Amicus Curiae Brief — National Rifle Association of America, Petitioner v. Maria T. Vullo
Supreme Court briefJan 11, 2024
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
i
No. 22-842
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,
v.
MARIA T. VULLO,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
CLAREMONT INSTITUTE’S CENTER FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
JOHN C. EASTMAN
ANTHONY T. CASO
Counsel of Record
Constitutional Counsel Group
1628 N. Main St. #289
Salinas, CA 93906
(916) 601-1916
atcaso@ccg1776.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................... ii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE.............................1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .....................................1
ARGUMENT ...............................................................4
I. Robust Protection of Free Speech Is
Essential to a Functioning Republic. ............... 4
II. Government Is Free to Add its Voice to a
Matter of Public Concern But is Not Free
to Silence the Voice of Others. ....................... 11
III.Use of Regulatory Power to Discriminate
Against Speakers and their Messages
Violates the First Amendment. ...................... 13
CONCLUSION ..................................................... 15
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
303 Creative LLC v. Elenis,
143 S.Ct. 2298 (2023)...............................................1
Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles,
569 U.S. 641 (2013)................................................ 14
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta,
141 S.Ct. 2373 (2021)...............................................1
Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010)................................................ 13
Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. FEC,
578 U.S. 604 (1996)................................................ 12
Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. Pub. Services
Comm’n of New York,
447 U.S. 530 (1980)................................................ 12
Garrison v. State of Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964).................................................. 12
Kennedy v. Warren,
66 F.4th 1199 (9th Cir. 2023) ....................................3
McDonald v. City of Chicago,
561 U.S. 742 (2010)..................................................1
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n,
514 U.S. 334 (1995)................................................ 10
Missouri v. Biden,
2023 WL 4335270 (2023) (cert granted, Murthy v.
Missouri, No. 23-411) ..............................................3
NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963)................................................ 11
iii
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v.
Becerra,
138 S.Ct. 2361 (2018)...............................................1
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964)..................................................9
Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92 (1972).................................................. 11
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969)................................................ 12
Sackett v. EPA,
566 U.S. 120 (2012)................................................ 13
Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960)................................................ 11
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York
State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105 (1991)................................................ 12
Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1960).................................................. 12
Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940)....................................................6
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943).............................................. 2, 4
Other Authorities
Agrippa XII, Massachusetts Gazette, reprinted in 5
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION, Massachusetts No. 2 (John
P. Kaminski, et al. eds. 2009)..................................8
Cahn, Edmond, The Firstness of the First
Amendment, 65 Yale L.J. 464 (1956) .................. 4, 9
iv
Candidus II, Independent Chronicle, reprinted in 5
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION, Massachusetts No. 2 (John
P. Kaminski, et al. eds. 2009)..................................8
Cooley, Thomas, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (Little, Brown, & Co. 1880) 5
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS (Helen Veit, et al. eds.
1991) .........................................................................9
Declaration of Rights and Other Amendments, North
Carolina Ratifying Convention (Aug. 1, 1788),
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) ......8
Franklin, Benjamin, On Freedom of Speech and the
Press, Pennsylvania Gazette, November 17, 1737
(reprinted in 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (McCarty & Davis 1840) .......4
George Mason’s Objections, Massachusetts Centinel,
reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
Commentaries on the Constitution No. 2 (John P.
Kaminski, et al. eds. 2009) ......................................7
History of Congress, February, 1799 ..........................9
Journal of the Continental Congress, 1904 ed., vol. I 6
Kaminski, John P., CITIZEN PAINE (Madison House
2002) .........................................................................5
Letter of George Lee Turberville to Arthur Lee,
reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, Virginia No. 1
(John P. Kaminski, et al. eds. 2009) .......................8
Letter of Thomas Jefferson to James Madison,
reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
v
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, Virginia No. 1
(John P. Kaminski, et al. eds. 2009) .......................8
Madison, James, On Property, Mar. 29, 1792 ........ 4, 6
Needles, Edward, AN HISTORICAL MEMOIR OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING THE
ABOLITION OF SLAVERY (Merrihew and Thompson
1848) .........................................................................7
New York Ratification of Constitution (July 26,
1788), reprinted in 5 The Founders’ Constitution
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds. 1987) ......8
Richardson, Katelynn, Stanford Admin Eggs
Students On As They Shout Down, Heckle Federal
Judge During Talk, Daily Caller News
Foundation, March 10, 2023 ...................................3
Shapero, Julia, Former NYT columnist Bari Weiss
releases ‘Twitter Files Part Two’, The Hill,
December 8, 2022.....................................................2
The Dissent of the Minority of the Convention,
reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, Pennsylvania
(John P. Kaminski, et al. eds. 2009) .......................8
The Liberator, vol. 1, issue 1, January 1, 1831 (image
available at http://fair-use.org/theliberator/1831/01/01/the-liberator-01-01.pdf) .........7
Thorpe, Francis N., THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS (William S Hein 1993) ...................6
Virginia Ratification Debates reprinted in 10 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION, Virginia No. 3 (John P.
Kaminski, et al. eds. 2009) ......................................8
vi
Wulfsohn, Joseph A., Twitter Files Part 6 reveals
FBI’s ties to tech giant: “As if it were a subsidiary”,
Fox News, December 16, 2022 ................................2
1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
The Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence is the
public interest law arm of the Claremont Institute,
whose stated mission is to restore the principles of the
American founding to their rightful and preeminent
authority in our national life, including the principle
that the people freedom of speech is critical to a functioning republic. The Center has previously appeared
before this Court as amicus curiae and counsel in several cases addressing these issues, 303 Creative LLC
v. Elenis, 143 S.Ct. 2298 (2023); Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 141 S.Ct. 2373 (2021); and
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v.
Becerra, 138 S.Ct. 2361 (2018).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court has acknowledged that the right to
keep and bear arms is among “those fundamental
rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (plurality), 822-50 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (2010). This is a conclusion with which respondent in this case strongly disagrees. Thus, she decided to use her government position to pursue her personal policy goals to silence a
Second Amendment advocacy organization. Unable to
attack the organization directly (since it was outside
of her regulatory purview), she exercised the raw
power of a regulator to threaten regulated industries
1 In accordance with Rule 37.6, counsel affirms that no counsel
for any party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no
person or entity other than amicus made a monetary contribution to fund the preparation and submission of this brief.
2
with costly proceedings and fines if they did not stop
doing business with the petitioner.
In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), this Court described as a
“fixed star in our constitutional constellation” the precept that “no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox … in … matters of opinion. This
term, the Court will hear several cases, in addition to
this case, to determine whether that star has been
eclipsed by state power to silence critics (Netchoice v.
Paxton, No. 22-555; Moody v. Netchoice, No. 22-277;
Murthy v. Missouri, No. 23-411).
Government officials pressure social media outlets
to suppress ideas and even truthful information that
runs counter to the government-backed narrative.
Reporters Matt Taibbi, Michael Shellenberger, and
Bari Weiss, who were given access to the “Twitter
Files,” have written about how government officials
pressured Twitter to suppress unwanted viewpoints
and even deplatform some speakers. See, e.g., Julia
Shapero, Former NYT columnist Bari Weiss releases
‘Twitter Files Part Two’, The Hill, December 8, 20222;
Joseph A. Wulfsohn, Twitter Files Part 6 reveals FBI’s
ties to tech giant: “As if it were a subsidiary”, Fox
News, December 16, 20223. United States Senator
Elizabeth Warren used her office to pressure Amazon
to suppress a book backed by current presidential candidate Robert Kenney, Jr. that was critical of govern-
2 https://thehill.com/policy/technology/3768087-former-nyt-col-
umnist-bari-weiss-releases-twitter-files-part-two/ (last visited
August 22, 2023).
3 https://www.foxnews.com/media/twitter-files-part-6-revealsfbis-ties-tech-giant (last visited August 22, 2023).
3
ment policies concerning Covid-19. Kennedy v. Warren, 66 F.4th 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 2023). The current
administration continues to work with Facebook to
suppress unwanted points of view. Missouri v. Biden,
2023 WL 4335270 at *2 (WD LA 2023) (cert granted,
Murthy v. Missouri, No. 23-411). Apparently, those in
power believe that they have the authority to decree
what shall be orthodox opinion and what information
can and cannot be shared.
Speakers at college campuses, and even law
schools, are regularly shouted down by protestors who
want to prevent the speakers from sharing their ideas.
In one recent episode, Fifth Circuit Judge Kyle Duncan was prevented by protestors from speaking at a
prominent law school. An official from the law school
intervened on behalf of the protestors! Katelynn Richardson, Stanford Admin Eggs Students On As They
Shout Down, Heckle Federal Judge During Talk,
Daily Caller News Foundation, March 10, 2023.4
The First Amendment was intended to protect
speech that challenged the listener – speech intended
to change the listener’s mind. It cannot tolerate attempts at censorship.
This case is not about whether the government, or
even an individual bureaucrat, has the legal authority
to advocate for elimination of a fundamental constitutional right. It is instead about whether the government can use its regulatory powers to dissuade other
private businesses from working with organizations
that advocate in favor of the Constitution.
4 https://dailycaller.com/2023/03/10/federal-judge-censured-dei-
dean-law-students-stanford/ (last visited August 22, 2023).
4
ARGUMENT
I.
Robust Protection of Free Speech Is Essential to a Functioning Republic.
The First Amendment preserves the natural
right to liberty of conscience—that right to one’s own
opinions, and to share those opinions with others to
sway them to your point of view. James Madison, On
Property, Mar. 29, 1792 (Papers 14:266-68) (“A man
has a property in his opinions and the free communication of them.”). Without this right, the people lose
their status as sovereign and officials in power “can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.” West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
The founding generation rejected the idea that
government officials should have the power to silence
opposing viewpoints. They recognized that freedom to
communicate opinions is a fundamental pillar of a free
government that, when “taken away, the constitution
of a free society is dissolved.” Benjamin Franklin, On
Freedom of Speech and the Press, Pennsylvania Gazette, November 17, 1737 (reprinted in 2 THE LIFE AND
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (McCarty & Davis
1840) at 431).
Thomas Paine argued that “thinking, speaking,
forming and giving opinions” are among the natural
rights held by people. Edmond Cahn, The Firstness of
the First Amendment, 65 Yale L.J. 464, 472 (1956).
Congress and the states agreed. The First Amendment does not “grant” freedom of speech. The text
speaks about a right that already exists and prohibits
Congress from enacting laws that might abridge that
5
freedom. U.S. Const. Amend. I. That prohibition extends to state and local governments. Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). As Thomas Cooley
noted, the First Amendment’s guaranty of free speech
“undertakes to give no rights, but it recognizes the
rights mentioned as something known, understood,
and existing.” Thomas Cooley, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (Little, Brown, & Co.
1880) at 272.
A sample of the speech activity at the time of the
founding helps define the breadth of the freedom of
speech recognized in the First Amendment. Thomas
Paine, of course, is the most famous example of the
pamphleteers during the time leading up to the revolution. His pamphlet Common Sense urged his fellow
citizens to take direct action against the Crown. John
P. Kaminski, CITIZEN PAINE (Madison House 2002) at
7.
Such speech was not protected under British rule.
Paine thus chose to publish Common Sense anonymously in its first printing. See id. Paine’s work was
influential. Another of Paine’s pamphlets, Crisis
(“These are the times that try men’s souls”), from The
American Crisis series, was read aloud to the troops
to inspire them as they prepared to attack Trenton.
Id. at 11. That influence, however, is what made
Paine’s work dangerous to the British and was why
they were anxious to stop his pamphleteering.
With these and other restrictions on speech fresh
in their memories, the framers set out to draft their
first state constitutions even in the midst of the war.
These constitution writers were careful to set out express protections for speech.
6
The impulse to protect the right of the people to
share their opinions with each other was nearly universal in the colonies. In 1776, North Carolina and
Virginia both issued Declarations of Rights protecting
freedom of the press. Francis N. Thorpe, 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS (William S Hein
1993) at 2788 (North Carolina) (hereafter Thorpe); 7
Thorpe at 3814 (Virginia). Both documents identified
this freedom as one of the “great bulwarks of liberty.”
Maryland’s Constitution of 1776, Georgia’s constitution of 1777, and South Carolina’s constitution of 1778
all protected liberty of the press. 3 Thorpe at 1690
(Maryland); 2 Thorpe at 785 (Georgia); 6 Thorpe at
3257 (South Carolina). Vermont’s constitution of 1777
protected the people’s right to freedom of speech, writing, and publishing. 6 Thorpe at 3741. As other states
wrote their constitutions, they too included protections for what Madison called “property in [our] opinions and the free communication of them.” James
Madison, On Property, supra.
An example of the importance of these rights to
the founding generation is in the letter that the Continental Congress sent to the “Inhabitants of Quebec”
in 1774. That letter listed freedom of the press as one
of the five great freedoms because it facilitated “ready
communication of thoughts between subjects.” Journal of the Continental Congress, 1904 ed., vol. I, pp.
104, 108 quoted in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
102 (1940).
The revolution against the Crown was not the
only topic of controversy that generated pamphlets in
this period. Abolition of slavery was a topic that divided the nation in the late 1700’s and that would
7
send the nation into civil war in the 1800’s. The Pennsylvania Abolition Society, formed in 1775, was one
organization that advocated its views to others. Edward Needles, AN HISTORICAL MEMOIR OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING THE ABOLITION OF
SLAVERY (Merrihew and Thompson 1848) at 14. The
Society and other abolitionists during this period engaged in legal actions, published books against slavery, circulated petitions, and distributed pamphlets.
See id. at 17-18. The focus of their efforts was to convince their fellow citizens of the inherent evils of slavery. In their own way, the abolitionists were an early
example of a right to life organization, promoting the
view that we are equal in the eyes of our Creator and
entitled to life and liberty.
The arguments offered by the abolitionists were
designed to capture the attention of their fellow citizens. In the words of William Garrison, in his antislavery newspaper, “The Liberator”, “I do not wish to
think, or speak, or write, with moderation … I am in
earnest – I will not equivocate – I will not excuse – I
will not retreat a single inch – AND I WILL BE
HEARD.” The Liberator, vol. 1, issue 1, January 1,
1831 (image available at http://fair-use.org/the-liberator/1831/01/01/the-liberator-01-01.pdf).
Notwithstanding the controversial nature of
speech activity in the latter half of the 18th Century,
the founders were steadfast in their commitment to
protect speech rights. The failure to include a free
speech guaranty in the new Constitution was one of
the omissions that led many to argue against ratification. E.g., George Mason’s Objections, Massachusetts
Centinel, reprinted in 14 The Documentary History of
the Ratification of the Constitution at 149-50; Letter
8
of George Lee Turberville to Arthur Lee, reprinted in 8
The Documentary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution at 128; Letter of Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison, reprinted in 8 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution at 250-51;
Candidus II, Independent Chronicle, reprinted in 5
The Documentary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution at 498; Agrippa XII, Massachusetts Gazette, reprinted in 5 The Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution at 722.
A number of state ratifying conventions proposed
amendments to the new Constitution to cure this
omission. Virginia proposed a declaration of rights
that included a right of the people “to freedom of
speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments.” Virginia Ratification Debates reprinted in 10
The Documentary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution at 1553. North Carolina proposed a similar amendment. Declaration of Rights and Other
Amendments, North Carolina Ratifying Convention
(Aug. 1, 1788), reprinted in 5 The Founders’ Constitution at 18. New York’s convention proposed amendment to secure the rights of assembly, petition, and
freedom of the press. New York Ratification of Constitution, 26 July 1788, Elliot 1:327--31, reprinted in 5
The Founders’ Constitution, supra at 12. The Pennsylvania convention produced a minority report putting forth proposed amendments including a declaration that the people had “a right to freedom of speech.”
The Dissent of the Minority of the Convention, reprinted in 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution.
Madison ultimately promised to propose a Bill of
Rights in the first Congress. CREATING THE BILL OF
9
RIGHTS (Helen Veit, et al. eds. 1991) at xii. Although
Madison argued that a Bill of Rights provision protecting speech rights would not itself stop Congress
from violating those rights, Jefferson reminded him
that such a guaranty in the Constitution provided the
judiciary the power it needed to enforce the freedom.
Madison repeated this rationale as he rose to present
the proposed amendments to the House of Representatives. The Firstness of the First Amendment, supra,
at 467-68.
Congress quickly tested this limit on its power
with the enactment of the Sedition Act. The question
for the new country was whether the free speech and
press guarantees only protected against prior restraint, as was the case in England, or whether they
guaranteed the type of liberty envisioned by Madison
and others who argued for a freedom to share ideas
with fellow citizens.
In the Sedition Act of 1798 Congress outlawed
publication of “false, scandalous, and malicious writings against the Government, with intent to stir up
sedition.” The supporters of the law argued that it
was needed to carry out “the power vested by the Constitution in the Government.” History of Congress,
February 1799 at 2988. Opponents rejected that justification as one not countenanced by the First
Amendment. In an earlier debate over the nature of
constitutional power, Madison noted “‘If we advert to
the nature of Republican Government, we shall find
that the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people.’
4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, p. 934 (1794).” New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964).
10
The Virginia Resolutions of 1798 also condemned
the act as the exercise of “‘a power not delegated by
the Constitution, but, on the contrary, expressly and
positively forbidden by one of the amendments
thereto.’” Id. at 274. The particular evil in the Sedition Act, according to the Virginia General Assembly,
was that it was “‘levelled [sic] against the right of
freely examining public characters and measures, and
of free communication among the people thereon.’” Id.
The Sedition Act expired by its own terms in 1801
and the new Congress refused to extend or reenact the
prohibitions. For his part, Jefferson pardoned those
convicted and fines were reimbursed by an act of Congress based on Congress’ view that the Sedition Act
was unconstitutional. Id. at 276.
This Court in New York Times Co., noted that
“[a]lthough the Sedition Act was never tested in this
Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day
in the court of history.” Id. More important than the
“court of history,” is the apparent political judgment
at the time that the enactment was inconsistent with
the Constitution. Where one Congress attempted to
insulate itself from criticism, the subsequent Congress immediately recognized that attempt as contrary to the First Amendment. Congress and the
President did not merely allow the law to lapse—they
took affirmative action to undo its effects through repayment of fines and pardons. This is the clearest indication we have of that the people intended the First
Amendment’s speech and press clauses to be much
broader than a simple bar on prior restraints. See
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 360
(1995) (Thomas, J. concurring) (evidence of original
11
understanding of the Constitution can be found in the
“practices and beliefs held by the Founders”).
The First Amendment prohibits government
from attempting to silence citizens, especially on matters of controversy. The people of the new nation understood the scope of controversial matters on which
people would share their opinions. They nonetheless
insisted on including a prohibition on “abridging freedom of speech” in their new Constitution.
In this case, respondent used her regulatory
power over third parties to isolate and punish the National Rifle Association. Respondent took this action
because she disagreed with the fundamental right
protected by the Second Amendment and hoped to silence the primary advocate for that right. But this
Court has held: “Above all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.” Police Dep’t of City of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
II.
Government Is Free to Add its Voice to a
Matter of Public Concern But is Not Free to
Silence the Voice of Others.
As important as Freedom of Speech is to political
freedom, it is also quite vulnerable to attempts by
state and federal regulators to suppress that speech.
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). For
that reason, this Court has recognized the need to provide “breathing space” for this vital freedom. Id.
Thus, the Court has been wary of schemes that could
“chill” freedom of speech and association. Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). For instance, the
12
Court has protected anonymous speech, in part to protect against government reprisal. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
This Court has also ruled that government may
not exclude viewpoints it opposes from the marketplace of ideas. The First Amendment places discrimination based on viewpoint “beyond the power of the
government.” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116
(1991). The search for political truth excludes the idea
that government can dictate what ideas are permissible. Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. Pub. Services
Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980).
Only by prohibiting viewpoint discrimination can
there be “an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.” Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969). It is in this way that the First Amendment
protects the search for “political truth” and self-government. Id., see Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964), see also Colorado Republican
Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 578 U.S. 604, 629
(1996) (Kenndy, J., concurring in the judgment).
In this case, Vullo has targeted one particular
viewpoint (the fundamental right to keep and bear
arms), and one particular speaker (the NRA). Undoubtedly, the NRA was targeted because of its success in advocating for the Second Amendment - the
viewpoint that Vullo finds objectionable. But rather
than engaging in debate in the marketplace of ideas,
respondent has chosen to attempt to shut down the
debate. Using the state’s regulatory power, respondent here sought to frighten regulated entities from doing business with the NRA. Vullo’s response to speech
13
she opposed was to punish that speech by threatening
others who engaged in business with the NRA.
Vullo’s actions were plainly based on viewpoint
discrimination.
III.
Use of Regulatory Power to Discriminate
Against Speakers and their Messages Violates the First Amendment.
Vullo used her regulatory power against third parties. She had no regulatory jurisdiction over the NRA.
Yet her actions were clearly aimed at the NRA – seeking to have regulated entities cease doing business
with the NRA. Her actions were motivated by her disagreement with the NRA’s defense of the fundamental
individual liberty recognized in the Second Amendment to the Constitution.
There can be no legitimate government purpose in
pressuring third parties to stop doing business with
an advocate simply because the government opposes
the advocate’s message. Even mere speech by a regulator that regulated entities ought not to transact
business with the NRA cannot be tolerated.
Regulatory agencies wield tremendous power to coerce actions by regulated entities. Complex regulatory schemes coupled with the power of criminal enforcement or imposition of civil penalties, are, as a
practical matter, likely to convince regulated entities
to fall in line with the political will of the regulator in
charge. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 355
(2010), see also Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 130-31
(2012) (“there is no reason to think that the Clean Water Act was uniquely designed to enable the strongarming of regulated entities into ‘voluntary compliance.’”); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles,
14
569 U.S. 641, 650-51 (2013) (use of a contract was
“part and parcel of a governmental program wielding
coercive power over private parties”). In reality, these
threats against third parties are no different than direct censorship of the speaker.
Once the government identifies speakers and viewpoints it opposes, regulated entities will naturally
take notice. When the regulator issues statements
“advising” regulated entities to avoid doing business
with the government-opposed speaker, those entities
are wise to consider that advice to be a threat to their
own livelihoods. Government action of this sort is inimical to the values protected by the First Amendment.
15
CONCLUSION
Government action that seeks to silence or punish
viewpoints and speakers must be judged under strict
scrutiny. The respondent in this action sought to suppress and punish speech based on the viewpoint of the
speaker. This violates the First Amendment.
January 2024
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN C. EASTMAN
ANTHONY T. CASO
Counsel of Record
Constitutional Counsel Group
1628 N. Main St. #289
Salinas, CA 93906
(916) 601-1916
atcaso@ccg1776.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.