Certiorari until February 24, 2023

There are no other proceedings in State or federal trial or appellate courts

or this Court directly related to this case within the meaning of this Court’s Rule

14.1(b)(iii).

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

As required by this Court’s Rule 29.6, Applicant hereby states that she is

an individual and as such has no parent entities and does not issue stock.

Dated: January 28, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

Maun A- 7a

Maude Laroche-St. Fleur, Pro se

PO Box 79

Roslindale, MA 02131

(857) 891-2520

MLAROCHEST @GMAIL.COM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS AND RELATED PROCEEDINGG............ i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ..............:c0secceeeeeeeeeeneeaeeeesenee iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS | asteesiienevenvos connows ctveeinernyenedive shes weuse stuns iweneanenerens v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES sisesccescsnsivecsnmese svesnevernecciesceseans cavasawecavaeeanentes vii

INTRODUCTION .....cscsesnteeiieiiesnetiscnidineditiien tie velstsitlesindivs siitiea mtn Sacuiigedaseseeneenceees 1

DECISIONS BELOW ...0... eee eee ee eeaeeen ee eeeeeeeaaeeesaeeeeeeesaeeeeeneeeae ess 3

BACKGROUND sipcccsasevests eenvestrovsent nee meviie teresa ceeevaenreeoes eeeeresecesenss 3

A. Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01: Bar

DISCIPIING «2... eee eee eee eee e ee eee cease eee eaeeaeeeaeseeeeeneneeeeees 3

B. The Board of Bar Overseers of the Supreme Judicial Court

of Massachusetts Proceedings Versus Applicant’s

Underlying Divorce: ReCOlrd wie csscecvessaeerrune ee rersianeeenreers 4

C. Merits Issues Have Been Ongoing for Well Over Eight

5 (Cc | CER el ee SLE, A, Me rant Re, ne er 8

D. — The Order of the Single Justice of the Massachusetts

Supreme Judicial Court ..........ccccccceceececeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeaens 10

E. The Opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial

Court Affirming the Order of Its Single Justice ............. eee 12

E The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s Order on

Applicant’s Motion for a Stay 2.0.0.0... cceceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeneeea ees 13

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE STAY 0.2.0... cee ceeeceesseeeeeee eee eeeeeen essen 14

l. A Stay is not Available from Any Other Court or Judge .............ceeee 14

IV.

V.

CONCLUSION

ADDENDUM

Applicant’s Request for a Stay Meets All the Required Standards

There is a Reasonable Probability that this Court Will Vote to

Grant Applicant's Petition And Then Reverse the Judgment

Below on the Constitutional Issues Raised in This Case

A.

Applicant Is Likely To Prevail On The Merits Of Her Claim

That The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Rule 4:01, §9(3) is Overbroad in Violation Of The Due

Process ClauSe ...........ccccccecececeeeeeeeeeeee ee eeeeeeeneteeeeeeeeenees

Applicant Is Likely To Prevail On the Merits Of Her Claim

That The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Rule 4:01, §9(3) Is Overbroad, In Contravention With

The Equal Protection Clause ..............cccceecseeeeeeeeee neta eeenes

The Merits Issues Are Pervasive And They Leave The Case

Unresolved In Violation Of The Due Process Clause And

The Equal Protection Clause ............cccceccc eee eeeeeeeeeaeeeeeeees

i. The Entry in the Mortgage Field Of Applicant’s

Financial Statement Fall Under An Exception Under

The Rules of the Probate And Family Court ...............

ii. Applicant Was Not and Is Not in Contempt of the

Probate and Family Court’s Orders ..............:ceceeeee eee

iii. The Judgment of Divorce Lacks Finality And Is Thus

1 (00 a ene ee eee

Applicant’s Irreparable Harms Would Continue to Accumulate

in the Absence of a Stay

The Equities and the Public Interest Overwhelmingly Favor a Stay ....

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Araneta v. United States,

478 U.S. 1301 (1986) ... eee eect eee cence eee eeeeeeaeeeaeeeeaeeesasaeeeesaseses 15

Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips,

274.U.S..316 (1927) sssecssamsveneners onceennrecenmauenersneaarennteecemmameemenesess 28

Bracy v. Gramley,

520 US 899 (1997) 0... eceeeeeceeeeeee eee eeeeeeeaeeeeeeeceeeeaeeeaeeeeaeeesaeeeeaensees 16

Catlin v. United States,

324 U.S. 229 (1945) oo. ceeeeeceeee ete ee ce eeeneeeee essa eeeeeeeeaaaeeaeaaeeeneaes 26

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,

A473 US; 432 (1985) sssacsccavessessav essen, caece caves sdersoaeseciatees avencnne snes 19, 20

Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture,

128 SICt. 2146 (2008) sic ccncscswesete onsisneaenaneuienetidenmeda een shade onda Seietenalbe 23

Ex parte Rowland,

104 U.S, 604 (1981) ccccceasessemirnseern coma sonererre renee aaarees 27

Gibson v. Berryhill,

411 US 564 (1973) ooo ccccccccccsccecsseeccsseeeccssseeeccessaeeecssseesecsreseses 18

Hollingsworth v. Perry,

558 U.S. 183 (2010) scvesssvistess tenes tevetevnsionaeeisteeeaeve verveiereeeaviaaweeauees 14

In re Birchall,

454: Mass887 (2009): vercceriscsasvsinoseannstvennsenweneueteanwmarmem sere awanawanecs 24

In re Detention of Kortte,

317 IN.App.3d 111 (2000) .....0.ccccecceseccecsseececesseeeeecnsueeeseatseesesteees 16

In re Ruffalo,

390 U.S. 544 (1968) oo... ecccceccccscccesseceesseeeeceesseeeeeestseeeseaaeseseenes 18

vii

Larson v. Larson,

28 Mass. App. Ct. 338 (1990) sccssiccccesesinsserssssesccsseneeseeesceeaaeseaes 24, 25

Mackey v. Montrym,

443 US 1 (1979) ....ec cee cceeee ccc teee eect ee eeeeenaneeeeeeenneeseeeeaeeneeeeaeneeeaae ees 16

Matter of Gargano,

460 Mass: 1022 (2011). sesccwesseweseveneereanneievererisbersnssesesewwesmniwtewanarionts 17

Maiter of Kenney,

399 Mass. 431 (1987), ..0...ncietaennr et sandntied eRe eRe NN 17

Matthews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319 (1976) 0... ccc cece eee eee eee eee ee eae eee eeet eases ae eeeneeeeeeea 17

Melenares v. Arpaio,

695 F.Sd 990 (Sth’Gir. 2012) ssiscnsencescm amcor teens 28

Nken v. Holder,

556 U.S; 418: (2009) wcsviswereewssssanannersoesservesasr ess tesessaewsneneneenes 15, 31

Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey,

510 U.S: 1309 (1994) ccccenssvcesuamntesereseeverssdewecsdtoscetvsacsessoncentincacninns 28

Pulliam v. Allen,

466 U.S, 522)(19B4) ..ccscccsannecnenc canner oetenssanea ene sanaasiauaaseveeneee aT 19

St. Louis, I.M. & S. R. Co. v. Southern Express Co.,

108 U.S. 24 (1983) 2... eee cere eee e ees er etree sed eeeeaneeeneeeea eee eeeeed 26

Rio Grande Community Health Center Inc. v. Rullan,

397 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2005) ..csssicenscrnarecrcressemmenmqereeerieemeen 28

Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield,

247 US 350 (1918) .0... eee eect e cence eee e eee a sees nesta eeee ener a eee nett 20

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,

528 US 562 (2000) ssseneevatseessewesavereennanmineswerssecsgsssswssws srotrsenenceenans 23

viii

V.T.A. Inc., v. Airco, Inc.,

597 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1979) 0.0... ceee eee e eee eee ee eee ee eee eee eenan ees 27

Withrow v. Larkin,

PIS TRU ISEC si GC) £=) ree 17

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. AMEN. XIV oo... ccc cece ee eee eee ec ee ceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeneeeeneeeeeees 16, 19

Statutes And Rules

DESC S:2TOI (RY aecsmnnccnnrnnnrealieonnssoaeeainane sash enkesstsexisucnsusainenneee 14

Supreme Court Rules

Sup: Cty Rule: 10(6) sec ccnesceravsenect cermeveesuenvesv eee weserseramernewnecives 15

Sup. Ct. Rule 28:3 «....:0ssctssesenes anmureneeresieemey recrawsesameermmereemr esas 14

State Rules

Supreme JUAIGIAl COUP RUIG 2:28 )...0csccaoermvanretinunuesinennansenentenessien 15

Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01 0.00... ccece cece cece ee eeeeeeeeeeeeeenees 2,3, 11

Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, § 5 .........cccccseeeeeeteeeeeee eee eee ee eeeees 4,21

Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, § 6 ..........cccscceeceeeseeeeeeeeneeeenaeeeeanees 4

Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, § 7 ........:.cccccecceeeeceneeeee eee eeeeenees 4, 22

Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, § 8 ...........ccccecceeecee neces eeeeneeee eee eeees 3

Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, § 9 ..........cccssecceeeeee seen eetteeeee 15, 16, 19

Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, § 13 ...........ccccceeeecee eects een eee nena 2, 29

Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, § 14 2.0... cece ceecee eee eeeteee eee 2, 11, 29

Mass. R. Civ. P. 60

Mass. Prob. and Fam. Ct. Supp. R. 401 20.2... ee cece eee eeeeeneeee eee ene 23

TO THE HONORABLE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND JUSTICE FOR THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF

MASSACHUSETTS:

Applicant respectfully seeks a stay of the judgment of the Supreme

Judicial Court of Massachusetts in this case, pending the filing and disposition

of a petition for a writ of certiorari. Applicant’s motion asking the court below to

stay its judgment was denied without a hearing on December 29, 2022. See

Application Appendix (“__a”) at 2a, Entry #31. Infra. at 184.

INTRODUCTION

This case raises profoundly troubling issues in violation of Applicant’s

fundamental, inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property under the

Constitution of the United States. This matter is based entirely upon the record

in Applicant’s underlying divorce case. The Board of Bar Overseers (“the BBO”)

availed itself of 31 exhibits to prosecute Applicant. Appendix Volume | (“App.

Vol. 1, __”) at 12, 95. But, Applicant was allowed to present only 2 exhibits from

the record in her defense. Infra at 169, Lines 12-22.

Yet, Assistant Bar Counsel said “... all of the evidence before the

committee particularly in the exhibits ... establishes very clearly that all of the

charges in the Petition for Discipline are well substantiated.” Infra. at 176, Lines

1-11. Then, Assistant Bar Counsel proceeded to attacking Applicant’s character

mercilessly. See Infra. at 182, Lines 6-16; Infra at 188-189; Infra at 191-194.

The Single Justice adopted the BBO’s recommendation and suspended

Applicant’s law license for 18 months. See 15a, 923. Infra at 18a-28a. The full

1

court below affirmed the order of its Single Justice. See 4a-12a. But the court

below has an unmet challenge. That is, to give Applicant the findings of fact and

the conclusions of law it relied upon in suspending Applicant’s law license. See

15a-17a, Entries 41-42, 50, 58-59.

Interestingly, on February 24, 2022, the Single Justice and Assistant Bar

Counsel subtly poked a hole in the findings of fact of the hearing committee.

App. Vol. 1 at 41, Lines 12-25. Finding 13 of the Hearing Reports is at Infra 202;

Infra 233. Four documents would complete this task: (1) Appendix M at 98a; (2)

Appendix N at 103a; (2) Appendix Volume 1 of 2; an (4) Appendix Volume 2 of 2.

On January 19, 2023, a hearing was held on Bar Counsel’s motion for an

order to have Applicant arrested. See 17a, Entry #60. The transcript of this

hearing should show that the Single Justice kept referring to “Section 14,” “the

Commissioner,” “Guardian Ad Litem,” “Disability,” “Inactive Status” ... The

Single Justice essentially said Applicant lacks the mental acuity to understand

what is going on in this case. He made it clear that he was considering taking

steps under his judicial authority and pursuant to SUC Rule 4:01, §§ 13 and 14

to do away with Applicant. See the rule at Application Addendum (“ADD”) at 6-8.

This case creates a constitutional crisis of national significance. This Court

should intervene and send a strong message nationally that States cannot

interfere with the superior power of the national constitution. The issuance of a

stay is warranted, pending the filing of Applicant’s petition for a writ of certiorari

and its disposition by this Court.

DECISIONS BELOW

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's Opinion affirming the Order

of the Single Justice that suspends Applicant's law license for 18 months is

included in the Appendix of this Application. See 4a— 12a. The Judgment was

issued on November 30, 2022. See 29a. On December 29, 2022, the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied Applicant’s motion to stay its

Judgment. See 140a—183a; /d at 184a.

BACKGROUND

A. Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01: Bar

Discipline

Pursuant to Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, the court

has exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving attorney disciplinary

proceedings. The court appoints the Board of Bar Overseers (“BBO”) to handle

complaints made against attorneys. The BBO, in turn, appoints a Bar Counsel

with the approval of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See ADD at 1.

The Bar Counsel considers and investigates complaints made against attorneys.

Not all complaints end with prosecution. ADD at 2.

Some matters can be cured through remedial measures, such as informal

conference, or diversion to an alternative educational, remedial, or rehabilitative

program. See SJC Rule 4:01, § 8(1)(b). See ADD at 3. A petition for discipline,

which is the charging document, should be issued only when formal disciplinary

proceedings are warranted. /d at § 8(3). See AD at 4.

3

When the Bar Counsel commences disciplinary proceedings with the filing

of a petition for disciple, the BBO appoints a hearing committee to conduct

hearings on the alleged charges made against the attorney. This committee may

make such recommendations as “dismissal of the matter, admonition, public

reprimand, suspension, or disbarment.” SJC Rule 4:01, § 6. See ADD at 2.

Alternatively, the BBO may appoint a hearing officer who is a lawyer to resolve

the matter, should the BBO determine that the matter can be resolved through

“a speedy and just disposition of the matter.” SUC Rule 4:01, at § 5(3)(d). See

ADD at 1-2.

Pursuant to SUC Rule 4:01, § 7(1), the Bar Counsel has the discretion not

to pursue a complaint that he or she “determines to be frivolous, to fall outside

of the [BBO’s] jurisdiction, or to involve conduct that does not warrant further

action.” See ADD at 2-3.

B. | The Board of Bar Overseers of the Supreme Judicial Court of

Massachusetts Proceedings Versus Applicant’s Underlying

Divorce Record

This matter stems from Applicant’s underlying divorce case. The BBO

inherits the record in the divorce proceedings, did not have to, and did not

engage in any discovery. On January 22, 2016, the BBO sent an initial letter to

Applicant, but kept this matter in deferment pending appeals. Appendix Volume

| (“App. Vol. 1”) at 17-29. On June 25, 2020, Bar Counsel filed a Petition for

Discipline against Applicant. Infra. 85, Entry #1. Id. at 89-96. Bar Counsel levels

three charges against Applicant.

Count I: Among other things, Bar Counsel alleges that Appellant (1) made

a false entry in the mortgage field of her financial statements, and (2) her

“financial statements were materially inaccurate in several respects.” Id. at

89-90.

Hearing Reports on This Entry. The Hearing Committee issued a hearing

report on August 2, 2021. Referring to the entry in the mortgage field, this report

reads: “We credit that the respondent in fact has this generalized concern.” App.

Vol. 1 at 219, §]79(c). The BBO amended this report on August 30, 2021. /d. at

225. And on October 21, 2021, the BBO issued an amended Hearing Report

with the same position on this entry in the mortgage field. Infra. at 249, 978(a).

Explanation for this Entry. See Exhibit P under Appendix Volume 2, at

119-139 and /d. at 136, “Explanation for Entry on Financial Statement.” These

pages are submitted to this Court under seal.

Alleged Inaccuracies of Financial Statements. The BBO’s allegation

that Applicant’s “financial statements were materially inaccurate in several

respects” has remained a conclusory statement. Stated another way, the BBO

has not produced the evidence in the record to that effect.

Count II. Bar Counsel charges Applicant for being held in contempt in her

divorce case. App. Vol. 1 at 90-92.

Seven Contempt Judgments and a Capias. |n 2015, the divorce judge

held Applicant in contempt three times. Appendix Volume II (“App. Vol. 2”) at

89-93. On December 3, 2015, the judge issued a capias for Applicant’s arrest.

Supra. at 36-37. In 2018, the judge issued three contempt judgments against

Applicant. Infra. at 94-97. And on January 9, 2020, the judge issued a seventh

contempt judgment against Applicant. /d. at 98-99.

Three Contempt Judgments in 2015. Among other things, payment is

due at the time of property division. /d. at 91, 914. Id. at 93. The judgment of

divorce for property division is dated December 30, 2015, and was entered on

January 6, 2016. See App. Vol. 2 at 28-29. Supra at 15, Entry #106.

Three Contempt Judgments in 2018. The Massachusetts Supreme

Judicial Court denied further appellate review on September 14, 2017. Infra. at

159. From September 14, 2017 to December 21, 2017, Applicant engaged the

other side, through emails and via his attorney, and attempted to reach a

negotiated settlement. /d. at 160-176. One offer to transfer the Deed to his name

was turned down. /d. at 162-166. Then, he turned down a second offer to buy

him out. /d. at 167-176.

In February 2018 and in March 2018, the judge issued a total of three

contempt judgments against Applicant for not selling her home. Supra at 94-97.

The judge appointed a partition commissioner to sell Applicant’s home at

auction.

Hearing in December 2019. On December 17, 2019, the judge gave the

partition commissioner the authority to seize Applicant’s home and evict her

therefrom. The judge said: “[YJou have the discretion to execute the plan as you

6

see fit...” The judge added: [Y]ou can take whatever course you deem

appropriate.” See 41a at Lines 14-20.

Motion to Reverse Conveyance of Home. On December 20, 2019,

Applicant filed a motion asking the Probate and Family Court Judge to reverse

his order conveying Applicant’s home to an appointed partition commissioner.

See 44a-46a. This motion, along with page 181 of Appendix Volume 2 (Sealed

Page), offers a glance of what Applicant was up against.

Contempt Judgment in 2020. On January 9, 2020, the judge issued a

seventh contempt judgment against Applicant. This time, the judge gave the

partition commissioner the authority to seize Applicant’s home and sell it at

auction. Id. at 98-99.

Motion for Issue Preclusion. Bar Counsel’s motion for issue preclusion

on three of the seven contempt judgments was entered on November 13, 2020.

See App. Vol. 1 at 86, #32. This motion is dated November 13, 2020. /d. at

97-100. Applicant vehemently opposed this motion. /d. at 101-110. /d. at

111-132. And /d. at 133-134.

Count III. Bar Counsel charges Applicant with filing a frivolous Rule 60

motion, among other things.

The BBO Availed Itself of 31 Exhibits From the Record. The BBO held

a hearing on March 23 and March 24, 2021. The BBO availed itself of 31 exhibits

from the underlying divorce record. See App. Vol. 1 at 12, 915.

Applicant Was Allowed to Present Only Two Exhibits. On January 14,

2021, Applicant submitted Exhibits A—VV from the underlying divorce record to

the BBO. See App. Vol. 1 at 121. See also Infra. at 159, Lines 10-16. The BBO

allowed Applicant to present only two of these exhibits: No. 32 and No. 33. /d. at

169, Lines 12-22.

Notably, the BBO allowed itself to admit into evidence excerpts from the

November 5 and November 6, 2015 trial transcripts. See 58a, at #12 and #13.

Applicant offered excepts from the same trial transcripts. App. Vol. 1, at 171,

Lines 8-20. See also /d at 172, Lines 10-23. The BBO did not allow those

statements to come in. Supra. at 169, Lines 12-22.

Shockingly, the BBO said in its closing argument that “all the evidence

before the committee, particularly in the exhibits ... establishes very clearly that

all of the charges in the Petition for Discipline are well substantiated.” Infra. at

176, Lines 1-11.

Cc. Merits Issues Have Been Ongoing for Well Over Eight Years

The other side, through his attorney, lulled Applicant into inaction and

inattention under the pretext that he agreed to exclude certain information and

documents from the divorce record. He agreed to amend his first pretrial

memorandum. App. Vol. 2 at 24-25, 41 and 411. See also Supra at 11, Entries

#13 and #16. Then, among other things, he subpoenaed the statements of three

business bank accounts that were closed since 2013, withheld them, and kept

Applicant in the dark. He mixed and entangled them with active statements.

8

Then, he blindsided Applicant with those entangled statements. App. Vol. 2, at

267-269. He said “there’s six more bank accounts that you didn’t tell us about?”

Id. at 270, Lines 7-8. He said Applicant had undisclosed assets. /d. at 277, Lines

16-24.

Finding of fact #25. This finding states in salient part that “[Applicant] has

bank accounts in her name or her business names of unknown value.” Supra at

47. On December 17, 2019, the trial judge asked four questions regarding

undisclosed bank accounts. See 37a at Lines 19-21; /d. at 38a, Lines 1-3.

Finding #13 of the BBO. The BBO’s August 2, 2021 Hearing Report and

its October 21, 2021 Amended Hearing Report refer to Applicant’s undisclosed

assets and unlisted bank accounts. App. Vol. 1 at 202 9113 and /d. at 233 413.

Those bank statements are under Trial Exhibits #8 and #9. Those statements

show with crystal clarity that the accounts ending in 6726, 6739, and 2979 were

closed since 2013. See App. Vol. 2 at 100-108; /d. at 109-110; /d. at 111-113.

For more clarity, the closing letters for those three accounts are under

App. Vol. 1, at 30-32. The Single Justice and Assistant Bar Counsel subtly

acknowledged the existence of those bank statements in open court on

February 24, 2022. See App. Vol. 1 at 41, Lines 12-25. In the history of this case,

this is the first time this ever occurred.

The Merits Issues Originated in the Trial Court. The trial judge’s

findings of fact are dated December 30, 2015. App. Vol. 2, at 44-56. On

February 9, 2016, the judge allowed Applicant to supplement the record with

9

documents that were not presented at trial in November 2015. See App. Vol. 2 at

116. Those additional documents fill in critical blanks.

In addition, certain trial exhibits in Appendix Volume 2 of 2 - in particular

exhibits #2, which leads Exhibit P; exhibit #13 under Exhibit NN; and exhibits #8

and #9 under Exhibit J - were not considered when the judge made his findings

of fact. But the trial judge denied Applicant’s motion to amend his findings fact.

Id. at 115. Those factual findings have remained unamended. The judge did not

make supplemental findings of fact in light of the additional documents in the

record. App. Vol. 2 at 211, Lines 24-25. Id. at 212, Line 1. The SUC denied

further appellate review in 2017 and in 2019. See App. Vol. 2 at 159. /d. at 220.

The underlying divorce case has remained unresolved on the merits to the

present. Four documents submitted with this Application would captivate the

attention of a curious reader. They are:

(1) Appendix M at 98a-102a; (2) Appendix N at 103a-139a; (3) Appendix

Volume 1 of 2; and (4) Appendix Volume 2 of 2.

D. The Order of the Single Justice of the Massachusetts

Supreme Judicial Court

The Single Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted

the recommendation of the Board of Bar Overseers. He suspended Applicant’s

law license for 18 months. See 18a-28a. This order was entered on March 25,

2022. See App. 15a, Entry #23. On April 5, 2022, the Single Justice denied

Applicant’s motion to stay his Order without a hearing. /d. at 15a, Entry #32. The

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Memorandum of Decision consists mainly of conclusory statements. On

September 9, 2022, Applicant filed a request for the findings of fact and

conclusions of law the Single Justice relied upon in suspending Applicant’s law

license for 18 months. Applicant simultaneously filed her Declaration in support

of this request. Applicant resubmitted the same request on October 4, 2022, and

on December 22, 2022. Her request has remained unanswered to date. See 15a,

Entries #41 and #42; /d. at 16a, Entry #50; /d. at 17a, Entries #58 and #59.

The BBO filed a motion seeking an Order for Applicant to show cause why

she should not be arrested for non-compliance with the terms of the suspension

of her law license. Applicant ceased practicing law pending a decision by this

Court. A hearing was held on January 19, 2023. The transcript of this hearing

should show that the Single Justice kept referring to “Section 14,” “the

Commissioner,” “Guardian Ad Litem,” “Disability,” “Inactive Status...” At some

point, the Single Justice asked Applicant directly if she would consent to the

appointment of a commissioner and a guardian ad litem. Applicant answered

with an emphatic and resounding “No.” Applicant asked why she was asked this

question. The Single Justice essentially said that Applicant lacks the mental

acuity to comprehend what is going on in this case.

Subsequently, Applicant read Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01 to

prepare for this Application. Then, Applicant came upon Sections 13 and 14,

which deal directly with “commissioner,” “disability,” “inactive status...” See

11

ADD at 6-8. This is more than an insult. This is a low blow, not to Applicant, but

to the administration of justice and to the justice system as a whole.

Sadly, this is not new to Applicant. In its October 21, 2021 Amended

Hearing Report, the BBO makes it look like Applicant has a mental disability and

cites exhibit 33. See App. Vol. 1 at 250, 1/78(c)(iv). Exhibit 33 is two August 14,

2014 email exchanges between Applicant and Opposing Counsel in the

underlying divorce case. infra. at 169, Lines 12-22. See also Supra at 166, Lines

13-17. And App. Vol. 2, at 24-25. Applicant does not have a mental disability,

and has never been diagnosed with a mental disability.

This seems to be more of a case where the BBO has a personal vendetta

against Applicant, and wants to destroy her at any costs. But worst of all, it is as

if the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts is unable to extricate itself from

this melee. Perplexingly, this matter rests on Applicant’s underlying divorce

case. The BBO has been protecting the other side overtly and repeatedly

assailing Applicant with ruthlessness.

E. The Opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial

Court Affirming the Order of Its Single Justice

On June 30, 2022, Applicant submitted her Preliminary Memorandum

pursuant to SUC Rule 2:23. See 2a, Entry #7. On July 6, 2022, Applicant

submitted a filing demanding that the BBO filed a Responsive Memorandum

under SJC Rule 2:23. The court denied this request on August 5, 2022. See 2a,

Entry #13. On October 27, 2022, the court affirmed - without a hearing and

12

without a responsive memorandum - the Order of the Single Justice suspending

Applicant’s law license for 18 months. See 2a, Entry #30. Applicant was

expecting an answer to her request for findings of fact and concussions of law.

Rather, the opinion of the full court maintains the status quo. Its “Sufficiency of

the Evidence” provision consists of 10 and a half lines of conclusory statements.

See 9a. However, the “Sanction” section occupies about three pages of the

Opinion. See 9Ya-12a.

The true narrative of the case is excluded from the Massachusetts

Supreme Judicial Court’s opinion. And so is the case in the Single Justice’s

Order, and the terms of Suspension. However, such Opinion, Order, and terms of

suspension, along with Applicant’s name and - in certain places, her photo - are

all over the internet, in widely circulated legal newspapers and legal blogs

(185a-193a), posted by the BBO under https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net.

F The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s Order on

Applicant’s Motion for a Stay

Subsequent to the affirmance of the Order of the Single Justice

suspending Applicant’s law license, Applicant submitted a motion for a stay of

the judgment pending the filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of

certiorari. See 140a. On December 29, 2022, the Massachusetts Supreme

Judicial Court denied this motion. See 2a, Entry #31 and Id. at 184a. Applicant

submits this application in light of that ruling.

13

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE STAY

I. A Stay is not Available from Any Other Court or Judge

“An application for a stay shall set out with particularity why the relief

sought is not available from any other court or judge.” Sup. Ct. Rule 23.3.

Applicant filed a motion seeking a stay of the judgment of the Supreme Judicial

Court of Massachusetts. The full court denied this motion on December 29,

2022. See 184a. See also 2a, Entry #31. The Single Justice also denied

Applicant’s motion for a stay on April 5, 2022. See 15a, Entry #32. A stay is not

available from any other court or judge. Consequently, this Court should grant a

stay pending the filing of Applicant’s forthcoming petition for a writ of certiorari,

and its disposition by this Court.

Il. Applicant’s Request for a Stay Meets All the Required Standards

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f), this Court may stay “the execution and

enforcement “ of a “final judgment or decree of any court ... pending the filing

and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari. For a Stay to be granted, an

Applicant must show:

“(1) a reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the issue

sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari;

(2) a fair prospect that a majority of the Court will vote to reverse the

judgment below; and

(3) a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay.”

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010).

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In addition, “[i]n close cases, the Court will balance the equities and weigh

the relative harms to the applicant and to the respondent.” /d. See also Araneta

v. United States, 478 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1986); Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,

427-429 (2009). Applicant meets each of these requirements.

lll. | There is a Reasonable Probability that this Court Will Vote to

Grant Applicant’s Petition And Then Reverse the Judgment

Below on the Constitutional Issues Raised in This Case

Because of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s clear conflict with

this Court's precedents and the national significance of this case, this Court will

likely grant the Petition and reverse the judgment below on three issues. Sup. Ct.

R. 10(c). First, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, §9(3) is

overbroad and in contravention with the Due Process Clause and the Equal

Protection Clause in profoundly troubling ways. —- Second, the merits issues are

pervasive and constitute grave violations of the Due Process Clause and the

Equal Protection Clause. Third, Applicant is challenging the constitutionality of

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Rule 2:23 in her forthcoming petition.

A. Applicant Is Likely To Prevail On The Merits Of Her Claim That

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, §9(3) Is

Overbroad in Violation Of The Due Process Clause

“The Board, members of the Board and its staff, members of hearing

committees, special hearing officers, and the bar counsel and members of his or

her staff shall be immune from liability for any conduct in the course of their

official duties.” SJC Rule 4:01, § 9(3). See ADD at 5.

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The words “shall,” “immune,” “liability,” “any conduct,” within this rule evoke

sovereignty. These words contradict the language under Section One of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the Untied States: “No State shall

deprive its citizens of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S.

Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. The Board of Bar Overseers is a subsidiary agency of

the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. It is Board of Bar Overseers of the

Supreme Judicial Court Massachusetts. The Board of Bar Overseers and its staff

inclusively are state actors. The Board of Bar Overseers and its members

inclusively “shall not deprive” any citizen of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts

“of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” SUC Rule 4:01, §9(3)

impermissibly gives the BBO and its staff the broad authority to act in any way

and be totally free from accountability for misconducts. Brazen and egregious

misconducts are protected under this rule.

“Procedural due process does not require perfect, error-free governmental

decision making.” Mackey v. Monirym, 443 US 1, 13 (1979). “It does, however,

require affording persons ... a relatively level playing field in a contested case

hearing. The state should not be permitted to maintain such an unfair strategic

advantage that a pall is cast over the fairness of the proceeding.” In re Detention

of Kortte, 317 Ill.App.3d 111, 250 (2000). “Thus, due process demands a fair trial

before a neutral or unbiased decision maker.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 US 899,

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904-905 (1997). “A basic requirement of due process is a fair trial before a fair

tribunal, and this principle applies to administrative adjudicators as well as to

courts.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 US 35, 46 (1975).

In the present case, the BBO availed itself of 31 exhibits from the record

for its March 2021 hearing. See App. Vol. 1 at 12, 95. The BBO’s Exhibits List

includes statements from the November 2015 trial transcripts. See 58a, #12-#13.

The BBO allowed Applicant to present only two exhibits from the record. App.

Vol. 1, at 169, Lines 12-22. Stunningly, the BBO prevented Applicant from

presenting exonerating statements from the November 2015 trial transcripts.

Infra at 171, Lines 8-20. The BBO live-streamed this hearing. Infra at 185, Lines

13-14. Applicant was not afforded “a relatively level playing field.” The BBO has

impermissibly maintained “such an unfair strategic advantage that a pall is cast

over the fairness of the proceedings.”

“A license to practice law is “ a constitutionally protected interest.” Matter of

Kenney, 399 Mass. 431, 436, 504 N.E. 2d 652 (1987). Citing Matthews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). “[An attorney’s] license to practice law is a

property interest that cannot be suspended without due process of law.” Matter of

Gargano, 460 Mass. 1022, 1025 (2011). “In a [suspension] proceeding an

attorney is entitled to procedural due process which includes fair notice of the

charges and an opportunity for explanation and defense.” Matter of Gargano, 460

17

Mass. 1022, 1025 (2011); Citing In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968). “Two

sources of possible bias - prejudgment of the facts or pecuniary interest - are

sufficient to disqualify the members of the Board.” Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 US

564, 578 (1973). (where the court found that the goal of the members of the

Board was to revoke the licenses of all optometrists in the state who were

employed by corporations).

Here, the BBO prejudged that Applicant promised to produce a written

agreement. As proof, the BBO cites and refers to nonexistent facts in the record.

App. Vol. 1 at 220, 479(e)(iii) and (v). Infra at 250, 178(c)(iii) and (v). Exhibit 33 is

two emails exchanged with opposing counsel in the underlying divorce case.

Supra at 169, Lines 12-22. The excerpts of the hearing transcripts cited by the

BBO are at 61a-85a. The BBO and its staff are constitutionally disqualified to

conduct proceedings against Applicant due to bias.

Notably, the opinion of the court below has been the topic of legal blogs.

This opinion has been published in widely circulated newspapers and other

media. See 185a-193a. The BBO has posted the order of the Single Justice

suspending Applicant’s law license online. See https://

bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net. This is more than bias. Or, this is bias with

teeth, limbs, and armors under the color of vested immunity pursuing to SJC

Rule 4:01, §9(3).

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B. Applicant Is Likely To Prevail On the Merits Of Her Claim That

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, §9(3) Is

Overbroad, In Contravention With The Equal Protection Clause

“The Board, members of the Board and its staff, members of hearing

committees, special hearing officers, and the bar counsel and members of his or

her staff shall be immune from liability for any conduct in the course of their

Official duties.” SJC Rule 4:01, § 9(3). See ADD at 5.

This rule of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts gives the BBO

plenary power to do as it pleases during proceedings with impunity. With the

extreme language within this rule comes a sense of plenary authority that can be

a perfect incubator for oppression and abuse. However, as State actors, the

Constitution of the United States imposes restraints on the actions and omissions

of the BBO during proceedings when complaints against attorneys come to their

attention. Consequently, there is a clash between SJC Rule 4:01, §9(3) and

Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

‘No State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.” Amend. XIX, § 1. “The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a

State from denying any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-542 (1984). Equal protection “is

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249,

87 L.Ed.2d 313(1985). The Supreme Court explains that “‘the purpose of the

equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person

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