Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ganiyu Ayinla Jaiyeola, Petitioner v. Thomas L. Dorwin

App. i

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit, Order, October 5, 2022........................ App. 1

United States District Court for the Western

District of Michigan, Southern Division,

Opinion and Order, April 26, 2022.................. App. 6

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit, Order Denying Petition for Rehearing

App. 11

En Banc, November 7, 2022

App. 1

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 22-1424

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GANIYU AYINLA

JAIYEOLA,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THOMAS L. DORWIN,

Defendant-Appellee.

) ON APPEAL FROM

) THE UNITED

) STATES DISTRICT

) COURT FOR THE

) WESTERN DISTRICT

) OF MICHIGAN

)

ORDER

(Filed Oct. 5, 2022)

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; GUY and COLE,

Circuit Judges.

Ganiyu Ayinla Jaiyeola, a pro se California resi­

dent, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing

his civil-rights complaint for lack of subject-matter ju­

risdiction. This case has been referred to a panel of the

court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees

that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P.

34(a).

In 2016, Jaiyeola filed a products-liability law­

suit (“Jaiyeola F) in state court against Toyota Motor

Corporation and others for alleged defects in his

1996 Toyota Camry. The defendants removed that

case to federal court, where extensive and contentious

App. 2

discovery and motion practice ensued. As relevant

here, Jaiyeola filed a Contested motion in which he

asked the district court to sanction two defense attor­

neys for allegedly committing fraud on the court. At

the close of discovery, the district court granted sum­

mary judgment in favor of the defendants on each of

Jaiyeola’s claims and denied Jaiyeola’s motion for

sanctions as moot. See Jaiyeola v. Toyota Motor N. Am,

Inc., No. l:17-cv-562, 2019 WL 3543628 (W.D. Mich.

Aug. 5, 2019). On appeal, we affirmed the district

court’s judgment but reversed its denial of Jaiyeola’s

sanctions motion and remanded the matter for consid­

eration of that motion. Jaiyeola v. Toyota Motor N. Am.,

Inc., No. 19-1918, 2021 WL 518155, at *6 (6th Cir. Feb.

1, 2021), cert, denied, 141 S. Ct. 2655 (2021).

On remand, the district court denied Jaiyeola’s

motion for sanctions, concluding that he had failed to

meet his burden of proving by “clear and convincing

evidence that Defendants’ counsel presented inten­

tionally false material to the Court.” Jaiyeola’s appeal

from that ruling is currently pending before this court

in Case No. 21-2737.

Thereafter, Jaiyeola filed a Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, as

well as a motion for leave to file two additional sanc­

tions motions against certain defense attorneys. The

district court summarily denied each of those motions

and instructed the clerk to “reject any further filings

by [Jaiyeola] in this case.” We affirmed the district

court’s order in its entirety. Jaiyeola v. Toyota Motor

App. 3

Corp., No. 21-1812, slip op. at 5-7 (6th Cir. June 16,

2022).

Meanwhile, in December 2021, Jaiyeola filed a

federal lawsuit (“Jaiyeola IF) alleging that Robert

Brundage, Toyota Motor North America, Inc.’s appel­

late counsel, had engaged in the unauthorized practice

of law by “ghostwriting pleadings” in Jaiyeola I. The

district court dismissed that lawsuit for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, Jaiyeola u. Brundage, No. l:21-cv1053, 2022 WL 368650, at *1-2 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 8,

2022), and Jaiyeola’s appeal from that judgment is cur­

rently pending before this court in Case No. 22-1083.

In February 2022, Jaiyeola filed this fee-paid law­

suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Thomas L. Dorwin,

who is the Clerk of Court for the United States District

Court for the Western District of Michigan. Jaiyeola al­

leged that Dorwin violated his constitutional rights

and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by not enter­

ing a default that he had requested against Brundage

in Jaiyeola II once Brundage failed to file a timely re­

sponsive pleading. According to Jaiyeola, an entry of

default against Brundage in Jaiyeola II would have

conferred federal subject-matter jurisdiction on the

district court in that case. Jaiyeola sued Dorwin in his

personal and official capacities and sought damages,

declaratory relief, and injunctive relief, as well as costs,

attorneys’ fees, and interest. He subsequently sought

leave to file recusal motions against the magistrate

judge and the district court judge in this matter be­

cause they are the judges who presided over Jaiyeola

II.

App. 4

On initial screening, the magistrate judge recom­

mended that the district court dismiss Jaiyeola’s com­

plaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant

to the rule ofApple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477,479 (6th Cir.

1999) (per curiam), upon concluding that Dorwin is not

a “state actor” subject to suit under § 1983 and that, in

any event, Dorwin is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial

immunity. She also recommended that the district

court designate Jaiyeola as a vexatious litigant. Over

Jaiyeola’s objections, the district court adopted in part

and rejected in part the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation and dismissed Jaiyeola’s complaint

with prejudice. In doing so, the district court agreed

that Jaiyeola’s complaint was subject to dismissal but

declined to declare Jaiyeola a vexatious litigant. The

district court also denied Jaiyeola leave to file his

recusal motions.

In this appeal, Jaiyeola challenges the district

court’s conclusion that Dorwin is entitled to quasi-ju­

dicial immunity. He also raises claims of judicial bias.

By limiting his appellate brief to those issues, Jaiyeola

has forfeited appellate review of the district court’s al­

ternative determination that Dorwin is not subject to

suit under § 1983, see Radvansky v. City of Olmsted

Falls, 395 F.3d 291,318 (6th Cir. 2005), which is wholly

dispositive of his challenge to the district court’s dis­

missal.

Jaiyeola also argues that the magistrate judge

and the district court judge were both biased against

him, thus requiring their recusal or disqualification.

A judge’s conduct may be “characterized as ‘bias’ or

App. 5

‘prejudice’ if “it is so extreme as to display clear inabil­

ity to render fair judgment.” Liteky v. United States,

510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994). But a judge’s frustration with

a litigant does not give rise to an inference of bias or

partiality absent some indication of personal animos­

ity on the part of the judge. See United States v. Griffin,

84 F.3d 820, 830-31 (7th Cir. 1996); accord Gordon v.

Lafler, 710 F. App’x 654, 664 (6th Cir. 2017). Jaiyeola

has failed to make such a showing, and his accusations

of judicial bias and vindictiveness are completely un­

founded. To the extent that Jaiyeola takes issue with a

particular adverse ruling, “judicial rulings alone al­

most never constitute a valid basis for a bias or par­

tiality motion.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Moreover,

although Jaiyeola argues that the magistrate judge ex­

hibited bias against him by recommending that he be

declared a vexatious litigant, he cannot show prejudice

because the district court ultimately rejected that rec­

ommendation.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

judgment.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF

THE COURT

/s/ Deborah S. Hunt______

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

App. 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

GANIYU AYINLA

JAIYEOLA,

Plaintiff,

Case No. l:22-cv-129

v.

HON. JANET T. NEFF

THOMAS L. DORWIN,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

(Filed Apr. 26, 2022)

This is the third related case brought by Plaintiff

Ganiyu Ayinla Jaiyeola. See Ganiyu Ayinla Jaiyeola v.

Toyota Motor North America, Inc., et al., No. l:17-cv562 (W.D. Mich.) (Jaiyeola I); Ganiyu Ayinla Jaiyeola v.

Robert A. Brundage, No. l:21-cv-1053 (W.D. Mich.)

((Jaiyeola II). Plaintiff initiated this action against De­

fendant Thomas L. Dorwin, the Clerk of this Court,

alleging claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The mat­

ter was referred to the Magistrate Judge, who issued a

Report and Recommendation (R & R), recommending

that this Court (1) dismiss the Complaint with preju­

dice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and (2) pre­

clude Plaintiff from filing any additional motions,

briefs, or other documents in the three related cases,

as well as prevent Plaintiff from filing any new case

related to this case (ECF No. 5). The matter is pres­

ently before the Court on Plaintiff’s objections (ECF

App. 7

No. 9) to the R & R and Plaintiff’s motions for leave to

file motions to recuse (ECF Nos. 6 and 7). In accordance

with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and FED. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3),

the Court has performed de novo consideration of those

portions of the Report and Recommendation to which

objections have been made. For the reasons stated be­

low, the Court adopts the recommendation to dismiss

the Complaint but rejects the recommendation to pre­

clude Plaintiff from further filings.

Plaintiff raises two main issues in his Objections.

First, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred

in finding that Defendant is entitled to quasi-judicial

immunity. He contends that Defendant is not immune

because he repeatedly acted “in the complete absence

of jurisdiction” and “failed to act when he had a duty

to do so” (ECF No. 9 at PageID.107).

The Court has reviewed the record and fords no

error in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis. Plaintiff’s

claims stem from Defendant not entering default

against a defendant in Jaiyeola II. As the Magistrate

Judge explained, this Court has held that the Clerk of

Court is entitled to judicial immunity in nearly the

identical situation. In McCreary v. Bell, No. l:10-cv1211, 2011 WL 4559712 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2011),

U.S. District Judge Gordon J. Quist held that the Clerk

of Court was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity be­

cause she was acting on behalf of the Court when she

allegedly failed to enter default. Plaintiff’s allegations

against Defendant in this case concern acts that are

intricately related to the judicial process. Plaintiff was

not entitled to the entry of default because the Court

App. 8

lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, Plain­

tiff has not shown that Defendant “had a history of

being unfair to Plaintiff” (ECF No. 9 at PageID.109).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection lacks merit.

Second, Plaintiff argues that the R & R “clearly

shows” the Magistrate Judge’s “judicial bias with prej­

udice against Plaintiff” (ECF No. 9 at PageID.110).

This objection is also related to Plaintiff’s motions

seeking to have the Magistrate Judge and the under­

signed recuse. In Jaiyeola I, the Court denied two of

Plaintiff’s motions for disqualification of the Magis­

trate Judge (See ECF Nos. 334 and 342, Jaiyeola I,

No. l:17-cv-562). Plaintiff’s objection, as well as the

motions, lack merit for the same reasons the Court

explained in its previous orders.

Furthermore, Plaintiff has not shown that the un­

dersigned should recuse itself from this case. Under 28

U.S.C. § 455(a), “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate of

the United States shall disqualify [herself] in any pro­

ceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). When bias is urged as

the basis for recusal, “the issue is whether ‘a reasona­

ble person would be convinced the judge was biased.

Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 299 F.3d

635, 640 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lac du Flambeau

Indians v. Stop Treaty AbuseWis., Inc., 991 F.2d 1249,

1255 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted)). A judge’s rul­

ings in a case are ordinarily not enough to support a

litigant’s request for recusal based on alleged bias. See

United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 405 (6th Cir.

2005). “ ‘Personal’ bias is prejudice that emanates from

App. 9

some source other than participation in the proceed­

ings or prior contact with related cases.” Youn, 324 F.3d

at 423 (citing Wheeler v. Southland Corp., 875 F.2d

1246, 1251-52 (6th Cir. 1989)). In the absence of proof

of extrajudicial bias, the moving party must show that

the judge has “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism

that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky,

510 U.S. at 555. In this case, Plaintiff provides no ev­

idence that the undersigned has a personal bias or

prejudice against Plaintiff or in favor of Defendants.

See Heard u. Caruso, 351 F. App’x 1,15 (6th Cir. 2009).

The fact that the undersigned has ruled against Plain­

tiff in other cases is not a valid basis for recusal.

Finally, the Court must address the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation “to preclude Plaintiff from fil­

ing any additional motions, briefs, or other documents,

with the exception of an objection to this Report and

Recommendation, in Jaiyeola I, II, or III, and that he

be precluded from filing any new case relating in any

way to Jaiyeola I, II, or III” (ECF No. 5 at PageID.35).

Although the Court agrees that such a sanction is war­

ranted based on Plaintiff’s repeated filings of frivolous

motions, the Court finds that such a sanction confers

too much discretion to the Clerk of Court in discerning

whether a new case is “relating in any way” to Jaiyeola

I, II, or III. If Plaintiff files any additional cases, the

case should go through the normal case opening proce­

dure. If the case is related to Jaiyeola I, II, or III, the

Magistrate Judge will make such a finding and the

case will be properly assigned to the undersigned. See

W.D. Mich. LCivR 3.3.l(d)(iii)(B). The Court finds no

App. 10

reason to deviate from the standard procedure at this

time.

Accordingly, this Court adopts in part and rejects

in part the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommen­

dation as the Opinion of this Court.

Therefore:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Objections

(ECF No. 9) are DENIED and the Report and Recom­

mendation of the Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 5) is

ADOPTED as to dismissing the Complaint and RE­

JECTED as to precluding Plaintiff from future filings

related to this same subject matter.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s

motions for leave to file motions to recuse (ECF Nos. 6

and 7) are DENIED.

A Judgment will be entered consistent with this

Opinion and Order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.

Dated: April 26, 2022

/s/ Janet T. Neff

JANET T. NEFF

United States District Judge

App. 11

No. 22-1424

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GANIYU AYINLA

JAIYEOLA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THOMAS L. DORWIN,

Defendant-Appellee.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ORDER

(Filed Nov. 7, 2022)

BEFORE: SUTTON, Chief Judge; GUY and COLE,

Circuit Judges.

The court received a petition for rehearing en

banc. The original panel has reviewed the petition for

rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the

petition were fully considered upon the original sub­

mission and decision of the case. The petition then was

circulated to the full court. No judge has requested a

vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF

THE COURT

/s/ Deborah S. Hunt________

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk