Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Charles A. McRae, Petitioner v. Shannon N. Myers, et al.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
Unitetr j&afos Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 14, 2023*
Decided March 9, 2023
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1821
CHARLES A. McRAE
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SHANNON N. MYERS, et al,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 20-cv-410-DWD
David W. Dugan,
Judge.
ORDER
In April 2020, Charles McRae, an Illinois prisoner, sued a prison dental hygienist
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly assaulting him sexually more than a decade earlier.
McRae also sued various officials at the prison and in the Illinois Department of
Corrections ("IDOC") for covering up the sexual assaults at the time or inadequately
investigating his grievances later. After allowing multiple amendments, the district
* Appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this appeal.
We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 22-1821
Page 2
court determined that McRae's claims were either time-barred or pled insufficiently and
dismissed the second amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. We affirm.
In reviewing the sua sponte dismissal of McRae's complaint, we take his
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Perez v. Fenoglio,
792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015). From mid-2008 until mid-2009, McRae's job at Big
Muddy River Correctional Center was to clean the health care unit, often under the
supervision of hygienist Shannon Myers. Throughout the year, Myers forced sexual
contact with McRae, which included kissing, grabbing, oral sex, and intercourse. McRae
resisted at first but acquiesced when Myers became aggressive. Two of Myers's
coworkers facilitated her meetings with McRae by being lookouts. Myers threatened
McRae that if he told anyone about what was happening, she and her coworkers would
say that he sexually assaulted her. McRae did not tell anyone, afraid that reporting the
conduct would interfere with his upcoming release. McRae was not aware that he was
legally unable to consent to sexual conduct with Myers. See 720ILCS 5/ll-9.2(e).
In May 2009, McRae was placed on supervised release. Soon after, Myers
convinced McRae's approved home-confinement host to back out because Myers was
pregnant with his child and wanted him to live with her. McRae's parole officer
approved her home as McRae's new host site. Myers then stopped working and helped
McRae get a construction site job. They lived together for eleven months, during which
Myers had "complete control over [him] and what he did," keeping him in "physical,
financial, and sexual servitude," and not allowing him access to mental health services
for his bipolar disorder and other mental health issues. McRae felt he had no choice but
to stay with Myers because she threatened to report him for violating the conditions of
his release. Two months after their child was bom, McRae had a "breakdown," broke
the law again, and went back to state prison.
When McRae was back in prison (not at Big Muddy), Myers, who had begun a
relationship with a correctional officer, threatened McRae that her boyfriend and other
friends throughout IDOC would sabotage him if he told anyone about what had
happened between them. Myers also threatened to change their daughter's name and
put her up for adoption. McRae remained silent out of fear.
Eight years later, in May 2019, McRae questioned Myers at a court hearing
(perhaps pertaining to their shared daughter), where she denied that they had a
relationship while he was at Big Muddy or that they had lived together later. Perplexed
by the lies, McRae did some research and discovered that engaging in a sexual
relationship with an inmate is illegal under state law.
No. 22-1821
Page 3
Armed with this new information, McRae submitted a grievance reporting
Myers for custodial sexual assault. He filed the grievance with the facility where he
resided (the Joliet Treatment Center) and directly with the IDOCs Administrative
Review Board. The Board responded that his grievance was moot because the alleged
assault was already being investigated by the Investigations and Intelligence Division.
McRae was interviewed during that inquiry, and an investigator told McRae that he
had provided enough information to substantiate his allegations. But no one followed
up with McRae afterward. McRae filed more grievances criticizing the prison's and
IDOC's responses to his reports of sexual misconduct and requesting the services
mandated for assault victims under the Prison Rape Elimination Act ("FREA"), 34
U.S.C. §§ 30301-30309. His grievances and requests were all ignored or denied.
In 2020, McRae sued Myers, her two Big Muddy coworkers, his parole officer,
and the IDOC and prison officials who handled his grievances and other requests. In his
operative second amended complaint, McRae asserted that Myers's assaults (in prison
and while he was on home monitoring) constituted cruel and unusual punishment from
which the other dental hygienists and his parole officer were obligated to protect him.
He also claimed that IDOC officials unconstitutionally retaliated and discriminated
against him by not investigating and reporting Myers's crimes or providing victims'
services, despite laws and policies that required them to do so. Finally, McRae alleged
violations of state law, including custodial sexual assault.
The district court dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice. First,
the court determined that the constitutional claims were time-barred because the
alleged unlawful conduct ended in 2010, and McRae did not file his complaint until
2020, well past the two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 suits in Illinois. As for the
handling of McRae's grievances, the court concluded that McRae did not state an equal
protection claim as a class of one because he did not plausibly plead that the defendants
had an improper personal motive to ignore his reports of sexual assault. And he did not
state a First Amendment retaliation claim, the court reasoned, because he did not allege
a causal connection between the alleged retaliation and protected speech. Finally, the
court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over McRae's state-law claims.
No. 22-1821
Page 4
McRae appeals the dismissal.1 He argues that (1) none of his claims were timebarred because the statute of limitations did not begin to run while Myers still
threatened him; (2) he properly pled his First Amendment and equal protection claims;
and (3) the district court should have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over his statelaw claims. We review the dismissal de novo. Perez, 792 F.3d at 776.
McRae contends that the statute of limitations has not run on any of his claims
because he is still being injured by Myers's threats. He relies on an Illinois statute
providing that the statute of limitations for criminal sexual conduct does not run while
"the person injured is subject to threats, intimidation, manipulation, or fraud
perpetrated by the perpetrator." 735 ILCS 5/13-202.3. But even though we borrow the
statute of limitations itself from state law, "the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is
a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law." Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Under federal law, the clock starts when the constitutional
violation is complete, and the plaintiff knows of his injury and its cause. Id.; O'Gorman
v. City of Chicago, 111 F.3d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 2015).
Any constitutional violations by Myers and the parole officer were complete in
2010—when McRae last interacted with Myers—and earlier for the other hygienists.
(Myers and McRae attended the hearing in 2019, but he does not allege that she injured
him then.) By 2010, McRae knew the facts and cause of his injury even if he did not
know the law on custodial rape (and he never says when he learned of possible
constitutional claims). See Tohey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018). Thus, his
2020 complaint was filed past the two-year limitations period. See id. at 645.
McRae's claims arising from the handling of his 2019 grievances are timely, but
their dismissal was proper. McRae contends that he stated a class-of-one equal v
protection claim because his complaint allowed the inference that the officials who
rejected or ignored his grievances were personally motivated to avoid liability for his
abuse. It is not settled (though the district court stated otherwise) that McRae had to
allege that the defendants held personal animus against him. See Brunson v. Murray,
843 F.3d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887
(7th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). At a minimum, however, plaintiffs must allege that they were
"intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment." Vill. Of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,
1 McRae also challenges the dismissal with prejudice of three claims from his first
amended complaint. But he realleged those claims in the operative complaint, and the
district court ruled on them again. Thus, we need only address the final dismissal order.
No. 22-1821
Page 5
564 (2000). Here, McRae alleges the defendants were required to follow certain protocol
for victims of sexual assault, and instead they either ignored his grievances or wrongly
decided them. Responding improperly might allow an inference of negligence, but
without more, not intentional discrimination. See Fares Pawn, LLC v. Indiana Dep't of Fin.
Insts., 755 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 2014) ("Negligent or accidental differential treatment
does not count."). Nothing suggests that the defendants targeted McRae for
mistreatment or tried to suppress reports of sexual assault.
Next, McRae argues that he stated a First Amendment claim by alleging that
certain defendants retaliated against him for reporting sexual assault by not responding
to his grievances as legally required. Generally, liability cannot be based simply on
reviewing or processing inmate grievances. Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559,563 (7th Cir.
2017) (citing Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001)). An exception
would be if the defendants had a retaliatory motive. But McRae does not allege a
"causal link" between his reports of decade-old assaults and the defendants' handling
of the grievances. Manuel v. Nalley, 966 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2020).
Our conclusion is limited to affirming the district court's dismissal of McRae's
claims under § 1983. His allegations are serious, but the federal Constitution does not
protect persons from state actors' violations of state law. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752,
760 (7th Cir. 2003). And, though PREA is a federal law, it does not create a private cause
of action. See 34 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30309.
With no remaining federal claims to adjudicate, the district court appropriately
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over McRae's state-law claims. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). We presume that district courts will relinquish jurisdiction unless
the statute of limitations has run on the state claims, substantial resources have already
been committed to adjudicating the case, or it is obvious how the state claims should be
decided. RWJMgmt. Co. v. BP Prod. N. Am., Inc., 672 F.3d 476,479-80 (7th Cir. 2012).
None of those concerns are present here. We note, however, that despite relinquishing
supplemental jurisdiction, the court stated in its judgment that the operative complaint
was dismissed for failure to state a claim. That is a merits dismissal, not appropriate for
the portion of the case over which the court relinquished jurisdiction. See Rivera v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 913 F.3d 603, 618 (7th Cir. 2018); Fields v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 518
(7th Cir. 2012). The judgment must specify that the state-law claims are dismissed
without prejudice to refiling in the appropriate forum. We modify the judgment
accordingly, and as so modified, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Everett McKinley Dirksen
United States Courthouse
Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Office of the Clerk
Phone: (312) 435-5850
www.ca7.uscourts.gov
FINAL JUDGMENT
March 9, 2023
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
CHARLES A. MCRAE,
Plaintiff - Appellant
No. 22-1821
v.
SHANNON N. MYERS, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees
ifipwn wmrratTom
District Court No: 3:20-cv-00410-DWD
Southern District of Illinois
District Judge David W. Dugan
The judgment must specify that the state-law claims are dismissed without prejudice to
refiling in the appropriate forum. We modify the judgment accordingly, and as so
modified, the judgment is AFFIRMED. The above is in accordance with the decision of
this court entered on this date.
Clerk of Court
form name: c7_FinalJudgment
(form ID: 132)
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 1 of 18 Page ID #650
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CHARLES A. McRAE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SHANNON N. MYERS,
JANE DOE 1,
JANE DOE 2,
D. REARDON,
R. JEFFREYS,
L. MCCARTY,
D. KNAUER,
S. JOHNSON,
J. EILERS,
E. JACKSON,
M. DELIA,
R. NOTTINGHAM,
A. TACK,
C. LARRY,
M. NURSE,
D. WILSON,
T. WILLIAMS,
O. JAMISON,
D. MARANO,
K. RENZI.
Defendants.
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Case No. 20-CV-410-DWD
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Charles McRae, an inmate at the Joliet Treatment Center (JTC) in the
Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42
IJ.S.C. S 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 31V This is
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, which was timely filed after the Court dismissed
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 2 of 18 Page ID #651
his earlier complaints for failure to state a claim. His allegations stem from an alleged
series of sexual assaults by a prison employee that began at Big Muddy River Correctional
Center (Big Muddy) and continued upon his release. In recent years, Plaintiff alleges that
he has repeatedly attempt to raise these issues to staff at the JTC and staff of the IDOC to
no avail. He seeks injunctive and monetary relief.
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 31) is now before the Court for
preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is
required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 lifLCI
8 1915AfaWbV Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a
defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(h). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally
construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.f 577 F,3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint
The factual allegations in Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint are strikingly
similar to his First Amended Complaint. Compare (Docs. 15,31). However, in the Second
Amended Complaint Plaintiff replaced many John Doe defendants with the names of
individuals. In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also elaborated on many of his
legal claims.
At the outset of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff discusses Illinois State
statutes and administrative procedures, as well as provisions of the Code of Federal
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 3 of 18 Page ID #652
Regulations, that he views as applicable to his case. (Doc. 31 at 6-181. The Court does
not find it necessary to recount these details for the purposes of this initial review order.
Plaintiff alleges that around August 2008, he was assigned a job as a health care
porter at Big Muddy. /Doc. 31 at 18V As part of his job duties, Plaintiff worked in the
dental area with Defendant Myers. In late 2008 during one of his shifts, Myers allegedly
cornered Plaintiff in an exam room and kissed him. (Doc. 31 at 20V Plaintiff did not
report the incident for fear that it would impact his release date, but Myers allegedly told
Jane Does 1 and 2. Plaintiff told Myers that he was not interested in a relationship.
Plaintiff alleges that over time, Myers continued to corner him, and she began to sexually
assault him on numerous occasions. He alleges that Jane Does 1 and 2 knew about this
conduct and acted as a look out, to warn Myers if anyone was in the vicinity. Plaintiff
alleges that this conduct occurred on a regular basis until his release from Big Muddy on
May 9,2009. /Doc. 31 at 23V
Upon release, Myers showed up at Plaintiffs parole placement house and told his
host site provider that she was his girlfriend, and she was pregnant with his child. (Doc.
31 at 24V From that point forward, Myers frequently came to Plaintiffs host site and
sexually assaulted him. A few weeks later, Myers convinced Plaintiffs host to contact
IDOC and to tell them she was no longer willing to host Plaintiff. IDOC directed Plaintiff
to move to Myers' house and to stay there until a parole officer visited. (Doc. 31 at 25).
At some point during his stay at Myers' house, Defendant Reardon, a parole agent, came
by to check on Plaintiff. Reardon had Plaintiff call Myers at work and then Reardon took
the phone outside and spoke to Myers for a while. Reardon returned and told Plaintiff
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 4 of 18 Page ID #653
that he had approved Myers' house as his new host site. Plaintiff alleges that this caused
him to be subjected to physical, financial, and sexual servitude for the next eleven
months. (Doc. 31 at 27V
During his eleven-month stay at Myers' house, Plaintiff alleges that among other
things she would not allow him to seek inpatient treatment for his mental illness. /Doc.
31 at 281 As a result, Plaintiff alleges he ultimately suffered an emotional, mental, and
physical breakdown which led to his reincarceration.
Upon reincarceration, Myers
allegedly told Plaintiff he had to keep their relationship a secret and she threatened to
harm him or to terminate his parental rights to their child. Plaintiff alleges that he lived
in fear for eight years. (Doc. 31 at 29V
Plaintiff alleges that in 2019 he was transferred from Dixon Correctional Center to
the JTC. On May 21, 2019, he attended a court hearing with Myers.1 After the hearing,
Myers allegedly threated Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that two employees from the JTC
witnessed the conversation and asked him about it. (Doc. 31 at 30V Plaintiff refused to
talk about it. Plaintiff began to research his encounters with Myers and Reardon, at which
time he decided he had been a victim of custodial sexual misconduct. (Doc. 31 at 31V
On August 5, 2019, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Administrative Review
Board (ARB) about this alleged staff misconduct. The ARB determined that his grievance
was moot because the allegations were being investigated by Central Investigations.
(Doc. 31 at 31: Doc. 31-1 at 3). On August 5, 2019, Plaintiff alleges that he also informed
1 The purpose or nature of this hearing is unclear. Plaintiff submitted a short excerpt of the transcript as an exhibit to
his complaint. It appears that Myers was cross-examined by Plaintiff at the hearing and that she testified on her own
behalf. (Doc.31-1 at 55-591.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 5 of 18 Page ID #654
JTC staff of his past abuse and requested counseling from a behavioral health counselor.
(Doc. 31 at 31). The counselor indicated that she would inform Defendant Marano of his
wish for a victim advocate or further counseling.
On August 6, 2019, Plaintiff was interviewed without a victim advocate by
Defendant Lt. Allen. After their conversation Allen said that an investigator from the ISP
would be in contact with him. (Doc. 31 at 32V She also had Plaintiff sign a summary of
her notes, which he was not afforded time to read. When he later asked her for a copy,
she said he could only obtain it by filing a Freedom of Information Act request. (Doc. 31
at 33). Plaintiff alleges that no one ever followed up on Allen's interview.
On August 9, 2019, Plaintiff asked Imburgia to speak with Marano about his
requests for a victim advocate and counseling. Plaintiff renewed his request on August
23, 2019. Plaintiff also submitted a grievance requesting services. On August 27, 2019,
Imburgia told Plaintiff that Marano would not provide services unless it was a confirmed
rape. /Doc. 31 at 34-35). On August 29, 2019, Plaintiffs grievance was returned, and
services were refused on the premise that he needed to be more specific about when the
alleged sexual abuse occurred. /Doc. 31 at 35: Doc. 31-1 at 9-12). Plaintiff appealed to the
ARB. He alleges that Defendant Knauer initially denied his grievance for a variety of
reasons, and when he attempted to cure those issues, he got no response to a subsequent
grievance.
Plaintiff engaged in efforts to secure his own counseling. He alleges that the
Guardian Angel Comm. Services (GACS) agreed to provide services, so he notified
Defendants Tack, and Marano. /Doc. 31 at 35-36). Plaintiff was eventually told that to
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 6 of 18 Page ID #655
have GACS visits, he would need to sacrifice visits that could otherwise be used for
family or friends. He used 4-5 visits per month for GACS.
On December 13, 2019, Plaintiff filed a grievance challenging the requirement that
he sacrifice visits for GACS to visit him and requesting a private meeting space with the
GACS counselor because the counselor had told him she could not discuss sexual assault
issues in a public space. /Doc. 31 at 36V Plaintiff alleges that the December 13 grievance
was never responded to by Tacks, so after 60 days he sent it to the ARB. Knauer at the
ARB refused to address the grievance because it had no institutional response. (Doc. 31
. at 37). At the direction of Defendant Jamison, Plaintiff refiled the December 13 grievance.
On December 16, 2019, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the ARB concerning the
outcome of his PREA investigation. (Doc. 31 at 371. Knauer denied the grievance as moot
and indicated the office had disposed of the issue on August 27,2019.
On January 24, 2020, Plaintiff filed three grievances concerning Jeffreys, McCarty,
Central Investigations and Sarah Brown-Foiles, regarding their handling of his sexual
assault allegations. Defendant Knauer deemed all three grievances untimely, which
Plaintiff alleged was wrong because he had been waiting on responses to the issues raised
therein.
Plaintiff alleges he subsequently filed a grievance about Knauer's denial of his
grievances, which Defendants Jeffreys and Johnson denied as unsubstantiated. They
informed him that his complaints were being investigated in compliance with PREA
policy, although he disagreed. (Doc. 31 at 38V Plaintiff alleges that Defendants actions
continued to the time of filing this case.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 7 of 18 Page ID #656
He claims that in early 2020 visits from GACS were completely discontinued by
theJTC. (Doc.31 at38V
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants conduct constituted negligence, a breach of
duty, and official misconduct. He explains at length why he believes that various actions
and incidents were improper. (Doc. 31 at 39-451. He then lists 10 enumerated claims for
relief.
In Claim 1, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Myers abusive conduct constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. 31 at 45-46). In Claim 2, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants Jane Doe 1 and 2, and Reardon failed to protect him or intervene in Myers"
conduct. (Doc. 31 at 46-47). In Claim 3, Plaintiff alleges that Myers, Reardon, Jane Doe 1
and Jane Doe 2 failed to protect him from custodial sexual misconduct. (Doc. 31 at 47V
In Claim 4 he alleges that Defendants Reardon, Jeffreys, McCarty, Knauer, Johnson,
Eilers, Jackson, Delia, Nottingham, Tack, Larry, Nurse, Wilson, Williams, Jamison, and
Renzi denied him his right to petition the government for redress concerning the alleged
assaults. (Doc. 31 at 48-491 In Claim 5, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Myers, Jane Does
1 and 2, Reardon, Jeffreys, McCarty, Knauer, Johnson, Eilers, Jackson, Delia, Nottingham,
Tack, Larry, Nurse, Wilson, Williams, Jamison, Marano and Renzi violated his right to
equal protection by refusing to report or investigation this incident. (Doc. 31 at 49-51).
In Claim 6, he alleges that Defendants Jeffreys, McCarty, Knauer, Johnson, Eilers, Jackson,
Delia, knotting ham, Tack, Larry, Nurse, Wilson, Williams, Jamison, Marano, and Renzi
retaliated against him because he was denied protections any person should expect when
reporting such an issue. (Doc. 31 at 51-52). In Count 7 he alleges that Myers, Jane Does
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 8 of 18 Page ID #657
1 and 2, and Reardon conspired to allow Myers' actions to occur because the Does acted
as a look out and Reardon helped Myers to arrange the parole living situation. (DqcJ31
at 52-53). Claim 8 alleges state law assault battery and sexual abuse/assault against
Myers for her actions. Claim 9 alleges state law intentional infliction of emotional distress
against numerous defendants. Claim 10 alleges custodial sexual misconduct against
Myers. (Doc. 31 at 55).
As relief Plaintiff seeks an injunction to direct a final agency decision regarding
the sexual assault allegations, referral of the matter to the ISP for investigation,
compliance with the PREA, a treatment agreement between GACS and the JTC, a private
counseling space at JTC, initiation of new GACS services for Plaintiff, a PREA audit at
die JTC, notification to IDOC of the probability of retaliation from Myers, and an
investigation into all allegations in the lawsuit. Plaintiff also seeks monetary damages.
The court adopts the claims proposed by Plaintiff, based on the Second Amended
Complaint:
Claim 1:
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment against
Defendant Myers;
Claim 2:
Eighth Amendment failure to protect or intervene against
Defendants Jane Doe 1 and 2 and Reardon;
Claim 3:
Eighth Amendment failure to protect against Defendants
Myers, Reardon, Jane Does 1 and 2;
Claim 4:
First Amendment right to seek redress from the government
against Defendants Reardon, Jeffreys, McCarty, Knauer,
Johnson, Eilers, Jackson, Delia, Nottingham, Tack, Larry,
Nurse, Wilson, Williams, Jamison and Renzi for their
alleged failure to investigate Plaintiff's allegations;
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 9 of 18 Page ID #658
Claim 5:
Equal Protection claim against Defendants Myers, Jane Doe
1 and 2, Reardon, Jeffreys, McCarty, Knauer, Johnson,
Eilers, Jackson, Delia, Nottingham, Tack, Larry, Nurse,
Wilson, Williams, Jamison, Marano and Renzi for failing to
investigate Plaintiff's allegations when other victims would
have been treated differently;
Claim 6:
Retaliation against Defendants Jeffreys, McCarty, Knauer,
Johnson, Eilers, Jackson, Delia, Nottingham, Tack, Larry,
Nurse, Wilson, Williams, Jamison, Marano, and Renzi for
denying him protections that should have been taken in
response to his allegations;
Claim 7:
Conspiracy claim against Defendants Myers, Reardon and
Jane Does 1 and 2 for allowing Myers' conduct;
Claim 8:
State law assault, battery, sexual abuse/harassment claim
against Myers;
Claim 9:
State law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim;
Claim 10:
State law custodial sexual misconduct claim against Myers;
Claim 11:
State law negligence claim against all defendants.
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned
in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without
prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombhj, 550 U.S.
544. 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does
not plead "enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face").
Preliminary Dismissals
In the master caption of his Complaint, Plaintiff lists J. Eilers, E. Jackson, M. Delia,
C. Larry, M. Nurse, D. Wilson, T. Williams, and K. Renzi as defendants in this action.
Although Plaintiff identifies each of these individuals' job title and general
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 10 of 18 Page ID #659
responsibilities in the opening pages of his complaint, he does not make any factual
allegations that demonstrate personal involvement of these individuals. Section 1983
liability is premised on individual responsibility, so generic allegations about the
defendants' job duties are not sufficient to state claims against these parties. Gentry v.
Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555. 561 (7th Cir. 1995). Additionally, if a party is named in the
caption, but there are no factual allegations as to that party, dismissal is appropriate.
I Iere, the Court will dismiss Defendants Eilers, Jackson, Delia, Larry, Nurse, Wilson, and
Williams because Plaintiff failed to identify sufficient factual allegations to state a claim
against these individuals under § 1983.
Analysis
Claim 1 alleges cruel and unusual punishment against Defendant Myers for her
alleged sexual conduct from approximately 2008-2010.
The applicable statute of
limitations period for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a state's period for
personal injury torts. See Kalimara v. III. Dept, of Corrections, 879 F.2d 276. 277 (7th Cir.
1989). In Illinois, where the events in Plaintiff's complaint occurred, that period is two
years. See Woods v. Illinois Dept, of Children and Family Svcs., 710 F.3d 762.765-766 (7th Cir.
2013); 735 TLCS S 5/13-202. Illinois recognizes equitable tolling of the two-year period
for an inmate to pursue administrative exhaustion of a claim at the institutional level. See
Terry v. Spencer, 888 F.3d 890. 894 (7th Cir. 2015). A court may sua sponte dismiss a case
at § 1915A review if the applicability of the statute of limitations is "so plain from the
language of the complaint.. .that it renders the suit frivolous." Id. at 894; Dickens v. Illinois,
753 Fed. App'x 390 (7th Cir. 2018) (a court may dismiss a complaint upon screening if it
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 11 of 18 . Page ID #660
is clearly barred by the statute of limitations). In this case, Plaintiff s allegations against
Defendant Myers for the alleged sexual assaults concern activity from 2008-2010. Plaintiff
did not begin to grieve the issue, nor did he file a complaint until 2019 or 2020. Claim 1
is plainly untimely, so it will be dismissed.
Claims 2, 3, and 7 are also time-barred because they allege a failure to protect or
intervene in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as well as a conspiracy under § 1983.
All of these claims are governed by the same two-year statute of limitations.
In Claim 4, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Reardon, Jeffreys, McCarty, Knauer,
Johnson, Eilers, Jackson, Delia, Nottingham, Tack, Larry, Nurse, Wilson, Williams,
Jamison and Renzi interfered with his right to seek redress from the government
concerning the alleged assaults. This claim is subject to dismissal for multiple reasons.
First, as explained above in the preliminary dismissal section, there are no individualized
allegations as to Defendants Eilers, Jackson, Delia, Larry, Nurse, Wilson, and Williams so
these defendants have been dismissed. Second, the only allegations in the complaint
against Defendant Reardon pertain to his actions in 2009 when Plaintiff was on parole.
The allegations about Reardon do not reflect interference with Plaintiffs right to seek
redress from the government, but even if they did, the claim would be barred by the
statute of limitations because Plaintiffs interactions with Reardon occurred more than
ten years ago.
Third, as to the remaining Defendants that Plaintiff names in support of this
claim—Jeffreys, McCarty, Knauer, Johnson, Jamison, Nottingham, Tack, and Renzi—
although he presents his claim as one of interference with the right to redress the
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 12 of 18 Page ID #661
government, his factual allegations are more consistent with interference with the
grievance procedure.
Specifically, he alleges throughout the complaint that these
individuals participated in the review and denial of multiple grievances. (Doc. 31 at 31.
35-38). The problem with these factual allegations is that inmates do not have any First
Amendment right to access a grievance procedure, so interference with grievances alone
does not state a First Amendment claim. See e.g. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th
Cir. 2011). The Constitution requires no procedure at all, and die failure of state prison
officials to follow their own procedures does not, standing alone, violate the Constitution.
Maust v. Headley, 959 F.2d 644. 648 (7th Cir. 1992); Shnngo v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091.1100-01
(7th Cir. 1982). Additionally, Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege that the defendants' actions
prevented him from seeking redress in die courts because he was able to file this lawsuit,
and it was not dismissed for grievance problems. Thus, Claim 4 fails as to all defendants,
and it will be dismissed.
In Claim 5, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right to Equal Protection.
He claims that he is a "class of one." The Court previously dismissed this claim from
Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint because he failed to identify anyone from whom he
was treated differently. /Doc. 26 at 7-81. Plaintiff attempted to remedy this problem by
alleging that he was treated differently than other victims in IDOC. "To state a so-called
'class-of-one' equal protection claim, [Plaintiff] must allege that he was 'intentionally
treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the
difference in treatment/" Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743..Z4Z (7th Cir. 2012). "A
bare allegation of bad motive, however, is not enough." Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp.,
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 13 of 18 Page ID #662
680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff must establish an arbitrary action and some
improper personal motive for the differential treatment. Id. Here, Plaintiff alleges that
the named defendants arbitrarily failed to investigate or escalate his reports of a sexual
assault, but he does not suggest any improper personal motive on behalf of the named
defendants. Given the minimal allegations about Plaintiffs differential treatment, and
the total lack of allegations that the defendants had a improper personal motive, Plaintiff
has failed to state a class-of-one claim.
In his Equal Protection claim Plaintiff emphasizes that without an investigation
into his allegations, he has not been able to pursue criminal charges, but even if there was
an investigation it would not enable him to initiate criminal charges on his own behalf.
"Private individuals 'lack [| standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority'
and 'lack [] a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of
another/" Sparks v. McCarthy, 2020 WT. 12738796 at *4 (S.D. Ind. 2020) citing Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 IJ.S, 614. 6I9 (1973). To the extent he contends that he was treated
differently because of the lack of prosecution, he has no standing to raise this issue via
Equal Protection. Id., see also United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891. 901 (7th Cir. 2008)
(declining to recognize a class-of-one claim concerning prosecutorial discretion because
the discretion conferred on prosecutors in choosing who and how to prosecute is flatly
inconsistent with a presumption of uniform treatment, and thus the notion of
arbitrariness or irrationality is a poor fit for assessing discretionary charging decisions).
Plaintiff's frustration over the handling of his alleged sexual assault is understandable,
but he has not alleged an improper personal motive for the handling of his claim, and
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 14 of 18 Page ID #663
even if he did his desire to have a criminal prosecution against the assailant is not
attainable via a class-of-one claim because it involves prosecutorial discretion. Thus,
Claim 5 will be dismissed.
In Claim 6, Plaintiff alleges that many defendants have retaliated against him for
filing grievances and complaining of his alleged sexual assault. The Court dismissed this
claim from the First Amended Complaint because Plaintiffs alleged injury (a limit on the
number of visitors he could have while receiving visits from GACS) was not sufficient to
demonstrate retaliation. In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has attempted to
bolster this claim by alleging that he pled a chronology of events that show he was denied
the protections that should be put in place when someone reports a sexual assault.
Plaintiff cross-references the negligence section of his Second Amended Complaint,
wherein he recited all the investigative steps that he believes should have been taken in
response to his reported assault. /Doc. 31 at 39-45). The negligence section of Plaintiff s
Second Amended Complaint is a formulaic laundry list of investigative steps he believes
defendants should have taken in response to his report of an assault, and a laundry list
of service he believes should have been rendered by the JTC.
"First Amendment retaliation cases require the petitioner to show that the speech
or activity was constitutionally protected, a deprivation occurred to deter the protected
speech or activity, and the speech or activity was at least a motivating factor in the
decision to take retaliatory action." Manuel v. Nalley, 966 F.3d 678. 680 (7th Cir. 2020).
The 'motivating factor' amounts to a causal link between the activity and the unlawful
retaliation." Id.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 15 of 18 Page ID #664
The Court will assume that Plaintiff's reporting of a sexual assault is protected
speech. In the Second Amended Complaint, rather than focusing solely on limitations as
to how many visitors he can have while receiving GACS services, Plaintiff now alleges
that he was "denied all protections put in place that should happen in response to
allegations of this sort." (Doc. 31 at 52). He alleges that he described many acts that could
be understood as retaliation. Even if Plaintiff has identified deprivations, he does not
allege a clear tie between his speech and the alleged deprivations he identified. Many of
the 'deprivations' he alleges in the negligence section of his pleading are his own
disagreements with the handling of his grievances and other correspondence about the
issue. Although he may not have agreed with the handling of these matters, he has failed
to show how they are tied to his speech, and thus he has failed to show retaliation.
Accordingly, Claim 6 will be dismissed.
Claims 8-11, and the negligence portion of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint,
all rely on state law. It would be an exercise of this Court's supplemental jurisdiction to
maintain these claims because all claims that rely on federal law have been dismissed.
Supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary. 28 U.S.C. S 1367. Here, the Court will decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. It is possible that Plaintiff's best recourse would be
found in state court.
Having given Plaintiff two opportunities to file amended pleadings to no avail,
the Court finds it unnecessary to extend an additional opportunity. See e.g. Burks, 555
F.8d at 596: Always Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2 F.4th 695. 707 (7th Cir.
2021) (courts may deny leave to amend if an amendment would be futile); McCree v.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 16 of 18 Page ID #665
Grissom, 657 F.3d 623. 624 (7th Cir. 2011) (leave to amend shall be granted where justice
so requires, but leave to amend need not be given if an amendment to the complaint
would be futile). This is not to say that Plaintiffs allegations are unimportant, and this
does not pass any judgment on the merits of Plaintiffs assertion. The Court has solely
determined that Plaintiff has not pled a federal cause of action on the facts presented.
Pending Motions
On June 7, 2021, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint for
failure to state a claim, and it dismissed four counts with prejudice. Three counts were
dismissed as time-barred, and one was dismissed because the Prison Rape Elimination
Act (PREA) does not create a private cause of action. (Doc. 26 at 6-7). Plaintiff asked the
Court to reconsider this dismissal on July 8, 2021, and the Court denied this request on
November 12, 2021, because Plaintiff had filed an operative complaint which it found
mooted any earlier pleadings. (Docket text 37).
On January 13,2022, Plaintiff again sought reconsideration of the earlier dismissal
of Counts 1-4 of his First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff sought for the dismissal to be
changed to without prejudice so that he could present the claims anew in his Second
Amended Complaint. He argues that if he were not allowed to present the claims in his
Second Amended Complaint, he would be barred from appealing the dismissal of the
First Amended Complaint in an interlocutory fashion. /Doc. 44V
The Second Amended Complaint contained claims that were somewhat similar in
nature to Counts 1 and 2 of the First Amended Complaint, but out of deference to Plaintiff
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 17 of 18 Page ID #666
as a pro se litigant, the Court considered the claims as if they were new because Plaintiff
substituted named parties for many of the Does in his earlier pleadings.
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to have the earlier dismissal changed from with
prejudice to without prejudice, the Court declines to make this change. The dismissal of
the earlier claims was appropriate. This is particularly so for the PREA claims because it
is settled law that there is no private right of action under the PREA. Accordingly,
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 44) is DENIED.
Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Status (Doc. 49) on March 28, 2022, which will be
DENIED as moot based on the issuance of this Order.
Disposition
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court will DISMISS Plaintiffs entire Second
Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 A. Plaintiff will
not be given leave to amend. Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 441 is DENIED, and
his Motion for Status (Doc. 491 is DENIED as moot.
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this
Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. Ff.d. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Plaintiff
chooses to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 filing fee irrespective of the outcome
of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(e): 28 U.S.C. S 1915(e)(2): Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d
724.725-56 (7th Cir. 2008). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff
may incur another "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A proper and timely motion filed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 50 Filed 04/21/22 Page 18 of 18 Page ID #667
Ftp. R- App. P. 4faW4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the
entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly and to close this
case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 21,2022
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604
Charles A. Mcrae
Plaintiff,Appellant
v.
Shannon N. Myers et al.
Defendants,Appellees
) No. 22-1821
) Appeal From The United States District
) Court For The Southern District Of
) Illinois
) No. 20-CV-410-DWD
) David W. Dugan
) Judge
PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING
Now comes Charles A. Mcrae, plaintiff, appellant in the above
entitled case, seeking a Panel Rehearing. Plaintiff Respectfully
Requests this Cdurt Reconsider it's Decision in accordance with
FRAP 40 (a) (1) and (2), within 14 days after entry of judgment,
on 3-9-23. Plaintiff files this Petition in accordance with FRAP
25 (2) (iii), filed by an inmate and deposited in the institution's
internal mail system on or before the last day of filing.
QUESTION
Did The Appellate Court Missapprehend Or Overlook The Following
Issues?
1. When plaintiff states he learned of possible crimes and
Constitutional claims he was a victim of while he was on parole
home monitor.
2. The date plaintiff knew of his injury and it's cause while he
was on parole, home monitor.
3. The deliberate mistreatment and suppression of plaintiffs
substantiated sexual assault allegation.
4. The "casual-link" between plaintiffs first amendment claim
/o £ ^
and the denial or refusal to investigate his grievances of
sexual assault as required by federal and state law. As well
as their referral to prosecutors.
5. Defendants actions as more than accidental or negligent in
their differential treatment.
6. The personal animus officials have against plaintiff for
alleging such a complaint against a female fellow employee.
argument
7. Plaintiff has two seperate federal claims and injuries of his
eighth amendment. One is when he was in prison at Big Muddy
River prison. The Second is when he was on parole, home monitor.
The two year limitation began on his prison claim in 2009 when
he was released from prison and knew of his injury while there.
The Second began in 2019 when he learned of his injury and
its cause while he was on parole, home monitor. At which time
he reported it and sought a legal remedy.
8. Plaintiff stated in his complaint, paragraph 200, that he did
learn of the crime of custodial sexual misconduct while he
was on parole, home monitor until August of 2019. He learned
at this time that this crime committed against him violated his
Constitutional Rights. Without knowing of a crime being committed
against him, plaintiff could not know of his rights being violated.
Learning that he was sexually abused while on parole home
monitor was the knowledge that he was injured. Plaintiff
is in weekly trauma therapy for this injury.
9. Plaintiff did not know of his injury and its cause while he was
on parole, home monitor in 2009. He learned of this in August
2019 as stated in his complaint.
10. Plaintiff relied on State Statute 735 ILCS 5/13-202.3 in
relation to his i8njuries prior to his parole while he was a
3o^r
prisoner at Big Muddy River prison, as stated in his complaint.
11. Plaintiff was unaware that he was unable to give knowing consent
to a sexual relationship with an IDOC employee while being on
parole, home monitor and them being an employee of IDOC. Where
defendants knew this as they are provided with yearly documented
training that discloses such information.
12. While the actions and injury that took place while plaintiff
was in prison is past the two year limitation since he knew of
this injury. The injury and its cause while he was on parole
is brought within the two year limitation once he learned of
his injury and its cause. August of 2019.
13. Plaintiff was sexually abused by defendant Myers while on parole
home monitor in 2009, unbeknownst to him until August 2019. At
which time plaintiff learned of his Constitutional Rights being
violated as a result. His injury and its cause.
14. IDOC has suppressed plaintiffs substantiated allegation of
sexual assault by refusing to investigate or refer this crime
to prosecutors. When there is no ststute of limitations on this
crime.
15. This is deliberate mistreatment by IDOC when plaintiff has
repeatedly contacted them citing federal and state laws that
mandate specific actions to be taken by them. They have refused
so far.
16. The "casual-link" between plaintiffs grievances and the denial
or refusal to investigate them regarding plaintiffs first
amendment claim, is the intentional mistreatment of his
substantiated allegations and grievances compared to others
who report these allegations, i.e. Female inmates. The
investigation and referral is mandated by federal and state
law. Defendants were repeatedly given the opportunity to
rectify this wrong by grievances and letters from the plaintiff.
3
^
Putting them on notice.
17. These actions were not only negligent, but deliberately
indifferent. Once notified of their wrongs and violation of
federal and state laws, defendants continue to violate these
laws and plaintiffs rights.
18. Plaintiff asserts that these officials have a personal animus
against him, a male inmate for alleging such a complaint
against a female employee. To this point, they have so far
avoided (successfully) criminal and civil liability for their
actions in this case as so intended.
Wherefore, it is for these reasons that plaintiff, appellant
Respectfully Requests that he be allowed to proceed on his claims
from when he was on parole and his Federal claims from when he was
in prison be time barred according to this Courts Ruling.
That plaintiffs First Amendment claim and Fourteenth Amendment
claims be allowed to proceed to discovery.
That his State claims be allowed to be brought in his Federal
claim as requested in his complaint.
Under penalty of perjury the undersigned certifies that the
statements set forth in this Petition are true and correct, except
as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief and
as to such matters the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that
he verily believes the same to be true.
Signed and Dated this 22nd day of March, 2023.
Z
Charles A. Mcrae B-62695
2848 W. McDonough Street
Joliet, IL. 60436
5
3Initeb States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
April 18,2023
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1821
Charles A. McRae (State Prisoner:
#B62695),
Plaintiff - Appellant,
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:20-cv-00410-DWD
v.
David W. Dugan,
Shannon N. Myers, et al,
Defendants - Appellees.
Judge.
ORDER
On consideration of the petition for panel rehearing, the judges on the original
panel have voted to deny rehearing. It is, therefore, ORDERED that the petition for
panel rehearing is'DENIED.
PiPPZti
~ D
3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 1 of 58 Page ID #402
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
Charles A. Mcrae
plaintiff
)
)
)
v.
)
Case No. 3:20-cv-00410
)
Shannon N. Myers
Jane Doe.l
Jane Doe.2
D. Reardon
R. Jefferys
L. McCarty
D. Knauer
S. Johnson
J. Eilers
E. Jackson
M. Delia
R. Nottingham
A. Tack
C. Larry
M. Nurse
D. Wilson
T. Williams
0. Jamison
D. Marano
K. Renzi
defendants
)
)
>
>
>
)
)
)
>
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
>
)
)
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Now comes Charles A. Mcrae, plaintiff, pro-se, pursuant to 42
USC 1983 to redress the deprivation under color of law of plaintiffs
rights as secured by the United States and Illinois State
Constitutions, and Law. Plaintiff is a State prisoner and seeks
Injunctive relief, and money damages against all defendants listed.
/
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 2 of 58 Page ID #403
JURISDICTION
1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 USC 1331,
and 28 USC 1343, in that this is a civil action arising under
the US Const, and seeks to redress the deprivation, under the
color of State law for equal rights within the jurisdiction
of the US.
2. Plaintiff requests that this Court exercise Supplemental
Jurisdiction over the State claims pursuant to 28 USC 1367,
in that the State claims do not raise a novel or complex issue
of State law, they do not predominate over the Federal claims,
they arise from the same facts, and are supported by factual
allegations and documentation.
3. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 USC 1391 (b)(1), in that these
allegations arose from this district and
one or more
defendants resides.
DEMAND OF JURY TRIAL
4. Plaintiff demands that this case be tried by a Jury.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
5. Plaintiff did exhaust all administrative remedies, when allowed
to do so. Plaintiff attaches Exhibits to show this. Including
Ex. 1.1— 17.1.
PARTIES
6. Charles A. Mcrae, plaintiff.
2848 W. McDonough Street
Joliet, IL. 60436
2
V
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 3 of 58 Page ID #404
7. Shannon N. Myers, defendant.
8. Jane Doe.l, defendant.
Big Muddy River Corr. Gen. Dental Assistant
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
9. Jane Doe.2, defendant.
Big Muddy River Corr. Cen. Dental Hygienist
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
10. D. Reardon, defendant.
Parole Officer ID0C
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
11. R. Jefferys, defendant.
Director IDOC
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
12. L. McCarty, defendant.
Admin. Review Board IDOC
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
13. D. Knauer, defendant.
Admin. Review Board IDOC
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
7
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 4 of 58 Page ID #405
14. S. Johnson, defendant.
Admin* Review Board IDOC
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
15. J. Eilers, defendant.
Chief of Operations IDOC
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
16. E. Jackson, defendant.
Chief of Investigations and Intelligence IDOC
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
17. M. Delia, defendant.
Chief of Investigations and Intelligence IDOC
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
18. R. Nottingham, defendant.
Agency PREA Cooridnator IDOC
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
19. A. Tack, defendant.
Chief Admin. Officer JTC IDOC
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
20. C. Larry, defendant.
Chief Admin. Officer JTC IDOC
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
1
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 5 of 58 Page ID #406
21. N. Nurse, defendant.
Acting Chief Admin. Officer JTC IDOC
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
22. D. Wilson, defendant.
PREA Compliance Manager JTC IDOC
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
23. T. Williams, defendant.
PREA Compliance Manager JTC IDOC
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
24. 0. Jamison, defendant.
PREA Compliance Manager JTC IDOC
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
25. D. Marano, defendant.
Backup PREA Compliance Manager JTC IDOC
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
26. K. Renzi, defendant.
Backup PREA Compliance Manager JTC IDOC
1301 Concordia Court
Springfield, IL. 62794
27. At all times relevant to the events at issue in this case,
plaintiff Charles A. Mcrae was in the care and custody of
the IDOC. Plaintiff was housed at BMRCC in august of 2008,
and was employed as a health care porter through May 9, 2009.
Then released on parole home monitor, mandatory supervised
release until app*^November 2009. Now currently housed in JTC
after transfer from Dixon CC in early 2019.
<
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 6 of 58 Page ID #407
28. At all times relevant to their involvement in this case,
defendants flyers, Doe.l, and Doe.2 were employed by Wexford
Health Sources Inc. and worked at the BMRCC for IDOC. As such
these defendants were acting under the color of law and within
their scope of employment as plaintiffs supervisors. They are
being sued in their individual capacities.
29. As employees at an IDOC facility defendants Myers, Doe.l, and
Doe.2 responsibilities and duties included but are not limited
to: Directing plaintiff in his work duties.
30. Ensuring the control and safety of plaintiff while supervising
him inside the dental area of BMRCC.
31. To report any alleged sexual abuse through the chain of command
as an unusual incident in accordance with Admin. Dir. 01.12.105.
Admin. Code 120.90 a)
(E*. 39.1)
32. As an IDOC employee, shall Completely and accurately document
any unusual incident that he or she observes, including any
sexual assault. Shall promptly prepare the Incident Report
and forward the report to the Director.
Admin. Code 112.30 a) 2) b)
(Ex. 36.1)
33. At all times relevant to his involvement in this case, defendant
D. Reardon was employed as a Parole officer by the IDOC. As such
defendant was acting under color of law and within his scope
of employment as plaintiffs parole officer while on home monitor.
He is being sued in his individual capacity.
34. As a parole officer for IDOC defendant Reardon responsibilities
and duties included but are not limited to: The care and custody
of plaintiff.
35. To ensure the safety of plaintiff and his residence while on
t*
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 7 of 58 Page ID #408
home monitor.
36. To investigate and approve a legal and safe host site location
for plaintiff.
37. To deny any unsafe or illegal host site locations for the
plaintiff.
38. To notify plaintiff of criminal sexual misconduct that he was
a victim too.
39. At all times relevant to his involvement in this case, defendant
R. Jefferys was the acting Director or Director of IDOC. As such
defendant was acting under the color of law and within his scope
of employment as such; he is being sued in his individual and
official capacities.
40. As acting Director/Director of IDOC defendant Jefferys responsibilties
and duties included but are not limited to: The implemation,
oversight, and supervision of all policies and procedures
followed by IDOC staff, ARB members, contractors, and voluteers
for IDOC.
41. Referring claims to the ISP/DII of sexual assault by an employee
on an inmate.
Admin. Order #6 (2003) Section 111. (A)(4)(B)(2)(C)
(Ex. 35.1 - 35.4)
42. To include sexual assault involving staff on inmate in accordance
with M0U.
MOU V. E.
(Ex. 34.1, 34.2)
43. Providing a final Agency decision on a grievance alleging sexual
assault within 90 days.
Admin. Dir. 04.01.114 G. 6. c.
Admin. Code 504.830 a)
7
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 8 of 58 Page ID #409
(Ex. 56.1 - 56.7 and 41.1)
44. To investigate the grievances of any person committed to the
Department and to inquire into ant alleged misconduct by
employees.
730 ILCS 5/3-2-2 (h)
Admin. Code 504.830 a)
(Ex. 23.1, 23.2, and 41.1)
45. To report to the States attorney of the county in which an
incident occurred or to the appropriate prosecuting official
that an individual (employee) has committed a violation of
criminal law, were reasonable grounds exist.
Admin. Code 112.50
(Ex. 37.1)
46. Review findings and recommendations of the ARB and make a
final determination of a grievance • » • and send a copy of the
Directors decision to the offender.
Admin. Code 504.850 e)
(Ex. 42.1)
47. At all times relevant to their involvement in this case, defendants
McCarty, Knauer, and Johnson were ARB members for IDOC. As such
defendants were acting under color of law and within their
scope of employment as such. Defendats are being sued in their
individual and official capacities.
48. As ARB members for IDOC defendants McCarty, Knauer, and Johnson
responsibilities and duties included but are not limited to:
Issuing a final Agency decision on the merits of any portion
of a grievance alleging sexual abuse within 90 days of the initial
filing of the grievance.
Admin. Dir. 04.01.114 G. 6. c.
Admin. Code 504.830 a)
(Ex. 56.1 - 56.4, and 41.1)
9
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 9 of 58 Page ID #410
49. Review unresolved offender grievances to ensure offenders were
afforded their due process rights and ensure compliance with
Departmental policies. And to refer issues grieved for further
investigation.
Admin. Dir. 04.01.115 E. 1. a. b.
Admin. Code 504.830 a)
(Ex. 57.1 - 57.5, and 41.1)
50. To investigate the grievances of any person committed to the
Department and to inquire into any alleged misconduct by
employees.
730 ILCS 5/3-2-2(h)
(Ex. 23.1, 23.2)
51. To submit recommendations to the Director in the form of a
written report with its findings regaurding grievances submitted.
Admin. Code 504.850 d)
(Ex. 42.1)
52. At all times relevant to his involvement in this case, defendant
Eilers was Chief of Operations of IDOC. As such defendant was
acting under color of law and within his scope of employment as
such. Defendant is being sued in his individual and official
capacities.
53. As Chief of Operations of IDOC defendant Eilers responsibilities
and duties included but are not limited to: Reporting allegations
of employee criminal misconduct to the Ill. State Police.
Admin. Dir. 01.12.101 F. 2.
Admin. Order #6;(2003) Section 111. (A)(4)(B)(2)(C)
(Ex. 53.1, 53.2, and 35.1 - 35.4)
54. Including sexual assault involving staff on inmate in
accordance with M0U.
MOU V. E.
(Ex. 34.1, 34.2)
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 10 of 58 Page ID #411
55. At all times relevant to their involvement in this case,
defendants Jackson and Delia were Chief of Investigations and
Intelligence for IDOC. As such defendants were acting under
color of law and within their scope of employment as such.
Defendants are being sued in their individual and official
capacities.
56. As chief of Investigations and Intelligence for IDOC defendants
Jackson and Delia responsibilities and duties included but are
not limited to: Reporting to the States attorney of the county
in which an incident occurred or to the appropriate prosecuting
official that an individual (employee) has committed a violation
of criminal law, were reasonable grounds exist.
Admin. Code 112.50
(Ex. 37.1)
57. Jurisdiction over investigations of suspected employee criminal
misconduct shall be based on April 1, 2004 MOU between the
Department and the Illinois State Police.
Admin. Dir. 01.12.101 F. 3.
(Ex. 53.1, 53.2)
58. If an incident of alleged criminal misconduct is listed as
reportable offence in the MOU, shall advise the ISP/DII and
obtain instructions regaurding investigations and further
reporting.
Admin. Dir. 01.12.101
Admin. Dir. 04.01.301 G. 7. f. (2)
(Ex. 53.1, 53.2, and 58.1 - 58.13)
59. Including sexual assault involving staff on inmate in
accordance with MOU.
MOU V. E.
(Ex. 34.1, 34.2)
fO
r
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 11 of 58 Page ID #412
60. At all times relevant to his involvement in this case,
defendant Nottingham was the Agency PREA Coordinator for
IDOC. As such defendant was acting under color of law and
within his scope of employment as such. Defendant is being
sued in his individual and official capacities.
61. As Agency PREA Coordinator for IDOC defendant Nottingham
responsibilities and duties included but are not limited to:
Ensuring compliance with agency directives and federal laws
relating to PREA, and reviewing and monitoring facilities
plans for implementation of processes to ensure the safety
of offenders within correctional facilities.
62. Develop, implement and oversee the Departments sexual abuse
and harrassraent prevention and intervention program.
Admin. Dir. 04.01.301 F. 2. a.
(Ex. 58.1 - 58.13)
63. Including prompt investigation, disciplinary action and referral
for prosecution. Services available to offenders following
sexual abuse or harrassraent.
Admin. Dir. 04.01.301 F. 1. b. e.
(Ex. 58.1 - 58.13)
64. Ensure each year at least one-third of the Departments facilities
undergo a PREA Audit performed by a contracted PREA Auditor
certified by the D0J.
Admin. Dir. 04.01.301 F. 1. d.
(Ex. 58.1 - 58.13)
65. At all times relevant to their involvement in this case,
defendants Tack and Larry were Chief Administative Officer at
the JTC and defendant Nurse was acting Chief Administrative
Officer for JTC and IDOC. As such defendants were acting under
color of law and within their scope of employment as such.
Defendants are being sued in their individual and official
capacities.
//
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 12 of 58 Page ID #413
66. As chief administrative officer and acting chief administrative
officer defendants Tack, Larry, and Nurse responsibilities and
duties included but are not limited to: Immediately advise the
Director of any allegations of employee criminal misconduct.
Admin. Dir. 01.12.101 F. 1.
(Ex. 53.1, 53.2)
67. Conduct an inquiry to determine whether there is any real or
apparent employee misconduct and shall advise the respective
Deputy Director, Chief, or other Executive staff member if
the allegation has merit.
Admin. Dir. 01.12.101 G. 1.
(Ex. 53.1, 53.2)
68. Immediately notify the Deputy Director of serious injury to an
offender. Any offender or employee action that the Department
may refer for prosecution of criminal charges.
Admin. Dir. 01.12.105 F. 1. f. 1.
(Ex. 54.1 - 54.3)
69. Report sexual abuse of an offender while housed at a different
facility to that facilities chief admin, officer no later than
72 hours after the initial report was received.
Admin. Dir. 04.01.301 G. 4. f.
(Ex. 58.1 - 58.13)
70. Review grievances and provide a written response to offender.
Admin. Code 504.830 a)
(Ex. 41.1)
71. Forward results of investigations into sexual abuse to Chief
of Operations.
Admin. Dir. 04.01.301 G. 7. f. (2)
(Ex. 58.1 - 58.13)
IA
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 13 of 58 Page ID #414
72. Notify victim in writing of outcome of the investigation.
Admin. Dir. 04.01.301 G. 7. f. (3)
(Ex. 58.1 - 58.13)
73. Review case with the appropriate States attorney for possible
referral for prosecution.
Admin. Dir. 04.01.301 G. 7. f. (4)
(Ex. 58.1 - 58.13)
74. Promptly notify the Illinois State Police DII if an alleged
incident involves the criminal sexual abuse of a patient/
resident/inmate.
Admin. Order #6 (2003) Section 111. (A)(4)(B)(2)(C)
(Ex. 35.1 - 35.4)
75. Including sexual assault involving staff on inmate in
accordance with M0U.
M0U V. E.
(Ex. 34.1, 34.2)
76. At all times relevant to their involvement in this case,
defendants Tack, Wilson, Williams, and Jamison were Facility
PREA Compliance managers for JTC and defendants Marano, and
Renzi were Facility Backup PREA Compliance Managers for JTC
and ID0C. As such defendants were acting under color of law
and within their scope of employment as such. Defendants are
being sued in their individual and official capacities.
77. As Facility PREA Compliance Managers and Backup PREA Compliance
Managers defendants Tack, Wilson, Williams, Jamison, Marano,
and Renzi responsibilities and duties included but are not
limited to: Coordinate the facilities effort to comply with
the PREA standards.
78. Notify internal and external investigators and have investigations
initiated.
IS
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 14 of 58 Page ID #415
79. Ensure compliance with Agency Directives and Federal Laws relating
to PREA.
80. Identify community agencies, including advocacy and crisis
organizations, where reports can be made or that provide
assistance or support services to staff or offenders in the
prevention or intervention of sexual abuse or harrassment.
Admin. Dir. 04.01.301 F. 4. c. ..
(Ex. 58.1 - 58.13)
81. Develope and maintain a program for the evaluation, treatment
and counseling of victims of sexual abuse or harrassment.
Admin. Dir. 04.01.301 F. 5. a. b.
(Ex. 58.1 - 58.13)
82. Offer counseling and supportive services, such as pyschological
services, chaplaincy services, correctional counselors, group
therapy etc. and, if possible, be provided with a victim
advocate from a sexual assault crisis center.
Admin. Dir. 04.01.301 G. 4. a. (4)
(Ex. 58.1 - 58.13)
83. Additionally defendants Myers, Doe.l, Doe.2, Reardon, Jefferys
McCarty, Knauer, Johnson, Eilers, Jackson, Delia, Nottingham,
Tack, Larry, Nurse, Wilson, Williams, Jamison, Marano, Renzi
responsibilities and duties included but are not limited to:
Obeying all Federal, State, and Local Laws.
Admin. Dir. 03.02.108 G.l. a.
Admin. Code 120.40 a)
(Ex. 55.1 - 55.7, and 38.1, 38.2)
84. Complying with Departmental Rules (Admin. Code), written
procedure (Admin. Dir.), bulletins, and written or verbal
orders issued by proper authorities.
Admin. Dir. 03.02.108 G. 1. d.
Admin. Code 120.40 c)
(Ex. 55.1 - 55.7, and 38.1, 38.2)
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 15 of 58 Page ID #416
85. Notify and report any allegations of staff misconduct claims
to the Executive Generals Office.
Admin. Order #6 (2003)
(Ex. 35.1 - 35.4)
86. Additionally defendants Jefferys, HeCarty, Knauer, Johnson,
Eilers, Jackson, Delia, and Nottingham as Agents of the Agency
of 1D0C responsibilities and duties included but are not
limited to: Agency means the unit of a state with direct
responsibility for the operation of any facility that confines
inmates, or residents including the implemation of policy as
set by the governing authority.
28 CFR 115.5
(Ex. 43.1)
87. The Agency shall attempt to make available to the victim a
victim advocate from a rape crisis center. If a rape crisis
center is not available to provide these services the agency
shall make available to provide these services a qualified
staff member from a community-based organization, or a qualified
agency staff member.
28 CFR 115.21 (d)
(Ex. 44.1, 44.2)
88. As requested by the victim, the victim advocate, qualified
agency staff member, or qualified community-based organization
staff member shall accompany and support the victim through • • $
investigatory interviews and shall provide emotional support
crisis intervention, information, and referrals.
28 CFR 115.21 (e)
(Ex. 44.1, 44.2)
89. The Agency shall ensure that an administrative or criminal
investigation is completed for all allegations of sexual abuse...
28 CFR 115.22 (a)
(Ex. 45.1)
/r
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 16 of 58 Page ID #417
90. The Agency shall issue a final agency decision on the merits
of any portion of a grievance alleging sexual abuse within
90 days of the initial filing of the grievance.
28 CFR 115.52 (d)(1)
(Ex. 46.1, 46.2)
91. When the agency conducts its own investigation into allegations
of sexual abuse... It shall do so promptly, thoroughly, and
objectively for all allegations...
28 CFR 115.71 (a)
(Ex. 48.1, 48.2)
100. Substantiated allegations of conduct that appears to be criminal
shall be referred for prosecution.
28 CFR 115.71 (h)
(Ex. 48.1, 48.2)
101. The agency shall impose no standard higher than a perponderance
of the evidence in determining whether allegations of sexual
abuse are substantiated.
28 CFR 115.72
(Ex. 49.1)
102. Substantiated allegation means an allegation that was
investigated and determined to have occurred.
28 CFR 115.5
(Ex. 43.2)
103. Following an investigation into an inmates allegation that
he or she suffered sexual abuse in an agency facility the
agency shall inform the inmate as to whether the allegations
has been determined to be substantiated, unsubstantiated,
or unfounded.
28 CFR 115.73 (a)
(Ex. 50.1)
/*
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 17 of 58 Page ID #418
104. Any contractor or volunteer who engages in sexual abuse shall
be prohibited from contact with inmates and shall be reported
to law enforcement agencies, unless the activity was clearly
not criminal, and to relevant licensing bodies.
28 CFR 115.77 (a)
(Ex. 51.1)
105. Additionally defendants Tack, Larry, Nurse, Wilson, Williams,
Jamison, Marano, and Renzi as Agents of the Facility of IDOC
responsibilities and duties included but are not limited to:
Facility means a place, institution that is used by an agency
for the confinement of individuals.
28 CFR 115.5
(Ex. 43.1)
106. The Facilty shall provide inmates with access to outside
victim advocates for emotional support services related to
sexual abuse by giving inmates mailing addresses and telephone
numbers... of local, State, or national victim advocacy or
rape crisis organizations... The facility shall enable
reasonable communication between inmates and these organizations
and agencies in as confidential a manner as possible.
28 CFR 115.53 (a)
(Ex. 47.1)
107. The Facility shall offer... as appropriate, treatment to all
inmates who have been victimized by sexual abuse in any prison. • •
28 CFR 115.83 (a)
(Ex. 52.1)
108. The... treatment of such victims shall include, as appropriate,
follow-up services...
28 CFR 115.83 (b)
(Ex. 52.1)
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 18 of 58 Page ID #419
109. The facility shall provide such victims with medical and
mental health services consistent with the community level
of care.
28 CFR 115.83 (c)
(E5. 52.1)
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
110. In or around August 2008, plaintiff was assigned as a health
care porter in the health care unit of BMRCC.
111. This assignment entailed cleaning all areas of the health
care unit, as instructed by various employees. Including
but not limited to the dental area.
112. The dental area was staffed Monday thru Thursday and had two
dental assistants and a dental hygienist and on occasion
a dentist.
113. Plaintiff was instructed by defendant Myers at various times
to come into the dental area to empty trash and to clean
various areas. Plaintiff would be supervised by Myers during
this time.
114. No inmate worker was allowed in the dental area without direct
supervision by a dental staff member.
115. Defendant Myers was the only dental employee that would
supervise plaintiff unless she was not at work.
116. Defendant Myers would have more jobs for the plaintiff to
do each week. The time plaintiff had to spend in the dental
area cleaning increased each week.
117. After a couple of months there were ever increasing instances
of no dentist working at BMRCC. This increased the amount of
time Myers would have plaintiff working in the dental area.
/*
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 19 of 58 Page ID #420
118. During these times defendant Myers would talk to plaintiff
about his past and future, while sharing personal information
about herself.
119. Defendant Myers increased the amount of work and time that
plaintiff had to spend working in the dental area, not
allowing other health care porters into dental to do these jobs.
120. Defendant Myers would have treat//or plaintiff that she would
bring from home. Including coffee, candy,home cooked food,
and snacks that were used to entice plaintiff into coming in
the dental area and working when she told him too.
121. When plaintiff would enter the dental area to work defendants
Doe.l and Doe.2 would go into the dental office away from
defendant Myers and plaintiff.
122. With no dentist being at BMRCC except once a week, this led
to defendant Myers instructing the corr. officer supervising
plaintiff that she needed plaintiff on a daily basis for
hours at a time.
1231 Plaintiff did as he was instructed to do when told too.
124. Plaintiff was one of many health care porter but was the only
one defendant Myers would allow and instruct to come into
dental to clean.
125. In late 2008 plaintiff was cleaning a small x-ray room where
x-rays were developed. This room was the size of a small
closet. Plaintiff had cleaned it on various occasions.
Defendant Myers stood in the doorway supervising him. When
he stood up to leave after cleaning a mini fridge, defendant
Myers stepped forward forcing herself on plaintiff and
kissing him on the mouth. When he did not kiss her back she
stepped back into the doorway blocking his exit.
n
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 20 of 58 Page ID #421
126. Plaintiff was shocked and scared, unable to think or speak.
127. Defendant Myers kept asking plaintiff if he was ok and that
she was sorry. Plaintiff tried to walk out of the roomrbut
she would not move out of the doorway. She stated that he
could not leave until he was ok. Plaintiff stated that he
was ok and tried to leave again but was not allowed too.
Defendant Myers stated that plaintiff had to promise not to
tell anyone what she had done, and promised that she would
not do it again. She reminded him that she had two children
at home to take care of and could not afford to lose her job.
Plaintiff promised not to say anything to anyone and was then
allowed to leave.
128. Plaintiff was less than a year away from being released,
after serving approximately seven years in IDOC. He was afraid
to say anything to anyone and risk staying in prison even
longer. Plaintiff believed if he did report it and defendant
Myers denied it that no one would believe him, he also
believed this was the end of it and it would not happen again.
129. Defendant Myers had told defendants Doe.l and Doe.2 that she
had kissed him. Plaintiff knew this because they would tease
him and joke with each other about this. Defendant Myers
stated that they would keep her secret, but this was a constant
threat to plaintiff.
130. Plaintiff explained to defendant Myers that he did not want
a relationship with a woman at this time and that he had too
many issues he needed to work on within himself before even
considering a relationship with someone else. That he did
not want to get into trouble and stay in prison even longer.
131. On one occasion when plaintiff came into dental area to work,
defendant Myers was reading his medical file. When asked why
she was doing this, she stated that she wanted to see what
he had been saying to the psychologist when he spoke to her.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 21 of 58 Page ID #422
132. Since there was no dentist at BMRCC usually, one of the jobs
given to the dental assistants was to assist the medical
records staff in organizing and refiling inmates medical
records after being seen by medical staff.
133. Defendant Myers would periodically read through plaintiffs
medical file without his consent.
134. A few weeks went by without incident, then one day defendant
Myers cornered plaintiff in another back area of dental and
kissed him again. Plaintiff asked her to stop and reminded
her that she had promised not to do this again. Plaintiff
was pressed up against a counter and defendant Myers knelt
down and grabbed the front of his pants and boxers, pulling
them part way down. Plaintiff pleaded with her to stop,
afraid to put his hands on her or try to force her to stop.
Plaintiff tried pushing her head away from his crotch, when
she grabbed his wrists with her hands and looked up stating
"don't be a pussy" and "you know you want it". Plaintiff
stated that he could not because he was not erect, asking her
to please stop. Defendant Myers then forced plaintiff to
receive oral sex from her. Once plaintiff did become erect,
she stepped and stated "see I knew you wanted it", although
this was against his wishes. Once plaintiff ejaculated,
defendant Myers swallotft^it and stated "see no evidence".
Plaintiff did not, could not respond.
135. Defendant Myers then told plaintiff that he could not tell
anyone. That if he did, she would deny it and the other
dental staff (Doe.l, Doe.2) would back her up. That no one
would believe him and if they did she would have to say that
he had forced her to do this. Plaintiff was made to promise
not to tell anyone before being allowed to leave.
136. Plaintiff thought about not coming to work anymore, but
knew he would get a disciplinary ticket if he refused to
come in and work. This would also stop his chance of receiving
3Ll
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 22 of 58 Page ID #423
restorative good time credit he was awaiting. Which would
keep him in prison longer.
137. Plaintiff tried to get other porters to go into dental to
clean/work so that he did not have to. Defendant Myers would
tell the corr. officer that the other porter did not do a
good job and that she did not trust them in the dental area,
that she needed plaintiff only.
138. Each day defendant Myers would find a reason to have plaintiff
come into the dental area to work. Each time she did and
there was no dentist, she would force herself on plaintiff,
performing oral sex on him.
139. Defendants Doe.l and Doe.2 were aware of this and would watch
out for defendant Myers, warning her if someone was coming
into the dental area so she would not get caught.
140. Defendant Myers told Doe.l and Doe.2 that plaintiff
was "hers" and they were in a relationship together.
141. Defendants Doe.l and Doe.2 would tease plaintiff about him
belonging to defendant Myers and how they would be married
someday. Stating that they were happy for her to have
plaintiff as hers.
142. These acts of oral sex eventually led to defendant Myers
performing oral sex until plaintiff was erect then standing
up, bending over and forcing plaintiff to have intercourse
with her. Afterwards forcing plaintiff to perform oral sex
on her.
143. Plaintiff would try to talk defendant Myers out of these
acts each time to no effect. Offering various reasons why
they should not do this. Defendant Myers would not take no
for an answer from plaintiff.
$2
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 23 of 58 Page ID #424
144. Plaintiff expressed a fear of getting defendant Myers pregnant
due to them having unprotected sex. Defendant Myers claimed
to be on birth control and could not get pregnant.
145. Defendant Myers would not take no for an answer from plaintiff
and would become very aggressive and forceful when plaintiff
would say no, disagree with her, or counterdict what she would
say to him. Eventually plaintiff stopped doing these things.
146. Defendant Myers told plaintiff that if they were caught that
she would have to say that plaintiff had forced himself on
her and made her do these things. So that she would not lose
her job and be able to continue providing for her children
at home.
147. This would have kept plaintiff in prison longer and so he
did whatever he could to be sure this did not happen.
148. These acts became a daily occurrence and part of plaintiffs
job each day there was no dentist there. The quicker he could
get this job over with, the quicker he was able to get out
of the dental area, and the less chance he would receive new
criminal charges and a longer prison sentence.
149. Each day that defendant Myers worked and there was no dentist
there, one or more of these sex acts took place against
plaintiff by defendant Myers.
150. Plaintiff lived in constant fear of these acts happening
again and again, along with getting caught and being blamed
for them until May 9, 2009 when he left BMRCC and went to
parole home monitor
151. Defendants Doe.l and Doe.2 providing look out for defendant
Myers during these acts, encouraging them and teasing plaintiff
about them.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 24 of 58 Page ID #425
152. Defendant Myers spent each day trying to convince plaintiff
that these acts were something he wanted and needed. That
she was doing these acts for plaintiff, that she loved and
cared for him, that he needed her, that no one else would
love or care for him as she did, and that she risked her
family and job to give him what he really wanted and needed.
Whether he knew it or not.
153. Plaintiff did become accustomed to this situation before
leaving BMRCC.
154. On May 9, 2009 plaintiff was released from BMRCC on mandatory
supervised release, parole home monitor in Homer Illinois.
155. That friday on defendant Myers day off she showed up at
plaintiffs home. She told Nora Sullivan who was plaintiffs
host site provider that she was his girlfriend* defendant
Myers told plaintiff that she was pregnant, that the child
was his, and that he would have to move into her house and
take responsibility for his child.
156. Plaintiff was afraid and ashamed to reveal the truth of
defendant Myers and his relationship to anyone. He told
defendant Myers that he was unable to leave his house due to
him being on home monitor or he would be violated from
parole and go back to prison.
157. Defendant Myers continued to have intercourse with plaintiff
stating that now they did not have to worry about getting
in trouble, her losing her job, or getting pregnant since
she already was.
158. Although plaintiff did not expressly say no to defendant
Myers requests, he felt as if he could not or should not
refuse anything she wanted or said. Plus he could no longer
get in trouble or be blamed for anything. Plaintiff did not
know that these acts were illegal and wrong.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 25 of 58 Page ID #426
159. Defendant Myers returned repeatedly on her days off and
taking days off to show up to have intercourse with plaintiff
at his home.
160. Plaintiff was not physically aroused or attracted to defendant
Myers so she would provide alcohol and viagra pills for him
to be able to perform for her.
161. This continued and eventually led to injuries and plaintiff
needing to be seen at an emergency room hospital in Champaign
Illinois for injuries sustained from intercourse with
defendant Myers.
162. After a few weeks defendant Myers told plaintiff that she
really had not been pregnant but that she was now and showed
him a positive pregnancy test.
163. Defendant Myers then spoke to Nora Sullivan plaintiffs host
site provider and had her call the IDOC parole number to
report that she no longer would provide her address as a
host site location for plaintiff.
164. Defendant Myers did this knowing that plaintiff had no other
address to go too. Defendant Myers then gave the phone to
plaintiff and instructed him to give IDOC her name, address,
and employer as a host site location to go too.
165. Plaintiff did this and was instructed by IDOC to unplug his
home monitor box and drive straight to defendant Myers house
in Pickneyville Illinois and plug the box in there.
166. Plaintiff was instructed by IDOC to stay inside the home
and not leave until a parole officer showed up to inspect
and approve the address as a host site location for plaintiffs
home monitor.
zr
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 26 of 58 Page ID #427
167. Plaintiff either had to do this or he would have been violated
from parole with no other alternative parole home monitor
host site location available to him.
168. Plaintiff went to defendant Myers home and plugged in the
home monitor box and waited for a parole officer to show up.
IDOC would call periodically and speak to plaintiff to verify
that he was complying with their instructions.
169. Defendant Myers brother was a Perry county sheriff officer
and would come to the house while defendant Myers was at work
at the BMRCC. He would warn plaintiff not to mess up or hurt
his sister.
170. Plaintiff spent the next few days inside the house cleaning
and organizing defendant Myers house and performing various
sex acts when defendant Myers got off work at BMRCC.
171. Plaintiff felt as is he had no choice but to do as he was told,
when to do it and how to do it.
172. Eventuall^defendant Reardon as a parole officer did show up
one day while defendant was at work at BMRCC. Defendant Reardon
asked plaintiff why he had moved into defendant Myers house.
Plaintiff stated he had no other choice that he had gotten
defendant Myers pregnant. He then asked if the prison BMRCC
knew plaintiff was living there. Plaintiff stated that he
did not know but assumed that they had to have known due to
him providing her address, name, phone number, and employer
to IDOC in order to move in to her house.
173. Defendant Reardon then instructed plaintiff to call defendant
Myers at BMRCC on the cell phone she had provided him upon
release from prison. Once she was on the phone defendant
Reardon took the phone and went outside to speak 4»o her.
z&>
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 27 of 58 Page ID #428
174. Defendant Reardon returned some time later and returned the
phone to plaintiff stating that he had approved the site for
plaintiffs home monitor and that plaintiff needed to get a
job right away.
175. Defendant Reardon approved this site despite the illegality
of this site and situation. This led to the systematic
physical, financial, and sexual servitude of plaintiff by
defendant Myers for the next eleven months unbeknownst to
plaintiff.
176. Shortly after the phone call defendant Reardon and Myers had
defendant Myers showed up at the house stating she had left
her job stating she could no longer work due to her pregnancy.
Stating she was going to get plaintiff a job with a friend
and that now plaintiff would have to step up and take care
of her, her two children and himself. That this was his
job now.
177. Defendant Myers was not employed during the eleven months
while plaintiff lived with her and plaintiff provided for
them and her two children.
178. Defendant Myers would use the threat of violation of his
parole to have complete control over plaintiff and what he
did, how he did it, and when he did it.
179. Defendant Myers would tell plaintiff that she had given him
a family, a place to live, his freedom, a job, clothes,
and food. That plaintiff could not do the right thing or
survive on his own. That she knew what was best and was
changing him into a better person. That she could not work
due to a medical condition of preclampsia, so he had to be
the sole provider of the household.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 28 of 58 Page ID #429
180. Defendant Myers then got a job for plaintiff working for
a friends brother in law. Scotts Construction in Fickneyville
Illinois. Plaintiff worked 10-12 hour days, seven days a
week to prov»V$support for the household, which can be
verified through parole records.
181. Defendant Myers had plaintiff open a checking account and
add her name on the account so that she had control of all
the money plaintiff made. At Woodforest Bank.
182. Plaintiff had been awaiting mental health services and
medication while residing in Homer Illinois. When he moved
to Pinckneyville Illinois he no longer qualified for these
services.
183. Plaintiff sought these services and medication in Carbondale
Illinois but was unable to receive them due to a lack of
funding.
184. Defendant Myers refused to allow plaintiff to seek inpatient
treatment due to him being the sole source of income for the
household.
185. Plaintiff suffers from a lifelong mental illness of bipolar
disorder, amoung other things and needed medications and
treatment for these illnesses.
186. Plaintiff had to live though bouts of depression, mania, and
psychosis. Plaintiff lived with this condition untreated for
approximately eleven months. Two months after the birth of
his child, plaintiff suffered an emotional, mental, and
physical breakdown, which led to his reincarceration.
28
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 29 of 58 Page ID #430
187. Defendant Myers then demanded that plaintiff not tell anyone
about their relationship while he was in prison. That she
needed to get her job back at BMRCC now. That this was the
only way that she could provide for their daughter. That if
plaintiff told anyone then she would not be able to support
her now three children or herself.
188. Shortly thereafter defendant Myers informed plaintiff that she
was now dating a corr. officer that worked at BMRCC where he
may end up being sent back too. That he should keep his mouth
shut if he knew what was good for him and not say anything
about what had happened while he was at BMRCC. That her
boyfriend could make his life hell and keep him from ever
getting out.
189. These threats continued when plaintiff would inquire about
his daughter or mention what happened at BMRCC. Defendant
Myers threatened plaintiff with the fact that she had family
and friends throughout IDOC including a cousin in Dixon CC
that worked as a corr. officer, if plaintiff was sent there
due to his mental illness. That plaintiff would be physically
harmed and never get out of prison if he ever spoke to
anyone about what happened at BMRCC.
190. Defendant Myers threatened to have plaintiffs daughters name
changed, have his parental rights terminated, have his daughter
adopted, and that his daughter would never know plaintiff as
her father if he ever told anyone about their relationship
while at BMRCC or if he continuer to inquire about his
daughter. That if he kept his mouth shut and quit bothering
her and got the help he needed, he would be able to know and
see his daughter in the future and he would be safe in prison.
191. Plaintiff spent the next eight years or so afraid to speak
about what happened or to report the incident that took
place at BMRCC. For the well being of his daughter and his
safety and freedom.
z?
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 30 of 58 Page ID #431
192. Plaintiff was sent to Dixon CC where defendant Myers cousin
worked. He sought mental health counseling, medications, and
treatment, did not report what had happened at BMRCC with
the promise of reuniting with his daughter some day in the
future, ensuring his well being and security as well as his
daughters with his silence.
193. In early 2019 plaintiff did transfer from Dixon CC to JTC.
194. On May 21, 2019 plaintiff attended a court hearing with
defendant Myers.
195. When plaintiff questioned defendant Myers under oath about
their living situation while he was on home monitor and
living at her house, she lied and committed perjury. She
denied plaintiff ever lived with her or that they had a
relationship before she left her job at BMRCC. As shown
in the trial transcripts provided.
(Ex. 18.1 - 18.5)
196. Plaintiff did not understand why defendant Myers would do
this. Plaintiff would later learn that defendant Myers
committed perjury to avoid admitting to committing a felony
offense under oath. That being custodial sexual misconduct.
(Ex. 33.1 - 33.3)
197. When leaving the court house defendant Myers approached
plaintiff and told him if he did not keep his mouth shut
he would never get out of prison and she would.make sure of it.
198. Plaintiff was in the custody of two CTOs from JTC who were
present and heard this exchange. On the way back to JTC they
questioned plaintiff on what defendant Myers meant by these
statements. Plaintiff said he could not talk about it.
3°
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 31 of 58 Page ID #432
199. Plaintiff then started researching these circumstances and
eventually learned of the criminal nature of the actions
taken by defendants Myers and Reardon during plaintiffs
time on parole home monitor of which he had been an unknowing
victim of.
200. Once plaintiff learned that he had been a victim of a felony
offense of custodial sexual misconduct while on parole home
monitor by defendant Myers, and that criminal charges could
be brought in accordance with State Law, he sought to do this
by reporting both the actions that took place at BMRCC and
while he was on home monitor in the form of a grievance and
report stating his wishes for criminal prosecution.
720 ILCS 5/3-6 (e)(l-5)
(Ex. 26.1 - 26.4)
201. Plaintiff still lives in fear of his safety and his eventual
release date once defendant Myers, her friends, and her
relations find out about this reporting and complaint. As
well as the adoption of his daughter, losing his parental
rights, and never knowing or seeing his daughter again.
202. Plaintiff filed a grievance on 8-5-19 alleging sexual assault
and staff misconduct, seeking criminal prosecution. This
grievance was submitted to the ARB of 1D0C.
(Ex. 1.1, 1.2)
203. Defendants Jefferys and McCarty found this grievance to be
"moot". Stating it was being investigated by Central Invest.
(Ex. 2.1)
204. Plaintiff reported this sexual assault and staff misconduct
to JTC staff as well. On 8-5-19.
205. Plaintiff was seen by BHT (behavior health technician)
Leadinghouse on 8-5-19 and requested a victim advocate and
counselor relating to sexual abuse.
It
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 32 of 58 Page ID #433
206. Plaintiff provided a copy of the 28 CFR Chapter 1 Section
115 that requires this. BHT Leadinghouse stated that she
would advise defendant Marano of this.
207. On 8-5-19 Lt. Allen from internal affairs came to speak to
plaintiff as well. Plaintiff showed Lt. Allen the same copy
that he showed to BHT Leadinghouse and requested a victim
advocate. She stated that she did not have the authority to
contact anyone for A?** but that she would give a copy of the
federal regulation to defendant Marano and send her an email
with this request.
208. On 8-6-19 plaintiff was interviewed by Lt. Allen without a
victim advocate and was not provided one afterwards.
209. Plaintiff provided details, letters, birth certificate, and
documentations! evidence through his master file and parole
information, along with defendant Myers previous employment
dates at BMRCC.
210. Lt. Allen stated that plaintiff had provided enough evidence
and details to substantiate his claim to her. Stating that
plaintiff would be contacted by an investigator from the ISP
soon. Who would interview him and take a more detailed
statement from him.
211. Documentation included to substantiate these claims are
enclosed in the follow exhibits.
212. Birth certificate listing plaintiff and defendant Myers as
biological parents with a birth date of Feb. 3, 2010.
(Ex. 19.1)
213. Plaintiffs parole records within ID0C computer system.
Showing date of residence with defendant Myers (then Shannon
Shirk), name,, address, phone number, and date approved.
(Ex. 20.1 - 20.4)
3*
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 33 of 58 Page ID #434
214. Defendant Myers (then Shannon Shirk) work records. Showing
employment dates, and date/time of last date of employment.
(Ex. 21.1 - 21.4)
215. Exhibit 19.1, plaintiffs daughters birth certificate was
amended on 4-2-15 unbeknownst to plaintiff changing his
daughters last name from Mcrae to Myers by defendant Myers
using fraudulent information in the court filings in order
do this.
216. On 8-6-19 a summary of what plaintiff reported to Lt. Allen
was typed by Lt. Allen and which he was told to sign.
217. Plaintiff did not have time to read this summary before he
had to sign it because there was a "code" called over the
radio of which Lt. Allen had to respond to. Plaintiff later
learned that this was a drill at JTC.
218. Lt. Allen stated that it was just her summary of what plaintiff
had said to her not a statement by him. That another person
would come take a statement from him shortly, from the ISP.
219. Plaintiff never was contacted by anyone after this.
220. Plaintiff requested a copy of the summary he had signed from
Lt. Allen later that day and the next day so that he could
fully read it.
221. Lt. Allen stated that she could not give plaintiff a copy of
the summary, that he would have to get it through a FOIA
request.
222. Plaintiff submitted a FOIA request seeking this summary and
it was denied. This was appealed and denied as well.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 34 of 58 Page ID #435
223. On 8-9-19 plaintiff spoke to BHX Iraburgia and requested that
she speak to defendant Marano in regaurds to the 28 CFR Ch. 1
Section 115 and plaintiffs need for a victim advocate and
confidential counseling relating to sexual abuse.
224. On 8-16-19 BHT Imburgia informed plaintiff that she had spoke
to defendant Marano and that she would look into it.
225. On 8^23*19 BHT Imburgia informed plaintiff that she had no
information as yet. Plaintiff requested that she inform
defendant Marano that he was filing a grievance on this issue
of refusing these services to him.
226. On 8-23-19 plaintiff filed a grievance on the refusal of
these services.
(Ex. 3.1, 3.2)
227. On 8-26-19 this grievance was returned to plaintiff stating
he must submit it through his counselor despite Adin. Code
504 F stating otherwise as stated on grievance.
(Ex. 4.1)
228. On 8-27-19 plaintiff resubmitted this grievance to his
counselor anyway.
(Ex. 4.1, 4.2)
229. It was then resubmitted to the grievance officer by the
counselor stating it must be responded to by the grievance
officer not the counselor.
(Ex. 5.2, 5.3) (counselors response)
230. On 8-27-19 BHT Iraburgia told plaintiff that she had told
defendant Marano that he had filed a grievance on this issue,
which Marano stated that "no services would be offered or
outside services contacted unless it was a confirmed rape".
31
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 35 of 58 Page ID #436
231. Plaintiff informed BHT Imburgia that this was not the standard
and showed her the copy of 28 CFR Section 115 to prove this.
That he had already substantiated his allegations with Lt.
Allen of IA. She said she would inform defendant Marano but
that there was nothing else she could do for plaintiff.
232. On 8-29-19 the grievance officer returr^the grievance dated
8-23-19 on the refusal of services again, this time stating,
he had consulted the PREA Coordinator (defendant Nottingham?)
and that plaintiff must be more specific on where alleged
sexual abuse took place, provi^4date time facility etc.
(Ex. 5.1 - 5.3)
233. Plaintiff then appealed this decision to the ARB and defendant
Jefferys due to him already providing the requested information
from the grievance officer and the inappropriateness of this.
(Ex. 6.1 - 6.5)
234. Defendant Knauer returned this grievance/appeal refusing to
respond despite plaintiff citing Admin. Code 504.810 (b), and
28 CFR Ch.l 115.61 (b), and 504.870 (a)(4), and having
including the counselors, and grievance officers responseStating plaintiff needed to provide these responses.
(Ex. 7.1)
235. Plaintiff then resubmitted this grievance to the grievance
pfficer including the response from defendant Knauer upon
return from the ARB. It has went unresponded too, to date.
(Ex. 6.1 - 6.5, and 7.1)
236. Plaintiff tried to contact the place listed in the JTC PREA
Audit Report for services, and the JHA (John Howard Ass.),
The Sexual Abuse Center in Joliet Illinois which does not
exist nor ever has ) JHA does not offer these services.
237. Plaintiff finally got in touch with GACS (Gaurdian Angel Comm.
Services) and they agreed to provide services in Joliet IL.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 36 of 58 Page ID #437
238. Plaintiff relayed this information to defendants Tack and
Marano as well as his counselor Marinelli.
239. They refused to allow this so plaintiff requested an advocate
from GAGS contact the facility JTC and inform them of the
plaintiffs needs and their willingness to provide this service
which is offered to the public.
240. After repeated attempts by GACS plaintiff was finally told
if he wanted these services he would have to li'ft them on his
visiting list and see them in the visiting room. That he
would lose his visitations allowed each month depending how
many times GACS came for counseling. This was once a week.
So 4-5 visitations were taken from plaintiff a month denying
visitations from his friends and family on these days.
241. On 12-13-19 plaintiff filed an emergency grievance and letter
to defendant Tack. Regaurding the punishment of losing his
visitation priviledges in order to receive these services.
The falsified information within the JTC PREA Audit Report
4s well as needing a confidential setting
to receive these services. This was hand delivered to defendant
Tacks personal mailbox by plaintiffs counselor Marinelli on
12-16-19.
(Ex. 8.1 - 8.7)
242. Plaintiff was informed by GACS counselor that by law she was
not allowed to provide confidential counseling relating to
sexual abuse in the visiting room because it was not a
confidential setting with other visitors within hearing
range and that a secure area would need to be used.
243. Defendant Tack refused to answer or respond to the grievance
dated 12-13-19. After 60 days with no response, plaintiff
appealed this to the ARB and defendant Jefferys on 2-17-20.
(Ex. 9.1 - 9.8)
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 37 of 58 Page ID #438
244. Defendant Knauer refused to respond to this grievance/appeal,
stating a response from counselor, grievance officer, or CAO
was needed. Despite Admin. Code stating no response after 60
days is considered a denial for the purpose of appeal.
(Ex. 10.1)
245. Plaintiff discussed this with defendant Jamison upon the
return of this appeal who instructed him to speak to his
counselor Rowe who instructed him to resubmit the grievance
again. So plaintiff did resubmit grievance and letter dated
12-13-19.
(Ex. 11.1 - 11.7)
246. Plaintiff had filed a grievance on 12-16-19 to the ARB
regaurding PREA compliance and the lack of a final agency
decision on the merits of any portion of any grievance
alleging sexual abuse within 90 days of the initial filing
of the grievance. Originally grieved on 8-5-19.
(Ex. 12.1, 12.2)
247. Defendant Knauer refused to respond to this grievance stating
that their office previously addressed this issue on 8-27-19
finding the grievance "moot".
(Ex. 13.1)
248. Plaintiff filed three grievances on 1-24-20 on defendants
Jefferys, McCarty, Central Investigations, and Sarah BrownFoiles. Regaurding their conduct as staff, reporting of
sexual assault claims, PREA guidelines, violation of plaintiffs
rights, non compliance of dept, rules, regulations, and
directives regaurding sexual assault allegations.
(Ex. 14.1 - 14.6)
249. Defendant Knauer refused to respond to all these grievances
stating they were not submitted in a timely manner despite
plaintiff awaiting responses on these issues and his grievances.
(Ex. 15.1)
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 38 of 58 Page ID #439
249. Defendant then filed a grievance on defendant Knauer regaurding
misconduct in not responding to plaintiffs grievance dated
12-16-19.
(Ex. 16.1.--:.16;3)
250. Defendants Jefferys and Johnson denied this grievance stating
allegations were not substantiated. That FREA claims were
being investigated according to PREA protocol, although they
were not.
(Ex. 17.1)
251. Defendants actions continue to date without resolve.
252. In early 2020 all visitation was ceased by GACS by JTC IDOC.
253. Plaintiff clarifies for time limitations on prosecution and
injury that he was aware of the injury of sexual assault
susstained by defendant Myers while in BMRCC when stating
"no" to defendant Myers on multiple occassions, that he
eventually stopped resisting and just let it happen feeling
as if he had no choice.
254. Plaintiff has been under multiple threats, intimidation,
and manipulation by defendant Myers since this injury of
which she is the perpetrator and it involved an injury
caused by sexual conduct or penetration. Of which the two year
time limitation does not run. Plaintiff is still under
these circumstances to date.
255. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the following statute.
735 ILCS 5/13*202.3
(Ex. 25.1)
256. That plaintiff was unaware of any illegality of the actions
taken by defendant Myers once he was no longer at BMRCC or
by defendant Reardon while he was on home monitor.
5«
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 39 of 58 Page ID #440
257. Plaintiff was deceived and manipulated into believing that
the actions taken by defendant Myers once he left BMRCC, those
being sexual intercourse and contact, were legal. That having
this relationship while defendant Myers worked at BMRCC and
plaintiff was on parole home monitor and conceiving a child
was not illegal. Plaintiff had no way of knowing that this
constituted custodial sexual misconduct of which he was victim
of and could not legally give consent too. The approval by
IDOC and later defendant Reardon of defendant Myers home
while she worked at BMRCC and plaintiff was on home monitor
parole additionally led plaintiff to believe that this was
a perfectly legal if quite bizarre relationship to be in.
Plaintiff believed defendant Myers when she stated that she
left BMRCC due to her medical condition.
258. IDOC, defendant Reardon, and Myers fraudulently presented
this as a legal circumstance.
NEGLIGENCE/BREECH OF DUTY/
(fX. Q*‘t, as.'/
259. Defendants had responsibilities and duties as described within
paragraghs 28 - 109. This conduct which was intentional,
wanton, willful, and disregaurdful of plaintiffs rights.
Defendants had a duty to protect plaintiff from the injuries
he complained about and put them on notice about multiple
times. Defendants failed to carry out or fulfill obligations
imposed by legislation in their conduct descibed within.
Violating a legal and moral obligation, and failing to act as
the law obligates them to act. The refusal to follow Federal,
State, and Local Laws, Admin. Codes, Admin. Dir. Admin.
Order, Dept. Rules and Regulations, and Constitutional Rights
constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable person would exercise in this situation.
Defendants acted deliberately despite awareness of circumstances
that would put a reasonable person on notice of the facts
assential to these crimes. Consciously disregaurding the harm
that their actions could and did do to the interests and
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 40 of 58 Page ID #441
rights of plaintiff. Defendants acted beyond their scope of
their authority through the following wrongful acts:
260. Defendant Myers, Doe.l, and Doe.2; did not ensure the safety
of plaintiff while supervising him inside the dental office
at BMRCC.
261. Did not report sexual abuse through chain of command as an
incident report.
262. Did not completely and accurately document an unusual incident
that they observed, including sexual assault.
263. Defendant Reardon; did not ensure the safety of plaintiff
while on parole home monitor and under his care and custody.
264. Did not report sexual abuse through chain of command as an
incident report.
265. Did not completely and accurately document an unusual incident
that he observed, including custodial sexual misconduct.
266. Did not comply with PREA standards/protocol.
267. Did not notify plaintiff of a crime of which he was a victim
of.
268. Did not ivestigate and approve a legal and safe host site
location for plaintiff while on home monitor parole.
269. Defendant Jefferys; did not refer plaintiffs claim of sexual
assault involving staff on inmate to the ISP/DII.
270. Did not provide a final agency decision on a grievance
alleging sexual assault within 90 days.
t/O
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 41 of 58 Page ID #442
271. Did not investigate plaintiffs grievances or inquire into
alleged misconduct by employees.
272. Did not report to the States Attorney of the county in which
an incident of sexual assault occurred or to the appropriate
prosecuting official that an employee committed a violation
of criminal law were reasonable grounds existed.
273. Did not make a final determination of plaintiffs grievances
and send his decision to the plaintiff.
274. Defendants McCarty, Knauer, and Johnson; did not issue a
final decision on the merits of any portion of a grievance
alleging sexual abuse within 90 days of the initial filing
of the grievance.
275. Did not review plaintiffs unresolved grievances to ensure
plaintiff was afforded his due process rights and ensure
compliance with Dept, policies.
276. Did not investigate plaintiffs grievances to inquire into
any alleged misconduct by employees.
277. Defendant Eilers; did not report an allegation of employee
criminal misconduct to the ISP/DII, and obtain instructions
regaurding investigations and further reporting when the
incident of criminal misconduct is listed in the MOU. The sexual
assault involving staff on inmate.
278. Defendants Jackson, and Delia; did not report to the States
Attorney of the county in which an incident occurred that an
employee committed a violation of criminal law, where reasonable
grounds existed.
279. Did not follow juridiction over investigations based on the
April 1, 2004 MOU between the department and the ISP.
Hi
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 42 of 58 Page ID #443
280. Did not advise the ISP/DII and obtain instructions regaurding
investigations and further reporting when the incident of
alleged criminal conduct is listed in the MOU. The sexual
assault involving staff on inmate.
281. Defendant Nottingham; did not ensure compliance with agency
directives and Federal Law relating to PREA, ensure the safety
of plaintiff as an offender within a correctional facility.
282. Did not ensure prompt investigation, disciplinary action and
referral for prosecution, or make services available to
plaintiff following sexual abuse.
283. Did not ensure that JTC undergo a PREA Audit within three
years of the last Audit performed.
284. Defendants Tack, Larry and Nurse; did not notify plaintiff as
a victim of sexual assault in writing of the outcome of the
investigation.
285. Did not review case with the appropriate states attorney for
possible referral for prosecution.
286. Did not review plaintiffs grievance and provide a written
response to plaintiff.
287. Did not notify the ISP/DII of an alleged incident involving
the criminal sexual abuse of a resident/inmate, including
sexual assault involving staff on inmate.
288. Defendants Wilson, Williams, Jamison Marano, and Renzi; did
not identify community agencies, involving advocacy and crisis
organizations where reports can be made or that provide
assistance or support services to offenders in the prevention
or intervention of sexual abuse.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 43 of 58 Page ID #444
289. Did not coordinate the facilities effort to comply with PREA
standards.
290. Did not develop and maintain a program for the treatment and
counselingr6f"'Victims of sexual abuse (plaintiff).
291. Did not offer counseling and supportive services or a victim
advocate from a sexual assault crisis center.
292. Did not notify internal and external investigators and have
investigations initiated.
293. Did not ensure compliance with agecy directives and Federal
Law relating to PREA.
294. Defendants Jefferys, McCarty, Knauer, Johnson, Eilers, Jackson,
Delia, and Nottingham as Agents of the Agency IDOC did not
make available to plaintiff as a victim a victim advocate
from a rape crisis center, or make available to provide a
qualified staff member from a community-based organization,
or a qualified agency staff member.
29$. Did not, as requested by (plaintiff) victim, the victim advocate,
qualified agency staff member, or qualified community-based
organization staff member to accompany and support plaintiff
through investigatory interviews and provide emotional support,
information, and referrals.
296. Did not ensure that an administrative or criminal investigation
was completed for plaintiffs allegation of sexual abuse.
297. Did not issue a final agency decision on the merits of any
portion of a grievance alleging sexual abuse within 90 days of
the initial filing of the grievance.
f3
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 44 of 58 Page ID #445
298. Did not conduct an Investigation into plaintiffs claims of
sexual abuse promptly, thoroughly, and objectively.
299. Did not refer plaintiffs substantiated allegation of sexual
conduct that was clearly criminal for prosecution.
300. Did not report to law enforcement agencies, and to relevant
licensing bodies a contractor who engaged in sexual abuse
that was clearly criminal.
301. Defendants Tack, Ear*?*; Nurse, Wilson, Williams, Jamison, Marano,
and Renzi as Agents of the Facility of JTG did not provide
plaintiff with access to outside victim advocates for emotional
support services related to sexual abuse by giving him mailing
addresses and telephone numbers of local, State, or national
victim advocacy or rape crisis organizations.
302. Did not enable reasonable communication between plaintiff and
these organizations and agencies in as confidential a manner
as possible.
303. Did not offer treatment to plaintiff who had been victimized
by sexual abuse while in prison*
304. Did not provide any follow-up service to this treatment not
offered and taken away.
305. Did not provide plaintiff with mental health services consistent
with the community level of care relating to sexual abuse.
306. Defendants Myers, Doe.l, Doe.2, Reardon, Jefferys, McCarty,
Knauer, Johnson, Eilers, Jackson, Delia, Nottingham, Tack,
Larry, Nurse, Wilson, Williams, Jamison, Marano, and Renzi;
did not obey Federal, State, and Local Laws.
307. Did not comply with Dept. Rules (Admin. Code), written procedure
(Admin. Dir.), bulletins, and written or verbal orders issued
n
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 45 of 58 Page ID #446
by proper authorities.
308. Did not notify and report allegations of staff misconduct
(staff on inmate sexual assault) claims to the Executive
Generals-Office.
rcV 1+
309. As a direct and proximate of defendants negligence, plaintiffs
rights were violated and he experienced physical injuries
including intentional emotional distress.
COUNT 1
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
310. Defendant Myers; as described more fully within, did use force
against plaintiff. That force in the form of repeated rape
while plaintiff was in BMRCC was objectively unreasonable and
meant to degrade and humiliate plaintiff.
311. Did use force against plaintiff unknowingly towards plaintiff.
That force being in the form of Custodial Sexual Misconduct
while plaintiff was on parole home monitor and she worked at
BMRCC. Resulting in the conception of a child. This force
although unknown to plaintiff at the time was objectively
unreasonable and meant to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional
rights and state law.
312. In using force against plaintiff, defendant Myers used extreme
and excessive cruelty towards him for the purpose of causing
harm, including degradation and humiliation. As well as the
production of a child. The actions by defendant Myers was not
in a good faith effort to maintain or restore security or
discipline or provide a valid health care service.
313. Defendant Myers knew that using force presented a risk of harm
to plaintiff, but recklessly disregaurded that risk and
plaintiffs emotional and physical safety by failing to take
reasonable measures to minimize the risk of harm.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 46 of 58 Page ID #447
314. As a direct and proximate result of defendant Myers actions,
plaintiffs rights were violated and he experienced physical
injuries, including intentional emotional distress. As well
as the conception of a child.
COUNT 2
FAILURE TO PROTECT/INTERVENE
315. Defendants Doe.l, Doe.2, and Reardon/IDOC had a reasonable
opportunity to prevent the continued violation of plaintiffs
constitutional rights as set forth within this complaint had
they been so inclined to do so but failed to.
316. Defendants Doe.l, and Doe.2 knew of a substantial risk of harm
to plaintiffs safety and could see and/or had the opportunity
to see the harm occurring to plaintiff as he was repeatedly
raped, or knew of the rape happening, would happen, and continue
to happen, and actively encouraged this. Consciously disregaurding
the risk plaintiff was experiencing by failing to take reasonable
steps to prevent the harm from occurring, continuing, or stopping
it as it occurred at BMRCC.
317. Defendant Doe.l and Doe.2 actions and failure to act was
intentional, done with malice, and done with reckless
indifference to plaintiffs rights and safety while at BMRCC.
318. Defendant Reardon/IDOC had a reasonable opportunity to prevent
the continued violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights
as described more fully within had they been so inclined, but
failed to do so while plaintiff was on parole home monitor. That
being the custodial sexual misconduct of defendant Myers against
plaintiff.
319. Defendant Reardon/IDOC knew of a substantial risk of harm to
plaintiffs safety and could see and/or had the opportunity to
see the harm occurring to plaintiff in the approval of a home
monitor host site at defendant Myers home while she worked at
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 47 of 58 Page ID #448
BMRCC and was pregnant by plaintiff constituting custodial
sexual misconduct, or knew that this crime would continue
to occur but consciously disregaurded the risk plaintiff was
experiencing by failing to take reasonable steps to prevent
the harm from occurring, continuing, or stopping it as it
occurred. Or by informing plaintiff of these facts. Instead
approving this site after being put on notice of these facts.
320. Defendant Reardon/IDOC failure to act was intentional, done with
malice, and done with reckless indifference to plaintiffs
rights and safety. As well as done in an attempt to deprive
plaintiff of this knowledge of harm.
321. As a direct and proximate result of defendants Doe.l, Doe.2,
and Reardon/IDOC actions and failure to intervene, plaintiffs
rights were violated and he experienced physical injuries,
including intentional emotional distress.
COUNT 3
FAILURE TO PROTECT
322. Defendants Myers, Doe.l, Doe.2 did fail to protect plaintiff
from the sexual assault while at BMRCC and the sexual assault
itself at BMRCC.
323. Defendants Myers, and Reardon/IDOC did fail to protect plaintiff
from the custodial sexual misconduct while on home monitor
parole and the custodial sexual misconduct itself while on home
monitor parole.
324. As outlined in Count 2.
325. As a direct and proximate result of defendants Myers, Doe.l
Doe.2, and Reardon/IDOC actions and failure to protect,
plaintiffs rights were violated and he experienced physical
injuries including intentional emotion*'distress •
47
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 48 of 58 Page ID #449
COUNT 4
TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
326. Defendants Reardon, Jefferys, McCarty, Knauer, Johnson, Eilers,
Jackson, Delia, Nottingham, Tack, Larry, Nurse, Wilson, Williams,
Jamison, and Renzi as outlined in paragraphs 259 - 309 did deny
plaintiff his right to petition the government for redress of
his grievance of being a victim of custodial sexual misconduct
as described by state-law by way of prosecution of this felony
offense committed against plaintiff by defendant Myers while
he was on parole home monitor and she worked at BMRCC327. Extended limitations apply to this specific case and these
circumstances had defendants performed their responsibilities
and duties, prosecution may commence within one year after
discovery of the offence by the victim (plaintiff) when
cooberating physical evidence is available and the offense
involved sexual conduct or penatration in which victim was
18 years of age or older at the time of the offense.
720 ILCS 5/3«6F(«)(l-5)
(Ex. 26.1 - 26.4)
328. This crime being custodial sexual miscoduct.
720 ILCS 5/11-9.2(a)(c)(e)(l)(iii)(iv)(3)(i)(ii)(4)
(Ex. 33.1 - 33.3)
329. Cooberating physical evidence being the conception of a child
between defendant Myers and plaintiff as well as DNA evidence
of such.
330. Defendants refusal to investigate refer for prosecution,
report to the ISP/DII and notify the proper authorities of
documentational and cooberating physical evidence of
custodial sexual misconduct for criminal prosecution under State
Law. Despite plaintiffs repeated requests that they do so.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 49 of 58 Page ID #450
331. Due to defendants actions plaintiff would be time barred from
seeking judicial criminal prosecution of this crime he was a
victim of while on home monitor parole.
332. This has created an actual injury against plaintiff.
333. Defendants were on notice of plaintiffs wishes to pursue this
criminal charge by way of multiple grievances and statements
of such.
334. Defendants acted intentionally, wantonly, willfully, and
disregaurdful of plaintiffs rights and interests.
335. Defendants acted beyond their scope of authority and against
Federal, State, and Local Laws, as well as the Constitution of US.
336. As a direct and proximate result of defendants actions plaintiff
suffered an actual injury including intentional emotional
distress.
COUNT 5
DUE PROCESS EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS
337« Defendants Myers, Doe.l, Doe.2, Reardon, Jefferys, McCarty,
Knauer, Johnson, Eilers, Jackson, Delia, Knottingham, Tack,
Larry, Nurse, Wilson, Williams, Jamison, Marano, and Renzi
did deny plaintiff equal protection of the Federal, State,
and Local Laws.
338. As stated more fully within defendants refusal to report,
refer, investigate and provide services relating to allegations
of sexual abuse denied plaintiff of persuing criminal charges
in State court against defendant Myers for criminal custodial
sexual misconduct once he was made aware of this crime.
339. As descibed in Count 4
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 50 of 58 Page ID #451
340. Despite plaintiffs repeated requests and notices of his wishes
to persue criminal charges and the need for services relating
to sexual abuse. Plaintiff was denied equal protection of
Federal, State, and Local Laws with the refusal of performing
outlined responsibilities and duties.
341. There can be no rational reason for the denial to perform
these responsibilities and duties as outlined. In relation to
a documented allegation of sexual abuse by an employee on an
inmate, and no limitation on these allegations and their time
frame. As well as the extended limitations on prosecuting such
allegations in criminal court by State Law.
342. Plaintiff asserts a class of one. A victim of a sexual abuse
by an employee on an inmate with documentational evidence
while being in the custody and care of 1D0C. With a perponderance
of evidence supporting these allegations.
343. Plaintiff states generally that he was treated intentionally
difltfefci' from other victims similarily situated with no
rational reason. Those persons being person*sexually abused
by an IDOC employee while in the care and custody of IDOC that
provides a perponderance of evidence by way of documentation
that an allegation of sexual abuse occurred and wishes to
persue criminal charges. With DNA evidence available to
cooberate these allegations.
( i.e. Jacqueline Farris)
344. In the alternative plaintiff has put forth in this complaint
what amounts to direct evidence of aritrary treatment. Plaintiff
identifies the specific harrassers, a plausible motive of
concealing liability towards themselves and employees that
are liable past and present both in a civil and criminal
nature, admitting or uncovering misconduct within the Agency,
and denying the rights of and protections owed to plaintiff,
with a series of actions and/or inactions that
appear "illegitamate on their face" would suffice to state a
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 51 of 58 Page ID #452
claim.
345. As a result plaintiff was denied equal protection of Federal,
State, and Local Laws as described more fully within this
complaint. Including the denial to persue criminal charges
against defendant Myers for custadial sexual misconduct while
he was on home monitor parole and she worked at BMRCC. as well
as services he requested and needed bu4^ did not receive and
has not to date.
346. Defendants acted deliberately, willfully, wantonly, and with
malice in depriving him of the protection of all laws and
rights despite being' on notice of these wrongs, and violations.
In the form of multiple grievances and notices. Defendants
acted beyond their scope of their duty and authority through
these wronful acts numerated within the Negligence claim.
Paragraphs 259 --309.
347. As a direct and proximate result plaintiff did suffer an
actual injury including intentional emotional distress.
COUNT 6
RETALIATION
348. Defendants Jefferys, McCarty, Knauer, Johnson, Eilers, Jackson,
Delia, Knottingham, Tack, Larry, Nurse, Wilson, Williams,
Jamison, Marano, and Renzi did retaliate against plaintiff.
349. Plaintiff filed a grievance and reported a sexual assault
by an employee that took place while he was at BMRCC and was
victim to custodial sexual misconduct while on home monitor
parole.
350. This action and its content is protected and rises to the
level of public concern.
*7
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 52 of 58 Page ID #453
351. These actions spawned the action/inaction outlined in the
Negligence claim. Paragraphs 259 - 309. Plaintiff was denied
all protections put in place that should happen in response
to an allegation of this sort. The allegations were a motivating
factor, in the defendants decisions to deny and disregaurd
all responsibilities and duties outlined within. The actions/
inactions taken whseraa in the aggragate constitute actionable
retalitory conduct. Outlined is a chronology of events from
which retaliation may plausibly be inferred. Plaintiff
experienced a multitude of adverse action that would most
definately deter anyone from reporting a sexual assault by
a staff member. If it was just ignored, not investigated,
prosecuted, or responded too, or services not provided, with
no puishment, acknowledgement or recourse. The defendants
actions over thesermonths in all ways would deter any person
of ordinary firmness from exercising this First Amendment right.
352. As a direct and proximate result of defendants actions plaiA'W^
did suffer an actual injury including intentional emotional
distress.
COUNT 7
CONSPIRACY
353. Defendant Myers, Doe.l, Doe.2, and Reardon did conspire to
commit conspiracy•(an unlawful act).
354. Defendant Myers, Doe.l, and Doe.2 did agree to sexually assault
(rape) plaintiff while he was at BMRCC. Depriving him of his
right toMfree of cruel and unusual punishment. Acting in
violation of state law and the US Constitution,they did act
in excess of their authority.
355. Myers did then rape plaintiff while at BMRCC while Doe.l, and
Doe.2 did encourage this and provide look out so as not to
be caught, they also failed to report this or stop it from
happening. This was done with willful and wanton negligence.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 53 of 58 Page ID #454
356. Defedant Myers and Reardon did agree to commit custodial
sexual misconduct while plaintiff was on home monitor parole
and Myers worked at BMRCC. They diihide this from plaintiff
by approving the home for parole, depriving plaintiff of his
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, his right
to petition the government for redress in prosecuting this
crime perpetrated against him by Myers. Acting in violation
of state law US Constitution and in excess of their authority.
357. Possibly having Myers leave her job to avoid criminal action
or prosecution.
358. As a direct and proximate result plaintiff did experience a
physical and actual injury including intentional emotional
distress.
COUNT 8
ASSAULT & BATTERY/SEXUAL ABUSE//'<*<'*/A‘><a0^
C£>• a
So./, ?/./,
)
359. Defendant Myers did repeatedly make physical contact with
plaintiff without valid cause or consent as descibed more fully
within. That physical contact was offensive and harmful while
plaintiff was at BMRCC.
360. Defendant Myers intended to harm and frighten plaintiff
withoufvalid cause. Her actions did cause plaintiff fear and
apprehension while at BMRCC.
361. Defendant Myers actions were done intentionally, willfully,
wantonly, and with sucJl reckless disregaurd for their natural
consequences as to contitute the tort of sexual abuse! under
the laws and constitution of Illinois while plaintiff was at
BMRCC.
362. In that Myers did repeatedly rape plaintiff at BMRCC.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 54 of 58 Page ID #455
363. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Myer conduct
plaintiff did experience physical injuries including
intentional distress.
COUNT 9
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
364. As stated more fully within defendant Myers, Doe.l► s and Doe.2
engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct when Myers repeatedly
raped plaintiff while at BMRCC and Doe.l and Doe.2 encouraged
this, did nothing to stop it, report it, or intervene to
stop it, providing look out for Myers while this was done.
These actions were undertaken intentionally and with knowledge
that there was a high probability that the conduct would
inflict severe emotional distress and with reckless disregaurd
of that probability.
365. As stated more fully within defendant Myers and Reardon/IDOC
engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct when Myers did
commit the crime of custodial sexual misconduct against
plaintiff while he was on parole home monitor and she worked
at BMRCC and Reardon encouraged this, did nothing to stop it,
or intervene to stop it, approving Myers home as a host site
for plaintiff and not advising him of this illegal conduct
of which he was a victim too. These actions were undertaken
intentionally and with knowledge that there was a high
probability that the conduct would inflict severe emotional
distress and with reckless disregaurd of that probability.
366. As-stated more fully within defendants Jefferys, McCarty,
Knauer, Johnson, Eilers, Jackson, Delia, Nottingham, Tack,
Larry, Nurse, Williams, Wilson, Jamison, Marano, and Renzi
did engage in extreme and outrageous conduct when they
violated plaintiffs rights, refused to investigate, refer
for criminal prosecution, report to ISP/DII and answer
claims of sexual abuse by an employee on an inmate, provide
services related to sexual abuse, or follow Federal, State, and
rf
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 55 of 58 Page ID #456
Local Laws, Admin. Code, Admin. Dir., Admin. Order, PREA
guidelines/protocol, and rules and regulations, not
answering, denying, returning, and finding moot all
grievances submitted by plaintiff. Ignoring all notice
given by plaintiff. Defendants encouraged this conduct,
did nothing to stop it, participated in it, did nothing
to intervene, or report it. These actions were undertaken
intentionally and with knowledge that there was a high
probability that the conduct would inflict severe emotional
distress and with reckless disregaurd of that probability.
367.
These actions and misconduct are rooted in an abuse of
power and authority with malice and reckless indiffererence.
368. As a direct and proximate result of defendants misconduct
plaintiff experienced an actual injury, physical injuries,
including intentional emotional distress.
COUNT 10
CUSTODIAL SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
369. As stated more fully within defendant Myers did as an
employee of a penal system BMRCC did engage in sexual conduct
and penetration with plaintiff who was in the care and custody
of that penal system by way of home monitor parole MSR. This
resulted in the conception of a child.
370. Defendant Myers intended to harm and take advantage of
plaintiff and conceive a child with plaintiff without valid
cause or knowledge by plaintiff. These actions did cause harm
to plaintiff and the conception of a child.
371. As a direct and proximate result of defendants misconduct
plaintiff experienced an actual injury, physical injuries
including intentional emotional distress.
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 56 of 58 Page ID #457
RELIEF REQUESTED
A. That defendant Jefferys identify by first and last name Doe.l
and Doe.2 as BMRCC dental assistant and hygienist during
11-2008 thru 5-2009. As acting director of ID0C. As well as
last known address. In the form of a Court Order in accordance
with Dept. Rules.
B. Issue an Injunction Ordering defendant Jefferys by and through
his Agents (defendants) to:
1. Immediately issue a final agency decision in relation to
the allegation of sexual assault by defendant Myers against
plaintiff.
2. Immediately notify the Executive Generals Office of staff
misconduct in a State facility as defined within this
complaint.
3. Immediately notify, report, and refer plaintiffs allegation
to the ISP/DII for investigation and possible prosecutionof criminal acts.
4. Immediately Comply with all PREA guidelines/protocol as
outlined in 28 CFR Chapter 1 Section 115.
5. Immediately enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with
Guardian Angel Community Services Center in Joliet Illinois,
to provide and offer local victim advocacy and outside
confidential counseling services and support in relation
to sexual abuse and rape crisis intervention and care,
For All Of The Joliet Treatment Center and Victims of
sexual abuse, since they have agreed to provide these
services in these cases.
6. Immediately stop the practice of requiring confidential
counseling relating to sexual abuse to be done in the
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 57 of 58 Page ID #458
visiting room during visitation times with other visitors
and denying vicitms the majority of their visiting priveleges
in order to receive this counseling. These services are
done by volunteers and should be treated, screened, and
allowed in to JTC as such in accordance with Dept. Rules.
7. Immediately arrange for the continuation and initiation
of the services required by plaintiff from GACS in a.
confidential manner in accordance with State law and
sexual abuse counselors requirements.
8. Immediately investigate, review, and issue a determination
on all plaintiffs unresolved grievances to ensure he is
afforded his due process rights and ensure compliance with
departmental policies. Including refer any for futher
investigation. Grievances attached.
(Ex. 1.1 - 17.1)
9. Immediatley have JTC undergo a mandatory PREA Audit Report
performed by a contracted PREA Auditor certified:by the
DOJ. And that plaintiff be included in this Audit.
10. That defendants be put on notice of the probability and
possible retaliation from defendant Myers by and through
her friends and relations that are employed with IDOC
and/or Wexford Health Sources Inc., after Service of this
complaint to defendants.
Wherefore plaintiff Charles A. Mcrae respectfully requests that
this Court grant Injunctive Relief and enter a Judgment in his
favor against defendants named in this complaint awarding :■
compensatory, and punitive damages, attorney fees, and any other
Relief this Court deems appropriate.
$7
Case 3:20-cv-00410-DWD Document 33 Filed 08/23/21 Page 58 of 58 Page ID #459
VERIFICATION OF CERTIFICATION
I Charles A. Mcrae certify to the best of my knowledge, information,
and belief, that this second amended complaint is in full compliance
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ll(a)(b).
Under penalty of perjury the undersigned certifies that the statements
set forth in this second amended complaint are true and correct,
except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief
and as to such matters the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that
he verily believes the same to be true.
Signed and dated this 22nd day of July-2021.
Charles A. Mcrae B62695
2848 W. McDonough Street
Joliet, IL. 60436
PROOF/CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
To: Clerk of Court US Dist. Court 750 Missouri Ave East St. Louis IL.
62201
Please take notice that on July 22, 2021 I Charles A. Mcrae did
place a second amended complaint in the institutional mailbox
w/proof of service at the JTC 2848 W. McDonough Str Joliet IL. 60436
properly addressed to the party listed above for mailing through the
USPS with postage fully prepaid.
Signed this 22nd day of July 2021.
Charles A. Mcrae B62695
2848 W. McDonough Str
Joliet, IL. 60436
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.