Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jack Jordan, Petitioner v. Kansas Disciplinary Administrator

No. 22-_______

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------JACK JORDAN,

Petitioner,

v.

KANSAS DISCIPLINARY ADMINISTRATOR,

Respondent.

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Kansas Supreme Court

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------JACK JORDAN

Counsel of Record

3102 Howell Street

North Kansas City, Missouri 64116

jack.jordan@emobilawyer.com

(816) 853-1142

================================================================================================================

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

A lawyer, in motions filed in federal court proceedings (requesting reconsideration of an order or disqualification of a judge) stated that one or more federal

judges asserted knowing falsehoods (lies) and committed federal offenses (crimes) (in 18 U.S.C. 241, 242, 371,

1001, 1512(b), 1519).

1.

Whether, under the foregoing circumstances, a court may disbar such lawyer

for such speech and petitioning (exposing

and opposing the lies and crimes of

judges) before the court identified clear

and convincing evidence of each fact material to establishing that such speech

and petitioning stated or implied a factual falsehood asserted with actual malice.

2.

Whether a court may disbar such lawyer

for such speech and petitioning before the

court identified clear and convincing evidence of each fact material to establishing that such speech and petitioning

violated a rule of conduct.

3.

Whether Kansas Supreme Court Rule

220 empowers Kansas Supreme Court

justices to knowingly violate provisions of

Kansas statutes and the Kansas and U.S.

Constitutions governing findings of fact,

evidence, testimony, testimonial privileges and proof.

ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Kansas Supreme Court:

In re Jordan, 518 P.3d 1203 (Kan. 2022) (Oct.

21, 2022).

The Kansas Supreme Court based its decision on

contentions by federal judges in the following:

U.S. District Court (Western District of Missouri):

Ferissa Talley v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, No. 1900493CV-W-ODS, Order of Chief Judge Phillips fining Petitioner $1,000 for criminal contempt (Mar. 4, 2020); Order of Judge Smith

fining Petitioner $500 for criminal contempt

(7/30/2020).

U.S. Court of Appeals (8th Cir.):

Ferissa Talley v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, No. 202439 (Jul. 30, 2021) (aff ’g criminal contempt

fines).

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................

i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ................................

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

v

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ...........

1

DECISIONS BELOW ..........................................

1

JURISDICTION ...................................................

1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS ...............................................................

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................

2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT............ 12

I.

Petitioner’s Speech and Petitioning Were

Part of Due Process of Law Vital to Our

Systems of Justice and Government ......... 14

II.

Petitioner’s Speech and Petitioning Were

Protected by Vital Due Process of Law ..... 22

III.

The Kansas Order Was Frivolous and

Fraudulent ................................................. 26

IV.

Attorneys Must Be Allowed to Assist More

in Remedying State and Federal Judges’

Deliberate, Determined Violations of this

Court’s Precedent ...................................... 32

V. This Court Must Address Related Matters ..... 42

CONCLUSION..................................................... 42

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

APPENDIX

Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, Opinion,

October 21, 2022............................................... App. 1

State Constitutional Provisions, State Statutes,

and State Rules Involved ............................. App. 105

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Addington v. Texas,

441 U.S. 418 (1979) .................................................23

Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v.

NLRB,

522 U.S. 359 (1998) .................................................35

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242 (1986) ..................................... 23, 36, 37

Beauharnais v. Illinois,

343 U.S. 250 (1952) .................................................20

Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963) ...................................................39

Brown v. Allen,

344 U.S. 443 (1953) .................................................35

California v. Green,

399 U.S. 149 (1970) .................................................29

Campo v. U.S. Dept. of Justice,

9-cv-00905, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22429

(W.D. Mo. 7/13/2020) ...............................................41

Campo v. U.S. Dept. of Justice,

854 Fed. Appx. 768 (8th Cir. 2021) .........................41

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986) .................................................36

Cohen v. Hurley,

366 U.S. 117 (1961) .................................................22

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Cooke v. United States,

267 U.S. 517 (1925) .................................................39

District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570 (2008) ........................................... 15, 19

District of Columbia v. Wesby,

138 S.Ct. 577 (2018) ................................................39

First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti,

435 U.S. 765 (1978) .................................................19

Gamble v. United States,

139 S.Ct. 1960 (2019) ........................................ 16, 21

Garrison v. Louisiana,

379 U.S. 64 (1964) ................................... 9, 10, 12, 18

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,

418 U.S. 323 (1974) .................................................22

Gilbert v. Minnesota,

254 U.S. 325 (1920) .................................................20

Harris v. United States,

382 U.S. 162 (1965) .................................................39

Hicks v. Feiock,

485 U.S. 624 (1988) .................................................39

In re Christensen Eng’g Co.,

194 U.S. 458 (1904) .................................................39

In re Huffman,

509 P.3d 1253 (Kan. 2022) ......................................28

In re Jordan,

518 P.3d 1203 (Kan. 2022) ........................................1

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

In re Lober,

204 P.3d 610 (Kan. 2009) ........................................28

In re Michael,

326 U.S. 224 (1945) .................................................39

In re Primus,

436 U.S. 412 (1978) ............................................. 9, 10

In re Pyle,

156 P.3d 1231 (Kan. 2007) .......................... 10, 11, 12

In re Ruffalo,

390 U.S. 544 (1968) .................................................27

Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell,

512 U.S. 821 (1994) .................................................38

Jordan v. U.S. Dept. of Justice,

17-cv-02702, 2019 WL 2028399

(D.D.C. 5/8/2019) .....................................................40

Jordan v. U.S. Dept. of Labor,

273 F. Supp. 3d 214 (D.D.C. 8/4/2017) ....................39

Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal.,

366 U.S. 36 (1961) ...................................................25

Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,

531 U.S. 533 (2001) .................................................21

Malloy v. Hogan,

378 U.S. 1 (1964) .....................................................28

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) ....................... 33, 34, 35

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,

497 U.S. 1 (1990) ............................................... 10, 22

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966) .................................................37

N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,

371 U.S. 415 (1963) ................................. 9, 10, 25, 26

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,

142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022) .................................. 15, 19, 24

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254 (1964) ................ 9, 10, 12, 18-20, 23, 26

Olmstead v. United States,

277 U.S. 438 (1928) .................................................37

Pickering v. Board of Ed.,

391 U.S. 563 (1968) ....................................... 9, 12, 19

Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley,

408 U.S. 92 (1972) ............................................. 17, 18

Quercia v. United States,

289 U.S. 466 (1933) .................................................29

Reilly v. Pinkus,

338 U.S. 269 (1949) .................................................29

Republican Party v. White,

536 U.S. 765 (2002) .................................................26

Santosky v. Kramer,

455 U.S. 745 (1982) .................................................23

Spevack v. Klein,

385 U.S. 511 (1967) .................................................27

State v. Russell,

610 P.2d 1122 (Kan. 1980) ......................................27

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Texas v. Johnson,

491 U.S. 397 (1989) .................................................17

Thornhill v. Alabama,

310 U.S. 88 (1940) ...................................................24

West Virginia State Board of Education v.

Barnette,

319 U.S. 624 (1943) .................................................35

Whitney v. California,

274 U.S. 357 (1927) .................................................20

Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,

339 U.S. 33 (1950) ...................................................36

Wood v. Georgia,

370 U.S. 375 (1962) .................................................24

Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,

481 U.S. 787 (1987) .................................................39

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Kan. Const. Art. 2, § 1 .................................................32

Kan. Const. Art. 2, § 17 ...............................................32

Kan. Const. Art. 3, § 1 .................................................32

Kan. Const. B. of R. § 2 ...............................................32

U.S. Const. Amend. I ............................. 2, 14, 36, 38, 42

U.S. Const. Amend. V ............................................ 36, 38

U.S. Const. Amend. XIII .............................................33

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV .............................. 2, 14, 27, 33

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

U.S. Const. Amend. XIX ..............................................33

U.S. Const. Art. IV.......................................................33

U.S. Const. Art. VI ................................................... 1, 19

U.S. Const. Preamble ..................................................17

STATUTES

5 U.S.C. 552 ...................................................................5

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) ........................................................41

5 U.S.C. 3331 ...............................................................19

18 U.S.C. 241 ......................................................... 27, 38

18 U.S.C. 242 ......................................................... 27, 38

18 U.S.C. 371 ...............................................................38

18 U.S.C. 401 ...............................................................38

18 U.S.C. 1001 .............................................................38

18 U.S.C. 1341 ....................................................... 26, 38

18 U.S.C. 1343 ....................................................... 26, 38

18 U.S.C. 1349 ....................................................... 26, 38

18 U.S.C. 1512(b).........................................................38

18 U.S.C. 1519 ....................................................... 38, 39

28 U.S.C. 453 ...............................................................19

28 U.S.C. 1257(a)...........................................................1

Kan. Stat. Ann. 54-106 ...............................................19

Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-243(a) ...........................................31

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-243(b) ...........................................31

Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-401(a)-(d) .....................................30

Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-401(h) ...........................................30

Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-419 ...............................................31

Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-420 ...............................................31

Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-460(a) ...........................................31

Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-460(o) .............................................8

Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-460(o)(1) .........................................8

RULES

Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 ..............................................................5

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 ............................................................36

Fed.R.Crim.P. 1, 16, 42 ...............................................38

Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(E) ...........................................39

Fed.R.Evid. 101, 602, 605, 802, 806, 1002, 1101 ........38

Kan.R.Prof.C. 8.2(a) .................................. 3, 4, 7, 11, 12

Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 220....................................................32

Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 222(a) ...............................................30

Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 222(c)(3) ...........................................30

Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 222(e)(1) ...........................................30

Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 222(e)(2) ...........................................30

Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 222(e)(3) ...........................................30

Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 226(a)(1)(A) ......................................28

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 8.1 ......................................................42

U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 8.2 ......................................................42

1

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Jack Jordan respectfully petitions for a

writ of certiorari to review disbarment by the Kansas

Supreme Court.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

DECISIONS BELOW

The Kansas Supreme Court disbarment order

(App. 1-104) is reported at In re Jordan, 518 P.3d 1203

(Kan. 2022); available at 2022 Kan. LEXIS 111, 2022

WL 12128182.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

JURISDICTION

The Kansas Supreme Court disbarment order was

entered on October 21, 2022. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1257(a).

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONSTITUTIONAL AND

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United

States which shall be made in Pursuance

thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall

be made, under the Authority of the United

States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;

and the Judges in every State shall be bound

thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or

2

Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. Const. Amend. I:

Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the

freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right

of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, §1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United

States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,

are citizens of the United States and of the

State wherein they reside. No State shall

make or enforce any law which shall abridge

the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Kansas justices “disbarred” Petitioner and ordered

him to pay “costs of ” such “proceedings.” App. 103-104.

The vast majority of the disbarment decision consisted

of merely quoting hearing panel attorneys’ Final Hearing Report (FHR). App. 3-81 (FHR ¶¶42-271).

Kansas attorneys and justices emphasized that

Petitioner’s only purported misconduct consisted of

3

speech and petitioning exposing and opposing the lies

and crimes of judges. Petitioner “accused multiple federal judges of lying about [Powers’] e-mail’s contents,

lying about the law, and committing crimes including

conspiring with others to conceal the document.” App.

1.

“In around a dozen [federal court] filings” Petitioner “made serious derogatory allegations” about

“Judge Smith, Chief Judge Phillips,” and “Eighth Circuit” judges, including “allegations of criminal activity,

lies, misrepresentations, [and criminal] conspiracy

with” federal agency attorneys regarding “matters

pending before” their “court[s], violations” of “judicial

canons, and even treason to the Constitution. All of

these allegations stem” from such “judges’ rulings in”

judicial “decisions.” App. 62-63 (FHR ¶220).

No judge or attorney ever even contended that any

Petitioner statement was false. Kansas justices merely

contended all Petitioner’s statements were “outlandish” and “abusive” and the “frequency” and “breadth

of ” Petitioner’s “accusations, and their seemingly indiscriminate application,” alone, “render them incredible.” App. 99.

Kansas justices knew the hearing panel attorneys

lied about “clear and convincing evidence that” Petitioner “repeatedly violated KRPC 8.2(a).” App. 64 FHR

¶225). Kansas justices knew the attorneys repeatedly

lied about “evidence” that Petitioner “had not read an

unredacted version of Powers’ email” and even “evidence” of Petitioner’s “knowledge that he lacked

4

evidence of what Powers’ email actually said.” App. 49

(FHR ¶181). See also App. 54-55, 63 (FHR ¶¶196, 222)

(“evidence” Petitioner “had not read an unredacted version of Powers’ email”); App. 17 (FHR ¶81) (Petitioner

contended “Judge Smith misrepresented what was

contained in Powers’ email (which [Petitioner] had not

read)”).

Kansas justices emphasized Kansas attorneys’ lie

that Petitioner’s “allegations that any judge lied about

the privileged status of or what was contained” in

“Powers’ email” clearly were “made with reckless disregard for” their “truth or falsity.” App. 63-64 (FHR

¶223) (emphasis added).

Kansas justices emphasized that Kansas attorneys “concluded” that Petitioner “violated KRPC

8.2(a)” only “because” Petitioner “had never read an

unredacted version of the Powers e-mail.” App. 100.

Kansas justices pretended that Kansas attorneys’ bare

assertions and lies about such fact somehow constituted evidence that Petitioner’s “assertions” that

‘judges lied about Powers’ email, concealed evidence,

and committed crimes” clearly “had to have been made

with reckless disregard to their truth or falsity.” Id.

Kansas justices lied when they contended that

“clear and convincing evidence establishes a KRPC

8.2(a) violation.” Id. They lied when they contended

that “clear and convincing evidence establishes” Petitioner’s “violations of KRPC 3.1, 3.4(c), 8.2(a), and

8.4(d) and (g).” App. 2. They lied when they contended

5

that “clear and convincing evidence supports each rule

violation the panel found.” App. 95.

Kansas attorneys and justices failed to identify

any evidence (or even state any finding of fact) that

could support any conclusion that any Petitioner statement was false, frivolous, prejudiced any administration of justice in any way, or violated any Kansas rule

of conduct. They relied almost entirely on conclusory

contentions by federal judges who merely summarily

fined Petitioner for criminal contempt during proceedings under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5

U.S.C. 552.

“Any discipline imposed here is premised on” Petitioner’s purported “baseless assertion of frivolous factual issues while litigating his FOIA cases in federal

court.” App. 87. Kansas justices emphasized that

“Judge Phillips” purportedly “found [Petitioner] made

frivolous factual assertions with no reasonable basis in

fact about Judge Smith.” App. 93. “Judge Phillips’ contempt order” purportedly “found” Petitioner “failed to

establish a factual basis for” Petitioner’s statements

“or a likelihood that such basis could be developed” and

that Petitioner’s “accusations lacked a reasonable basis in fact. These” purported “findings” purportedly “established” that Petitioner’s “contentions were

frivolous,” and Petitioner “failed to adduce evidence at

the panel hearing to rebut” a “presumption” that the

justices fabricated. App. 95.

“Judge Phillips’ order” purportedly “establishes” a

“presumption that” Petitioner “violated FRCP 11” and

6

“Judge Smith’s July 20, 2020, order” purportedly “establishes” a “presumption” that Petitioner “repeated[ly] violat[ed]” court “Orders,” and Petitioner

“did not come forward at” the “hearing with evidence

to rebut these presumptions.” App. 96.

Kansas attorneys observed that “Judge Phillips”

purportedly “found respondent violated Missouri rule

4-8.2,” and they misrepresented that “so the burden

shifted to” Petitioner “to disprove that” purported

“finding under [Kansas Supreme Court] Rule 220.”

App. 100.

Kansas justices knowingly misrepresented that

“the panel properly applied Rule 220.” App. 94. More

specifically, Kansas justices lied about having copies of

federal court decisions merely “certified” somehow “establish[ed] that the federal courts” actually “made”

some unidentified “factual findings.” App. 93.

“Judge Phillips” fined Petitioner “$1,000.00, to be

paid” to “the Clerk of the Court.” App. 19, 40, 47 (FHR

¶¶87, 149, 172). “Judge Smith” fined Petitioner

“$500.00.” App. 26, 51 (FHR ¶¶108, 186). See also App.

65, 74 (FHR ¶¶229, 250).

The only support the Kansas attorneys and justices identified for criminal contempt (and for disbarment for purported “frivolous” statements) were a few

conclusory contentions by Judges Smith and Phillips.

See App. 19, 40 (FHR ¶¶86, 148 (emphasis added):

Judge Phillips concluded that [Petitioner]

demonstrate[d] his contempt for the Court’

7

and that [Petitioner’s] filing ‘contains multiple statements and accusations that had no

reasonable basis in fact.’ Chief Judge Phillips

ruled that [Petitioner’s] ‘conduct qualifies under [some unidentified] dictionary-definition

of “contempt”.’

See also App. 46-47 (FHR ¶170) for the same except

that “ruled” was substituted for “concluded.” “Judge

Phillips” also merely contended that she “found” Petitioner’s “defense of his actions” merely “unpersuasive”

and she “further ruled that” Petitioner “presented no

‘evidentiary support or the likelihood of evidentiary

support for his accusations.’ ” App. 39-40 (FHR ¶147)

(emphasis added).

Judge Smith merely vaguely alluded to unidentified “violations of ” unidentified “Orders.” App. 51 (FHR

¶186). When Judge Smith (and the Kansas attorneys

and justices) pretended to show that Judge Smith ordered something, Judge Smith clearly merely “warns”

Petitioner, i.e., “[t]his” was only a “warning.” App. 22,

52 (FHR ¶¶99, 191).

Kansas attorneys knowingly misrepresented that

“Judge Phillips’ March 4, 2020, order” is “evidence

that” Petitioner violated “KRPC 3.4(c)” (App. 47-48

(FHR ¶173)) and violated “KRPC 8.2(a)” (App. 61-62

(FHR ¶215)).

Kansas justices clearly misrepresented that the

hearing panel “admit[ted] certified court judgments”

as “evidence” of Petitioner’s “misconduct.” App. 92. The

8

panel clearly did not do so. The panel emphasized that

such judicial hearsay was evidence only of “what was

stated in the documents,” and it was “not [admitted]

for the truth of the matter asserted within any of the

statements contained in the documents.” FHR ¶17.

The panel clearly emphasized that it “admitted”

such records “to prove [only] the content of the record,”

and “the panel considers them only for that purpose.”

App. 80 (FHR ¶267). The panel repeatedly emphasized

that Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-460(o) permitted admitting

such records only “to prove the content” thereof and

clearly precluded admitting any such record “to prove

the truth” of any judge’s hearsay therein. See App. 7880 (FHR ¶¶263-267).

Kansas attorneys also lied about Petitioner being

“disbarred for his misconduct” in “the Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals.” App. 74 (FHR ¶250). That court did

not in any way even attempt to justify its disbarment

order or even label any Petitioner conduct “misconduct.”

In Petitioner’s briefing to the court he emphasized

“due process, equal protection, and ‘Kansas law’ arguments” under the Fourteenth Amendment by asserting

“that Rule 220 conflicts with K.S.A. 60-460(o)(1)” and

that Kansas “deprived” Petitioner “of the opportunity

to confront ‘any witnesses against him.’ ” App. 93.

In briefing to the hearing panel (and the court),

Petitioner also “assert[ed] that the First Amendment”

and Fourteenth Amendment and U.S. “Supreme Court”

precedent required Kansas to “prove that the

9

statements” Petitioner “made about judges in his filings were false.” App. 56 (FHR ¶200) (noting Petitioner

presented, inter alia, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64

(1964); Pickering v. Board of Ed., 391 U.S. 563 (1968);

N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); In re Primus,

436 U.S. 412 (1978)).

Petitioner’s briefing to the hearing panel “argu[ed]

that” Kansas “was violating his rights under the First,

Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.” App. 76 (FHR

¶254). The “panel” purportedly “conclude[d] that” Petitioner’s “rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments have not been violated.” App. 77 (FHR

¶258).

Petitioner’s “opening brief ” to the court sought “to

establish” that “imposing any discipline here violates

his First Amendment rights as applied to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment.” App. 86.

Petitioner’s briefing to the court “challenges” Kansas’s “restrictions on his right to petition” and “content-based regulations on speech imposed by the

KRPC provisions at issue;” “contends discipline may

not be imposed for [Petitioner’s] statements because”

Kansas “fail[ed] to demonstrate his assertions about

judges lying and committing crimes were false;” “contends” that “the KRPC provisions” at issue “must withstand strict scrutiny because they are content-based

regulations on speech as applied to him;” and “argues

the falsity of [Petitioner’s statements] must be shown

to impose discipline.” App. 86-87 (noting Petitioner

10

presented, inter alia, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,

497 U.S. 1 (1990); Garrison; New York Times).

Petitioner “argue[d]” to the court that “applying

Kansas Supreme Court Rule 220(b)” to “admit certified

court judgments” as “evidence of ” Petitioner’s “misconduct” “violates ‘Kansas law and the Due Process and

Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment’ and the separation of powers. We disagree.” App.

92.

Kansas attorneys and justices knew that Petitioner “argue[d]” that Kansas “failed to prove that” Petitioner “made any false statement” whatsoever. App.

56 (FHR ¶200). Kansas attorneys knowingly misrepresented that Petitioner’s “arguments are not supported

by United States Supreme Court and Kansas Supreme

Court case law surrounding attorney discipline matters.” Id. The Kansas attorneys and justices knew that

Primus, Button, above, and Pyle, below, were such precedent and they conclusively supported Petitioner.

Petitioner “filed exceptions to the” FHR “and argues discipline cannot be imposed because the First

Amendment” (and Fourteenth Amendment) “protects

his statements” and “his assertions have not been

proven false.” App. 2.

Kansas attorneys and justices pretended to address the relevant parts of Pyle. See App. 57-59 (FHR

¶¶202-207). The attorneys lied about what the Kansas

Supreme Court “held” in Pyle. App. 57 (FHR ¶203).

Kansas justices merely contended that “[u]nlike” Pyle,

11

Petitioner “did not offer evidence tending to show any

factual basis for his allegations.” App. 100.

Kansas attorneys and justices ignored or summarily dismissed the parts of Pyle that Petitioner presented, including the following.

“Some judges are dishonest” and “their identification and removal is” a “high priority in order to promote a justified public confidence in the judicial

system.” In re Pyle, 156 P.3d 1231, 1247 (Kan. 2007).

“Expressing honest [ ] opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice;”

only “false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.” Id. at 1243 quoting Comment to KRPC Rule

8.2(a).

So “Rule 8.2(a) enables” only “carefully circumscribed control over lawyer speech by prohibiting

only false statements” and “only when the lawyer either knew them to be false or displayed reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.” Pyle at 1243. Only

“factual allegations that are false . . . can lead to sanction.” Id.

The “panel” contended that it merely “disagrees

with” Petitioner’s “assertion that” Kansas “must prove

that” Petitioner “made a false statement with actual

malice.” App. 60 (FHR ¶210). Kansas justices knowingly misrepresented that the “panel” attorneys somehow “determined” that Kansas “was not required to

prove” any Petitioner “statements were false.” App. 99.

12

Kansas justices, themselves, failed to even purport to

determine any such thing.

Kansas attorneys and justices knew that Rule

8.2(a) prohibited only “statement[s] that” Petitioner

“knows to be false” or asserted “with reckless disregard

as to” their “falsity.” App. 55, 60 (FHR ¶¶199, 209); App.

98.

Immediately thereafter, Kansas justices lied

(twice) about the “plain language” of Rule 8.2(a) “prohibit[ing]” even a merely “false statement” or “one”

merely “made with reckless disregard for the statement’s truth.” Id. They knew Rule 8.2(a) plainly required proof of falsity and of knowledge thereof, and

Pyle (and this Court’s precedent in New York Times,

Garrison and Pickering) emphasized Rule 8.2(a)

plainly (and necessarily) required proof of falsity and

reckless disregard for falsity.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Certiorari should be granted for many compelling

reasons.

The facts are clean and straightforward. The Kansas disbarment order did not (and Kansas cannot show

that it did) include even one finding of fact or identify

any evidence of even one fact material to proving, or

identify any legal authority that would permit concluding, that any Petitioner speech violated any rule of conduct. Kansas did not and cannot do so.

13

Kansas Supreme Court justices purportedly decided multiple important federal questions in a way

that clearly (and intentionally) conflicted with this

Court’s clear and clearly-controlling precedent. Kansas

justices disbarred Petitioner, expecting many other

state and federal judges to follow their lead and reciprocally disbar Petitioner while flouting this Court and

copious precedent and knowingly violating the Constitution. Some federal judges have done so.

Reciprocally, the Second Circuit implicitly suspended Petitioner, two district courts explicitly suspended him, and the Tenth Circuit disbarred him.

Three circuit courts, three district courts, and one state

court have yet to take action openly against Petitioner.

The controlling legal authorities and issues are

clear and compelling. But as shown by the conduct at

issue here, some state and federal judges and attorneys knowingly violate the Constitution and flout this

Court’s precedent merely because they want to and

think they can.

Kansas justices clearly and knowingly violated

judges’ duties and Petitioner’s rights under many provisions of the U.S. and Kansas Constitutions and Kansas law. Such judges pretended to have the power to

thwart, flout, violate and undermine their own court,

this Court, federal law, Congress, Kansas law, the Kansas legislature and the U.S. and Kansas Constitutions.

14

I.

Petitioner’s Speech and Petitioning Were

Part of Due Process of Law Vital to Our

Systems of Justice and Government.

The state and federal judges and government attorneys attacking Petitioner for his speech starkly illustrate dangerous, extremist, rogue government

employees’ determination to be the last brutal bastion

of deliberately, blatantly and outrageously illegal repression of Americans’ freedom of speech and right to

petition for redress of grievances against abusive officials.

Due process of law clearly includes Americans’

right to discuss and seek to influence the creation or

administration of law. Americans’ “freedom of speech”

and “press” and their “right” to “petition the Government” for “redress” clearly include exercising such

rights and freedoms to expose and oppose judges abusing their positions to violate law or commit crime. U.S.

Const. Amend. I. No court has any power to “abridg[e]”

any such right or freedom. Id.

“No state” employee whatsoever may “make or enforce any law” that “abridge[s]” any “privileges or immunities” of American “citizens” or “deprive any

person” of any “liberty” or “property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person” essentially “equal

protection of the laws.” Amend. XIV, § 1. The Constitution is categorical and comprehensive: no person, no

privilege or immunity, no liberty or property, no state

employee, any law.

15

Petitioner’s right and freedom to speak, publish

and petition as he did were secured by the First, Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments. Significantly, “it has always been widely understood that” the First Amendment (merely) “codified a pre-existing right.” District of

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). Accord

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111,

2127 (2022).

“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the

scope they were understood to have when the people

adopted them, whether or not future legislatures” or

“future judges think that scope too broad.” Heller at

634-35. The plain text, purpose and processes pertaining to the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and Bill of Rights are especially insightful and

even essential to understanding American attorneys’

freedom of speech.

Two aspects of the Declaration are especially relevant. First, many Founders responsible for the Declaration were lawyers (and legislators). The primary

writers were four lawyers (Jefferson, John Adams,

Robert Livingston, Roger Sherman) and a printerturned-statesman (Franklin).

Second, they vehemently attacked the people and

institutions responsible for creating and administering

laws: Parliament, legislators, courts, judges, prosecutors. The Declaration was very largely lawyers (losing

lawyers) harshly criticizing such officials for abusing

laws and legal procedures to oppress and abuse the

people. Such abuses were responsible for much harm,

16

including destructive war. See Declaration of Independence ¶¶1-3, 5-7, 10-12, 15, 17, 20-24, 30. For example, “the Declaration” vehemently “denounced” laws

“passed by Parliament” and implemented by judges

“protecting” abusive officials with “mock Trial[s].”

Gamble v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 1960, 1965-66

(2019). That issue is highly relevant here. See pages

37-41, below.

Lawyer-legislator-Founders publicly excoriated

and vilified their oppressors (the winners, as it were,

for a while) and “pledge[d]” their “Lives,” “Fortunes”

and “sacred Honor” (Declaration ¶32) to “secure” our

“rights” against public officials, including ensuring

they “deriv[ed only] just powers” exclusively “from the

consent of the governed” (id. ¶2).

“Our founding documents” clearly “rest on the

premise that certain fundamental principles are both

knowable and objectively true.” Gamble, 139 S.Ct. at

1983, n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring). Lawyer-legislatorFounders emphasized “We hold” for all courts and all

time (and they stated and proved) that one of the

“truths” that was “self-evident” to them and this Nation was that (especially regarding self-government

and the “Liberty” to speak publicly and truthfully

about government) “all men are created equal” and

equally “endowed” with “unalienable Rights.” Id. quoting Declaration of Independence ¶2 (emphasis added).

They immediately emphasized that “all men” included all “Governments [that] are instituted among

Men.” Declaration ¶2. The original Constitution and

17

Bill of Rights robustly emphasized that all judicial

power must be used solely to “establish Justice” and

“secure the Blessings of Liberty” to “the People.” U.S.

Const. Preamble.

For hundreds of years, some of the best and brightest stars of this Court have emphasized that the Constitution was carefully crafted to accentuate not only

the limited and separate powers and duties of the people in the three branches of government, but also the

great privileges, powers and duties of the roots of government—the people, at large.

The clear and “enduring lesson” of many of this

Court’s “decisions” is “that the government may not

prohibit expression simply because it disagrees with

its message” regardless of “the particular mode in

which” Petitioner chose “to express an idea.” Texas v.

Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416 (1989). Punishing “political

expression” for its “content” always “must” be “subject”

to “the most exacting scrutiny.” Id. at 412. A “principal”

and vital “function of free speech under our system of

government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best

serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of

unrest, creates dissatisfaction” or “even stirs people to

anger.” Id. at 408-09. If Petitioner’s “opinion” somehow

“gives offense, that” is “a reason for according it constitutional protection.” Id. at 409.

Americans’ freedom to speak freely about public

issues “means that government has no power to restrict” Petitioner’s “expression because of its message,

its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Police Dep’t

18

of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). Judges’

viewpoint discrimination against Petitioner’s speech is

especially repugnant to the Constitution. See id. at 94,

96, 98. Kansas justices clearly abridged Americans’

freedom of speech and right to petition by punishing

truthful criticism of judges because of its critical content and viewpoint.

Petitioner’s “speech concerning public affairs” is

“the essence of self-government.” Garrison, 379 U.S. at

74-75. “Truth may not be the subject of ” any type of

“either civil or criminal” (or quasi-criminal) contentbased “sanctions where discussion of public affairs is

concerned.” Id. at 74. The Constitution “absolutely prohibits” any type of content-based “punishment of truthful criticism” of any public official’s official conduct. Id.

at 78 (preluding punishing government attorney for

criticizing eight judges).

All courts must protect Americans’ “privilege for

criticism of official conduct.” New York Times, 376 U.S.

at 282. All courts must “support” the “privilege for the

citizen-critic of government” (id.) because “such a privilege is required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments” (id. at 283). Courts cannot “give public servants

an unjustified preference over the public they serve” by

affording “critics of official conduct” less than “a fair

equivalent of the immunity granted to the officials

themselves.” Id. at 282-83.

The “constitutional guarantees” in the First, Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments “require” a nation-wide

“rule that prohibits” any “public official from”

19

precluding, penalizing or punishing any criticism for

content “relating to” any “official conduct” except a

“falsehood” asserted with “actual malice” (“with

knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard”

for its falsity, i.e., a lie or reckless falsehood). Id. at 27980. Accord Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 (precluding discharge of government employee).

Regarding Petitioner’s “protected speech,” courts

and legislatures are “constitutionally disqualified from

dictating the subjects about which persons may speak

and the speakers who may address” such “public issue[s].” First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 78485 (1978). That applies to state-created corporations,

and even more clearly and forcefully, to state-licensed

lawyers.

The First Amendment “is the very product of an

interest balancing by the people” and it clearly “elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding,

responsible citizens” to use speech and petitioning “for

self-defense” against abusive public officials. Bruen,

142 S.Ct. at 2131 quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. “It is

this balance—struck by the traditions of the American

people—that demands” the “unqualified deference” of

all public servants. Id. The first and foremost duty of

every judge is to support the Constitution. See U.S.

Const. Art. VI; 5 U.S.C. 3331; 28 U.S.C. 453; Kan. Stat.

Ann. 54-106.

“Those who won our independence believed” that

“public discussion is a political duty; and that this

should be a fundamental principle of the American

20

government.” New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270 quoting

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927)

(Brandeis, J., concurring). “It is as much [the] duty” of

“the citizen-critic of government” to “criticize as it is

the official’s duty to administer.” Id. at 282. “It is as

much” an attorney’s “duty to criticize” judges’ violations of law and the Constitution “as it is” judges’ “duty

to administer” the law and support the Constitution.

Id. In this regard, “public men” are “public property”

(id. at 269 quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.

250, 263, n.18 (1952)) and “discussion cannot be denied

and the right” and “the duty, of criticism must not be

stifled” (id. quoting Beauharnais at 264).

In exposing and opposing the lies and crimes of

judges and government attorneys, Petitioner “restrain[ed] the exertion of baleful influences against the

promptings of patriotic duty to the detriment of the

welfare of ” this “Nation,” which clearly “is only to render a service to its people.” Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254

U.S. 325, 331 (1920). See also id. at 337-38 (Brandeis,

J., dissenting):

The right of a citizen [ ] to take part, for his

own or the country’s benefit, in the making of

federal laws and in the conduct of the Government, necessarily includes the right to speak

or write about them; to endeavor to make his

own opinion concerning laws existing or contemplated prevail; and, to [ ] teach the truth

as he sees it. . . . Full and free exercise of this

right by the citizen is ordinarily also his duty;

for its exercise is [even] more important to the

Nation than [to the person].

21

Kansas justices’ (and their federal followers’) putative “reading” of the Constitution would require the

absurd assumption that “the same Founders who quite

literally revolted against” (fought a desperate, almost

decade-long war to free themselves from) oppressive

and abusive tactics of legislators and judges (after having as harshly and publicly as possible vilified such officials for even longer) “would soon” after all the

foregoing “give” the Nation they created “an Amendment” to the Constitution “allowing” extreme retaliation for far less harsh criticism. Gamble, 139 S.Ct. at

1966. “We doubt it,” this Court wrote. Id. And so it

should again.

In addition to all the foregoing, independent attorney support for the law and the Constitution is vital to

our system of justice.

“[C]ourts depend” on an “independent bar” for “the

proper performance of [courts’] duties and responsibilities. Restricting” conscientious, capable “attorneys”

from “presenting arguments and analyses to the courts

distorts the legal system by altering the traditional

role of the attorneys.” Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,

531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001). “An informed, independent

judiciary” must have “an informed, independent bar.”

Id. at 545. Courts cannot “prohibit[ ] speech and expression upon which courts must depend for the proper

exercise of the judicial power.” Id. Judges cannot “exclude from litigation those arguments and theories”

they deem “unacceptable but which by their nature are

within the province of the courts to consider.” Id. at 546

22

[T]he important role that lawyers [ ] play in

our society [makes it] imperative that they

not be discriminated against with regard to

the basic freedoms that are designed to protect the individual against the tyrannical exertion of governmental power. For [ ] one of the

great purposes underlying [such] freedoms

was to [afford] independence to those who

must discharge important public responsibilities. [Lawyers], with responsibilities as great

as those placed upon any group in our society,

must have that independence.

Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 137 (1961) (Black, Douglas, JJ., and Warren, C.J., dissenting).

II.

Petitioner’s Speech and Petitioning Were

Protected by Vital Due Process of Law.

Courts may and should preclude or punish attorneys’ and judges’ contentions that are lies or frivolous

and materially prejudice the administration of justice.

A “lie” is “no essential part of any exposition of ideas.”

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).

Lies can be express or implied. Any “statement of

opinion” by Petitioner “relating to matters of public

concern which does not contain a provably false factual

connotation will receive full constitutional protection.”

Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20. Each court must (but did not

and cannot) prove that Petitioner’s speech stated or

“impl[ied] a false assertion of fact.” Id. at 19.

23

Any purported “proof presented to show” each material fact must have “the convincing clarity which the

constitutional standard demands.” New York Times,

376 U.S. at 285-86. The “First Amendment mandates a

‘clear and convincing’ standard” of proof of each material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

252 (1986).

Such “standard of proof ” is “embodied in the Due

Process Clause” to establish “the degree of confidence”

each court must “have in the correctness” of its “factual

conclusions.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423

(1979). It “serves to allocate the risk of error” to the

court punishing attorney speech, and “to indicate the”

great “importance attached to the ultimate decision.”

Id. It “reflects the” great “value society places on individual liberty.” Id. at 425.

The “clear” and “convincing” standard “reduce[s]

the risk to” Petitioner “of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing” each court’s “burden

of proof.” Id. at 424. Such “level of certainty” is “necessary to preserve fundamental fairness” in “government-initiated proceedings that threaten” an

“individual” with a “significant deprivation of liberty”

or “stigma.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756

(1982).

“It is imperative that, when the effective exercise

of ” First Amendment “rights is claimed to be

abridged,” all “courts should ‘weigh the circumstances’

and ‘appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced’ in support of the challenged regulations” or

24

punishment. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96

(1940). “[W]hen it is claimed that” First Amendment

“liberties have been abridged,” even this Court “cannot

allow a” mere “presumption of validity of the exercise

of ” another court’s “power to interfere with” this

Court’s own “close examination of the substantive

claim presented.” Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 386

(1962).

Due process of law requires much more than the

mere “enunciation of a constitutionally acceptable

standard” by judges merely purportedly “describing

the effect of ” Petitioner’s “conduct.” Id. at 386. Any

state or federal judge’s mere conclusory contentions

“may not preclude” or in any way diminish each court’s

“responsibility to examine” all relevant “evidence to

see whether” the evidence “furnishes a rational basis

for the characterization” that such judges “put on it.”

Id. at 386.

The First “Amendment’s plain text covers” Petitioner’s “conduct” so “the Constitution presumptively

protects that conduct. To justify” any “regulation” (punishment) of Petitioner’s speech, each court “must

demonstrate” that its “regulation” (punishment) was

“consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition” of

protecting such speech. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. at 2126. Each

court “must affirmatively prove that” its putative “regulation” is within this Nation’s long and strong “historical tradition” of protecting speech, assembly and

petitioning within “the outer bounds” of such “right[s].”

Id. at 2127. No judge or attorney did or can bear any

25

applicable burden of proof regarding even one Petitioner statement.

“Only if ” a court proves that its “regulation” is

“consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may”

the “court conclude that” any Petitioner “conduct falls

outside” the “unqualified command[s]” in the First

Amendment. Id. at 2126 quoting Konigsberg v. State

Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50, n.10 (1961) (emphasis

added). The true “significance” of such rights must “be

gathered” by “considering their origin and the line of

their growth.” Konigsberg at 50, n.10 (expressly pertaining to “freedom of speech” relevant to attorney discipline).

Courts “may not prohibit” any “modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments” by merely invoking the mere

general “power to regulate the legal profession.” Button, 371 U.S. at 428-29. “[I]t is no answer to the constitutional claims asserted” here “that the purpose of ”

any “regulations was merely to insure high professional

standards.” Id. at 438-39. Courts “may not, under the

guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore

constitutional rights” of lawyers or litigants. Id. at 439.

Courts “cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels,” regardless of whether the

label is applied to the law, the oppressor or the oppressed. Id. at 429. No law, no “regulatory measures,”

no justification, “no matter how sophisticated,” can “be

employed in purpose or in effect to stifle, penalize, or

curb” Petitioner’s “exercise of First Amendment

26

rights.” Id. at 439. Accord New York Times, 376 U.S. at

269 (“mere labels” under various “formulae for the repression of expression”). “The test is not the form in

which [government] power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised” within constitutional limits. Id. at 265.

Judges punished Petitioner’s “speech on the basis

of its content and burden[ed] a category of speech that”

is “at the core of our First Amendment freedoms,” i.e.,

“speech about the qualifications of [people holding or

seeking] public office.” Republican Party v. White, 536

U.S. 765, 774 (2002). Each court must prove it applied

each relevant “restriction” with at least “strict scrutiny,” i.e., “prove that” punishment under each rule was

“narrowly tailored, to serve” a “compelling” court “interest.” Id. at 774-775. Each court “must demonstrate

that” it did not “unnecessarily circumscribe protected

expression.” Id. at 775. Clearly, no judge “carried” any

“burden imposed” by the “strict-scrutiny test” regarding any material fact. Id. at 781. They “offered” mere

“assertion and conjecture” and even obvious falsehoods. Id.

III. The Kansas Order Was Frivolous and

Fraudulent.

The Kansas order was frivolous and Kansas justices defrauded Petitioner of his law license and the

“costs” of defrauding him. See pages 2-12, above. Cf. 18

U.S.C. 1341, 1343, 1349.

27

The Kansas justices knew many of their contentions were false and their conduct was illegal. They

clearly (and knowingly) violated virtually every one of

the many provisions of Kansas Supreme Court rules,

Kansas statutes and the Kansas and U.S. Constitutions presented herein. They knowingly violated Petitioner’s rights secured by the Constitution to pretend

to justify injuring Petitioner for exercising rights secured by the Constitution. Cf. 18 U.S.C. 241, 242. Cf.

page 14, above, discussing U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.

Disciplinary proceedings “are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature.” In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S.

544, 551 (1968). So courts cannot resort to any “procedural violation of due process” that “would never pass

muster in any normal civil or criminal litigation.” Id.

“The sanctions threatened,” i.e., “loss of professional

status and livelihood, have been” and should be

“equated to criminal penalties.” State v. Russell, 610

P.2d 1122, 1130 (Kan. 1980) citing Spevack v. Klein,

385 U.S. 511 (1967).

“Lawyers are not excepted from the words ‘No person’ ” in the Fifth Amendment (or “any person” in the

Fourteenth Amendment), and courts “can imply no exception.” Spevack at 516. Clearly, “lawyers also enjoy

first-class citizenship.” Id. Courts clearly cannot resort

to “procedure” that “would deny” lawyers “all opportunity” to compel courts “to make a record” by proving

each material fact by clear and convincing evidence. Id.

at 518-19. Accord id. at 520 (Fortas, J., concurring):

28

a lawyer [who] is not an employee of the State

[ ] does not have the responsibility of an employee to account to the State for his actions

because he does not perform them as agent of

the State. . . . The special responsibilities that

he assumes as licensee of the State and officer

of the court do not carry with them a diminution, however limited, of his Fifth Amendment

rights.

“The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege[s] that the Fifth Amendment

guarantees against federal infringement.” Malloy v.

Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).

The Kansas justices and attorneys knew that they

must “consider[ ]” only admissible “evidence,” and allegations of “misconduct must be established” by admissible “evidence” that was “clear and convincing.” App.

83 citing Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 226(a)(1)(A) (App. 113).

“Clear and convincing evidence” is “evidence that

causes” the Kansas attorneys and justices “to believe

that” the “truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.” In re Lober, 204 P.3d 610, 616 (Kan. 2009). The

Kansas attorneys and justices knew that they must

“believe” that admissible “evidence” proved not merely

that “the facts asserted are true,” but also that their

truth is “highly probable.” App. 84 quoting In re Huffman, 509 P.3d 1253 (Kan. 2022).

The only real potential witnesses against Petitioner were Judges Smith and Phillips. Their conclusory contentions were illegally treated as findings of

29

fact, and their hearsay was illegally treated as true

(clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner’s speech

and petition violated Kansas rules of conduct). See

pages 4-7, above.

A presiding federal judge “may not” purport to “assume the role of a witness,” and “he may not either distort” any “evidence” or “add to it.” Quercia v. United

States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933). Any federal judge who

wished to say something against Petitioner in the Kansas proceedings was required to testify.

Testimony in open court “forces the witness to submit to cross-examination,” which is the “greatest legal

engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,” and it

“permits” everyone “to observe the demeanor of the

witness in making” and explaining “his statement,

thus aiding” in “assessing his credibility.” California v.

Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). The “object” of “crossexamination” clearly is “to test” the “testimony,” and

the clear and fundamental “error of this deprivation

could not be cured by having” any judge merely “examine” or purport to describe evidence. Reilly v. Pinkus,

338 U.S. 269, 276 (1949). “It certainly is illogical” and

“unfair, to permit” judges’ hearsay to be used to disbar

Petitioner but “deprive” him of “all opportunity to interrogate” his accusers. Id. at 275. See also Green, 399

U.S. at 156-158, 162-164.

The Kansas justices knew they could not merely

pretend that federal judges’ hearsay was evidence or

that such hearsay was true, including because

30

Petitioner was denied his statutory and constitutional

rights to confront any witness against him.

Kansas was required to afford Petitioner a “hearing” that was “recorded” (Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 222(e)(3))

and “open to the public” (id. 222(a)), at which any “witness” would “testify” only “under oath” (id. 222(e)(2))

and whom Petitioner was “entitled” to “cross-examine”

(id. 222(c)(3)). (App. 112-113). The “hearing” was required to be “governed by the Rules of Evidence, K.S.A.

60-401 et seq.” Id. 222(e)(1) (App. 112). But the Kansas

attorneys and justices ensured it was not.

Kansas attorneys and justices illegally and unconstitutionally used mischaracterizations and mere labels to pretend that conclusory contentions by judges

were “found” or “findings” or that a purported “ruling”

was evidence that it was true that Petitioner’s speech

or petitioning violated a rule of conduct. See pages 4-7,

above. No such judicial contention was a “finding of

fact,” “evidence” or “proof ” of anything adverse to Petitioner. Cf. Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-401(a)-(d), (h) (App. 107108) (defining such terms). Kansas justices repeatedly

lied about federal judges’ conclusory contentions constituting statutorily-defined findings of fact, evidence

and proof establishing that Petitioner’s speech violated

Kansas rules of conduct. See pages 4-7, above.

Moreover, the Kansas attorneys and justices knew

that no hearsay whatsoever was admissible against

Petitioner unless the “person who” made the “statement” was both “present at the hearing” and “available

for cross-examination” regarding “the statement and

31

its subject matter.” Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-460(a) (App.

110).

Any “witness’ testimony must be taken in open

court.” Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-243(a) (App. 106). Any “witness may be contradicted and impeached by” Petitioner

and “may be cross-examined” on any “subject matter of

the witness’ direct examination.” Id. 60-243(b) (App.

107).

For the crucial “purpose of impairing” the “credibility of ” a judge as “witness,” Petitioner must be permitted to “examine the witness and introduce extrinsic

evidence concerning any conduct by him or her and

any other matter relevant upon the issues of credibility.” Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-420 (App. 109). “As a prerequisite for the testimony of ” any judge as “a witness on a

relevant or material matter, there must be evidence

that he or she has personal knowledge thereof.” Kan.

Stat. Ann. 60-419 (App. 109).

Judges Smith and Phillips were not present and

did not testify at the hearing. Kansas “called” only Petitioner and “investigator” Stratton “as witnesses.”

App. 2. So Kansas justices lied about federal judges’

contentions being entitled to a presumption they were

true (clear and convincing evidence) and a legal consequence attached to Petitioner’s failure to rebut such

fictitious “presumptions.” See pages 5-6, above.

The Kansas justices clearly (and knowingly) violated the Kansas Constitution. The people and Constitution of Kansas specifically created the Kansas

“supreme court” and delegated to it “general

32

administrative authority over all courts in this state.”

Kan. Const. Art. 3, § 1 (App. 106). But they did so only

after emphasizing that only the Kansas legislature

possesses the “legislative power of this state.” Kan.

Const. Art. 2, § 1 (App. 105).

The Kansas Supreme Court had no power to make

or use Rule 220 (or any other rule or ruling) to purport

to contradict, change or violate any Kansas statute at

issue. “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state.” Kan. Const. Art.

2, § 17 (App. 105). Kansas statutes governing findings

of fact, evidence, proof, testimony and hearsay clearly

are laws of a general nature.

Moreover, the Kansas Supreme Court had no

power use Rule 220 (or any other rule or ruling) to create or modify any testimonial privilege for judges. “No

special privileges” for judges ever “shall be exercised

by” any “tribunal” except to the extent such a privilege

has been “granted by the” Kansas “legislature.” Kan.

Const. B. of R. § 2.

IV. Attorneys Must Be Allowed to Assist More

in Remedying State and Federal Judges’

Deliberate, Determined Violations of this

Court’s Precedent.

The primary points here are too important to be

merely implied. They are too easily overlooked or ignored. Certain misconduct should be exposed and opposed by everyone who truly respects, believes in and

cares to support the truly amazing systems of justice

33

and government the Founders and millions thereafter

did and sacrificed so very much to create and protect.

State and federal governments were constituted

with written constitutions to ensure that all Americans always enjoy all “Privileges and Immunities” of

citizenship (U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 2; accord Amend. XIV,

§ 1 (“privileges or immunities of citizens”)) and to

“guarantee” to all citizens a “Republican Form of government” (Art. IV, § 4). Great sacrifices and struggles

were devoted to ensuring that truly all citizens truly

are protected. See Amends. XIII, XIV, XIX.

Allowing disbarment of attorneys for the purpose

of silencing opposition to judges’ constitutional violations “would subvert the very foundation of ” the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,

178 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.). “It would declare, that”

judges may “do what is expressly forbidden” by the

Constitution, giving them “a practical and real omnipotence.” Id. at 178. Such conduct “reduces to nothing

what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions—a written constitution.” Id.

The primary point of much of the plain language

of the Constitution is that even all three branches of

government—even acting together—have no power to

authorize any public servant to rob the people of the

protections secured by the Constitution. No judge can

knowingly allow any public official to violate any person’s constitutional rights. The primary point of much

of the Declaration of Independence was that even the

King and Parliament had no such powers.

34

The clear meaning and clear purpose of much of

the plain language of the Constitution is that the “very

essence of judicial duty” is to support the Constitution,

i.e., “decide” every matter “conformably to the constitution.” Id. “It is emphatically” judges’ “duty” to “say

what the law is,” not lie about or knowingly violate the

law. Id. at 177. When applying any “rule,” judges

“must” expressly “expound and interpret that rule,”

not merely judicial falsehoods about such rule (or

about lawyers or litigants). Id.

All judges must expressly state the controlling legal authority and then apply and comply with it. “It is

the duty of ” every judge “to conform to the law” because each is “an officer” who is “bound to obey the

laws.” Id. at 158. Whenever any judge “acts,” it is only

“under the authority of law.” Id. When a judge is “directed” by the Constitution “to perform certain acts;

when the rights of individuals are dependent on the

performance of those acts,” the judge is an “officer of

the law” and “is amenable to the laws for his conduct.”

Id. at 167.

Clearly, “the constitution” must “rule” the “government of [all] courts.” Id. at 179-80. Every litigant “has

a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.” Id. “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the

protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.

One of the first duties of government is to afford that

protection.” Id. at 163. Federal and state judges “cannot” pretend to have the “discretion” to “sport away”

any lawyer’s or litigant’s “vested rights,” as the Kansas

35

justices and federal judges did and too commonly do.

Id. at 166.

Today, judges are frighteningly far from the least

dangerous branch. Judges, themselves, too often are

the “clear and present danger” that government must

“prevent.” West Virginia State Board of Education v.

Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943).

It “is hard to imagine a more violent breach of ” a

judge’s duties “than” knowingly “applying a [purported] rule of primary conduct” that “is in fact different from the rule or standard formally announced.”

Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522

U.S. 359, 374 (1998). It is “evil” for judges to knowingly

“appl[y] a standard other than the one” that the law,

the Constitution and this Court’s precedent “enunciates.” Id. at 375. But such violent breaches and evil are

commonplace in some areas of litigation.

In Petitioner’s experience, every tribunal and

agency below this Court views its precedent as merely

advisory when it suits them and they think they can.

Daily, they emphasize that in their eyes this Court is

far from “final” or “infallible.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.

443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).

State and federal judges and government attorneys openly flout this Court’s careful, conscientious

precedent. They do so precisely to insidiously attack

and undermine crucial support for the Constitution.

Such conduct is, perhaps, most prevalent in FOIA and

Administrative Procedure Act (APA) litigation.

36

FOIA was carefully designed and repeatedly

amended to fortify the APA, which was painstakingly

designed and amended to fortify the Constitution. See,

e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37-41

(1950); 92 Cong. Rec. 2149 (Statement of Sen. McCarran).

Today, however, federal judges commonly, knowingly and openly violate and undermine FOIA, the

APA, federal rules, the Constitution and this Court’s

precedent to deny Americans access to the information

they need and to which they are entitled to effectively

govern themselves. This problem is pervasive.

Judges routinely knowingly and egregiously violate Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and this Court’s precedent, specifically and deliberately, to violate “the right of the

people” to “petition” (U.S. Const. Amend. I), the concomitant right to access government information, and

the right to “due process of law.” (Amend. V).

In FOIA litigation, the agency virtually never

“bears” any “responsibility” for “identifying those portions of ” the record that “demonstrate the absence of a

genuine [dispute regarding each] material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Although Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 “by no means authorizes trial on

affidavits” and judgment based on even “determinations” (much less fictitious presumptions) of agency

employee “[c]redibility” or “the weighing of the evidence” favoring the agency, that is exactly what judges

do. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Each “judge must” address “whether a fair-minded jury could return a

37

verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented,” but

they just do not do it. Id. at 252.

This Court, alone, clearly cannot cope with circuit

and district court “systems” determined and designed

to violate this Court’s precedent. More democratic

measures are necessary and appropriate. Judges must

not be allowed to arbitrarily and viciously “punish” attorneys for exposing and opposing judges’ violations or

misrepresentations of law. Attorneys must be allowed

to help prevent the problems, below, and remedy them

much more quickly and quietly.

The following indicate how extreme and pervasive

the problem is. “Crime is contagious. [When] the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for

law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself;

it invites anarchy.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,

479-480 (1966) quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277

U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

Judges Smith and Phillips (Mo. W.D.) were the

complaining witnesses who initiated the Kansas proceedings. The primary reason they expressly and repeatedly sought to have only state judges disbar

Petitioner (the primary reason they continue to fail to

even attempt to have their own court disbar Petitioner

for any purported misconduct) is that they are abusing

criminal fines and disbarment to silence opposition to

judges’ lies and crimes, to cull and kill the messenger,

as it were. Petitioner was subjected to fines and disbarment, specifically, to knowingly intimidate him into

abandoning petitions and to cause him to refrain from

38

petitioning to obtain such evidence, and to knowingly

injure him for such petitioning. Cf. 18 U.S.C. 241, 242,

371, 1001.

No state or federal judge or attorney ever even has

disputed or attempted to refute anything Petitioner

has presented to show that state or federal judges committed crimes by lying about or concealing material

facts or evidence and knowingly violating (and knowingly injuring Petitioner for exercising) Petitioner’s

rights secured by federal law and the Constitution. Cf.

id.; 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, 1349, 1512(b), 1519.

Judges Smith and Phillips fraudulently fined Petitioner $1,500, which Eighth Circuit judges fraudulently affirmed. They all knew that such fines were

imposed solely to injure and intimidate Petitioner for

speech and petitioning (exposing and opposing the lies

and crimes of judges) that they all knew were protected by the Constitution and federal law. Cf. U.S.

Const. Amends. I, V; 18 U.S.C. 241, 242, 371; pages 1426, above.

They all knowingly violated copious federal law

and the Constitution and flouted copious precedent

(which were presented to such judges) emphasizing

due process of law in criminal contempt proceedings.

Cf., e.g., U.S. Const. Amends. I, V; 18 U.S.C. 401;

Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 1, 16, 42; Fed.R.Evid. 101, 602, 605,

802, 806, 1002, 1101.

They all knew that criminal fines could not be imposed in mere proceedings under FOIA and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed.R.Civ.P.). Cf., Int’l

39

Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.

821, 831 (1994); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631-632

(1988); Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S.

787, 798-799 (1987); In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227

(1945); In re Christensen Eng’g Co., 194 U.S. 458, 461

(1904).

While they fined or affirmed fining Petitioner, such

judges (and Judge Contreras (D.D.C.)) concealed or

helped conceal evidence that Judges Smith and Contreras lied about the content and purpose of Powers’

email. Cf. Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 16(a)(1)(E), 18 U.S.C. 1519;

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963); Harris v.

United States, 382 U.S. 162, 166, n.4 (1965); Cooke v.

United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925) (Taft, C.J.).

“Based on the vagueness and implausibility of ”

various judges’ “stories” about Powers’ email, below,

everyone should infer they all “were lying.” District of

Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 587 (2018).

Judge Contreras published his examples for others to follow. See Jordan v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 273

F. Supp. 3d 214, 224 (D.D.C. 8/4/2017) (“Jordan I”);

308 F. Supp. 3d 24, 30 (D.D.C. 3/30/2018) (“Jordan

II”); 331 F.R.D. 444 (D.D.C. 7/1/2019) (“Jordan III”).

Judge Contreras knew that agency attorneys’ lies

about Powers’ email by were egregiously inadequate,

so Judge Contreras added his own lie: “Powers email

contains an express request for legal advice” (id. at

232), “Powers email contained an express request for

legal advice” (Jordan II at 30), “Powers email” “contained an explicit request for legal advice” (Jordan III

40

at 448). Judge Contreras even lied about the D.C. Circuit (“found” that “Powers email contains an explicit

request for legal advice”). Id. at 450.

Judge Contreras also knew agency attorneys lied

about a privilege notation on Powers’ email (“Subject

to Attorney Client Privilege”). Id. at 221, 231, 232, 236,

237; Jordan II at 29. Judge Contreras repeatedly emphasized that someone (later) added a markedly different notation (“subject to attorney-client privilege”) to

Powers’ email. Jordan I at 232; Jordan II at 30; Jordan

III at 448.

Any express request for advice, input or review

must include words such as “please advise regarding”

or “please review and provide input.” Each such phrase

and any purported privilege notation is a “Key

Phrase.”

Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit and Judge Contreras contended that all Key Phrases were merely “disjointed words” having “minimal or no information

content.” Jordan v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 17-cv-02702,

2019 WL 2028399 at *4 (D.D.C. 5/8/2019) (emphasis by

Judge Contreras). Accord id. at *5 and n.4 (repeatedly

stating same, including by quoting Jordan v. U.S. Dept.

of Labor, 18-5128, 2018 WL 5819393 at *1 (D.C. Cir.

10/19/2018)).

Judge Contreras even emphasized that any words

in any Key Phrase were “meaningless words,” and he

even threatened “sanctions” for seeking evidence

thereof. Id. at *5, n.5.

41

To thwart another FOIA requester seeking Powers’ email, Judge Smith and agency attorneys (including in a declaration) insisted that all information

redacted from Powers’ email was the personal private

information of Petitioner (Campo’s counsel). They insisted that Powers’ email was in Petitioner’s “personnel” or “medical” or “similar files” and it included only

Petitioner’s personal, private information (so it necessarily belonged to Petitioner). Campo v. U.S. Dept. of

Justice, 19-cv-00905, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122429 at

*25-26 (W.D. Mo. 7/13/2020) invoking FOIA Exemption

6 (5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)).

Regarding each of Judge Smith’s factual contentions, implications and inferences, above, Eighth Circuit judges insisted that “no genuine issue of material

fact” even “remained for trial.” Campo v. U.S. Dept. of

Justice, 854 Fed. Appx. 768, 769 (8th Cir. 2021).

Realizing that their own lies and those of Judges

Smith and Contreras, above, were blatant, irrational

and even absurd, Eighth Circuit judges disbarred Petitioner without any reason stated. The Kansas Supreme Court disbarred Petitioner expressly to help

Judges Smith and Phillips and Eighth Circuit judges

retaliate against and silence Petitioner for exposing

and opposing the lies and crimes of such judges. Cf.

App. 10-44, 46-55, 61-71.

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V.

This Court Must Address Related Matters.

Petitioner, a “member of ” this Court’s “Bar,” was

“disbarred” and “suspended” by “court[s] of record,” so

this Court must “enter an appropriate order.” U.S. Sup.

Ct. R. 8.1. This Court must afford Petitioner “a hearing

if material facts are in dispute.” Id. R. 8.2. An appropriate order would address issues herein, so this Court

should support and enforce its prior precedent with additional precedent.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION

A significant number of judges make or enforce

falsehoods as so-called findings, rulings or conclusions

to repress critics and petitions under the First Amendment and FOIA. They repeatedly prove that, in their

alternate reality, judicial power is virtually supreme

(this Court, the Constitution, and the People are virtually irrelevant). Such judges are dangerously incompetent or dangerously deceitful.

This Court should support and protect people trying to remedy such grave dangers responsibly and

conscientiously within the justice system. For the foregoing reasons, certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

JACK JORDAN

Counsel of Record

3102 Howell Street

North Kansas City, Missouri 64116

jack.jordan@emobilawyer.com

(816) 853-1142