Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sherri Jefferson, Petitioner v. State Bar of Georgia, et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-12835-HH

SHERRI JEFFERSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

STATE BAR OF GEORGIA,

SHARON L BRYANT,

in her official capacity,

CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, STATE BAR OF GEORGIA,

WILLIAM COBB,

in his official capacity as Bar Councel,

PATRICK LONGAN,

in his official capacity as review panel

chairman et al.,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

(

ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING AND PETITIONS FOR REHEARING EN BANC

BEFORE: JORDAN, BRASHER, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED, no judge in regular active service on the Court

having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc. (FRAP 35) The Petition for

Rehearing En Banc is also treated as a Petition for Rehearing before the panel and is DENIED.

(FRAP 35, IOP2)

ORD-42

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In ihc

Urnteh jifoies Court of .Appeals

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No. 22-12835

Non-Argument Calendar

SHERRIJEFFERSON,

Plain tiff-Appellant,

versus

STATE BAR OF GEORGIA,

SHARON L. BRYANT,

in her official capacity,

CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, STATE BAR OF GEORGIA,

WILLIAM COBB,

in his official capacity as Bar Counsel,

PATRICK LONGAN,

in his official capacity as review panel

chairman, et al.,

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Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. l:22-cv-01883-TCB

Before Jordan, Brasher, and Hull, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Sherri Jefferson is a former member of the State Bar

of Georgia who was disbarred by the Georgia Supreme Court on

October 7, 2019. See In re Jefferson, 834 S.E.2d 73 (Ga. 2019).

Jefferson, proceeding pro se, sued the State Bar of Georgia and

certain officials (collectively, “State Bar”) alleging, inter alia, that

they acted improperly when they disciplined and ultimately

disbarred her (and other African American lawyers).

The district court denied Jefferson's motion to recuse,

granted the State Bar's motion to stay discovery pending resolution

of its motion to dismiss, and later granted the State Bar's motion to

dismiss. Jefferson appeals these three rulings. After careful review,

we affirm the district court’s denial of the recusal motion, its

staying of the discovery, and its dismissal ofJefferson's claims.

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Opinion of the Court

I.

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3

MOTION TO RECUSE

On appeal, Jefferson challenges the district court’s denial of

Jefferson's motion to recuse. We review a denial of a motion for

recusal for abuse of discretion. In re Walker,, 532 F.3d 1304, 1308

(11th Cir. 2008).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, a judge ''shall disqualify himself in

any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.”

28 U.S.C. § 455(a). A judge shall also disqualify

himself if "he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,

or personal knowledge ofdisputed evidentiary facts concerning the

proceeding.” hi § 455(fc>). f‘[T]he general rule is that bias sufficient

to disqualify a judge must stem from extrajudicial sources.”

Thomas v. 1'eimeco Packaging Co293 F.3d 1306. 1329 (11th Cir.

2002) (quotation marks omitted). "The exception to this rule is

when a judge's remarks in a judicial context demonstrate such

pervasive bias and prejudice that it constitutes bias against a party.”

Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Here, Jefferson moved to recuse the district court judge

because he previously had presided over two of her cases.1 The

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jefferson's

1 In Jefferson v. Deal, Case No. l:15-cv-02069-TCB (N.D. Ga. June 9, 2015),

Jefferson challenged the constitutionality of several Georgia criminal statutes

without success. In Doe v. Deal, Case No. l:15-cv-02226-TCB (N.D. Ga, June

19, 2015), Jefferson initially listed herself as the attorney representing "Jane

Doe” but later sought to be the plaintiff, and she again challenged the

constitutionality of certain Georgia statutes without success.

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motion to recuse for three reasons. First, the alleged bias raised by

Jefferson pertained to the district court judge's capacity as a judge

and was not extrajudicial in nature. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b); Thomas,

293 F.3d at 1329.

Second, there was no evidence of remarks

suggesting, much less constituting, bias. Third, Jefferson provided

no other reason to suggest the district court judge’s impartiality

could reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

II.

STAY OF DISCOVERY

On appeal, Jefferson also challenges the district court's

staying of discover}7 pending the resolution of the State Bar’s

motion to dismiss. We review matters pertaining to discovery

under an abuse of discretion standard. Josendis v. Wall to Wall

Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011).

District courts have "broad discretion to stay discovery

pending a decision on a dispositive motion.” See Panola Land

Buyers Ass n v. Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550, 1560 (11th Cir. 1985); see

also Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1366 (11th

Cir. 1997) ("[Djistrict courts enjoy broad discretion in deciding how

best to manage the cases before them.”). As outlined later, the

State Bar's motion to dismiss raised numerous legal reasons why

Jefferson’s case must be dismissed. Jefferson has shown no abuse

of discretion in the district court’s staying discovery pending a

ruling on the State Bar’s motion to dismiss.

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III.

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5

MOTION TO DISMISS

The district court granted the State Bar’s motion to dismiss

on many grounds including: (1) the Rooker-Feldm&n doctrine; (2) a

lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (3) the statute of limitations;

(4) judicial, prosecutorial, and qualified immunity; (5) collateral

estoppel; and (6) failure to state a claim.

On appeal, Jefferson challenges both a procedural aspect and

the substantive merits of the district courts order on the State Bar’s

motion to dismiss.

We begin with Jefferson’s procedural

argument.

A.

Procedural

In its order granting the State Bar’s motion to dismiss, the

district court noted—in a footnote—Jefferson’s prior actions

regarding her disbarment ruled on by the United States Supreme

Court and the Georgia Supreme Court:

Jefferson petitioned the Supreme Court of the United

States for a writ of certiorari, which was denied on

February 24, 2020. Jefferson v. Sup. Ct. of Ga., 140 S.

Ct. 1148 (mem.), reh’gdenied, 140 S. Ct. 2637 (2020)

(mem.). She has since filed two unsuccessful actions

with the Georgia Supreme Court seeking the

reinstatement of her law license. See In reJefferson,

No. S22O0785 (Ga. Apr. 19, 2022); In reJefferson, No.

S22Y0949 (Ga. June 1, 2022).

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Jefferson argues the district court erred by considering cases

outside the instant litigation without converting the motion to

dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. We disagree.

Generally, a district court must convert a motion to dismiss

into one for summaryjudgment if it considers materials outside the

complaint. SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc ofAm. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d

1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2010). But there are exceptions to this general

rule. For example, a district court may consider matters of which

a court may take judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues St

Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509 (2007).

As relevant here, a district court may take judicial notice of

another lawsuit to establish the fact of such lawsuit and related

filings, but not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other

lawsuit. See United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir.

1994) ("[A] court may take notice of another court’s order only for

the limited purpose of recognizing the judicial act’ that the order

represents or the subject matter of the litigation.”).

Here, by

referring to cases outside the instant litigation, the district court

merely noted the existence of those cases and whether they were

successful. The district court did not reference those cases for the

truth of the matters asserted in those cases. We thus conclude the

district court did not err in this respect.

B.

Merits ofMotion to Dismiss

Jefferson also challenges each substantive ground given by

the district court for granting the State Bar’s motion to dismiss.

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We begin with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars

federal district courts from reviewing state-court decisions.2 Behr

v. Campbell, 8 F.4fh 1206, 1208 (11th Cir. 2021). It applies to "'cases

brought by state-court losers complaining of Injuries caused by

state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and

rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521-22 (2005).

On appeal, Jefferson does not appear to dispute that she

qualified as a "state-court loser" and her October 2019 disbarment

was "rendered before the district court proceedings commenced"

in May 2022 in the instant case. Id. Rather, Jefferson claims she

was not seeking to overturn the state court judgment. So the

question is whether or not her instant claims are "inviting district

court review and rejection of [the state court] judgment^/’ Id.

A careful review of Jefferson’s amended complaint in this

case shows that she is seeking review and rejection of the state

2 This doctrine is named after two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S, Ct. 149 (1923), and District of Columbia Court

ofAppeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct, 1303 (1983). In Rooker, the

Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs, who had lost in state court, could not

ask the federal district court to declare the srate court judgment ‘‘null and

void.” 263 U.S. at 414-15, 44 S. Ct. at 149-50. Similarly, in Feldman, the

Supreme Court said that lower federal courts lacked jurisdiction to review a

decision by the District of Columbia’s highest, court denying a waiver of a bar

admission rule that requires applicants to the District of Columbia Bar to have

graduated from an approved law school. 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S. Ct. at 1315.

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court judgment that disbarred her. Jefferson's amended complaint

asked the district court to enjoin the State Bar from "[flailing or

refusing to take such steps as may be necessary to restore ... the

victims of Defendants’ unlawful practices to the position they

would have been in but for the discriminatory conduct/’ Jefferson

thus essentially asked the district court to overturn the state court

judgment and reinstate her law license.3 See Feldman, 460 U.S. at

482 n.16,103 S. Ct. at 1315 n.16 ("Orders of a state court relating to

the admission, discipline, and disbarment of members of its bar

may be reviewed only by the Supreme Court of the United States

on certiorari to the state court, and not by means of an original

action in a lower federal court/’ (quotation marks omitted)).

Further,

by

claiming

that

during

her

disciplinary

proceedings the State Bar treated her unlike other similarly situated

individuals, Jefferson essentially asked the district court to reject

the state court judgment on the basis that it was rendered

incorrectly. That is akin to requesting a declaration that the state

3 Jefferson attempts to distinguish "restore” from “reinstate" by arguing that

restore means “to reestablish," while reinstate means “to put somebody to a

former position or rank." We are unpersuaded. There is little daylight,

between restore and reinstate. Compare Restore, Merriam-Webster Online

Dictionary, https:/ / www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/restore (last

visited Jan. 9, 2023) (defining restore as “to bring back to or put back into a

former or original state"), with Reinstate, Merriam-Webster Online

Dictionary, https:/ /www.tneniam-websrer.com/dictionary/reinstate (last

visited Jan. 9, 2023) (defining reinstate as “to place again ... in a former

position” or “to restore to a previous effective state.’’).

/•■t.

1/

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court judgment was arbitrary and capricious, which this Court

recently held is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Be.hr,;

8 F.4th at 1211. We thus affirm the district court’s dismissal of

Jefferson’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Because we affirm for this substantive reason, we need not,

and do not, address whether the other, alternate grounds relied on

by the district court for dismissal—lack of subject matter

jurisdiction; statute of limitations; judicial, prosecutorial, and

qualified immunity; collateral estoppel; and failure to state a

claim—were likewise correct.

AFFIRMED.

Case l:22-cv-01883-TCB Documents Filed 07/26/22 Page 1 of 14

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

SHERRI JEFFERSON

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION FILE

v.

NO. l:22-cv-1883-TCB

THE STATE BAR OF GEORGIA;

SHARON L. BRYANT, in her

official capacity; SARAH B.

COOLE, in her official capacity;

WILLIAM COBB, in his official

capacity; PATRICK LONGAN, in

his official capacity; and

ANTHONY ASKEW, in his official

capacity,

Defendants.

ORDER

This case comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion [26] to

dismiss Plaintiff Sherri Jefferson’s amended complaint [14]. Also before

the Court is Jefferson’s motion [36] for reconsideration of this Court’s

order denying her motion to recuse the undersigned and stay discovery.

Case l:22-cv-01883-TCB Documents Filed 07/26/22 Page 2 of 14

I.

Background

Plaintiff Sherri Jefferson is a former member of the State Bar of

Georgia who was disbarred by the Supreme Court of Georgia on October

7, 2019. In re Jefferson, 834 S.E.2d 73 (Ga. 2019). This lawsuit appears

to be her latest effort to challenge her disbarment.1

On May 11, 2022, Jefferson, proceeding pro se, brought this action

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against the State Bar of Georgia and

various individuals who participated in some capacity with her

disciplinary proceedings.

She amended her complaint on June 1. At the heart of her

amended complaint are allegations that Defendants discriminated

against herself and other Black lawyers—particularly those who did not

graduate from Emory University, Mercer University, University of

Georgia, or Georgia State University—during disciplinary proceedings.

1 Jefferson petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of

certiorari, which was denied on February 24, 2020. Jefferson v. Sup. Ct. of Ga., 140

S. Ct. 1148 (mem.), reh’g denied, 140 S. Ct. 2637 (2020) (mem.). She has since filed

two unsuccessful actions with the Georgia Supreme Court seeking the

reinstatement of her law license. See In re Jefferson, No. S22O0785 (Ga. Apr. 19,

2022); In re Jefferson, No. S22Y0949 (Ga. June 1, 2022).

2

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The bulk of the complaint’s factual averments detail the alleged wrongs

that took place during her own disciplinary proceedings.

In addition to her constitutional claims, Jefferson alleges that

Defendants engaged in fraud upon the court and violated Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act, 4 U.S.C. § 2000e, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Executive

Order 11246, and the Landrum-Griffin Act when they deprived her of

her law license. She asks the Court to declare that Defendants’ actions

were discriminatory and unconstitutional and to reinstate her and

others to the positions they would have been in but for Defendants’

unlawful conduct. She also asks for two million dollars in damages for

Defendants’ alleged fraud.

Defendants now move to dismiss the amended complaint on a

number of grounds, including lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

II.

Motion for Reconsideration

The Court will first consider Jefferson’s motion for

reconsideration. On July 12, the Court denied Jefferson’s motion to

recuse the undersigned, finding that she had not shown proper grounds

3

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for recusal. It also granted Defendants’ motion to stay discovery

pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss.

Jefferson moves for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 59(e), reiterating that the undersigned or his staff has

personal knowledge of the alleged fraud upon the court and is biased

against her.

Rule 59(e) permits a party to file a “motion to alter or amend a

judgment” after the entry of the judgment, and Local Rule 7.2 permits

motions for reconsideration in limited circumstances. However, “[cjourts

may grant relief under Rule 59(e) or Local Rule 7.2E only if the moving

party clears a high hurdle.” Chesnut v. Ethan Allen Retail, Inc., 17 F.

Supp. 3d 1367, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2014).

“[T]he only grounds for relief under Rule 59(e) are the discovery of

new evidence or the existence of a manifest error of law or fact.” Id.

(citing Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007)). Similarly,

Local Rule 7.2(E) provides that motions for reconsideration are not to be

filed “as a matter of routine practice,” but only when “absolutely

necessary.” A party may move for reconsideration only when at least

4

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one of the following three elements exists: (1) the discovery of new

evidence; (2) an intervening development or change in the controlling

law; or (3) the need to correct a clear error or manifest injustice. Pres.

Endangered Areas of Cobb's Hist., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps ofEng’rs, 916

F. Supp. 1557, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1995).

Because reconsideration may only occur under these limited

circumstances, a motion for reconsideration “is not an opportunity for

the moving party ... to instruct the court on how the court ‘could have

done it better’ the first time.” Id.

In other words, a party “may not employ a motion for

reconsideration as a vehicle to present new arguments or evidence that

should have been raised earlier, introduce novel legal theories, or

repackage familiar arguments to test whether the Court will change its

mind.” Brogdon ex rel. Clihe v. Nat’l Healthcare Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d

1322, 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2000); see also Godby v. Electrolux Corp., Nos.

l:93-cv-0353-ODE, l:93-cv-126-ODE, 1994 WL 470220, at *1 (N.D. Ga.

May 25, 1994) (“A motion for reconsideration should not be used to

reiterate arguments that have previously been made. ... [It is an

5

;

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improper use of] the motion to reconsider to ask the Court to rethink

what the Court [has] already thought through—rightly or wrongly.”

(some alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Above the Belt,

Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)));

Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir.

2005) (“[Plaintiff] however cannot use a Rule 59(e) motion to relitigate

old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been

raised prior to the entry of judgment.”).

Jefferson’s motion falls short of the requisite standard for

reconsideration. She repackages arguments already considered and

rejected by the Court, and nothing in her motion undermines the

Court’s determinations that recusal is not warranted and that a stay of

discovery is appropriate. Thus, her motion for reconsideration will be

denied.

III.

Motion to Dismiss

Defendants contend that Jefferson’s amended complaint is due to

be dismissed on numerous grounds: the claims are barred by the

Rooker’Feldman doctrine; the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction;

6

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the claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations; the claims

are barred by judicial, prosecutorial, and qualified immunity; the claims

are barred by collateral estoppel; and the amended complaint fails to

state a claim. The Court need only consider the first few grounds to

conclude that dismissal of Jefferson’s amended complaint is warranted.

A.

Legal Standard

A challenge to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) may either be “facial” or

“factual.” McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 501

F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d

404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981)). When considering a facial attack, the Court

takes all allegations in the complaint as true. Id. (quoting Lawrence v.

Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion

may also be based on a “factual attack,” which allows the Court to go

beyond the pleadings to determine whether the claim of subject-matter

jurisdiction is credible. See id. (quoting Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529).

“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” FED. R. ClV. P. 12(h)(3).

7

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As the party asserting jurisdiction, Jefferson bears the burden of proof

on the issue. Lujan u. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)

(citations omitted).

B.

Discussion

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine places limits on the subject matter

jurisdiction of federal district courts and courts of appeal over certain

matters related to previous state court litigation.” Goodman ex rel.

Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Rooker

v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983)). It “provides that federal courts, other

than the United States Supreme Court, have no authority to review the

final judgments of state courts.” Id. (quoting Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d

1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

In her prayer for relief, Jefferson asks the Court to enjoin

Defendants from “refusing to take such steps as may be necessary to

restore, as nearly as practicable the victims of Defendants’ unlawful

practices to the position they would have been in but for the

discriminatory conduct and disparate treatment, including the fraud

8

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upon the court.” [14] at 35. To the extent Jefferson seeks to challenge

the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court and asks the Court to order

Defendants to reinstate her law license, the Court has no jurisdiction

over such a claim pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Cohran

v. State Bar of Ga., 790 F. Supp. 1568, 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1992); see also

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16 (“Orders of a state court relating to the

admission, discipline, and disbarment of members of its bar may be

reviewed only by the Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari

to the state court, and not by means of an original action in a lower

federal court.” (citation omitted)).

Jefferson now insists that she does not seek to challenge any

disciplinary order or judgment; rather, she asks the Court to “review

the State Bar’s alleged discriminatory disciplinary practices and

determine whether Defendants denied Jefferson and others equal

protection and due process. [32] at 6, 28. Nevertheless, the RookerFeldman doctrine bars her claims because the doctrine “extends not

only to constitutional claims presented or adjudicated by a state court,

but also to claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court

9

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judgment." Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1172 (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482

n.16; Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1997)).

“A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court

judgment 'if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state

court wrongly decided the issues before it.’” Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1172

(quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J.

concurring)). Thus, the doctrine does not apply to a federal litigant who

is not seeking reversal of the state court decision, Target Media

Partners v. Specialty Marketing Corp., 881 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir.

2018), but “[a] claim that at its heart challenges the state court decision

itself. . . falls within the doctrine,” May v. Morgan County, 878 F.3d

1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). In other words, “a state

court loser cannot avoid Rooker-Feldmans bar by cleverly cloaking her

pleadings in the cloth of a different claim.” May, 878 F.3d at 1005.

In her response brief, Jefferson contends that while the Court

must necessarily examine the disciplinary proceedings, it must do so

only to satisfy any standing issue and not to review or reject the final

judgment. But this argument belies the claims at the heart of the

10

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amended complaint—that Defendants violated Jefferson’s rights when

they interfered with her practice of law—and her relief requested,

including a declaration that Defendants discriminated against her and

acted unlawfully in depriving her of her license. Her claims succeed

only to the extent that the Georgia Supreme Court wrongly revoked her

license. Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1172; see also Cohran, 790 F. Supp. at 1572

(explaining that a plaintiff cannot escape the Rooker-Feldman rule by

bringing his action under § 1983 for the unconstitutional deprivation of

a property interest).

Jefferson also argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not

bar her claims because she had no reasonable opportunity to raise them

in state court, citing Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th

Cir. 1983). But Georgia State Bar Rule 4-218 provides a lawyer the

opportunity to raise objections and constitutional arguments with the

Georgia Supreme Court before that court subjects her to discipline. See

Wood v. Frederick, No. 21-12238, 2022 WL 1742953, at *6 (11th Cir.

May 31, 2022); see also Cohran, 790 F. Supp. at 1571—72. Thus, this

argument also lacks merit.

11

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The Court is therefore required under Booker-Feldman to dismiss

Jefferson’s claims.

Even if it were not, the Court would lack subject-matter

jurisdiction over Jefferson’s claims because “any case challenging the

action or inaction of the State Bar or any person in connection with a

disciplinary proceeding can be brought only before the Supreme Court

of Georgia.” Wood v. Frederick, No. l:21-cv-2269-TCB, 2021 WL

2815051, at *3 (N.D. Ga. June 9, 2021) (citing Arroyo v. Colbert, No.

l:18-cv-848-SCJ, 2018 WL 10510870, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2018)).

Ineed, “[t]he Supreme Court of Georgia is endowed with the inherent

and exclusive authority to govern the practice of law in Georgia.”

Wallace v. State Bar of Ga., 486 S.E.2d 165, 166 (Ga. 1997) (citations

omitted). Jefferson’s claims are subject to dismissal for this additional

reason.

Finally, even if Jefferson’s equal protection and due process claims

were not a challenge to her disciplinary proceedings, it is apparent from

the face of the complaint that they are time barred.

12

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Claims brought pursuant to §§ 1983 and 1985 are subject to the

statute of limitations period governing personal injury actions in the

state where the cause of action arose. Wellons v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of

Corr., 754 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Crowe v. Donald, 528

F.3d 1290, 1292 (11th Cir. 2008)); Villalona v. Holiday Inn Express &

Suites, 824 F. App’x 942, 946 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing

Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003)). In Georgia,

then, the statute of limitations for these claims is two years. O.C.G.A.

§ 9-3-33; Wellons, 754 F.3d at 1263 (citing DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d

1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2011)).

Although Jefferson’s amended complaint generally avers that

Defendants’ unlawful conduct occurred “during the periods of 2000

through 2022” and is ongoing, [14] at 1, her factual averments are

limited to the time period between November 2000 and October 2019,

id. at 8, and her claims are based on Defendants’ conduct through and

including only October 2019.

Accordingly, Defendants argue that the statute of limitations on

these claims ran in October 2021 (or at the very latest, February 2022

13

Case l:22-cv-01883-TCB Documents Filed 07/26/22 Page 14of 14

based on tolling related to the COVID-19 pandemic)—well before

Jefferson filed this action on May 11, 2022. Jefferson offers no response,

and the Court agrees with Defendants that her constitutional claims

are due to be dismissed as time barred.

IV.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Jefferson’s motion [36] for

reconsideration is denied, and Defendants’ motion [26] to dismiss is

granted. The Clerk is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 26th day of July, 2022.

Timothy C. Batten, Sr.

Chief United States District Judge

14

L

Case l:22-cv-01883-TCB Document 41 Filed 07/26/22 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

SHERRI JEFFERSON,

CIVIL ACTION FILE

Plaintiff,

NO. 1:22-cv-1883-TCB

vs.

THE STATE BAR OF GEORGIA,

SHARON L. BRYANT, SARAH B.

COOLE, WILLIAM COBB, PATRICK

LONGAN, AND ANTHONY ASKEW,

Defendants.

JUDGMENT

This action having come before the court, Honorable Timothy C. Batten, Sr.,

United States District Judge, for consideration of defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the

court having granted said motion, it is

Ordered and Adjudged that the action be, and the same hereby is, dismissed.

Dated at Atlanta, Georgia, this 26th day of July, 2022.

KEVIN P. WEIMER

CLERK OF COURT

By:

Prepared, Filed, and Entered

in the Clerk’s Office

July 26, 2022

Kevin P. Weimer

Clerk of Court

By:

s/ D. Barfield

Deputy Clerk

s/ D. Barfield

Deputy Clerk

Case l:22-cv-01883-TCB Document 33 Filed 07/12/22 Page lot 8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

SHERRI JEFFERSON,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION FILE

v.

NO. l:22-cv-1883-TCB

THE STATE BAR OF GEORGIA;

SHARON L. BRYANT, in her

official capacity; SARAH B.

COOLE, in her official capacity;

WILLIAM COBB, in his official

capacity; PATRICK LONGAN, in

his official capacity; and

ANTHONY ASKEW, in his official

capacity,

Defendants.

ORDER

Plaintiff Sherri Jefferson brings this action pro se against

Defendants, averring that they engaged in discriminatory practices

towards herself and others during state bar disciplinary proceedings.

Case l:22-cv-01883-TCB Document 33 Filed 07/12/22 Page 2 of 8

Jefferson generally alleges that Defendants have violated her

constitutional rights and contravened 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Jefferson has filed a motion to recuse the undersigned. Defendants

have filed a motion to dismiss and move the Court to stay discovery

pending the resolution of their motion to dismiss. Now before the Court

are Jefferson’s motion [20] to recuse and Defendants’ motion [28] to

stay.

I.

Motion to Recuse

In her motion to recuse, Jefferson argues that the undersigned

cannot be fair and impartial because (1) he harbors bias towards her;

and (2) he or his staff could be witnesses in the current case based on

her two prior cases before this Court, Jefferson v. Deal, No. l:15-cv2069-TCB (N.D. Ga. filed June 9, 2015); Doe v. Deal, No. l:15-cv-2226TCB (N.D. Ga. filed June 19, 2015). To support these assertions,

Jefferson broadly invokes 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455.

Jefferson’s contentions suggest recusal based upon either 28

U.S.C. § 455(a) or 455(b). Subsection (a) provides that “[a]ny . . . judge

. . . of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in

2

Case l:22-cv-01883-TCB Document 33 Filed 07/12/22 Page 3 of 8

which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 455(a). Under this subsection, the issue is “whether an objective,

disinterested lay observer fully informed of the facts . . . would

entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.” United

States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Parker

v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988)). To warrant

recusal or disqualification, any bias “must be personal and

extrajudicial; it must derive from something other than that which the

judge learned by participating in the case.” McWhorter v. City of

Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Jaffe v. Grant,

793 F.2d 1182, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 1986)).1

Additionally, subsection (b) provides that a judge shall recuse

himself “[w]here he has . . . personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary

facts concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). Similarly, a

judge shall recuse himself if he “[i]s to the judge’s knowledge likely to be

1 While an exception exists for this principle, it is not applicable here. See

Wood v. Frederick, No. 21-12238, 2022 WL 1742953, at *4 (11th Cir. May 31, 2022)

(The “alleged bias ‘must stem from extrajudicial sources, unless the judge’s acts

demonstrate ‘such pervasive bias and prejudice that it unfairly prejudices one of the

parties.”’ (quoting United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir. 1999))).

3

Case l:22-cv-01883-TCB Document 33 Filed 07/12/22 Page 4 of 8

a material witness in the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iv). As with

subsection (a), if a judge acquires this knowledge “in the course of a

judicial proceeding,” recusal under these sections is unnecessary

because the alleged prejudice or bias is not “extrajudicial.” See United

States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966, 969 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted);

see also Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1334 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).

Under each subsection, “a charge of partiality must be supported

by facts,” not merely speculation or unsupported claims. See United

States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556, 1558 (11th Cir. 1986).“[A] judge has

a duty to deny recusal when proper grounds for recusal have not been

shown.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Natl Urological Grp., Inc., No. l:04-cv3294-CAP, 2015 WL 13687740, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 27, 2015).

Because neither section justifies recusal, the Court will deny

Jefferson’s motion.

First, no objective lay observer would question the impartiality of

the undersigned or his staff. Jefferson fails to demonstrate any

existence of bias or prejudice. Though she provides emails between the

4

Case l;22-cv-01883-TCB Document 33

Filed 07/12/22 Page 5 of 8

'V.

Court’s staff and herself, these

prejudice. Moreover,

emails are devoid of any evidence of

even if Jefferson’s assertion

Prejudice stemming from prior proceed

were interpreted as

ings before the Court, this

supposed prejudice is not the type

510 U-s- at 551 (“Also

bias’ or ‘prejudice’ are

contemplated by § 455(a). See Liteky,

»ot subject

deprecatory character™,,™ „

opinions held by judges as a

result of what they

learned im earlier proceedings.”).

Second, Jefferson largely relies

upon the presumption that the

undersigned or his staff might be witnesses in the

current proceeding,

However, it is unclear how either the

undersigned or his staff could be

material witnesses, especially where this Court and his staff lack, as

required by § 455(b), “personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts”

regarding Jefferson’s constitutional claims. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b).

Indeed, even assuming the undersigned acquired personal

knowledge of Jefferson’s claims, this supposed knowledge “was acquired

in the course of a judicial proceeding,” which does not support recusal.

See Bailey, 175 F.3d at 969 (emphasizing that “alleged knowledge of a

disputed evidentiary fact does not require recusal” if acquired in the

5

Case l:22-cv-01883-TCB Document 33 Filed 07/12/22 Page 6 of 8

course of a judicial proceeding); see also United States v. Sims, 845 F.2d

1564, 1570 (11th Cir. 1988) (denying plaintiffs motion to recuse where

the district court judge learned of a contentious issue while in his

“judicial capacity”).

Therefore, recusal of the undersigned is not warranted.

II.

Motion to Stay Discovery

A “District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an

incident to its power to control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520

U.S. 681, 706 (1997). When such motion is raised, the movant has the

burden of showing “good cause and reasonableness” for her motion to

succeed. Cuhaci v. Kouri Grp., LP, 540 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1186 (S.D. Fla.

2021) (citing Howard v. Galesi, 107 F.R.D. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).

In Defendants’ motion to stay, they argue that in light of their

pending motion to dismiss, staying discovery would preserve resources,

particularly because of the various legal grounds for dismissal.

Jefferson responds that the “preliminary peek standard” compels a

denial of Defendants’ motion and that staying discovery would prejudice

her case. [29] at 4 (citing Moore v. Shands Jacksonville Med. Ctr., Inc.,

6

Case l:22-cv-01883-TCB Document 33 Filed 07/12/22 Page 7 of 8

No. 3:09-cv-298-J-34TEM, 2009 WL 4899400, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 11,

2009).

Without addressing the merits of Defendants’ motion to dismiss,

the Court disagrees with Jefferson and will grant Defendants’ motion to

stay.

While a motion to dismiss is not dispositive for granting a stay of

discovery, a “preliminary peek” at the merits of the motion to dismiss

warrants halting discovery. Defendants allege multiple legal

questions—not factual disputes—that could serve as grounds for

dismissal. See Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp123 F.3d 1353, 1367

(11th Cir. 1997) (holding that “[fjacial challenges to the legal sufficiency

of a claim or defense” must be resolved before discovery proceeds). If

discovery began and the Court later found Defendants’ motion to

dismiss meritorious, the parties and the Court would likely expend

significant resources in the interim.

Thus, Defendants motion “should . . . be resolved before discovery

begins.” Id.

7

Case l:22-cv-01883-TCB Document 33 Filed 07/12/22 Page 8 of 8

III.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Jefferson's motion [20] to recuse is

denied. Additionally, for good cause shown, Defendants’ motion [28] to

stay discovery is granted. Discovery in this case is stayed until the

Court rules on Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 12th day of July, 2022.

Timothy C. Batten, Sr.

Chief United States District Judge

8

Additional material

from this filing is

available in the

Clerk's Office.