Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Robert R. Snyder, Petitioner v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, et al.

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MAR 15 2023

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ROBERT R. SNYDER,

Petitioner,

vs.

California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The California Supreme Court

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ROBERT R. SNYDER, In Pro Se

D.O.C. No. AC9136,

CSATF, COR./F-yard

P.O. Box 5244

Corcoran, CA 93212

received

MAR 11 2023

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

•

Did the California corrections agency exceed

the bounds of its statutory authority when

they wrote an administrative regulation

without any sort of predicate timeframe?

•

Can a state law without a timeframe for

property reissuance, pass the reasonableness

test? What would constitute an unreasonable

delay in that context?

•

Can review courts safely defer to

administrative interpretation that does not

exist? Does the omission of a substantive

predicate—to guide decision makers—

constitute an ambiguity and/or a failure to

interpret (the governing authority) for

Chevron purposes?

•

Does an agency actually possess discretion to

promulgate and then refuse to amend.., one

sided administrative codes—those which

result in casual and often deprivations of

prisoner’s chattels?

•

Is the term ministerial duty strictly limited to

the text of agency-regulations—under a state's

administrative procedures—or can it be

derived also from duties arising out of

statutory and/or constitutional provisions?

11

•

Upon refusing to grant relief, did the

California Court of Appeal avoid some issues,

confuse others and in general, fail to narrowly

frame the primary questions presented in

their opinion?

•

Could a more fair procedure be ordered into

place to prevent the exact sort of judicial bias,

appurtenant to the lower court proceedings?

Ill

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner: Robert R. Snyder was the

Petitioner in the lower court, Fifth District Court of

Appeal and in the Supreme Court of California

proceedings.

Respondents:

California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation,

Supreme Court of California,

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate

District,

California State Superior Court of The

County of Kings,

California Attorney General: Robert Bonta

NO RELATED CASES

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . .

1

OPINIONS AND ORDERS

1

Application for an extension of time to file a writ

of certiorari granted by Justice Kagan.................

1

Opinions and Orders from the CA Supreme

Court..........................................................

1

Opinions and Orders from the California Fifth

Appellate District Court ............................. . . 1

Opinions and Orders from the California Superior

Court, County of Kings.......................................... 2

JURISDICTION

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI . .

5

ARGUMENT

7

A: Introduction

7

B: Subjective Reasonableness of Policy . . .

9

V

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

C: Constitutionally Deficient Appellate Review

11

D: CA Supreme Court’s Silent Deference

. .

12

E: Additional, Miscellaneous Viewpoints From

Arlington..........................................................

15

CONCLUSION

16

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

VERIFICATION

.

.

17

18

APPENDIX

Application to the U.S. Supreme Court for extension

of time was granted January 24, 2023 . . . App. 1

Order Affirming the California Supreme Court’s

Denial November 09, 2022

App. 2

Order Affirming the lower court’s denial was

submitted by the 5th Appellate District Court

of California, August 15, 2022

.... App. 3—9

Order of Judgment by the Superior Court, County of

Kings, dismissed the first amended petition for writ

of mandate on February 13, 2020. . . .App. 10-11

VI

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Federal Cases

[Arlington v. FCC, (2013) infra]

4

Bonin u. Calderon,

(C A, 9) 59 F. 3d 815, at p. 842

8

Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC,

(1984) 467 U.S. 837

13-14

Chen v. Chertoff,

(2007) U.S. Dist. Lexis 64664 at (*4). . . 14

City of Arlington v. FCC,

668 F. 3d 229, 261(C A 5, 2012) ... 14

City of Arlington v. FCC, (2013)

569 U.S 290, 308-309, 311,312, 314 . . 9, 15

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at p. 472 (1983) ...

8

In re Williams, 241 C.A. 4th 738, 744 (2015) . .

8

Johnson v. City of Hazelwood, (2014)

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176031 at (*13). . .10

Vll

Kolender v. Lawson, (1983)

461 U.S. 352, 358

13

Long Island Care v. Coke,

(2007) 551 U.S. 158, 165

9

NCTA v. Brand X,

(2005) 545 U.S. 967, 980

8

Pell v. Procunier, (1974) 417 U.S. 817, 822- 23 . . 10

Plata v. Scharzenegger, (2005)

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43796 at (*52)

5

Sandin v. Connor,

(1995) 515 U.S. 472, 482

9

Sandstrom v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd.,

31 Cal. 2d 401 (1948) . . .

11

Sarlak v. Pompeo, 2020 WL 3082018/2020

U.S. Dist. Lexis 101881 at (*16). .

14

Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720,

(6th Cir. 2003).....................

m4C v. FCC, 750 F. 2d

70 (D.C, cir., 1984)

. 12

14

Vlll

U.S. v. Rodriguez, 2018 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 26963 at (*19). . .

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, (1886)

118 U.S. 356, 373-74

9

. . . . 10

9

Federal Statutes

28U.S.C. § 1257

2

Federal Rules

Sup Ct. Rule 10(b)

2

Sup Ct. Rules 13, and 30

2

Sup. Ct. Rule 14

17

1

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Robert Snyder respectfully petitions for a writ

of certiorari to review a proceeding by the Supreme

Court of California. That review was taken sub­

sequent to the dismissal of a direct civil appeal in the

Fifth Appellate of California.

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

Order from the U.S. Supreme Court.

An extension of time to file this writ of

certiorari was granted by Justice Kagan, who

extended the time to and including March 18, 2023.

The matter is attached at App.l

Opinions and Orders from the California

Supreme Court.

The petition for review was filed in this

court on October 15th, 2022. The court’s denial is

attached at App. 2 for Case No. S276137.

Opinions and Orders from the Court of

Appeal, Fifth appellate District.

The August 15th, 2022 order dismissing

Plaintiffs appeal from the Superior Court of Kings

County, is attached at App.’s 3 through 9 for Case

No. F081087.

2

Opinions and Orders from the California

Superior Court, County of Kings.

The February 13, 2020 Judgment

dismissing Petitioner’s first amended petition for

writ of mandate is attached at App.’s 10 and 11 for

Case No. 18C0297.

♦

JURISDICTION

This Petition is authorized by United States

Supreme Court rules, Rule 10 subd.(b) and is timely

filed in accordance with Rule 13 and 30. Jurisdiction

is conferred upon this court by 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

This case involves issues directly related to

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution: No State shall make or enforce any

law, which shall abridge the privileges or immun­

ities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any

State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On Oct. 3rd, 2018 prisoner Robert Snyder

petitioned Kings County Superior Court regarding

agency inaction through a petition for writ of

mandate in pro per after a series of post-transfer

property deprivations; Case No.: 18-C0297. This case

was dismissed and the judgment was entered on Feb.

13th, 2020. A timely appeal was filed on Nov. 19th,

2020 and was affirmed on Aug. 15th, 2022. The

opinion (located at 2022 WL 3354785/2022 Cal. App.

Unpub. LEXIS 5003) did not provide a careful

consideration of the thorough legal claims posited by

appellant before the court; in light of comprehensive

nature of the briefs and argument on record. A

Petition For Review was filed in the California

Supreme Court (hereinafter, “CSC”) on Sept. 15th,

2022 and a silent denial issued on Nov. 9th, 2022.

Federal questions were raised throughout the state

proceedings; see p. 13, 18 of the State Appellate

Opening Brief. Petitioner also moved for a motion to

extend the filing deadline in this court on Jan. 12th,

2023 until Mar. 18th, 2023 based upon a surprise

court ordered appearance by Los Angeles

County Superior, which happened during the

pendency of the 90-day certiorari deadline.

First of all, petitioner would like to

announce: he considers himself fortunate to appear

before the court today. Second, the contextual

backdrop is as follows: California’s prison system

continues to suffer from systemic crowding, enough

so to interfere with its ability to rehabilitate all of

the prisoners in their custody. Besides this, the

California Dept, of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

#

4

(hereinafter "CDCR"), has various other areas of

concern, including whereas here, claims of property

deprivations have become normative. This matter

places a spotlight on only one of several other

problematic regulations within 15 Cal. Code of Regs.

Based upon the evidence, the following contains no

hyperbole.

A lot can be said of what was learned during

the course of the proceedings, particularly when

Petitioner filed for a writ of prohibition in the

appellate court concerning claims of judicial bias.

After the assigned judge scheduled the first hearing,

Kings County switched out the bench without any

notice to the petitioner; *refer to Case No.: F079978,

review denied 1/29/20.

Additionally, some key tenets are: (1)

California would like to confine the meaning of

ministerial duty to be—only what their agencies

rule-making1 bodies enact; (2) Most property

deprivations in prison take place immediately

subsequent inter-institutional transfers—which

indisputably invokes a protected liberty interest; (3)

CDCR’s general property policy is woefully deficient

of the most essential component, a regulatory

1 CDCR’s office of Regulation and Policy Management refused

to process petitioner’s request for § 3190’s rule-making file, in a

timely manner.

5

timetable; 2 (4) multiple procedural due process

violations below included credible evidence that the

trial court proceedings were tainted by judicial bias;

and (5) the court granted a request by the deputy

attorney general, to hand the case off to a judge who

was determined to stop the matter at the pleadings

stage. Petitioner soon thereafter filed for Judicial

Intervention* in the Fifth Appellate District Court of

Appeal, which issued a summary denial. During that

time, the summary of proceedings shows that the

original judge who was assigned to the case,

returned to the bench—just in case the higher court

granted the peremptory writ.

REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

Supplicant thinks the doctrine of trained

incapacity explains how this and other similar

controversies begin.3 This sort of administrative

scienter, evident by the lodged facts, results in

agency rulemaking bodies whom may try to legislate

their way into regulatory impunity. It makes sense

that CDCR would not want to write a law that limits

their options.

2“ ... Strong-arming of regulated parties into voluntary

compliance without the opportunity for judicial review.”

[Arlington v. FCC, (2013) infra]

^ Plata v. Scharzenegger, (2005) U.S. Dist. Lexis 43796 at

(*52)

6

Prisoners need officers to act on 'passing out

their property'. However, without a time-specific

rule, it is never surprising when property

distribution/re-distribution is not timely or does not

occur at all. Without a specific timetable to quote, it

is difficult to write a cognizable grievance. It is

questionable whether state congress would authorize

this hardship into place, given the protection

afforded prisoners by the federal constitution. The

basic right to file a prison grievance becomes an

ancillary issue.

The controversy started when the CDCR

repeatedly engaged in hurtful and unfair discrim­

ination concerning the deprivation of prisoner’s

property as well as the property of others. This

factual claim led petitioner to discover a constit­

utionally infirm administrative policy, 15 of § 3190

of the California Code of Regulations, hereinafter

“CCR”. The vague and otherwise incomplete

regulation became the subject of a dispute in the

local trial court. CDCR's authority to write rules this

way is far from clear. The attorneys for CDCR filed

a summary judgment motion—in response to clear

pleadings—disguised as a demurrer—attempting to

bulldoze numerous potential factual disagreements,

summarily. Petitioner’s pro per status earned him

no leniency upon making his pleading.

Upon direct civil appeal, the appellate court

ignored many of the issues that would have resolved

the matter favorable to the filing party here. The key

facts were refused treatment by the lower court; the

critical legal claims were likewise improperly set

7

aside, in spite of their merit. His right to present

evidence before an impartial tier of facts was

shrugged aside, which is an apparent procedural

due process violation under the 14th Amendment to

the U.S. Constitution.

ARGUMENT

A: Introduction

When Petitioner Snyder requested the court

require CDCR to amend 15 CCR § 3190, he in turn

was asking that they interpret their own rules,

which could have been done either regionally or

locally, (Cal. Pen. Code, § 2086)—one of id. 15 §

3190's enabling statutes. PC §§ 2600 and 2601—

California’s codification of the 'reasonably related'

Turner standard and ’right to own, sell and inherit

property,' (while incarcerated) statutes—are also

CCR’s 15 § 3190's governing authority, respectively.

The other few acts listed under CCR’s 15 § 3190 are

either basic rulemaking vehicles or are otherwise

irrelevant to central issues.

Because CDCR’s guards are not expected to

know the language of judicial decisions, they need

specific instruction 4 by their own state agencies'

official policy. Here in California, that is ‘Cal. Code

of Regs, CCR Title 15’. In this case, the lower court

4 The attitude would be "bad rule or not, we are going to

follow orders". This type of improper influence is what

perpetuates the mindset behind the 'trained incapacity'

doctrine.

#

#

8

upheld the pleas of the deputy state attorney, who

claimed, "The department has no 'ministerial duty' to

return property within a specific timeframe," making

their defense into an admission of their serious

omission... Depending on the meaning of 'ministerial

duty', which petitioner agues extends beyond their

own custom administrative codes.., the department

should not have benefited from a sustained demurer.

Akin to an admission of error should not serve as a

defense to suit. The question would be '... if the

implementing agency's construction is reasonable,'

NCTA v. Brand X, (2005) 545 U.S. 967, 980. How

can the omission of a specific predicate be deemed

reasonable?

California knows the standard set in 1995's

Bonin v. Calderon, (C A, 9) 59 F. 3d 815, at p. 842

citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at p. 472 (1983), yet

still enjoys a regulatory scheme that lacks

"...substantive predicates governing official decision

making..." Although 15 CCR § 3190 was created well

before the shift in perspective, they nonetheless have

a duty to amend their regulations. Since then, courts

have recognized how many states have regulations

without mandatory language. Petitioner’s request

was that CDCR conform to this shift. Instead, the

trial court failed to recognize the merits of the claim:

"After Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the

inquiry into existence of a protected liberty interest

... is not the language of the regulations ... but the

nature of those conditions themselves, in relation to

the ordinary incidents of prison life." (In re

Williams, 241 C.A. 4th 738, 744 (2015)). Certainly

CDCR would prefer to keep their regulations silent

as to how many days their inmates must wait for

#

9

their legal paper work and other important items

such as food, hygiene and warm clothes. However,

the competing interests at stake, which serve a

higher purpose, should take precedence over

administrative factors such as convenience and costsavings.5

By allowing the state to keep their rules

deficient, it helps the corrections agency dispel

liberty interest claims regarding property. The

Sandin court must have had such conditions in mind

when it ruled out incentives 6 to write ambiguous

policy; conditions where prisoners spend weeks, if

not months without basic supplies.

B: Subjective Reasonableness Of Policy

The demands placed upon state prison codes

are that they must be reasonable; Yick Wo v.

Hopkins, (1886) 118 U.S. 356, 373-74; Long Island

Care v. Coke, (2007) 551 U.S. 158, 165; City of

Arlington v. FCC, (2013) 569 U.S 290, 311. See also,

(Cal. Gov’t code § 11342.2). Therefore, can a prison

regulation without a yardstick survive this test?

Prisoner grievances without a point of contention

such as, "the deadline has passed, please return my

property," would demand greater attention by verbal

5 “Outside of extreme or unusual circumstances,

convenience and cost-savings to the government should not

outweigh properly considered burdens ” by any party.

U.S. v. Rodriguez, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26963 at (*19).

Prisoner’s interest in their property, includes the

preservation of health.

6 Sandin v. Connor, (1995) 515 U.S. 472, 482.

10

protest or by personally confronting the property

officer. These methods promote disorder and may

lead to disciplinary charges, which bring the due

process clause to mind; also 'some important

questions going to the administration of a state

prison...' (1974)'s Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539.

By refusing to amend their rule regarding a

fundamental right, hence keeping pace with the

judiciary's evolving standards, 15 CCR § 3190

continues to lack the most essential provision:

substantive guidance to which all parties could agree

is fair. Precisely how many days would constitute an

unreasonable delay? Along with how the question

concerns rights guaranteed by California's

constitution, it must be examined under strict

scrutiny; it does not serve a compelling penological

interest to maintain essentially silent property rules.

Cal. Const. Art. I, § 1 enumerates its citizens

'inalienable rights', of which property is one. See how

the text of Cal. Civ. Code Proc., § 1085 uses the word

'law' not 'regulation' in setting forth the require­

ments before an agency or board, which can be forced

by mandate to discharge any duty. Petitioner

believes that all agencies have a ministerial duty to

respect the inalienable rights of their citizens. It

seems unreasonable to confine 'ministerial duty' to

only the realm of rules written by state officials;

particularly when those rules contravene greater

sources 7 of law.

7 Johnson v. City of Hazelwood, (2014) U.S. Dist. LEXIS

176031 at (*13)(a ministerial duty can be either statutory or

regulatory).

11

Pell v. Procunier, (1974) 417 U.S. 817, 82223 explains the three basic penological objectives:

deterrence, rehabilitation and internal security. It

is axiomatic that a prison administration has no

compelling interest under Pell in granting them­

selves unlimited discretion in areas that trans­

gress the boundaries of the United States juris­

prudence.

C: Constitutionally Deficient Appellate

Review

Had the Court of Appeal answered

petitioner’s questions, it would have resolved the

case favorably and remanded the matter. Instead, a

plain reading of their opinion will display how it

applied inapposite case authority, comprised of

decisions that had little or no factual relevance; see

Appendix. "Whether any specific regulation is so

unreasonable as to be arbitrary, capricious, or in

excess of the delegated authority of the agency,

depends on the particular facts and circumstances of

the individual case,” (Sandstrom v. Cal. Horse

Racing Bd., 31 Cal. 2d 401 (1948)). The appeal court

possesses wide latitude to consider the novel

questions associated with this case; arguably

questions that need to be addressed eventually.

However, the court declined to. answer these

important questions because petitioner suspects his

pro per status may have disparaged his presentation.

The level of prejudice towards petitioner in

this case was grievous, to say the least. He has the

upmost respect for the CSC, however cannot

reconcile with anything besides the whole truth;

12

which is the appearance of a serious injustice. The

'exhaustion of administrative remedies' defense 8 was

not even briefed by the respondent because it was a

non-issue on appeal. Although it was first raised by

the court itself on appeal..? Normally this does not

happen. The attached opinion affirming the denial of

relief, accomplished nothing more than undue pause

of a vital legal cause. Perhaps the current venue is

the best way to address this question.

D: California Supreme Court's Silent

Deference

The federal courts will look-through to last

reasoned opinion when the state high court issues a

summary ruling denying relief. In other words, the

two courts agree to adopt the same position towards

Snyder's petition although there is no evidence CSC

gave it any consideration. Therefore, the state high

court of last resort approved of both the appellate

court's due process errors and has deferred to the

agencies interpretation, or lack thereof in this case.

"The existence of statutory ambiguity is

sometimes not enough to warrant the conclusion that

congress has left a deference-warranting gap for the

agency to fill because our cases make clear that

other, sometimes context-specific factors will on

occasion prove relevant," {id. Arlington at p. 308-09)

Breyer, J., concurring with the result. This language

8 The (exhaustion of administrative remedies relies on

the DOC to faithfully execute their duty to process

prisoner’s grievances); Cf. Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d

720, (6th Cir. 2003).

13

supports petitioner ad litem's contentions. It is not

necessarily a good thing for an administrative code to

remain ambiguous. In the context of criminal

statutes, vague codes deemed standardless can be

invalidated; Cf. Kolender v. Lawson, (1983) 461 U.S.

352, 358. Thus, ambiguity as to time leads officials

to make arbitrary determinations as to when an

incarcerated citizen will be allowed access to his/her

own belongings.

Along with what is noted above, Arlington

id., posited a scholarly treatment of many other

relative issues. In that case, CTIA requested a

declaratory ruling of the FCC then the City of

Arlington asked the 5th Circuit to review its

affirmative ruling. During that controversy, the

FCC clarified ambiguous language, changing, 'within

a reasonable period of time,' into '... 90 days to

process a collocation application...' 9 This court

upheld the 5th circuits ruling under Chevron post.

The FCC is an interstate federal agency obliged to

make certain a workable timetable was put into

place when it was faced with a 'silent or ambiguous

statute'; Arlington id. at syllabus *2. How much

more does CDCR have a similar duty to clarify 15

CCR § 3190?

It would be a daunting task to re-hash all of

Arlington v. FCC's elaborate points that provide

9 Today, 47 USC § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) actually provides 30

in place of 90 days.

14

thrust for this petition. Pars interponere does not

seek to challenge the ruling in Chevron U.S.A. v.

NRDC, (1984) 467 U.S. 837, instead declares that

CSC should not have deferred to CDCR's obstinate

refusal to bring 15 CCR § 3190 up to date with the

well-established federal case law post-Sandin.

Proviso est providere praesentia et futura, non

praeteria.

The default interpretation of 15 CCR § 3190

by officers regarding demands for property issuances

normally, "Well, I have an unlimited amount of

time..," to reissue it. Hence, many courts have

undoubtedly confronted similar questions as to what

constitutes an ’unreasonable delay'10 in the admin­

istrative forum; (Sarlak v. Pompeo, 2020 WL

3082018/2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101881 at (*16);

Chen v. Chertoff, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 64664 at (*4);

TRAC v. FCC, 750 F. 2d 70 (D.C, cir., 1984). In this

case, petitioner trusts this court's ability to control

the discretion of an agency that is overwhelmed by

crowding related problems.

The ambiguous phrase 'within a reasonable

period' is far more honest than simply leaving the

timeframe up to the best guess by relatively

unaccountable guards. The complete lack of

predicate leaves no room for interpretation later.

Was this intentional omission designed to 'alter the

scope of the governing authority'?

1® "Both service providers and zoning authorities

would benefit from FCC guidance on what lengths of

delay would generally be unreasonable under sec. 322(c)

(7)." City of Arlington u. FCC, 668 F. 3d 229, 261(C A 5,

2012).

15

E: Additional, Miscellaneous Viewpoints

From Arlington

With respect to its property policy, the Cal.

Pen C. gave CDCR little more than a general grant

of rule making authority; that is, only a minimal

imprimatur of interpretive powers. All the more

reason for California to proceed with caution—

yet they stretched the legislative meter, into an

administrative mile. It is true, "Congress often fails

to speak to 'the precise question before an agency, t ti

(.Arlington, supra at p. 314). And, whereas here, Cal.

Pen. C. §§ 2600, 2601, 2086, 5054 and 5058 etc., offer

nothing specific to help CDCR’s position relative to

these issues now before the court. Therefore—thus

far, the California courts have sent this question up

into the air so "...that it is the agency really doing the

legislating," (id. at p. 315) but the federal supreme

court does 'not leave it to the agency to decide when

it is in charge." (Id. at p. 327).

"An agency cannot exercise interpretive

authority until it has it; the question whether an

agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a

court without deference to the agency." (Arlington,

id. at p. 312). In light of their recent dismissal at

bar, CSC has invited a rule of federal reason; to fill

in the administrative gap that their courts have thus

far permitted. At this point, CDCR prisoners lack a

clear initial path towards relief; seeing that (CDCR’s)

'language establishing a private right of action, is

ambiguous." (Id. at p. 319).

16

Hence in the interim, the question remains

"...whether authority over the particular ambiguity

at issue has been delegated to the agency." (Id. at p.

323). In their written opinion, the 5th App. Dist.,

focused mostly on CDCR's discretion; instead of

correctly determining on "... its own whether

congress delegated interpretive authority over,"

allowing 15 Cal. Admin. Code, § 3190 to stay stand­

ardless as to time. When we assemble all these

points of view, we may be left with the sense that it

violates fundamental fairness.

♦

CONCLUSION

The over simplified approach by the lower

courts was an abuse of their discretion, in many

respects. A prison regulation that discriminates

against prisoners through the omission of a most

essential predicate, violates the 14th Amendment to

the U.S. Constitution and therefore should not be

protected by deference. It is hard to imagine a more

fundamental liberty than a citizen’s right to enjoy

property. The CDCR failed to amend and/or clarify

their silent regulations as required by constitutional

authority. The bad faith errors throughout the

proceedings, highlight CDCR’s bureaucratic scienter

which includes exerting undue pressure on its state’s

deputy attorneys. These various due process

violations are intolerable by the evolving standards

of 14th Amendment jurisprudence. Based upon the

17

foregoing argument, petitioner Snyder respectfully

requests that the court retain jurisdiction, appoint

counsel and provide a grant of Certiorari in this

matter.

Quando abest provisio partis, adest prouisio legis.

Thank you for the opportunity to be heard.

Respectfully Submitted,

ROBERT R. SNYDER, Pro Se

D.O.C. No. AC9136

CSATF, COR/F-Yard

P.O. Box 5244

Corcoran, CA 93212