Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Rajul Ruhbayan, Petitioner v. Rebecca Beach Smith, Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 19, 2022

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

” XiT

22~QAliL O

No.

FILED

DEC 1 9 2022

,gsE^<aasM4 r.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Rajul Ruhbayan---- PETITIONER

vs.

Robert B. King, App. judge

Allyson K. Duncan, App. judge

William W. Wilkins, App. judge

Rebecca B. Smith, Dist. .judge-—RESPONDENTS

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO:

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS----^at--RlCHMOND, VIRGINIA

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Rajul Ruhbayan

REG. #: 51657-083

FCI2 BUTNER MEDIUM, PO BOX 1500, BUTNER,. NC 27509

t—

;

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether this Supreme Court or Solicitor General should

invoke its supervisory powers to deter the illegal acts of and

implement a remedy for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and

four Defendant judges', ongoing 17 years, cover up or violations

of Petitioner’s prospective denial of access claims

two

constitutional underlying claims of both .a Sixth Amendment right

to trial by jury and a Fifth Amendment right to a Legitimate

Expectation of Finality as to the severity of his instant sentence

and detention's legality not to exceed beyond 21 months or a date

of October 2003?

2. Whether the Circuit Court’s, ongoing 17 years, cover up,

overlooking or not deciding of the cause's only presented two

grounds of prospective claims, and yet its deciding of the same

cause soley based upon the Circuit Court’s unpresented and

fabricated single ground of a retrospective claim, so far departed

from the proper standards in the administration of justice, to

call for this Court’s supervisory powers in light of Christopher

v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-15 (2002); United States v. Kordel,

397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970); Mcnabb v. United States. 318 U.S. 332,

340-41 (1943); and United States v. Hastings. 461 U.S. 499, 505

(1983)?

■t

LIST OF PARTIES

M All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[ ] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of

all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows:

RELATED CASES

United States v. Rajul Ruhbayan, 2:02-cr-29 (Judge Rebecca B.

Smith

8, 9

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

•

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4-11

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

12-20

CONCLUSION

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Decision of Federal Court of Appeals (3 pages) ,1, 2, 10, 15

APPENDIX B

Decision of federal district court (Page 2 and 3)

APPENDIX C

Decision of federal en banc hearing (1 page)

APPENDIX D

Original complaint in district court (16 pages) 8-10,12,15-18

APPENDIX E

Petition for direct review (4 pages) .

APPENDIX F

Petition for En Banc Review (3 pages)

APPENDIX G

Supplemental brief, filed Aug. 20, 2004, with the

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal (20 pages)

. 6, 7, 9,15,20

APPENDIX H

Docket Record of federal district court, from

2004 to 2005 (page 15 ).....

Docket Record of federal appeals court, from

2004 to 2005 (page 5 ) .

„

N/A

APPENDIX I

III

i; io

.N/A

}

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

SUPREME COURT

Christopher v. Harbury,

536 U.S. 403 (2002).

1,3,12-20

Directive of Booker (" DOB "),

543 U.S. 220 (2005).

7,8,13,16-7,19^20

Frazier v. Heebe,

482 U.S. 641.(1987).

McNabb v. United States,

318 U.S. 332 (1943).

1,12,13

Minstretta, •

488 U.S. 361 (1989).

Remedial Holding of Booker (" RHB "),

543 U.S. 220 at 245-246 (2005).

3,5,7,8,20

Sixth. Amendment holding of Booker (" SAHB "),

543 U.S 220 at 226-234 (2005).

3-8,15-17,19-20

United States v. Hastings,

461 U.S. 499 (1983).

1,12,13

United States v. Kordel,

397 U.S. 1 (1970) .

1,12,13,

Griffith v. Kentucky,

479 U.S. 314 (1987) .

3,7,20

APPEALS COURT

Case of Davis,

7 F. Cas. 63, 1867 App. Lexis at 109-10

(4th cir ./1867)

United States v. Hughes,

401 f.3d 540 (4th cir/2005)

United States v. Lundien,

769 f.2d 981 (4th Cir./1985) .

3,20

United States v. O'Georgia,

569 f.3d 281 (6th Cir./2009) .

4-5

United States v. Ruhbayan,

406 f.3d 292 (4th Cir./2005) .

7-9

DISTRICT COURT

Regal Cinemas Inc.,

2021 U.S. Dist. Lexis 131191 ('4th Cir./2021)

United States v. Shamblin,

323 f. Supp. 2d 757 (4th Cir./2004)

STATUTES AND RULES

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)

3-7,15

18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)

3-7.15

18 U.S.C. § 3624(a)

3,4,6,7,15

U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2

18 U.S.C. § 321

18 U.S.C. § 1622

18 U.S.C. § 1623

18 U.S.C.-§ 1512(b)(1)

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[x] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix A

the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[x] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix

the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[x] is unpublished.

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix_____ to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the _

court

appears at Appendix

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at ____

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

[id] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was -3uly 15, 2022______ ,

[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[jc] A timely petition for rehearing was^denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date:

, and a copy of the

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix _ C....

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including______

(date) on

(date)

in Application No.__ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix_______

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

--------------------------------- , and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including____

(date) on

(date) in

Application No. __ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

■X

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. FIFTH AMENDMENT right to due process, under the legal tenets

°f Christopher v, Harbury (" Harbury "), 536 U.S. 403 at 413-415 (2005),

presented (see herein pages 7-20) two prospective claims of:

A. Prospective declaratory relief claims that are ancillary to

B. Prospective denial of access claims that.are ancillary to:

the following immediate below two underlying 5th and 6th

Amendment claims;

2. FIFTH AMENDMENT right to due process, under the legal tenets

of the United States v. Lundien, 769 f.2d 981 at 987 (4th cir/App. ct./

2005), presented (see herein pages 4-20) a prospective underlying

Legitimate Expectation of Finality claim of:

A. Legitimate Expectation of Finality as to the severity

of Petitioner's instant sentence and detention's legality

not to exceed beyond 21 months or a date of October 2003

based upon;the Directive of Booker (" DOB "), 543 U.S.

220 at 268 (2005;, and its directive imperative that

the four defendant or respondent judges "must apply"

the mandatory legal tenets of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1),

3585(b) and 3624(a) of the Sixth Amendment holding of

Booker (" SAHB "), 543 U.S. at 226-234,to Petitioner's

supplemental brief’s pages 11-12's contested calculation

facts to the sentence and detention's legality exceeding

beyond 21 months or a date of Oct. 2003. E.g. see Lundien,

769 f.2d at 987 ( Recognizing " due process may be;denied

when a sentence is enhanced after defendant has served

so much of his sentence that expectations as to finality

have crystalized and it would be fundamentally unfair to

defeat them. " );

3. SIXTH AMENDMENT right to trial by jury, under the mandatory

legal tenets of the SAHB, 543 U.S. at 226-234, presented (see:.-herein

pages 4-20) a prospective SAHB claim of:

A. Prospective underlying SAHB claim based on the DOB, 543'

U.S. at 268; the DOB, at 268, in quote reads:

( " We must apply today's holdings-both the Sixth Amend

ment and remedial interpretation of the Sentencing

Act---- to all cases oti direct review. Griffith, 479

U.S. 314,328 (1987)( " (A) new rule for the conduct

of criminal prosecution is to be applied retroactively

to all cases on direct review or not yet final. " )).

STATEMENT

THE

CASE

The seminal origin of the case sub judice springs from the

operative legal landscape of the Sixth Amendment holding in U.S.

v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-234 (2005). Booker recognizes that

the federal guidelines "are binding on judges" and that "the guide

lines have the force and effect of laws. Minstretta. 488 U.S. 361

(1989)." Id., at 234. From November 1987 to January 12, 2005, based

on the canons of IMPLIED REPEAL doctrine, Booker's (new law) legal

tenets of 18 U.S.C. Sections 3553(b)(1), 3585(b), and 3624(a)

declared a lesser penalty of a statutory guideline range of 1521 months to operatively effect, an IMPLIED REPEAL of Plaintiff's

indictment notice's (old law) total statutory maximum of 25 years

collective statute penalty provisions of 18 U.S.C. Sections 371

(5 years), 1622 (5 years), 1623 (5 years), and 1512(b)(1). See

Davis, 7 F. cas;. 63, 1867 U.S. App. LEXIS 109-110 (1867):

An [Ijndictment (or sentencing judgment) cannot be sustained upon

(old law) statute which has already been repealed, unless the

(new law) repealing statute has a savings clause. That the declaring

of a less penalty (by a new law) for the same offense operates as

a (implied) repeal of the old (law) penalty .... No person

can be punished for a statutory offense, unless, at the moment when

sentence is pronounced upon him the statute exists in FULL FORCE

& VIGOR.

See also Shamblin. 323 F.Supp.2d 747, 767 (June 2004/4th Cir./Dist.

Ct.) (Court reduces sentence from 240 months to 6-12 months, holding

that "the guidelines are the law which binds this court in

sentencing matters, and to that extent that the guidelines can

be applied in a manner consistent with the Sixth Amendment (I.e.

Booker, supra, at 226-234), the court shall strive to do so . .

. ."); Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 547 (2005/4th Cir./App.Ct) (Court

reduces sentence from 46 months to 6-12 months due to Booker);

0' Georgia, 569 F.3d 281 , 286, 289 (6th Cir.2009) (The sentencing

decision was remanded in light of Booker, holding that the guide

lines are now advisory, but re-imposing the same sentence of 21

months that had already been served under the mandatory guidelines.

The appellate court observed: "Rather the procedural error stems

from the district court's failure to recognize (Arhebamen's)

completion of his custodial sentence (under the old law's mandatory

legal landscape of Booker 7) rendered that portion moot at the

re-sentencing stage (under the new law's advisory legal landscape

of the Booker ruling at U.S. 245-46)." 3 •

Accordingly, on January 8, 2002, African American Plaintiff

was charged and continually detained by his government who charged

him essentially for the non-violent offense of obstruction of

justice, during a federal trial, pursuant to the United States

Sentencing Guideline Statute section 2 J1.2 (i.e. obstruction of

justice); it follows:

1) pursuant to section § 3553(b)(1) of the Sixth Amendment

holding in Booker: the jury verdict alone prescribed defendant

district judge Smith a limited subject matter jurisdiction of

sentence authority of a guideline statutory maximum of 21 months

(e.g. see, § 3553(b)(1): "The court SHALL impose a sentence of

the kind and within the range.");

2) pursuant to the mandatory legal tenets of § 3585(b) of

the Booker ruling: Plaintiff was accredited with 21 months he had

served in pretrial detention, in the city jail of Suffolk, VA.,

from his initial arrest and detention, on January 8, 2002,

continually through to the jury's verdict, on October 27, 2003;

so Defendant judge Smith's subject matter jurisdiction of sentence

authority had fully exhausted, by Oct. 2003, hence the 21 months

custodial portion, but not the assumed 0-36 months—supervised

release portion, of Plaintiff's sentence became moot, by Oct. 2003

(e.g. see § 3585(b): "A defendant SHALL be given credit toward

the service of a term imprisonment for any time he has spent in

official detention prior totthe date the sentence commences.");

3) thus, pursuant to § 3624(a) of the Booker ruling: Plaintiff

was entitled to a 'Legitimate Expectation of Finalty* as to

immediate release from custodial detention, not to exceed 21 months

or a date of Oct. 2003. (e.g. see, § 3624(a) : "A prisoner SHALL

be released by the Bureau of Prisons on the date of the expiration

of the term of imprisonment.").

Accordingly, on AUgust 20, 2004, Plaintiff filed a 14 page

supplemental brief (hereafter referenced as "Supplement") with

the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals (Appx. G, pg. 1-14). The three

Circuit Court Defendants supervised over the direct review.

Plaintiff presented on the Supplement, pages 11-12 (Appx. G, pg.

11-12) contested calculation facts of a Base Offense Level of 12

("BOL"), Criminal History Category ("CHC") of III and a Mandatory

Guideline Range of 15-21 months; and alleged and showed the legal

tenets of Sections 3553(b)(1), 3585(b), and 3624(a) of the Sixth

Amendment holding in Booker at 226-234, applied to such contested

calculation facts perfectly entitled him both a Sixth Amendment

right to trial by .-jury (i.e • 9 the mandatory legal tenets of the

Booker ruling at 226-234,) and a Fifth Amendment right to a

Legitimate Expectation of Finality as to the severity of his

sentence and detention's legality not to exceed beyond 21 months

or a date of Oct. 2003.

The Four Defendant judges tainted processes of administering

this court's Directive of Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 268 (2005) ("DOB''),

have since April 2005, for an ongoing 17 years, frustrated and

roadblocked Plaintiff's access to court to have meaningful

litigation and hearing on the intrinsic merits of his 5th and 6th

Amend, claims.

Plaintiff's claims are "non-frivilous" and "arguable" being

they were both awarded to Plaintiff by this Supreme Court's DOB,

543 U.S. at 268, and its directive to the four Defendant judges

that they "MUST APPLY" the legal tenets of Sections 3553(b)(1),

3585(b), and 3624(a) of the SAHB, at 226-34,&■ the Remedial Holding

of Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46 ("RHB"), in a manner consistent with

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) ("Griffith"), to

Plaintiff's filed, on August 20, 2004* Supplement, pages 11-12's,

above stated, 5th and 6th Amend, underlying claims apposite

calculation of facts' contest to the sentence and detention's

legality beyond 21 month's or a date of Oct. 2003 (Appx. G, pg.

11-12).

The official court record of Ruhbayan, 406 F.3d 292, 298

n,6 (4th Cir.2005), does show the three Circuit Court Defendant

judges receiving and supervising over Plaintiff's 14 page Supplement

on Aug. 20, 2004 (Appx. G, pg. Cover-Page: stamped proof of filing).

And it shows they buried alive his Supplement, pages 11-12's 5th

and 6th Amend: claims (Appx. G, pg. 11-12), in the tiny obscure

gravesite of Footnote Six to never again, at any time during any

court proceeding, to consider or mention, in any court record,

his Supplement, or to give it a conclusive adjudication of both

the mandatory legal tenets of the Booker ruling and advisory legal

tenets of the RHB, in a manner consistent with Griffith, to

Plaintiff’s Supplement, pages 11-12's 5th and 6th Amend, claims

apposite contested calculation facts to the detention's legality

beyond 21 months or Oct. 2003.

It follows the official court record of Ruhbayan, 406 F.3d

at 301 n.9 (Appx. D, pg. 6-7) does show neither the DOB's Sixth

Amendment ruling in Booker or RHB were applied to Plaintiff's

presented 5th and 6th Amend, grounds of claims’ Supplement’s pages

11-12’s apposite contested calculation facts of BOL of 12. CHC

of III and a Mandatory Guideline Range of 15-21 months or Oct.

2003; but instead is shown Defendants applied the legal tenets

of Booker's Sixth Amendment ruling to their unpresented and

fabricated ground of claim's inapposite and uncontested calculation

facts of a BOL of 32 to 36. CHC of VI and Mandatory Guideline Range

of 210-262 months to 324-405 months; further Footnote nine of

Ruhbayan, supra, shows Defendants adopted an illegal "Assuming,

without deciding," adiudication posture to conduct their 'inconclusive test

of the detention's legality, despite Plaintiff/

Petitioner's presented contested calculation facts of his Supplement

pages 11-12, were clearly due process of and Legitimately Expecting

a 'conclusive test'» as to the detention's legality beyond 21 months

or a date of Oct. 2003.

Accordingly the entire record as a whole of the case 2:02cr-29(RBS), as such relevant records are chronologically set forth

in (Appx. D, pg. 5-11 and 12-14), conclusively show that such

incidences of their roadblocking access to court to frustrate a

a meaningful litigation and hearing on the cause's 5th and 6th

Amend, claims occurred, under their supervision during the 1st

direct review of 2005 (Appx. D, pg. 6-7); 1st resentencing hearing

of November 2005 (Appx. D. pe. 7-8); 2nd direct review of May 2007

(Appx. D, pg 9); 3rd direct review of 2010: 1st 28 U.S.C. § 2255

hearins of 2011 (Appx. D, pe 10-11) and each of the successive

years of his collateral habeas relief filinfis from 2012-2019 (Appx.

pr .

12-14).

The district court Docket Record of (Appx. H , pg. 15) shows

that Defendant /judge Smith was utterly uninformed about Plaintiff’s

Supplement, pages 11-12’s 5th and 6th Amend, claims

contest of

the detention's legality beyond 21 months or a date of Oct. 2003,

during its 1st resentencing hearing of Noy. 2005 (Appx. D, pg 78); 2nd resentencing of March 2009 and 1st § 2255 hearing of Apr.

2011 (Appx. D, pg. 10-11) because the record shows the district

court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing and because the record

of the Docket Sheet shows omission occurred as to all data involving

data about plaintiff’s Supplement filed on Aug. 20, 2004; the

omissions occurred between 3/31/2004 to 4/22/2005, as is reflected

in the docket sheet. The fact that the district court docket records

omits all facts concerning the Supplement is important because

it is important to be mindful that the three appellate defendant

/judges Robert B King, Allyson K. Duncan, and William W. Wilkins,had, as stated and earlier shown above, in FOOTNOTE SIX and FOOTNOTE

• NINE of Ruhbayan, 406. f;3d at 298'& 301, buried alive and put the

nail in the coffin concerning Plaintiff's Supplement, page’s 11

and 12's 5th and 6th Amend, claims.

So Plaintiff's 5th and 6th Amend, claims being both buried

alive by the three appellate defendant /judges and omitted from

the district court docket, records by the district court defendant

/judge or its clerk resulted in the four Defendants

cover up of

Plaintiff’s Supplement and their having roadblocked it, for all

times, from all air of expression before all and any competent

court: further it denied Petitioner/Plaintiff access to the court

to have (a)n opportunity to a meaningful litigation on the intrinsic

merits of both his 5th and 6th Amend, claims.

10.

Accordingly, on May 17, 2021, for all above reasons, Plaintiff

in the Eastern District of North Carolina filed the instant

prospective-denial-of-access suit (Appx. D), presenting in the

cause two grounds of prospective claims, they were: 1) Prospectivedeclaratory and injunctive relief claims (Appx. D, pg. 15) , that

were an ancillary mechanism of a legal battering ram for and to

2) Count one (Appx. D, pg. 5) and Count Two’s (Appx. D, pg. 12)

prosepective denial of access claims’ that were ancillary to the

predicate underlying 5th and 6th Amend. claims.

Plaintiff’s simple obiective for his prospective declaratory

relief claims and his simple iustification for their being an

ancillary mechanism of a battering ram for his prospective denial

of access claims was simply to remove the four Defendant judges,

ongoing 17 years, frustrating roadblocks so to future wise place

him in a position to pursue his separate nonfrivolous arguable

predicate underlying 5th and 6th Amend. claims.

The district court who supervised the cause of complaint,

its decision is in (Appx. B). It summarily dismissed the cause's

civil complaint, FIRST, for frivolity review reason of forma

pauper status, pursuant to 28 tf.S.G. §. 1915 (A.pft%. B, pg2);. and

Secondly, for reason the court deemed the four defendant judges:

were ’’absolutely immune for acts performed in their judicial capacity.”

(Appx. B, pg. 2-3).

On July 15, 2022, the Circuit Court supervised the civil

11.

complaint's direct review (Appx. A). The Circuit Court stated that

the district court's reason for dismissing the complaint were

unwarranted, FIRST, because plaintiff was solvent filer, who before

hand had fully paid the filing fee (Appx. A, page 2); SECOND, because

the four defendants were not absolutely immune due to the legal

fact "Bivens does not bar declaratory relief against judges." (Appx.

A, pg 3). However the supervising Circuit Court's decision dismissed

the complaint of case, 1st, based on its decision's false premise

deciding the case upon an unpresented and fabricated ground that

plaintiff's cause sought only a singular ground of claim of a

backward looking or retrospective "declaratory relief that past

acts (Alone) that occurred within the context of his criminal

proceedings violated his constitutional rights." (Appx. A, pg 3);

2nd, based on its false premise that over looked, by carelessness

or design, Plaintiff's, above foresaid, two grounds of prospective

declaratory relief claims and prospective denial of access claim's

two predicate underlying 5th and 6th Amend. claims. (Appx. A, pg

3).

Therefore the decision's flawed conclusion (Appx. A, pg 3)

found that "Ruhbayan's request for declaratory relief is purely

retrospective .... As a result, Defendants (i.e. four federal

j udge collegues of the court) are protected by judicial immunity,

and the district court correctly determined Ruhbayan was not entitled

to relief under Bivens."

»:

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. Reasons Why the Writ Should be Granted

12.

This Court’s judicial supervision over the direct appeals,

the administration of justice and the maintaining of the integrity

of judicial review, in the federal courts, should require summary

reversal of the Circuit Court’s decision for the following

three

reasons of ’A-C':

A) Harbury, 413-415 infra, supports the following two.legal facts:

1) Count One (Appx. D, pg 5) and Count Two's (Appx. D, pg 12)

prospective denial of access claims’ predicate underlying 5th and

6th Amend. claims sufficiently established Art. Ill standing for

their ancillary; 2) prospective declaratory releif claims (Appx.

D, pg. 15);

B) Yet Harbury. 413-415, conflicts with the Circuit Court's,

following two judicial procedure acts of: 1) cover up of or over

looking of such two prospective claims and 2) its deciding the

cause -soley based upon its unpresented and fabricated ground of a

retrospective claim (Appx. A, pg. 3);

C) Hence in light of Kordel. 397 U.S. at 11 infra, Hastings,

461 U.S. at 505 infra, and Mcnabb. 318 U.S. at 34 infra, the Circuit

Court's immediate above, conflicting two judicial procedural acts,

denies plaintiff access to court on such two prospective claims;

convincingly implies the Circuit Court's attempting to cover up

the four defendant judges' ongoing 17 years, roadblocking access

to court, regarding the cause's two claims; and gives a rogish

blackeye of corruption and lack of INTEGRITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW,

within Art. Ill Halls.

v.^

13.

Accordingly Petitioner/Plaintiff seeks that the Writ of

Certiorari be granted to afford due administration of justice to

achieve either or all of the following enumerated 'FOUR AIMS1:

1) To rectify the Circuit Court’s rogishly wild, lawless and

unenlightened judicial procedures of its decision’s premise and

conclusion to conform to the ’’accepted and usual judicial proceedings"

of civilized legal standards of this COurt’s decision in Christopher

v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403,413

(1943) ("Harbury’'). ' See also, U.S.

v . Mcnabb, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) ("Mcnabb") ("The scope of our

reviewing power . . . (of cases) brought here from the federal courts

is not confined to ascertain of constitutional validity. Judicial

Supervision of the Administration of . . . justice in the federal

courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining

civilized

standards of procedure’ and evidence.").

2) To restore the integrity of judicial review procedures as

to the reflections of "such unfairness or want of consideration

as to violate due process or constitute a departure from the proper

standards in the administration of justice" regarding the Circuit

Court’s undue and departed processess from Harbury, at 413-415,

and the four defendant judges, ongoing 17 years, undue and departed

processes from the mandatory language of the Directive of Booker.

543 U.S. 220, 268 (2005) ("DOB"). See, e.g • » U.S. v. Kordel, 397

U.S. 1, 11 (1970) ("Kordel") (Recognizing Supreme Court’s supervisory

powers cover presented issues of unfairness or want of consideration

for justice as to violate due process or departures from proper

standards in the administration of justice.); see also, Frazier

v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 at footnote 6B ("Heebe") (Recognizing "The

Court’s supervisory power over federal courts allows the court to

intervene to protect the integrity of the federal system.").

3) To deter the illegal conduct of the Circuit Court's

erroneous application of Harbury at 413-415, and the Circuit Court's

and four defendant judges' ongoing 17 years, cover up and road

blocking the cause's two grounds of prospective denial of access

claims

underlying 5th and 6th Amendment claim. See e.g •» U.S.

v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) ("The purpose underlying

supervisory powers . . . [is] ... to deter illegal conduct.").

4) To implement a remedy for the Circuit Court's decision's

Conflict with Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413-415, and for the four

Defendant judges', ongoing 17 years, violation of cover up and

roadblocking Plaintiff's statutory and constitutional rights of

the cause's prospective denial of access claims' 5th and 6th Amend.

underlying claims. See, e.g • > U.S. v. Hastings, 461 U.S. at 505

(1983) ("The purpose underlying supervisory powers . . . [is] .

. . to implement a remedy for the violation of a recognized

statutory or constitutional right.").

14.

Accordingly Petitioner/Plaintiff suggest that either this

Court, in light of Hastings at 505, or the Solicitor General, in

light of whatsoever relevant statutory ad hoc provisions for ad

hoc circumstances, immediately initiate and implement either one

the following TWO REMEDIES: REMEDY ONE: Schedule order or simply

initiate and invite Plaintiff/Petitioner to an impromtu IMPARLANCE

meeting, so far as for the Solicitor General's delegated

representative and Plaintiff to reach an amicable and private

settlement of the instant suit of complaint.

REMEDY TWO: For this Court or the Solicitor General to direct

the Circuit Court and four Defendant judges to immediately present,

before this lofty - Supreme Court and Plaintiff a single official

sentencing, direct review, or section 2255 hearing record of court,

showing a single paragraph or sentence, that conclusively and

clearly verifies that the four defendant judges did give Plaintiff

(a)n Opportunity to a meaningful litigation and hearing of an

applied application of the mandatory legal tenets of 18 U.S.C.

Sections 3553(b)(1), 3585(b), and 3624(a) of the Sixth Amendment

holding of Booker, 543 U.S. at 226-234 (2005) ("SAHB"), to his

Supplements pages 11-12's 5th and 6th Amend. underlying claims'

contested calculation facts of the detention's legality beyond

21 months or a date of Oct. 2003 (Appx. G, pg. 11-12).

However, in advance, Plaintiff assures this Honorable Supreme

Court that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the four

Defendant judges will not and can not present such single paragraph

or even single sentence from an official court document of court

proceedings due to their ongoing 17 years

cover up and roadblocking

of access of Petitioner's/Plaintiff's 5th and 6th Amend, underlying

claims.

II. FACTS SHOWN WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED

15.

The Circuit Court's decision decided the cause soley based

upon its unpresented and fabricated ground of a backward looking

or retrospective declaratory relief claim, by its decision s j ump

from its fabricated premise (i.e. "He (Plaintiff) sought a

declaratory judgment that past actions that occurred within the

context of his criminal proceedings violated his constitutional

rights." (Appx. A, pg. 3)) to its flawed conclusion (Ruhbayans's

request for declaratory relief is purely retrospective".

(Appx.

A, pg. 3)). Therefore its fabricated premise and flawed conclusion

overlooked, the cause's only two presented two grounds of claim,

they were: 1) prospective declaratory relief claims (Appx. D, Pg.

15) that were ancillary to 2) Count One (Appx. D, pg 5-11) and

Count Two's (Appx. D, pg. 12-14) prospective denial of access claims

that were ancillary to the predicate underlying claims

both a

6th Amend, right to trial by jury (i.e. the legal tenets of the

SAHB, 543 U.S. at 226-234).and a 5th Amend, right to a Legitimate

Expection of Finality as to the severity of the sentence or

detention's legality not to exceed 21 months or a date of October

2003.

16.

The Supreme Court, in Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413, holds that

two categories emerge where a Plaintiff, as here, sought only

forward-looking declaratory and injunctive relief claims that were

ancillary to a denial of access claim.

The first sort is purely prospective or forward-looking,

Harbury at 413, the second sort is purely retrospective or backward

looking, Harbury at 414. Further, where a Plaintiff, as here, sought

only a forward-looking declaratory and injunctive relief, a

presented purely backward-looking, retrospective or past injury

denial of access claim is insufficient to establish constitutional

Art. Ill standing. Rather the Plaintiff must present a purely

forward-looking, prospective or actual injury denial of access

claim that is ancillary to a

nonfrivolous arguable underlying

claim to sufficiently establish const. Art. Ill standing, Harbury

at 415.

17.

Plaintiff's simple objective for his prospective declaratory

claims and his simple justification for their being purely an

ancillary mechanism of a battering ram for his prospective denial

of access claims was simply to remove the four Defendant judges,

ongoing 17 years, frustrating roadblocks concerning their tainted

processes of administrating the DOB, 543 U.S. at 268, so to future

wise place him in a position to pursue his separate nonfrivolous

arguable two predicate underlying claims—both a 6th Amend, right

to jury trial (i.e. the mandatory legal tenets of the SAHB, 543

U.S. at 226-234) and a 5th Amend. right to a Legitimate Expectation

of Finality as to the severity of his sentence and detention's

legality not to exceed 21 months or a date of Oct. 2003. See e.g.,

Regal Cinemas, Inc v. Town of Culpeper, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131191,

at LEXIS 23 (July 14, 2021) (Recognizing "A Declaratory judgment

is inherently a

forward looking mechanism' intended to guide the

parties behavior in the future.").

18.

It follows the cause's plain text, immediately below shows,

at (A pp x. D, pg. 15) Plaintiff's sought declaratory and injunctive

relief claims' objective was

purely prospective' and such

prospective interest extended only so far as being an ancillary

mechanism of a battering ram for the cause's prospective denial

of access claims; the relevant quoted excerpts of the cause's

request for declaratory and injunctive relief reads: ("PROSPECTIVE

DECLARATORY, INJUNCTIVE AND DAMAGES RELIEF: Declaratory relief

seeking determination of the validity of procedures for imposing

the legal standard of the DOB (i.e. DIRECTIVE OF BOOKER), 543 U.S.

220, 268 (2005) . . . to provide Mr. Ruhbayan a first Opportunity

of access of hearing to redress .

. . his 5th Amendment (underlying)

claim of a Legitimate Expectation of Finality and in conclusion

is, Sought any prospective declaratory, injunctive and damages

relief this court deems that equity and proper carriage of justice

requires in order to deter defendants (four Defendant judges) from

future invalid procedures of the legal standard of the DOB (543

U.S. at 268) and to expedite restoration of Mr. Ruhbayan's sacred

1st and 5th Amend, rights of access to courts regarding the (under

lying) claims of this suit." (Appx. D, pg 15)).

Specifically Harbury at 415, supports that the cause's

prospective denial of access claim's underlying claims of a 5th

and 6th Amend. sufficiently established const. Art. Ill standing

for their ancillary declaratory and injunctive relief claims where

Count One (App. D, pg. 5) and Count Two (Appx. D, pg. 12) alleged

"elements" that FIRST, described the official acts of the four

Defendant judges' roadblocking of the litigation, in the following

manner of quoted languages ("1st and 5th Amendment U.S. Constitution

deprivation of access of hearing, under the U.S. Supreme Court's

Directive of BookeXj . 543 U.S. 220 at 268 (2005) . . . ."); SECONDLY,

described the underlying claim and that it was not forever lost,

but anticipated to be redressed in future litigation, in the

following manner of quoted language: ("to redress in a federal

court a Fifth Amendment claim of a Legitimate Expectation of

Finality . . . ."). THIRDLY, described the official actors, four

Defendant judges, in the following manner of quoted language:

("Against Art. Ill Defendant judges Robert B. King, Allyson K.

Duncan, William W. Wilkins of the Appellate Court of Richmond VA.

and District judge Rebecca B. Smith of the district court of

Norfolk, VA . . . .").

19.

In addition the cause's COUNT ONE AND COUNT TWO'S arguments'

allegments (Appx. D, 5—11 and 12—14) and the cause's DECLARATORY

RELIEF CLAIMS'allegments (Appx. D, pg. 15) and the cause's PETITION

OF DIRECT APPEALS' SUPPORTING FACTS' SECTION (Appx. E, pg. 2) and

its REQUESTED RELIEF SECTION (Appx. E, pg. 3) provide and describe

and exhaustive account to meet each of the immediate above 3

"elements i tt requirements of Harbury, at 413 and 415. See e.g.,

Harbury at 415 ("We noted that even in forward looking . .

prisoner actions to future litigation the named Plaintiff must

identify a "nonfrivolous" "arguable" "underlying" claim . .

It follows that the underlying cause of action is an element that

must be described in the complaint just as much as allegations

must describe the official acts frstrating the litigation.").

Harbury at 413 ("In causes of this sort (i.e • $ prospective/forwardlooking), the essence of the access claim is that the official

action is presently denying an opportunity to litigate . . . the

opportunity is not forever lost for all time, however, but only

in the short term, the object of the denial suit, and the

justification for recognizing the claim, is to place the plaintiff

in a position to pursue a separate claim for relief once the

frustrating condition has been removed.").

It follows that the DOB, 543 U.S. at 268

in direct quote

as follows reads:

" We must apply today's holdings-both the Sixth Amendment holding

and remedial interpretation of the Sentencing Act---- to;all cases

on direct review. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)

( " (A) new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecution is to

be applied retroactively to all cases on direct review or not

yet final. " ) V

Accordingly, for an ongoing 17 years, the Circuit Court and the four

Defendant judges have defied the DOB, being they have roadblocked

Petitioner's access to meaningful litigation & hearing of an applied

application of holdings-both the SAHB, 543 U.S. at 226-234 & the

RHBy 543 U.S. at 245-246, to petitioner1s 'Supplement,

pages 11-12's

5th & 6th Amend, claims contested calculation facts of the instant sentence & detention's legality beyond 21 months or Oct. 2003; Further

nor can or will the Circuit 'Court or four Defendant judges produce

a single paragraph or sentence from any official court proceeding of

record showing, conclusively, that they, in fact

honored the DOB,

by affording Petitioner such a meaningful litigation and hearing.

E.g. see, Lundien, 769 f.2d 981 at 984-985 (4th cir./App. Ct./1985)

( Recognizing Legi.t ini'a.te Expectation of Finality is 5th Amend, due-process

right; court cannot reimpose sentence, once defendant has fully served

maximum lawful sentence.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Date:

IX //9/&o9~&-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.