Amicus Curiae Brief — United States, et al., Applicants v. Texas, et al.

No. 22A17

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ET AL.,

APPLICANTS,

V.

STATES OF TEXAS AND LOUISIANA,

RESPONDENTS.

TO THE HONORABLE SAMUEL A. ALITO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICI CURIAE BRIEF ON 8 1/2 BY 11

INCH PAPER IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS TEXAS AND LOUISIANA

OF ARIZONA, ALABAMA, ALASKA, ARKANSAS, FLORIDA, GEORGIA,

KANSAS, KENTUCKY, INDIANA, MISSISSIPPI, MISSOURI, MONTANA,

NEBRASKA, OHIO, OKLAHOMA, SOUTH CAROLINA, UTAH, WEST

VIRGINIA, AND WYOMING

MARK BRNOVICH

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Joseph A. Kanefield

Chief Deputy & Chief of Staff

Brunn (“Beau”) W. Roysden III

Solicitor General

* Counsel of Record

Drew C. Ensign*

Deputy Solicitor General

James K. Rogers

Senior Litigation Counsel

2005 N. Central Avenue

Phoenix, AZ 85004

Phone: (602) 542-5025

Fax: (602) 542-4377

JULY 13, 2022

(additional counsel listed in signature block)

MOTION FOR LEAVE

The States of Arizona, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kansas,

Kentucky, Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma,

South Carolina, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming (“Amici States”), represented by

their attorneys general, respectfully move for leave to file the attached proposed brief

of amici curiae in support of Respondents Texas and Louisiana and in opposition to

the Federal Petitioners’ Application for a Stay of Judgment. Amici States therefore

seek leave file the attached brief (1) without 10 days’ advance notice to the parties

and (2) on 8 1/2 by 11 inch paper, rather than in booklet form.

In light of the expedited briefing schedule set by this Court, Amici States could

not provide 10 days’ notice of their intent to file. Counsel for the State of Arizona,

however, provided notice to the parties of Arizona’s intent to file an amicus brief on

behalf of itself and additional states on the same day that Federal Petitioners filed

their application (July 8). Amici States further sought the consent of the parties for

the filing on this brief. Respondents consent to the filing of the attached amicus brief,

while Federal Petitioners take no position on this motion.

Amici States are suffering similar harms as Respondents Texas and Louisiana

from Petitioners’ intentional and pervasive violations of mandatory requirements of

federal immigration laws and the APA—which the district court’s vacatur

substantially remedied. Much like Respondents, Amici States would therefore suffer

extensive harms if this Court were to grant the stay sought by Federal Petitioners,

and therefore have a strong interest supporting their sister states in defense of the

vacatur they deservedly obtained.

More generally, this Court has observed that States “bear[] many of the

consequences of unlawful immigration.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 397

(2012). The challenged Final Memo substantially increases the volume of illegal

immigration

through

intentionally

and

unlawfully

degrading

immigration

enforcement—all at a time when illegal border crossings are already at historically

unprecedented levels. The Final Memo thus predictably increases the already

enormous burdens placed upon the States from DHS’s abysmal failure to secure our

nation’s borders.

The expedited filing and consideration of the Application prevented the Amici

States from printing and filing this brief in booklet form. In light of the expedited

proceedings and emergency nature of the Application, Amici States request the Court

grant this motion and accept the paper filing.

2

July 13, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Drew C. Ensign

MARK BRNOVICH

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Joseph A. Kanefield

Chief Deputy & Chief of Staff

Brunn (“Beau”) W. Roysden III

Solicitor General

* Counsel of Record

Drew C. Ensign*

Deputy Solicitor General

James K. Rogers

Senior Litigation Counsel

2005 N. Central Avenue

Phoenix, AZ 85004

Phone: (602) 542-5025

Fax: (602) 542-4377

Also supported by:

Steve Marshall

Alabama Attorney General

Eric S. Schmitt

Missouri Attorney General

Treg R. Taylor

Alaska Attorney General

Austin Knudsen

Montana Attorney General

Leslie Rutledge

Arkansas Attorney General

Douglas J. Peterson

Nebraska Attorney General

Ashley Moody

Florida Attorney General

Dave Yost

Ohio Attorney General

Christopher M. Carr

Georgia Attorney General

John M. O’Connor

Oklahoma Attorney General

Theodore E. Rokita

Indiana Attorney General

Alan Wilson

South Carolina Attorney General

Derek Schmidt

Kansas Attorney General

Sean D. Reyes

Utah Attorney General

Daniel Cameron

Kentucky Attorney General

Patrick Morrisey

West Virginia Attorney General

Lynn Fitch

Mississippi Attorney General

Bridget Hill

Wyoming Attorney General

3

No. 22A17

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ET AL.,

APPLICANTS,

V.

STATES OF TEXAS AND LOUISIANA,

RESPONDENTS.

TO THE HONORABLE SAMUEL A. ALITO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

PROPOSED BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE THE STATES OF ARIZONA,

ALABAMA, ALASKA, ARKANSAS, FLORIDA, GEORGIA, KANSAS,

KENTUCKY, INDIANA, MISSISSIPPI, MISSOURI, MONTANA, NEBRASKA,

OHIO, OKLAHOMA, SOUTH CAROLINA, UTAH, WEST VIRGINIA, AND

WYOMING IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONERS’ REQUEST FOR A STAY

MARK BRNOVICH

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Joseph A. Kanefield

Chief Deputy & Chief of Staff

Brunn (“Beau”) W. Roysden III

Solicitor General

* Counsel of Record

JULY 13, 2022

Drew C. Ensign*

Deputy Solicitor General

James K. Rogers

Senior Litigation Counsel

2005 N. Central Avenue

Phoenix, AZ 85004

Phone: (602) 542-5025

Fax: (602) 542-4377

(additional counsel listed in signature block)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .................................................................................... 1

ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... 2

I.

The Situation At The Border Deteriorated While The Final Memo

And Its Predecessors Were In Effect ........................................................ 3

II.

The Need For The District Court’s Vacatur Is Underscored By

The Administration’s Lawless Actions ..................................................... 7

A.

DHS Has Repeatedly Violated Notice-and-Comment

Requirements ............................................................................... 8

B.

DHS Has Repeatedly And Illegally Refused To Consider

The States’ Reliance Interests ................................................... 10

III.

The Final Memo Harms States Through Increased Law

Enforcements Costs And Additional Crime ........................................... 15

IV.

“Shall” In 8 U.S.C. §§1231(a)(1)(A) And 1226(c) Means “Must” ........... 18

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 25

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS,

141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021).......................................................................................... 14, 15

Arizona v. DHS,

No. CV-21-00186, 2021 WL 2787930 (D. Ariz. June 30, 2021).................... 15, 17, 18

Arizona v. United States,

567 U.S. 387 (2012) ................................................................................................ 1, 12

BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States,

541 U.S. 176 (2004) .................................................................................................... 19

Biden v. Texas,

__ S. Ct. __, 2022 WL 2347211 (U.S. June 30, 2022) ................................................. 7

Christensen v. Harris Cty.,

529 U.S. 576 (2000) .................................................................................................... 21

Coyt v. Holder,

593 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................... 21, 24

DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,

140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020)................................................................................ 2, 10, 11, 12

Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki,

552 U.S. 389 (2008) .................................................................................................... 19

Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno,

515 U.S. 417 (1995) .................................................................................................... 19

Jennings v. Rodriguez,

138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).................................................................................................. 20

Jimenez v. Quarterman,

555 U.S. 113 (2009) .................................................................................................... 19

Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,

141 S. Ct. 2271 (2021)............................................................................................ 3, 18

iii

Kucana v. Holder,

558 U.S. 233 (2010) .................................................................................................... 24

Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach,

523 U.S. 26 (1998) ...................................................................................................... 19

Louisiana v. CDC,

__ F.Supp.3d __, 2022 WL 1604901 (W.D. La. May 20, 2022)................. 6, 10, 15, 16

Louisiana v. CDC,

No. 22-CV-885, 2022 WL 1276141 (W.D. La. Apr. 27, 2022)................................... 10

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. 137 (1803) ........................................................................................................ 14

Nielsen v. Preap,

139 S. Ct. 954 (2019).............................................................................................. 3, 18

Texas v. Biden,

20 F.4th 928 (5th Cir. 2021) ........................................................................................ 7

Texas v. Biden,

No. 21-cv-00067 (N.D. Tex. June 15, 2022) ................................................................ 7

Texas v. United States,

__ F.Supp.3d __, No. 6:21-CV-00016, 2022 WL 2109204 (S.D. Tex. June 10, 2022)

................................................................................................................................ 9, 16

Texas v. United States,

14 F.4th 332 (5th Cir. 2021) ........................................................................................ 9

Texas v. United States,

515 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2021).......................................................................... 8

Texas v. United States,

524 F. Supp. 3d 598 (S.D. Tex. 2021).......................................................................... 8

Texas v. United States,

555 F. Supp. 3d 351 (S.D. Tex. 2021).......................................................................... 9

TRW Inc. v. Andrews,

534 U.S. 19 (2001) ...................................................................................................... 20

West Virginia v. EPA,

__ S. Ct. __, 2022 WL 2347278 (June 30, 2022) ...................................................... 15

iv

STATUTES

8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) ....................................................................................................... 7

8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) .................................................................................................. 7

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) ........................................................................................................... 7

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) .................................................................................................... 19, 21

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2)................................................................................................ 21, 22

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1) (1996) .......................................................................................... 25

8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(2) .................................................................................................... 23

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) .............................................................................. 19, 21, 22, 25

8 U.S.C. § 1231(c)(2)(C)................................................................................................. 22

8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1996) .................................................................................................. 23

8 U.S.C. § 1252 (c)(1) (1996) ......................................................................................... 24

OTHER AUTHORITIES

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828 ............................................................................. 23, 24, 26

Joseph Biden, Remarks at the White House (August 3, 2021),

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/03/remarksby-president-biden-on-fighting-the-covid-19-pandemic/ .......................................... 15

National Institute of Justice, Measuring Recidivism (Feb. 20, 2008),

https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/measuring-recidivism#statistics ......................... 18

Nick Miroff, U.S. border arrests rose to record high in May, data shows, THE

WASHINGTON POST, June 16, 2022,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2022/06/16/united-states-borderimmigration-arrests/.................................................................................................... 7

Off. of Inspector Gen., ICE Spent Funds on Unused Beds, Missed COVID-19

Protocols and Detention Standards while Housing Migrant Families in Hotels

(April 12, 2022), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2022-04/OIG-2237-Apr22.pdf .............................................................................................................. 14

v

Shall, American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed.) ........................................................... 20

Shall, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ............................................................ 20

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Southwest Land Border Encounters, available

at https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-land-border-encounters ........... 6

vi

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

As this Court has previously observed, States “bear[] many of the consequences

of unlawful immigration.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 397 (2012). In the

last 17 months, the volume of unlawful immigration has soared to levels unseen in

the United States in decades—and, quite likely, ever. So too have the resulting

burdens placed on the States.

But the federal government steadfastly refuses to acknowledge those costs:

either in considering the harms to States and their reliance interests in rulemaking,

as the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) demands, or in court by refraining from

reflexively advancing baseless standing arguments premised on the States somehow

never suffering a scintilla of cognizable harms from DHS’s unprecedented and

appalling failures. DHS’s lawless refusal to enforce immigration laws as written—

exemplified by the challenged action here, which reads multiple “shall”s as mere

“may”s—continues to impose significant costs on the States, including billions of

dollars in new expenses relating to law enforcement, education, and healthcare

programs. Those harms are exacerbated by DHS’s increasingly brazen disrespect for

the requirements of our nation’s immigration laws and the APA.

As sovereigns within our federal system of dual sovereigns, the States also

have an important interest in ensuring that the federal government respects the rule

of law. DHS’s challenged policies here, however, reflect a corrosive disrespect for that

bedrock principle.

1

ARGUMENT

The States of Arizona, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kansas,

Kentucky, Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma,

South Carolina, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming (“Amici States”), submit this brief

in support of their sister states Texas and Louisiana and in opposition to Federal

Petitioners’ (“DHS’s”) request for a stay of the district court’s judgment. This brief

advances four principal points to provide important context to this Court’s resolution

of DHS’s application. First, the current situation at the U.S.-Mexico border is an

unmitigated disaster. The number of illegal crossings per month is at levels unseen

in at least a generation. DHS’s own data and declarations make these facts painfully

clear—and further reveal just how wildly implausible DHS’s contention that none of

this crisis has inflicted any cognizable injury on Texas and Louisiana is here.

Second, the challenged Final Memo (a.k.a. “Guidance,” “Permanent Guidance”

or “Permanent Memorandum”) is the product of escalating lawlessness by DHS. Both

of the Final Memo’s predecessors were enjoined for inter alia violating the APA’s

notice-and-comment requirements. But despite having sufficient time to take and

respond to comments before issuing the Final Memo, DHS instead decided to triple

down on its APA violations. The Final Memo also continues DHS’s serial refusals to

consider the reliance interests of States—despite this Court’s unequivocal holding in

DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S.Ct. 1891 (2020) that it do so.

Third, the Final Memo plainly inflicts harms upon both Respondent States and

Amici States. In particular, increased law enforcement expenses is the predictable—

2

and realized—result of the Final Memo and its equivalent predecessors. Indeed,

DHS’s own officer readily admitted in a deposition that the Final Memo’s predecessor

was the only conceivable cause of the “big drop-off” (his words) both in immigration

detainers being issued and in final removal orders being effectuated.

Fourth, the Final Memo’s interpretation of sections 1226(c) and 1231(a) violate

those sections’ plain text—which imposes an actual mandate by commanding that

DHS “shall” take particular actions, rather than “may” take them (which is the

central premise of the Final Memo). These conclusions are confirmed by the

applicable canons of construction and the legislative history, including the 1996

amendments, which manifestly intended to obliterate the very discretion that DHS

now arrogates to itself. Even more importantly, the Final Memo violates this Court’s

construction of those precise provisions. Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S.Ct. 954, 959 (2019)

(holding that under §1226(c), “aliens must be arrested ‘when [they are] released’ from

custody on criminal charges” (emphasis added)); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 141

S.Ct. 2271, 2281 (2021) (holding under §1231(a)(1)(A) that “[o]nce an alien is ordered

removed, DHS must physically remove him … within a 90-day ‘removal period.’”

(emphasis added)). DHS tellingly cites neither case in its application to this Court.

The Final Memo’s contrary conclusions—which directly violate the holdings of

this Court—are as audaciously unlawful as agency actions come.

I.

The Situation At The Border Deteriorated While The Final Memo And

Its Predecessors Were In Effect

The challenged Final Memo here is part of a constellation of policies that have

intentionally hobbled immigration enforcement and led to enormous increases in

3

attempted (and successful) illegal border crossings. This, in turn, has caused the

Amici States extensive harms through increased law enforcement, education, and

health care expenditures. To put those harms in perspective, it is useful to consider

first the unprecedented scale of the current border crisis.

DHS has itself admitted that it is “encountering record numbers of noncitizens

... at the border,” which “ha[s] strained DHS operations and caused border facilities

to be filled beyond their normal operating capacity.” Declaration of David Shahoulian

(DHS Assistant Secretary for Border and Immigration Policy) at 1-2, Huisha-Huisha

v. Mayorkas, No. 21-cv-100, ECF No. 116 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2021).

DHS’s own statistics reveal the unprecedented surge of unlawful migration

and the collapse of DHS’s operational control of the border. Nearly a year ago, DHS

admitted that July 2021 had the highest number of monthly encounters in decades—

and, very likely, ever (up to that point). Id. at 7 (reporting “the highest monthly

encounter number since Fiscal Year 2000”). “Monthly family encounter rates have

generally been increasing since April 2020, rising 100-fold from 738 encounters in

April 2020 to over 75,000 in July 2021.” Id. at 9. DHS itself characterized these

summer-2021 numbers as “an historic surge” and an “influx.” Id. at 3, 6.

That “historic surge” has only gotten worse since then. U.S. Border Patrol

statistics for migrants illegally crossing the southwestern border show that, in each

month in 2021, alien encounters were significantly higher than encounters during the

same month in previous years. And, so far, monthly encounters for each month in

2022 was higher than the number of encounters in 2021.

4

The most recent DHS data, from June 2022, (copied below) illustrates the

unprecedented nature of the crisis. Notably, the number of encounters in May 2022

with illegal border-crossers—239,416—was more than ten times the May 2020

numbers, and more than 1.5 times the corresponding number for May 2019.

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Southwest Land Border Encounters,

available at https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-land-border-encounters.

5

As the Washington Post explained, “Immigration arrests along the U.S.

southern border rose in May to the highest levels ever recorded.... CBP made 239,416

arrests along the Mexico border last month.... The agency is on pace to exceed 2

million detentions during fiscal 2022 ... after tallying a record 1.73 million in 2021.”1

Border encounters with DHS unfortunately only tell a small part of the story.

DHS fails to encounter (i.e., apprehend) most illegal border-crossers entirely. These

so-called “gotaways” comprise about three-fourths of all border crossers. See

Louisiana v. CDC, __ F.Supp.3d __, 2022 WL 1604901, at *6 (W.D. La. May 20, 2022)

(“[O]nly 27.6% of undocumented persons crossing the southern border were

apprehended by DHS personnel.”). Thus, the actual number of crossers may be four

times DHS’s reported encounter numbers (i.e., roughly three gotaways for every DHS

encounter).

Many of those migrants encountered by DHS are nonetheless permitted entry

into the U.S. Although most are supposed to be subject to mandatory detention if they

are not immediately removed, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §1225(b), DHS has also circumvented

this mandate through abuse of its parole authority under 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(5).

As this Court recently observed, parole “authority is not unbounded: DHS may

exercise its discretion to parole applicants ‘only on a case-by-case basis for urgent

humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.’” Biden v. Texas, __ S. Ct. __, 2022

Nick Miroff, U.S. border arrests rose to record high in May, data shows, THE WASHINGTON POST,

June 16, 2022 (emphasis added), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2022/06/16/unitedstates-border-immigration-arrests/.

1

6

WL 2347211, at *12 (U.S. June 30, 2022) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). But DHS

has instead unlawfully been “releas[ing] undocumented immigrants into the United

States en masse” under its limited parole authority. Texas v. Biden, 20 F.4th 928, 996

(5th Cir. 2021) rev’d in part 2022 WL 2347211 (2022).

Thus, in May 2022, DHS paroled 68,527 aliens into the U.S.; in April, the

number was 91,250 aliens. Texas v. Biden, No. 21-cv-67, ECF No. 139 at 3 and ECF

No. 140 at 3 (N.D. Tex. June 15, 2022). These numbers are escalating rapidly: in

March 2022, DHS “only” paroled 36,777. Id. ECF No. 136.

In a nutshell: aliens are unlawfully crossing the southwestern border in

historically unprecedented numbers. Most—roughly ¾—elude DHS entirely. And for

that small portion that does not slip through DHS’s fingers entirely, the agency

unlawfully paroles many of them into the U.S. rather than detaining them. For the

vast majority of migrants unlawfully entering the United States, actual enforcement

of U.S. immigration laws by DHS is thus the rare exception, rather than the rule.

This is a crisis, even if the Administration steadfastly will not describe it as

such.

II.

The Need For The District Court’s Vacatur Is Underscored By The

Administration’s Lawless Actions

The Administration’s brazen defiance of APA requirements underscores the

need for federal courts to act decisively to break the Administration’s escalating

pattern of lawlessness. DHS has engaged in a systematic pattern of violating the APA

for 17 months now. These serial APA violations underscore why DHS’s requested stay

is particularly unwarranted here.

7

A.

DHS

Has

Repeatedly

Requirements

Violated

Notice-and-Comment

The decision below vacating the Final Memo is only the latest iteration in a

string of decisions reviewing successive DHS anti-enforcement rules/memoranda.

The first rule was a memorandum issued—without notice-and-comment—on January

20, 2021, the “January Memorandum.” The January Memorandum imposed a 100day moratorium on all deportations and also created a list of “enforcement priorities”

significantly limiting detention and removal of aliens going forward.

The Southern District of Texas quickly concluded that the January

Memorandum was both procedurally and substantively invalid. That court

specifically held that it was “a rule that is not exempt from the notice and comment

requirements of section 553.” Texas v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 3d 598, 662 (S.D.

Tex. 2021); accord Texas v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 3d 627, 638 (S.D. Tex. 2021)

(granting temporary restraining order). That court further held that the January

Memorandum violated 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(1)(A) and was arbitrary and capricious. 524

F. Supp. 3d at 644-56.

DHS neither appealed that decision, nor attempted to comply with it. Instead,

the agency doubled down. DHS thus issued a new, superseding memorandum on

February 18, 2021 (the “Interim Guidance”)—also without complying with noticeand-comment procedures, even though it adopted “enforcement priorities”

substantially similar to its predecessor.

The Southern District unsurprisingly held this was unlawful, again, and

issued a preliminary injunction. Texas v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 3d 351, 435 (S.D.

8

Tex. 2021). Once again, that court held that DHS had violated notice-and-comment

requirements (among other mandates). Id. at 426-35. This time DHS did appeal and

initially obtained a partial stay pending appeal, but the Fifth Circuit then granted

rehearing en banc and dissolved the stay. See Texas v. United States, 14 F.4th 332

(5th Cir.) (granting stay), vacated on rehearing en banc 24 F.4th 407 (5th Cir. 2021).

By this time, DHS’s third serial notice-and-comment violation was already well

underway. DHS issued a successor memorandum on September 30, 2021, the “Final

Memo,” along with an accompanying “Considerations Memorandum”—again without

complying with notice-and-comment procedures. See Texas v. United States, __

F.Supp.3d __, No. 6:21-CV-00016, 2022 WL 2109204, at *10 (S.D. Tex. June 10, 2022).

DHS’s third evasion of notice-and-comment requirements was not the charm:

The same district court again held DHS’s circumvention unlawful. Id. at *39-42.

DHS’s persistent refusal either (1) to abide by the APA’s requirements or (2) attempt

to address any of the district court’s repeated holdings that DHS violated applicable

legal requirements, is lawless. And this third violation was particularly noteworthy,

as DHS had more than seven months after issuing the Interim Guidance—i.e., ample

time—to take and respond to public comment.

But despite having sufficient time to conduct notice-and-comment rulemaking

for the Final Memo here, DHS simply chose not to do so—apparently concluding that

the judicial rebukes it has received to date were not yet sufficiently stinging to justify

any change of course. Denial of a stay here may start the very necessary process of

convincing DHS that APA compliance is not optional and readily dispensed with.

9

Notably, the Administration’s serial APA notice-and-comment violations for

DHS’s anti-enforcement memoranda are paired with other parallel APA violations in

the immigration context. In particular, the CDC issued an order purporting to

terminate the federal government’s “Title 42 policy” without notice-and-comment

rulemaking. The Western District of Louisiana concluded this too violated the APA

and issued a preliminary injunction. Louisiana, 2022 WL 1604901, at *21. CDC

appealed that decision, but has neither sought a stay pending appeal nor begun

attempting to comply with notice-and-comment requirements in the meantime. DHS

was also caught red-handed illegally—and clandestinely—implementing the Title 42

Termination Order before its actual effective date, necessitating a temporary

restraining order. See Louisiana v. CDC, No. 22-CV-885, 2022 WL 1276141 (W.D. La.

Apr. 27, 2022).

B.

DHS Has Repeatedly And Illegally Refused To Consider The

States’ Reliance Interests

Notice-and-comment requirements are hardly the only APA mandates of which

DHS is a repeat offender. In particular, DHS has repeatedly failed to consider the

States’ reliance interests in promulgating its immigration (non-)enforcement policies.

“When an agency changes course … it must ‘be cognizant that longstanding

policies may have engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into

account.’” Regents, 140 S.Ct. at 1913 (cleaned up) (citation omitted). “It would be

arbitrary and capricious to ignore such matters.” Id.

The Final Memo, however, makes no attempt to consider the States’ reliance

interests. Instead, DHS endeavors only to delegitimize those reliance interests, rather

10

than weigh them meaningfully or fairly. Thus, just as in Regents, DHS “does not

contend that [it] considered potential reliance interests; it counters that [it] did not

need to.” Id. at 1913.

In Regents, DHS argued that “DACA recipients have no ‘legally cognizable

reliance interests’ because the DACA Memorandum stated that the program

‘conferred no substantive rights’ and provided benefits only in two-year increments.”

Id. In other words, echoing its rationale here, DHS argued in Regents that any

reliance interests were not reasonable or legitimate because the immigration

enforcement program at issue created no vested rights and was inherently temporary.

This Court made plain that this rationale squarely violates the APA. Id. at 1913-15.

Regents further faulted DHS explicitly for failing to consider the reliance interests of

“States and local governments [which] could lose $1.25 billion in tax revenue each

year.” Id. at 1914.

Recalcitrant in the face of Regents’s holding, DHS recycles its same discredited

rationale here. DHS thus claims that the States’ reliance on prior enforcement

policies was illegitimate as a matter of law since, in DHS’s view, it “would be

unreasonable in light of the long history of the Executive’s use of evolving

enforcement priority schemes in this area.” Considerations Memorandum at 16.

But this Court has already rejected this precise argument: “[N]either the

Government nor the lead dissent cites any legal authority establishing that such

features automatically preclude reliance interests, and we are not aware of any.”

Regents, 140 S.Ct. at 1913-14. Moreover, Regents too involved an “evolving

11

enforcement priority schemes”—i.e., DACA and DAPA. DHS’s reasoning here thus

offers nothing beyond what the agency already said in Regents, which this Court

found wanting.

Moreover, the Fifth Circuit already invalidated on the same basis another

equivalent rationale post-Regents, involving the MPP or “Remain in Mexico”

program—a holding DHS did not seek review of in Biden v. Texas. There too, DHS

had discounted outright the States’ reliance interests based on its assertion that the

agency “had no obligation to consider the States’ reliance interests at all.” Texas v.

Biden, 20 F.4th at 990. This Fifth Circuit, however, found that rationale

“astonishing[]” since it was “squarely foreclosed by Regents.” Id. It is no less

astonishingly bad here.

Defendants’ refusal to consider the States’ reliance interests is particularly

egregious because Defendants did consider the reliance interests of, and practical

impact on, “non-governmental entities, including immigrant advocacy organizations.”

Considerations Memo at 8, 11. But no such consideration was extended to the States,

even though they “bear[] many of the consequences of unlawful immigration.”

Arizona, 567 U.S. at 397. DHS’s contempt for the States is thus paired with palpable

solicitude for the interests of the Administration’s ideological allies. The APA exists

precisely to avoid this sort of myopic decision-making in which only the interests and

input of political pals is considered.

DHS’s repeated refusal to consider the reliance interests of the States thus

underscores the lawlessness that pervades the Final Memo.

12

*

*

*

These violations of the requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking and

considering States’ reliance interests are merely some of the most egregious legal

violations by DHS in its efforts to cripple immigration enforcement. DHS’s own

Inspector General, for example, has concluded that the agency violated procurement

law in awarding a $17 million no-bid contract, putatively for supplementing DHS’s

detention capacity—but the agency then overwhelmingly failed to use the capacity

that it had unlawfully secured.2 DHS also contrived last week to reduce its detention

capacity through settling a suit with its ideological allies—thereby further degrading

its enforcement efforts and virtually guaranteeing additional parole grants. Rae Ann

Varona, ICE Agrees To Restrictions In COVID-19 Hot Spot Settlement, LAW360, (July

7,

2022),

https://www.law360.com/articles/1509393/ice-agrees-to-restrictions-in-

covid-19-hot-spot-settlement. And, as explained above, DHS also secretly and

illegally began implementing CDC’s attempted rescission of Title 42 Orders more

than a month before the effective date. Supra at 10.3

Nor is the rest of this Administration any paragon of the rule of law. President

Biden announced his judgment that any extension of the CDC eviction moratorium

Office of Inspector Gen., ICE Spent Funds on Unused Beds, Missed COVID-19 Protocols and

Detention Standards while Housing Migrant Families in Hotels (April 12, 2022),

https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2022-04/OIG-22-37-Apr22.pdf.

3 The States only discovered the premature illegal implementation from news reports. Even though

the States had a pending motion for a preliminary injunction, DHS declined to inform the States that

the actions they sought to enjoin were already underway before the purported implementation date of

the disputed rule at issue.

2

13

was likely illegal—while simultaneously commanding CDC to extend it anyway.4 The

President further observed that—legal or not—he was likely to be able to impose his

will for at least a time: “[B]y the time it gets litigated, it will probably give some

additional time.”5 CDC then predictably and obsequiously obeyed.

It fell then to this Court to remind CDC that it has no authority to act

unlawfully. See Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S.Ct. 2485, 2488 (2021)

(holding that it was “difficult to imagine” that CDC’s actions were lawful). Thus, while

Petitioners lament (at 4), the number of suits by States, they tellingly fail to consider

the possibility that their own lamentable lack of respect for legal niceties might be

the cause of the increased number of actions. And while Petitioners point (at 4) to

“bedrock Article III and equitable principles,” they forget another foundational

Article III principle: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial

department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

Thus, if an administration policy unlawfully injures the States and the action is

otherwise reviewable, federal courts’ duty is to declare that legal violation, rather

than fret that such action would exceed their injunction/vacatur allowance for the

quarter. Nor do equitable principles “permit agencies to act unlawfully even in

pursuit of desirable ends.” Alabama Realtors, 141 S.Ct. at 2490.

President Biden specifically acknowledged that “[t]he bulk of the constitutional scholarship says

that [the action was] not likely to pass constitutional muster.” Joseph Biden, Remarks at the White

House

(August

3,

2021),

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speechesremarks/2021/08/03/remarks-by-president-biden-on-fighting-the-covid-19-pandemic/.

5 Id.

4

14

If the Administration is intent on engaging in pervasive legal violations—even,

at times, publicly admitting the likely illegality of its acts while engaging in them

anyway—it can no more fairly claim surprise at being sued by States than Captain

Renault could be shocked to find that gambling was occurring in Rick’s Café. And if

the Administration wishes to reduce the number of injunctions/vacaturs that States

obtain against it, the correct tool for it to employ is a mirror, not distortions of Article

III and equitable principles. See also, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, __ S. Ct. __, 2022

WL 2347278, at *10-11 (June 30, 2022) (rejecting Administration’s latest attempt to

invoke Article III to shield its illegal actions from judicial review sought by States).

The district court and Fifth Circuit refused to indulge DHS’s further

lawlessness with the Final Memo below. This Court should too by denying DHS’s

request for a stay.

III.

The Final Memo Harms States Through Increased Law Enforcements

Costs And Additional Crime

Amici States are also suffering harms under the Final Memo similar to those

of Texas and Louisiana here. Arizona’s experience provides an illustration of this,

including harms recognized by the Western District of Louisiana and the District of

Arizona. Louisiana, 2022 WL 1604901, at *5-6 (discussing law enforcement,

incarceration, and health costs to Arizona caused by increased immigration); Arizona

v. DHS, No. CV-21-186, 2021 WL 2787930, at *6-8 (D. Ariz. June 30, 2021) (same).

The Western District of Louisiana also recognized the harms caused by

increased immigration to non-border states, such as Missouri. Louisiana, 2022 WL

15

1604901, at *7 (recognizing education, health, and administrative costs to Missouri

of increased immigration). These harms are ongoing and compounding by the day.

In particular, the Amici and Plaintiff States have suffered, and will suffer,

increased costs of incarceration and other law enforcement services due to the

challenged actions. Significantly, the Final Memo has directly resulted in ICE lifting

detainers on criminals who have completed their sentences. Texas v. United States,

2022 WL 2109204, at *10-13 (“The Final Memorandum has led to the rescission of

detainers, which has at least in part contributed to fewer criminal aliens being

detained by ICE.”). Instead of being removed, these individuals are instead being

released onto the streets and into communities. Id. at *13-15.

DHS’s actions have directly led to States incurring supervised-release costs

that they otherwise would not incur. Arizona, for example, has identified convicted

criminal aliens whose ICE detainers were lifted prior to their release from state

prisons due to the new removal priorities in just the first two months since DHS

adopted them. See Louisiana, 2022 WL 1604901, ECF No. 13-3 at 44-430 (Declaration

of Jennifer Abbotts). Indeed, emails received from ICE itself specify that the new

removal priorities were the reason ICE lifted each detainer. See, e.g., id. at 50-52, 57,

and 62-62. These individuals were placed on community supervision (similar to

federal supervised release), which costs Arizona $4,163.60 annually per individual.

See id. at 432-35 (Declaration of Shaka Okougbo). The population involved is large:

“over 6% of Arizona’s prison population—2,434 noncitizen inmates—currently have

ICE detainers lodged against them.” Arizona v. DHS, 2021 WL 2787930, at *7.

16

Defendants’ actions also impose direct law enforcement costs and crime-based

injuries due to criminal recidivism committed by removable criminal aliens that DHS

refuses to remove. See, e.g., Arizona, 2021 WL 2787930, ECF No. 15-1 at 6-9.

Generally, among released prisoners, 68% are re-arrested within 3 years, 79% within

6 years, and 83% within 9 years. See National Institute of Justice, Measuring

Recidivism

(Feb.

20,

2008),

https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/measuring-

recidivism#statistics. Given those recidivism rates, the release of convicts into the

community under the Final Memo makes it virtually certain that the States will incur

additional law enforcement and incarceration costs, as well as direct crime-based

losses, from the Final Memo’s provisions, which closely mirror the Interim Guidance.

Testimony of senior ICE official Albert Carter confirms that the “only factor”

for the “big drop-off” both in immigration detainers being issued and in removals

being carried out from before and after February 2021 was the new enforcement

priorities (there the Interim Guidance). Arizona, 2021 WL 2787930, ECF No. 79-1 at

18-20 (Deposition of Albert Carter at 81:10-84:5; 87:1-89:11).6 Director Carter further

testified that ICE is releasing detainers for aliens who do not fit Interim Guidance

priorities, and when detainers are released, jails have to put aliens on supervisory

release or just release them into the community. Id. at 84:6-14. The same is true of

the operation of the Final Memo—whose provisions overwhelmingly mirror the

Interim Guidance.

Albert Carter is a career law enforcement officer who served as the Acting ICE Phoenix Filed Office

Director from December 2020 to early-May 2021. Arizona, 2021 WL 2787930, ECF no. 79-1 at 12-13

(Deposition of Albert Carter at 15:20-24; 18:15-19:19).

6

17

IV.

“Shall” In 8 U.S.C. §§1231(a)(1)(A) And 1226(c) Means “Must”

A core issue in this case is whether the “shall”s in 8 U.S.C. §§1231(a)(1)(A) and

1226(c) impose mandatory duties on DHS to detain and remove aliens. The plain

language of the statute, canons of construction, and legislative history all make clear

that “shall” in these two provisions means “must.”

That is undoubtedly why this Court has already construed both provisions to

be mandatory. See Nielsen, 139 S.Ct. at 959 (Under §1226(c), “aliens must be arrested

‘when [they are] released’ from custody on criminal charges,” and they must

subsequently be detained. (emphasis added)); Guzman Chavez, 141 S.Ct. at 2281

(“Once an alien is ordered removed, DHS must physically remove him from the

United States within a 90-day ‘removal period.’” (emphasis added)). The Final Memo

is thus brazenly unlawful in its conclusions that the “shall”s in §§1231(a)(1)(A) and

1226(c) actually mean “may.”

But even if this Court were construing those provisions on a blank precedential

slate, DHS’s permissive interpretations are plainly untenable.

Plain Text

The plain texts of sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(1)(A) establish that DHS has a

non-discretionary duty to detain criminal aliens and aliens with final removal orders.

“Shall” in those sections means just that: an actual mandate and not just a

conveniently-ignorable suggestion.

“[A]ny question of statutory interpretation … begins with the plain language

of the statute. It is well established that, when the statutory language is plain,

18

[courts] must enforce it according to its terms.” Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113,

118 (2009) (citations omitted). Thus, this Court’s “inquiry begins with the statutory

text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.” BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United

States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). That is just so here.

It is well-established that “‘shall’ generally means ‘must.’” Gutierrez de

Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 432 n.9 (1995). That accords with dictionary

definitions, both legal and non-legal. The “mandatory sense” of the word “shall” is the

one “that drafters typically intend and that courts typically uphold.” Shall, Black’s

Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Similarly, American Heritage Dictionary defines

“shall” as an “order, promise, requirement, or obligation.” Shall, American Heritage

Dictionary (5th ed.).

This Court has thus repeatedly made clear that “Congress’ use of the term

‘shall’ indicates an intent to ‘impose discretionless obligations.’” Fed. Exp. Corp. v.

Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 400 (2008) (citation omitted)). Indeed, “the mandatory ‘shall’

... normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.” Lexecon Inc. v.

Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998). It is equally

impervious to executive discretion.

Canons of Construction

The canons of construction confirm what the text of Section 1226(c) and

1231(a)(1)(A) already makes plain. Two are critical here: 1) the avoidance of

surplusage, and 2) expressio unius.

19

•

Canon Against Surplusage

“It is a ‘cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon

the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word

shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31

(2001) (citation omitted). Defendants’ interpretation of Sections 1226(c) and

1231(a)(1)(A) violates this cardinal principle.

Section 1226(c)(1) requires that the government “shall take into custody” any

alien having certain kinds of criminal convictions or who is involved in terrorism.

Section 1226(c)(2) goes on to state that the government “may release” such an alien

if “necessary” to protect a witness cooperating with an investigation. That narrow

exception is superfluous if DHS possesses the broad discretion it claims here.

Similarly, section 1231(a)(1)(A)’s requirement of removal “within 90 days” is

completely superfluous if that section’s “shall” means only “may.” Under DHS’s

interpretation, that section is effectively rewritten as providing that DHS “may

remove within 90 days, or after 90 days, or never.”

•

Expressio Unius

Under the venerable expressio unius canon, “[t]he expression of one thing

implies the exclusion of others.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830, 844 (2018).

Thus, ‘“[w]hen a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes a

negative of any other mode.”’ Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 583 (2000)

(citation omitted).

20

Under expressio unius, the enumeration of only the single exception for

testifying aliens in Sections 1226(c)(2) and 1231(c)(2)(C) means, quite simply, that

only one such exception exists. But DHS has never claimed that the Final Memo (or

its predecessors, the January Memorandum and the Interim Guidance) can squeeze

within that exception. The expressio unius canon thus strongly militates against

reading in a second, unwritten exception, let alone complete discretion to release

aliens that DHS asserts.

Similarly, section 1231(a)(1)(A) explicitly begins with an “[e]xcept as otherwise

provided in this section” exception. Under the canon of expression unius, that explicit

exception is presumably the only exception that Congress intended. And DHS does

not argue that the Final Memo’s exclusions from removals can be crammed within

that exception either.

The Legislative History Makes Plain That the Final Memo is Unlawful.

•

1996 Amendments To Statutory Text.

Congress adopted the current versions of Sections 1226 and 1231 as part of the

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”).

Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2010). The changes made to those sections’

texts in IIRIRA make plain Congress’s intent to constrain sharply the discretion of

the Attorney General (and now DHS) in effecting removals and detaining aliens

subject to removal.

The plain language of Section 1226 is already clear enough, but the House

Conference Report leaves no doubt that Congress’s intent was strictly to limit the

21

government’s discretion: “New section 236(c) provides that the Attorney General

must detain an alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2) or deportable under

new section 237(a)(2).... This subsection also provides that such an alien may be

released from the Attorney General’s custody only if the Attorney General decides ...

that release is necessary to provide protection to a witness ... [or] a person cooperating

with an investigation into major criminal activity....” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, at

210-211 (emphasis added).

Congress’s amendments to Section 1231 also show its intent to limit the

Executive’s discretion. In enacting the current version of §1231, Congress made

substantial changes. The old §1252 became §1231(a), and Table 1 shows the changes

in language:

Table 1: Comparison Of Language Pre- and Post-IIRIRA

Prior §1252

Current §1231(a) (emphasis added)

“[D]uring [the six-month deporation “During the removal period, the

period], at the Attorney General's Attorney General shall detain the alien.”

discretion, the alien may be detained, 8 U.S.C. §1231 (a)(2) (emphasis added).

released on bond in an amount and

containing such conditions as the

Attorney General may prescribe, or

released on such other condition as the

Attorney General may prescribe.”

8 U.S.C. §1252 (1996) (emphasis added).

Congress thus removed language that explicitly granted “discretion” and that

allowed for release on “condition[s] as the Attorney General may prescribe” and

replaced that language with a direct, clear, and laconic command: “shall detain.”

22

Congress’s intent to accelerate removals and decrease the Executive Branch’s

discretion to forego deportations is confirmed by other statutory changes. In

particular, three predecessor sections that were consolidated into §1231 contained

specific grants of discretion to the Attorney General (now DHS)—all of which

Congress tellingly abolished. As the House Conference Report explains, IIRIRA

“inserts a new section 241 [8 U.S.C. §1231]” that “restates and revises provisions in

current sections 237, 242, and 243 [8 U.S.C. §§1227, 1252, and 1253] regarding the

detention and removal of aliens.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, at 215.

For example, the old §1252 provided that during the prior six-month removal

period “the Attorney General shall have a period of six months ... to effect the alien’s

departure from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §1252 (c)(1) (1996). But IIRIRA amended

Section 1231 to remove the prior language that only called for a general outcome to

take place within a long period of time (six months) with an unequivocal command

for the federal government to remove the alien within a time period less than half as

long: “[T]he Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a

period of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Similarly, the prior

§1227 stated that arriving aliens who are excluded “shall be immediately deported ...

unless the Attorney General, in an individual case, in his discretion, concludes that

immediate deportation is not practicable or proper.” 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(1) (1996)

(emphasis added). But discretion too was expressly eliminated, and the current

§1231(c) has no such “in his discretion” language.

23

Nor are these eradications of discretion isolated or subtle. While the word

“discretion” appeared thirteen times in the prior versions of §§1227, 1252, and 1253,

it no longer appears even once in the amended (and current) Section 1231. In essence,

Congress through IIRIRA engaged in a search-and-destroy mission regarding the

Executive Branch’s discretion. That is hardly the action of a Congress that intended

to confer unbounded and unreviewable discretion.

•

Legislative History And Intent

The legislative history and cases examining it confirms the intent already

evident from IIRIRA’s text. In IIRIRA, “Congress amended the INA aggressively to

expedite removal of aliens lacking a legal basis to remain in the United States.”

Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 249 (2010). Congress’s purpose in adopting IIRIRA

was “to expedite the physical removal of those aliens not entitled to admission to the

United States” and “[t]o that end, IIRIRA ‘inverted’ certain provisions of the INA,

encouraging prompt voluntary departure and speedy government action.” Coyt, 593

F.3d at 906 (emphasis added). The House Conference Report on IIRIRA similarly

made plain that the bill’s purpose was “to improve deterrence of illegal immigration

to the United States by ... reforming exclusion and deportation law and procedures.”

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, at 1 and 199 (1996).

DHS’s interpretation thwarts this intent: while IIRIRA was intended to

expedite removals and deter illegal entries, DHS invokes its provisions to assert

unlimited and unreviewable discretion to thwart and slow removals. That result is

neither what Congress intended nor what Congress’s adopted text can bear.

24

CONCLUSION

The border is in crisis. This DHS Administration is lawless. And the States

continue to suffer escalating irreparable harm as the border crisis continually

intensifies to successive, ever-more-unprecedented levels of illegal crossings. To

prevent the Final Memo from becoming a final countdown to complete loss of

operational control at the southwestern border, this Court should deny DHS’s

application for a stay.

25

July 13, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Drew C. Ensign

MARK BRNOVICH

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Joseph A. Kanefield

Chief Deputy & Chief of Staff

Brunn (“Beau”) W. Roysden III

Solicitor General

* Counsel of Record

Drew C. Ensign*

Deputy Solicitor General

James K. Rogers

Senior Litigation Counsel

2005 N. Central Avenue

Phoenix, AZ 85004

Phone: (602) 542-5025

Fax: (602) 542-4377

Also supported by:

Steve Marshall

Alabama Attorney General

Eric S. Schmitt

Missouri Attorney General

Treg R. Taylor

Alaska Attorney General

Austin Knudsen

Montana Attorney General

Leslie Rutledge

Arkansas Attorney General

Douglas J. Peterson

Nebraska Attorney General

Ashley Moody

Florida Attorney General

Dave Yost

Ohio Attorney General

Christopher M. Carr

Georgia Attorney General

John M. O’Connor

Oklahoma Attorney General

Theodore E. Rokita

Indiana Attorney General

Alan Wilson

South Carolina Attorney General

Derek Schmidt

Kansas Attorney General

Sean D. Reyes

Utah Attorney General

Daniel Cameron

Kentucky Attorney General

Patrick Morrisey

West Virginia Attorney General

Lynn Fitch

Mississippi Attorney General

Bridget Hill

Wyoming Attorney General

26