Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lily Cassandra Alphonsis, Petitioner v. Joel Garnica, Deputy, et al.

Supreme Court briefFeb 24, 2023

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-7651

INA

Supreme Councils

FILED

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FEB 24 2023

OFFICE OF THE m ct,.,

LILY CASSANDRA ALPHONSIS—PETITIONER

vs.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al —RESPONDENT(S)

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LILY CASSANDRA ALPHONSIS

Post Office Box 2465

Beverly Hills, CA 90213

(424)417-0613

RECEIVED

MAY 2 b

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT. U.S. 1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE UNDER RLUIPA, AMERICANS WITH

DISABILITIES ACT AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

Congress passed RLUIPA because prisons sometimes imposed ‘“frivolous

or arbitrary’ barriers” on religious exercise. Id. at 716 (quoting 146 Cong.

Rec. 16,698, 16,699 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy

on RLUIPA)).

In 2015, the Supreme Court held in Holt that, if most other prisons would

accommodate the religious practice a plaintiff has requested and has been

denied, prison officials must show why they cannot allow that practice at

their prison. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853

(2015). Holt held that

RLUIPA’s test “is exceptionally demanding” and “requires the [State] to

show that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal.”

The Questions Presented Are:

a) Whether a jail facility’s ban on the hijab or religious head scarf worn for

religious reasons, was the least restrictive means of ensuring effective prison

administration and security; b) Whether, particularly in light of the

intervening decision in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015), the lower

court afforded improper due deference to Respondent under RLUIPA, 42

U.S.C. 2000cc-l(a), since many of the factual assertions was grossly

exaggerated in dismissing Petitioner’s hijab case; c) Whether correctional

officers should discard inmate's Quran and prayer mat.

Whether the 9th Circuit's decision on Americans with Disabilities Act

conflicted the Supreme Court's decision regarding the due process in

''V

denying access to an inmate with severe food allergies’ to enrollment in an

institutional program.

a) Whether Scott v. Harris is applicable in a video evidence where the party

who presented the video evidence’s own key witness testimony contradicts

the video evidence and confirms the victims version of events; b)Whether

the Eighth Amendment allow correctional officer to use excessive force to

remove handcuffs on an inmate who poses no threat and is locked behind a

heavy metal door.

11.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEEDINGS BELOW

Petitioner Lily Cassandra Alphonsis was the plaintiff in the district court and

the appellant in the court of appeals.

Respondent County of Los Angeles and Joel Gamica were the defendants in

the district court and the appellees in the court of appeals.

111.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

This case arises from and is related to the following proceeding in the

U.S. District Court for the Central District of California and the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:

• Alphonsis v. County of Los Angeles et al, No. CV 17-03650-ODW

(DFM)

• Alphonsis v. County of Los Angeles et al, No. 21-56141(9th Cir.),

judgment entered November 30, 2022.

There are no other proceedings in state or federal trial or appellate courts

directly related to this case within the meaning of this Court’s Rule

14.1 (b)(iii).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented.....................................

Parties to the Proceedings Below.................

Related Proceedings....................................

Opinions Below...........................................

Statement of Jurisdiction.............................

Statutes Involved..........................................

Statement of the Case..................................

I. Background....................................

II. Proceedings Below.......................

A. Proceedings in the district court....

B. Proceedings in the court of appeals

Reasons for Granting the Petition.................

1. To remove the substantial burdens placed on Muslim women’s

rights to wear the Hijab and pray in correctional institutions in

the country

2. To avoid the restrictions on religious items especially the Qurans

and mats in solitary confinement

3. To avoid the discrimination and the abuse against people with

severe food allergies

4. To hold correctional officers accountable for gross misconduct and

inmate abuse

Conclusion

Appendix A - Order Denying Rehearing

Ninth Circuit Court

(November 30, 2022)

Appendix B - Opinion of the United States..........

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

(October 14, 2021)

Appendix C - Opinion of the United States..

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(September 8, 2021)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Bonner v. Lewis,

857 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir.1988)

Cheema v. Thompson,

67 F.3d 883, 885 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1995)

Duffy v. Riveland,

98 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1996)

Furnace v. Sullivan,

No. 10-15961, slip op. (9th Cir. January 17, 2013)

Graham v. Connor

490 U.S. 386

(1989)..:...............

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,

546 U.S. 418

(2006).......................................................................................

Holt v. Hobbs,

574 U.S. 352

(2015)............

Morrissey v. Brewer,

408 U.S. 471

(1972).......................

Morrissey v. Brewer,

(1972) 408 U.S.

471

Scott v. Harris,

550 U.S.372, 127 S. Ct. 1769

(2007)....................................

13,13,14

Thomas v. Davis United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

Sep 28, 1999

United States v. Cejas

761 F.3d 717, 723 (7th Cir.

2014).................................

United States v. Ikezi,

353 F. App'x 482, 483 (2d Cir.

2009).......................................

United States v. Sarro

742 F.2d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir.

1984).................................

Waterford Bd. ofEduc.,

277 F.3d 633, 635 (2d Cir.

2002)................................

Watson v. Geren

(2nd Cir. 2009) 587 F.3d 156, 160FRAP

40(a)(2)...................................................

Winterrowd v. Nelson,

(Furnace v. Sullivan, No. 10-15961, slip op. (9th Cir. January 17,

2013)

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

LILY CASSANDRA ALPHONSIS,

Petitioner,

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES AND JOEL GARNICA,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Petitioner Lily Cassandra Alphonsis respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to

review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The court of appeals’ opinion (App., infra, la) is reported. The district court’s

opinion (App., infra, 33a-60a) is unreported.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was filed on October 14, 2022. App., infra,

la. and the Petition for Rehearing was denied on November 30, 2022. This Court

has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

RLUIPA, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE EIGHTH

AMENDMENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. BACKGROUND

On May 29, 2015, the California state prosecutor Susan Jung Townsend

presented misleading information to Judge Lisa B. Lench and sentenced Petitioner

to five years at the Century Regional Detention Facility (C.R.D.F.). While

Petitioner was in Respondent’s custody, Petitioner was deprived of a medical diet

for seven months and forced to survive on cereal and water. She was starved and

then punished whenever she failed to join the food line that she could not consume

from. Petitioner depended on other inmates for fruits/vegetables because

Respondent refused to provide a medical diet suitable for Petitioner’s deadly food

allergies. Petitioner was repeatedly mistreated and antagonized by Respondent and

was denied access to vocational programs due to her special dietary needs. She was

mocked, harassed and punished for practicing her religion as a Muslim woman.

Petitioner’s Hijab

Petitioner is a Muslim woman whose religious faith mandates that she wear

a headscarf or headcover, also known as the Hijab for prayers. The Hijab is a

significant part of Islamic religious practice for women during prayer. Petitioner

sincerely holds the proffered belief rooted in her Islamic religion.

In June 2015, Petitioner submitted a request for a Hijab and long sleeve

shirts for prayer. However, the County informed her that it was against the jail’s

policy to wear any form of headcover.

In August 2015, Petitioner spoke with the jail’s Islamic Chaplain, Ms. Maria

Khani who confirmed the County's policy and encouraged Petitioner to use her Tshirt and bedsheet as a cover-up for prayers. Petitioner used a makeshift Hijab to

pray in her cell, as suggested by the chaplain, but was constantly and

contradictorily harassed and punished by Respondents for refusing to stop her

prayer to remove her Hijab. The Respondents, deputies Gonzales, Hernandez,

Castle, and Castro told Petitioner not to cover her head. Deputy Gonzales put

Petitioner on "24-hour lockdown" after she refused to remove her Hijab in the

middle of her prayer. Whenever Petitioner’s prayers were interrupted, she would

explain that her religious beliefs prohibited her from removing her Hijab.

However, her explanations were ignored, and she was cited for insubordination and

sent to solitary confinement for refusing to stop her prayers to remove her Hijab.

Petitioner was repeatedly harassed for practicing her religion and experienced

severe mental stress in handling the harassment, given the fact that she was

deprived of food and strongly depended on her prayers for hope and sustenance.

In October 2015, Petitioner spoke with a mental health officer and reported

the harassment to him. She stated that she could no longer handle the mental

distress and that she should be moved from the facility. She was then transferred to

C.R.D.F. but was sent to solitary confinement because a deputy alleged that

Petitioner’s discussion with a mental health officer was fake.

Removal of Petitioner’s Prayer Mat and Quran.

On October 2015, February 7, 2016, and August 25, 2016, Respondent’s

deputies, who worked at the discipline division, removed Petitioner’s Quran from

her property in solitary confinement. Petitioner filed a complaint and inquired into

the removal of her Quran and prayer mat. Respondent Sergeant Hernandez

answered Petitioner’s grievance and told her that the Quran was removed because

it belongs to the County of Los Angeles, and it was against Respondent’s policy

for her to have the Quran during discipline. Whenever Petitioner was sent to

solitary confinement her Quran was confiscated, and the Bible and the Torah were

made available to her only.

Petitioner’s Food Allergies and Respondent’s Fashion Design

Program.

In July 2015, Petitioner enrolled in a Respondent’s fashion design vocational

program but was removed from the program in September 2015, and transferred to

Respondent’s Twin Towers Facility because Respondent claimed it could not

accommodate Petitioner’s special dietary needs. In October 2015, Petitioner

returned to Respondent’s Century Regional Detention Facility (CRDF) and re

applied to the fashion design program. However, Respondent’s officer Vera

answered Petitioner’s request in late November 2015, and stated that Petitioner

could not participate in the program because of her severe food allergies.

In 2016, Petitioner asked Respondent’s officer Martinez to find out the

reason she was refused reentry into the vocational program. However, the deputy

returned with the same answer stating that Respondent’s Education Based

Incarceration department had firmly stated that Petitioner will never be enrolled in

the program again due to her medical dietary restrictions, which were considered a

liability against E.B.I. policy.

Respondent Joel Garnica inflicting injuries on Petitioner

On June 5, 2015, Petitioner’s housing module was raided by Respondent

Garnica and his team. The inmates were kept in the outdoor recreation area, where

Garnica and his team addressed inmate concerns and answered their questions.

Petitioner asked questions about the County's property damage policy because her

personal property was constantly destroyed each time her module was raided.

Respondent Joel Garnica did not like Petitioner’s questions and reprimanded her.

Garnica called Petitioner to come forward, handcuffed her, and then took Petitioner

to solitary confinement.

Respondent Joel Gamica put Petitioner in a cell, but as the door slid closed,

he grabbed Petitioner’s handcuffs through a knee-level slot hole and intentionally

pressed on the handcuff to lower her body down. He then twisted her wrist, which

in turn dislocated her arm and caused her back to pop. Petitioner screamed in pain

and told Respondent that he was hurting her. She asked that he let go of the

handcuffs so that she can adjust her arm and for him to remove the handcuffs.

However, Garnica, joined by a second deputy, Ochoa, refused to let go and instead

used excessive force to press the handcuffs on Petitioner’s wrist, causing cuts,

bruises, and injuring her back.

II. PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Proceedings in the District Court

Upon exhausting all her administrative remedies in the jail, Petitioner

submitted a civil complaint and asked the district court to intervene. The district

court assigned constitutional statutes to Petitioners claims and asked her to amend

her complaint. In following the Court’s recommendations, Petitioner presented her

Third Amended complaint in pursuant to the Eighth Amendment Excessive Force,

R.L.U.I.P.A and the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The district court cited the Hudson factors and dismissed Petitioner’s Eighth

Amendment claim. The court erroneously held that Petitioner suffered minimal

injuries from the unhandcuffmg because she lifted her hand after her injury and

therefore, was not injured. The Court also cited Scott v. Harris and used

evidentiary flawed video evidence that contradicted Respondent’s key eyewitness’

statement. The Court then used qualified immunity to dismissed Petitioner’s Eighth

Amendment claim.

Under Petitioner’s Hijab case, the district court cited the Turner factors and

held that Respondent’s male-only Kufi cap policy was the least restrictive means

of furthering its compelling interest in the women’s jail security. The court held

that Respondent’s male-only Kufi policy satisfied R.L.U.I.P.A’s broad protection

for the Hijab and then dismissed Petitioner’s Hijab claim. The court failed to

consider a letter from the jail’s chaplain refuting Respondent’s gross exaggerations

about Kufi caps. The chaplain’s letter confirmed Respondent’s restrictions on the

Hijabs and rebutted Lt. Kelly Adlers assertions in her Declarations, which declared

the availability of the male-only Kufi caps in the women’s jail.

In Petitioner’s Americans with Disabilities Acts claim, the district court

held that Respondent denied Petitioner access to its vocational class because of

disciplinary actions and not her medical diet. The court failed to see that

Respondent still violated the Petitioner’s ADA right to due process even if denial

of access to the vocational class was based on the disciplinary action.

Proceedings in the court of appeals

The Ninth Circuit Court affirmed the district’s court decision on Petitioner’s

excessive force claim and conflicted its precedent established by an earlier decision

held in Furnace v. Sullivan, No. 10-15961, slip op. (9th Cir. January 17, 2013). In

Petitioner’s claim, the Ninth Circuit held that there was no genuine dispute of

material fact that Respondent Gamica did not use excessive force when he

removed Petitioner’s handcuffs on June 5, 2017. The Ninth circuit contradicted

itself, then cited Scott v. Harris in support of using Respondents evidentiary flawed

video evidence for their final decision.

Under Petitioner’s Hijab claim, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court

correctly concluded that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that the

Respondent policy, which prohibited head coverings other than Kufi caps, was “the

least restrictive alternative available ... to reach [the County’s] compelling

interest” in prison security. The Courts unconstitutionally held that it was

acceptable for Muslim women to wear Kufi caps for prayer and misconstrued the

jail chaplain’s letter to fit that narrative. Furthermore, the lower court concluded

that Petitioner did not allege a R.L.U.I.P.A. claim premised on the purported

confiscation of her Quran and prayer mat, nor did she address any such claim in

her opening brief on appeal and they dismissed her claim as a result.

The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court entered summary judgment

in favor of Respondent in the disability discrimination because there was no

genuine dispute of material fact that due to Petitioner’s disciplinary infractions,

Petitioner was not “otherwise qualified to participate in” the jail education

program. However, the Court failed to acknowledge that Respondent violated

Petitioner’s due process when she was removed from the program.

The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion

when they failed to review Petitioner’s supplemental evidence showing her injuries

and refuting Respondent’s false statements.

In addition, the Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s Petition for Panel

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

To remove the substantial burdens placed on Muslim women’s rights to

wear the Hijab and pray in correctional institutions in the country.

In 2015, this Court unanimously ruled that an Arkansas prison policy which

prohibited a Muslim prisoner from growing a short beard in accordance with his

religious beliefs violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

Act (RLUIPA). Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015).

R.L.U.I.P.A. requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling

interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law "to the person"—

the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially

burdened.'" Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S., at

, 134 S. Ct., at 2779 (quoting

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita).

In Petitioner’s case, Respondent, the County of Los Angeles, failed to create

a religious policy that allows Muslim women to pray in accordance with religious

practice for its women’s jail facilities. Petitioner was harassed on a daily basis for

following the jail chaplain’s directives to use a makeshift Hijab to pray in her cell.

She was constantly cited for insubordination and sent to solidarity confinement for

refusing to stop her prayers and remove her makeshift Hijab. Her Quran and prayer

mat were intentionally removed and discarded whenever she was sent to solitary

confinement, and the Bible and the Torah were made available to her.

Respondent had the chance to accommodate Muslim women in its jail

facilities by permitting the use of the Hijab like other correctional institutions in

Southern California. But they failed to do so even after the chaplain approached

them with a policy that would have allowed Muslim women to use the Hijab in

accordance with prison security policy. They intentionally placed a substantial

burden on Petitioner and tormented her spirit.

This Court noted that the ability of other correctional institutions to use

further comparable interests without challenging the existing regulations is

evidence that a less restrictive alternative is available. It also demonstrates that

where a significant number of other facilities allow accommodations, a facility

cannot deny accommodations consistent with R.L.U.I.P.A.'s strict scrutiny

requirements, unless the facility offers persuasive reasons why it cannot adopt the

less restrictive methods used elsewhere.

Respondent violated Petitioner’s religious rights and presented a Kufi cap

policy drafted for its Men Central Jail to defend its failure to create a policy that

accommodates its women’s jail facilities. The lower courts’ decision to substitute

Respondent’s male-only Kufi cap policy for a Muslim woman’s Hijab is a conflict

to R.L.U.LP.A’s broad protections for the Hijab. The County failed to prove that a

man's headcover is the least restrictive means to deny a Muslim woman’s right to

wear her Hijab to pray in her cell.

In addition, the County failed to show why they took a different course from

the many other correctional facilities that permit the Hijab. Respondent failed to

show how the Kufi cap policy became an alternative means to satisfy the

compelling government interest against the use of the Hijab and did not present

any alternative means that they considered before the restrictions on the Hijab.

Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 885 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding fault with

Defendant's failure to explain that another school district had managed to

accommodate Sikh students' religious practices without sacrificing school safety).

Also, See Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2124 (quoting Brief for the United States at 24).

The lower Courts overlooked Petitioner’s rights to religious practice and to

be free from harassment and punishment. They overlooked R.L.U.I.P.A’s strict

scrutiny requirements and favored the Respondent’s male Kufi cap policy over a

woman’s protected rights to prayer. The Courts were convinced by Respondent’s

misleading declarations that the Kufi cap policy was a suitable accommodation for

the Hijab. However, women in Islam do not wear Kufi caps for prayer, just as men

in Islam do not wear Hijabs.

The Islamic Shura Council of Southern California intervene upon hearing

the Respondent’s claim about the Kufi cap and submitted a letter to the Ninth

Circuit to clarify the Respondent’s misleading declarations. After all, the Kufi cap

policy was drafted by the Islamic Shura Council of Southern California for the

Men Central Jail. This is why Respondent’s Kufi cap policy can never satisfy the

"least restrictive means" requirement under R.L.U.I.P.A.

10.

Respondent knew it could not offer any persuasive reasons why it did not

adopt the less restrictive methods used in other women’s facilities. This is why

Respondent presented the men's central jail Kufi policy in its defense against

Petitioner’s R.L.U.I.P.A. claim. The lower Court’s decisions on Petitioner’s Hijab

case have raised global concern in the Islamic community and created an unlslamic

principle that needs immediate rectification by the nation’s highest court.

The courts’ decisions are not just unlslamic but they are prejudicial material errors

of law that have resulted in the denial of justice—and has raised issues of

important systemic consequences for the development of the law and the

administration of justice" Watson v. Geren (2nd Cir. 2009) 587 F.3d 156,

160FRAP 40(a)(2).

To avoid the restrictions on religious items especially the Qurans

and mats in solitary confinement.

R.L.U.I.P.A’s material point of fact and law was overlooked by the lower

court’s decision against Petitioner’s Quran and mat claim. Petitioner’s religious

beliefs are protected by the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (R.L.U.I.P.A.). The discarding of Petitioner’s

religious items violates both statutes. However, the lower courts sided with

Respondent, and chose to apply only the Free Exercise Clause to Petitioner’s

claim. Indisputably, the courts know that under R.L.U.I.P.A, Petitioner does not

have to show that Respondent has a custom of discarding inmates' Quran and

prayer mats. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b.). The lowers

courts overlooked R.L.U.I.P.A’s protection for religious items and abused its

discretion. The Second Circuit has cautioned, that "'a decision is against the weight

of the evidence ... if and only if the verdict is [(1)] seriously erroneous or [(2)] a

miscarriage of justice. . . .'" Raedel, 670 F.3d at 417-18 (quoting Farrior v.

11.

Waterford Bd. of Educ., 277 F.3d 633, 635 (2d Cir. 2002)). In Petitioner’s case it is

a miscarriage of justice and the reason for this Court to grant review.

To avoid discrimination and abuse against people with severe

food allergies and allow them to be productive in correctional

institutions.

It is a matter of national interest for this court to grant Petitioner’s Writ of

Certiorari and review the case due to the discrimination and abuse against people

with severe food allergies and avoid the unreported number of suicides in jail.

In citing Thomas v. Davis to dismiss Petitioner’s A.D.A. claim, the lower

court contradicted the Ninth Circuit's ruling in that case. In Thompson v. Davis, the

"Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants have violated Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act ("A.D.A. ") by denying them full and fair consideration for parole

based on their disability of drug addiction." The district court dismissed the

complaint. However, the Ninth Circuit Court reversed the district court's ruling and

remanded the case for further proceedings.

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Petitioner’s ADA case

conflicted with the Supreme Court's decision regarding due process in denying

inmates access to institutional programs. Respondent alleged that Petitioner was

denied access to the vocational program due to her disciplinary infractions. But

there is no evidence that was provided to show that Petitioner was informed about

the write-ups being the reason she was restricted access to the vocational sewing

class. Respondent did show evidence that Petitioner’s A.D.A. grievances were

even answered by its Deputy Sharman and Gabowa. See Duffy v. Riveland, 98

F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding the same with respect to prison disciplinary

hearings); Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1988) (same).

12.

The Ninth Circuit stated in Thomas v. Davis that "we have found that prison

"programs or activities" include such things as parole and disciplinary hearings.”

See Armstrong I, 124 F.3d at 1024, and Armstrong II, 275 F.3d at 856 (collectively

making clear that parole proceedings are "programs or activities" within the

meaning of the A.D.A.);. The lower Court stated, we have interpreted Title II's

"programs" and "activities" to include" 'all of the operations of a qualifying local

government." In reaching this conclusion, this Supreme Court noted that the

legislative history of the A.D.A. "strongly suggests that § 12132 should not be

construed to allow the creation of spheres in which public entities may

discriminate on the basis of an individual's disability."

In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), this Supreme Court set forth

the minimal due process requirements that a parole, or, in this case, correctional

institution's program revocation hearing must meet to satisfy the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Some of those requirements include the following:

(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole or program;

(b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him;

evidence.

The Respondent should have addressed Petitioner’s A.D.A. issue if the

information she was given about her special diet being the reason for the denial of

the program was incorrect, but they did not. In addition, Respondent failed to

provide any evidence that they addressed Petitioner’s concerns or grant her the

right to due process. The indisputable fact is that Petitioner's disciplinary history

had nothing to do with denying her access to the program. As Respondent’s

records show, her food allergies and medical diet were the main reasons she was

13.

removed from the program, transferred out of C.R.D.F., and then denied access

upon her return to the facility. Respondent violated Petitioner’s ADA right, the due

process to be heard, and to defend herself against the write-ups, even if they were

the reason why Deputy Tammy Sherman denied her access to the program.

In her declaration to the lower Court, Deputy Tammy Sherman admitted that

she removed Petitioner from her sewing class and then transferred her to Twin

Towers on September 21, 2015, but gave no explanation as to why she removed

Petitioner from her vocational class. Deputy Sherman's declaration also stated that

she decided that Petitioner would not be permitted to enroll in the program after

reviewing her records. She made this decision without speaking to Petitioner to

hear her side of the story or inform her of the reason behind her decision.

Moreover, she did not answer any of Petitioner’s A.D.A. grievances in writing.

Respondent failed to inform Petitioner why she was removed from the

program. She also failed to answer her grievances and to allow her to be heard

before she was removed from the program and denied reentry. As a result, the

lower Court's application of Thomas v. Davis in dismissing Petitioner’s right to

access the vocational sewing program should be reviewed by this Court and be

remanded for further proceedings. Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471.

To hold correctional officers accountable for gross misconduct

and inmate abuse.

Petitioner was injured in a position where she posed no threat to Respondent

Garnica. She was handcuffed behind a locked metal door while two deputies pulled

her body down through a slot hole and removed her handcuffs. Winterrowd v.

Nelson (Furnace v. Sullivan, No. 10-15961, slip op. (9th Cir. January 17, 2013).

Respondent presented an evidentiary flawed videotape that contradicted

their key eyewitness’ statement about the incident. Respondent’s only eyewitness’

14.

statement did not contradict Petitioner’s complaint. However, Deputy Webster's

statement contradicted the events depicted on the videotape and raises questions

about the video’s authenticity. United States v. Cejas, 761 F.3d 717, 723 (7th Cir.

2014). See, e.g., United States v. Ikezi, 353 F. App'x 482, 483 (2d Cir. 2009)

(referring to Rule 901(b)(9) as a basis for authenticating a videotape); 555 F. App'x

389, 395-96 (5th Cir. 2014).

The lower Court’s cited Scott v. Harris to dismiss Petitioner’s claim.

However, this Court held that summary judgment is only appropriate where

videotape evidence blatantly contradicts a non-moving party's version of the

events. In Scott v. Harris, the videotape evidence did not contradict the eyewitness

for the moving party's version of the events, nor did Respondent in that case

question the authenticity of the videotape. In fact, in Scott v. Harris, this Court was

so confident in the videotape evidence that they posted the video on the Court's

website. The question in reviewing this case, can this Court make the same

decision with the County's videotape evidence? If not, then Scott v. Harris is

inapplicable in Petitioner’s case. The Respondent’s evidence failed the proponent

of a videotape foundation in terms of identification and accuracy. The Respondent

did not produce a witness statement to identify that the videotape presents a fair

and accurate depiction of what actually occurred. See generally F.E.D. R. EVID.

901(a). Id.

Petitioner raised this argument in her opposition to Respondent’s Summary

Judgement and on appeal, but the lower Courts ignored this material fact.

Respondent failed to show how the videotape was produced, what type of

equipment was used for the two versions submitted to the court, and who edited,

deleted, replaced scenes, and extracted the videotapes. See United States v. Sarro,

742 F.2d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that the proponent of a videotape

15.

must show "(1) the competency of the operator [of the recording equipment]; (2)

the fidelity of the recording equipment; (3) the absence of material deletions,

additions, or alterations in the relevant part of the tape. The lower court failed to

analyze these facts in their de novo review, causing a miscarriage of justice in this

case.

The Supreme Court noted in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) that

not all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single

generic standard and rejected that notion. Instead, it noted that courts must identify

the specific constitutional rights allegedly infringed upon by the challenged

application of force, and then judge the claim by reference to the specific

constitutional standard which governs that right. Pp. 490 U. S. 393-394. This is

why the Court should review this case and correct the overtly misinterpretation of

Scott v. Harris in the lower Court to violate victims right.

To grant the submission of supplemental evidence that could not be

obtained on time due to COVID-19, for review and acceptance.

The lower Court’s failure to consider the Petitioner’s supplemental evidence

was a harmful error because the medical files are the only evidence that show the

severity of Petitioner’s injuries. The lower Courts interpretation of Chaplain Maria

Khani’s letter is a miscarriage of justice against all Muslim chaplains and women.

5. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Petitioner humbly request this Court’s review of her

Writ of Certiorari.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.