Petition for Writ of Certiorari — John W. Fink, Petitioner v. Jonathan L. Bishop, et al.

Supreme Court briefFeb 23, 2023

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NO.

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

JOHN W. FINK, Petitioner,

JONATHAN L. BISHOP; KAYDON A. STANZIONE;

JOSEPH M. TROUPE; SUEZ WTS USA, INC.; ADT

INC.; EDGELINK, INC.; PRAXIS TECHNOLOGIES

CORPORATION; PRAXIS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.;

J. PHILIP KIRCHNER; and

FLASTER/GREENBERG, P.C., Respondents

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR

Writ Of Certiorari

John W. Fink

Pro Se

6812 Yellowstone Blvd.

Apt. 2V

Forest Hills, NY 11375

j ohnlawsuit@e arthlink. net

718-459-3541

received

Feb 2 7 2023

IScnn£LF.1K

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

In my underlying complaint which invoked F.R.C.P.

(“Rule”) 60(d), I alleged two judges in the District of

New Jersey had deprived me of due process by

committing a combined 50+judiciary violations,

including their use of extrajudicially sourced facts.

These violations constituted a pattern that spans

four related prior cases and revealed the judges bias

against me.

In a Rule 12(b)(6) proceeding in the underlying case,

the presiding judge dismissed my case. In doing so,

he also committed judiciary violations, thereby

revealing his bias against me. The Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit affirmed his decision.

Significantly, the four Respondents who participated

in this matter did not disprove with specificity any of

the facts supporting my allegations about the

pattern of 50+ judiciary violations.

The Questions Presented are:

•

Did the Third Circuit judges repeatedly fail to

impartially decide my underlying appeal case,

as well as other previous appeal cases of mine?

•

Did the Third Circuit fail to conduct a true

plenary hearing, especially since they did not

address any of the 50+ judiciary violations

which had deprived me of due process and

which the Respondents had not disproved with

specificity?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

I, John W. Fink, petition this Court for a writ of

certiorari regarding claims against the

Respondents. Only Respondents Steven W.

Davis1; SUEZ WTS USA, Inc.2 (combined, the

“Suez Respondents”); J. Philip Kirchner, Esq.,

and Flaster Greenberg, P.C. (the last two parties

combined, the “F/G Respondents”; all combined,

the “F/G-Suez Respondents”) participated and

moved to dismiss my case in the district court

and only they opposed my subsequent appeal to

the Third Circuit.

RELATED CASES

1. U.S. District of New Jersey; No. l:09-cv05078; John W. Fink v. EdgeLink, Inc., and

KaydonA. Stanzione; Judgment: March 27,

2012.

2. U.S. Third Circuit; No. 12-2229; John W. Fink

v. EdgeLink, Inc., Kaydon A. Stanzione;

Judgment: January 21, 2014.

3. U.S. District of New Jersey; No. l:13-cv03370, John W. Fink v. Jonathan L. Bishop,

Kaydon A. Stanzione, Joseph M. Troupe, GE

Betz, Inc.,3 Steven W. Davis, Praxis

Technologies Corporation, Praxis

Technologies, Inc., ADTSecurity Services, Inc.;

Judgment: June 16, 2015.

1 Inadvertently included twice in initial caption.

2 Now known as VEOLIA WTS USA, INC.

3 GE Betz, Inc. subsequently renamed as SUEZ WTS USA Inc.

4. U.S. Third Circuit; No. 15-2689; John W. Fink

v. Jonathan L. Bishop; Kaydon A. Stanzione;

Joseph M. Troupe.; GE Betz, Inc.; Steven W.

Davis; Praxis Technologies Corporation;

Praxis Technologies, Inc.; ADT Security

Services, Inc.; Judgment: February 2, 2018.

5. U.S. District of New Jersey; No. l:12-cv04125; John W. Fink v. J. Philip Kirchner,

and Flaster/Greenberg P.C.; Judgment: April

5, 2016 and December 20, 2016.

6. U.S. Third Circuit; No. 17-1170; John W. Fink

v. J. Philip Kirchner; Flaster/Greenberg P.C.;

Judgment: July 3, 2018.

7. U.S. Supreme Court; No. 18-399; John W.

Fink v. J. Philip Kirchner, et al.; Judgment:

December 3, 2018.

8. U.S. District of New Jersey; Case No. 2:19-cv09374; John W. Fink v. J. Philip Kirchner and

Flaster Greenberg, P.C.; Judgment: January 8,

2020, June 16, 2020, November 23, 2020.

9. U.S. Third Circuit; No. 20-3572; United States

of America, J. Philip Kirchner, Flaster

Greenberg, P.C.; Judgment: October 1, 2021.

10. U.S. District of New Jersey; 23-cv-00566; John

W. Fink v. Jonathan L. Bishop, Kaydon A.

Stanzione, Joseph M. Troupe, Steven W.

Davis, Suez WTS USA, Inc., Johnson Controls

Security Solutions LLC, EdgeLink, Inc.,

Praxis Technologies Corporation, Praxis

Technologies, Inc., J. Philip Kirchner,

Flaster/Greenberg, P.C.; Judgment: Pending.4

4 Initially filed on December 29, 2022 in the U.S. District Court

of the Southern District of New York as Case No. l:22-cv10978 before being transferred to the District of New Jersey

per the transfer order dated January 25, 2023 (Appx. F at

37a). (Discussed below.)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED..........

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

RELATED CASES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Vll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OPINIONS AND JUDGMENT BELOW

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND

STATUTES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Introduction

B. Docket Abbreviations.......................

C. District Judges Denied Due Process

D. The First Three Cases.....................

E. The Newark Litigation...................................

F. The Underlying District Case.........................

G. The Underlying Appeal Case........................

H. The Subsequent SDNY Complaint...............

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION..

A. District Judges Failed to Act Impartially.

B. Proof of the Facts in My Complaint.........

C. Third Circuit Failed to Conduct a True

Plenary Hearing....................................

D. Continual Pattern of Judicial Bias...........

E. Answers to the Petition Questions............

F. Decision Rendered Based on Papers Only

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A: Court of Appeals order denying

rehearing, November, 28, 2022....la

Appendix B: Court of Appeals opinion,

September 28, 2022 Appendix......3a

Appendix C: Court of Appeals judgment,

September, 28, 2022............

11a

Appendix D: District Court order,

August 16, 2021.......

13a

Appendix E: District Court opinion,

August 16, 2021...........

15a

Appendix F: SDNY Court opinion,

January 25, 2023......

32a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317 (1986)................

Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428

F.3d 408 (2d Cir. 2005).............................

Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d

287 (3d Cir. 1980)...................

Klugh v. U.S., 620 F.Supp. 892 (D.S.C. 1985) .... 23

Liteky v. U.S., 114 US S. Ct„ 1147 (1994)

23-25

Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d

291 (7th Cir. 1981)...........

New Jersey Carpenters & the Trustees

Thereof v. Tishman Const. Corp. of

New Jersey, 760 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2014)

Taylor v. O’Grady, 888 F.2d

1189 (7th Cir. 1989)..................

United States v. Balistrieri, lid F.2d

1191 (7th Cir. 1985)..... ..................

United States v. Eisenberg, 734 F.

Supp. 1137 (NJDC 1990)........

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 455

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

28 U.S.C. § 1291

S. Ct. R. 10

Federal Rules of Civ.

Proc. 12...............

i, 3, 13-14, 16, 26-27, 34

Federal Rules of Civ.

Proc. 59..............

11, 18-19, 28

Federal Rules of Civ.

Proc. 60...............

i, 3, 5, 8, 10-13, 14, 16, 20,

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

I, John W. Fink, a pro se litigant, respectfully

petition for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Third Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS AND JUDGMENT BELOW

The opinion (Not Precedential) and judgment of the

court of appeals (Appx. B at 3a-10a; Appx. C at 11a12a, respectively) and the order denying rehearing

and rehearing en banc (Appx. A at la-2a) are

attached. The opinion (Not for Publication) and order

of the District of New Jersey court (Appx. D at 13a14a; Appx. E at 15a-31a, respectively) are attached,

as is the transfer order of the Southern District of

New York court (Appx. F at 32a-37a).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The opinion and judgment of the Third Circuit was

entered on September 28, 2022. (Appx. B at 3a-13a.)

The court of appeals denied the appellant’s timely

petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc on

November 28, 2022. (Appx. A at la-2a.) Petitioner

requests a writ of certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

None.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Introduction.

Our judicial system requires an impartial judge

sitting at its center. No true or fair decision can be

rendered by a judge who favors one or more of the

parties as occurred in this case and its four

predecessors. A decision rendered by a less than an

impartial judge constitutes a grave miscarriage of

justice. To correct such an injustice, I am petitioning

for a writ of certiorari.

S. Ct. R. 10 states that “[a] petition for a writ of

certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error

consists of erroneous factual findings or the

misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.” In

this instance, given the sheer number of “erroneous

factual findings” across five cases (including this

one), I assert this situation now warrants this

Court’s intervention so as to ensure my

Constitutional right to due process.

These “erroneous factual findings” also reveal a

pervasive pattern which demands this Court’s

attention so as to ensure the proper maintenance of

the Judiciary Branch.

In the underlying case, I alleged in my complaint

that in the four prior cases, the presiding district

and appellate judges had repeatedly committed

“erroneous factual findings.” By their sheer number

(more than 50 at the district level alone), these

erroneous factual findings” made the application of a

“properly stated rule of law” impossible. In short,

those district and appellate judges had denied me

due process.

The underlying case, my first action which

specifically invoked Rule 60(d), was dismissed in a

Rule 12((b)(6) proceeding even though I had

specifically identified the existence of more than 50

“erroneous factual findings” and detailed with

specificity many instances of them in my complaint

and various filings. Further, the Respondents who

participated in this case did not dispute with

specificity any of the “erroneous factual findings”

which I detailed, nor that there were more than 50 of

them.

Not only did the lower courts commit 50+ “erroneous

factual findings” in the four prior district cases, the

presiding judges in this underlying case and

subsequent appeal also committed judiciary

violations of their own.

Therefore, this Court needs to grant a writ of

certiorari and needs to address this systemic

problem.

Finally, given the factual nature of this matter, this

Court should consider resolving this matter based

solely on the papers; oral arguments would not

appear to be necessary.

B. Docket Abbreviations.

Abbreviations for three court dockets referenced in

the footnotes herein:

DE = Docket Entry for case 21-cv-00063, the

underlying district case; uses the formal pagination

at bottom of the page.

CA-DE = Docket Entry for appeal case, No. 21-2651

(the appeal of case 21-cv-00063); uses the formal

pagination at bottom of the page, except where

otherwise indicated.

SDNY-DE = Docket Entry for case 22-cv-10978, the

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New

York (“SDNY’); uses the pagination at top of the

page.

C. District Judges Denied Due Process.

This petition addresses the following cases, all

decided in the District of New Jersey: (i) two

summary judgment decisions — Case No. l:09-cv05078 (“EdgeLink Litigation”) and Case No. l:12-cv04125 (“Kirchner Litigation”) - and (ii) three cases

dismissed before discovery commenced - Case No.

l:13-cv-03370 (“Bishop-I Litigation”), Case No. 2:19cv-09374 (“Newark Litigation”), and Case No. 1:21cv-00063 (“Bishop-II Litigation”).5

The Honorable Noel L. Hillman, USDJ, presided in

the first three of these cases (the EdgeLink,

Kirchner and Bishop-I Litigations).6 The Honorable

Kevin McNulty, USDJ, presided in the fourth case,

the Newark Litigation.7 The Honorable Robert B.

Kugler, USDJ, presided in the underlying district

s CA-DE 25-1 at 1-2.

6 CA-DE 25-1 at 1-2 (Judge Hillman’s chambers exist in the

Camden Courthouse).

7 CA-DE 25-1 at 2 (Judge McNulty’s chambers exist in the

Newark Courthouse).

case, the Bishop-II Litigation.8

In each of the four prior cases, the presiding judge

granted the motions for summary judgment or

dismissal.91 appealed each case.10 The Third Circuit

affirmed each appealed decision except for two in the

Newark Litigation which the Third Circuit

concluded (incorrectly) were beyond its jurisdiction.11

My complaint in the underlying Bishop-II Litigation

constituted my first explicitly stated independent

action under Rule 60(d).12 In it, I alleged I had been

deprived of due process by Judge Hillman and Judge

McNulty in four prior cases because these judges

had committed 50+judiciary violations, including

the use of extrajudicially sourced facts.13

I also alleged these two district judges had

committed fraud on the Third Circuit.14

D. The First Three Cases.

a. Judge Hillman Decided These Cases.

Judge Hillman committed at least 30+ judiciary

violations, including the use of at least six

extrajudicially sourced facts (all

disputable/false/meaningless), which span the three

8 CA-DE 25-1 at 1 (Judge Kugler’s chambers exist in the

Camden Courthouse).

9 CA-DE 25-1 at 17, 19, 23, 26-27.

10 CA-DE 25-1 at 19-20, 24, 27; DE 50.

11 CA-DE 25-1 at 19, 21, 25, 27-28; CA-DE 26-1 at 13-14 (circled

pagination at bottom right-hand portion of the pages).

12 CA-DE 25-1 at 10; also see DE 1 at 11J1.

13 CA-DE 25-1 at 1-2.

14 CA-DE 25-1 at 2.

cases over which he presided.15

Not only did Judge Hillman use extrajudicially

sourced facts, he also independently introduced them

without providing any prior notification to the

parties, a distinct disadvantage to the sole

disfavored party, me.16 As a result, he deprived me of

due process, a grave injustice.

b. Third Circuit Affirmed These Three

Decisions.

The Third Circuit affirmed Judge Hillman’s three

decisions.17

In the EdgeLink Litigation, a summary judgment

decision, the Third Circuit echoed at least six

judiciary violations contained in Judge Hillman’s

analysis.18 Also, the Third Circuit independently

introduced at least one additional extrajudicially

sourced fact.19

In the Bishop-I Litigation, decided prior to

discovery, the Third Circuit echoed Judge Hillman’s

alleged findings of fact and conclusions of law even

though I, the nonmoving party, showed them to be

15 CA-DE 25-1 at 2, 5, 11, 17 (see FN 14); DE 1 at 32-35 1162171 (EdgeLink Litigation violations), 48 1234-242, (Bishop-I

Litigation violations), 66-72 1320-339 (Kirchner Litigation

violations), 87-88 1413-414 (absence of contradictory facts in

the Newark Litigation record).

w CA-DE 25-1 at 2, 5, 11, 17 (see FN 14), 39; also see DE 1 at 68

1326.

17 CA-DE 25-1 at 1-2.

is CA-DE 25-1 at 19; DE 1 at 3-37 1177-180.

w CA-DE 25-1 at 19.

incorrect.20 For example, citing Judge Hillman, the

Third Circuit stated that “Fink is wrong that he

pleads new facts about the [Suez Respondents].” 21

The Third Circuit reached this conclusion based

solely on one of Judge Hillman’s opinions which

erroneously described documents as addressing the

Suez Respondents when those documents did not

even mention either one of the two Suez

Respondents.22

In the Kirchner Litigation, a summary judgment

decision, the Third Circuit, among its other errors,

used an extrajudicially sourced fact (false) which

Judge Hillman had independently introduced into

the proceeding without prior notification to the

parties.23 Also, the Third Circuit did not address my

complaint statement that disputed that fact: I stated

Kirchner, by tampering with evidence, had killed the

February 2008 Settlement of my legal disputes (in

effect, the court impermissibly assigned a zero value

to my statement).24

c. My Former Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari.

On September 20, 2018,1 filed a petition for a writ of

certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court - Case No.

18-399 - which addressed numerous “erroneous

factual findings” committed by Judge Hillman and

20 CA-DE 25-1 at 21.

21 CA-DE 25-1 at 21; also see DE 1 at 51 K249.

22 CA-DE 25-1 at 21; also see DE 1 at 51-54 1(249-256.

23 DE 1 at

24 CA-DE 25-1 at 15-16, 25; also see DE 1 at 68-69 1(328, at 74751(351-354.

the Third Circuit in deciding and affirming,

respectively, the Kirchner Litigation.25 This Court

denied my petition and my December 28, 2018

rehearing petition.26

E. The Newark Litigation.

a. Judge McNulty Deprived Me of Due

Process.

On April 3, 2019,1 filed the Newark Litigation

against the F/G Respondents and others who were

not named in the Bishop-II Litigation.27 The F/G

Respondents moved to dismiss my complaint via a

pre-discovery motion.28

I filed a cross motion (“Void Motion-1”) and

requested under Rule 60(b)(4) that the court declare

void/vacant two summary judgments decisions

rendered by Judge Hillman in 2016 in the Kirchner

Litigation.29

Void Motion-1 presented facts in support of my

allegation that Judge Hillman, in granting the F/G

Respondents summary judgment in his December

20, 2016 decision, had committed at least 20

judiciary violations, including the use of five

25 CA-DE 25-1 at 25; DE 1 at 75 1356; U.S. Supreme Court

Case No. 18-399, petition, at 16-17, 20-45.

26 CA-DE 25-1 at 25; also see U.S. Supreme Court Case No. 18399, rehearing denial.

27 CA-DE 25-1 at 25; also see DE 37 at 90 1383 (corrected date

typo - “5078, 2019” - in DE 1 at 75 1358).

28 CA-DE 25-1 at 25.

29 CA-DE 25-1 at 25-26.

extrajudicially sourced facts.30 The F/G Respondents

did not dispute with specificity any of these 20

judiciary violations.31 As such, no facts existed in the

Newark Litigation record which disproved my

allegation as to these violations.32

On January 8, 2020, Judge McNulty rendered a

decision (“Decision-1”) in which he denied VoidMotion-1 and stated he “detected no flaw” in Judge

Hillman’s dispositive decisions in the Kirchner

Litigation in the year 2016.33

b. Judge McNulty’s Erroneous Conclusion.

On June 16, 2020, Judge McNulty rendered a

decision (“Decision-2”) as to my reconsideration

motion (“Jan-2020 Reconsideration Motion”).34 He

stated that he had considered the “20 purported

summary judgment rule violations.” 35 Judge

McNulty also stated (incorrectly) that I had newly

raised “five other errors” in my Jan-2020

Reconsideration Motion.36

30 CA-DE 25-1 at 25-26.

31 CA-DE 58 at 2; the Suez Respondents were not named as

defendants in the case.

32 CA-DE 58 at 3 (“no supporting facts for [Judge McNulty’s]

conclusion existed in the record before him” as to his finding

that Judge Hillman’s decisions had contained “no flaw”).

33 CA-DE 25-1 at 26, 33 (“no facts in the Newark Litigation

record supported [Judge McNulty’s] conclusion”).

34 CA-DE 25-1 at 26.

33 CA-DE 25-1 at 34.

36 CA-DE 25-1 at 26.

c. I Moved for the Court to Declared

Decision-1 and Decision-2 Void/Vacant.

On July 1, 2020,1 filed a motion (amended on July

14, 2020 (“Void Motion-3”)) under Rule 60(b)(4) to

declare void/vacant Judge McNulty’s Decision-1 and

Decision-2.37 For the first time, I alleged that Judge

McNulty had deprived me of due process.38

Judge McNulty’s November 23, 2020 decision

(“Decision-3”) denied Void Motion-3, stating

(erroneously) it contained “[n]othing new;” i.e., he

did not acknowledge that my Void Motion-3 had

alleged he had deprived me of due process, nor

presented any factual findings to contradict that

allegation.39

d. My Motion for the Recusal of Judge

McNulty.

Following Decision-2,1 also moved for the recusal of

Judge McNulty.40 Judge McNulty denied my motion

as part of Decision-3.41

e. My Appeal of Judge McNulty’s Decisions.

In opposition to my appeal brief, the F/G

Respondents (the only parties to oppose the Newark

37 CA-DE 25-1 at 27, 37.

38 CA-DE 25-1 at 27.

39 CA-DE 25-1 at 27, 31 (“a serial motion for reconsideration”),

33; also see CA-DE 26-2 at 23-32 (circled pagination at bottom

right-hand portion of the pages), 23-32 (circled pagination at

bottom right-hand portion of the pages)).

40 NWK-DE 66 at P. 7.

41 NWK-DE 66 at P. 7.

Litigation appeal case) alleged my notice had not

been timely.42 In my reply, I stated that (i) I had

filed Void Motion-3 under Rule 60(b), (ii) the F/G

Respondents’ timeliness allegation only consisted of

vague comments, and (iii) therefore the Third Circuit

should reject the F/G Respondents’ allegation.43

f. Appeal’s Timeliness as to Decision-1 and

Decision-2.

The Third Circuit did not address my statements as

to the timeliness of part of my notice of appeal.44

The Third Circuit stated that “Judge McNulty

appears to have treated [my Void Motion-3] as a

serial Rule 59(e) motion.” 45 [Emphasis Added.] The

court did so even though Judge McNulty had not

even explicitly reference Rule 59(e) in his opinion.46

The Third Circuit did not request clarification from

the parties as to which Rule I invoked.47

The Third Circuit concluded that its decision could

not “directly reach” Decision-1 and Decision-2 even

though the Third Circuit acknowledged that “Fink

42 CA-DE 25-1 at 30 (see CA-DE 65 at 4 (pagination at top of

page) — errata sheet with correction for a cited sentence).

43 CA-DE 25-1 at 30.

44 CA-DE 26-1 at 11-16 (circled pagination at bottom right-hand

portion of the pages).

45 CA-DE 25-1 at 9-10.

46 CA-DE 25-1 at 29 (“offer[ed] only one reason for doing so”).

47 CA-DE 25-1 at 27-31; also see CA-DE 26-1 at 11-16 (circled

pagination at bottom right-hand portion of the pages).

invoked Rule 60(b)(4).” 48

The Third Circuit did not acknowledge that Void

Motion-3 sought to void Judge McNulty’s decisions

because he had deprived me of due process.49

Instead, the court, citing Judge McNulty’s Decision3, stated “[Void Motion-3] raised nothing new.” 50

g. The Appeal of My Recusal Motion.

The Third Circuit affirmed Judge McNulty’s decision

to deny my recusal motion.51 In doing so, that Court

did not consider whether Judge McNulty had

committed judiciary violations when he rendered

Decision-1 and Decision-2.52

F. The Underlying District Case.

My underlying complaint constituted my first

independent action under Rules 60(d)(1) & (3) in

which I alleged that Judge Hillman and Judge

48 CA-DE 26-1 at 13 (see FN 3) (“Fink invoked Rule 60(b)(4) [in

Void Motion-3] and does the same on appeal”) and at 13 (“We

construe Fink’s [Void Motion-3], and refer to it hereafter, as a

Rule 60(b) motion”), 14 (“we review [Void Motion-3] and his

related motion for recusal. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291 to that extent.”) (Citations reference circled

pagination at bottom right-hand portion of the pages).

49 CA-DE 26-1 at 10-16 (circled pagination at bottom right-hand

portion of the pages).

50 CA-DE 26-1 at 15 (circled pagination at bottom right-hand

portion of the pages).

51 CA-DE 26-1 at 11, 16 (circled pagination at bottom righthand portion of the pages).

52 CA-DE 26-1 at 11-16 (circled pagination at bottom right-hand

portion of the pages).

McNulty had deprived me of due process in the four

prior cases.53

The F/G Respondents and the Suez Respondents

filed separate motions to dismiss my case but their

briefs and replies did not dispute with specificity any

of the 50+ judiciary violations, including the

extrajudicially sourced facts, which my complaint

and opposition briefs alleged Judge Hillman and

Judge McNulty had committed.54

On August 16, 2021, Judge Kugler granted the

dismissal motions in a Rule 12(b)(6) proceeding.55

Judge Kugler acknowledged that my complaint had

alleged Judge Hillman had denied me due process

because, as Judge Kugler stated, Judge Hillman (i)

“[gave] zero weight to much of the physical evidence

[Fink] produced,” (ii) “[accepted] the defendants’

statements and testimony as truthful in the face of

[my] contradictory evidence,” (iii) “used

53 Appx. E at 19a at 22 (“Fink makes clear that the entirety of

his [Bishop-II Litigation] complaint is premised on the

success of his Rule 60(d)(1) and (3) actions”); also see DE 1 at

1-2 f land DE 37-3 at 1-2 11.

54 CA-DE 25-1 at 40-42 (section labeled “Appellees Failed to

Carry Their Burden in the Underlying Case” as to the Judge

Hillman violations), 45-47 (concerning the Judge McNulty

violations).

55 Appx. D at 14a.

‘extrajudicially sourced facts’ in his opinion,” and (iv)

“mischaracterized [Fink’s] statements.” 56

However, Judge Kugler did not present any specific

factual findings that disputed any of the facts in my

complaint (see Section III, above)57 which support my

due-process allegations.58 Nevertheless, Judge

Kugler concluded (incorrectly) “Fink’s assignment of

legal errors allegedly committed by Judge Hillman

smacks more of disagreement with the rulings

rather than a true charge of partiality and is wholly

insufficient to demonstrate even a specter of bias.” 59

Similarly, Judge Kugler acknowledged that I had

alleged “Judge Hillman committed fraud on the

court” but did not include any specific factual

findings which disputed any of the supporting facts

for this allegation.60

Judge Kugler also did not address with specificity

why the above undisputed facts (see Section III) did

not constitute sufficient grounds “to clear the high

bar imposed by Rule 60(d)(1) or (3)” in a Rule

12(b)(6) proceeding,61

Judge Kugler did not discuss/analyze Judge

McNulty’s decisions, nor list any findings of fact

56 Appx. E at 23a, 20a (“facts alleged in the complaint are

accepted as true”), 26a (“asserts that Judge Hillman denied

[Fink] due process”).

57 Section III mostly cites my appeal brief and reply which in

turn cited my complaint.

58 Appx. E at 15a-31a.

59 Appx. E at 24a.

60 Appx. E at 19a, 15a-31a.

61 Appx. E at 19a, 15a-31a.

which disputed any of the specific judiciary

violations I alleged Judge McNulty had committed.62

Judge Kugler did not address my statements that

the Third Circuit’s decisions to affirm Judge

Hillman’s three decisions incorporated some of

Judge Hillman’s own judiciary violations (see above),

including Judge Hillman’s independently introduced

extrajudicially sourced facts.63

G. The Underlying Appeal Case.

a. My Brief and Reply.

In my appeal case of Judge Kugler’s decision, I

repeated my allegation that Judge Hillman and

Judge McNulty had committed numerous judiciary

violations, thereby depriving me of due process, as

well as stated that Judge Kugler did not

discuss/analyze Judge McNulty’s decisions.64 In

addition, I alleged Judge Kugler had also committed

judiciary violations, including his use of

extrajudicially sourced facts.65

b. Respondents’ Opposition.

The F/G-Suez Respondents did not dispute with

specificity any of the 50+ judiciary violations; they

62 Appx. E at 15a-31a

63 Appx. E at 15a-31a.

64 CA-DE 25-1 at 7 (no supporting court record for Judge

McNulty’s “no flaw” conclusion, thereby he deprived me of

due process), 11 (Judge Hillman deprived me of due process),

39 (Judge Hillman committed 30+ judiciary violations spread

across only three decisions reveals a clear pattern of bias).

65 CA-DE 25-1 at 7-10.

did not allege in their briefs that the existence of any

of the judiciary violations had adversely affected

them in the underlying proceeding.66

Also, they did not discuss with specificity the

Newark Litigation.67

c. The Third Circuit’s Decision.

i. The Alleged Judiciary Violations.

The Third Circuit affirmed Judge Kugler’s Rule

12(b)(6) decision without addressing with specificity

any of the numerous (and undisputed) judiciary

violations which I alleged the district judges had

committed.68

The Third Circuit did not explain why my allegations

of having suffered the adverse impact of numerous

judiciary violations did not constitute a grave

miscarriage of justice, other than to simply quote

Judge Kugler who stated my “allegations fall

woefully short of satisfying the exacting Rule 60(d)

grave miscarriage of justice standard.”69 The Third

Circuit did not include an explanation even though I

had alleged (which the F/G-Suez Respondents had

not disputed) that those judiciary violations included

the prior district judges’ use of extrajudicially

sourced facts -1 had extensively discussed them in

my appeal brief — and I had shown the

extrajudicially sourced facts used in the summary

judgment proceedings to be

ee CA-DE 31; CA-DE 44.

67 CA-DE 31; CA-DE 44.

68 Appx. B at 3a-10a.

69 Appx. B at 3a-10a at 6a.

disputable/false/meaningless.70

The court did not allege any of the violations

adversely impacted the Respondents’ dismissal

motions.71

ii. Fraud-on-the-Third-Circuit Allegations.

The Third Circuit acknowledged that my “complaint

alleged, inter alia, that [Judge Hillman and Judge

McNulty] had violated Fink’s due process rights in

his previous cases, that [Judge Hillman and Judge

McNulty] had committed ‘fraud upon the court.’” 72

However, the court then only “conclude[ed] that the

demanding standard for establishing fraud on the

court has not been met in this case” and that “[Fink’s

fraud-on-the court allegations, as well as his [dueprocess] allegations [...], amount to nothing more

than disagreements with the District Judges’ rulings

in those cases.”73 The Third Circuit did not present

any factual findings which supported these

conclusions, such as facts that disprove my factually

supported allegations that Judge Hillman and Judge

McNulty had used extrajudicially sourced facts.74

Also, the Third Circuit reached its conclusions even

though (i) the F/G Respondents did not present any

specific, contradictory facts or viable

counterarguments to dispute my fraud-on-the-ThirdCircuit allegations; and (ii) the Suez Respondents

70 CA-DE 25-1 at 2, 4-6, 11-12, 17, 24 (examples of discussions

about extrajudicially sourced facts; Appx. B at 3a-10a.

71 Appx. B at 3a-10a.

72 Appx. B at 3a-10a at 6a.

73 Appx. B at 3a-10a at 8a.

74 Appx. B at 3a-10a.

did not proffer any specific facts, nor cite any case

law, to do so either.75 The Suez Respondents merely

declared, without proffering any supporting fact or

legal citation, that “[the Third Circuit] knows that

[my fraud-on-the-Third-Circuit allegations are]

untrue.”76

iii. My Allegations Against Judge McNulty.

The Third Circuit stated hardly anything in its

opinion as to the Newark Litigation.77 In particular,

the Third Circuit did not state any findings of fact

which dispute the facts in my brief, reply and

complaint that support my allegation that Judge

McNulty had deprived me of due process; the Third

Circuit did not reach any substantive conclusion as

to whether any factual support for Judge McNulty’s

“no flaw” decision existed.78 The Third Circuit did

not contradict my allegation that Judge McNulty

had deprived me of due process, especially with his

incorrect “flawless” characterization of Judge

Hillman’s 2016 decisions.79

The Third Circuit did not do so even though I

reminded the court that in the Newark Litigation

appeal it had not considered Judge McNulty’s

Decision-1 because the Third Circuit had incorrectly

concluded Rule 59(e) precluded its review of

Decision-1 for on jurisdictional grounds despite the

fact that Judge McNulty explicitly mentioned Rule

75 CA-DE 25-1 at 3; also see CA-DE 31; CA-DE 44.

76 CA-DE 44 at 21; also see CA-DE 58 at 14-15.

77 Appx. B at 3a-10a.

78 Appx. B at 3a-10a.

79 Appx. B at 3a-10a, also see CA-DE

59(e).80

iv. Erroneous Rule 59(e) Assumption.

As for the Third Circuits flawed jurisdictional

reason, the Third Circuit did not address the

following statement I made in my appeal brief as to

the Third Circuit’s use of Rule 59(e) in the Newark

Litigation appeal when it concluded that my appeal

of Decision-1 had not been timely:

Importantly, [in the Newark Litigation

appeal,] the Third Circuit did not ask me to

justify that I had timely filed my notice of

appeal for of all three decisions — Decision-1,

Decision-2 and Decision-3 — or whether my

related motions had been repetitious given the

F/G Appellees’ vague accusation. As such, I

never had a chance to address either the Rule

59(e) or serial reconsideration motion issues

before the Third Circuit rendered its

decision.81 [Citation Omitted.]

v. My Petition for a Rehearing.

On October 27, 2022,1 filed a petition for a

rehearing en banc. Its highlights included (i) a

discussion of the judiciary violations I alleged the

three district judges had committed; (ii) that Judge

Kugler had stated nothing of significance about

these judiciary violations allegations; (iii) that Judge

Kugler stated nothing of substance about Judge

McNulty’s decisions, especially since no facts existed

in the Newark Litigation record to support his

80 CA-DE 25-1 at 29; CA-DE 58 at 4, 17-18.

81 CA-DE 25-1 at 31.

Decision-1; (iv) that my filing of a notification of my

appeal in the Newark Litigation had been timely as

to all of the listed decisions; (v) that, in their

dismissal motions in the Bishop-II Litigation, the

Suez Respondents stated nothing of substance either

about Judge McNulty’s decisions, while the F/G

Respondents did not even mention Judge McNulty;

and (vi) the Third Circuit had failed to consider

these significant facts and related arguments I had

presented, especially in light of the fact that the F/GSuez Respondents had not disputed them.82

On November 28, 2022, the Third Circuit denied my

petition without having ordered a response from any

of the F/G-Suez Respondents.83

H. The Subsequent SDNY Complaint.

On December 29, 2022 (a month after the Third

Circuit denied my petition for a rehearing), the

SDNY Court filed my latest complaint (jury trial

demanded) which invoked Rules 60(d)(1) and

60(d)(3), along with a motion to stay any transfer of

the complaint to another district.84 Unlike my initial

115-page complaint in this case, my new 138-page

complaint included Judge Kugler in the list of judges

who had deprived me of due process.85 With minor

edits, my new complaint contained all the facts

included in my underlying complaint in this

82 CA-DE 74.

83 Appx. A at 2a.

84 SDNY-DE 1 at 1 (see caption and *| 1); SDNY-DE 3.

85 DE 1 at 1 (see f 1), 115 (last page); SDNY-DE 1 at 1 (see ^1),

138 (last page).

matter.86

Explicitly invoking the interest of justice, my stay

motion only requested the SDNY Court to retain

jurisdiction over this new matter.87 In keeping with

my demand for a jury trial, my stay motion did not

ask the SDNY Court to enter judgment against the

named parties or to set aside judgments in my

favor.88

On January 24, 2023, the Suez Respondents objected

to my stay motion.89 They did not dispute any fact

contained in my complaint.90 They did not mention

anything about my motion requesting the SDNY

Court to enter judgment against the named parties

or to set aside any one or more judgments in my

favor.91

On January 25, 2023 (the next day, i.e., prior to my

being able to oppose the Suez Respondents

objection), the Honorable Ronnie Abrams, USDJ, the

presiding judge, only described my motion as a

request to stay the transfer of my complaint only

once - in her conclusion.92 Everywhere else in the

order she described (erroneously) my motion as

requesting for her “to set aside judgments of the

District Court for the District of New Jersey and

Revealed by comparison of DE 1 to SDNY-DE 1.

87 SDNY-DE 3 at 5 of 234.

88 SDNY-DE 3.

89 SDNY-DE 21.

90 SDNY-DE 21.

91 SDNY-DE 21.

92 Appx. F at 37a.

enter judgment in his favor.” 93

Judge Abrams acknowledged that my complaint

alleged that “the original judgments [in five prior

cases] in the District of New Jersey relied on

‘extrajudicially sourced facts,’ and that each judge in

the previous proceedings exhibited “glaring bias

against” me.94 She then stated that “this Court

disagrees and has identified no grounds for

considering Plaintiffs motion to set aside the prior

judgments.” 95 [Emphasis Added.] She did not

present any factual findings which disputed with

specificity any fact contained in my complaint.96

Judge Abrams ordered the transfer of my case to the

District of New Jersey.97 She made no mention of

any of the named parties having opposed my stay

motion, nor did the judge state that any of them had

moved to dismiss my complaint.98

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A. District Judges Failed to Act Impartially.

An unfair decision, one rendered by judge(s) who fail

to act impartially, must not be allowed to stand;

their decisions must be voided if justice is to prevail.

To protect justice in those circumstance, “[a]

judgment is void if the court that rendered it [...]

acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.”

93 Appx. F at 35a.

94 Appx. F at 35a.

. 95 Appx. F at 35a.

9(3 Appx. F at 32-37a.

97 Appx. F at 35a.

98 Appx. F at 32-37a.

Klugli v. U.S., 620 F.Supp. 892, 901 (D.S.C. 1985)

(citing Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291 (7th Cir.

1981) cert, denied).

An impartial judge constitutes a key element in

assuring due process. Per 28 U.S. Code § 455,

Section (a): “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge

of the United States shall disqualify himself in any

proceeding in which his impartiality might

reasonably be questioned.” Section (b)(1) of § 455

requires that a judge shall also disqualify himself

[...] [wjhere he has a personal bias or prejudice

concerning a party, or personal knowledge of

disputed evidentiary facts concerning the

proceeding.”

“Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party

need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the

judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under

the stated circumstances. Taylor v. O’Grady, 888

F.2d 1189, 1200 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing United States

v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985).)

"Disqualification is required if an objective observer

would entertain reasonable questions about the

judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of

mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a

fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge

must be disqualified." Liteky u. U.S., 114 US S. Ct.,

1147, 1162 (1994).

“As for using opinions as a means of arguing a judge

failed to act impartially, this Court stated:

... opinions formed by the judge on the

basis of facts introduced or events

occurring in the course of the current

proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do

not constitute a basis for a bias or

partiality motion unless they display a

deep-seated favoritism or antagonism

that would make fair judgment

impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during

the course of a trial that are critical or

disapproving of, or even hostile to,

counsel, the parties, or their cases,

ordinarily do not support a bias or

partiality challenge. They may do so if

they reveal an opinion that derives

from an extrajudicial source; and

they will do so if they reveal such a

high degree of favoritism or

antagonism as to make fair judgment

impossible. [Emphasis Added.] Liteky at

1157.

In the underlying appeal case, I presented many

facts from my complaint which supported my

allegation that I suffered at the district court level a

continual pattern of adverse bias via 50+ judiciary

violations, including the use of extrajudicially

sourced facts with all adverse to my interests and

almost all disputed/ false/meaningless.

Significantly, neither the F/G-Suez Respondent, nor

the judges in the underlying matter, presented

specific facts which disputed with specificity any of

the facts supporting the alleged violations, nor did

any of these parties and judges allege that any of the

violations adversely impacted the Respondents’

dismissal arguments.

As such, Judge Hillman’s 30+judiciary violations

and spanning three cases constitute a clear pattern

of his bias against me, a pro se litigant. As for Judge

McNulty, his January 8, 2020 decision clearly

reveals his bias against me (i.e., for Judge Hillman)

if for no other reason - others do - than no facts

existed in the record before him which would support

his denial of my Void Motion-1.

The odds of 50+ violations inadvertently causing an

adverse impact on only one party - me - is at least 1

in a billion; Lotto offers a much better chance at

winning its jackpot." As a result, these judiciary

violations - especially the use of

disputed/false/meaningless extrajudicially sourced

facts - reveal a glaring judicial bias against me, a

grave miscarriage of justice.

While this Court has stated “‘judicial rulings alone

almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or

partiality motion’” (Liteky at 1157), my case, with its

unopposed allegations of 50+ judiciary violations

spanning four cases, must be considered as an

exception. After all, an objective observer could only

conclude that I had been repeatedly deprived of due

process, especially since the Third Circuit has

defined an extrajudicial bias as “a bias that is not

derived from the evidence or conduct of the parties

that the judge observes in the course of the

proceedings.’” United States v. Eisenberg, 734 F.

Supp. 1137, 1153 (NJDC 1990) (citing Johnson v.

Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 1980)

(citations omitted)). If for no other reason, the

99 CE-DE 25-1 at 39 (see FN 24).

district judges use of extrajudicially sourced facts to

support 50+ judiciary violations - all adverse to me —

constitutes proof of the judges’ bias against me.

Further, in the underlying Rule 12(b)(6) proceeding,

Judge Kugler stated that “[f]or the purposes of a

motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the complaint

are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences

are drawn in favor of the plaintiff.” (Appx. E at 20a

(citing New Jersey Carpenters & the Trustees Thereof

v. Tishman Const. Corp. of New Jersey, 760 F.3d 297,

302 (3d Cir. 2014)).) However, in the underlying

matter, Judge Kugler and the Third Circuit did not

accept as true the unopposed facts in my complaint

that support my allegation about the 50+ judiciary

violations which, in turn, constitute a grave

miscarriage of justice.

While Judge Kugler acknowledged my complaint

alleged Judge Hillman had denied me due process

and even categorized my supporting facts, he never

stated with specificity any factual findings that

disproved the facts supporting my allegations about

the violations described in those categories.

By using the 50+ judiciary violations, Judge Hillman

and Judge McNulty were able to paint a false picture

of material events which directly allowed them to

render adverse decisions against me. As a result,

Judge Hillman and Judge McNulty repeatedly

deprived me of my right to due process, a grave

miscarriage of justice, in the prior four cases.

B. Proof of the Facts in My Complaint.

The F/G-Suez Respondents’ opposition briefs in the

underlying appeal case constitute proof of the

veracity of the facts in my complaint. Neither of

their briefs disputed with specificity any of the facts

that support my due-process allegations which I

presented in my appeal brief. Since the F/G-Suez

Respondents moved for a dismissal, they had to

disprove (dispute would be insufficient) those

supporting facts in my complaint since otherwise

those supporting facts must be believed in a

Rule(12)(b) proceeding. As such, the 50+ judiciary

violations required Judge Kugler to deny the

dismissal motions.

C. Third Circuit Failed to Conduct a True

Plenary Hearing.

Judges, especially appellate judges, face an immense

judicial workload that they need to manage. It is

quite conceivable that to reduce their workload,

judges would rely on other judge’s findings of fact as

opposed to a pro se litigant’s statement of facts as a

way of conserving their time. Based on my cases,

that seems to have happened.

Regardless of the reason why, a review of the Third

Circuit’s four prior opinions reveals a fatal reliance —

intentional or not - on the district judges’ “erroneous

factual findings” (or omission of factual findings) as

opposed to conducting an actual independent review

of the facts. As a result, the district judges’

“erroneous factual findings” (or omission of facts),

including extrajudicially sourced facts, reappear in

the Third Circuit decisions.

For instance, the Third Circuit’s opinion of Judge

Hillman’s three appealed decisions echoed some of

Judge Hillman’s combined 30+ judiciary violations,

including his use of extrajudicially sourced facts,

even though I presented opposing material facts

which created material disputes.100 The court did not

consider my key statements (i.e., effectively assigned

a zero value to them and other facts in my briefs and

replies), such as my eyewitness statement that

Kirchner killed the February 2008 Settlement.

As for Judge McNulty’s decisions, by invoking Rule

59(e), the Third Circuit then did not have to review

the facts; effectively, the Third circuit eased its fact

finding workload in the Newark Litigation. Instead,

in the Newark Litigation, the Third Circuit assumed

my Void Motion-1 had invoked Rule 59(e) and

thereby deemed Decision-1 and Decision-2 beyond its

jurisdiction.

The court made this assumption even though neither

Judge McNulty, nor the F/G Respondents, nor me,

ever stated explicitly that any of my motions had

invoked Rule 59(e). The court also did so without

asking the parties to clarify the issue; an easy

clarification which would have shown Rule 59(e) did

100 Judge Hillman granted summary judgment in the EdgeLink

and Kirchner Litigations which is not permissible when

material disputes of fact exist: “Summary judgment is

appropriate where the court is satisfied ‘that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” (Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986).) [Citation omitted.]

not apply and that Decision-1 and Decision-2 fell

within the court’s jurisdiction.

In reviewing the Bishop-II Litigation, the Third

Circuit again reduced its need to conduct a fact

finding effort. Once again, the court just echoed the

underlying decision issued by Judge Kugler without

any consideration of the facts in my brief and reply.

Echoing Judge Kugler conclusion as to my

allegations against Judge Hillman, the Third Circuit

concluded (incorrectly) that my allegations against

Judge Hillman and Judge McNulty amount to only a

disagreement with the judge’s rulings when I

presented facts to support my allegations. Also in the

underlying appeal, just as Judge Kugler had failed to

do, the Third Circuit did not state any factual

findings as to my specific allegations against Judge

McNulty.

D. Continual Pattern of Judicial Bias.

I now find myself in a Kafkaesque world where the

facts in my complaint should at least allow me to

present my case to a jury but do not. I am caught in

an endless loop where my allegations are

unchallenged with specificity, but my cases denied

anyway without the presiding judges presenting any

findings of specific, non-extrajudicially-sourced facts

that support their conclusions. The judges in

summary judgment or pre-discovery proceedings

have repeatedly forced me back to the beginning of

the judicial process via decisions that considered less

and less (if any) of the facts I presented.

In each case, the Third Circuit affirmed the district

court’s decision. This occurred even for the least

likeliest case worthy of affirmation: the underlying

district case. After all, in my Bishop-II Litigation

complaint I alleged that Judge Hillman had

committed at least 30+ judiciary violations and

Judge McNulty at least 20 judiciary violations which

the F/G-Suez.Respondents did not dispute with

specificity. The Third Circuit, intentionally or not,

protected Judge Kugler’s dismissal decision when

the facts did not warrant the affirmation of it.

The most recent incident of a district court depriving

me of due process occurred in the SDNY Court with

respect to my new complaint which remains pending.

Judge Abrams rendered a decision on my stay

motion on the day after the Suez Respondents

objected to my stay motion, thereby effectively

precluding my ability to reply.

Also, Judge Abrams misconstrued my motion to stay

a transfer of my new complaint as an attempt by me

“to have this Court enter judgment against

Defendants” even though my complaint clearly

states I am demanding trial by jury. Also, a fair

reading of my motion does not support her

description of it, neither does the Suez-Respondents’

objection brief which made no mention of my motion

requesting the SDNY Court to enter judgment

against the named parties or to set aside judgments

in my favor. In fact, Judge Abrams did not even

acknowledge my motion to be a stay motion until she

stated her conclusion at the very end of her order.

Instead, she described my stay motion in her

discussion section as a “motion to set aside the prior

judgments,” which is not true.

Disregarding the true nature of my stay motion, she

stated she had “identified no grounds for considering

Plaintiffs motion to set aside the prior judgments”

but offered no findings of fact to support her

conclusion. Therefore, I somehow lost an unopposed

motion I did not make despite the absence of any

opposition by any of the named defendants since the

Suez Respondents (the only parties who responded

to my stay motion) only filed an objection to the

motion which I did file. Clearly, an objective

observer would not describe Judge Abrams as having

acted impartially, that she favored the district

judges.

Judge Abrams also acknowledged that “Courts enjoy

considerable discretion in deciding whether to

transfer a case in the interest of justice” (citing

Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408,

435 (2d Cir. 2005)).101 However, she did not exercise

such discretion in the interest of justice; she did not

retain jurisdiction or transfer my new complaint to

the Eastern District of New York, the district in

which I live, a fact she knew.”102 Instead, she

transferred my case back to the District of New

Jersey where my problems began.

This event constitutes further proof of a district

judge’s bias against a pro se litigant and in favor of

101 Appx. F at 36a.

102 Appx. F at 35a (“Plaintiff is a resident in the Eastern

District of New York”).

other judges.

E. Answers to the Petition Questions.

As to whether the Third Circuit judges repeatedly

failed to impartially decide my underlying appeal

case, based on the above, the answer must be yes. I

had presented plenty of facts in prior cases to

require the Third Circuit to reverse the lower court

decisions. Time and again, the court sided with the

district judges, even using their extrajudicially

sourced facts even though I presented facts which

disputed them. In the underlying appeal case, the

court did not present any factual findings that

disproved my allegations about the 50+

extrajudicially sourced facts. In prior cases, the court

relied on (and copied) extrajudicially sourced facts

produced by Judge Hillman without prior

notification to the parties, even when I presented

disputing facts.

Since all my cases where either decided in summary

judgment or pre-discovery proceedings, a single

dispute of a material fact - which I repeatedly

presented — was all I needed to defeat win, yet I

continually lost.

In the underlying appeal case where I detailed many

of the 50+ judiciary violations, I presented many

supporting facts which supported my due process

allegations, yet again I lost. In fact, in the Newark

Litigation, the Third Circuit did not even analyze

Judge McNulty’s conclusion as to my Void Motion-1

when my recusal motion would seemed to have

required it.

In the underlying appeal case, there existed no

impediments which would have prevented the Third

Circuit from analyzing Judge McNulty’s Void

Motion-1 decision since it had not done so in the

Newark Litigation. Regardless, the Third Circuit did

not conduct such an analysis (nor explained why

not), but instead followed Judge Kugler’s lead and

simply chalk up my allegations as somehow being

hollow disagreements with unfavorable decisions.

Had the Third Circuit acted impartially, I would not

be here now, requesting a writ of certiorari.

As to whether the Third Circuit failed to conduct a

true plenary hearing, again the answer must be yes.

The court repeatedly relied on the factual findings of

the direct courts as opposed to conducting its own

fact-finding process. The court did not address any of

the 50+ judiciary violations which I alleged had

deprived me of due process. In the underlying appeal

case, the validity of my supporting facts for these

violations should have been obvious since the

Respondents had not disproved with specificity any

of them.

Also, the Third Circuit had not asked me for

clarification Rule used in Deceion-1 in the Newark

Litigation. Rather, it made an assumption that

allowed it to put a review of Decision-1 beyond its

jurisdiction; an assumption that was detrimental to

my arguments in that case.

F. Decision Rendered Based on Papers Only.

Given the questions posed in this petition, not only

should this petition be granted, but also the writ

itself could be reviewed based just on the papers

themselves. Oral arguments will not be necessary

since the facts contained in the papers are

determinative and will be so if the writ is granted.

The 50+ judiciary violations, unchallenged with

specificity, reveal the district judges did not render

decisions based on the facts supporting my dueprocess allegations. The facts reveal the Third

Circuit duplicated those violations in its reviews, as

it had in the underlying appeal. As such, in the prior

four prior cases, the district and appellate judges’

had not rendered their decisions/reviews with

impartiality.

The only way for the F/G-Suez Respondents to

prevail in this petition is for them to by disprove all

the various facts, especially the extrajudicially

sourced facts, that support my allegations about the

judiciary violations since the Third Circuit stated in

the underlying appeal case that it had conducted a

plenary review of the underlying Rule 12(b)(6)

proceeding.

If, as the F/G-Suez Respondents have done in the

past, they will again only cite what various judges

stated about facts in these five matters; they will not

attempt to disprove with original source material

any of the facts supporting my allegations. If this

comes to pass (as expected), no basis will exist for

this Court to uphold either Judge Kugler’s decision

or the Third Circuit’s affirmation of that decision

since the supporting facts in my complaint will

remain unchallenged with specificity. If so, my

allegations about being deprived of due process

would also remain unchallenged.

CONCLUSION

Given all the above, at a minimum, a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

John W. Fink

Pro Se Petitioner

6812 Yellowstone Blvd.

Apt. 2V

Forest Hills, NY 11375

johnlawsuit@earthlink.net

718-459-3541

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A: Court of Appeals order denying

rehearing, November, 28, 2022.... la

Appendix B: Court of Appeals opinion,

September 28, 2022 Appendix..... 3a

Appendix C: Court of Appeals judgment,

September, 28, 2022...........

11a

Appendix D: District Court order,

August 16, 2021......

13a

Appendix E: District Court opinion,

August 16, 2021..........

15a

Appendix F: SDNY Court opinion,

January 25, 2023......

32a

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.