Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Chelsea Shannon McIntyre, Petitioner v. United States

No. ___________

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

____________

CHELSEA SHANNON MCINTYRE,

Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

____________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

To the United States Court of Appeals

For the Ninth Circuit

____________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

____________

ANDREA RENEE ST. JULIAN

Counsel of Record

12636 High Bluff Dr., Ste. 400

San Diego, California 92130

(858) 792-6366

astjulian@san.rr.com

Counsel for Petitioner,

CHELSEA SHANNON MCINTYRE

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did Ms. McIntyre receive due process of law where the district

applied Career Offender Guidelines, lacking a sound basis in policy,

and leading to a career offender designation that was based on

insufficiently substantial predicate convictions?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The parties are petitioner, Chelsea Shannon McIntyre, and

respondent, United States of America. All parties appear in the caption

of the case on the cover page.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

OPINIONS BELOW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

A.

Ms. McIntyre’s Personal History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

B.

The Alleged Facts Giving Rise to the Instant

Conviction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Ms. McIntyre’s Complaint, Indictment, Detention,

and Arraignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

C.

D.

Pre-Plea Report and Change of Plea. . . . . . . . . . . . 10

E.

The Sentencing and Appeal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

1.

Ms. McIntyre’s failure to appear at the initial

sentencing hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2.

The presentence reports and sentencing

memoranda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

3.

The sentencing hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

4.

The appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

ii

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

I.

MS. MCINTYRE DID NOT RECEIVE DUE

PROCESS OF LAW WHERE THE DISTRICT

APPLIED CAREER OFFENDER GUIDELINES,

LACKING A SOUND BASIS IN POLICY, AND

LEADING TO A CAREER OFFENDER

DESIGNATION THAT WAS BASED ON

INSUFFICIENTLY SUBSTANTIAL PREDICATE

CONVICTIONS.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

A.

The District Court Was Not Required to Adhere

to the Career Offender Guidelines When

Sentencing Ms. McIntyre.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

B.

The Career Offender Guidelines Lack a Sound

Basis in Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

C.

The Predicate Convictions on Which Ms.

McIntyre’s Career Offender Designation Was

Based Were Insufficiently Substantial to Justify

Her Sentence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

APPENDICES

Appendix A

March 21, 2023, Memorandum of the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2a

Appendix B

February 8, 2022, Judgment of U.S. District Court, Central

District of California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8a

iii

FEDERAL CASES

Hawkins v U.S.,

706 F.3d 820 (7th Cir.2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Johnson v. United States,

135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Nelson v. United States,

555 U.S. 350 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Rita v. United States,

551 U.S. 338 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 29

Spears v. United States,

555 U.S. 261 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

U.S. v Booker,

543 U.S. 220 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

U.S. v Foote,

784 F.3d 931 (4th Cir.2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Gall v U.S.,

552 U.S. 38 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

iv

FEDERAL STATUTES

18 U.S.C § 3553 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

OTHER

U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Report to the Congress:

Career Offender Guidelines Working Group Memorandum,

(Mar. 1988) at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/

research-and-publications/working-groupreports/

miscellaneous/031988_Career_Offender.pdf (Last visited

August 21, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Michael S. Gelacak, Ilene H. Nagel, & Barry L. Johnson,

Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An

Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 299,

356-57 (Dec. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Sentencing Comm'n, Report to the Congress:

Career Offender Sentencing Enhancements, at 2 (Aug.

2016) at https://www.ussc.gov/ sites/default/

files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-andreports/

criminal-history/201607_RtC-Career-Offenders.pdf.. . . . . . 29

U.S.S.C.,

Report to the Congress: Career Offender Sentencing

Enhancements, at 2 (Aug. 2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

v

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Chelsea Shannon McIntyre, respectfully prays that a

writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals, entered in the instant proceeding on March 21, 2023, Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeal No. 22-50019.

OPINIONS BELOW

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an

unpublished memorandum decision in this matter. App. 2a. See

United States v. McIntyre, No. 22-50019, 2023 WL 2584246 (9th Cir. March

21, 2023)(unpublished). The district court order from which Ms.

McIntyre appealed is also unpublished. App. 5a. See United States v.

McIntyre, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, No.

19-cr-00236.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The date on which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals filed its

Memorandum in the instant matter was March 21, 2023. 2b. This Court

has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Amendment V: No person shall be . . .

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

A.

Ms. McIntyre’s Personal History

Ms. McIntyre was born in 1990 to troubled parents, Michele

McIntyre and Orlando Rios. 1-PSRs-17. Michelle was a heroin addict at

the time she gave birth to Ms. McIntyre. Mr. Rios was Michele’s drug

supplier.

Due to her parents’ drug addiction and incarceration for the

possession for sale of cocaine and heroin, Ms. McIntyre was sent to live

with her grandparents when she was one year old. Ms. McIntyre has

seen her father only once when she was 16. 1-PSRs-17

When McIntyre was between the ages of 10 and 12, she went to

live with her mother and younger sisters. Ms. McIntyre had little to no

structure living with her mother, who was in a methadone program and

always sleeping. 1-PSRs-18. Michele’s live-in boyfriend, Dimas Romero,

drank heavily and used drugs throughout the time he lived with the

family. 1-PSRs-18.

3

At the age of 12, Ms. McIntyre began smoking cannabis. That same

year, her 15-year-old boyfriend, Mario Flores, introduced her to

methamphetamines which quickly became her drug of choice. 1-PSRs18. That same year, Ms. McIntyre was introduced to alcohol. 1-PSRs-18.

By the time she was in high school, Ms. McIntyre smoked cannabis with

her mother. 1-PSRs-18.

Ms. McIntyre’s relationship with Mr. Flores lasted from the time

she was 12 until she was 17 years old. The relationship was a violent

one. When Ms. McIntyre was 17, Mr. Flores severely beat her, knocking

her out and leaving bloodied a nose, lips, and a black eye. Ms.

McIntyre’s mother said nothing of the severe beating and made Ms.

McIntyre go to school the next day. 1-PSRs-18.

At the age of 14, Ms. McIntyre became pregnant. 1-PSRs-18. She

and the child’s father decided to terminate the pregnancy. When Ms.

McIntyre was 22 years old, the father of the child was murdered by his

brother in a most gruesome manner. 1-PSRs-18-19; 3-ER 247. Ms.

4

McIntyre was required to testify at the murder trial. The murder and

having to testify traumatized her. She mourned the death of the child’s

father and regretted having had an abortion. 1-PSRs-18-19.

At the age of 23, Ms. McIntyre entered a drug rehabilitation center

for the first time. Two years later, however, Ms. McIntyre suffered yet

another devastating loss. Her Aunt, Doris Miles, who had treated Ms.

McIntyre like a daughter, died a sudden and untimely death. 1-PSRs-19.

Ms. McIntyre increased her methamphetamine use to cope. 1-PSRs-19.

Aunt Doris’s death was on the heals of the sudden and untimely death

of Ms. McIntyre’s uncle, Bob. 3-ER 240-241, 247.

At 28 years of age, Ms. McIntyre attempted to enter a facility

rehabilitation for a second time, after having resided in a sober living

facility the year before. 1-PSRs-19-20. There was, however, no space for

her. 3-ER-247.

In June 2020, Ms. McIntyre successfully entered residential

treatment where she participated in weekly treatment groups in areas

5

such as Living in Balance, Matrix, Anger Management, Seeking Safety,

Clean and Sober Parenting, and Nurturing Parenting. McIntyre tested

negative for all substances, was

helpful to the other women, and participated in social support through

virtual support groups. The same month she entered the treatment

program, she gave birth to her first child, a daughter. 1-PSRs-19, 20.

Following her July 2020 discharge from treatment, Ms. McIntyre

went to live with her maternal grandparents. 1-PSRs-19. She spent time

with her grandparents, buying groceries for them and helping them

clean and landscape their rental properties. 1-PSRs-19. She did

everything to help take care of her elderly grandparents included buying

their clothes, cooking for them and helping them to stay organized. 3ER-248, 303.

While living with her grandparents, Ms. McIntyre also took care of

her daughter and worked to be the mother she never had. She was

motivated to be a good role model, stay clean, and live a law abiding life.

6

She did not want to miss any more years of her daughter’s upbringing

than she had to. 1-PSRs-19.

Ms. McIntyre took easily to caring for her grandparents because of

her work history. She has a GED and also a food handler’s license. Thus

her employment history includes work in the hotel, restaurant and spa

industries. 1-PSRs-21.

Ms. McIntyre has suffered from mental health issues since

childhood, leading her to feel manic and restless at times. She did not,

however, seek treatment for it until June 1, 2020 when she began

attending weekly treatment groups in areas that address emotional

health. 1-PSRs-20. Eventually, Ms. McIntyre was diagnosed as having a

bipolar disorder that included mania and depression 3-ER-251, 253. She

was prescribed mental health medication. 2-ER-65-66, 83.

Ms. McIntyre also suffers from high blood pressure, which was

exacerbated by her pregnancy. 1-PSRs-19. The pregnancy also caused

Ms. McIntyre to suffer postpartum depression. 3-ER-253.

7

B.

The Alleged Facts Giving Rise to the Instant Conviction

On January 30, 2019, local law enforcement from San Luis Obispo

conducted a traffic stop of driver, Rudolfo Cerda. 1-PSRs-6; 2-ER 216 .At

the time of the stop, an officer observed that Mr. Cerda gave something

to Ms. McIntyre who was the passenger. 1-PSRs-6; 2-ER-217. Upon

questioning Mr. Cerda, the officer learned that Mr. Cerda was on parole.

2-ER-217.

The officer who conducted the stop alleged that she viewed a

hypodermic needle with no cap in the back passenger seat. The officer

further alleged that brown liquid inside the needle was consistent with

heroin. 1-PSRs-6; 2-ER-96.

During a pat-down search of Ms. McIntyre, the officer allegedly

encountered a large bulge in her waistband. The bulge contained what

the officer believed was a white rock-like substance consistent with

methamphetamine. The officer also allegedly retrieved a glass pipe with

white residue inside and a small baggie with a black tar substance the

8

officer believed was consistent with heroin from Ms. McIntyre’s

waistband. 1-PSRs-6; 2-ER-219-221. Law enforcement alleged that, in a

Mirandized interview, Ms. McIntyre stated that the methamphetamine

belonged to her. 2-ER-220-221.

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) laboratory report of

the substances collected from the stop reflected that the substance

contained methamphetamine with a total net weight of 88.3 grams, with

a purity of 100%, resulting in 88.3 grams of actual methamphetamine. 1PSRs-6; 2-ER-128.

C.

Ms. McIntyre’s Complaint, Indictment, Detention, and

Arraignment

On March 18, 2019, a Complaint was filed in the Central District of

California charging Ms. McIntyre with Possession with Intent to

Distribute a Controlled Substance under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On April

18, 2019, the local U.S. attorney filed an Indictment, alleging Possession

9

with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A)(viii). 2-ER-178.

Following her arrest, the government requested that Ms. McIntyre

be detained. 2-ER-208. The district court denied that request and set bail

at $25,000. 2-ER-186-187, 200. At the detention hearing, Ms. McIntyre

waived her right to a preliminary hearing. 2-ER-184-185, 205. At

arraignment, Ms. McIntyre pleaded not guilty. 2-ER-171 175.

D.

Pre-Plea Report and Change of Plea

On January 20, 2020, the district court ordered that probation

prepare a Pre-Plea Presentence Report, which was completed on May 21,

2020. 1-PSRs-51; 2-ER-140. On February 14, 2020, the parties filed a joint

statement regarding Ms. McIntyre’s Rule 11 plea. 2-ER-125. The parties

did not, however, enter into a plea agreement. 1-PSRs-6. Thus, Ms.

McIntyre entered an open plea. 2-ER-109, 115.

On February 18, 2020, Ms. McIntyre pleaded guilty to the single

10

count of the Indictment. 2-ER-104, 117. The district court found that Ms.

McIntyre knowingly and voluntarily waived her rights and thus it

accepted Ms. McIntyre’s guilty plea. 2-ER-117.

At the time of the change of plea hearing, Ms. McIntyre was

pregnant. The district court set her sentencing date for October 2020 so

that she could have her baby prior to sentencing while she was out on

bail. 2-ER-117-118. The sentencing hearing was later continued to

February 16, 2021. 2-ER-79.

E.

The Sentencing and Appeal

1.

Ms. McIntyre’s failure to appear at the initial

sentencing hearing

On the day of her February 16, 2021 sentencing hearing, Ms.

McIntyre failed to appear. On that same day, she absconded from

pretrial supervision and location monitoring by removing her GPS

11

tracker. She remained a fugitive until she was arrested on a bench

warrant on August 5, 2021. 2-ER-72-75 1-PSRs-8.

The psychiatrist who evaluated Ms. McIntyre following her rearrest noted that Ms. McIntyre’s behaviors in absconding were very

much in keeping with her then untreated mental health issues:

Chelsea McIntyre's descriptions of her mood

during her pregnancy and in the postpartum,

which included symptoms of detachment, panic,

crying, feelings of hopelessness, spontaneous

crying, obsessive worry and intrusive images are

consistent with a diagnosis of a perinatal mood

disorder. At the time of the arrest, in a manic

state, she acted impulsively by cutting off her

ankle monitor without any reflection about the

possible consequences of her actions.

3-ER-253.

The evaluating psychiatrist further found that Ms. McIntyre’s

bipolar illness had been exacerbated by her long-term use of

methamphetamine. In this regard, methamphetamine use has been

found to aggravate mood swings, increase irritability, and inter alia,

12

negatively impact a user’s reasoning abilities. 3-ER-254.

While Ms. McIntyre was absent from custody, her mental health

continued to deteriorate. She contemplated suicide. 3-ER-41, 249-250. In

this regard she started consuming fentanyl for the first time, “hoping to

die.” 3-ER-241-249.

The evaluating psychiatrist ultimately concluded:

Chelsea McIntyre's mental disease is manageable

and controllable with appropriate

pharmacological and psychological intervention.

Patients have the potential to live fully productive

lives when bipolar disorder is effectively treated.

With proper rehabilitation, her substance use

disorder can also be addressed. She has shown

that she can maintain sobriety.

3-ER-254.

13

2.

The presentence reports and sentencing memoranda

a.

The presentence reports

The Office of Probation prepared a pre-plea report, a presentence

report, a revised presentence report, and three addenda. 1-PSRs-3, 27, 28,

29, 51. The final Presentence Report (PSR) calculated Ms. McIntyre’s

sentencing guideline range based on the following determinations.

Base Offense Level (Guideline §2d1.1) 30

Obstruction of Justice

+2

Adjusted Offense Level

32

Career Offender

37

Total Offense Level

37

Criminal History Category

VI

1-PSRs-5.

The addition of two points for obstruction of justice was based on

Ms. McIntyre absconding while out on bail. 1-PSRs-8. The Career

Offender designation was based on two previous convictions, one of

14

which was considered a crime of violence and the other of which was a

controlled substance offense. 1-PSRs-8-9. The first conviction had taken

place in 2008 shortly after Ms. McIntyre turned 18 years old. Ms.

McIntyre was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon or instrument

other than a firearm or by means of force likely to produce great bodily

injury, California Penal Code § 245(a)(1). This conviction was based on a

minor altercation with her mother while Ms. McIntyre was intoxicated

from alcohol. 1-PSRs-10. The second conviction was for possession of a

controlled substance (morphine) for sale (California Health & Safety

Code, § 11378), which occurred in September 2012. 1-PSRs-11.

Because of the Career Offender designation, Ms. McIntyre’s

Criminal History Category became a level VI. This produced a guideline

imprisonment range of 360 months to life with five years of supervised

release. 1-PSRs-5, 22. The statutory minimum for Ms. McIntyre’s offense

was ten years incarceration with a maxim term of imprisonment being

life. 1-PSRs-21.

15

Ms. McIntyre’s criminal history included a June 2012 conviction for

possession of a controlled substance, a 2012 conviction for shoplifting a

makeup bag, and a conviction for receiving stolen property and for

using another’s ID (California Penal Code, §§ 496(a) and 530.5(a).) 1PSRs-11-13. The PSR listed the probation violations that were associated

with these convictions, and also additional arrests. 1-PSRs-12-19.

Probation opined that there were factors that may have warranted

a downward departure. 1-PSR-23. Probation indicated that, besides the

ten-year old incident with her mother when Ms. McIntyre was just 18,

Ms. McIntyre had no violent offenses. 1-PSR-23. Additionally, Ms.

McIntyre’s lengthiest prior sentence imposed was for two years in 2010.

Probation also noted that Ms. McIntyre “. . .has recently participated in

treatment, gave birth, and assists her elderly grandparents.” 1-PSR-23.

Thus, Probation concluded that Ms McIntyre’s “. . . criminal history

category may be overstated.” 1-PSR-24.

b.

The government’s sentencing position

16

The government submitted its sentencing position before Ms.

McIntyre absconded and thus based its position on the original

presentence report filed. 2-ER-93. In that position statement, the

government recommended that the district court impose a 262-month

term of imprisonment. 2-ER-99. At Ms. McIntyre’s ultimate sentencing

hearing, the government continued to recommend a sentence of 262

months. 1-ER-21.

c.

Ms. McIntyre’s sentencing position

Ms. McIntyre, in a supplemental position paper, explained that the

district court should not apply the career offender guidelines and

instead sentence her to 138 months – fifteen months more than the tenyear mandatory minimum sentence for a career offender. 1-ER-15; 3-ER236.

Ms. McIntyre based her argument on the following reasons:

#

A ten-year sentence was a low-end

guideline sentence and the mandatory

17

minimum.

#

Ms. McIntyre’s background contained

myriad mitigating circumstances.

#

Ms. McIntyre was a new mother that had

made recent successful efforts to improve

her life for the better.

#

Ms. McIntyre was a drug addict and the

instant offense was a manifestation of that.

#

Ms. McIntyre was neither a kingpin nor a

sophisticated drug dealer and at most, was a

low-level street dealer.

#

Ms. McIntyre would be facing less time if

she committed a violent offense, including

voluntary manslaughter.

#

The longest period in custody Ms. McIntyre

had ever served was two years (over 10

18

years prior to her conviction in this matter).

#

The facts of the predicate priors were

mitigating and did not justify a career

offender designation since one offense

occurred a month after Ms. McIntyre turned

18 and the other involved small amounts of

drugs.

#

The methamphetamine guidelines are overly

harsh with the mandatory minimum and

more than sufficient in this case.

#

Ms. McIntyre attempted to cooperate in

good faith, evidencing that she is reformed

and unlikely to reoffend.

#

A sentence of more than 10 years will derail

any progress that Ms. McIntyre has made

since a lengthy prison term makes it more

19

difficult for a defendant to assimilate back

into society.

3-ER-271-272.

Ms. McIntyre further based her request on the facts that:

#

She did not flee the state or county when she

absconded.

#

She suffers from a number of mental health

issues and trauma that, prior to absconding,

had not been properly treated.

3-ER-236-237.

In requesting that the district court not apply the career offender

guideline, Ms. McIntyre explained that without that designation, her

sentencing guideline range would have been 120 to 150 months. 3-ER200, 237; 3-ER 273.

20

3.

The sentencing hearing

On February 7. 2022, the district court sentenced Ms. McIntyre to a

210-month term of imprisonment. 1-ER-2, 8. In arriving at Ms.

McIntyre’s sentence, the district court found that Probation had correctly

calculated Ms. McIntyre’ sentencing guideline range which resulted in a

suggested sentence of 262 to 273 months. 1-ER-22.

In explaining the sentence it would imposed on Ms. McIntyre, the

district court stated that it would vary from the guideline range. In this

regard, the district court stated that the sentence, which was 52 months

below the lowest guideline range, was the equivalent of a two-level

downward departure. 1-ER-27. The district court felt the variance was

appropriate because:

#

Ms. McIntyre did attempt to cooperate with law enforcement;

#

Her longest sentence, which had been imposed ten years

earlier, had only been two years; and,

21

#

Her background was particularly troubled.

1-ER-22-23, 27-28.

4.

The appeal

Ms. McIntyre filed a timely notice of appeal of the judgment on

February 9, 2022. 2-ER-223. The Court of Appeals filed an unpublished

memorandum affirming Ms. McIntyre’s conviction on March 21, 2023.

22

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

MS. MCINTYRE DID NOT RECEIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW

WHERE THE DISTRICT APPLIED CAREER OFFENDER

GUIDELINES, LACKING A SOUND BASIS IN POLICY, AND

LEADING TO A CAREER OFFENDER DESIGNATION THAT

WAS BASED ON INSUFFICIENTLY SUBSTANTIAL

PREDICATE CONVICTIONS.

At her sentencing hearing, Ms. McIntyre requested that the district

court consider but ultimately reject a custodial sentence based on her

designation as career offender. Specifically, Ms. McIntyre requested that

the district court exercise its discretion and not apply the career offender

guidelines to her. 3-ER-238. In so requesting, Ms. McIntyre pointed out

that the career offender guidelines are not sufficiently grounded in

policy nor do the guidelines, as applied to her, accurately reflect the

23

predicate convictions on which her designation at a career offender were

based. Consequently, application of the career offender guidelines

gravely over-sentenced her.

Despite the circumstances of Ms. McIntyre’s sentencing, the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction and the corresponding

sentence. The district court sentence and the Ninth Circuit’s decision

lacked sufficient legal authority and was thus a violation of Ms.

McIntyre’s due process rights.

24

A.

The District Court Was Not Required to Adhere to the

Career Offender Guidelines When Sentencing Ms.

McIntyre.

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory,

and though district courts must take them into account, they are not

bound by them. U.S. v Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). District courts may not

presume that a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable. Nelson v.

United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009). Rather, district courts must make

their own independent determination that a Guidelines sentence

comports with the sentencing standards of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), even a

sentence based on a career offender designation. See U.S. v. Foote, 784

F.3d 931, 943 (4th Cir.2015); See also Hawkins v U.S., 706 F.3d 820, 832 (7th

Cir.2013). District courts are thus empowered to vary below the low end

of the career offender guideline. See U.S. v Gillis, 592 F.3d 696, 698 (6th

Cir.2009); To similar effect see, Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264

25

(2009).

26

B.

The Career Offender Guidelines Lack a Sound Basis in

Policy.

As discussed more fully in the immediately following subsection of

this petition, the application of the career offender guidelines caused Ms.

McIntyre’s sentence to be wildly out of proportion to the realities of her

criminal history and the crime of which she was convicted in the instant

matter. The application of the career offender guidelines to Ms.

McIntyre had a dramatic effect on her guidelines range. Without a career

offender designation, Ms. McIntyre’s suggested guidelines range would

have been 120 to 150 months for a custodial sentence. The application of

the career offender designation increased the guidelines range to 262 to

327 months of incarceration. This is a more than a doubling of the

suggested guidelines sentencing. The unreasonable nature of this

doubling can be found in the lack of reasoned policy underlying the

career offender designation.

27

The career offender guidelines are based solely on congressional

dictate rather than the Federal Sentencing Commission’s normal process

of studying empirical data. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Report to the

Congress: Career Offender Sentencing Enhancements (Aug. 2016) pp.

12-14 at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/

news/congressional-testimony-andreports/criminal-history/201607_RtCCareer-Offenders.pdf. (Last visited August 21, 2022). In other words, the

career offender guideline resulted from congressional directive rather

than resulting from “careful study based on extensive empirical

evidence derived from review of thousands of individual sentencing

decisions.” Gall v U.S., 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). Because the Sentencing

Commission created the career offender guideline in the absence of

empirical support, the Commission deviated from its primary mission to

promulgate “a set of Guidelines that seek to embody the § 3553(a)

considerations, both in principle and in practice.” Rita v. United States,

28

551 U.S. 338, 349 (2007).

The Commission not only failed to rely on empirical evidence of

pre-guidelines practice, but it also failed to review and revise the career

offender guideline in light of later judicial decisions, sentencing data,

and comments from experts in the field. Indeed, almost ten years before

Booker, a study of downward departures found “extensive use of

[downward] departures from sentences generated by the career offender

provisions,” and these were “quite substantial,” “typically” to the

sentence that would have applied

absent the career offender provision. See Michael S. Gelacak, Ilene H.

Nagel, & Barry L. Johnson, Departures Under the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines: An Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 299,

356-357 (Dec. 1996). One reason for

such departures was that the predicates were “minor or too remote in

time to warrant consideration.” Id. at 357. But the Commission has not

29

reexamined or revised the career offender guideline, other than to

expand its reach in several ways after its initial creation and address the

Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551

(2015), regarding crimes of violence.

The Commission’s failure to remedy the problems many courts

have identified with the career offender guideline is highlighted by the

Commission itself having recognized that the guideline is flawed. A 1988

Commission study concluded that the career offender guideline “makes

no distinction between defendants convicted of the same offenses, either

as to the seriousness of their instant offense or their previous convictions

. . . even if one defendant was a drug ‘kingpin’ with serious prior

offenses, while the other defendant was a low-level street dealer [with]

two prior convictions for distributing small amounts of drugs.” U.S.

Sentencing Comm'n, Report to the Congress: Career Offender Guidelines

Working Group Memorandum, p. 13 (Mar. 1988) at

30

https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/

research-and-publications/working-groupreports/miscellaneous/031988_

Career_Offender.pdf (Last visited August 21, 2022).

In 2016, the Commission acknowledged “concerns that the career

offender directive fails to meaningfully distinguish among career

offenders with different types of criminal records and has resulted in

overly severe penalties for some offenders.” U.S. Sentencing Comm'n,

Report to the Congress: Career Offender Sentencing Enhancements, at 2

(Aug. 2016) at https://www.ussc.gov/

U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Report to the Congress: sites/default/

files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-andreports/criminal-history/201

607_RtC-Career-Offenders.pdf. (Last visited August 21, 2022). Likely

with those concerns in mind, district courts are more frequently

sentencing career offenders well below the career offender guideline

range. “[T]he proportion of career offenders sentenced within the

31

applicable guideline range. . . decreased from 43.3 percent in fiscal year

2005 to 27.5 percent in fiscal year 2014.” Id. at 22.

Despite the deep concerns regarding the career offender

guidelines, the Commission did nothing to address them. Because of the

Commission’s refusal to revise the career offender guidelines even

though they were not based on empirical evidence or past practice, the

career offender guidelines do not provide even a rough approximation

of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)’s objectives. United States v. Rita, 551 U.S. 338, 350

(2007).

A number of courts have rejected the career offender guidelines on

policy grounds. See, e.g., U.S. v Mitchell, 624 F.3d 1023, 1028-1030 (9th

Cir. 2010); U.S. v Newhouse, 919 F. Supp.2d 955 (N.D. Iowa 2013) wherein

the court systematically deconstructed the career offender guideline and

concluded that it raises “a specter of aperiodic, irrational, and arbitrary

sentencing guideline ranges”; Id. at 967-968 listing courts that have

32

varied from the career offender guideline on policy and

individual-defendant grounds. As discussed more fully in the following

subsection, the irrational and arbitrary nature of the application of the

career offender guidelines to Ms. McIntyre was a due process violation

that provides a compelling reason for the grant of the instant petition.

33

C.

The Predicate Convictions on Which Ms. McIntyre’s Career

Offender Designation Was Based Were Insufficiently

Substantial to Justify Her Sentence.

Ms. McIntyre’s predicate convictions were both relatively minor

and remote in time. For these reasons the more than two-fold increase in

her sentencing guidelines range was wholly unwarranted and

constituted a due process violation.

The first predicate conviction occurred in 2008. At that time, Ms.

McIntyre was a high school student who lived with her mother. 1-PSRs28; 3-ER-295. One month after turning 18, Ms. McIntyre came home

intoxicated. 1-PSRs-18; 3-ER-238, 278, 284, 295. She went to bed, but her

mother angrily woke Ms. McIntyre from a deep sleep. 3-ER-295. In her

confused state, Ms. McIntyre struck her mother. 3-ER-295. Ms.

McIntyre’s mother admitted to law enforcement that she was the

aggressor, not Ms. McIntyre. 1-PSRs-218; 3-ER-238, 295. Ms. McIntyre

34

was criminally charged, resulting in a 2008 conviction for assault. 1-PSRs

10, 18; 3-ER 238. She was given a sentence of three years of probation

and 45 days in county jail. 1-PSRs-10.

Ms. McIntyre was so intoxicated at the time of the 2008 incident

that she does not remember it. Afterward, Ms. McIntyre felt extremely

remorseful, apologized to her mother, and never drank alcohol again. 1PSRs-18; 3-ER-295. Thus, the altercation was a one-time, isolated

incident never repeated that took place ten years prior to the incident

giving rise to the instant proceeding. 3-ER-278, 295.

The second offense that counted as a predicate conviction for the

career offender designation is a 2012 controlled substance for sale

offense. The offense involved small amounts of heroin (3.13 grams) and

methamphetamine (13 grams) and occurred more than eight years prior

to sentencing in this matter. 1-PSRs-11 Ms. McIntyre received a sentence

of three years of probation and 180 days in county jail. 1-PSRs-11.

35

Defendants, such as Ms. McIntyre, who only marginally fit within

the career offender guideline should not bear the full weight its

directives. As has been noted:

[D]istrict courts should not be overly shy about

concluding that particular defendants . . . do not

have the profile Congress and the Commission

had in mind when they directed that sentences for

career drug offenders be set at or near the top of

the statutory range. Booker discretion is at its

zenith when sentencing courts make the judgment

that the particular conduct of the defendant falls

only marginally within the scope of a guideline

that even the Commission regards as overbroad

and (in some applications) counter-productive.

United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1172 (10th Cir. 2007).

Because of two relatively minor convictions both of which were

remote in time, the Sentencing Guidelines led to Ms. McIntyre being

designated a career offender. In both cases, Ms. McIntyre received a

sentence of probation and minimal county jail time. These factors, taken

together, reflect that the two crimes were simply not serious enough to

36

warrant a designation of career offender. Thus, the district court’s heavy

reliance on the career offender designation prevented Ms. McIntyre from

receiving fair and just treatment under the law. This violation of due

process is a compelling reason to grant the instant petion.

37

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari

should be granted.

Dated: June 5, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Andrea R. St. Julian

Andrea R. St. Julian

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant,

CHELSEA SHANNON MCINTYRE

38

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

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APPENDIX B

4a

Case 2:19-cr-00236-RGK Document 94 Filed 02/08/22 Page 1 of 6 Page ID #:357

JS-3

United States District Court

Central District of California

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs.

Defendant

Docket No.

CHELSEA SHANNON MCINTYRE

2:19-cr-00236-RGK

Social Security No. 1

2

8

9

(Last 4 digits)

akas:

In the presence of the attorney for the government, the defendant appeared in person on this date.

COUNSEL

MONTH

DAY

YEAR

FEB

7

2022

NEHA CHRISTERNA, DFPD

(Name of Counsel)

PLEA

X GUILTY, and the court being satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.

NOLO

CONTENDERE

NOT

GUILTY

There being a finding/verdict of GUILTY, defendant has been convicted as charged of the offense(s) of:

Possession with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 USC 841(a)(1)(b)(1)(A)(viii), as charged in Count

One of the Indictment

JUDGMENT The Court asked whether there was any reason why judgment should not be pronounced. Because no sufficient cause to the

AND PROB/ contrary was shown, or appeared to the Court, the Court adjudged the defendant guilty as charged and convicted and ordered that:

Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, it is the judgment of the Court that the defendant is hereby committed to the

COMM

custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of:

ORDER

FINDING

TWO HUNDRED TEN (210) MONTHS

It is ordered that the defendant shall pay to the United States a special assessment of $100, which is due

immediately. Any unpaid balance shall be due during the period of imprisonment, at the rate of not less than $25 per

quarter, and pursuant to the Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.

Pursuant to Guideline §5E1.2(a), all fines are waived as the Court finds that the defendant has established that

she is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine.

The Court recommends that the Bureau of Prisons conduct a mental health evaluation of the defendant and

provide all necessary treatment.

Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, it is the judgment of the Court that the defendant, Chelsea

Shannon McIntyre, is hereby committed on Count 1 of the Indictment to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a

term of TWO HUNDRED TEN (210) MONTHS.

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be placed on supervised release for a term of FIVE (5)

YEARS under the following terms and conditions:

1.

The defendant shall comply with the rules and regulations of the United States Probation Office and Second

Amended General Order 20-04.

CR-104 (wpd 12/20)

JUDGMENT & PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER

5a

Page 1 of 6

Case 2:19-cr-00236-RGK Document 94 Filed 02/08/22 Page 2 of 6 Page ID #:358

USA vs.

CHELSEA SHANNON MCINTYRE

Docket No.:

2:19-cr-00236-RGK

2.

During the period of community supervision, the defendant shall pay the special assessment in accordance with

this judgment's orders pertaining to such payment.

3.

The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample from the defendant.

4.

The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug

test within 15 days of release from custody and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, not to exceed eight tests

per month, as directed by the Probation Officer.

5.

The defendant shall participate in an outpatient substance abuse treatment and counseling program that includes

urinalysis, breath and/or sweat patch testing, as directed by the Probation Officer. The defendant shall abstain from

using alcohol and illicit drugs, and from abusing prescription medications during the period of supervision.

6.

During the course of supervision, the Probation Officer, with the agreement of the defendant and defense counsel,

may place the defendant in a residential drug treatment program approved by the U.S. Probation and Pretrial

Services Office for treatment of narcotic addiction or drug dependency, which may include counseling and testing,

to determine if the defendant has reverted to the use of drugs. The defendant shall reside in the treatment program

until discharged by the Program Director and Probation Officer.

7.

The defendant shall participate in mental health treatment, which may include evaluation and counseling, until

discharged from the program by the treatment provider, with the approval of the Probation Officer.

8.

As directed by the Probation Officer, the defendant shall pay all or part of the costs of the Court-ordered treatment

to the aftercare contractors during the period of community supervision. The defendant shall provide payment and

proof of payment as directed by the Probation Officer. If the defendant has no ability to pay, no payment shall be

required.

9.

The defendant shall submit the defendant's person, property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, computers (as

defined in 18 USC 1030(e)(1)), cell phones other electronic communications or data storage devices or media, email

accounts, social media accounts, cloud storage accounts, or other areas under the defendant's control, to a search

conducted by a United States Probation Officer or law enforcement officer. Failure to submit to a search may be

grounds for revocation. The defendant shall warn any other occupants that the premises may be subject to searches

pursuant to this condition. Any search pursuant to this condition will be conducted at a reasonable time and in a

reasonable manner upon reasonable suspicion that the defendant has violated a condition of her supervision and that

the areas to be searched contain evidence of this violation.

10.

The defendant shall not obtain or possess any driver's license, Social Security number, birth certificate, passport

or any other form of identification in any name, other than the defendant's true legal name, nor shall the defendant

use, any name other than the defendant's true legal name without the prior written approval of the Probation Officer.

The Court recommends that the Bureau of Prisons consider the defendant for placement in its Residential Drug

Abuse Program (RDAP).

CR-104 (wpd 12/20)

JUDGMENT & PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER

6a

Page 2 of 6

Case 2:19-cr-00236-RGK Document 94 Filed 02/08/22 Page 3 of 6 Page ID #:359

USA vs.

CHELSEA SHANNON MCINTYRE

Docket No.:

2:19-cr-00236-RGK

The Court authorizes the Probation & Pretrial Services Office to disclose the Presentence Report to the substance

abuse treatment provider to facilitate the defendant's treatment for narcotic addiction or drug dependency. Further

redisclosure of the Presentence Report by the treatment provider is prohibited without the consent of the sentencing judge.

The Court authorizes the Probation Officer to disclose the Presentence Report, and any previous mental health

evaluations or reports, to the treatment provider. The treatment provider may provide information (excluding the

Presentence report), to State or local social service agencies (such as the State of California, Department of Social Service),

for the purpose of the client's rehabilitation.

The Court recommends that the defendant be designated to a Bureau of Prisons facility in Southern California and

has no objection to Dublin.

The defendant is advised of her right to appeal.

In addition to the special conditions of supervision imposed above, it is hereby ordered that the Standard Conditions of Probation and

Supervised Release within this judgment be imposed. The Court may change the conditions of supervision, reduce or extend the period of

supervision, and at any time during the supervision period or within the maximum period permitted by law, may issue a warrant and revoke

supervision for a violation occurring during the supervision period.

February 8, 2022

Date

R. Gary Klausner, United States District Judge

It is ordered that the Clerk deliver a copy of this Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order to the U.S. Marshal or other qualified officer.

Clerk, U.S. District Court

February 8, 2022

Filed Date

CR-104 (wpd 12/20)

By

/s/ Sharon L. Williams

Deputy Clerk

JUDGMENT & PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER

7a

Page 3 of 6

Case 2:19-cr-00236-RGK Document 94 Filed 02/08/22 Page 4 of 6 Page ID #:360

USA vs.

CHELSEA SHANNON MCINTYRE

Docket No.:

2:19-cr-00236-RGK

The defendant must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court (set forth below).

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF PROBATION AND SUPERVISED RELEASE

While the defendant is on probation or supervised release pursuant to this judgment:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

The defendant must not commit another federal, state, or local

crime;

The defendant must report to the probation office in the federal

judicial district of residence within 72 hours of imposition of a

sentence of probation or release from imprisonment, unless

otherwise directed by the probation officer;

The defendant must report to the probation office as instructed by

the court or probation officer;

The defendant must not knowingly leave the judicial district

without first receiving the permission of the court or probation

officer;

The defendant must answer truthfully the inquiries of the probation

officer, unless legitimately asserting his or her Fifth Amendment

right against self-incrimination as to new criminal conduct;

The defendant must reside at a location approved by the probation

officer and must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before

any anticipated change or within 72 hours of an unanticipated

change in residence or persons living in defendant’s residence;

The defendant must permit the probation officer to contact him or

her at any time at home or elsewhere and must permit confiscation

of any contraband prohibited by law or the terms of supervision and

observed in plain view by the probation officer;

The defendant must work at a lawful occupation unless excused by

the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable

reasons and must notify the probation officer at least ten days

before any change in employment or within 72 hours of an

unanticipated change;

CR-104 (wpd 12/20)

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

The defendant must not knowingly associate with any persons engaged

in criminal activity and must not knowingly associate with any person

convicted of a felony unless granted permission to do so by the probation

officer. This condition will not apply to intimate family members, unless

the court has completed an individualized review and has determined

that the restriction is necessary for protection of the community or

rehabilitation;

The defendant must refrain from excessive use of alcohol and must not

purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any narcotic or other

controlled substance, or any paraphernalia related to such substances,

except as prescribed by a physician;

The defendant must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of being

arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer;

For felony cases, the defendant must not possess a firearm, ammunition,

destructive device, or any other dangerous weapon;

The defendant must not act or enter into any agreement with a law

enforcement agency to act as an informant or source without the

permission of the court;

The defendant must follow the instructions of the probation officer to

implement the orders of the court, afford adequate deterrence from

criminal conduct, protect the public from further crimes of the

defendant; and provide the defendant with needed educational or

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the

most effective manner.

JUDGMENT & PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER

8a

Page 4 of 6

Case 2:19-cr-00236-RGK Document 94 Filed 02/08/22 Page 5 of 6 Page ID #:361

The defendant must also comply with the following special conditions (set forth below).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO PAYMENT AND COLLECTION OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

The defendant must pay interest on a fine or restitution of more than $2,500, unless the court waives interest or unless the fine or

restitution is paid in full before the fifteenth (15th) day after the date of the judgment under 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(1). Payments may be subject

to penalties for default and delinquency under 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g). Interest and penalties pertaining to restitution, however, are not

applicable for offenses completed before April 24, 1996. Assessments, restitution, fines, penalties, and costs must be paid by certified check

or money order made payable to “Clerk, U.S. District Court.” Each certified check or money order must include the case name and number.

Payments must be delivered to:

United States District Court, Central District of California

Attn: Fiscal Department

255 East Temple Street, Room 1178

Los Angeles, CA 90012

or such other address as the Court may in future direct.

If all or any portion of a fine or restitution ordered remains unpaid after the termination of supervision, the defendant must pay the

balance as directed by the United States Attorney’s Office. 18 U.S.C. § 3613.

The defendant must notify the United States Attorney within thirty (30) days of any change in the defendant’s mailing address or

residence address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments are paid in full. 18 U.S.C. § 3612(b)(l)(F).

The defendant must notify the Court (through the Probation Office) and the United States Attorney of any material change in the

defendant’s economic circumstances that might affect the defendant’s ability to pay a fine or restitution, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k).

The Court may also accept such notification from the government or the victim, and may, on its own motion or that of a party or the victim,

adjust the manner of payment of a fine or restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(3) and for probation 18 U.S.C.

§ 3563(a)(7).

Payments will be applied in the following order:

1. Special assessments under 18 U.S.C. § 3013;

2. Restitution, in this sequence (under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all non-federal victims must be paid before the United

States is paid):

Non-federal victims (individual and corporate),

Providers of compensation to non-federal victims,

The United States as victim;

3. Fine;

4. Community restitution, under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(c); and

5. Other penalties and costs.

CONDITIONS OF PROBATION AND SUPERVISED RELEASE PERTAINING TO FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

As directed by the Probation Officer, the defendant must provide to the Probation Officer: (1) a signed release authorizing credit

report inquiries; (2) federal and state income tax returns or a signed release authorizing their disclosure and (3) an accurate financial

statement, with supporting documentation as to all assets, income and expenses of the defendant. In addition, the defendant must not apply

for any loan or open any line of credit without prior approval of the Probation Officer.

When supervision begins, and at any time thereafter upon request of the Probation Officer, the defendant must produce to the

Probation and Pretrial Services Office records of all bank or investments accounts to which the defendant has access, including any business

or trust accounts. Thereafter, for the term of supervision, the defendant must notify and receive approval of the Probation Office in advance

of opening a new account or modifying or closing an existing one, including adding or deleting signatories; changing the account number or

name, address, or other identifying information affiliated with the account; or any other modification. If the Probation Office approves the

new account, modification or closing, the defendant must give the Probation Officer all related account records within 10 days of opening,

modifying or closing the account. The defendant must not direct or ask anyone else to open or maintain any account on the defendant’s

behalf.

The defendant must not transfer, sell, give away, or otherwise convey any asset with a fair market value in excess of $500 without

approval of the Probation Officer until all financial obligations imposed by the Court have been satisfied in full.

These conditions are in addition to any other conditions imposed by this judgment.

CR-104 (wpd 12/20)

JUDGMENT & PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER

9a

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USA vs.

Case 2:19-cr-00236-RGK Document 94 Filed 02/08/22 Page 6 of 6 Page ID #:362

CHELSEA SHANNON MCINTYRE

Docket No.:

2:19-cr-00236-RGK

RETURN

I have executed the within Judgment and Commitment as follows:

Defendant delivered on

to

Defendant noted on appeal on

Defendant released on

Mandate issued on

Defendant’s appeal determined on

Defendant delivered on

to

at

the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons, with a certified copy of the within Judgment and Commitment.

United States Marshal

By

Date

Deputy Marshal

CERTIFICATE

I hereby attest and certify this date that the foregoing document is a full, true and correct copy of the original on file in my office, and in my

legal custody.

Clerk, U.S. District Court

By

Filed Date

Deputy Clerk

FOR U.S. PROBATION OFFICE USE ONLY

Upon a finding of violation of probation or supervised release, I understand that the court may (1) revoke supervision, (2) extend the term of

supervision, and/or (3) modify the conditions of supervision.

These conditions have been read to me. I fully understand the conditions and have been provided a copy of them.

(Signed)

CR-104 (wpd 12/20)

Defendant

Date

U. S. Probation Officer/Designated Witness

Date

JUDGMENT & PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER

10a

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