Petition for Writ of Certiorari — George Washington University, Petitioner v. Jabari Stafford

Supreme Court briefMar 23, 2023

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IN THE

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THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,

Petitioner,

JABARI STAFFORD,

Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The District Of Columbia Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JASON C. SCHWARTZ

Counsel of Record

JONATHAN C. BOND

MOLLY T. SENGER

ANDREW G.I. KILBERG

MATTHEW P. SAPPINGTON

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 955-8500

jschwartz@gibsondunn.com

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED

This Court has recognized that, where a federal

statute creates a claim but does not specify a deadline

to assert it, Congress presumptively “intended that

the courts apply the most closely analogous statute of

limitations under state law.” DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158

(1983); see, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392,

395 (1946). Respondent brought this suit against

petitioner, alleging a violation of Title VI of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.—

Spending Clause legislation that prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in a program that receives federal funding. Title VI contains

no express limitations period for private suits. The

district court held that the state law most closely analogous to Title VI is the District of Columbia Human

Rights Act—a statute that proscribes the same conduct, has the same purpose, offers the same remedies,

applies in the same contexts, and is enforced through

the same processes as Title VI.

The court of appeals reversed. It construed this

Court’s precedents as requiring the application of the

state-law limitations period for personal-injury

claims to any federal civil-rights statute lacking its

own express deadline. The court of appeals therefore

held that respondent’s claim is subject to the District’s catchall limitations period that encompasses

personal-injury claims for which no other time bar is

specified. The question presented is as follows:

Whether courts should reflexively borrow the

state-law general limitations period applicable to all

personal-injury claims to govern any claim alleging

unlawful discrimination under a federal statute that

does not specify its own limitations period.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner The George Washington University

was the defendant in the district court and the appellee below.

Respondent Jabari Stafford was the plaintiff in

the district court and the appellant below.

iii

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Petitioner The George Washington University

does not have a parent corporation, and no publicly

held company owns 10% or more of its stock.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (D.D.C.):

Stafford v. The George Washington University,

No. 18-cv-2789 (Jan. 4, 2022) (order granting

summary judgment)

United States Court of Appeals (D.C. Cir.):

Stafford v. The George Washington University,

No. 22-7012 (Dec. 23, 2022)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

OPINIONS BELOW .................................................... 1

JURISDICTION .......................................................... 1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ................. 2

INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 2

STATEMENT .............................................................. 5

A. Legal Background ....................................... 5

B. The Present Controversy ............................ 7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ....... 10

I. THE DECISION BELOW DEEPENS AN

EXISTING LOWER-COURT CONFLICT ................. 13

II. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH

THIS COURT’S PRECEDENTS ............................. 23

III. THIS CASE IS A GOOD VEHICLE TO

RESOLVE AN ISSUE OF EXCEPTIONAL

IMPORTANCE .................................................... 31

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 35

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A: Opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit (Dec. 23, 2022) ....................... 1a

APPENDIX B: Memorandum Opinion of the

United States District Court for the

District of Columbia Granting Summary

Judgment (Jan. 4, 2022) ................................... 11a

APPENDIX C: Pertinent Statutory and

Regulatory Provisions ....................................... 62a

20 U.S.C. § 1681 ................................................ 62a

29 U.S.C. § 794 .................................................. 63a

42 U.S.C. § 2000d .............................................. 64a

42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1........................................... 65a

34 C.F.R. § 100.8 ............................................... 67a

D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 ....................................... 69a

D.C. Code § 2-1402.41 ....................................... 70a

D.C. Code § 2-1403.04 ....................................... 71a

D.C. Code § 2-1403.16 ....................................... 73a

D.C. Code § 12-301 ............................................ 74a

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases ............................................................... Page(s)

Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &

Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987) ............ 7, 25

Alexander v. Sandoval,

532 U.S. 275 (2001) ........................................... 26

Artis v. District of Columbia,

138 S. Ct. 594 (2018) ......................................... 32

Baker v. Board of Regents of Kansas,

991 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1993) ............... 18, 19, 20

Ballard v. Rubin,

284 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2002) ............................. 19

Board of Regents of University of State of

New York v. Tomanio,

446 U.S. 478 (1980) ..................................... 30, 32

Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh,

882 F.2d 74 (1989)............................................. 17

Burnett v. Grattan,

468 U.S. 42 (1984) ......................................... 7, 25

Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,

990 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1993) ............................. 19

Campbell v. City of Haverhill,

155 U.S. 610 (1895) ....................................... 6, 24

Cetin v. Purdue University,

94 F.3d 647, 1996 WL 453229

(7th Cir. Aug. 7, 1996) ...................................... 18

viii

Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City

of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) ........................ 24

Coleman v. Tollefson,

575 U.S. 532 (2015) ........................................... 21

Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v.

Nevils, 581 U.S. 87 (2017)................................. 22

CTS Corp. v. Waldburger,

573 U.S. 1 (2014) ......................................... 32, 34

Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller,

P.L.L.C., 142 S. Ct. 1562 (2022) ..................... 2, 5

Curto v. Edmundson,

392 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2004) ........................ 18, 21

Davis v. Potomac Electric Power Co.,

449 A.2d 278 (D.C. 1982) .................................. 33

DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of

Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) ........... 2, 6, 7, 10,

......................................................... 12, 24, 25, 26

Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v.

SEPTA, 539 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2008) ................ 17

Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College,

72 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 1995) ......................... 18, 20

Everett v. Cobb County School District,

138 F.3d 1407 (11th Cir. 1998) ............. 19, 20, 21

Gabelli v. SEC,

568 U.S. 442 (2013) ............................... 32, 33, 34

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,

482 U.S. 656 (1987) ..................... 4, 10, 26, 28, 33

Hagen v. Utah,

510 U.S. 399 (1994) ........................................... 22

Hall v. Knott County Board of Education,

941 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1991) ............................. 19

Hickey v. Irving Independent School

District, 976 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1992) .............. 19

Holmberg v. Armbrecht,

327 U.S. 392 (1946) ............................................. 6

Jaiyeola v. District of Columbia,

40 A.3d 356 (D.C. 2012) ............ 16, 17, 22, 25, 29

Jersey Heights Neighborhood Association v.

Glendening, 174 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 1999) ........ 15

Johnson v. California,

545 U.S. 162 (2005) ........................................... 22

Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,

541 U.S. 369 (2004) ....................................... 6, 23

Kellogg Brown & Root Services v. United

States ex rel. Carter,

575 U.S. 650 (2015) ........................................... 34

King-White v. Humble Independent School

District, 803 F.3d 754 (5th Cir. 2015) .............. 18

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

550 U.S. 618 (2007) ........................................... 22

Levy v. Kansas Department of Social &

Rehabilitation Services,

789 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2015) ......................... 21

Lillard v. Shelby County Board of

Education, 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996) ...... 18, 21

M’Cluny v. Silliman,

28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830) ................................ 24

M.H.D. v. Westminster Schools,

172 F.3d 797 (11th Cir. 1999) ........................... 19

McCormick v. Miami University,

693 F.3d 654 (6th Cir. 2012) ............................. 21

McCullough v. Branch Banking & Trust

Co., 35 F.3d 127 (4th Cir. 1994) ................. 15, 21

Michigan v. Clifford,

464 U.S. 287 (1984) ........................................... 21

Monroe v. Columbia College Chicago,

990 F.3d 1098 (7th Cir. 2021) ..................... 18, 20

Moore v. Greenwood School District No. 52,

195 F. App’x 140 (4th Cir. 2006) ...................... 16

Morse v. University of Vermont,

973 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1992) .............................. 19

North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas,

515 U.S. 29 (1995) ............................................... 6

Ott v. Maryland Department of Public

Safety & Correctional Services,

909 F.3d 655 (4th Cir. 2018) ....................... 15, 16

Owens v. Okure,

488 U.S. 235 (1989) ......................... 10, 28, 30, 31

Pereira v. Sessions,

138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) ....................................... 21

Pieri v. Dammasch State Hospital,

77 F.3d 490, 1996 WL 73379

(9th Cir. Feb. 20, 1996) ..................................... 19

Rozar v. Mullis,

85 F.3d 556 (11th Cir. 1996) ...................... 18, 20

Scott v. Illinois,

440 U.S. 367 (1979) ........................................... 22

Sewell v. Monroe City School Board,

974 F.3d 577 (5th Cir. 2020) ............................. 18

Stanley v. Trustees of California State

University, 433 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2006) ........ 19

Taylor v. Regents of University of

California, 993 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1993) .......... 18

Texas Department of Community Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) ........................... 22

Thomas v. Advance Housing, Inc.,

475 F. App’x 405 (3d Cir. 2012) .................. 17, 18

Tomei v. Parkwest Medical Center,

24 F.4th 508 (6th Cir. 2022) ............................... 6

United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell,

451 U.S. 56 (1981) ............................................... 6

xii

United States v. Kubrick,

444 U.S. 111 (1979) .......................................... 32

Varnell v. Dora Consolidated School

District, 756 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2014) .......... 19

Wilson v. Garcia,

471 U.S. 261 (1985) …………… 3, 4, 7, 10, 12, 14,

....................................... 18, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 33

Wolsky v. Medical College of Hampton

Roads, 1 F.3d 222 (1993) ............................ 14, 15

Statutes

20 U.S.C. § 1681 ....................................................... 5

28 U.S.C. § 1658 ....................................................... 6

29 U.S.C. § 794 ....................................................... 32

42 U.S.C. § 1981 ................................. 3, 6, 10, 12, 27

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ........................... 3, 9, 10, 12, 14, 27

42 U.S.C. § 1988 ..................................................... 24

42 U.S.C. § 2000d ............................................. 26, 30

42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 ................................................ 26

42 U.S.C. § 18116 ..................................................... 5

D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 ........................................ 2, 26

D.C. Code § 2-1402.41 ............................................ 26

xiii

D.C. Code § 2-1403.04 ............................................ 26

D.C. Code § 2-1403.16 .................................. 8, 22, 26

D.C. Code § 12-301 ............................................. 8, 22

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120 ........................................ 31

Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030 ....................................... 33

Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.875 ....................................... 33

Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 ................................... 31

Other Authorities

Civil Rights, Education and Title VI,

https://tinyurl.com/5acz27cr

(last modified Jan. 10, 2020) ............................ 31

Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division,

Title IX Legal Manual,

https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix

(last modified Aug. 12, 2021) ............................ 32

IN THE

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No.

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,

Petitioner,

JABARI STAFFORD,

Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The District Of Columbia Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The George Washington University respectfully

petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra,

1a-10a) is reported at 56 F.4th 50. The opinion of the

district court (App., infra, 11a-61a) is reported at

578 F. Supp. 3d 25.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on December 23, 2022. The jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent statutory provisions are reproduced in

an appendix to this petition. App., infra, 62a-74a.

INTRODUCTION

This case presents a common problem: the absence of an explicit limitations period in a federal statute. Respondent sued petitioner The George Washington University (University) under Title VI of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.,

which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,

color, or national origin in any program that receives

federal funding. Although Title VI does not contain

an express private right of action, this Court has

“found an implied right of action” to enforce the statute. Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C.,

142 S. Ct. 1562, 1569 (2022) (citation and emphasis

omitted). That unwritten cause of action, however,

contains no express limitations period.

For well over a century, this Court has followed a

simple rule to address this common problem: where a

federal claim has no limitations period, courts borrow

the limitations period from the “most closely analogous” state law—unless no state-law analogue exists

or importing the closest state-law parallel would be

incompatible with the federal scheme. DelCostello v.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,

158 (1983). Applying that rule to this case is not difficult. The relevant jurisdiction (the District of Columbia) has a statute that is a near twin of Title VI:

the D.C. Human Rights Act, D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 et

seq. Like Title VI, the D.C. Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national

origin—including by educational institutions. Respondent’s claim that he was subjected to a racially

hostile environment is actionable under both Title VI

and the D.C. Human Rights Act; indeed, he originally

sued under both statutes. The district court thus correctly held that the “most closely analogous” state-law

claim to a federal claim alleging race discrimination

against an educational institution was a state-law

claim alleging race discrimination against an educational institution.

The D.C. Circuit, however, rejected this commonsense conclusion—and, in so doing, deepened a

lower-court conflict. The D.C. Circuit found that a

Title VI claim was more “closely analogous” to a

personal-injury claim than to a claim under the D.C.

Human Rights Act. That holding compounded a recognized conflict between the Fourth Circuit and the

D.C. Court of Appeals, on the one hand, and nine other

circuits, on the other. Instead of examining alternative state laws from which to borrow a time bar and

considering which is most closely analogous to

Title VI, the D.C. Circuit and the courts it joined apply

a blanket rule that all federal civil-rights actions (absent an express time bar) incorporate the state-law

limitations periods applicable to personal-injury

claims, regardless of whether a closer analogue exists.

That across-the-board rule rests on a misreading

of this Court’s decisions addressing two particular

Reconstruction-era statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and

1981. The Court held that those distinctive statutes

borrow state-law personal-injury time bars based

largely on the expansive breadth of the conduct and

contexts they addressed. The Court in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), reasoned that one unitary

limitations period must cover all claims under

§ 1983—which proscribes not only “discrimination in

public employment on the basis of race,” but also the

“mistreatment of schoolchildren” and “the seizure of

chattels without advance notice or sufficient opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 273. General-purpose

personal-injury claims were the only equally expansive comparator. The Court reached the same conclusion in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656

(1987), for claims under § 1981, which protects not

just “contractual rights,” but also “personal rights to

sue, to testify, and to equal rights under all laws for

the security of persons and property.” Id. at 661. The

Court has also recognized that Congress’s clear intention in adopting those landmark laws in the Civil

War’s aftermath was to override state-law remedies

that Congress deemed inadequate to safeguard civil

rights. Borrowing from any specific state-law remedies would undermine that aim.

None of the features that set §§ 1983 and 1981

apart is present in Spending Clause statutes like Title

VI, which seek to discourage discrimination through

federal incentives. The Spending Clause statutes are

narrowly focused on particular types of discrimination, and often parallel state laws with the same aims.

The D.C. Circuit and others whose approach it

embraced nevertheless reflexively extend to these and

all other civil-rights statutes the time bars applicable

to personal-injury claims. In effect, those courts hold

that the closest analogue to a Title VI racialharassment claim is a tort claim arising from a car

crash, not a state-law racial-harassment claim that

tracks Title VI almost exactly. That cannot be right.

The Court should grant certiorari to resolve this

important conflict and reaffirm its longstanding rule

that (absent an express time bar) a federal statute

borrows the limitations period of the state-law claim

that is the “most closely analogous”—here, the D.C.

Human Rights Act.

STATEMENT

A. Legal Background

“Pursuant to its authority to fix the terms on

which it shall disburse federal money, Congress has

enacted four statutes prohibiting recipients of federal

financial assistance from discriminating based on certain protected grounds.” Cummings v. Premier Rehab

Keller, P.L.L.C., 142 S. Ct. 1562, 1569 (2022) (citation

and quotation marks omitted). Those four statutes

are:



Title VI: “Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 forbids race, color, and national origin discrimination in federally funded programs or activities. 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.”



Title IX: “Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 similarly prohibits sex-based discrimination, 86 Stat. 373, 20 U.S.C. § 1681.”



Rehabilitation Act: “[T]he Rehabilitation Act

bars funding recipients from discriminating because of disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794.”



Affordable Care Act: “[T]he Affordable Care Act

outlaws discrimination on any of the preceding

grounds, in addition to age, by healthcare entities receiving federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 18116.”

Ibid.

Although “[n]one of th[o]se statutes expressly provides * * * a private right of action,” this Court has

recognized that privately enforceable remedies are

available under each one. Cummings, 142 S. Ct. at

1569-1570. None of those statutes, however, prescribes its own statute of limitations. A general fouryear default federal limitations period applies to “actions arising under federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990” (and to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981

“made possible by * * * post-1990” amendments).

Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 371,

382-383 (2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1658). But of the

four cited Spending Clause statutes, only the Affordable Care Act was enacted after December 1, 1990. Tomei v. Parkwest Medical Center, 24 F.4th 508, 513-515

(6th Cir. 2022).

The absence of an explicit, statute-specific limitations period does not imply that “Congress intended

that there be no time limit on actions at all,”

DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983)—least of all for causes

of action that are themselves implied. Instead, this

Court has long recognized that, where a federal statute is silent on the limitations period, Congress “intended that the courts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law.” Ibid.

Courts must borrow the time bar for the “most closely

analogous” state-law claim unless no analogue exists

or applying the closest parallel would be “at odds with

the purpose or operation of federal substantive law.”

Id. at 158, 161; see North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas,

515 U.S. 29, 33-35 (1995); see also, e.g., Holmberg v.

Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); Campbell v. City

of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616 (1895).

To identify the most closely analogous state law,

courts should “examin[e] * * * the nature of the federal claim and the federal policies involved,” United

Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60-61

(1981), and identify the state-law claim that most

closely corresponds to the federal claim’s “essence,”

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985). Although

there is no mechanical formula for pinpointing the

closest analogue, this Court’s decisions make clear

that courts should compare the federal and state statutes’ texts, their substantive aims, the rights they protect, the remedies they create, and their enforcement

mechanisms. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v.

Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151

(1987); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1984);

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 167-168, 170.

B. The Present Controversy

1. The University is located in Washington, D.C.

and receives federal funds for its educational programs. Respondent was an undergraduate student at

the University from 2014 to 2018 and played on the

University’s men’s tennis team. App., infra, 12a, 20a.

In November 2018, respondent sued the University and several of its current and former employees.

Respondent asserted six claims, including claims under Title VI and the D.C. Human Rights Act, D. Ct.

Doc. 1, ¶¶ 95-104 (Nov. 26, 2018), alleging that he had

been subjected to a racially hostile educational environment based primarily on conduct by his former

tennis teammates, App., infra, 21a.

a. The University moved to dismiss. The district

court granted the motion in substantial part, leaving

only a Title VI deliberate-indifference claim against

the University. App., infra, 21a. As relevant here, the

court dismissed respondent’s D.C. Human Rights Act

claim because he had failed to allege facts sufficient to

state a claim within that statute’s one-year limitations period. D. Ct. Doc. 16, at 13-15 (June 5, 2019).

Because the University had not yet argued that the

same one-year deadline should be borrowed for respondent’s Title VI claim, the court declined to dismiss that claim. Id. at 16-18.

b. The district court subsequently granted the

University’s motion for summary judgment. App., infra, 11a. As relevant here, the University argued at

summary judgment that the D.C. Human Rights Act’s

one-year limitations period should apply to respondent’s Title VI claim. D.C. Code § 2-1403.16(a); App.,

infra, 27a. Respondent maintained that the District

of Columbia’s general, catchall three-year limitations

period—which encompasses claims for which no other

limitations period is specified (including personalinjury claims)—governed. D.C. Code § 12-301(8);

App., infra, 27a-28a. The court agreed with the University. App., infra, 11a.

The district court concluded that the D.C. Human

Rights Act is more analogous to Title VI than a

personal-injury suit. App., infra, 29a-30a. The court

examined the statutes’ texts, purposes, rights, remedies, and enforcement mechanisms and explained

that “Title VI and the [D.C. Human Rights Act] have

[the] shared purpose and ambitious aims” of ending

racial discrimination. Id. at 31a (quotation marks

omitted). The court emphasized that both statutes

are “enforceable via private rights of action and provide for similar remedies.” Id. at 32a. The court

acknowledged that “the [D.C. Human Rights Act] is in

some ways broader than Title VI” because it “cover[s]

more bases for discrimination and extend[s] beyond

recipients of federal funding.” Ibid. Even so, the district court recognized that “these differences pale in

comparison to the similarities” between the two statutes. Ibid. (citation omitted).

The district court found unpersuasive decisions of

other circuits holding that a State’s personal-injury

limitations period always applies to “claims arising

under Title VI and many other federal antidiscrimination laws.” App., infra, 30a. The district court observed that those courts had improperly failed to compare the federal laws at issue to analogous state statutes. Id. at 32a-33a. Instead, those courts found the

Spending Clause antidiscrimination statute to be

analogous to another federal statute, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, and then extended to the Spending Clause

statute this Court’s holding in Wilson that § 1983

claims are subject to a State’s limitations period for

personal-injury claims. Ibid.

The district court rejected that federal-to-federalto-state mode of analysis. App., infra, 32a-34a. Instead, it explained that “whether claims under

Title VI and claims under § 1983 are analogous is not

the right question,” because “[this] Court has instructed courts engaging in this borrowing analysis to

generally look to similar state law, not federal law.”

Ibid. The court further observed that § 1983’s special

status as “a uniquely federal remedy” that “can have

no precise counterpoint in state law” means that

§ 1983 and Spending Clause federal antidiscrimination statutes “may not have the same state-law analogue.” Id. at 33a (quotation marks omitted).

2. The court of appeals reversed. App., infra, 2a. It

held that D.C.’s general, catchall limitations period—

not the D.C. Human Rights Act’s one-year bar—

governed respondent’s claim. Ibid. The court did not

address the similarities between the D.C. Human

Rights Act and Title VI’s texts, purposes, protections,

remedies, and enforcement options. Instead, the court

reasoned that decisions of this Court had established

that all “federal civil rights causes of action” are governed by the relevant State’s limitations period for

general personal-injury claims. App., infra, 4a-9a (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989) (regarding 42

U.S.C. § 1983); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S.

656 (1987) (regarding 42 U.S.C. § 1981); and Wilson,

471 U.S. 261 (regarding 42 U.S.C. § 1983)). The court

of appeals concluded that, because discrimination in

violation of Title VI can be characterized as inflicting

a form of personal injury, “Title VI shares the same

essence as section 1983” and thus “is most analogous

to a personal injury statute.” Id. at 5a-6a. Based on

its reading of Wilson, the court did not analyze

whether a claim under Title VI is more closely analogous to the D.C. Human Rights Act claim than to a

personal-injury claim.

The court of appeals additionally interpreted Wilson and Owens as instructing it “to select a statutory

period that applies to a large number of civil claims,”

and as establishing that only “a personal injury tort

* * * could cover such diverse causes of action” arising

from “civil rights statutes.” App., infra, 7a-8a. The

court of appeals further read those cases as imposing

a “duty” to further “uniformity” through selection of a

limitations period. Id. at 8a-9a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The decision below warrants review because it

deepens a lower-court rift on a recurring question of

widespread significance and conflicts with this Court’s

precedents. This Court has long recognized a general

rule that, where a federal statute permits private suits

but does not specify a limitations period, the limitations period applicable to the “most closely analogous”

state-law claim controls. DelCostello v. International

Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983).

Application of that simple rule here leads to an unremarkable conclusion: respondent’s Title VI claim alleging race-based discrimination against a university

is “most closely analogous” to a state-law claim alleging

race-based discrimination against a university.

The D.C. Circuit rejected that commonsense conclusion. In so doing, it compounded an alreadyentrenched conflict by holding that Title VI claims are

subject instead to whatever state-law limitations period governs personal-injury claims. That holding expands an existing conflict between the Fourth Circuit

and the D.C. Court of Appeals, on one side, and nine

other circuits, on the other, regarding the correct

method for selecting a state-law limitations period to

import for Title VI and other Spending Clause antidiscrimination statutes. The former courts have

faithfully followed this Court’s teaching by looking for

the most analogous state statute—which is often a

state antidiscrimination law. The latter have misinterpreted this Court’s precedents construing specific

Reconstruction-era civil-rights statutes as establishing a blanket rule that all federal civil-rights claims

(absent an express time bar) automatically incorporate the state-law limitations periods applicable to

personal-injury claims, regardless of whether a closer

analogue exists.

The divide on this frequently recurring federal

question warrants review. The standards for selecting the state-law limitations period to import in adjudicating federal antidiscrimination claims now varies

in federal court between the District and the surrounding States in the Fourth Circuit. Those standards now differ even for a suit within the District depending on whether it is brought in D.C. Superior

Court or federal district court.

The D.C. Circuit also departed from this Court’s

precedents. The simple rule set forth in this Court’s

decisions dating back more than a century requires

courts to identify the “most closely analogous” state

law, unless no analogue exists or applying its limitations period would be “at odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive law.” DelCostello,

462 U.S. at 158, 161 (emphasis added). The D.C. Circuit discarded the D.C. law that is most similar to

Title VI. Instead, like nine other circuits, but unlike

the Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Court of Appeals, the

D.C. Circuit overread this Court’s decisions in Wilson

v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), and later cases to require the application of personal-injury time bars to

all federal antidiscrimination claims. That approach

severely distorts this Court’s decisions.

Wilson and later cases relied on specific, unique

attributes of the Reconstruction-era civil-rights statutes they addressed, now codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983

and 1981. Title VI suits do not share those attributes.

The Reconstruction-era laws encompass wide and varied claims that transcend any typical category of

state-law claims. And the animating premise of those

statutes was that state-law remedies were palpably

inadequate—not a model for federal legislation. That

conclusion is inapplicable to Title VI and other Spending Clause legislation, which target specific forms of

discrimination in programs in which defendants voluntarily participate—not as part of a federal effort to

supersede state law.

The practical importance of the issue confirms the

need for the Court’s intervention. Suits under Spending Clause statutes prohibiting discrimination by recipients of federal funding are ubiquitous. The proper

method for selecting the time bar for such claims is of

paramount significance to plaintiffs and defendants

alike. That vital issue should be simple and predictable for all concerned, not left in doubt.

THE DECISION BELOW DEEPENS AN EXISTING

LOWER-COURT CONFLICT

The D.C. Circuit’s decision exacerbates a welldeveloped lower-court conflict on which nearly every

circuit has taken a side. The lower courts disagree

about the correct interpretation of this Court’s precedents addressing the appropriate limitations period to

borrow for federal antidiscrimination statutes that do

not specify a deadline for bringing suit.

The Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Court of Appeals

each apply to such statutes the simple rule that this

Court has followed for more than a century. In addressing Spending Clause antidiscrimination statutes

such as Title VI, those courts identify the most analogous state-law claim and borrow its corresponding

limitations period. The Fourth Circuit has done so in

the context of Title VI and Title IX, and both it and

the District’s highest court have done the same for the

Rehabilitation Act.

In the decision below, by contrast, the D.C. Circuit

joined nine other circuits that take a fundamentally

different approach. Those courts construe this Court’s

decisions as categorically requiring importation of the

relevant State’s limitations period for personal-injury

claims to any federal antidiscrimination suit. The

D.C. Circuit and seven other circuits have adopted

that approach for Title VI in particular, and nine have

reached the same conclusion for both Title IX and the

Rehabilitation Act.

The decision below thus has compounded an existing disagreement over the basic rules that govern

the timeliness of claims under multiple federal statutes. It also has created a division within the District,

between the law applicable in D.C. Superior Court

and federal district court. Only this Court can definitively resolve this conflict about its own precedents.

A. 1. The Fourth Circuit has consistently conducted the same careful, individualized inquiry in determining which limitations period to borrow for

Title VI, Title IX, and the Rehabilitation Act. The

Fourth Circuit borrows the state-law limitations period for the claim that is most analogous to the federal

statute at issue, taking account of both laws’ texts, purposes, protections, remedies, and enforcement options.

The Fourth Circuit applied that approach to a Rehabilitation Act claim in Wolsky v. Medical College of

Hampton Roads, 1 F.3d 222 (1993). The court determined that the Virginia law most closely analogous to

the Rehabilitation Act was a statute prohibiting discrimination against the disabled, relying on the many

similarities it identified between the Rehabilitation

Act and the state antidiscrimination statute. Id. at

223-225.

Wolsky explicitly rejected the contention that Virginia’s personal-injury limitations period applied under Wilson, supra. Wilson had held that, for purposes

of borrowing state-law limitations periods, all claims

that can conceivably be brought under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 must be considered together as a unitary class,

and that the state-law claim most analogous to that

wide and highly heterogeneous category of federal

claims is one for personal injury. 471 U.S. at 475-476.

The Fourth Circuit in Wolsky declined to extend that

approach to the Rehabilitation Act, noting key differences between that statute and § 1983. 1 F.3d at 225.

For example, the Fourth Circuit observed that, in declining to borrow more specific state-law limitations

periods that might more closely resemble particular

claims under § 1983, the Wilson Court had reasoned

that “[S]ection 1983 actions cannot have parallel state

law provisions” in many circumstances because

§ 1983 was enacted in part to override inadequate

state-law mechanisms. Ibid. The Fourth Circuit explained that the same is not necessarily true of other,

non-Reconstruction-era federal civil-rights statutes,

which have more direct state-law parallels. Because

Virginia did have “an exact counterpart” to the Rehabilitation Act, that statute’s limitations period governed instead of the State’s personal-injury limitations period. Ibid.

The Fourth Circuit has continued to apply the

same approach in cases since Wolsky. It has done so

several times in other Rehabilitation Act cases. See

Ott v. Maryland Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services, 909 F.3d 655, 659-660 (4th Cir.

2018) (borrowing limitations period from Maryland

Fair Employment Practices Act); McCullough v.

Branch Banking & Trust Co., 35 F.3d 127, 129-132

(4th Cir. 1994) (borrowing limitations period from

North Carolina Handicapped Persons Protection Act).

The Fourth Circuit also has done the same for

Title VI. In Jersey Heights Neighborhood Association

v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 1999), the court

explained that “a specific, comparable statute to

Title VI” would provide the limitations period. Id. at

187. But because “[n]o party ha[d] suggested that”

such a statute existed in Maryland at that time, and

because the “court d[id] not know of one,” it applied

the statute of limitations from the State’s personal-injury law. Ibid.

Following Jersey Heights, however, Maryland

added a private right of action to its antidiscrimination law with an express limitations period. See Ott,

909 F.3d at 660. The rule the Fourth Circuit adopted

in Jersey Heights thus would now lead to the result

that the Maryland antidiscrimination statute’s limitations period applies to Title VI claims in Maryland.

The Fourth Circuit has reached precisely that conclusion with respect to the Rehabilitation Act, relying on

the similarities between Maryland’s Fair Employment Practices Act’s private right of action and a

claim under the Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 659-660

(applying Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act’s

time bar to Rehabilitation Act claim, notwithstanding

prior decision applying “Maryland’s general civil

three-year statute of limitations”).

The Fourth Circuit has applied the same methodology in the Title IX context. In Moore v. Greenwood

School District No. 52, 195 F. App’x 140 (4th Cir.

2006) (per curiam), the court held that a South Carolina law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex

was the best state-law fit for Title IX. Id. at 143. The

court specifically rejected a contention that the

personal-injury limitations period should be borrowed. Ibid.

2. The highest court of the District of Columbia

has embraced the same approach. In Jaiyeola v. District of Columbia, 40 A.3d 356 (D.C. 2012), the D.C.

Court of Appeals adopted the Fourth Circuit’s individualized inquiry for determining the appropriate statelaw limitations period for a Rehabilitation Act claim.

Id. at 364-366. The court held that the D.C. Human

Rights Act is the most closely analogous law to the Rehabilitation Act and, accordingly, borrowed the D.C.

Human Rights Act’s limitations period.

366-369.

Id. at

B. 1. The D.C. Circuit has now joined other circuits that have taken a contrary approach. These

courts have misinterpreted Wilson as providing a

blanket rule that all federal civil-rights statutes (absent an express time bar) incorporate the state-law

limitations periods applicable to personal-injury

claims, regardless of whether a closer analogue exists.

An early case adopting this approach was the

Third Circuit’s decision in Bougher v. University of

Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 77 (1989). Bougher held that

the personal-injury limitations period that applied to

§ 1983 claims also applied to Title IX claims, apparently relying on Wilson. Id. at 78 (“Here, we conclude

that the most analogous statute of limitations, as in

section 1983 and 1985 claims, * * * is Pennsylvania’s

two year statute of limitations period applicable to

personal injury actions.”); see ibid. (applying Wilson’s

holding that § 1983 claims are subject to the state

personal-injury time bar).

The Third Circuit subsequently applied that approach to Title VI and the Rehabilitation Act. See

Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. SEPTA,

539 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Thomas v.

Advance Housing, Inc., 475 F. App’x 405, 406 (3d Cir.

2012) (per curiam). The court made clear its view that

all federal civil-rights statutes stand on the same footing and uniformly borrow state personal-injury limitations periods. In Disabled in Action, the court

adopted the personal-injury limitations period for a

Rehabilitation Act claim because of “our precedent regarding the statute of limitations for federal civil

rights claims.” 539 F.3d at 208. Likewise, in Thomas,

the court adopted the personal-injury limitations period for Title VI actions because, “[i]n federal civil

rights cases, courts look to the statute of limitations

for personal injury actions.” 475 F. App’x at 406 (citing Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266-267).

Six other courts of appeals have applied the blanket personal-injury rule to Title VI. Sewell v. Monroe

City School Board, 974 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 2020)

(“Title VI * * * [is] subject to state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions.”); Monroe v. Columbia College Chicago, 990 F.3d 1098, 1100 (7th Cir.

2021) (Because a Title VI claim “seeks recompense for

an injury to one’s individual rights[,] * * * it should

be governed by the limitations period that a state has

specified for personal injury claims.”); Egerdahl v.

Hibbing Community College, 72 F.3d 615, 618 (8th

Cir. 1995) (holding that, under Wilson, personalinjury limitations period governs Title VI claims); Taylor v. Regents of University of California, 993 F.2d 710,

712 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (applying personalinjury limitations period because Title VI is similar to

§§ 1981 and 1983); Baker v. Board of Regents of Kansas, 991 F.2d 628, 631 (10th Cir. 1993) (extending Wilson’s reasoning to Title VI); Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d

556, 561 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying personal-injury

limitations period because Title VI is similar to

§§ 1981 and 1983).

Eight circuits (beyond the Third) have done the

same for Title IX. Curto v. Edmundson, 392 F.3d 502,

504 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam); King-White v. Humble

Independent School District, 803 F.3d 754, 759 (5th

Cir. 2015); Lillard v. Shelby County Board of Education, 76 F.3d 716, 729 (6th Cir. 1996); Cetin v. Purdue

University, 94 F.3d 647 (Table), 1996 WL 453229, at

*2 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 1996); Egerdahl, 72 F.3d at 618;

Stanley v. Trustees of California State University,

433 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2006); Baker, 991 F.2d

at 631; M.H.D. v. Westminster Schools, 172 F.3d 797,

803 (11th Cir. 1999).

Those same eight circuits also have applied this

approach in the context of the Rehabilitation Act, reasoning that Wilson requires applying personal-injury

limitations periods to that statute as well. Morse v.

University of Vermont, 973 F.2d 122, 127 (2d Cir.

1992); Hickey v. Irving Independent School District,

976 F.2d 980, 983 (5th Cir. 1992); Hall v. Knott County

Board of Education, 941 F.2d 402, 407-408 (6th Cir.

1991); Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 990 F.2d

928, 933 (7th Cir. 1993); Ballard v. Rubin, 284 F.3d

957, 963 (8th Cir. 2002); Pieri v. Dammasch State Hospital, 77 F.3d 490 (Table), 1996 WL 73379, at *2 (9th

Cir. Feb. 20, 1996); Varnell v. Dora Consolidated

School District, 756 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 2014);

Everett v. Cobb County School District, 138 F.3d 1407,

1409 (11th Cir. 1998).

The D.C. Circuit has now joined these circuits in

applying this rule in the Title VI context. Relying on

Wilson, Owens, and Goodman, it held that the District’s personal-injury limitations period applies to all

“federal civil rights causes of action.” App., infra,

4a-9a. Deeming Title VI such a statute, the D.C. Circuit borrowed D.C.’s catchall limitations period, which

encompasses (among other things) personal-injury

suits. Id. at 5a-6a.

2. The rationales relied upon by these circuits

have varied and in some instances are not entirely

clear.

Some circuits directly analogize antidiscrimination Spending Clause statutes to §§ 1981 and 1983,

and on that basis, copy the personal-injury limitations

periods applicable to §§ 1981 and 1983 claims. See

App., infra, 32a-33a. The Seventh Circuit in Monroe,

for example, applied the personal-injury limitations

period because “Title VI is a civil rights statute that is

closely analogous to sections 1983 and 1981.”

990 F.3d at 1100 (brackets and quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Rozar, 85 F.3d at 561.

Other courts appear to extend the broader reasoning of Wilson, Owens, and Goodman to the Spending

Clause statutes. The decision below, for example,

stated that it was adopting the personal-injury limitations period for respondent’s Title VI claim based on

Wilson, citing the supposed breadth of Title VI and a

federal interest in uniformity. App., infra, 7a-8a (discussing Wilson, Goodman, and Owens). Likewise, the

Tenth Circuit in Baker justified its decision to apply

the personal-injury limitations period by emphasizing

that it would promote uniformity and “minimize[] the

risk that the choice of a state statute of limitations

would not fairly serve the federal interests vindicated

by” the statute. 991 F.2d at 631 (quotation marks

omitted); see also Egerdahl, 72 F.3d at 618.

Still other courts provide little reasoning or

simply embrace other circuits’ conclusions. In Everett,

for example, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the personal-injury limitations period for Rehabilitation Act

claims because “most circuits” took the “limitations

period for personal injury actions.” 138 F.3d at 1409

(collecting cases). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in

Lillard adopted the personal-injury limitations period

for Title IX on the grounds that “all of the circuits deciding” the limitations period applicable to a similar

Title VI claim “have uniformly applied the state per-

sonal injury limitations period.” 76 F.3d at 729 (collecting cases); accord Curto, 392 F.3d at 504 (collecting cases).

* * *

Whichever path they follow to that common destination, these courts apply a legal rule that is directly

contrary to the one used by the Fourth Circuit and the

D.C. Court of Appeals. These courts do not search for

specific state-law analogues for Spending Clause antidiscrimination legislation because they construe this

Court’s decisions to mean that, if a claim arises under

an antidiscrimination Spending Clause statute, the

state’s personal-injury limitations period controls.

C. This widespread circuit conflict is openly

acknowledged. At least four circuits have expressly

recognized this disagreement over basic methodology.

See Levy v. Kansas Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services, 789 F.3d 1164, 1173 (10th Cir. 2015);

McCormick v. Miami University, 693 F.3d 654, 662

(6th Cir. 2012); Everett, 138 F.3d at 1409;

McCullough, 35 F.3d at 129-132. This direct and entrenched disagreement warrants this Court’s review.

See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 &

n.4 (2018) (rejecting position held by seven circuits in

favor of position held by one circuit); Coleman v.

Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 536-537 (2015) (rejecting position held by “the vast majority of” circuits in favor

of position held by one circuit).

The Court’s intervention is especially warranted

here, because the dispute concerns the meaning of this

Court’s decisions in Wilson and later cases. The Court

has repeatedly granted review to resolve lower-court

disagreements about the meaning of its own precedents. See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287,

289 (1984) (plurality); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981); Scott

v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 368 (1979). Only this Court,

after all, can authoritatively interpret its prior decisions. Cf. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

550 U.S. 618, 642 n.11 (2007).

The conflict, moreover, is now acute. The decision

below creates inconsistency between the answers that

the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia

and the D.C. Superior Court will give when asked the

same question: which limitations period should be

borrowed for Title VI claims. The D.C. Court of Appeals follows the Fourth Circuit’s approach of applying the rule this Court has articulated since the 19th

century. Jaiyeola, 40 A.3d at 364-366. In this case,

that approach requires applying the D.C. Human

Rights Act’s one-year bar. D.C. Code § 2-1403.16(a).

The D.C. Circuit, however, now borrows the threeyear bar imposed under D.C.’s catchall statute of

limitations—which is not specific to personal-injury

claims, but merely encompasses them alongside others not specifically addressed elsewhere. App., infra,

5a; D.C. Code § 12-301(8). The D.C. Circuit expressly

acknowledged that it was disagreeing with the D.C.

Court of Appeals based on its own reading of Wilson

and later cases. App., infra, 6a-7a. That conflict between federal and state (or equivalent) courts covering the same territory warrants review. See, e.g., Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v. Nevils, 581 U.S.

87, 94 (2017); Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 164

(2005); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 409 (1994).

This growing conflict will not resolve itself. Congress could create an explicit limitations period for

each antidiscrimination Spending Clause statute.

But it declined to do so when it created a default limitations period only for actions under statutes enacted

after December 1, 1990. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley &

Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 371 (2004). The University is

not aware of any proposed legislation to codify limitations periods for Title VI, Title IX, or the Rehabilitation Act. And because the circuits that follow the

blanket personal-injury rule have indicated that they

believe it is compelled by this Court’s precedents, only

this Court can resolve it.

There is no reason for this Court to defer resolving

the conflict. Among regional circuits, only the First

Circuit has not taken a side. And both sides of the

conflict are entrenched. Most courts on each side have

reiterated their position repeatedly and applied it to

multiple statutes. Additional percolation is thus unlikely to clarify or resolve the conflict. Only this Court

can settle the dispute over the proper reading of its

precedents. It should do so here.

II. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THIS

COURT’S PRECEDENTS

The D.C. Circuit is on the wrong side of the conflict about the meaning of Wilson. This Court’s precedents dating back more than a century call for identifying and borrowing the limitations period from the

most analogous state law (unless there is none that is

compatible with the federal statute). Where, as here,

state law provides a very close parallel to the federal

claim, the parallel state-law limitations period should

also apply. The D.C. Circuit erred by misreading this

Court’s decisions addressing two particular civilrights laws enacted in the wake of the Civil War as

dictating a one-size-fits-all rule for all federal antidiscrimination statutes.

The decision below takes that misguided approach to its limits. The court applied a catchall limitations period that does not even target personalinjury claims; it merely happens to encompass them

alongside any other claims for which D.C. law supplies no specific statutory time bar. That backup limitations period that sets a fallback deadline for

otherwise-unprovided-for claims cannot possibly be a

closer analogue to Title VI than a D.C. antidiscrimination statute that closely resembles Title VI.

A. 1. This Court’s decisions borrowing state-law

limitations periods where federal statutes supply

none date back nearly two centuries. As early as

1830, the Court explained that “the acts of limitations

of the several states, where no special provision has

been made by congress, form a rule of decision in the

courts of the United States, and the same effect is

given to them as is given in the state courts.” M’Cluny

v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 277 (1830).

Decades later, the Court clarified that, in the face

of congressional silence, the federal statute is “subject

* * * to the general laws of the state applicable to actions of a similar nature.” Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616 (1895) (emphasis added). That

principle requires determining “the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law.”

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158; see also Chattanooga

Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390,

398-399 (1906) (considering which of three Tennessee

limitations periods covers claims closest in substance

to the federal claim at issue). Congress subsequently

“endorsed this approach” for certain Reconstructionera civil-rights statutes, including what are now

§§ 1981 and 1983, subject to certain limitations. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 267; see 42 U.S.C. § 1988. By its

terms, § 1988 does not apply to Title VI or other

Spending Clause antidiscrimination statutes, see

App., infra, 4a, but it reflects Congress’s judgment

that borrowing state-law limitations periods is not inherently incompatible with federal civil-rights statutes.

To be sure, sometimes no “obvious state-law

choice” exists. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171. This

Court has occasionally borrowed a time bar from another federal statute that “provides a closer analogy

than available state statutes.” Id. at 172. But it has

done so only where “the federal policies at stake and

the practicalities of litigation make that [federal] rule

a significantly more appropriate vehicle.” Ibid. (emphases added).

Under those precedents, a federal statute that

lacks an express limitations period should presumptively incorporate the “most closely analogous” state

law. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158 (emphasis added).

To find the closest state-law analogue, courts must

zero in on the “essence” of the federal statute and then

survey state law to identify the state law that best encapsulates that essence. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268. This

process requires careful examination of the statutes’

texts, purposes, protections, remedies, and enforcement mechanisms. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v.

Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151

(1987); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1984);

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 167-168.

2. Application of that approach to this case is simple. By any measure, the D.C. Human Rights Act is

the D.C. law that is “most closely analogous” to

Title VI. Both statutes have the “shared purpose and

ambitious aims” of eliminating racial discrimination.

Jaiyeola, 40 A.3d at 367. Both create a right to be free

from racial discrimination, including in the educational context.

42 U.S.C. § 2000d; D.C. Code

§§ 2-1401.01, 2-1402.41. Both permit plaintiffs to obtain damages and injunctive relief.

D.C. Code

§ 2-1403.16; Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279

(2001). And both are enforceable through a private

right of action, D.C. Code § 2-1403.16; Alexander,

532 U.S. at 280, and provide for administrative enforcement, D.C. Code § 2-1403.04 et seq.; 34 C.F.R.

§ 100.8; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (authorizing federal agencies to enforce Title VI by terminating funding or “by any other means authorized by law”). Given

its parallels to Title VI, the D.C. Human Rights Act

presents the paradigmatic case for borrowing a limitations period from a specific state law, as opposed to

from a more generic catchall provision designed to

cover personal-injury (and many other types of)

claims.

To be clear, the University strongly agrees with

this Court’s teaching that “racial discrimination * * *

is a fundamental injury to the individual rights of a

person.” Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656,

661 (1987). But in determining which state-law statute of limitations to borrow, this Court’s precedents

call for a more focused inquiry. The question is not

whether violations of Title VI are similar to personalinjury claims at some level of generality, but what

state-law claim is the “most closely analogous” to a

Title VI claim. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158 (emphasis

added). Given the many similarities between the D.C.

Human Rights Act and Title VI, claims under Title VI

are more closely analogous to claims under the D.C.

antidiscrimination statute than they are to personalinjury claims—let alone all claims covered by a

catchall limitations period.

B. The D.C. Circuit and other circuits have been

led astray by misreading this Court’s decisions regarding two particular Reconstruction-era federal

civil-rights laws: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.

1. In Wilson, this Court confronted the question

of how to apply the general borrowing rule to § 1983

claims. The Court first determined that its task was

“to select, in each State, the one most appropriate

statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims.” 471 U.S.

at 275 (emphasis added). It found that this classwide

(instead of case-by-case) approach was dictated by the

sheer variety of claims that may be pursued under

§ 1983, which covers “discrimination in public employment on the basis of race or the exercise of First

Amendment rights, discharge or demotion without

procedural due process, mistreatment of schoolchildren, deliberate indifference to the medical needs of

prison inmates, the seizure of chattels without advance notice or sufficient opportunity to be heard.” Id.

at 273 (footnotes omitted). “The federal interests in

uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation” pointed toward a single state-law

source for the limitations period for all § 1983 claims

in each State. Id. at 273-275.

The Court then concluded that a personal-injury

claim was the “best alternative” to capture the wide

array of claims that § 1983 encompasses. 471 U.S. at

276-279. The Court reasoned that Congress, if it had

confronted the issue, “would have characterized

§ 1983 as conferring a general remedy for injuries to

personal rights.” Id. at 278. And although “state remedies for wrongs committed by public officials” are superficially similar to § 1983, that analogy ultimately

fails because “[i]t was the very ineffectiveness of state

remedies that led Congress to enact the Civil Rights

Acts in the first place.” Id. at 279.

Later cases echo the unique breadth of the

Reconstruction-era federal civil-rights laws. In Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989), the Court rejected

an argument that a statute of limitations for intentional torts was a better fit than a general personalinjury limitations period. Id. at 249-250. Owens

found “[t]he intentional tort analogy * * * particularly inapposite in light of the wide spectrum of claims

which § 1983 has come to span,” many of which “bear

little if any resemblance to the common-law intentional tort.” Id. at 249-250. Goodman applied the

same basic reasoning in determining whether to analogize § 1981 claims to breach-of-contract claims or to

personal-injury claims. The Court chose the latter,

explaining that “Section 1981 has a much broader focus than contractual rights,” and addresses “personal

rights to sue, to testify, and to equal rights under all

laws for the security of persons and property.”

482 U.S. at 661.

Wilson, Owens, and Goodman did not create a

blanket rule for all civil-rights statutes, and their reasoning does not apply to Title VI or other antidiscrimination statutes enacted pursuant to the Spending

Clause. Title VI and other Spending Clause antidiscrimination statutes are not capacious civil-rightsprotection mechanisms that cover a wide array of diverse claims. Instead, each addresses discrimination,

with a focus on a specific protected characteristic.

Even if all Title VI (or Title IX or Rehabilitation Act)

claims are addressed as a class, that class is much

narrower and more cohesive than everything that is

actionable under § 1983. And, unlike the broad universes of claims that §§ 1983 and 1981 respectively

cover, that narrower class can and does often have a

direct analogue in state law: statutes like the D.C.

Human Rights Act. In fact, state antidiscrimination

statutes are sometimes more encompassing than the

analogous Spending Clause statutes. See, e.g., Jaiyeola, 40 A.3d at 366 (noting that D.C. Human Rights

Act “applies broadly to proscribe discrimination” in

more settings than does the Rehabilitation Act).

The Spending Clause context means that Wilson’s

other key premise is also missing: Congress did not,

through these statutes, superimpose a remedy available against state and other actors against their will to

solve the inadequacy of state remedies. Rather,

Title VI, Title IX, and the Rehabilitation Act secure

compliance and provide remedies as part of a bargain

with governments and other entities that choose to accept government funds. These recipients opt into a

regime that includes potential claims that otherwise

would not apply. There is no overriding of state law—

only incentivizing. The reasoning in Wilson, Owens,

and Goodman is inapplicable to Title VI, Title IX, and

the Rehabilitation Act.

2. The D.C. Circuit’s justifications for nevertheless extending Wilson, Owens, and Goodman are unpersuasive.

The court first reasoned that the limitations period applicable to personal-injury claims is appropriate because a Title VI violation is “an injury to the individual rights of the person.” App., infra, 5a-6a. But

that is the wrong level of generality; the question is

which state-law claim is the most analogous to a

Title VI suit. To the extent the D.C. Circuit emphasized that Title VI is about discrimination, that is only

more reason to look to the D.C. Human Rights Act,

which specifically addresses discrimination, rather

than to the catchall limitations period applicable to

personal-injury claims.

The D.C. Circuit also suggested that “federal interests” are “best” served by “select[ing] a statutory

period that applies to a large number of civil claims.”

App., infra, 7a. But that justification from Wilson’s

examination of § 1983 is inapplicable here. Unlike

§ 1983, Title VI does not apply to a wide-ranging “catalog” of claims. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 273. Title VI covers only discrimination based on race, color, or national origin; and unlike § 1983, Title VI does not apply to, for example, “the seizure of chattels.” Ibid.; see

42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Nor does Title VI present the same

risk that States will attempt to manipulate the limitations period for federal claims as § 1983 does.

Finally, the D.C. Circuit cited a judicial “duty” to

“promote uniformity,” by which it meant joining sister

circuits in treating Wilson, Owens, and Goodman as if

they set a rule applicable to all federal civil rights statutes that lack an explicit statute of limitations. App.,

infra, 8a-9a. But the uniformity objective this Court

has described does not justify borrowing for Title VI

claims whichever state law (here, a catchall, default

provision) happens to cover personal-injury claims.

The uniformity the Court stressed is “uniformity

within each State.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275 (emphasis

added). Wilson explicitly recognized that a desire for

“national uniformity” cannot displace the general rule

that courts must borrow the most closely analogous

state law. Ibid. (citing Board of Regents of University

of State of New York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 489

(1980)). And Owens’ discussion of a “rule” for “all 50

States” embodied Wilson’s concern about the diverse

range of § 1983 claims and the selection of the proper

personal-injury statute to embody all of those claims.

488 U.S. at 242-243, 248-250. The question Owens answered was which personal-injury limitations periods

to choose when a State has more than one. Ibid.

Nationwide uniformity as to the length of the limitations period is impossible under any approach. On

any view, Title VI incorporates a time bar from state

law, but States differ in the time they allow particular

claims to be brought. Tennessee, for example, has a

one-year limitations period for personal injuries,

Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1), while Missouri has

a five-year limitations period, Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 516.120(4).

The uniformity this Court has prioritized is intrastate consistency. The D.C. Circuit’s decision below

defeats that objective by creating a conflict between

federal and local courts within D.C.

III. THIS CASE IS A GOOD VEHICLE TO RESOLVE AN

ISSUE OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE

The question presented is significant. The antidiscrimination statutes that Congress has enacted

pursuant to the Spending Clause give rise to extensive

litigation across the country. In the context of education alone, the Department of Education reports that

Title VI covers “50 state education agencies, their subrecipients, and vocational rehabilitation agencies; the

education and vocational rehabilitation agencies of

the District of Columbia and of the territories and possessions of the United States; 17,000 local education

systems; 4,700 colleges and universities; 10,000 proprietary institutions; and other institutions, such as

libraries and museums.” Office of Civil Rights, Education and Title VI, https://tinyurl.com/5acz27cr (last

modified Jan. 10, 2020).

The same is true of other Spending Clause antidiscrimination statutes. Title IX applies to all educational institutions that receive federal funds. Dep’t of

Justice, Civil Rights Division, Title IX Legal Manual,

§ I, https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix (last modified

Aug. 12, 2021). And the Rehabilitation Act applies to

any recipient of federal funds as well as federal “Executive agenc[ies].” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

The question presented has a significant bearing

on the viability of claims against all of these educational institutions and Executive agencies. Which

state-law limitations period governs a Title VI,

Title IX, or Rehabilitation Act claim may be dispositive in many cases brought at a distance of time from

the underlying alleged conduct.

That issue also implicates important values. Limitations periods are “fundamental to a well-ordered judicial system.” Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 487. Statutes of

limitations “promote justice,” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2014) (citation omitted), including by eliminating stale claims “in which the

search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss

of evidence,” United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111,

117 (1979).

Limitations periods “provide security and stability to human affairs,” and are “vital to the welfare of

society.” Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 448-449 (2013)

(quotation marks omitted). Limitations periods provide potential defendants a measure of confidence

that, at some point, new claims are unlikely to materialize, enabling regulated entities to close the books

on past years, absent unusual circumstances. See,

e.g., Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 608

(2018) (“primary purposes of limitations statutes” include “preventing surprises to defendants and barring

a plaintiff who has slept on his rights” (quotation

marks omitted)). Clear limitations periods also help

plaintiffs by informing them of their “opportunity for

recovery,” thus permitting them to plan their conduct

to make sure they have a chance to litigate their cases.

Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 448 (quotation marks omitted).

To be clear, the primary concern is clarity, predictability, and evenhandedness—not a limitations

period of a particular length. In fact, adopting the limitations period applicable to the most analogous state

law instead of always borrowing the personal-injury

time bar will not always result in a shorter limitations

period.

Compare Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 659A.030,

659A.875(1)(b) (five-year limitations period for many

forms of discrimination), with id. § 12.110(1) (twoyear limitations period for personal injuries). And in

Goodman, the personal-injury statute of limitations

borrowed by this Court was four years shorter than the

alternative limitations period for contract claims.

482 U.S. at 659-660. In any event, in the context of

discrimination claims, both defendants and plaintiffs

can benefit from relatively shorter limitations periods.

Those claims “are apt to become stale quickly” in light

of the “impermanent” nature of “subjective estimations of the discriminatory ‘climate’ at the workplace”

and other relevant evidence, and a shorter time bar

“promote[s] rapid compliance.” Davis v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 449 A.2d 278, 280-281 (D.C. 1982).

Clarity and predictability are undermined by

“conflict, confusion, and uncertainty” regarding “[t]he

actual process used to select an appropriate state statute,” which the Court has previously recognized provide “compelling reasons for granting certiorari.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266. The conflict that the decision

below deepened results in untenable inconsistency in

the approaches courts apply. In light of the decision

below, for example, a federal court adjudicating a

Title VI case in the District of Columbia must look for

a different state-law limitations period than a federal

court in the surrounding States, which follow the

Fourth Circuit’s well-reasoned rule. And, given the

D.C. Court of Appeals’ embrace of the Fourth Circuit’s

approach, the fate of a claim brought in the District of

Columbia itself will now depend in part on whether

the suit is brought in Superior Court or federal district

court. See p. 22, supra. This Court’s intervention is

necessary to eliminate such asymmetries and to provide clarity once and for all.

This case offers a good opportunity for the Court

to do so. The question of the proper statute of limitations to borrow was extensively briefed below. See,

e.g., Resp. C.A. Br. 33-50; Pet. C.A. Br. 16-36; Resp.

C.A. Reply Br. 2-9. And each court squarely addressed it—the district court in its thorough opinion

granting summary judgment to the University, App.,

infra, 25a-34a, and the court of appeals in reversing

that ruling, id. at 3a-9a. The question presented is

also likely to be outcome-determinative in this case. A

decision of this Court that the district court correctly

borrowed the D.C. antidiscrimination statute’s limitations period would strongly support reinstating that

court’s summary-judgment ruling in the University’s

favor. This Court has regularly granted review in like

circumstances to address questions concerning a statute of limitations or repose. See, e.g., Kellogg Brown

& Root Services v. United States ex rel. Carter,

575 U.S. 650, 655-656 (2015); CTS Corp., 573 U.S. at

6-7; Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 446-447. At a minimum, this

Court’s decision would substantially narrow the scope

of any remaining issues.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted.