Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Annecia M. Fort, Petitioner v. Department of Labor, et al.

*■<*

!

USCA11 Case: 20-13998

V

,

Document: 1-3

Date Filed* 10/23/2020

Page: 1 of 4

I

w

U.S. Department of Labor

Administrative Review Board

200 Constitution Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20210-0001

In the Matter of:

ANNE CIA M. FORT,

COMPLAINANT,

v.

ARB CASE NO. 2018-0026

ALJ CASE NO. 2017-STA-00028

DATE: October 1, 2020

LANDSTAR TRANSPORTATION

LOGISTICS, INC.,

RESPONDENT.

BEFORE:

THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD

Appearances:

For the Complainant:

Annecia M. Fort; pro se; Jacksonville, Florida

For the Respondent:

G. Thomas Harper, Esq.; The Law and Mediation Offices of G. Thomas

Harper, LLC; Jacksonville, Florida

Before: James A. Haynes, Thomas H. Burrell and Heather C. Leslie,

Administrative Appeals Judges

ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION

PER Curiam. The Complainant, Annecia Fort, filed a complaint alleging that

her employer, Landstar Transportation Logistics, Inc. (Landstar), retaliated against

her for engaging in activities protected by the employee protection provisions of the

Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA) as amended.! On February 2,

1

49 U.S.C. § 31105 (2007) as implemented at 29 C.F.R. Part 1978 (2019); see 49

U.S.C. § 42121 (2000) (providing standards referenced in the STAA).

ft

»<

USCA11 Case: 20-13998

Document: 1-3

Date Filed: 10/23/2020

Page: 2 of 4

2

2018, a Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an order in

which he granted Landstar’s Motion for Summary Decision on the issue that

Complainant failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact by showing that

prior to her discharge she had engaged in any activity that the STAA protects. On

March 6, 2020, we affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that the Respondent was entitled

to summary decision holding that it was in accordance with law and the undisputed

facts. On March 23, 2020, Fort filed a Petition for Review seeking reconsideration of

our decision.

The ARB is authorized to reconsider a decision upon the filing of a motion for

reconsideration within a reasonable time of the date on which the decision was

issued.2 We will reconsider our decisions under limited circumstances, which

include: (i) material differences in fact or law from those presented to a court of

which the moving party could not have known through reasonable diligence, (ii) new

material facts that occurred after the court’s decision, (iii) a change in the law after

the court’s decision, or (iv) failure to consider material facts presented to the court

before its decision.3

Fort asserts that we should reconsider our decision due to the “inaccuracy of

the events and timelines surrounding the retaliation. Specifically, she raises the

events involving driver Michael Pease, which she alleges demonstrates that she

reported violations of applicable safety regulations. The Board considered and

rejected this contention in its decision. None of Fort’s arguments fall within any of

the four limited circumstances under which we will reconsider our decisions.

Therefore, we DENY her Request.

Fort may appeal our decision as described in the regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 29

C.F.R. § 1978.112 (Judicial review).

SO ORDERED.

2

Toland v. Firstfleet, Inc., ARB No. 2009-0091, ALJ No. 2009-STA-00011 (ARB Mar.

8, 2011).

3

See, e.g., Williams v. United Airlines, ARB No. 2008-0063, ALJ No. 2008-AIR-00003

slip op. at 2-3 (ARB June 23, 2010).

t\

USCA11 Case: 20-13998

Document: 40-1

s

Date Filed: 01/11/2023

Page: 1 of 9

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

3it tfie

Mmhh jihttes Court of

5tar flic 'iHcUcnffy Circuit

No. 20-13998

Non-Argument Calendar

ANNECIA M. FORT,

Petitioner,

versus

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD,

LANDSTAR TRANSPORTATION LOGISTICS, INC.,

Respondents.

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Department of Labor

USCA11 Case: 20-13998

2

Document: 40-1

Date Filed: 01/11/2023

Opinion of the Court

Page: 2 of 9

20-13998

Agency No. ARB2018-0026

Before Jordan, Newsom, and Luck, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

Proceeding pro se, Annecia Fort alleged that her employer,

Landstar Transportation Logistics, Inc., retaliated against her, in vi­

olation of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C . section 31105. She petitions us to review the affirmance of the summary decision for Landstar. We deny her petition.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

From November 2004 to October 2015, Fort worked for

Landstar as a Log Compliance Representative. In this position,

Fort made sure that Landstar's truck drivers complied with Dep artment of Transportation regulations about hours of sendee. The

three incidents that allegedly constituted Fort's protected activity

occurred between November 2014 and August 2015.

First, in November 2014, Fort recommended that driver Mi­

chael Pease be disqualified from driving for Landstar because he

had multiple log violations. Although Fort's immediate supervisor

agreed with her recommendation, Compliance Director Mahal Ca­

son, at arLagents request, sent Mr. Pease for retraining on the elec­

tronic logging device instead of disqualifying him. After learning

that Mr. Pease got into two accidents in one day, Fort went above

Director Cason's head to Mike Cobb Vice President for Safety and

0

USCA11 Case: 20-13998

20-13998

Document: 40-1

Date Filed: 01/11/2023

Page: 3 of 9

Opinion of the Court

3

Compliance, and told him about her disqualification recommenda­

tion. Because Mr. Pease had two accidents on the same day, he

was disqualified.

Second, in January 2015, Fort complained to Director Cason

about how a driver’s call was handled. About half of the Log C ompliance Department, including Fort , was attending a training session when driver Jose Martinez called Fort back about training on

the electronic logging device. Because Fort was in training and the

department was short-staffed, an employee told Mr. Martinez to

call back the next day and to use paper logs in the meantime. Fort

thought that having a driver call back contradicted company pol­

icy, so she instructed the employee that it did, spoke with the su­

pervisor who had approved the response, and reported the incident

to Director Cason. Director Cason counseled the supervisor about

managing employee availability to avoid being short-staffed, and

she determined that the incident didn t violate any regulations.

And third, in August 2015, Fort told Vice President Cobb

that a driver’s record had been improperly changed. Landstar con­

ducted a mock Department of Transportation audit of driver rec­

ords and discovered that driver Andrea Hurddrobneck’s logs

showed that she had been in her sleeper berth for the past three

weeks. Ms. Hurddrobneck simply forgot to log off when she took

her truck in for repairs. Because she couldn’t access her truck to

log off in the usual way, an employee logged her off from Landstar’s demonstration terminal.

Landstar did not inform Ms.

cy

USCA11 Case: 20-13998

4

Document: 40-1

Date Filed: 01/11/2023

Opinion of the Court

Page: 4 of 9

20-13998

Hurddrobneck that it remotely changed her status in the system

until after it had done so.

Fort submitted a one-page complaint to human resources al

leging that because she complained about the three

incidents,

Landstar retaliated against her by writing her up "with false

accusations,” fabricating a "demeaning annual review” for her, attempt­

ing to lie about events, and pursuing her "constructive termina­

tion.” Sensing an irreparably "broken relationship” between Fort

and the management m the Log Compliance Department, Land

star put Fort on leave, with full pay and benefits, so she could in­

terview for positions elsewhere in the company. Eventually, Fort

assumed the position of Carrier Qualifications Service Specialist,

making the same pay as before.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Fort filed a whistleblower screening form with the Occup ational Safety and Health Administration. The Department of La

bor construed the form as asserting that Landstar retaliated

against

Fort, in violation of the Act. After an investigation, the Depart­

ment of Labor found “no reasonable cause to believe" that Landstar violated the Act. Fort appealed the Department's decision to

the Office of Administrative Law Judges.

Landstar moved for summary decision. It argued that Fort

could not show that she engaged in protected activity because the

incidents with Mr. Pease, Mr. Martinez, and Ms. Hurddrobneck

didn't involve Landstar's violation of federal law and because Fort

USCA11 Case: 20-13998

20-13998

Document: 40-1

Date Filed: 01/11/2023

Page: 5 of 9

Opinion of the Court

5

couldn t establish that she reasonably believed that Landstar was

violating a motor vehicle safety regulation. Fort also couldn't es­

tablish an adverse employment action, Landstar said, because she

didn't suffer any economic harm and because human resources—

not a supervisor involved with the three incidents—put her on paid

leave until she found another position in a different department in

the company. And Landstar argued that Fort couldn't show causa­

tion because too much time passed between the alleged protected

activity and adverse action for temporal proximity to support an

inference of causation, because Landstar encouraged safety com­

plaints and compliance with federal regulations, and because Landstar had legitimate nonretaliatory reasons for removing Fort from

the Log Compliance Department: her deep resentments and “de­

structive influence on others.”

The administrative law judge granted summary decision for

Landstar because Fort couldn t show that she engaged in protected

activity. A reasonable person with Fort's training and experience,

the administrative law judge explained, wouldn't believe that any

of the three incidents violated a motor vehicle regulation. As to

the incident with Ms. Hurddrobneck, the administrative law judge

said that “[a] reasonable person with more than a decade of experience in log compliance would not have an objectively reasonable

belief' that Landstar had to get Ms. Hurddrobneck's “consent be­

fore correcting an obviously incorrect log.” The regulation requir­

ing a driver to confirm or reject a change to the driver's record of

sN

0

USCA11 Case: 20-13998

6

Document: 40-1

Date Filed: 01/11/2023

Opinion of the Court

Page: 6 of 9

20-13998

duty status did not go into effect until six months after the incident

with Ms. Hurddrobneck.

Fort appealed the summary decision to the Administrative

Review Board, which affirmed. The Board agreed with the admin­

istrative law judge that Fort failed to show any protected activity.

It explained that “none of [FortJ's reports concerned violations of

the [Act] or safety related matters; rather, each complained-of inci­

dent had to do with electronic logging device problems and

not

safety matters.”

Fort asked the Board to reconsider its affirmance, and it de­

nied her request. Fort petitioned us to review the Board's deci­

sion.1

We asked the parties to address jurisdictional questions about whether the

Board s summary decision affirmance was a final agency decision even though

Fort did not receive a formal evidentiary hearing, whether we can construe

Fort s petition as seeking review of the affirmance, and whether Fort's request

for reconsideration of the affirmance tolled the time for her to petition for re­

view. After considering the parties' responses, we agree with the respondents

that the Board s affirmance was a final agency decision, Fields v. U.S. Dep'tof

Lab. Admin. Rev. Bd., 173 F.3d 811, 812 (11th Cir. 1999), United States v.

Cheramie Bo-TrucNo. 5, Inc., 538 F.2d 696, 698 (5th Cir. 1976), and we can__

and do—construe Fort's pro se petition as seeking review of that decision

And we agree with the Department that Fort’s appeal is timely because her

request for reconsideration tolled the period for her to petition us for review.

See Interstate Com. Comm 'n v. Bhd. ofLocomotive EngJrs, 482 U.S. 270 284

(1987) ("[T]he timely petition for administrative reconsideration stayed the

running of the . . . limitation period until the petition had been acted upon by

the [Board]."). Thus, we have jurisdiction to consider Fort’s petition.

USCA11 Case: 20-13998

20-13998

Document: 40-1

Date Filed: 01/11/2023

Opinion of the Court

Page: 7 of 9

7

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review “agency action[s], findings, and conclusions” to

determine whether they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis­

cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”

5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A); see 49 U.S.C. § 31105(d). We review the Department’s

legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial ev­

idence. Stone & Webster Constr., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't ofLab., 684

F.3d 1127, 1132 (11th Cir. 2012).

DISCUSSION

Fort contends that the Board erred in affirming the summary decision against her because the summary decision conflicted

with the law and the evidence and because the Board credited

Landstar’s version of events over hers and overlooked that Landstar admitted to engaging in unacceptable behavior. Landstar re­

taliated against Fort, she says, because she “reported unethical, un­

lawful events” like the incident with Ms. Hurddrobneck. Fort also

argues that Mr. Pease’s “egregious behavior put public safety at

risk,” Landstar’s “violations were performed with intent,” and un­

der Dick v. Tango Transp., ARB No. 14-054, ALJ No. 2013-STA-60,

slip op. at *7 (Dep’t of Lab. Admin. Rev. Bd. Aug. 30, 2016), she

didn’t need to “complain about a specific safety regulation”; she

just needed to complain '“related to’ safety regulations.”

The Act prohibits an employer from “discharging,]. .. dis­

ciplining,] or discriminating] against an employee regarding pay,

terms, or privileges of employment” because the employee “has

TO

USCA11 Case: 20-13998

8

Document: 40-1

Date Filed: 01/11/2023

Opinion of the Court

Page: 8 of 9

20-13998

filed a complaint . . . related to a violation of a commercial motor

vehicle safety or security regulation, standard, or order.” 49U.S.C.

§ 31105(a)(l)(A)(i). Here, a violation includes "an act reasonably

perceived to be a violation.” Koch Foods

Secy, US. Dept of

Lab., 711 F.3d 476, 482 (11th Cir. 2013). The employee has the in­

itial burden of making a prima facie case that her protected activity

"was a contributing factor in

the adverse employment action

against her. 49 U.S.C. §§ 31105(b)(1), 42121(b)(2)(B)(i). To make a

prima facie case, she must show: (1) she engaged in activity pro­

tected under the Act; (2) she suffered an adverse employ ment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected ac­

tivity and adverse action. See Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care

Sys-, Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006) (Family and Medical

Leave Act); Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Secy of Lab., 50 F.3d 926 , 933

(11th Cir. 1995) (Energy Reorganization Act).

To establish protected activity, Fort had to show that she

reasonably believed that Landstar violated a motor vehicle safety

regulation. Dick, slip op. at *7. The belief had to be both subjec­

tively and objectively reasonable. Id. To determine whether the

belief was objectively reasonable, we consider the information

available to a reasonable person in the same circumstances with the '

same training and experience as Fort. Id.

Although, under Dick, Fort didn’t have to prove an actual

violation of a specific safety regulation, she still had to show an ob­

jectively reasonable belief related to violations of safety regula­

tions. Id. But she failed to do so. The incidents with Mr. Pease,

USCA11 Case: 20-13998

20-13998

Document: 40-1

Date Filed: 01/11/2023

Opinion of the Court

Page: 9 of 9

9

Mr. Martinez, and Ms. Hurddrobneck don't relate to safety viola­

tions, and a reasonable Log Compliance Representative with Fort's

extensive work experience wouldn't believe that they do. Fort her­

self recognized that Director Cason didn't violate any safety regu­

lations in sending Mr. Pease for retraining instead of disqualifying

him. Fort described the incidents as violations of company policy,

not federal regulations. She could have made a colorable argument

that Landstar violated 49 C.F.R. section 395.30(d) when it corrected

Ms. Hurddrobneck's obviously incorrect record without the

driver's consent—if the regulation had been in effect at the time.

But the regulation wasn't yet in effect, and a reasonable person in

Fort's position wouldn't have believed it was. Thus, Fort failed to

establish protected activity to make a prima facie case of retaliation.

Fort's other arguments lack merit. The Board properly ap­

plied the Act and viewed the record in the light most favorable to

her.

Substantial evidence supported the factual findings. And

Landstar never admitted to violating a federal motor vehicle safety

regulation with respect to the three complained-of incidents.

Because Fort didn't establish that she engaged in activity

protected under the Act, the summary decision for Landstar was

proper, and we deny her petition for review.

PETITION DENIED.

\

(L

USCA11 Case: 20-13998

Document: 44-2

Date Filed: 03/20/2023

Page: 1 of 2

2ln %

Mnxith ^izxfas ©curt of J\ppmh

3fcr the IBtentfy Cfltrxrutt

*■'

No. 20-13998

j

ANNECIA M. FORT,

Petitioner,

versus

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD,

LANDSTAR TRANSPORTATION LOGISTICS, INC.,

Respondents.

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Department of Labor

Agency No. ARB2018-0026

ISSUED AS MANDATE: 03/20/2023

' %

USCA11 Case: 20-13998

Document: 44-2

Date Filed: 03/20/2023

2

Page: 2 of 2

20-13998

JUDGMENT

It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the opinion is­

sued on this date in this appeal is entered as the judgment of this

Court.

Entered: January 11, 2023

For the Court: DavidJ,. Smith, Clerk of Court

(

i

.-

') L

J

/v^/7 y / —u

(

. y

ISSUED AS MANDATE: 03/20/2023

O-

l <•>, V YK L

/'

Qerf'u-)m.n -

Administrative Review Board

200 Constitution Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20210-0001

U.S. Department of Labor

In the Matter of:

ANNECIA M. FORT,

ARB CASE NO. 2018-0026

COMPLAINANT,

ALJ CASE NO. 2017-STA-00028

DATE: March 6, 2020

v.

LANDSTAR TRANSPORTATION,

LOGISTICS, INC.,

RESPONDENT.

Appearances:

For the Complainant:

Annecia M. Fort; pro se; Jacksonville, Florida

For the Respondent:

G. Thomas Harper, Esq.; The Law and Mediation Offices of G.

Thomas Harper, LLC; Jacksonville, Florida

Before: Thomas H. Burrell, Acting Chief Administrative Appeals

Judge, James A. Haynes, and Heather C. Leslie, Administrative

Appeals Judges.

DECISION AND ORDER

PER CURIAM. This case arises under the employee protection provisions of the

Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA) as amended.1 Annecia Fort

(Complainant) was employed by Landstar Transportation Logistics, Inc. (Landstar

or Respondent) as a Log Compliance Representative in Landstar’s Log Compliance

Department from November 2004 until October 2015, when she was transferred to

Landstar’s Carrier Qualification Department.2 Fort filed a complaint with the U.S.

Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) on

September 15, 2015. She alleged that the Respondent violated the terms of the

STAA by discharging her from the Log Compliance Department in retaliation for

raising safety concerns regarding three of the Business Capacity Owners (BOC or

“drivers”). Following an investigation, OSHA dismissed the complaint on December

23, 2016. Complainant objected to OSHA’s determination and requested a hearing

with the Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ).

On January 6, 2018, Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Decision which

Complainant opposed. After considering the Respondent’s Motion for Summary

Decision and Complainant’s Objection to Employer’s Motion, a Department of Labor

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted the Respondent’s motion under 29 C.F.R.

§ 18.72 (2016) and cancelled the hearing. Order Granting Summary Decision (Feb.

2, 2018) (Order). Complainant appealed. We agree with the ALJ and affirm.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The Administrative Review Board (ARB or Board) has jurisdiction to

review the ALJ’s STAA decision pursuant to Secretary’s Order No. 01-2020

(Delegation of Authority and Assignment of Responsibility to the

Administrative Review Board) (Feb. 21, 2020); 29 C.F.R. Part 1978.

The ARB reviews an ALJ’s grant of summary decision de novo under the

same standard the ALJ applies. Summary decision is permitted where “there

1

49 U.S.C. § 31105 (2007) as implemented at 29 C.F.R. Part 1978 (2018); see 49

U.S.C. § 42121 (2000) (providing standards referenced in the STAA).

2

Fort was working in Landstar’s Carrier Qualification Department at the time

the case was considered by the ALJ in February 2018.

2

i

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

decision as a matter of law.” 29 C.F.R. § 18.72(a) (2018). The ARB views the

record on the whole in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Micallef v. Harrah’s Rincon Casino & Resort, ARB No. 16-095, ALJ No. 2015SOX-025, slip op. at 3 (ARB July 5, 2018).

Discussion

STAA complaints are governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in the

employee protection provision of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and

Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21). 49 U.S.C. § 31105(b)(1); see 49 U.S.C.

§42121 (2000). To prevail on a STAA claim, an employee must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that she engaged in protected activity that was a

contributing factor in an unfavorable personnel action taken against her. 49 U.S.C.

§ 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). In light of our disposition of this matter, we limit our

discussion to the issue of whether the ALJ correctly granted summary decision on

the issue that Complainant failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact by

showing that prior to her discharge she had engaged in any activity that the STAA

protects.

In her complaint, Fort referenced three incidents as protected activity under

the Act. First, on November 21, 2014, Fort recommended that Landstar disqualify a

driver from driving for Landstar because he had accumulated 76 violations for log

compliance issues. A Landstar agent requested Director of Compliance Mahal

Cason consider that the driver was an older, long-time driver who did not

understand electronic logs (ELD). Instead of disqualifying the driver based on the

electronic log violations, Cason referred him for additional training on how to use

the electronic logging system.3 The ALJ considered Fort’s allegation that Cason

exhibited an improper motivation for retaining the driver, but concluded that a

reasonable person would not^believe that electronic logging problems would

constitute a violation of a motor vehicle regulation. Further, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to Fort, the ALJ was not able to find a regulation

3

Two days after Fort made her recommendation to disqualify the first driver,

he had two separate minor accidents, which Fort reported to Vice-President Michael Cobb.

The driver was then disqualified from driving with Landstar.

3

implicated by Cason’s decision to retain the driver and give him retraining. ALJ

Order at 4.

Fort’s second allegation concerned an Hours of Service (HOS) alert from a

second driver’s ELD in January 2015. Fort called the second driver to provide log

compliance counseling but failed to reach him. When the second driver returned her

call on January 28, 2015, requesting to be trained on the ELD, a supervisor advised

another employee that Fort was in a meeting and instructed her to tell the second

driver to call back the next day. When she learned what had happened, Fort

reported her concerns to Director Cason. The ALJ concluded that while asking a

driver to call back at a later time may be inconsistent with company policy and

department practice, Complainant’s concern was not about a violation of any sort.4

The third incident of alleged protected activity involved a third driver. In

August 2015, Landstar underwent a mock Department of Transportation audit.

During the audit, the auditors reviewed the logs of the third driver and noted that

her log showed that she had been in her sleeper berth for three weeks. After an

investigation, a Log Compliance Department employee confirmed with the third

driver that she had taken her truck to the shop and had forgotten to change her

duty status. The third driver verbally consented to Landstar changing her status

remotely. Following a review of the applicable regulations, the ALJ concluded that

there was no regulation that would forbid an employer from changing the duty

status of a driver. Moreover, the ALJ concluded that no reasonable person would

believe that Landstar falsified the log or that the third driver had been in the

sleeper berth for three weeks.

On appeal, Complainant does not identify errors of law that would show that

the ALJ’s conclusions were wrong. Indeed, none of Complainant’s reports concerned

violations of the STAA or safety related matters; rather, each complained-ofincident had to do with electronic logging device problems and not safety matters.

Thus, upon de novo review of the ALJ’s conclusion that the Respondent was entitled

4

On appeal, Fort argues that the ALJ did not acknowledge her contention that

she reported that the driver was in violation of Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

Hours of Service regulations. However, the materials submitted to the ALJ reflect that Fort

reported HOS alerts and did not specify that the second driver had violated a regulation.

4

to summary decision as a matter of law, we hold that it is in accordance with law

and the undisputed facts. 29 C.F.R. § 18.72.

Conclusion

The ALJ properly concluded that the Respondent was entitled to summary

decision as a matter of law. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision to GRANT the

Respondent’s motion for summary decision is AFFIRMED and the complaint is

hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

5

USCA11 Case: 20-13998

Document: 43-2

Date Filed: 03/10/2023

Page: 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-13998-GG

ANNECIA M. FORT,

Petitioner,

versus

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD,

LANDSTAR TRANSPORTATION LOGISTICS, INC.,

Respondents.

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Department of Labor

ON PETITIONS') FOR REHEARING AND PETITIONS) FOR REHEARING EN BANC

BEFORE: JORDAN, NEWSOM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED, no judge in regular active service on the Court

having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc. (FRAP 35) The Petition for

Panel Rehearing is also denied. (FRAP 40)

ORD-46