Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Vincent Alonzo Corson, Petitioner v. Texas

Supreme Court briefNov 22, 2022

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FILED

NOV 2 2 2022

IN THE

OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICE

SUPREME COURT. U.S.

Vincent Alonzo Corson

— PETITIONER

(Your Name)

vs.

The State of Texas

— RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

Court of Criminal Appeals

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Vincent Alonzo Corson

(Your Name)

Connally Unit, B99 FM 632

(Address)

Kenedy, tx 76119

(City, State, Zip Code)

N/A

(Phone Number)

Certiorari Pg II

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

1. If a State Post-Conviction proceeding is conducted in a manner that does not afford an

Applicant a full & fair hearing—Due Process—leaving the Court's judgement Constitution

ally infirm, should that State Court still be entitled to give such a judgement preclus

ive effect to be used to bar the Applicant from relitigating his cause.

2. Pursuant to the McCleskey Abuse of Writ Doctrine, should the Cause & Prejudice Carrier

standard be made applicable to State Court proceedings, modified to allow subsequent

State applications.

3. Pursuant to the Carrier standard, should this standard be sufficient to prevent a State

from refusing to consider subsequent applications.

k. Pursuant to the Carrier standard, should State &/or Judicial misconduct that rises to

the level of depriving an applicant of Due Process of Law during a habeas corpus hearing,

constitute Causa.

5. Pursuant to the Carrier standard, should any conduct during a habeas corpus hearing that

deprives an applicant of Due Process of Law Constitute Cause.

6. Should whatever remedy this Court permits be made retroactive to the States.

7. Where there is no appeal, nor an opportunity available for further consideration of the

issues on the merits, should the principles of Res Judicata apply to the State Court's

judgement.

8. Where there is no federal remedy to a Constitutionally infirm State Court judgement

decided after the federal Court has lost its jurisdiction, pretaining to a federal

Constitutional law, what remedy is available for the applicant.

Certiorari Pg III

LIST OF PARTIES

IX] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[ ] All parties do riot appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of

all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows:

RELATED CASES

72,778

03-15-00055-CR;

72,779

03-15-00056-CR; UR-86,912-02;

UR-86,912-06;

UR-86,912-11

72,780

03-15-00057-CR; UR-86,912-03;

UR-86,912-07;

UR-B6,912-10

71 ,403

03-15-00054-CR; UR-B6,912-05

UR-86,912-01;

UR-86,912-05; UR-86,912-09

Certiorari Pg IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

2-4

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

6-7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

B-25

CONCLUSION

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A Decision of Court of Criminal Appeals

APPENDIX B Order of Conviction

APPENDIX C Order Dismissing Motion for En Banc Reconsideration

APPENDIX D Exerpt of Crief raising issues/questions for review

APPENDIX E The Problem of "Rubber-Stamping".. .Case Study

APPENDIX F Lethal Indifference, a Case Study

Appendix G

Motion to enter Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law,

& State's Findings of Fact & Conclusions of li'aw.

Appendix H

Trial Court's Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law

Appendix I

Motion for Independent Analysis (72,780; UR-86,912-10)

Appendix 0

Independent Analysis Request Denial

Appendix K

Motion for En Banc Reconsideration Bs

Certiorari Pg V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES

PAGE NUMBER

BECAUSE OF THE EXTENSIVENESS OF THE AUTHORITIES CITED HEREIN, A SEPERATE PAGE HAS BEEN

DEDICATED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE AUTHORITIES CITED.

THE SEPERATE PAGE REFERENCED ABOVE FOLLOWS THIS PAGE. pg VI

STATUTES AND RULES

C.C.P.Art 11.07 § 4(a)

3, 10, 11

2B USC §~2244(d)(1)

12, 19

227'

2B USC § 173B

OTHER

Abuse -Of-Writ doctrine

15, 14, 19

■f

15,,16, 22

Res Oudicata

Procedural Default

Certiorari Pg HE

Table Of Authorities

What

Where

Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 3B6, 15B L.ED.2d 659, 124 S.Ct 1B47 (2004)

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L.ED.2d 1201, 103 S.Ct 3469 (1963)

Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 1995)

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 108 S.Ct 1981, 100 L.ED.2d 575 (1988)

Hathron v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 72 L.ED.2d 824, 102 S.Ct 2421 (1982)

Ex Parte Buck, 418 S.W.3d 98 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013)

4, 11

Ex Parte Torress, 943 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)

Ex Parte Rawlinson, 958 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)

Ex Parte Evans, 964 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998)

Ex Parte Mcpherson, 32 S.W.3d 860 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)

Ex Parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002)

Ex Parte Kerr, 64 S.W.3d 414 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002)

Ex Parte Hood, 227 S.W.3d 700 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007)

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S.Ct 830 (1985)

Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 53 L.ED.2d 281, 97 S.Ct 2319 (1972)

Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 89B, 138 L.ED.2d 914, 117 S.Ct 2635 (1997)

Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 84 L.ED.2d 716, 60 S.Ct 472 (1940)

10*

Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F.Supp.2d 705 (W.D.Tex 2004)

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. B17, 52 L.ED.2d 72, 97 S.Ct 1491 (1977)

Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp, 456 U.S. 461, 72 L.ED.2d 262, 102 S.Ct 1888 (19B2)

Furman et el v. Georgia, 40B U.S. 238, 33 L.ED.2d 346, 92 S.Ct 2726 (1972)

11:

Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, 596 U.S. ___ (2022 (No. 20-1009))

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 36 L.ED.2d 854, 93 S.Ct 2041 (1973)

Kaufman v. U.S • } 394 U.S. 217, 22 L.ED.2d 227, 89 S.Ct 1068 (1968)

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 146 L.ED.2d 3B9, 120 S.Ct 1495 (2000)

Ex Parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.Cr.App. 1989)

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 91 L.ED.2d 397, 106 S.Ct 3639 (1986)

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 82’L.ED.2d 1, 104 S.Ct 2901 (1984)

Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 68 L.ED.2d 662, 127 S.Ct 2842 (2007)

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 161 L.ED.2d 440, 125 S.Ct 1528 (2005)

Honda v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 114 S.Ct 233 (1994)

14.

Little v. Streater, 425 U.S. 1, 68 L.ED.2d 627, 101 S.Ct 2202 (1981)

14.

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 28 L.ED.2d 113, 91 S.Ct 780 (1971)

14, 17.

Jefferson v. Sellers, 250 F.Supp.3d 1340 (2017 U.S.Dist.Lexis 66035)

The Problem of "RubberOStamping" In Capital Cases..., 55 Hous. L.Rev. 889 (2017) 14, 17,

14, 16

Felker v. Turpin, 51B U.S. 651, 135 L.ED.2d 827, 116 S.Ct 2333 (1996)

15, 16, 19McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 113 L.ED.2d 384, 111 S.Ct 1454 (1991)

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,,146 L.ED.2d 435, 120 S.Ct 1479 (2000)

Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 3B6, 158 L.ED.2d 659, 124 S.Ct 1847 (2004)

Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 168 L.ED.2d 662, 127 S.Ct 2842 (2007)

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 53 L.ED.2d 594, 97 S.Ct 2497 (1977)

Montana v. US., 440 U.S. 147, 159 L.ED.2d 210, 99 S.Ct 970 (1979)

16.

Gomex v. Tri City Community Hosp LTD, 4 S.W.3d 281 (Tex.App -San Antonio 1999)

City of Lufkin v. D.H.Mcvicker. M'.D., 510 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.App.Lexis 1973)

Freeman v. Freeman, 327 S.W.2d 428 (1959)

16.

Ex Parte Moreno, 245 S.W.3d 419 (Tex.Cr.App. 2008)

Ualdez v. Cockrell, 28B F.3d 702 (5th.Cir. 2002)

1 8‘Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 123 L.ED.2d 353, 113 S.Ct 1710 (1993)

Brady v. Maryland, 373.U.S. 679, 83 S.Ct 1194 (1963)

Lethal Indifference, A Texas Death Penalty Case Study (2002)

Kerr v. Johnson, No. SA-98-CA-151-06, slip op. at 1 (W.D.Tex 1999)

Ex Parte Smith, 977 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998)

Ex Parte Kerr, 977 S.W.2d 585 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998)

Certiorari Pg VIE

Authorities Cont'd

What

Where

Ex Parte Butler, 416 S.W.3d B63 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012)

Ex Parte Damson, 509 S.W.3d 294 (Tex.Crim.App. 2016)

Kyles v. Whitley, 498 U.S. 931, 111 S.Ct 333 (1990)

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 4TB, 60 L.ED.2d 323, 99 S.Ct 1B04 (1979)

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct 1087 (1985)

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 22 L.ED.2d 281, 89 S.Ct 1082 (1969)

Vincent v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 1166, B3 L.ED.2d 929, 105 S.Ct 1414 (1985)

Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941 (5th.Cir. 2001)

Gideon v. Wainmright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct 792 (1963)

Ex Parte Renier, 734 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Crim.App.Lexis 742)

Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 125 L.ED.2d 257, 113 S.Ct 2637 (1993)

Louve v. SEC, 472 U.S. 151, 86 Li.ED.2d 130, 105 S.Ct 2557 (1985)

END

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix

the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix

the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

EKI For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix _E___to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

|><r is unpublished.

The opinion of the________:_________________

appears at Appendix _H___to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

04 is unpublished.

court

Certiorari Pg 2

JURISDICTION

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was_____________________

[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date:____________

, and a copy of the

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including______

(date) on

(date)

in Application No. ___ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

|X] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was 07/27/2022

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix

[><] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

08/22/2022

, and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

IX An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including____

(date) on

(date) in

Application No.__ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

NOTE: Far the reasons casserted on pages 3 & 4 of the instant petition, this Court's

Jurisdiction is confirmed.

Certiorari Pg 3

i: r-

Jurisdictional Statement

1) Under Jurisdictional Grant 28 USC § 1257(a), this Court has the Authority to consider

claims that arise out of a proceeding decided by a State's highest Appellate Court.

2) However, "an adeguate & independent procedural disposition strips this Court of Certi

orari jurisdiction to review a State Court's judgement." Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 3B6,

392, 158 L.ED.2d 659, 124 S.Ct 1847, 1851 (2QU4). Accord, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.

1032, 1041-42, 77 L.ED.2d 1201, 103 S.Ct 3469, 3476 (1983).

3) Initially, VAC concedes that, on their face, the causes challenged herein were dismis

sed on what would traditionally be considered adeguate & independent State Procedural

grounds. See C.C.P.Art 11.07 § 4; C.C.P.Art 11.071 § 5.

4) However, the Presumption "of adequacy can be rebutted in certain circumstances...if

the State's procedural rule is not 'strictly or regularly followed l n Sones v. Hargett,

61 F.3d 410, 416 (5th Cir. 1995)(quoting Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587,

108 S.Ct 1981, 1987, 100 L.ED.2d 575 (1988)(Citations & Internal quotations omitted

with alterations to the original).

5) The reason for the allowance of the presumption of adequacy being -allowed to be rebu

tted is because "State Courts may not avoid deciding federal issues by invoking proce

dural rules they do not apply even handly to all "similar claims'". Sones, Supra (quo

ting Hathron v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 263, 102 S.Ct 2421, 2426, 72 L.ED.2d 824 (1982)).

6) Accordingly, pursuant to the Webster's New World College Dictionary (5ed 2014), Simil

ar is defined as: Nearly but not exactly the same or alike; having a resemblance. In

the instantsinstance, this means more than dismissals of other causes dissimilar to

the facts of a given cause, & meaning, the underlying facts that are relevant should

be similar.

7) Wherefore, VAC asserts that because his cause specifically challenged the adequacy &

correctness of the State procedural rule—in the State Court proceeding, as well as in

the instant action—the normally independent & adequate State Court procedural bar is

inadequate to preclude this Court's Jurisdiction.

8) VAC, alleges that, when the adequacy &/or correctness of the State Procedural rule has

Certirari Pg M

Jurisdiction Cont'd

been called into question, whether by the State, the Applicant or the Justices of the

Court; the merits of such a claim have been considered in each of the following causes:

A) Ex Part Buck, 41B S.W.3d 98 (Tex.Crim.App 2D13)(noting what an example of being

r■’ dimissed without a consideration of the merits, at all—similar to the instant cau

se—resembles) .

B) Ex Parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.Crim.App 1997)(noting the first application

was an out of time appeal & the second one challenged the conviction & they defined

subsequent).

C) Ex Parte Rawlinson, 958 S.U.2d 19B (Tex.Crim.App 1997)(noting the cause was filed

to consider if it was barred & to define disposition).

D) Ex Parte Evans, 964 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Crim.App 199B)(noting the first application

challenged the conviction & the second one challenged a parole denial).

E) Ex Parte Mcpherson, 32 S.W.3d B60 I^Tex.Crim. App 2C00) (noting that an out-of-time

appeal does not count as a challenge to a conviction).

F) Ex Parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex.Crim.App 2002)( noting that this was filed to

consider whether a claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel on a previous habeas

was &/or should be a cognizable issue for purposes of subsequent Writ consideratio

ns. Though dismissed, the merits of the issue presented were considered before its

dismissal).

G) Ex Parte Kerr, 64 S.ld.3d 414 (Tex.Crim.App 2002)(noting that the first two habeas

corpus applications were too deficient to be considered original applications).

H) Ex Parte Hood, 227 S.W.3d 700 (Tex.Crim.App 2007)(noting it was dismissed as subse

quent, however, only after considering the merits to determine if it should be dis

missed). CF. Ex Parte Santana, 227 S.W.3d 700 (Tex.Crim.App 2007).

9) Wherefore, because the Court has consistently filed for consideration of whether or

not a cause that raises a novel issue &/or to define the Statute, the Court has not

consistently dismissed such causes without a consideration of the issue at hand, hence,

their normally independent & adequate procedural bar, in relation to the facts of the

instant cause, is thus, inadequate & this Court's jurisdiction is plain & clear.

10) Wherefore, 0AC hereby requests this Court to assume it has proper jurisdiction to

consider the merits of the issue raised herein.

Continued On Next ; Page

>■

Certiorari Pg 5

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

5th Amendment: Inter alia, "nor be deprived of Life, Liberty, or Property, without Due

Process of Law."

14th Amendment: Inter alia, "nor shall any State deprive any person of Life, Liberty, or

Property, without Due Process of Law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the Law."

C.C.P.Art 11.07 § 4(a): If a subsequent application far writ of habeas corpus is filed

after disposition of an initial application challenging the same

conviction, a court may not consider the merits of or grant relief

based on the subsequent application unless the application contains

sufficient specific facts establishing that:

1) Inter alia, "The current claims & issues have not been & could

not have been presented previously in an original application...

because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable."

2.)! "by a preponderance of the evidence, but for a violation of the

United States Constitution no rational juror could have found

the applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."

28 USC § 2244(d)(1): Inter alia, "A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an applica

tion for a writ of habeas corpus by

person in custody pursuant to

the judgement of a State Court."

28 USC § 1738: Inter alia, "[These] Acts, records & judicial proceedings or copies thereof,

so authenticated, shall have the same full faith & credit in every court

within the United States & its territoraies & Possessions as they have by

law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from

which they are taken."

Certiorari Pg 6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Sup.Crt.R. 14(g)(i), Prerequsites

The

State

Habeas

Corpus

1-5)

were

raised.

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the

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C.C.P.Art

11.07

law&

4(a)(See

arg

App.

"Should Tex.Crim.Pro.Art 11.07 § 4(a), apoly to the instant causeT where

the previous Habeas Corpus applications were not conducted nor resolved in accordance with

Due Process.")

The foregoing argument was reasserted in a motion for En Banc Reconsideration (See App.

K). A further request for the Court to independently analyze this specifc issue was also

filedr twice (once with the Trial Court & once with the Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA)—

72.780-C & WR-B6.912-10, respectively)(See App. 0).

Accordinglyv the question was not considered by the State Courts, though they were made

aware that the intent was to petition this Court for its resolution of the matter (See App.

D, cause l'JR-86.912-1□, pp. 1-2. at n. 9. Inter alia,

"presented in such a manner so as to

allow for a meaningful review in the U.S. Suoreme Court.").

Though also properly raised & on time in a motion for En Banc Reconsideration, the St

ate Court dismissed instead of denying the motion (See Apd. C).

The Court should note, the instant issues raised about. C.C.P.Art 11.07 § 4(a)'s Const

itutionality & whether it should apply could not be raised until the Petitioner (VAC) had

standing to raise such a challenge, thus, not applicable in an original application & only

applicable in a subsequent apolication that is being denied as subsequent under this rule.

Statement Of Facts

During VACs trial he was denied the effective assistance of counsel guranteed (6th

Amendment) to him by his Counsel's (Stephen Lee) failure to investigate. VAC was further

denied the asistance of a disinterested expert to examine him & his volumious mental health

records on issues of sanity, though the record showed that his mental health would play a

significant role. VAC alleged to have been insane during the commsion of his crimes. He

further alleged to have been heavily medicated on psycho-active drugs that he'd previously

had adverse affects to, & seeing & hearing things that no one else saw or heard & unable

to defend himself (5th Amendment), yet, as alleged;, ha was not afforded a meaningful &

sufficient resolution of either of these issues before he was tried, convicted & sentenced,

noting that the ineffectiveness of his Counsel prevented the competency evaluation he did

have to find the numerous underlying mental health problems that would've required an ind

ependent competency hearing. VAC also assarted that his plea of guilty was unknowing & in-

Certiorari Pg 7

Statement Cont'd

voluntary & that he'd desired to go to trial.

The Foregoing are the underlying facts for the State Habeas Corpus applications VAC

filed.

Because VAC, as an indigent defendant, mas unable to afford to hire an independfentrdisif'lnterested expert to evaluate his competency to stand trial or his post-conviction compete

ncy, which he alleged in the federal Court had not, resolved itself for nearly 2 years after

his final convictions, allowing his time limits under 28 USC § 2244(d)(1), to expire & ba

rring all federal forms of relief.

In VAC's first set of Habeas Corpus applications for causes: 72,778; 72,779; 72,780 (

See UR-86,912-01; UR-86,912-02; UR-B6,912-03 (hence forth UR...01; Ur...02; UR...03, etc)),

the State's District Attorney, Sean K. Proctor, acted as the designated & sole factfinder

with no participation from the Trial Court except for the Court's signing of what was put

before it. The CCA failed to participate as well, leaving the decision to the State.

The State manipulated VAC's allegations to make some represent different allegations

not raised. The State went on to request an affidavit from VAC's Trial Counsel, to which,

though said affidavit was wholely unsupported, conclusory & contradicted the clear & conv

incing evidence in the record, the State still found it credible & made findings based,

nearly,^exclusively off said affidavit, while mostly ignoring the record & the evidence

put before the Court.

The State drafted proposed Findings suggesting relief to be denied that were almost

immediately adopted verbatim by the Trial Court, without input from it nor did the Court

permit VAC to object or respond to said findings before ordering they be transmitted to the

CCA. The Trial Court did not consider a single motion filed by VAC, nor .did it hold an

evidenitary hearing to address the clear inconsistencies in said affidavit, to the record.

Uithout any further considerations, the CCA adopted the Trial Court's findings, verbatim

& denied VAC relief.

All of the subsequent habeas proceedings (See UR..85; UR..86; UR..07; UR..08; UR..09;

UR..10; UR..11) were considered, decided &/pr dismissed in the exact same manner, using the

same affidavit, though they were put on’lnotice of the deficiencies of the first applications

in causes: UR..05; UR..06; UR..07;LUR..08.

The findings proposed by the State & adopted verbatim by the Courts were wholly unsup

ported & often mistated the record &/or manipulated it so that it supported the findings.

Sometimes the findings confirmed Constitutional denials yet ignored the Constitutions.

If not for the 2244(d)(1) bar, the federal Court would've found.unreasonable applicat

ions of federal laws, unreasonable determinations of facts & contrary to federal law ruli

ngs &.relief would've been unquestionably granted.

Finally, there was no Due Process of Law during any of the Habeas.Corpus applications

none of which actually reached the merits of the issues raised.

Certiorari Pg B

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Introduction

It is here that I wish to express that, as a honorably served Veteran of the U.S. Army,

it'*’is not my intention to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Courts of the United States.

However, injustices are injustices, no matter what my intent is.

What I ask of this Court as it reviews these reasons to grant the Certiorari is that you

keep an open mind. I have gone to war to protect our Rights & Freedoms & our Constitution &

our Bill Of Rights. It is here I only seek for OUR Constitution & the Rights therein to

protect me.

Before I begin, I also ask the Court to keep the following in mind. If my claims in the

State.Court judicial proceedings were meritless & I was not entitled to relief what-s.p-ever,

why not say so instaed of committing what would ordinarily be classified as a third degree

felony in the State of Texas. Agg. Perjury.

Penal Code § 37.3(a): A person commits an offense if he commits perjury as defined in

section 37.02, & the false statement,

1) is made during or in connection with an official proceeding, &

2) is material.

A full review of.the instant cause will confirm that this has happened.

Note: The numbering continues from the Ourisdictional Statement.

11) The reasons this Court should grant this Certiorari are set in the fallowing sections:

Right To Appellate Review,

Habeas Corpus Relief,

Deficient Remedies,

The Need For The Court's Intervention,

Justification For Alternative Remedy,

Final Point, &

Conclusion.

Right To Appellate Review

12) As an initial matter, VAC hereby concedes that "The Constitution does not require

States to grant appeals of right to criminal defendants seeking to review alleged Trial

Court errors." Evitts v. liucey, 469 U.S. 3B7, 393, 105 S.Ct B3C, B34 (19B5). However,

"if a State has created appellate courts as 'an integral part of the system for finally

adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant, the procedures used in deciding

Certiorari Pg 9

appeals [must] compart with ithe demands of the [Due Process] & Equal Protection clauses

of'the Constitution." Ibid(Citation Omitted; Emphasis Added).

13) Wherefore, though the Petitioner (now known as VAC) is not entitled under the Constitu

tion to have his cause reviewed for trial errors or Constitutional violations, because the State has granted such a right (See: C.C.P.Art 11.07), the proceedings are

thereby constrained by the "demands of the Due Process & Equal Protection clauses of

the Constitution." Ibid., to which, the Petitioner charges that said proceedings did

not compart with said Constitution.

14) VAC further concedes that, the Court has held that "preventing & dealing with crime

is much more the business of the States than it is of the federal government." Patte

rson v. New York, 432 U.S.. 197, 201 , 53 L.ED.2d 2B1 , 97 S.Ct 2319, 2322 (1972). The

Court further held that, "it is normally 'within the power of the State to regulate

procedures under which its laws are carried out...& its decision in this regard is

not subject to proscription under the Due Process clause unless it offends some prin

ciple of justice so rooted in the tradition & conscience of our people as to be rank

ed as fundamental." Id. at U.S. 201-02, 97 S.Ct 2322.

15) However, such a holding has the very real potential of running afoul of a judge or

justices 'mandatory duty to uphold the Supreme Law Of The Land. "The Constitution was

originally understood to permit imposition of an [obligation] on [State judges] to

enforce [federal] prescriptions, in so far as those prescriptions related to matters

appropriate for the judicial power."-Printz v. U.S • 9 521 U.S. 89B, 907, 138 L.ED.2d

914, 117 S.Ct 2635, 2371 (1997). The Supremacy Clause, Art.VI. cl. 2 announced that

"the Laws of the United States 9 • ..shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; & the [judges]

in every state shall be [bound] thereby." Ibid.

16) VAC asserts that, the conflict comes where the States are not historically required

to afford appellate courts, nor Post-Conviction proceedings, however, once they do,

said proceedings are required tar’camport with Due Process requirements, thus, the

judges & Justices of the state are bound to uphold the Constitution before statutes

&/or rules of the Court, if by fallowing said statutes or rules would cause a confli-

Certiorari Pg 10

ct with their duty & obligation to uphold said Constitution.

17) Uherefore, it is fundamental that "The Due Process provisions of the 14th Amendment

—just as that in the 5th—.. .was intended to [guarantee] procedural standards adequa

te & appropriate then & thereafter." Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.5. 227, 236, 84 L.ED.

2d 716, 721, 60 S.Ct 472 (1940). Therefore, "'As Justice O'Connor state[d], "[i]f

there is one [fundamental] requiste of due process, :it is that an individual is [ent

itled] to an ^opportunity to be heard'" Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F.Supp.2d 705, 707

(W.D.Tex 2004)(Citation Omitted). "Justice Powell specifically noted [state! proceed

ings deficient in this respect 'invite[] arbitrariness & error'." Ibid.

18) While n. 17, Panetti, Supra, primarily focused on deference, the overall principle

remains the same. Due Process protections are a prerequsite for any appellate procee

dings .

19) Wherefore, a State procedural rule that, itself, does<not offend some principle well

rooted in the tradition & conscience of the people, when applied to the facts & circ

umstances of the instant cause, its use dictates & demands that a judge &/or justice

of the Court must ignore their sworn oaths & obligations & duty to uphold the Supreme

Law of the Land, where, the use of the Statutory procedural bar—C.C.P.Art 11.07 § 4

(a)—where the previous proceeding is Constitutionally infirm & failed to reach the

merits of the issues raised, means VAC will never have his day, though guranteed, in

Court. "It is now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a Constitutional Right

of access to the Courts." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 52 L.ED.2d 72, 97 S.Ct

1491 , 1994 (1977).

20) VAC, alleges, it is the very real implication that C.C.P.Art 11.07 § 4(a), overrides

the U.S. Constitution & the judges' duty to uphold it„ where, in a traditional since,

"A State [judge] may [not] grant preclusive effect in its own Courts to a Constituti

onally infirm judgement." Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp, 456 U.S. 461, 481, 72 L.ED.

2d 262, 102 S.Ct 1888, 1897 (1982). However, in the instant cause, the Constitutional

mandate must yield to the superior State procedural rule & preclusion must be granted.

?1) lilr- must nnt,_in the grri

uf 'Juriinin1 ""r+riainti1-- nhrii nnta our [funrinmQntn1 ■]—™^pri-

Certiorari Pg 11

21) C.C.P.flrt 11.07 § 4(a) reads: If a subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus

is filed after final disposition of an initial application challenging the same conv

iction, a court may not consider the merits of or grant relief based on the subseque

nt application unless the application contains sufficient specific facts establishing

that:

1) The current claims & issues have not been & could not have been presented previou

sly in an original application or in a previously considered application filed

under this article because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailab

le on the date the applicant filed the previous application; or

2) by a preponderance of the evidence, but for a violation of the United States Cons

titution no rational juror could have found the applicant guilty beyond a reasona

ble doubt.

22) The Court will note that 11.07 § 4(a), leaves no room for consideration of whether the

r "'.previous application was decided in compliance with Due Process of law & though the

Court of Criminal Appeals found that "[i]nterpreting the phrase 'final disposition',

to mean the disposition of the entire writ by any method would result in consequences

seriously adverse to the legislature's intent" Ex Parte Torres, 943 S.U.2d 469, 474

(Tex.Cr.App 1997), the instant application will show the Court that this is precisely

how the instant applications were resolved. In effect, random words that loosely ref

erence evidence in the record, thrown on a sheet of paper & considered a resolution

of the cause or a final disposition.

23) "LJe must not, in the guise of 'Judicial restraint', abdicate our fundamental respons

ibility to enforce the [Bill Of Rights]. Uere we to do so, the 'Constitution would "

indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy & power. Its

general principles would have little value & be converted by precedent into impotent

& lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality. i ii Furman et

el v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 23B, 269, 33 L.ED.2d 346, 92 S.Ct 2726 (1972)(Citation Omitt

ed; Emphasis Added).

Habeas Corpus Relief

Certiorari Pg 12

24) As recently as Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, this Court reaffirmed that "The Writ of

habeas corpus is an 'extraoridinary remedy' that guards only against extreme malfunctionslin the State criminal justice system. I II Id. at 596 U.S. ___ (2022)(l\lo. 20-1D09).

25) Further, "to ensure that federal habeas corpus retains its narrow role, AEDPA imposes

several limits on habeas relief." Ibid. One such limit is the one year limitation on

when a federal habeas corpus may be filed, unless one of the exceptions are met. See

28 USC § 2244(d)(1).

26) However, VAC reminds the Court that the "necessity that [federal Courts] have the '1ast say' with respect to questions of federal law," was based in large part due to "

the inadequacy of state procedures to raise & preserve federal claims, the concern

that State judges may be unsympathetic to federally created rights, [&] the institut

ional constraints on the exercise of this Court's Certioarari jurisdiction to review

state convictions." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259, n. 13, 36 L.ED.2d

854, 93 S.Ct 2041 (1973)(quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 225-26, 22

L.ED.2d 227 (Alteration to the original;"Emphasis Added).

27) "When federal judges exercise their federal-question jurisdiction under the 'Judicial

Power' of Article HI of the Constitution, it is 'emphatically the province & duty

the judges to

say what the law is'. At the core of this power is the federal courts

independent responsibility...to interpret federal law. A construction of AEDPA that

would require federal courts to cede this authority to the Courts of the States would

be inconsistent with the practice of the federal judges have traditionally fallowed

in discharging their duties under Article 11 of the constitution." Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 378-79, 146 L.ED.2d 389, 120 S.Ct 1495, 1505 (2000)(Citations Omitted;

Alterations to the Original).

28) The instant causa demonstrates that when 2244(d)(1), has lapsed, yet the State still

has the authority to decide federal law questions, that this is precisely what the

federal Courts have done. In such an instense, AEDPA has effectively stripped the

federal Courts of all of their Article HE authority & they have ceded all of it to

the State Courts.

Certiorari Pg 13

29) "The purpose of the Writ of Habeas Corpus is simple—it is a process utilized to det

ermine the lawfulness of confinement. However, it is clear that the habeas corpus is

available to review only jurisdictional defects, or a [denial] of one's [fundamental

or Constitutional Rights]." Ex Parte Adams, 768 S.Ul.2d 281, 287 (Tex.Cr.App 1989)(

Citations Omitted).

30) However, n ! Congress sought to 'interpose the federal Courts between the States & the

people, as [guardians] of the [people's federal rights]—to protect the people from

unconstitutional action." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 519, 91 L.ED.2d 397, 106

S.Ct 3639, 2678 (19B6)(Brennan dissenting)(quoting Reed V. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 104 S.Ct

2901, 82 L.ED.2d 1 (1984)). "This interest is at its strongest where the state court

has declined to consider the merits of a Constitutional claim, for without habeas

review no court will consider whether the petitioner's constitutional rights were

violated." Carrier, Supra at U.S. 520, 106 S.Ct at 2679.

31) On the contrary, l/AC believes the interest is at its strongest when the State does

reach the merits, but manipulates the record, the evidence therein, the laws &/or the

constitution in such a way as to do egregious damage to the Court's integrity.

32) However, it is these fundamental truths (See n. 17, 20, 23, 26, 27, 30; Ante 10-13),

that necessitated the need for the expansion of the federal habeas corpus that has

now brought about the instant cause. The instant cause is a clear & conclusive examp

le of what could—has—happen if /when the federal courts cede their authority to have

the last say on federal constitutional questions of law. "[P]etitioners run the risk

under the proposed interpretation of 'forever losing their opportunity for any feder

al review of their claims." Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 68 L.ED.2d 662, 677,

127 S.Ct 2B42 (2007)(quoting Rhines v. LJeber, 544 U.S. 269, 275, 161 L.ED.2d 440, 125

S.Ct 152B (2005)).

33) This Court has noted that "the basic procedural protections of common law have been

regarded as so [fundamental], very few cases have arison in which a party has compla

ined of their denial." Honda v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430, 114 S.Ct 233 (1994).

34) V/AC asserts that, the instant cause is in fact one of those "very few cases" Ibid.

Certiorari Pg 14

35) This Court has long since held that "Due Process [requires], at a minimum, that abse

nt a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settie their

claims of right & duty through the judicial process must be given a [mean-

ingful] opportunity to be heard." Little v. Streater, 425 U.S. 1, 5-6, 6B L.ED.2d 627,

101 S.Ct 2202, 2205 (1981)(Emphasis Added). The Court has further held that, "notice

& an opportunity to be heard in a manner appropriate to the nature of the case are

[essential requirements] of procedural due process. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 "■

U.S. 371, 379, 28 L.ED.2d 113, 91 S.Ct 780 (1971)." Jefferson v. Sellers, 250 F.Supp.

3d 1340, 1351 (2017 U.S.Dist.Lexis 66035)(Emphasis Added))

36) Except, as with the instant cause—as well as hundreds, if not thousands of other ca

uses tried under the State habeas scheme in Texas—"the factfinding procedure employ

ed by the state habeas court [is] not adequate to afford Petitioner[s] a full & fair

hearing & the deficient procedure employed deprive[s] Petitioner[s] of due process

of lau." Ibid. See also, The Problem of "Rubber-Stamping" In State Capital Habeas

Proceedings: A Harris County Case Study, 55 Hous.L.Rev. 889, 902 (2017)(See App tL ):

> n. 54 (citing cases where Due Process protections were ignore &/or not adhered to:

Ex Parte Ayesta, 754409-A; Ex Parte Davis, 616522-A; Ex Parte Duncan, 9402885-A;

Ex Parte Fratta, 1195044-B; Ex Parte Guidry, 1073163-A, -B; Ex Parte Hunter, 964

8713-A; Ex Parte Rosales, 432787-B; Ex Parte Rowell, 905130-A; Ex Parte Smith,

274702-C; Ex Parte Wilson, 823411-A)

> Further cases cited at: n. 56 (9 cases cited); 57 (7 cases cited); 58 ( 4 cases ci

ted); 61 (8 cases citedO; 62 (5 cases cited); 63 (3 cases cited); 64 (7 cases cited);

65 (5 cases cited); 66 (5 cases cited); & 67 (8 cases cited).

37) VAC will point out that each & every single one of the cases cited &/or referenced at

n. 36 (Ante 14), were/are Capital cases, many Death-Penalty cases which, as of the

date of the instant petition, have no other remedy at law & will be put to death (if

not already done) without

meaningful review of their meritful claims.

Deficient Remedies

38) A deeper understanding of the issue at bar is needed. The Law of the Court is that a

federal petitioner will have a single opportunity to file a.petition for Habeas Carpus, to which, the Court developed the

Abuse of Writ' doctrine in order to prevent

petitioners from saving claims for a second or subsequent petitionSee Felker v.

Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664, 135 L.ED.2d'827, 116 S.Ct 2333, 2340 (1996). Accord.

Certiorari Pg 15

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 113 L.ED.2d 517, 111 S.Ct 1454 (1991).

39) As explained at n. 24 (Ante 12), because State remedies are often seen as deficient

by petitioners, a method of avoidance insued where the petitioner would not raise th

eir claims, either at all or sufficiently, in the State Court proceedings, in the ho

pes of a de novo review in the federal courts, however, such conduct flew in the face

of exhaustion & comity principles, thus, the Procedural default doctrine was develop

ed, mandating that such actions would also bar federal review of defaulted claims.

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436, 120 S.Ct 1479, 1490, 146 L.ED.2d 435 (200

0)(Explaining exhaustion & Comity principles); See also Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 3B6,

392, 158 L.ED.2d 659, 124 S.Ct 1847, 1851-52 (2004)(explaining the procedural default

doctrine).

40) In the interests of the principles of Comity, Finality & Federalism, congress later

codified these principles & doctrines in AEDPA. See 28 USC § 2244(a); § 2254(b)(1)(A).

See also Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 168 L.ED.2d 662, 667, 127 S.Ct 2842 (2

007)(explaining AEDPA's purpose).

41) It should be noted that this Court, in the interests of justice, did still feel comp

elled to create exceptions to these doctrines. "[A] procedural default will be excused upon a showing of cause & prejudice.\Wainwright v. Sykes [, 433 U.S. 72, 53 L.ED.

2d 594, 97 S.Ct 2497 (1977)]. We now-hold that the same standard applies to determine

if there has been an abuse of the writ through inexcusable neglect." Zant, Supra at

U.S. 493, 111 S.Ct at 1470.(Alteration to the original).

42) However, the Court should further note that all of these principles, doctrines &/or

statutes deal squarely with the proper methods for petitioning &/or obtaining relief

in the federal Courts. Non of these have been applied in any other fashion, thus, the

issues/questions presented herein fall squarely outside of the realm of these, leavi

ng them deficient for these purposes, unless expanded by the Court.

43) However, for the issues/questions presented herein, there was a ready made & sound

solution. Res Judicata &/or Estoppal. "Redeterminatian of issues is warranted if the

re is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed

Certiorari Pg 16

in prior litigation' Montana v. United States, Supra at 164, n. 11, 99 S.Ct at 979,

n. 11." Kremer, Supra at 481, 102 S.Ct at 1B97. "The State [must], however, satisfy

the applicable [requirements] of the [Due Process Clause.] A State may [not] grant

[preclusive effect] in its own Courts to a [Constituionally infirm judgement]." Id at

U.5. 482, 102 S.Ct at 1898 (Emphasis Added).

44) Wherefore, by these principles alone, if a State Court—or a judge thereof—may not

grant preclusive effect to a constitutionally infirm judgement, C.C.P.Art 11.07 § 4(

(a), would thus be deemed null & void as applied to the facts of the specific cause.

"A voidable act is one which is absolutely void within itself, but which is binding

until disaffirmed." Gomex v. Tri City Community Hosp. ijTD, 4 S.W.3d 281 (Tex.App- San

Antonio 1999)

it i Judgements

are void for lack of powers in Courts to render them when

they are rendered [contrary] to [Constitutional] or valid statutory prohibition or

outside limiting [Constitutional] or statutory authority." City of Lufkin v. B.H.McVicker, M.D • 9 510 S.li).2d 141, 144 (Tex.App.Lexis 1973) (Emphasis Added) (citing Freeman

v. Freeman, 160 Tex 148, 327 S.W.2d 428, 433 (1959).

45) The Court should note that the State Court, in the instant instance, has two ready

made avenues for which to establish a previous judgement is void, however, without a

mandate from this Court to abide by these principles, said remedies are of no effect.

See TRAP 76(d)CMotion for enbanc Reconsideration) ; 'See also Ex Parte Moreno, 245 S.bJ.

3d 419, 428 (Tex.Cr.App 2008)("An individual State must surely retain the authority...

to revisit one of its own judgements.")

46) Except, in Zant, Supra, this Court finally concluded that Res Judicata did not apply

in the context of a habeas corpus application/petition. "As Appellate review became

available from a decision in habeas refusing to discharge the prisoner, Courts began

to question the continuing validity of the common-law rule allowing endless succesive

petitions." Id at U.S 479, 111 S.Ct at 1462 • 9 thereby,/! the Court held that the Abuseof-Urit doctrine would take its places as a modified Res Judicata. Felker, Supra.

47) VAC, asserts, where no appeal has been granted, the federal habeas corpus is not ava

ilable & no other federal remedy is avilable, -& yet the State is still permitted to

Certiorari Pg 17

consider federal questions of law, the State Court has thereby become the defacto

Court charged with the duty to define/interpret & uphold the federal Constitution,

yet, the instant cause illustrates what happens when the State Courts fail to fulfill

this obligation. "In many jurisdictions, the State Post-Conviction proceedings are

simply a sham." Rubber-Stamping, Supra at 693. "Post-Conviction Courts have a reputa

tion in Texas for lax fact-finding practices, rarely holding evidentiary hearings, &

frequently rubber-stamping State-proposed findings." Ibid. "As accepted by the major

ity, this flawed syllogism evisverates meaningful federal habeas review of a State

Court's [flaunting abdication of its duty] to apply the law of th[e Supreme] court to

the facts of a prisoner's case." Valdez v. Cockrell, 288 F.3d 702, 705 (5th.Cir. 2002)

(Dennis, Idierner & Parker, dissenting).

48) In Defferson v. Sellers, the Court found "the process by which the State habeas judge

arrived at the Court's final order was fundamentally unfair." Id 250 F.Supp.3d 1340,

1354 (2017 U.S.Dist.Lexis 66035). To which, such a proceeding "deprived Petitioner of

a-full & fair hearing & Due Process of law." Ibid.

49) VAC charges that the procedures & conduct complained of by the Court in Sellers, Sup

ra, is in fact the standard procedure employed in the State of Texas. In particular,

"Harris County Post-Conviction prosecutors have authored & proposed 21,275 seperate

findings of fact & conclusions of law & the Harris County Courts have adopted 20,261

of the prosecutor's proposed findings verbatim: an adoption rata of 95%." Id at 900.

50) "[A]t least eight Harris County Courts...have never rejected a State-authored findin

gs of fact or conclusion of law...even when those findings & conclusions are [plainly

contradicted by the record]" Id at 904 (Emphasis Added).

51) The Court should note, in the instant cause (& All other listed causes) the adoption

rate is 100% & neraly every single finding of fact was clearly contradicted by the

evidence in the record & each set of proposed findings submitted by the State was

simply signed & adopted verbatim by the Court within 24 hours of their reciept.

52) VAC points out that, though his causes were/are not Capital, nor conducted in Harris

County, the findings & conclusions of this case study match verbatim with his cause.

Certiorari Pg 1B

The Need Far The Court's Intervention

53) Generally, "[a]bsent affirmative evidence that State-Court judges are ignoring their

oath, we discount...argument[s] that Courts will respond to our ruling by violating

their Article VI duty to uphold the Constitution." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,

635, 123 L.ED.2d 353, 113 S.Ct 1710, 1720 (1993)( Citations Omitted; Alterations to the

Original).

54) VAC alleges his cause presents such 'affirmative evidence', in that, they permitted

the use of perjured testimony in place of the undisputable evidence in the record

order to allow VACs relief to be denied, a clear Brady violation on the part of the

Court & the State's Attorney (Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S • 9 B3 S.Ct 1194 (1963)), as

well as failed to ensure Due Process Protections were adhered to, &, once notified of

the Unconstitutionality of the previous judgements, continued to utilize them as if

they did not violate the fundamental minimums afforded to any Applicant. "A State may

[not] grant [preclusive effect] in its own Courts to a [Constitutionally infirm judge

ment]." Kremer, Supra.

55) However, more definite & absolute evidence is needed. See the following:

A) "The CCA demonstrates further indifference to the State habeas process by failing

to properly fund the appeals,generating boiler plate, two-page opinions in most

State habeas cases, & almost universally adopting trial Court findings of fact

generated by prosecutors in 90% of the cases." Lethal Indiference, by TexasdDefender Service (2002) atp.xiii (See App p ).

B) "[T]he State of Texas'[s] decision to appoint [this] attorney to represent the pet

itioner in what should have been petitioner's final foray into the State Courts in

search of relief from his [death Sentence] constituted a [cynical & reprehensible]

attempt to expedite petitioner's [execution] at the expense of all semblence of

fairness & [integrity]." Id at 23(quoting U.S.District Budge Orlando Garcia, Kerr v.

Johnson, No. SA-9B-CA-151-06, slip op. at 1, 16-17 (lil.D.Tex Feb 24, 1999) (Emphasis

Added).

C) "[T]wo judges:'[T]he majority gives new meaning to the lady with a blindfold holdi

ng the scales of justice, as it dispatches...[some] death row inmates toward the

execution chamber [without meaningful review] of their habeas claims. i it Lethal,

Supra at 24(quoting Ex Parte Smith, 977 S.Ld.2d 610 (Tex.Crim.App 199B).

D) "For this Court [to] refuse to stay this scheduled execution is a farce & travesty

of applicant's legal right to apply for habeas relief. It appears that this Court,

in approving such a charade, is punishing applicant, rewarding the State, & perhaps

even encouraging other attorney's to file perfunctory 'non-applications'...If appl

icant is executed as scheduled, this Court is going to have blood on its hands for

allowing [it]. By this dissent, I wash my hands of such repugence." Lethal, Supra

at 26 (quoting Ex Parte Kerr, 977 S.U.2d 5B5 (Tex.Crim.App 199B).

E) "Today, a majority of the Court chooses which sections of article 11.071 will be

strictly adhered to & which will be loosely construed... For the majority to so bla

tantly misrepresent these facts is not only disingenous but down right disturbing...

Certiorari Pg 19

In so doing, the majority ignores that LJE failed our duty...by choosing this selec

tive construction of the statute, the majority willfully violates the intent of

article 11.071" Ex Parte Smith, 977 S.liJ.2d 610, 614, n. 7 (Tex.Crim.App 1998)

F) Ex Parte Butler, 416 S.bJ.3d 863, n. 16 (Tex.Crim.App 2012 (Price, J • ) dissenting)

(Noting that the cause was remanded by the 5th Circuit for further consideration,

to which, the CCA sent it back to the Trial Court to reconsider the merits, to whi

ch, the Trail Court openly refused to reconsider the cause & redacted a single word

from its original findings-credible-& resubmitted said findings as the findings of

the Court, to which, without further consideration, the CCA adopted the findings &

denied relief without a written order, "nineteen findings of fact that the convict

ing court originally recommended we take based on ’the credible affidavit of Dr.

DenkowskiT that it now recommends we make based simply on Tthe affidavit of Dr.

Denkowski[.]' ")

G) "Applications are being denied relief in a manner that is unauthorized by the Texas

Constitution & Statutes...At this juncture, this is no-longer an honest mistake.

Rather, this is an intentional & knowing refusal to abide by the plain terms of the

Texas Constitution & Statutes." Ex Parte Dawson, 509 S.U.3d 294, 299-306 (Tex.Crim.

App 2016)(Alcla, 0., dissenting).

H) See n. 36 for a host of cited cases where Due Process Protections were ignored by

the Court's Budges & Justices.

56) Wherefore, VAC asserts that the importance of this Court &/or the federal Court's int^

'rv ervention could never be clearer. However, AEDPA has stripped the federal Courts of

their judicial capacities (28 USC § 2244(d)(1)), thus, an alternative remedy is needed.

Justification For An Alternative Remedy

57))In Zant, Supra, this court explained the origins of the Abuse-bf-Writ doctrine. The

Court reasoned that the ability for a'petitioner to be able to petition every other

judge or court in the realm "mads sense because at common law an order denying habeas

relief could not be reviewed." id at U.S. 479, 111 S.Ct at 1462. & that, these "succesive petitions served as a substitute for appeal." Ibid (Citations Omitted).

58) However, "As appellate review became available from a decision in habeas refusing to

discharge the prisoner, Courts began to question the continuing validity of the commonlaw rule allowing endless successive petions." Ibid (Citations Omitted).

59) The Court should note that a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2254) to the federal

Courts has effectively become the defacto "substitute for appeal[s]" to a State level

denial of habeas corpus relief. Ibid.

60) Except, as explained, pursuant to 28 USC § 2244(d)(1), such a substitute appeal could

only be taken within one year of the issuance of the mandate—or other exceptions—thus,

once this time period elapses, in a State Court that could still entertain a Writ for

habeas corpus, the decision of that Court—on federal Constitutional law questions—

Certiorari Pg 20

whether properly" decided or not, is, for all intents & purposes, the final decision on

the matter & not up for debate.

61) True, this Court retains the jurisdiction to consider such an action under 28 USC §

1257(a), however, this Court only grants a review of an action—especially at this st

age-under the mast exceptional of circumstances, which is certainly not to correct

errors . See S.Ct.R 10(a-c); See also Kyles v. Whitley, 498 U.S. 931, 111 S.Ct 333 (19

90).

62) Thus, the instant cause presents the question—among others—of what remedy is availab

le for a Constitutionally infirm State Court judgement—on matters of Federal Law—when

no federal remedy is available. Not just an inaccurate denial, but one so preverse as

to be considered Constitutionally infirm.

63) The foregoing is especially troublesome because the resulting consequence in such a

circumstance is that the federal Courts will have lost their ability to be the ones

charged with the duty of insuring the federal Constitution is adhered to, thereby

regulating this duty to the States. Williams, Supra at U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct at 1505.

64) However, the importance of this need must further be explained.

65) In a Civil suit, one that "Society has a minimal concern with the outcome of", the

"litigants share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion." Addington v. Texas, 441

U.S. 418, 423, 60 L.ED.2d 323, 99 S.Ct 1804, 1808 (1979). On the other hand the "heavy

standard applied in criminal cases manifests our concern that the risk of error to the

individual must be minimized even at the risk that some who:are guilty might go free."

Id at U.S. 428, 99 S.Ct at 1810. To which, "the host of safeguards fashioned by this

Court over the years to diminish the risk of erroneous conviction stands as a testame

nt to that concern[s]". Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78, 105 S.Ct 1087, 1093 (1985).

69) To insure the foregoing remained the norm, the habeas corpus transformed to insure the

Constitutional rights of the people. "There is no higher duty of a Court, under our 7

Constitutional system, than the careful processing & adjudication of petitions for wr

its of habeas corpus, for it is in such proceedings that a person in custody charges

that error, neglect, or evil purpose has resulted in his unlawful confinement & that

Certiorari Pg 21

he is deprived of his freedom contrary to Isuj.

Harris v. Nelson, 394.U.S. 286, 292, 89

S.Ct 1082, 1087, 22 L.ED.2d 2B1 (1969)." Vincent v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 1166, 83 L.ED.

2d 929, 105 S.Ct 1414 (1985)(Brennan, dissenting).

67) However, such concerns are undermined when it is held that a State's Habeas Corpus pro

cess is [NOT] required to compart with Due Process of Law. "Ue hold that a full & fair

hearing [Due Process] is [not] a precondition to according § 2254(e)(1), presumption of

correctness." Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 951 (5th.Cir. 2001). Yet, "The Supreme

Court has said that federal courts need not respect state judgements unless litigants

has a 'full & fair opportunity

to litigate their claims in State Court." id at 970 (

Dennis, Dissenting) (Alterations to the Original; Emphasis Added).

68) VAC charges, what use is OUR federal Constitution &/or Bill of Rights if a federal Cou

rt’ -could hold that a State Court's opinion, & by extension, the State Court is not obli

gated to uphold OUR Constitution,for thpir decisions to still be upheld. "This evoluti

on [the protection of the Constitution & Bill of Rights] appears not to have been fully

recognized by many state courts, in this instance charged with the frontline responsib

ility for the enforcement of Constitutional rights." Gideon v. Uainwright, 372 U.S. 335,

351, B3 S.Ct 792 (1963).

69) In 60 years, it appears nothing has changed in the State of Texas.

73) The result, as expressed, "State Courts are [now] free to: 1) rubber-stamp the

prosecuting body's proposed findings of fact & conclusions of law, 2) deny the petitioner relief without affording him a hearing, & 3) effectively prevent a federal court from later granting the requested relief." Valdez v. Cockrell, 28B F.3d 702, 703 (5th.Cir. 2002)

(Dennis, Dissenting)., to which, the instant cause shows that such assertions were not

inaccurate, but, infact, OUR—Ue The People—reality.

74) The foregoing, n.73 (Ante 21), is further supported by the fact that the Trial Court

failed to consider a single motion submitted by VAC-though the Court granted each of

the States—& instead forwarded each to the CCA for their consideration, though this is

not proper. "The Court of Criminal Appeals was not equipped, let alone inclined, to hoId evidentiary hearings or conduct immediate examinations of existing trial court reco-

Certiorari Pg 22

rds...[the] procedure left the trial Courts not only with their Constitutional & Statu

tory authority to issue writs of habeas corpus, but with the power & responsibility 'to

ascertain the facts necessary for proper consideration of the issues involved. I II Ex

Parte Renier, 734 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Crim.App.Lexis 742). However, the CCA ignored this

fact & took it upon themselves to simply deny each motion without any considerations.

72) Wherefore, simply mandating that the State Court must adhere to the Constitution by the

principles of Res Oudicata, to include the inability to grant preclusive effect to any

Constitutionally infirm judgements, would thus insure questions of federal law are at

minimal decided in accordance with the federal law. "Due Process functions to 'prevent

unfair & mistaken deprivations'"...& to insure the "accurate determination of the matt

ers before the Court, not in a result more favorable to him." Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509

U.S. 312, 332, 125 L.ED.2d 257, 113 S.Ct 2637, 2649 (1993).

73) However, while it "has long been established that [28 USC] § 1738 [the Full Faith & Cr

edit Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV § 1] does not allow federal Courts to employ

their own rules of res judicata in determining the effect of state judgements." Kremer,

Supra at U.S. 481, 102 S.Ct at 1897 (Alteration to the Original), a state court's judg

ement &/or rules employed to enforce said judgements, are only due the respect entitled

to them if the underlying proceeding comparts with the minimal standards of Due Process

of Law. Otherwise, "federal Courts are not required to accord full faith & credit to

such a judgement." Kremer, Supra.

74) "Where we are bound by the Statutory directive of § 1738, State proceedings need do no

more than [satisfy] the [minimum] procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendments

[Due Process Clause] in order to qualify for the full faith & credit guaranteed by fed

eral law." Kremer, Supra. "What a full & fair opportunity to litigate entails is the

procedural requirements of due process." id at 24.(Emphasis Added).

75) VAC charges that the State Court has failed to abide by the minimum procedural standar

ds/requirements of Due Process. Sellers, Supra. "In areas where legislation might intr

ude on Constitutional gurantees, we believe that Congress, which has always sworn to

protect the constitution, would err on the

side of fundamental Constitutional liberti-

Certiorari Pg 23

es. " Louie v. SEC, 472 U.S. 151, 206, n. 56, 105 S.Ct 2557, 2571

n.5 8, 86 L.ED.2d 130

(1985).

Final Point

76) Let there be no doubt that the validity &/or Constitutionality of the process that is

used in the State of Texas has been called into question in the State Court Proceedings

multiple times. The record will show all of the following;

A) In causes: UR-86,912-01; UR-86,912-02; UR-86,912-03; objections were raised & compl

aints levied for this conduct of rubber-stamping inconsistent findings of the State.

B) In causes: UR-86,912-05; UR-86,912-06; UR-86,912-07; UR-86,912-08; multiple grounds

were dedicated to this precise issue, as well as objections being filed once these

grounds were ignored & it happened again.

C) In causes: UR-86,912-09; UR-86,912-10; UR-86,912-11; an entire^ argument was dedica

ted to whether such unconstitutional conduct by the.State & the Courts would consti

tute cause for application for the cause & prejudice standard & negate application

of C.C.P.Art 11.07 § 4(a). (.See App. D).

D) In motions for En Banc Reconsideration for the causes at n. C'(Ante 23), these issues

were raised again & requested to be considered, (See App. K).

E) In motions for Independent Analysis Requests, for the causes at n. C (Ante 23),

requests for the Court to simplyyindependently consider this issue & to issue their

own.-opipion was requested, each of which were ignored by the Trial Court & CCA. (See App I).

77) The Court should note, not once did the State entertain the opportunity to consider the

issuer-though, it was properly presented to them multiple times.

Conclusion

78) In summary, VAC alleges his asserted Due Process violations during his State Habeas

Corpus applications, consisted of:

A) The State's Prosecutor was the infered designated & sole fact finder,

B) The Trial Court only stamped what the State put before it & did so almost immediatej-*

ly & without any independent consideration, (See App. G & H)

C) The Trial Court did not consider & rule upon any of the motions filed by VAC,

Certiorari Pg 24

D)The State's Proposed findings manipulated &/or contradicted the evidence in the reco

rd,

E) The Trial Court signed the Statels Proposed findings within 24 hours of their

reciept, (See App. H).

F) The Trial Court did not suggest how the findings should look or inform the State of

what its findings were,

G) The Trial Court did not afford the applicant an opportunity to respond to said find

ings before adopting them verbatim,

H) The affidavit relied upon contradicted all of the undisputable,evidence in the Cour

ts record,

I) The Trial Court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing to clear up the clear inco

nsistencies between the record & the relied upon affidavit, &

3) Other than sighing what was placed before the Courts, there was no judicial partici

pation in any of the forementioned causes.

81) In summary, the Constitutional violations VAC alleges happened during his Trial consis

ted of:

A) His Trial Counsel did not thorughly investigate (6th Amendment),

B) His Trial Counsel did not interview his psychiatrists (6th Amendment),

C) His Trial Counsel did not request his mental health records before advising him that

they did not contain anything's telling him to plead guilty & to forego a trial,

(6th Amendment),

D) VAC's Competency examination was conducted without his mental health records-leaving

the evidence that would've mandated a competency hearing to be held missing (5th

Amendment),

E) Though there more than enough evidence to suggest that mental health would play a

key factor in his trial, VAC's trial Counsel still failed to prosue the issue by obtai

ning the assistance of an expert.

82) As a final matter, the Court should note, without an alternative remedy, under tha cur

rent interpretation of AEDPA, defendants, some innocent, are being [& going to be:] put

f ft

■ <!SS

Certiorari Pg 25

death without a meaningful review of their meritful claims. "If applicantfs] [are]

excuted as scheduled, this Court is going to have blood on its hands for allowing [it]."

Kerrr Supra at 505.

B3) Wherefore, 1/AC hereby respectfully requests this Court to grant this Certiorari. He

asserts

an alternative remedy is needed & requests this Court to consider this issue.

Notice To The Court

It is not lost on me that I have levied some very heavy allegations in the foregoing.

However, I firmly stand behind each & everyone.

In support of this position & my desire for the [TRUTH] to be known once & for all, I

would like to propose a potential simple & final resolution of the instant cause.

Included with this petition is a Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing. If this Court gran

ts that hearing as requested & the magistrate judge's findings do [NOT] confirm my Due Pro

cess violations as asserted at n. 80 (Ante 23-24), I will withdraw this petition, as well

as, by order of this Court, formally waive all future arguments about the validity & Const

itutionality of my convictions, granting them the finality due them.

However, if my allegations are confirmed, all I ask is this Court takes this fact into

its considerations as whether to grant this Certiorari or not..

If said motion is not included herewith, I also request this Court to issue an order

to me requesting for me to resubmit said order to the Court for its considerations.

Submitted

Vincent Corson

TDC# 1973705

Connally Unit

899 FM 632

Kenedy, Tx 78119.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Date:

At on 2-o Cors-on

11/16/2022.

Certiorari Pg 26

IJnrd Count Certification

Pursuant to S.Ct.R. 33.1(h), I certify that the instant Petition For A Writ of

Certiorari, complies with the uiprd limits of 33.1(g)(1), of 9,000, with the wn

words of the petition equalling 7,435 words, counted by hand.

Unsworn Declereation

I, Vincent Alonzo Corson, TDC# 1973705, Incarcerated at John B. Connally.Unit,

at B99 FM 632, Kenedy, Tx 78119, Declares under penalty of perjury, that the

statementsmade in the Word Count Certification is, to the best of my knowledge,

True & Correct.

Signed on this the 27th day of Oanurary, 2023.

Vincent Corson

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.