Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Tiange Huang, et al., Petitioners v. Ngoc Bach Phan, et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 30, 2022

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

DEC 3 0 2022

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No.

3fn tlje Supreme Court of tlje fHmteb States

TIANGE HUANG, et. al.,

Petitioners,

NGOC BACH PHAN; VINH CHE; KHANH CHE,

Respondents,

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Tiange Huang

Lead Petitioner

2602 Orchard Creek Ln

Katy, TX 77494-2994

(202) 866-8558

huangtiange@hotmail.com

Qiuyuan Huang

huangqiuyuan@gmail.com

Jing Lin

2602 Orchard Creek Ln

Katy, TX 77494-2994

(267) 283-5450

linjing.org@hotmail.com

Petitioners

Twenty-sixth day of December, MMXXII

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Article I of the United States

Constitution provides all legislative Powers therein

granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United

States. Do Article III Courts have the power to

judicially rewrite laws to conform with a judge’s

views?

The Third Branch is without legislative

power, (insert citations here) In Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 565 (1992), this Court failed to

consider the provisions stated in Article I of the

United States Constitution, and de facto amended a

congressional enactment without examination of its

constitutionality. Should this Court overrule Lujan

and TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 1682

(2021) and hold that the Constitution and Acts of

Congress shall be construed as written absent

ambiguity?

Can a non-attorney incompetent adult

person represent another incompetent person before

United States Courts?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners, and plaintiff-appellants below, are

Tiange Huang, Qiuyuan Huang, and Jing Lin.

Respondents, and defendant-appellees below,

are Ngoc Bach Phan, Vinh Che, and Dr. Khanh Che,

M.D.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (E.D. Pa.):

Qiuyuan Huang; Jing Lin; and Tiange Huang v.

Ngoc Bach Phan; Vinh Che; and Khanh Che,

No. 21-cv-0057-PD (May 26, 2021) (order

granting motion to dismiss)

United States Court of Appeals (3rd Cir.):

Qiuyuan Huang; Jing Lin; and Tiange Huang v.

Ngoc Bach Phan; Vinh Che; and Khanh Che,

No. 21-2040 (July 14, 2022) (opinion)

Qiuyuan Huang; Jing Lin; and Tiange Huang v.

Ngoc Bach Phan; Vinh Che; and Khanh Che,

No. 21-2040 (Oct. 4, 2022) (sur petition for

rehearing, en banc rehearing denied)

Ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented..................................................

Parties to the Proceeding..........................................

Related Proceedings..................................................

Table of Authorities ....... ............................................

Vll

Opinions Below...........................................................

Jurisdiction..................................................................

Rule 29.4(b) Statement.............................................

Statutory Provisions Involved................................

Introduction................................................................

Statement of the Case...............................................

History of Respondents’ Violations.........

Respondents’ Response to This Lawsuit;

Pertinent Evidence.....................................

Lower Court Rulings..................................

Reasons for Granting the Petition..........................

This Court should grant certiorari

to consider overruling

Lujan and TransUnion...............................

Lujan and TransUnion were

greviously wrong.................................

Lujan and TransUnion have

spawned significant negative

consequences........................................

Lujan and TransUnion have

generated no legitimate reliance

interests ............................................

II. This Court should grant certiorari

to consider can incompetent persons

represent another incompetent person

in U.S. Courts..........................................

Conclusion.............................................................

Appendix

Appendix A

Opinion [Not Precedential], United

States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit, Qiuyuan Huang; Jing Lin; and

Tiange Huang v. Ngoc Bach Phan; Vinh

Che; and Khanh Che,

No. 21-2040 (July 14, 2022)....................... App-1

Appendix B

Sur Petition for Rehearing [en banc

rehearing denied], United States Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit,

Qiuyuan Huang; Jing Lin; and Tiange

Huang v. Ngoc Bach PhanX Vinh Che;

and Khanh Che,

No. 21-2040 (Oct. 4, 2022).......................... App-8

Appendix C

Order, United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,

Qiuyuan Huang; Jing Lin; and Tiange

Huang v. Ngoc Bach Phan; Vinh Che;

and Khanh Che,

No. 21-cv-00057 (May 26, 2021)................ App-10

Appendix D

Pertinent Sections From 24 C.F.R. Part 35,

Subpart A — Disclosure of Known LeadBased Paint and/or

Lead-Based Paint

Hazards Upon Sale or Lease of Residential

Property

App-17

24 C.F.R. § 35.80

24 C.F.R. § 35.82

24 C.F.R. § 35.84

24 C.F.R. § 35.86

24 C.F.R. § 35.88

24 C.F.R. § 35.90

24 C.F.R. § 35.92

24 C.F.R. § 35.94

24 C.F.R. § 35.96

App-17

App-18

App-23

App-25

App-30

Appendix E

Pertinent Sections From 40 C.F.R. Part

745, Subpart F — Disclosure of Known

Lead-Based Paint and/or Lead-Based Paint

Hazards Upon Sale or Lease of Residential

Property .......................

App-32

40 C.F.R. § 745.100

40 C.F.R. § 745.101

40 C.F.R. § 745.102

40 C.F.R. § 745.103

40 C.F.R. § 745.107

40 C.F.R. § 745.110

40 C.F.R. § 745.113

40 C.F.R. § 745.115

40 C.F.R. § 745.118

App-32

App-33

App-38

App-40

App-44

App-45

Appendix F

The Definitions of Words Pertinent to the

inftant Cafe from Samuel Johnfon’s A

Dictionary of the Englifh Language,

1755 edition

App-47

Case.............

Controversy

Equity..........

Executive....

Judicial.......

Legislative ...

Power..... ....

Welfare......

App-47

App-50

App-51

App-52

App-56

Vll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Anderson v. Wilson,

289 U.S. 20 (1933)......................................

Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc.,

570 U.S. 1 (2013)..........

24, 26, 29, 33, 35

Beardstown v. Virginia,

76 Ill. 34 (Ill. 1875)......

BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007)......

14, 15

Betts v. Brady

316 U.S. 455 (1942)......

Carlton et al. v. Matthews,

103 Fla. 301 (Fla. 1931)

Chuengv. Youth Orchestra Found. Of Buffalo, Inc.,

906 F.2d 59 (CA2 1990)..............

Cicenia v. La Gay

357 U.S. 504 (1958).......... ............

City of Fort Worth v. Rylie,

602 S.W.3d 459 (Tex. 2020)........

Cohn v. Kingsley,

5 Idaho 416, 49 P. 985 (Id. 1897)

24, 33

Crooker v. California

357 U.S. 433 (1958)......................

Denn v. Reid,

10 Pet. 524 (1836).........................

Vlll

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization,

597 U.S.___(2022).............................................

Dodd v. United States,

545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005)..................................

Doggett v. Florida Railroad,

99 U.S. 72 (1878)................................................

Ex parte Siebold,

100 U.S. 371 (1879).............. ............................

Ferguson v. Wilcox,

28 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1930)...............................

Franchise Tax Bd. of Calif, v. Hyatt (Hyatt III),

139 S.Ct. 1485 (2019).....

22, 23

Gardner v. Parson,

874 F.2d 131 (CA3 1989)

Gideon v. Wainwright,

372 U.S. 335 (1963).........

Hart v. Jordan,

14 Cal.2d 288 (Cal. 1939)

Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters

Bank, N.A.,

530 U.S. 1 (2000).............

Hills v. Chicago,

60 Ill. 86 (Ill. 1871).........

In re Matthews,

333 So. 3d 422 (La. 2022)

24, 33

King v. Burwell,

576 U.S. 473 (2015).......

Knick v. Twp. of Scott,

139 S.Ct. 2162 (2019)

Lake County v. Rollins,

130 U.S. 662 (1889) ....

25, 35

Leonard v. Wiseman,

31 Md. 201 (Md. 1869)

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 565 (1992)............ 14, 21, 24, 27, 28, 31

Marbury v. Madison,

1 Cranch 137 (1803)...........

29, 31, 41

McGovern v. Mitchell,

78 Conn. 536 (Conn. 1906) .

McNeil v. United States,

508 U.S. 106 (1993)............

Meeker v. Kercher,

782 F.2d 153 (CA10 1986) ..

Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966)............

Montgomery v. Louisiana,

577 U.S. 190 (2016)............

Moore et Ux. v. Love,

171 Tenn. 682 (Tenn. 1937)

M. P. Management, L.P. v. Williams,

594 Pa. 439 (Pa. 2007).................

Newell v. People,

7 N.Y. 9 (N.Y. 1852).....................

Nicol v. Ames,

173 U.S. 509 (1899)....................................

Osei-Afriyie v. Med. College of Pennsylvania,

937 F.2d 876 (CA3 1991).....

Penhallow v. Doane’s,

3 Dali. 54 (1795)....................

People v. Potter,

47 N.Y. 375 (N.Y. 1872).......

Ramos v. Louisiana,

140 S.Ct. 1390 (2020)..........

Roe v. Wade

410 U.S. 113 (1973)..............

Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson

370 U.S. 195 (1962)..............

Steele v. Thurston

2020 Ark. 320 (Ark. 2020)....

24, 33

Sveen v. Melin

138 S. Ct. 1815 (2018)...........

The Mayor v. Cooper

73 U.S. 247 (1867)..................

The People v. Purdy

2 Hill, 31, 36 (N.Y. 1841).....

35, 42

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez

141 S. Ct. 1682 (2021).........

21, 24

United States v. Fisher

6 U.S. 358 (1805)

14, 35, 42

Vanhorne v. Dorrance

2 U.S. 304 (1795)..........................

Yates v. United States

574 U.S. 528 (2015).....................

Zuni Public School District No. 89 v.

Department of Education

550 U.S. 81 (2007)........... ............

14, 15

Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules

Preamble, U.S.Const. .

U.S.Const. Art. I, § 1 ..

U.S.Const. Art. I, § 8 ..

1-3, 13, 27, 28, 34, 36, 37

U.S.Const. Art. Ill, § 1

U.S.Const. Art. Ill, § 2

3-4, 25, 26, 27, 30

U.S.Const. Art. IV, § 4

U.S.Const. Amend. I..

U.S.Const. Amend. II .

Toxic Substances Control Act,

15 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.........

... 16, 17, 18, 19, 20

15U.S.C. § 2619.................

9-13, 17, 19, 20, 37

15 U.S.C. § 2689.................

28 U.S.C. § 1254.................

28 U.S.C. § 1654.................

Rules Enabling Act,

28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 .........

Xll

Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act,

42 U.S.C. § 4851, et seq...................... 16, 17, 18, 19, 20

42 U.S.C. § 4851a...............................

42 U.S.C. § 4852d...............................

5-8, 16, 18, 43

24 C.F.R. Pt. 35, Sbpt. A...................

........... 13, 17

40 C.F.R. Pt. 745, Sbpt. F ,................

.............13, 17

S.Ct.R. 10..............................................

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 17......................

Other Authorities

Committee on Commerce on S. 3148,

S. Rept. 94-698 (Mar. 16, 1976)

28, 30, 40, 42

Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations

Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the

States of the American Union (2d ed.)

(1871)

Gulson, Mahaffey, et al,. Contribution of tissue lead

to blood lead in adult female subjects based on

stable lead isotope methods, J. Lab. Clin. Med.,

125(6), 703-712. (June 1, 1998)......................... 38

Johnson’s Dictionary, (1755)...................................... 32

Liu, Early Health Risk Factors for Violence:

Conceptualization, Review of the Evidence, and

Implications, Aggress. Violent Behav., 16(1), 6373 https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.avb.2010.12.003

(2010)

Xlll

National Institute for Occupational Safety and

Health (NIOSH), Report to Congress on Workers’

Home Contamination Study Conducted Under

The Workers’ Family Protection Act (29 U.S.C.

671a), DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 95-123

(Sept. 1995)

Nevin, Understanding international crime trends: the

legacy of preschool lead exposure, Environ. Res.

104(3), 315-336 (Apr. 23, 2007)....................... 39

Potula, & Kaye, The impact of menopause and

lifestyle factors on blood and bone lead levels

among female former smelter workers: the

Bunker Hill Study. Am. J. Ind. Med., 49(3),

143-152. https://doi.org/10.1002/ajim.20262

(Feb. 8, 2006)............................... ......... ..............

Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the

United States, (5th ed.)

(1905).....................................................................

Taylor, Opeskin et al., The relationship between

atmospheric lead emissions and aggressive crime:

an ecological study, Environ. Health 15, 23,

https://doi.org/10.1186/sl2940-016-0122-3

(Feb. 16, 2016)....................................................... 39

U. S. Department of Health and Human Services,

Toxicological Profile for Lead (update), Public

Health Service Agency for Toxic Substances and

Disease Registry

(Aug. 2020)

XIV

U. S. Department of Housing and Urban

Development, American Healthy Homes Survey

II, Lead Findings, Office of Lead Hazard

Control and Healthy Homes

(Oct. 29, 2021)....................................................... 40

Weyermann, & Brenner, Factors affecting bone

demineralization and blood lead levels of

postmenopausal women-a population-based

study from Germany, Environ. Res., 76(1),

19—25. https://doi.org/10.1006/enrs.1997.3780

(1998)...................................................................... 38

OPINIONS BELOW

The Third Circuit’s opinion is reproduced in

the Appendix at App.1-7. The Eastern District of

Pennsylvania’s order is reproduced in the Appendix

at App.10-16.

JURISDICTION

The Third Circuit’s judgment was entered July

14, 2022. The Third Circuit denied rehearing on

October 4, 2022. App.8-9. This Court has jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

RULE 29.4(b) STATEMENT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.4(b), 28

U.S.C. § 2406(a) may apply and service has been

made on the Solicitor General of the United States,

950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, DC

20530-0001.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent constitutional provisions involved

are first, § 8 of Article I of the United States

Constitution:

The Congress shall have Power To lay and

collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to

pay the Debts an provide for the common

Defence and general Welfare of the United

States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall

be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow Money on the credit of the United

States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,

and among the several States, and with the

Indian Tribes;

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,

and uniform Laws on the subject of

Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and

of foreign Coin, and fix the standard of Weights

nd Measures;

provide

for

the

Punishment

counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of

the United States;

To establish Post Offices and post Roads;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful

Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors

and Inventors the exclusive Right to their

respective Writings and Discoveries;

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the

supreme Court;

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies

committed on the high Seas, and Offences

against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and

Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures

on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no

Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a

longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and

Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to

execute the Laws of the Union, suppress

Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and

disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such

Part of them as may be employed in the Service

of the United States, reserving to the States

the Appointment of the Officers,

respectively,

and the Authority of training the Militia

according to the discipline prescribed by

Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases

whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten

Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular

States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become

the seat of the Government of the United States,

and to exercise like Authority over all Places

purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of

the State in which the Same shall be, for the

Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock

yards, and other needful Buildings;—And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary

and proper for carrying into Execution the

foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by

this Constitution in the Government of the

United States, or in any Department or Officer

thereof.

U.S.Const. Art. I, § 8.

And finally, § 2 of Article III of the United States

Constitution:

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in

Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,

the Laws of the United States, and Treaties

made, or which shall be made, under their

Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,

other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all

Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—

to Controversies to which the United States

shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two

or more States;—between a State and Citizens of

another State,—between Citizens of different

States,—between Citizens of the same State

claiming Lands under Grants of different States,

and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and

foreign States, Citizens or subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other

public Ministers and Consuls, and those in

which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court

shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other

Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court

shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law

and Fact, with such Exceptions,

and under

such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of

Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial

shall be held in the State where the said Crimes

shall have been committed;

but when not

committed within any state, the Trial shall be at

such Place or Places as the Congress may by

Law have directed.

U.S.Const. Art. Ill, § 2.

The first statutory provision pertinent to this

case is § 1018 of Title X of the Residential LeadBased Paint Hazards Reduction Act of 1992:

(a) Lead Disclosure in Purchase and Sale or

Lease of Target Housing, —

(1) Lead-based paint hazards. Not later than 2

years after the date of enactment of this Act, the

secretary and the Administrator of the

Environmental

Protection

Agency

shall

promulgate regulations under this section for

the disclosure of lead-based paint hazards in

target housing which is offered for sale or lease.

The regulations shall require that, before the

purchaser or lessee is obligated under any

contract to purchase or lease the housing, the

seller or lessor shall —

(A) provide the purchaser or lessee with a

lead hazard information pamphlet, as proscribed

by the Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency under section 406 of the Toxic

Substances Control Act;

(B) disclose to the purchaser or lessee the

presence of any known lead-based paint, or any

known lead-based paint hazards, in such

housing and provide to the purchaser or lessee

any lead hazard evaluation report available to

the seller or lessor; and

(unless the parties mutually agree upon a

different period of time) to conduct a risk

assessment or inspection for the presence of

lead-based paint hazards.

(2) Contract

for

purchase

and

sale.

Regulations promulgated under this section

shall provide that every contract or the purchase

and sale of any interest in target housing shall

contain a Lead Warning Statement and a

statement signed by the purchaser that the

purchaser has —

(A) read the Lead Warning Statement

and understands its contents;

(B) Received a lead hazard information

pamphlet; and

parties mutually agreed upon a different period

of time) before coming obliged under the contract

to purchase the housing to conduct a risk

assessment or inspection for the presence of

lead-based paint hazards.

(3) Contents of lead warning statement. The

Lead Warning Statement shall contain the

following text printed in large type on a separate

sheet of paper attached to the contract:

“Every purchaser of any interest in

residential real property on which a residential

dwelling was built prior to 1978 is notified that

such property may present exposure to lead from

lead-based paint that may place young children

at risk of developing lead poisoning. Lead

poisoning in young children may produce

permanent neurological damage, including

learning disabilities,

reduced

intelligence

quotient, behavioral problems, and impaired

memory. Lead poisoning may also poses a

particular risk to pregnant women. The seller of

any interest in residential real property is

required to provide the buyer with any

information on lead-based paint hazards from

risk assessments or inspections in the seller’s

possession and notify the buyer of any known

lead-based paint hazards. A risk assessment or

inspection for possible lead-based paint hazards

is recommended prior to purchase.”.

(4) Compliance Assurance. Whenever a seller

or lessor has entered into a contract with an

agent for the purpose of selling or leasing a unit

of target housing, the regulations promulgated

under this section shall require the agent, on

behalf of the seller or lessor, to ensure

compliance with the requirements of this section.

(5) Promulgation. A suit may be brought

against the secretary of Housing and Urban

Development and the Administrator of the

Environmental Protection Agency under section

20 of the Toxic Substances Control Act to compel

promulgation of the regulations required under

this section and the Federal district court shall

have jurisdiction to order such promulgation.

(b) Penalties for Violations. —

(1) Monetary penalty. Any person who

knowingly violates the provisions of this section

shall be subject to civil money penalties in

accordance with the provisions of section 102 of

the Department of Housing and Urban

Development Reform Act of 1989 (42 U.S.C.

3545).

(2) Action by Secretary. The Secretary is

authorized to take such lawful action as may be

necessary to enjoin any violation of this section.

(3) Civil liability. Any person who knowingly

violates the provisions of this section shall be

jointly and severally liable to the purchaser or

lessee in an amount equal to 3 times the amount

of damages incurred by such individual.

(4) Costs. In any civil action brought for

damages pursuant to paragraph (3), the

appropriate court may aware court costs to the

party commencing such action, together with

reasonable attorney fees and any expert witness

fess, if that party prevails.

(5) Prohibited act. It shall be a prohibited act

under section 409 of the Toxic Substances

Control Act for any person to fail or refuse to

comply with a provision of this section or with

any rule or order issued under this section. For

purposes of enforcing this section under the

Toxic Substances Control Act, the penalty for

each violation applicable under section 16 of that

Act shall not be more than $10,000.

this section shall affect the validity or

enforceability of any sale or contract for the

purchase and sale or lease of any interest in

residential real property or any loan, loan

agreement, mortgage, or lien made or arising in

connection with a mortgage loan, nor shall

anything in this section create a defect in title.

(d) Effective Date. The regulations under this

section shall take effect 3 years after the date of

the enactment of this title.

42 U.S.C. § 4852d.

Second, § 409 of the Toxic Substances Control

Act:

It shall be unlawful for any person to fail or

refuse to comply with a provision of this

subchapter or with any rule or order issued

under this subchapter.

15 U.S.C. § 2689.

And finally, § 20 of the Toxic Substances Control

Act:

(a) In general

Except as provided in subsection (b), any person

may commence a civil action—

(1) against any person (including (A) the

United States, and (B) any other governmental

instrumentality or agency to the extent

permitted by the eleventh amendment to the

Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of

this chapter or any rule promulgated

under section 2603, 2604, or 2605 of this title, or

subchapter II or IV, or order issued

under section 2603 or 2604 of this title or

subchapter II or IV to restrain such violation, or

(2) against the Administrator to compel the

Administrator to perform any act or duty under

this chapter which is not discretionary.

Any civil action under paragraph (1) shall be

brought in the United States district court for

the district in which the alleged violation

occurred or in which the defendant resides or in

which the defendant's principal place of business

is located. Any action brought under paragraph

(2) shall be brought in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia, or the United

States district court for the judicial district in

which the plaintiff is domiciled. The district

courts of the United States shall have

jurisdiction over suits brought under this section,

without regard to the amount in controversy or

the citizenship of the parties. In any civil action

under this subsection process ma!y be served on a

defendant in any judicial district in which the

defendant resides or may be found and

subpoenas for witnesses may be served in any

judicial district.

(b) Limitation

No civil action may be commenced—

(1) under subsection (a)(1) to restrain a

violation of this chapter or rule or order under

this chapter—

(A) before the expiration of 60 days after

the plaintiff has given notice of such violation (i)

to the Administrator, and (ii) to the person who

is alleged to have committed such violation, or

(B) if the Administrator has commenced

and is diligently prosecuting a proceeding for the

issuance of an order under section 2615(a)(2) of

this title to require compliance with this chapter

or with such rule or order or if the Attorney

General has commenced and is diligently

prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United

States to require compliance with this chapter or

with such rule or order, but if such proceeding or

civil action is commenced after the giving of

notice, any person giving such notice may

intervene as a matter of right in such proceeding

or action;

(2) under subsection (a)(2) before the

expiration of 60 days after the plaintiff has given

notice to the Administrator of the alleged failure

of the Administrator to perform an act or duty

which is the basis for such action or, in the case

of an action under such subsection for the failure

of the Administrator to file an action

under section 2606 of this title, before the

expiration of ten days after such notification,

except that no prior notification shall be

required in the case of a civil action brought to

compel a decision by the Administrator pursuant

to section 2617(f)(3)(B) of this title; or

(3) in the case of a civil action brought to

compel a decision by the Administrator pursuant

to section 2617(f)(3)(B) of this title, after the date

that is 60 days after the deadline specified

in section 2617(f)(3)(B) of this title.

Notice under this subsection shall be given in

such manner as the Administrator shall

prescribe by rule.

(1) In any action under this section, the

Administrator, if not a party, may intervene as a

matter of right.

(2) The court, in issuing any final order in any

action brought pursuant to subsection (a), may

award costs of suit and reasonable fees for

attorneys and expert witnesses if the court

determines that such an award is appropriate.

Any court, in issuing its decision in an action

brought to review such an order, may award

costs of suit and reasonable fees for attorneys if

the court determines that such an award is

appropriate.

(3) Nothing in this section shall restrict any

right which any person (or class of persons) may

have under any statute or common law to seek

enforcement of this chapter or any rule or order

under this chapter or to seek any other relief.

(d) Consolidation

When two or more civil actions brought under

subsection (a) involving the same defendant and

the same issues or violations are pending in two

or more judicial districts, such pending actions,

upon application of such defendants to such

actions which is made to a court in which any

such action is brought, may, if such court in its

discretion so decides, be consolidated for trial by

order (issued after giving all parties reasonable

notice and opportunity to be heard) of such court

and tried in(1) any district which is selected by such

defendant and in which one of such actions is

pending,

(2) a district which is agreed upon by

stipulation between all the parties to such

actions and in which one of such actions is

pending, or

(3) a district which is selected by the court

and in which one of such actions is pending.

The court issuing such an order shall give

prompt notification of the order to the other

courts in which the civil actions consolidated

under the order are pending.

15U.S.C. § 2619.

The regulations pertinent to this case 24 C.F.R.

Pt. 35, Sbpt. A, and 40 C.F.R. Pt. 745, Sbpt. F, may

be found respectively in Appendix D at App. 17-31,

and E at App.32-46, to this petition.

INTRODUCTION

“We the People of the United States, in Order to

form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure

domestic Tranquility, provide for the common

defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the

Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,

do ordain and establish this Constitution for the

United States of America.” Preamble, United States

Constitution.

The legislative Power is vested in Congress.

U.S.Const. Art. I, § 1. Congress has the Power to

provide for through legislation, the general Welfare

of the United States, and through further necessary

and proper legislation to ensure theretofore

legislation providing for the general Welfare of the

United States be executed. Ibid, § 8.

“The judicial Power of the United States, shall

be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior

Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain

and establish.” U.S. Const. Art. Ill, § 1. “The judicial

Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,

arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the

United States[;]—to Controversies ...

Citizens of different states[.]” Ibid, § 2.

between

“Where a law is plain and unambiguous,” as

Justice Washington recognized, “whether it be

expressed in general or limited terms, the legislature

should be intended to mean what they have plainly

expressed, and consequently no room is left for

construction.” United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358,

399—400 (1805). Justice Black in Sinclair Refining

Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 203 (1962) pronounced

the Court “cannot ignore the plain import of a

congressional enactment,-particularly one which, as

we have repeatedly said, was deliberately drafted in

the broadest of terms in order to avoid danger that it

would be narrowed by judicial construction.” This

stance remains standing to this day, with Justice

Scalia and Justice Stevens affirming such stance

respectively recently in Zuni Public School District

No. 89 v. Department of Education, 550 U.S. 81, 108

(2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting, with Robert, Thomas,

and Souter, JJ., joined) and Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 596 (2007) (Stevens J„

dissent)

Yet Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 565

(1992) invalidated a statute (largely identical to one

pertinent statute in this instant case), effectively

exercising legislative Powers,

Without first

examining the constitutional authorities of Congress,

this Court refused to enforce and take the pertinent

congressional enactment in Lujan as is, rather

constructed upon said enactment despite its lack of

ambiguity. Despite this Justice Scalia’s stance in

Lujan, Justice Scalia continued to uphold the correct

standard aforementioned, holding when a statute is

without ambiguity, construction by the courts is

prohibited. Zuni, 550 U.S. 81, 108 (2007). Lujan and

TransUnion theretofore create a double standard for

reviews by this Court and courts inferior theretofore.

When Article III an institution wish to dismiss a

party in a civil action petitioning said Article III

institution to construct a statute in a manner

inconsistent with a statute in a case .or controversy

reviewed, the institution will rely on the relevant

caselaw of this Court to support its decision.

However, when an Article III institution does not

want to hear a case and wants to act inconsistent

with a congressional enactment, they will freely do

so by constructing the statute, and departing so far

resultant a pertinent congressional enactment

judicially rewritten and amended. And they will do

so whilst citing Lujan, TransUnion, and/or Bell Atl.

Corp. as authoritative support. Such results in the

frequent distribution of publick injustice. To ensure

the proper distribution of publick justice, there shall

be only one standard, and only with a uniform

standard can ensure consistent distribution of

publick justice to the people.

Previous rulings rendered by inferior courts in

the instant case ignored and jettisoned the plain

import of a congressional enactment. Despite the

plain language and the lack of ambiguity, the inferior

courts nevertheless ruled Petitioners were without

standing to bring suit. Such effectively rendering the

inferior courts distributing injustice. United States

Courts are not venues for the distribution of publick

injustice. This Court must stop and end the courts’

distribution of publick injustice.

Respondents violated the Residential LeadBased Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992. Why is it

important to restrain the Respondents and other

violators from further violating the 1992 Act?

Because the effect of lead exposure and ingestion is

widespread in society. Lead negatively impacts the

general Welfare of the United States. Continuing to

violate said act will directly cause more citizens to be

exposed to lead. As a direct result, victims will cause

more violent criminal incidents due to the exposure

to said chemical, aforementioned, negatively impact

the general Welfare. Post. 38—40. Furthermore, lead

can kill. Failure of the courts to issue injunctions will

create an atmosphere which will encourage violators

to continue violate such important law and commit

unlawful acts. Such behavior of the inferior courts

has set a very dangerous precedence into motion.

This Court should grant certiorari.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners filed this action in 2020. Until this

litigation, Respondents lease and continue to lease

over a dozen residential dwellings (“subject

Properties”) subject to the Residential Lead-Based

Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 (RLBPHRA), 42

U.S.C. § 4851 et seq. Violation of the RLBPHRA is a

violation of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),

15 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

4852d(b)(5). Respondents in their Motion to Dismiss

conceded to the violations. Nevertheless, the inferior

courts failed to acknowledge such infamous

violations. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2619, Petitioner

Tiange Huang issued a Notice of Violations to all

Respondents and the Administrator of the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on October

18, 2020, with a courtesy copy to the Attorney

General of the United States. Petitioners filed the

original Complaint on January 5, 2021.

History of Respondents’ Violations

Upon discovery of and in light of the

Respondents’ violation of the RLBPHRA, Petitioner

Tiange Huang initiated an investigation into

Respondents’ violations. (The investigation remains

ongoing. Petitioner Tiange Huang determined

existing available violative history and evidence of

unlawful acts are sufficient to bring action.) Per his

investigation, Tiange Huang discovered that

Respondents actively engaged in and participated in

active concert leasing of over a dozen dwellings

located in Delaware, Montgomery, and Philadelphia

Counties in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Tiange Huang discovered Respondents violated the

RLBPHRA dating back to at least 2014 through

present. Respondents failed to comply with the rules

promulgated pursuant to the RLBPHRA.

The

RLBPHRA

and

its

implementing

regulations, found at 24 C.F.R. Pt. 35, Sbpt. A, and

40 C.F.R. Pt. 745, Sbpt. F, require, inter alia, lessors

and agents to disclose and include when a new lease

is entered into for residential dwellings constructed

prior to 1978: 1) any known information concerning

lead-based paint and lead-based paint hazards; 2)

any records or reports available to the lessors

pertaining to lead-based paint and lead-based paint

hazards; 3) a lead hazard information pamphlet

approved by the EPA; 4) a lead warning statement

containing specific language prescribed by 42 U.S.C.

§ 4852d; 5) a statement disclosing the presence of

known lead-based paint and lead-based paint

hazards or a statement disclosing lack of knowledge

of said information; 6) a list of any records or reports

pertaining to lead-based paint and lead-based paint

hazards that have been provided to the lessee or a

statement indicating the lack of such; 7) a statement

by the tenant affirming receipt of the information

heretofore; and 8) the signatures of the lessors and

agents attesting and certifying to the accuracy and

completeness of their required disclosures, and

signatures of the lessees attesting to their receipt of

the required disclosures, along with the dates of all

parties’ signatures.

In short, in order to satisfy the requirements of

the RLBPHRA, all 8 strict elements of disclosure

activities must be fulfilled, otherwise would be an

unlawful act. Respondents violated the RLBPHRA.

Ante at 17.

Respondents’ Response to This Lawsuit;

Pertinent Evidence

In January 2021, Petitioners sued respondents

Ngoc Bach Phan, Vinh Che, and Khanh Che in the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania for violations of the

RLBPHRA and TSCA. Respondents soon moved to

dismiss the case. CA3.App’x (JA) 28.

Respondents moved to dismiss on the grounds of

res judicata, Rooker-Feldman (the former and latter

collectively based on a void judgment from a

jurisdiction deficient state tribunal. See JA.28—

34; 100—109), and failure to state a claim.

Respondents conceded to violations of the RLBPHRA

and TSCA in the process, stating “[the subject

property] was built before 1978. In fact, Mr. Ngoc

disclosed this fact to Mr. Huang in the Residential

Lease.” JA.28. (Errors in original). Respondents also

submitted evidence to prove and support their

unlawful acts and violations. See JA.52. While prima

facie appears to be in compliance, the implementing

regulations of the RLBPHRA requires the disclosure

of information and reports material to lead-based

paint or lead-based paint hazards. Disclosure of

exclusively the year built is immaterial to the

RLBPHRA. Such exclusivity resulted in an unlawful

act and violation of the RLBPHRA. A violation of the

RLBPHRA is a violation of the TSCA. Wherefore,

inter alia, 15. U.S.C. § 2619 is invoked as a cause of

action among the causes.

C. Lower Court Rulings

In May 2020, the district court entered judgment

for Respondents. Inter alia, 15. U.S.C. § 2619 was

one of out of the many basis for cause of action. 15

U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1).

The district court held

Petitioners were without standing for pertinent parts

arising under section 2619.

The district court held “[Petitioners] are thus

foreclosed from obtaining the relief sough under the

TSCA, as they no longer live at [Respondents’]

property” App.14, despite § 20 of the TSCA, 15 U.S.C.

§ 2619 plainly states “any person may commence a

civil action” except in cases 60-day advance notice

was not given to the violators and the Administrator

of EPA. Ibid, (emphasis added)

Regarding the RLBPHRA, the district court first

held Petitioners Tiange Huang and Jing Lin were

without standing under the RLBPHRA. The district

court held the only damages covered by the

RLBPHRA are physical injuries, resultant in the

district court judicially amended the RLBPHRA,

narrowing the scope of “damages” otherwise broad

scope by the statute’s nature. No part of the

RLBPHRA legislative text restricts violators’

liabilities to physical injuries. The district court

finally held that Petitioners failed to plead any

factual allegations.1 It is worth noting the Complaint

filed is similar to those filed by the Department of

Justice filed in similar cases involving the same

issues with different defendants.

1 It is impossible for courts to determine whether an allegation

is factual or not at the pleadings stage. Such determination is

only possible at trial. An allegation may be true, but a court

may render it “not factual,” or an allegation may be false, but it

appears factual. (True=factual. False^factual.) Either produces

injustice to litigants. Resultant too much power overly prone to

abuse by bad judges. Such practice permits judges to act at

heart’s content, rather than judge the merits.

The Third Circuit affirmed. Although the Third

Circuit held the district court incorrectly held

Petitioners Tiange Huang and Jing Lin had standing

under the RLBPHRA (see n.l at App.5), otherwise

nevertheless a mere recitation of the district court’s

intellectually bankrupt findings. The Third Circuit

denied en banc rehearing.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Court should hear this case for three

independent reasons.

Firft, Lujan and TransUnion should be overruled.

Lujan’s core holding—a citizen-suit provision would

authorize Congress to transfer from the President to

the courts the Chief Executive’s executive powers—is

plainly wrong. Lujan at 577. See also TransUnion v.

(2021), (slip op., at 13). It

Ramirez, 594 U.S.

satisfies all criteria that this Court considers when

overruling precedents. Only this Court can overrule

its own precedent, and whether to overrule Lujan

and TransUnion is “an important question of federal

law that has not been, but should be, settled by this

Court.” S.Ct.R. 10(c). That question was not raised

prior to this litigation. This case is the ideal vehicle

for this Court to reconsider Lujan, given the identical

citizen-suit provision present in this case and in

Lujan, and TransUnion due to their outrageous

narrowing of the scope of Article III.

Second, the Third Branch must give statutes full

force absent ambiguity. In recent years, the

institutions of the Third Branch have been overly

keen to construct upon unambiguous laws. Such sets

a very dangerous precedent that must be enjoined.

Both cases are classic examples of the Third Branch’s

favorability towards construction relying on caselaw

rather than respecting the plain imports of the

statutory text. They are a classic amongst the latest

trends. Only this Court has full authority and may

bind the courts inferior heretofore from further

constructing unambiguous laws. Too often, inferior

courts plunge deep into caselaw, and fail to examine

the plain import of and respect the statutory text,

first. Many times, resultant in the misconstruction of

the statutory text. Laws must be applied equally.

(Justice.) Lujan and TransUnion patently violated

such principles whilst reading the Constitution.

Lujan was the start of a dangerous trend, and

TransUnion dug deeper into a dangerous rabbit hole.

Any departure from the meaning of statutory text

results in unequal applications and creates wholly

avoidable injustice.

Finally, the final question presented in this case,

can a non-attorney incompetent adult person

represent another incompetent person before United

States Courts? The Third Circuit failed to answer

this question. Wherefore, such important question

must, unfortunately, be readdressed by this Court.

This Court should grant certiorari to con

sider overruling Lujan and TransUnion.

Overruling precedent is always serious, “[b]ut

stare decisis is not an inexorable command.”

Franchise Tax Bd. of Calif, v. Hyatt, 139 S.Ct. 1485,

1499 (2019) (cleaned up). This Court considers

overruling a precedent virtually every Term, many of

this Court’s “most notable and consequential

decisions” overruled precedent, and almost “every

current Member of this Court” voted to overrule

“multiple constitutional precedents” in “just the last

few Terms.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S.Ct. 1390,

1411 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part)

(collecting cases). That’s because stare decisis ‘“is at

its weakest when [this Court] interpret[s] the

Constitution,”’ as it did in Lujan and TransUnion.

Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S.Ct. 2162, 2177 (2019).

When deciding whether to overrule a precedent,

this Court considers “a number of factors.” Hyatt III,

139 S.Ct. at 1499. Those factors can be organized

into “three broad considerations”:

Is the prior decision “not just wrong, but

grievously or egregiously wrong”?

Has the prior decision “caused significant

negative jurisprudential or real-world

consequences”?

Would overruling the prior decision “unduly

upset reliance interests”?

Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1414-15 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring in part). These considerations all point in

the same direction here: Lujan and TransUnion

should be overruled.

A. Lujan and TransUnion were grievously

wrong.

Lujan was wrong the day it was decided, and

TransUnion was further so. Despite reaffirming the

Powers of the judicial branch of the United States

Government, Lujan held that in order for the

plaintiff to have standing, “[t]he plaintiff must have

suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally

protected interest which is (a) concrete and

particularized,” 504 U.S. 555, 560. “By particularized,

[the Court means] that the injury must affect the

plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Ibid, 560

n.l. TransUnion amended deeper into a rabbit hole

Article Ill’s “Cases” and “Controversies” to “Cases”

and “Controversies” which the plaintiff have a

“personal stake.”

Also see TransUnion, 594 U.S.

____(2021) (slip op. at 7). That holding departs too

far from the Constitution’s original meaning, and is

inconsistent with other precedents, and has no true

defenders. The courts may not act in such manner.

It is the consistent and universal holding under

the American jurisprudence, courts cannot amend,

alter, nor change a constitution, nor of the several

departments of the several governments of the

United States nor the several States do so, unless in

the manner prescribed by the respective material

constitution. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz.,

Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 34 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting);

Steele v. Thurston, 2020 Ark. 320, 365 (Ark. 2020);

Hart v. Jordan, 14 Cal.2d 288, 291 (Cal. 1939);

McGovern v. Mitchell, 78 Conn. 536, 569 (Conn.

1906); Cohn v. Kingsley, 5 Idaho 416, 439, 49 P. 985,

993 (Id. 1897); In re Matthews, 333 So. 3d 422, 427

(La. 2022); Ferguson v. Wilcox, 28 S.W.2d 526, 533

(Tex. 1930); City of Fort Worth v. Rylie, 602 S.W.3d

459, 468 (Tex. 2020).

Section 2 of Article III of the United States

Constitution, does not restrain the United States

Courts’ Power to extend only cases or controversies

in which a plaintiff have a personal stake in any

judicial Case, nor does the provisions contained in

section 2 even suggest so. Not even slightly.

Constructing upon the provision without shrinking

or expanding the scope of the text is permitted.

However, to the extent a court narrows or expands

the plain import and scope of the unambiguous

provisions, the courts’ usurpation of power ripen. It is

exactly such usurpation the Lujan and TransUnion

Courts committed. And as aforementioned, such acts

are not within the Powers vested by the United

States Constitution in the Courts.

Justice Lamar wrote, “[t]o get at the thought or

meaning expressed in a statute, a contract or a

constitution, the first resort, in all cases, is to the

natural signification of the words, in the order of

grammatical arrangement in which the framers of

the instrument have placed them.” Lake County v.

Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889). “If the words

convey a definite meaning which involves no

absurdity, nor any contradiction of other parts of the

instrument, then that meaning, apparent on the face

of the instrument, must be accepted, and neither the

courts nor the legislature have the right to add to it

or take from it.” Ibid, (emphasis added.)

The holdings of Lujan and pertinent precedents

omitted in Lujan, created “irreducible constitutional

minimum[s] of standing”, that in applicable times,

undermines certain provisions of the United States

Constitution. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Amending the

Constitution is not amongst the Powers of the several

Courts under Article III, “this Court does not have

the power to alter the terms of the Constitution.”

Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S.

1, 34 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Lujan and

TransUnion Courts, and many pertinent precedents

relied upon (by Lujan and TransUnion), did exactly

such (altered the Constitution). For that reason

alone is sufficiently compelling to overrule Lujan and

TransUnion (as those cases created numerous

additional “minimums” to standing which is overly

narrow compared to the plain import of the

constitutional provisions in Article III).

There are only two irreducible constitutional

minimums of standing under Article III, which may

be derived from the plain provision text: 1) whether

publick justice is distributable (ability to exercise the

judicial Power), and 2) a Case in Law and Equity

arising under the supreme Law of the Land, the

Constitution, and the Laws of the United States,

inter alia, or Controversies outlined in the second

section of Article III. Creating additional minimums

is beyond the judicial Power, and plainly alters the

terms of the Constitution, which no department of

the government is vested with such power to do.

Denn v. Reid, 10 Pet. 524 (1836); Doggett v. Florida

Railroad, 99 U.S. 72 (1878); Carlton et al. v.

Matthews, 103 Fla. 301, 381-82 (Fla. 1931); Moore et

Ux. v. Love, 171 Tenn. 682, 693 (Tenn. 1937). The

one supreme Court, and such inferior Courts which

Congress has ordained and established over time,

must extend their judicial Power “to all Cases, in

Law and Equity.” U.S.Const. Art. Ill, § 2. (emphasis

added). Wherefore, any ruling by any Court of the

United States narrowing the scope of “Cases” and

“Controversies” is unconstitutional and invalid.

(Unconstitutional rulings must be overruled.)

Despite the unambiguous language and the prior

and continuing holding of this Court in absence of

ambiguity, the courts must give it full force, Lujan

further held that the citizen-suit provision would

“transfer from the President to the Courts” the

executive Powers, an element missing from the law.

504 U.S. 555 at 577. Such holding departs from the

and

citizen-suit

Constitution’s

provision’s

unambiguous plain import. Perhaps the Lujan Court

forgot Congress has the Power “[t]o make all Laws

which shall be necessary and property for carrying

into Execution” of legislation the Congress was

empowered to provide. U.S.Const. Art. I, § 8. The

Powers of the Congress include, but not limited to,

inter alia, the “Power to ... provide for the .., general

Welfare of the United States.” Such holding has once

more departed too far from the Constitution’s plain

import. “The Constitution is ... the supreme law of

the land” Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 308

(1795) (Paterson, J.); see also Anderson v. Wilson, 289,

U.S. 20, 27 (1933). As Chief Justice Roberts wrote,

“[i]f the statutory language is plain, we must enforce

it according to its terms.” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S.

473, 486 (2015) Chief Justice Roberts seems to have

abandoned this very principle he personally held

when he joined the majority in TransUnion. (This

case would present a great opportunity for the Chief

Justice to recoup his correct principles.)

Although everyone may concede not every Act of

Congress may be enacted within the Powers of

Congress, perhaps the Third Branch should not be

too rushed to jump into the conclusion that a citizensuit provision would transfer the executive Power

from the Second Branch to the Third. Congress is

empowered to prescribe how laws may be executed,

and how to execute Powers vested in Congress.2 U.S.

Const. Art. I, § 8.

A citizen-suit provision does not deprive of the

Second Branch’s “duty, to take Care that the Laws be

faithfully executed.” Lujan at 577. Wherefore, it does

not “transfer” executive Powers to the courts,

because the executive Powers were not deprived of

from the Executive, but rather an avenue for any

person to participate in the enforcement of the law,

as a backup to the Second Branch, as Congress

deemed it necessary.3 Post at 39. At times, the

Executive couldn’t take care of the law due to

2 Inter alia, one of the Powers vested in Congress, is to make all

Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into

Execution those Powers vested by the Constitution in Congress,

and all other Powers vested by the Constitution in the

Government of the United States. U.S. Const. Art.I, § 8.

3 The executive have a limited workforce, wherefore Congress

determined a citizens’ suit provision would be adequate as it

provides a remedy if the executives are lax in carrying out its

duties. Committee on Commerce on S. 3149, S. Rept. 94-698, 28

(Mar. 16, 1978); confra Post at 39.

physical constraints, and certain Powers exercised by

Congress need to be Executed in other forms without

vesting new Powers to other branches of the

Government. Hence Congress created citizen-suit

provisions. Most importantly, a citizen-suit provision

does not open the door for the Third Branch to

prosecute a case.

This Court is not free to rewrite the statutory

text. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 111

(1993); also Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 570

(2015) (Kagen, J., dissenting) “[W]hen the statute's

language is plain, the sole function of the courts — at

least where the disposition required by the text is not

absurd — is to enforce it according to its terms.”

(internal quotation marks omitted) Dodd v. United

States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005) (citing Hartford

Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.,

530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) Furthermore, nothing in the

text of Article III of the Constitution narrows the

scope of “the province of the courts to solely deciding

on the rights of individuals.” Marbury v. Madison, 1

Cranch 137, 170 (1803). Such holding would alter the

text of the Constitution, which this Court is without

the Power to do, otherwise would usurp the Powers

vested. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc.,

570 U.S. 1, 34 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

Wherefore, previous holdings of the same nature

must be overruled.

If a citizen-suit provision would enable Congress

“transfer” the executive Powers to the courts, then all

criminal and civil Cases in which an Executive body

shall be a commencing party would be effectively

Powers transferred to the courts. If such were to be

true as advocated by Lujan and TransUnion, then

what is the purpose for the existence of the Courts?

Facts tell us such is not true. The Executives initiate

and prosecute numerous new criminal and civil

Cases in the Third Branch every day. Perhaps this

Court would argue if it chuse to uphold Lujan and

TransUnion, the Executive is transferring the

executive Powers to the courts daily.

In the pertinent Act of Congress in this instant

case, its citizen-suit provision is “intended to provide

a remedy if the [Executive] is lax in carrying out his

duties under [the TSCA].” Committee on Commerce

on S. 3148, S. Rept. 94-698, 28. (Mar. 16, 1976) It

does not permit Article III institutions to prosecute

cases, wherefore the “transfer” was never realized. In

order to show “transfer” of Power, Congress would

need to enact a law to permit the courts to prosecute

cases, an element patently missing from the

provisions. “Citizens are authorized to bring suits to

enjoin certain violations” Ibid at 3. (emphasis added)

Furthermore, if this Court continues to hold a

citizen-suit provision, being necessary and proper to

ensure a legislation which Congress is empowered to

enact, would constitute a “transfer” of Power,

perhaps the sections of the Rules Enabling Act,

28 U. S. C. §§ 2071—2077, governing rule-making

powers, would constitute a “transfer” of the

legislative Powers from Congress to the supreme

Court. Lujan and TransUnion failed to respect the

plain import of the provisions in section 8 of the First

Article of the United States Constitution. Lujan and

TransUnion’s interpretation of section 2 of the Third

Article of the United States Constitution also

departed too far from the plain import.

Lujans and

TransUnion’s holdings

are

quintessential^ the same as holding the Second

Amendment does not protect an individual’s right to

bear arms, or the First Amendment does not bar

Congress from making laws respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free

exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,

or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to

assemble, and to petition the Government for a

redress of grievances. Lujan and the precedents

relied upon are unconstitutional and dangerous.

In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the

Commonwealth’s Supreme Court held “[a] void

judgment . . . cannot be made valid through the

passage of time.” M. P. Management, L.P. v. Williams,

594 Pa. 439, 490-491 (Pa. 2007). The same applies to

unconstitutional rulings. An unconstitutional act

may not become constitutional through the lapse of

time. No court has jurisdiction to usurp its prescribed

powers. Such a ruling must be challenged by wise

men and overruled by a wise court. “[A] law

repugnant to the conftitution is void; and that courts,

as well as other departments, are bound by that

inftrument.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 180

(1803) (emphasis added). The same rule applies to

rulings by the courts.

Finally, in Lujan, this Court wrote “[w]hile the

Constitution of the United States divides all power

conferred upon the Federal Government into

legislative Powers, the executive Power, and the

judicial Power, it does not attempt to define those

terms.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559 (citations ommitted).

To be sure, the Constitution need not define those

terms, words contain meaning, and the Constitution

does not define them otherwise. If a judge cannot

understand words, perhaps he or she is incompetent

to hear cases, nevertheless serve as a judge. Plainly,

legislative Powers shall mean the authority of giving

laws, law giving. The executive Power shall mean the

authority of having the power to put in act the laws.

And the judicial Power shall mean the authority to

practife the diftribution of publick juftice. See

Johnson’s Dictionary (1755). The supreme Court and

all courts inferior theretofore established and

ordained by Congress, are not venues to practife and

diftribute publick injuftice. Granting certiorari opens

an opportunity for the Supreme Court to end

injudicial pracitfes.

B. Lujan and TransUnion have spawned

significant negative consequences.

America is a republick, not a democracy.4

U.S.Const. Art. IV, § 4. The difference between the

two is distinguished as follows: in the latter form, the

government may act freely without boundaries of

power at its will, whereas the former is bound by a

constitution binding the government strictly to

4 There are generally two categories in the forms of government:

democratic or bureaucratic. All republicks are democracies (in

practice). (These do not include republicks in name only that

are in practice bureaucracies.) However, not all democracies are

republican forms of government. (U.S.Const. Art. IV, § 4.)

Under the bureaucracy catergory, it includes monarchies,

bureacuractic governments, or generally any form of

government in practice which the people are without any

election/voting rights.

several limited powers. Dan Smoot Report, Vol. 12,

No. 16. Disregard of the Constitution can cause it to

lose its authority. Our constitutional republick slowly

erodes away when the several departments of the

government too often usurp their powers vested by

and commit infractions against the constitution too

commonly. The danger of such results in disregard

and opens the door for the entrance of a dictatorship

(an occurrence which the Constitution attempts to

enjoin, given if it maintains the authoritative health).

Concurrently, the several departments of the

government must respect the powers vested in the

several departments by the Constitution, according

to the plain import of the authoritative

Constitutional provisions. The plain import of the

Constitution must not be altered (unless in the

manner prescribed by the very authority itself) nor

questioned, a healthy authority by the Constitution

shall thrive.

As aforementioned, Lujan and TransUnion are

such plain examples. The Supreme Court cannot

expand, narrow, violate and/or alter the terms of the

very Constitution which vested its Powers, the

judicial Power. Nor any departments of the several

governments within the republick do so. Arizona v.

Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 34

(2013); Steele v. Thurston, 2020 Ark. 320, 365 (Ark.

2020); Cohn v. Kingsley, 5 Idaho 416, 439, 49 P. 985,

993 (Ida. 1897); In re Matthews, 333 So. 3d 422, 427

(La. 2022). In Lujan and TransUnion, this Court

essentially adjudicated away certain legislative

powers of Congress, and the rights of the people.

In Lujan, this Court de facto deprived Congress’

authority to place all laws necessary and proper for

carrying out its powers found in Section 8 of the First

Article of the United States Constitution into real

effect. As aforementioned, although every Act of

Congress may not be constitutional, the constituents

and courts of this republick must meticulously

inspect each provision of an Act of Congress in

question, examining them for any bit that may result

in the legislature acting beyond those Powers

granted by the Constitution which ordained the

department. The courts concurrently must be

punctilious when examining the Constitution, and

laws enacted by the legislature. The Mayor v. Cooper,

73 U.S. 247, 251 (1867); Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509,

515 (1899); Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1831

(2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The opinion of the

court in Lujan has nearly the same effect of declaring

all citizen-suit provisions unconstitutional except

under certain circumstances which this Court gave

birth to in Lujan, further narrowed in TransUnion.

Giving the constitution’s unambiguous meaning

at the time of adoption, full force, is sine qua non to

the constitution’s authority. This Court in Lujan and

TransUnion failed exactly so. The latter would,

and the former had, set a very dangerous path in

American jurisprudence with regard to the

construction and interpretation of the Constitution.

Such disregard of the plain import bears legitimate

substantial negative consequences upon the Welfare

and wellbeing of the republick.

Lujan

and

TransUnion

construed

and

constructed the unambiguous provision language

contained in the Third Article of the Constitution in

a manner that departed in immeasurable distance to

the plain meaning at the time of its adoption

substantially diminishes and incapacitates the

authority of the supreme Law. Permitting Lujan and

TransUnion and failure to overrule those illogical

and injudicious rulings sets American justice on an

erroneous path. It has been long recognized by the

jurisprudence of American justice, the constitution

must be construed, absent ambiguity, consistent with

its plain import.

No department of government,

neither the legislative, executive, nor judicial branch

may add to nor take away what the government

instrument reads. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358,

399-400 (1805); Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662,

670 (1889); Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz.,

Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 34 (2013); Bills v. Chicago, 60 Ill. 86

(Ill. 1871); Beardstown v. Virginia, 76 Ill. 34 (Ill.

1875); Leonard v. Wiseman, 31 Md. 201, 204 (Md.

1869); Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 9, 97 (N.Y. 1852); 5

People v. Potter, 47 N.Y. 375 (N.Y. 1872); Cooley,

Const. Lim. 57; Story on Const. § 400. Failure by the

several departments of the several governments of

this republick to abide by such simple but critical

principles, and failure to respect the plain import of

authoritative provisions of the Constitution spawns

compelling negative consequences, which certainly

and undeniably threatens the wellbeing of our

republick.

In The People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 31, 36 (N.Y. 1841),

Bronson, J., commenting upon the danger of

departing from the import and meaning of the

language used to express the intent, and hunting

after probable meanings not clearly embraced in that

language, says: “In this way . . . the constitution is

made to mean one thing by one man and something

else by another, until in the end it is in danger of

being rendered a mere dead letter, and that, too,

where the language is so plain and explicit that it is

impossible to make it mean more than one thing,

unless we lose sight of the instrument itself and

roam at large in the boundless fields of speculation.”

Such “danger” of the constitution “being rendered a

mere dead letter”, is well demonstrated by Lujan and

TransUnion wrong holdings. If the courts continue

down the path of this rabbit hole recently further

depend by TransUnion, the constitution will become

“a mere dead letter.” Ibid.

Wherefore, again, it is critical such erroneous

decisions akin to Lujan and TransUnion be overruled

by a wise court upon challenge by wise men.

Otherwise, the authority and integrity of the United

States Constitution will continue to be weakened by

rulings altering its plain import. The negative

consequence of Lujan has already presented itself in

the recent TransUnion decision.

In a congressional enactment like the RLBPHRA

of 1992, failure by the executive, and the people (as

Congress prescribed citizens suit enforcement), to

ensure, and to permit by the courts, the fullest

enforcement in the manners prescribed by Congress,

would in practise deprive Congress of their Power

vested by the Constitution to provide for the general

Welfare of the United States. U.S.Const. Art. I, § 8.

Failure to ensure and permit enforcement of the

force would greatly harm the general Welfare of the

United States. The courts cannot argue the

legislature should have acted to provide for the

general Welfare, because the legislature has already

acted. Congress would have executed if Article I

vested executive Powers. The courts would not

distribute publick justice if it doesn’t permit all

actions initiated under 15 U.S.C. § 2619 to proceed

(except on certain reasons other than standing, such

as the lack of violation of the Act).

Enacted in 1992 by Congress, the RLBPHRA

serves, inter alia, (A) “to encourage effective action to

prevent childhood lead poisoning by establishing a

workable framework for lead-based paint hazard

evaluation and reduction”; (B) “to ensure [ ] the

existence of lead-based paint hazards are taken into

account in the . . . sale, rental, and renovation of

homes and apartmentsand (C) “to educate the

public concerning the hazards and sources of leadbased paint poisoning and steps to reduce and

eliminate such hazards42 U.S.C. § 4851a

(emphasis added). Regulating such dangerous

chemical is within the scope of the congressional

Power vested by the eighth section of Article I of the

United States Constitution, “to ... provide for the...

general Welfare of the United States”. The Act also

amended the TSCA which includes provisions that

“shall be necessary and proper for carrying into

Execution” Congress’ Powers. Ibid. The amendments

to the TSCA enacted by Congress through the

RLBPHRA, inter alia, prescribed how the

Departments and Officers of the Second Branch and

citizens may take action to ensure the “carrying into

Execution” of the RLBPHRA.

The negative consequences of the chemical lead

are numerous. Lead exposure causes reduced IQ,

learning disabilities, developmental delays, reduced

height, poorer hearing, and a host of other health

problems in young children. These effects are

irreversible. In later years, lead-poisoned children

are much more likely to drop out of school, become

juvenile delinquents and engage in criminal and

other anti-social behavior. At higher levels, lead can

damage a child’s kidneys and central nervous system

and cause anemia, coma, convulsions, and even death.

Gulson, Mahaffey, et al., Contribution of tissue lead

to blood lead in adult female subjects based on stable

lead isotope methods, J. Lab. Clin. Med., 125(6), 703712. http://bit.ly/3I7idbP (June 1, 1998); Weyermann,

& Brenner, Factors affecting bone demineralization

and blood lead levels of postmenopausal women-a

population-based study from Germany, Environ.

Res.,

76(1),

19-25.

https://doi.org/10.1006/enrs.1997.3780 (1998), Potula,

& Kaye, The impact of menopause and lifestyle

factors on blood and bone lead levels among female

former smelter workers: the Bunker Hill Study. Am. J.

Ind.

Med.,

49(3),

143-152.

https://doi.org/10.1002/ajim.20262 (Feb. 8, 2006);

National Institute for Occupational Safety and

Health (NIOSH), Report to Congress on Workers’

Home Contamination Study Conducted Under The

Workers’ Family Protection Act (29 U.S.C. 671a),

DHHS

(NIOSH)

Publication

No.

95-123,

http://bit.ly/3GjFaan (Sept. 1995); U.S. Department

of Health and Human Services, Toxicological Profile

for Lead (update), Public Health Service Agency for

Toxic

Substances

and

Disease

Registry

http://bit.ly/3Ik3tXd (Aug. 2020).

In short, expert studies conducted over the

passage of time have undeniably indicated, lead

creates crime, especially violent crimes like murder.

Many trends of violent crimes and lead exposure are

very parallel. Nevin, Understanding international

crime trends: the legacy of preschool lead exposure,

Environ. Res. 104(3), 315-336, http://bit.ly/3WK5cJ7,

https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.envres.2007.02.008 (Apr. 23,

2007); Liu, Early Health Risk Factors for Violence:

Conceptualization, Review of the Evidence, and

Implications, Aggress. Violent Behav., 16(1), 63-73

http://bit.ly/3hP0gUs,

https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.avb.2010.12.003

(2010);

Taylor, Opeskin, et al., The relationship between

atmospheric lead emissions and aggressive crime: an

ecological

study,

Environ.

Health

15,

http://bit.ly/3Vqyw6v, https://doi.org/10.1186/sl2940016-0122-3 (Feb. 16, 2016)

Wherefore, it is

imperative every legislation is given full force by

proactive enforcement actions and the courts must

permit, and not prohibit such attempts. With the

existing caselaw, courts are preventing many

enforcement attempts.

Furthermore, Congress implemented the citizensuit provision to aid enforcement of the RLBPHRA,

due to the tremendously large number of subject

Properties that contain lead, the Environmental

Protection Agency and the Department of Housing

and Urban Development could not simply handle and

ensure compliance of a potentially violative 34.6

million residential dwellings (29.4% of all housing

units) containing lead-based paint.5 The combined

total workforce of both departments of government is

very small with only 22,767 personnel, respectively

8,186 (FY2022) for HUD6, and 14,5817 (FY2022) for

the EPA. The courts cannot say its Congress’

problem for not providing sufficient resources or

avenues to ensure enforcement of such important

law when Congress created the citizen-suit

provisions “to provide a remedy if the [Executive] is

lax in carrying out his duties [enforce the provisions]

under this Act.” Committee on Commerce on S. 3149,

S Rept. 94-698, 28. (Mar. 16, 1976). Congress

anticipated potential lax due to the size of the

problem, “[c]itizens are authorized to bring suits to

enjoin certain violations” to take care of the problem,

and ensure alongside the Executives execution of

Congress’ Power to provide for the general Welfare.

Ibid at 3. In other words, both the legislative history

and legislation provisions do not suggest the Courts

may bring an action to enjoin violations, which would

then have resulted in a transfer of Power suggested

by Lujan and TransUnion. If the courts begin

permitting all forms of enforcement action as

appropriately prescribed by Congress, perhaps the

RLBPHRA and TSCA would finally function as

anticipated.

5 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,

American Healthy Homes Survey II, Lead Findings, Office of

Lead Hazard Control and Healthy Homes,

http://bit.ly/3Wnmmwd (Oct. 29, 2021).

6 HUD Fiscal Year 2022 Budget in Brief at 30 —

http://bit.ly/3G2hcz8

7 EPA’s Budget and Spending — http://bit.ly/3vinRjC

Wherefore, Lujan and TransUnion create

compelling and substantial judicial and real-world

negative consequences which could be eliminated by

this Court simply granting certiorari and overrule of

those two rulings.

C. Lujan and TransUnion have generated

no legitimate reliance interests.

Lujan and TransUnion cannot be sustained in

the name of reliance interests. This Court places

little stock in reliance interests when it overrules

precedents, like Lujan and TransUnion, where a

ruling conflicts with the constitution. E.g., Gideon v.

Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overruling Betts v.

Brady); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

(overruling Crooker v. California and Cicenia v. La

Gay);

Dobbs

Jackson

Women's

Health

(2022) (overruling Roe v.

Organization, 597 U.S.

Wade). Reliance interests do not and shall not deter

this Court from overruling blatantly unconstitutional

and wrong rulings. Since ancient times, this Court

held any law repugnant to the United States

Constitution, is null, and no one, is bound by it.

Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 180 (1803); Ex

parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1879); Montgomery

v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 203 (2016). This principle

equally applies to rulings by courts of law.

Nothing trumps, and shall trump, the plain

import of the constitution. Departing from the plain

import of the constitution making it “to mean one

thing by one man and something else by another,

until in the end it is in danger of being rendered a

mere dead letter” The People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 31, 36

(N.Y. 1841). The departure is too plain in Lujan and

TransUnion, so far it undermines the fundamentals

of judicial interpretation. A constitutional provision,

as Justice Washington held, “should be intended to

mean what they have plainly expressed, and

consequently no room is left for construction.” United

States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 399-400 (1805).

Without the constitution, courts would not exist.

Wherefore, all courts must act within the Powers

vested by that instrument, and any act of the courts

which usurp its authorities, like this Court did in

Lujan and TransUnion, are null, and therefore must

be overruled.

Overruling Lujan and TransUnion would permit

citizen-suit, such as the instant case, initiated under

Acts like the TSCA to proceed. Citizen-suit to enforce

other Acts of Congress may not stand on the

constitutionality of that given Act, but in the instant

Case, the TSCA is proven within the Congress’

legislative authority as vested and prescribed in Art.

I, § 8. The TSCA and the RLBPHRA provide for the

general Welfare of the United States, and Congress

made all laws proper and necessary to Execute the

Acts, prescribing to detail what actions the Executive

may take to carry into Execution of the Acts, and

what the people may take to carry into Execution if

the Executive is lax. S. Rept. 94-698, at 3. (Mar. 16,

1976). Enabling citizen-suit would not harm the

respondents in any way. They can avoid the

RLBPHRA’s disclosure requirements by simply not

engage in the leasing residential dwellings that are

subject Properties built before 1978. 42 U.S.C. §

4852d.

II. This Court should grant certiorari to con

sider can incompetent persons represent

another incompetent person in U.S. Courts.

Since ancient times, this Court has ruled infants,

and persons non compos mentis generally, must be

represented. Penhallow v. Doane’s, 3 Dali. 54, 106

(1795) (“The infant cannot act for himself’). This rule

governs to this day, most recently codified into the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under Rule 17(c)(2)

in 1938.

Although one may conduct their own cases

personally, only counsel may conduct on one’s behalf.

28 U.S.C. § 1654; Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153,

154 (CA10 1986); Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131,

141 (CA3 1989) (Holding the district court was

without authority to reach the merits of incompetent

plaintiffs claim and reversing dismissal); Chueng v.

Youth Orchestra Found. Of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59,

61 (CA2 1990); see also Osei-Afriyie v. Med. College of

Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876, 882-883 (CA3 1991)

(Holding a person who is not a licensed attorney may

not represent another person in court).

This instant case was commenced when lead

petitioner Tiange Huang was 16 years old. As the

record8 indicates, the original January 5, 2021

Complaint shows the lead petitioner’s name in

redacted form. The record further indicates the

infant petitioner conducted all required service of

papers filed in the district court, to the opposing

parties. Upon the petitioner’s motion, the district

court permitted the then infant petitioner to disclose

his full name. All appellants’ Briefs filed during

appeal to the court of appeals were written by the

then 17 years old infant petitioner. All other

petitioners are English deficient and do not

understand the case on their own.

This Court should also grant certiorari to

determine whether, in federal practise, English

language deficiency shall play part in determining

whether one whom is deficient in the English

language shall be competent to bring his own case.

Language deficiency bars a litigant from fully

understanding legal provisions, complex caselaw,

and his own rights, all of which are very challenging

even for native English speakers.

8 Available on the district court’s docket and accessible through

the internet via Case Management/Electronic Case Files.

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant certiorari.

Tiange Huang

Lead Petitioner

2602 Orchard Creek Ln

Katy, TX 77494-2994

(202) 866-8558

huangtiange@hotmail.com

Qiuyuan Huang

huangqiuyuan@gmail.com

Jing Lin

2602 Orchard Creek Ln

Katy, TX 77494-2994

(267) 283-5450

linjing.org@hotmail.com

December 26, 2022

Petitioners

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.