Reply Brief — Brian Matthew Morton, Petitioner v. United States

No. 22-6489

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

___________

Brian Matthew Morton,

Petitioner,

v.

United States of America,

Respondent.

___________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

___________

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

___________

Kevin Joel Page

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Federal Public Defender’s Office

Northern District of Texas

525 S. Griffin Street, Suite 629

Dallas, TX 75202

(214) 767-2746

Joel_page@fd.org

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................... ii

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION .......................................................................... 1

I.

The case presents an important constitutional question that has

divided the federal judiciary…………………………………………………..1

II.

The en banc court’s decision to resolve the case applying the good

faith doctrine should not prevent review……………………………………6

III.

Factual differences between this case and Griffin do not

disprove the existence of a circuit split on the questions presented,

nor of extensive dissension and splintering in the federal judiciary ….13

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 15

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Federal Cases

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731 (2011) .................................................................................................. 2

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,

542 U.S. 318 (2000) .................................................................................................. 1

Illinois v. Gates,

462 U.S. 213 (1983) ................................................................................................ 10

Nieves v. Bartlett,

__U.S.__, 139 S.Ct. 1715 (2019) ............................................................................... 2

Riley v. California,

573 U.S. 373 (2014) ........................................................................ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10

United States v. Griffith,

867 F.3d 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2017)................................................................... 4, 5, 7, 14

United States v. Leon,

468 U.S. 897 (1984) ............................................................................................ 9, 11

United States v. Lindsey,

3 F.4th 32 (1st Cir. 2021) ............................................................................... 4, 5, 14

United States v. Morton,

46 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc) ............................2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14

United States v. Morton,

984 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2021), vacated by, 996 F.3d 754 (5th Cir.

2021) (en banc) ........................................................................................................ 13

United States v. Oglesby,

No. 4:18-CR-0626, 2019 WL 1877228 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2019) .......................... 14

United States v. Orozco,

41 F.4th 403 (4th Cir. 2022) ............................................................................... 4, 14

United States v. Ramirez,

180 F. Supp. 3d 491 (W.D. Ky. 2016) ..................................................................... 14

United States v. Smith,

__F.4th__, 2022 WL 4115879 (6th Cir. 2022) ............................................. 3, 4, 5, 7

ii

Whiteley v. Warsen,

401 U.S. 560 (1971) .................................................................................................. 8

State Cases

Burns v. United States,

235 A.2d 758 (D.C. App. 2020) ............................................................................... 15

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. IV ............................................................................................. 5, 11

Other Authorities

Appellee's Petition for Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Morton,

No. 19-10842 (5th Cir. Filed March 11, 2021) ......................................................... 3

Centers for Disease Control, Fast Stats, Illicit Drug Use (Last

Reviewed October 20, 2022) ..................................................................................... 1

National Center for Drug Abuse Statistics, Drug Related Crime

Statistics (2023), available at https://drugabusestatistics.org/drugrelated-crime-statistics/ ........................................................................................... 1

iii

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION

I.

The case presents an important constitutional question that has

divided the federal judiciary.

To secure a search warrant for a cell phone, do police need to show more than

the target’s possession of that cell phone during a crime, here simple drug possession?

How this Court answers that question will have resounding implications with respect

to protecting our privacy rights, and, indeed, to the relationship of a free people to

their government in the 21st century. After all, police will never want for arrestable

offenses, including simple possession of drugs (committed by more than 43 million

people a month, see Centers for Disease Control, Fast Stats, Illicit Drug Use (Last

Reviewed October 20, 2022), available at https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/druguse-illicit.htm, last visited April 19, 2023), resulting in 1.16 million arrests a year, see

National Center for Drug Abuse Statistics, Drug Related Crime Statistics (2023),

available

at

https://drugabusestatistics.org/drug-related-crime-statistics/,

last

visited April 24, 2023, and even minor traffic violations, see Atwater v. City of Lago

Vista, 542 U.S. 318 (2000). And because cell phones contain an unparalleled quantity

of sensitive information, see Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385, 393-394 (2014), a

negative answer to the question posed above would effectively authorize a back-doorsurveillance state, in which law enforcement can freely access the most private

beliefs, predilections, and associations of any person who breaks any criminal law,

however minor. As this Court observed in its unanimous decision in Riley:

[i]t would be a particularly inexperienced or unimaginative law

enforcement officer who could not come up with several reasons to

1

suppose evidence of just about any crime could be found on a cell phone.

Even an individual pulled over for something as basic as speeding might

well have locational data dispositive of guilt on his phone. An individual

pulled over for reckless driving might have evidence on the phone that

shows whether he was texting while driving.

Riley, 573 U.S. at 399.

As the flagrantly pretextual search conducted here demonstrates, giving police

such unfettered authority will expose the citizenry to abuse and bias. See United

States v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331, 334 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc); Pet. App. 1a-3a; see also

(ROA.275, 278, 279); Pet. App.2a, 68a, 71a, 72a. And while the target here happened

actually to possess images of child sexual abuse, the next target may be a critic of the

law enforcement agency or their political allies, a journalist conducting an

investigation of them, or simply an ethnic, cultural, or political minority subjected to

the abusive whim of an individual law enforcement officer. Notably, the existence of

such a pretext will probably not invalidate law enforcement activity premised on the

presence of probable cause, see Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 734 (2011), even if

the officers’ true motive is to punish constitutionally protected activity, see Nieves v.

Bartlett, __U.S.__, 139 S.Ct. 1715, 1724-1725 (2019). As such, the enforcement of a

meaningful nexus requirement between a phone and criminal activity stands as the

only potential protection left to the public against this tactic.

This case well satisfies the traditional criteria for certiorari. As the foregoing

illustrates, it involves a question of surpassing importance. Were it otherwise, the

government would not have sought en banc review, would not have mustered the

signatures of every United States Attorney’s Office in the Fifth Circuit, see Petition

2

for Rehearing En Banc in United States v. Morton, No. 19-10842, at *1-2 (5th Cir.

Filed March 11, 2021), and would not have secured review. The importance of the

issue is likewise attested to by the numerous expressions of concern regarding the

upshot of the case: that the mere possession of a phone— which nearly everyone owns,

see Riley, 573 U.S. at 385—during the commission of a crime at least minimally

justifies the issuance of a warrant to search the phone. See Morton, 46 F.4th at 340

(Higginson, J., concurring) (“[I]f the fact that the arrestee was carrying a cell phone

at the time of arrest is sufficient to support probable cause for a search, then the

warrant requirement is merely a paperwork requirement,” and the holding of Riley

is “hollow.”); Pet. App. 14a-15a; id. (“If these three facts are sufficient to support

probable cause for the search here, then any time an officer finds drugs (or other

contraband for that matter) on a person or in a vehicle, there is probable cause to

search the entire contents of a nearby cell phone.”); United States v. Smith, __F.4th__,

2022 WL 4115879, at *17 (6th Cir. 2022) (Moore, J., concurring) (“The breadth of a

rule allowing the government to search an arrestee’s cell phone as long as two people

are allegedly involved in a crime concerns me as much as it concerns Judge Clay”),

cert. pending Smith v. United States, 22-6777 (Feb. 14, 2023).

The issue has also proven exceedingly divisive in the courts of appeals. Most

saliently, it has produced a high degree of splintering. Three cases that address the

necessary nexus between a phone and criminal activity have produced no unanimous

opinion as to either the question of probable cause or the application of the good faith

doctrine in the absence of a more significant nexus. See Smith, __F.4th__, 2022 WL

3

4115879, at *8 (Guy, J., concurring); id. at *10, *15 (Clay, J., concurring and

dissenting); id. at *16 (Moore, J., concurring); United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265,

1268, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Griffith, 867 F.3d at 1284 (Brown, C.J., dissenting);

Morton, 46 F.4th at 337; Pet. App. 9a; Morton, 46 F.4th at 340 (Higginson, J.,

concurring); Pet. App. 14a-15a; id. at 341-344 (Graves, J., dissenting); Pet. App. 17a21a.

More concerning, judges of the federal courts of appeals have employed

diametrically opposite reasoning. Some treat Riley’s observations about the power

and ubiquity of cell phones as a reason to assume a nexus between crimes and phones,

while others treat it as a reason for vigilance against cell phone searches. Compare

Smith, __F.4th__, 2022 WL 4115879, at *8 (Guy, J., concurring) (concluding that cell

phone was likely to contain evidence because “[a]s a practical matter, the Supreme

Court has observed that cell phones are “a pervasive and insistent part of daily life”

and that ‘[c]ell phones have become important tools in facilitating coordination and

communication among members of criminal enterprises, and can provide valuable

incriminating information about dangerous criminals.”’) (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at

385, 401); United States v. Lindsey, 3 F.4th 32, 39–40 (1st Cir. 2021) (“The affidavit

also explained that Lindsey had more than one cellphone and that it is common for

drug dealers to use multiple cellphones to conceal their drug business. This was

enough to support a fair inference that the cellphones would contain evidence of drug

dealing.”); United States v. Orozco, 41 F.4th 403, 411 (4th Cir. 2022) (“The allencompassing information on cellphones explains why unconstrained warrantless

4

cellphone searches, like warrantless home searches, contravene the Fourth

Amendment. But it is also why phones ‘can provide valuable incriminating

information about dangerous criminals.’ So just as it is sometimes reasonable to

believe that a suspect’s home may contain evidence of their crimes, it might be

reasonable to believe that his cellphone will.”) (quoting and citing Riley, 573 U.S. at

403 and citing United States v. Lindsey, 3 F.4th 32, 39–40 (1st Cir. 2021)) with Smith,

__F.4th__, 2022 WL 4115879, at *15 (Clay, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[T]hat

people involved in criminal activity regularly employ their mobile electronic devices

in the planning, the commission, or the concealment of crime” cannot “establish a

nexus between the thing to be searched (Smith’s cell phone) and the evidence sought

(involvement in a homicide).”) (parentheses in original); Griffith, 867 F.3d at 1279

(“…we do not doubt that most criminals—like most people—have cell phones, or that

many phones owned by criminals may contain evidence of recent criminal activity.

Even so, officers seeking authority to search a person’s home must do more than set

out their basis for suspecting him of a crime.”); Morton, 46 F.4th at 343 (Graves, J.,

dissenting) (required nexus between crime and phone cannot be “hinged … on general

conclusions about cellphones and criminals.”); Pet. App. 18a.

In other words, it is undisputed that cell phones are everywhere, documenting

everything. The federal judiciary, however, has taken radically divergent positions

about the legal significance of this fact.

5

II.

The en banc court’s decision to resolve the case applying the good

faith doctrine should not prevent review.

Resisting review, the government relies chiefly on the absence of a formal

probable cause holding in the decision below. See (Brief in Opposition, at 11-12). It is

correct that the en banc opinion below classified the warrant at issue as “borderline”

and never decided whether the affidavit set forth probable cause. See Morton, 46

F.4th at 338, 339; Pet App. 11a, 12a. For at least three reasons, however, this should

not prevent review. First, certiorari would be warranted solely to decide whether

officers may rely in good faith on a warrant that omits any particularized nexus

between a phone and a crime. Second, the heavy overlap between the probable cause

and good faith questions make it impossible to address either without shedding

significant light on the other. Third, if the absence of a formal probable cause holding

defeats review in this case, the government will be able to postpone review

indefinitely, depriving the citizenry of a chance to vindicate our privacy interests

against the dangerous tactic of pretextual cell phone searches stemming from minor

offenses.

A.

Certiorari would be warranted solely to determine

whether a warrant to search a cell phone merits good faith

reliance in the absence of any particularized nexus between the

phone and a crime.

Relying heavily on the absence of a probable cause holding below, the

government simply ignores the second question presented:

6

[w]hether police officers may avail themselves of the good faith doctrine

when they execute a warrant that relies solely on the central role of cell

phones in contemporary society to supply a nexus between suspected

criminal activity and a suspect’s phone?

(Petition for Certiorari, at i). That question was undeniably reached by the court

below. See Morton, 46 F.4th at 337-338; Pet. App. 7a-11a. Further, it has produced

divergent opinions among the federal judiciary. Compare Smith, __F.4th__, 2022 WL

4115879, at *8 (Guy, J., concurring); id. at *16 (Moore, J., concurring); Griffith, 867

F.3d at 1284 (Brown, C.J., dissenting); Morton, 46 F.4th at 337; Pet. App. 9a; id. at

340 (Higginson, J., concurring); Pet. App. 14a-15a with Smith, __F.4th__, 2022 WL

4115879, at *10, *15 (Clay, J., concurring and dissenting); Griffith, 867 F.3d at 1268,

1279); Morton, 46 F.4th at 341-344 (Graves, J., dissenting); Pet. App. 17a-21a.

The government suggests that the affidavits clearly satisfied the threshold for

the good faith doctrine, (Brief in Opposition, at 12-13), but it is wrong about that. The

affidavit showed nothing of substance to connect the phone to drug possession (nor to

trafficking), save the truism that phones often reveal the commission of crimes in all

of its various features. See (ROA.270-271); Morton, 46 F.4th at 334; Pet. App. 3a, 63a64a. The adequacy of that truism—for the purpose of either probable cause or the

good faith doctrine—is an important and divisive issue.

Arguing for a different conclusion, the government points to the affidavit’s

claim of “training and experience,” which it appears to classify, audaciously, as a

“case-specific detail.” (Brief in Opposition, at 12-13). But the proposition asserted by

virtue of “training and experience” was little more than that “individuals” use phones

to commit “criminal activity,” (ROA.269); Pet. App. 62a (“Affiant knows through

7

training and experience that individuals use cellular telephones to arrange for the

illicit receipt and delivery of controlled substances along with other criminal

activity.”), which activity can be reflected in the various features of the phone, see

(ROA.270-271); Morton, 46 F.4th at 334; Pet. App. 3a, 63a-64a. The power of cell

phones to reveal the user’s activity is simply an undisputed truism dressed up as

expertise, one that will likely be attested in any case where there is probable cause

to believe that any cell phone user has committed any crime at all. The question

presented is precisely whether this truism should defeat a challenge to a search

warrant, or whether some more particularized nexus is necessary. At any rate, the

ability of an affiant to recount the basic operation of cell phones is hardly a “case

specific detail.”

The government also points to the presence of multiple phones in the car. See

(Brief in Opposition, at 12). But as the concurrence points out “…the affidavits here

did not mention that multiple phones were found in the car, let alone rely on that fact

to support probable cause.” Morton, 46 F.4th at 340, n.1; Pet. App. 14a-15aAbsent

oral testimony, a magistrate considering a search warrant is limited to the four

corners of the affidavit. See Whiteley v. Warsen, 401 U.S. 560, 565, n. 8 (1971). The

failure of the affiant, whose expertise and training the government touts, even to

mention this consideration suggests that it does not provide a meaningful reason to

believe the phone contained evidence of a crime.

Stripped of two points—the general tendency of phones to document the lives

of their users, and the presence of multiple phones in the car (a fact the affiant did

8

not even mention)—the government’s defense of the warrant becomes very feeble

indeed. The government points to the fact that Petitioner was speeding, and to the

fact that he was doing so after midnight. See (Brief in Opposition, at 12). It offers no

explanation as to why this would cause anyone to think that the phone was more

likely to contain evidence of a crime. See (Brief in Opposition, at 12). It cannot even

muster a single judicial citation linking the act of speeding at night to drug dealing.

See (Brief in Opposition, at 12). If there is any meaningful connection, it is not one

that marks the speeder as a likely drug dealer with any specificity. Rather, it is a fact

so common as to expose much of the population’s phones to exploration by law

enforcement, aggrandizing governmental power at the expense of the individual.

Indeed, it is not far from this Court’s warning in Riley: that a traffic offense could be

used by law enforcement to access a phone. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 399.

The government assumes that the good faith exception applies if the facts show

that a cell phone “could” contain evidence. (Brief in Opposition, at 13) (“…those casespecific details were sufficient to allow a neutral magistrate to reasonably infer that

petitioner’s phones could contain information connected to his purchase and

possession of controlled substances, such that the good-faith exception applies.”).

That watered-down standard offers no protection against an unjustified search of this

extremely

sensitive

information,

and

is

not

compelled

by

this

Court’s

precedent. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915 (1984) (cautioning that

“reviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based on an affidavit that does not

9

‘provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of

probable cause.’”) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983)).

A random selection of phones taken off the street will contain evidence of some

crime much of the time an officer must have something more than a justifiable belief

that the phone “could” harbor evidence. Otherwise, Riley becomes nothing more than

a “paperwork requirement.” Here, the officers had nothing but evidence of drug

possession – no scales, no large reserve of currency, no firearm -- and nothing linking

the drugs to the phone.

In short, the second question presented has divided the courts of appeals, and

would be squarely before the Court in the instant case.

B.

Resolution of either question presented would shed

substantial light on the other.

The absence of a formal probable cause holding in the opinion below is of little

practical significance because the good faith and probable cause inquiries so heavily

overlap. The two questions presented in the Petition share a single operative core.

Specifically, both ask whether the police must allege something more than the

general tendency of phones to document the life of the user. To the extent they differ,

it is only in the sense that each compels a different consequence in the event an

affirmative answer: whether magistrates should issue search warrants in the absence

of a specific nexus to the phone, and whether judges should suppress evidence if

magistrates issue warrants without such a nexus.

10

It will be well nigh impossible to decide the case without providing substantial

guidance to magistrates, officers, and reviewing courts on both questions. Certainly,

if Petitioner prevails on the merits, the Court cannot fail to conclude that the

warrants failed to set forth probable cause. But even if the government prevails, and

does so on the good faith exception alone, the opinion may warn magistrates and

officers that cell phone warrants issued without a nexus between the crime and the

phone rest on shaky ground. The opinion below, for example, warned arresting

officers that comparable affidavits may be regarded as “borderline.” Morton, 46 F.4th

at 338, 339; Pet. App. 11a-12a.

Nothing prevents this Court from agreeing to decide the case and deciding the

probable cause issue first. Probable cause is a potentially dispositive basis for ruling

in favor of the government, so both parties will have ample incentive to contest it

vigorously. The Reporters contain innumerable cases in which this Court proceeds to

answer all questions that might determine the outcome, rather than focusing

narrowly on the one that ultimately does so. Indeed, this Court has said in this very

context that “[t]here is no need for courts to adopt the inflexible practice of always

deciding whether the officers’ conduct manifested objective good faith before turning

to the question whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated.”

Leon, 468 U.S. at 924.

11

C.

If the government’s argument against review prevails

here, it will enjoy the unilateral power to prevent review of the

probable cause question, to its great advantage, and to the

detriment of our privacy rights.

If the absence of a formal probable cause holding prevents review here, the

government will be able to defeat review indefinitely. Consider each of three possible

postures in which this issue may arise in petitioners to this Court: 1) the government

has prevailed below in an opinion that dodges any explicit holding as to probable

cause, and relies exclusively on the good faith doctrine, 2) the government has

prevailed below in an opinion that finds probable cause, and 3) the defendant has

prevailed below. None of these situations will better present the issue than

Petitioner’s case.

If the government prevails below on good faith grounds, it will be able to make

the same argument it presses now. Accordingly, if the government’s argument

against review succeeds here, there is no reason to believe that another case will

garner review from this posture.

If the government prevails below on the explicit ground that a warrant rests

on probable cause, the losing defendant will be no better positioned to seek review

than Petitioner. In such a case, the government could argue that resolution of the

probable cause issue is unnecessary to the outcome, because this Court might resolve

the issue on good faith grounds. Indeed, the government would be better positioned

to oppose review in such a case than it is here—if a court of appeals finds that a

12

warrant rests on probable cause, it is very unlikely that this Court will find that no

reasonable officer could have relied on the warrant. Certainly, a defendant is less

likely to defeat the good faith doctrine in such a case than one in Petitioner’s position,

where an en banc majority characterized the warrant as “borderline,” Morton, 46

F.4th at 338, 339; Pet. App. 11a-12a, and a panel reversed the conviction, United

States v. Morton, 984 F.3d 421, 431 (5th Cir. 2021), vacated by, 996 F.3d 754 (5th Cir.

2021) (en banc), different results reached en banc, 46 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2022); Pet.

App. 22a-36a. Accordingly, the government is not correct in its assertion that the

“various cases in which courts have decided whether probable cause supported

warrants to search cell phones” show that review cannot be postponed indefinitely.

(Brief in Opposition, at 13-14).

Finally, if the government does not prevail in the court of appeals, it will enjoy

the unilateral power to defeat review by declining to file a petition at all. That is

unacceptable. The government possesses substantial incentive to prevent review of

the tactic at issue here, which offers it immense power over the citizenry, and should

not get to decide when that review occurs.

III.

Factual differences between this case and Griffin do not

disprove the existence of a circuit split on the questions presented,

nor of extensive dissension and splintering in the federal judiciary.

The government separately contends that review should be denied for want of

a true circuit split. See (Brief in Opposition, at 14-16). In support, it points up factual

differences between Petitioner’s case and Griffin. See (Brief in Opposition, at 14-16).

13

All cases will differ factually to some extent; the significant point is that the Fifth,

Sixth and D.C. Circuits are utilizing opposite propositions of law. The D.C. Circuit

clearly rejected the proposition that the mere tendency of cell phones to document

criminal activity permitted officers to rely on a warrant in good faith, without any

particularized nexus:

we do not doubt that most criminals—like most people—have cell

phones, or that many phones owned by criminals may contain evidence

of recent criminal activity. Even so, officers seeking authority to search

a person’s home must do more than set out their basis for suspecting

him of a crime.

Griffith, 867 F.3d at 1279. This is the opposite reasoning from the court below, which

accepted the simple general tendency of phones to provide such evidence as adequate.

See Morton, 46 F.4th at 337; Pet. App. 9a. Other courts have done so as well. See

Lindsey, 3 F.4th 3at 39–40; Orozco, 41 F.4th at 411.

In any case, there can be little doubt that the questions presented have proven

incredibly divisive within the federal judiciary. The extent of division below is evident

in the remarkable degree of splintering within panels, and the vertical dissension

(two reversals) in this case’s posture. Notably as well, district courts and the D.C.

Court of Appeals have resolved the questions presented in way that is not consistent

with the decision below. United States v. Oglesby, No. 4:18-CR-0626, 2019 WL

1877228, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2019) (“The fact that a phone was present at the

crime scene, plus Affiant’s generalizations about phones often containing evidence of

“crimes,” fails to establish that nexus.”); United States v. Ramirez, 180 F. Supp. 3d

491, 495 (W.D. Ky. 2016) (“Possessing a cell phone during one’s arrest for a drug-

14

related conspiracy is insufficient by itself to establish a nexus between the cell phone

and any alleged drug activity.”). Similarly, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

has found that a detective’s general statement about the function of a cell phone could

not support an unrestricted search of the phone. Burns v. United States, 235 A.2d

758, 774 (D.C. App. 2020).

The questions presented are critical constitutional questions which the lower

courts have found exceedingly difficult to answer. This Court should grant certiorari

to resolve one, or both, of them.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner respectfully submits that this Court should grant certiorari to

review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted this 24th day of April, 2023.

JASON D. HAWKINS

Federal Public Defender

Northern District of Texas

/s/ Kevin Joel Page

Kevin Joel Page

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Federal Public Defender's Office

525 S. Griffin Street, Suite 629

Dallas, Texas 75202

Telephone: (214) 767-2746

E-mail: joel_page@fd.org

Attorney for Petitioner

15