Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Rossen Iossifov, Petitioner v. United States

NO. _______________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ROSSEN IOSSIFOV,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

_______________________________________________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

_______________________________________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

John Kevin West (KY #81802)

STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC

41 South High Street, Suite 2200

Columbus, Ohio 43215

(614) 458-9889 phone

(614) 221-0952 fax

kevin.west@steptoe-johnson.com

Counsel for Petitioner Rossen Iossifov

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Petitioner, Rossen Iossifov (“Iossifov”), was indicted on July 5,

2018, and charged with one count of conspiring to engage in racketeering

activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(d) (Count 1) and one count of

knowingly conducting and attempting to conduct financial transactions

affecting interstate and foreign commerce, which transactions involved

the proceeds of fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(1) and (a)(2)

(Count 3).

The United States alleged (and Iossifov does not deny) that most of

Iossifov’s Romanian co-defendants were engaged in a scheme in which

they would post advertisements on online sales platforms like eBay or

Craigslist for non-existent goods like motor vehicles and would convince

unsuspecting victims to purchase debit cards and send them as payment

for the non-existent items. An American middleman would then convert

the debit cards to money orders which were ultimately converted to

Bitcoin for a percentage of the profit from the fake sale. There was no

evidence presented at trial that Iossifov had any contact with any of the

American fraud victims. Furthermore, Iossifov had never set foot in the

United States prior to his extradition to stand trial for the offenses

alleged in the indictment.

Iossifov is a Bulgarian citizen who after working in a factory and

operating an accounting business, opened a Bitcoin exchange business in

2014 which was called RG Coin. Iossifov registered the business with the

Bulgarian government, advertised on the internet, and opened an office

with a sign on the door advertising the name of the business. When

dealing with customers, he used his own legal name or the name of his

business (which was derived from the initials of his name-Rossen

Georgiov) and, unlike the Romanian customers who it was later

determined were engaged in fraudulent activity, never attempted to

conceal his identity.

Iossifov was not aware that the Romanian customers later charged

with fraud were engaged in fraudulent activities until an arrest and

extradition warrant was served on him at his home in the early morning

hours of December 11, 2018. The United States introduced evidence at

trial that most of RG Coin’s customers were not engaged in fraudulent

activities. At trial, the only direct evidence offered by the United States

that Iossifov was aware of the fraudulent activities of the Romanian

2

customers was the testimony of a co-defendant, Andrei Stocia, about a

hearsay statement allegedly made by Razvan Sandu, a co-defendant who

had not been apprehended and who did not testify at trial.

This Court should grant certiorari and review Iossifov’s

conviction on jurisdictional grounds for three reasons. First, there was

no venue in the Eastern District of Kentucky and conducting a trial

there violated the United States Constitution. Second, none of the laws

that Iossifov was charged with violating applied outside of the United

States. Third, the prosecution violated Iossifov’s due process rights

because the United States had no legitimate interest in prosecuting the

charged conduct as to Iossifov. Assertion of jurisdiction in this case

conflicts with prior decisions of this Court and this Court should grant

certiorari to correct the violation of Iossifov’s rights and ensure the

rights of future defendants are not violated by the improper assertion

of extraterritorial jurisdiction.

3

LIST OF PROCEEDINGS

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit No. 215063/5404

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Rossen Iossifov,

Defendant-Appellant

Date of Final Opinion: August 12, 2022

4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ..................................................................... 1

LIST OF PROCEEDINGS ........................................................................ 4

INDEX OF APPENDICES ........................................................................ 6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................... 7

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ............................................... 9

OPINIONS BELOW .................................................................................. 9

JURISDICTION ........................................................................................ 9

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .............................................. 10

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................ 10

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .............................................. 13

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF ....................................... 25

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT ....................................................... 26

5

INDEX OF APPENDICES

The Sixth Circuit’s conviction affirming Iossifov is attached as

Appendix 1. The district court’s Final Judgment and Order denying his

motion to dismiss are attached as Appendices 2 and 3.

This case involves application of 18 U.S.C. §1956 and 18 U.S.C.

§1962. The texts of these provisions are contained in Appendix 4.

6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A.,

353 U.S. 138 (1957) ........................................................................................................ 14, 18

EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,

499 U.S. 244 (1991) .................................................................................................. 14, 17, 18

F. Hoffmann-La-Roche Ltd. v. Empagran,

542 U.S. 155 (2004) .............................................................................................................. 13

Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo,

336 U.S. 281 (1949)............................................................................................................... 17

Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,

382 U.S. 399 (1966) .............................................................................................................. 21

In re Hijazi,

589 F.3d 401 (7th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................................... 22

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,

326 U.S. 310 (1945) .............................................................................................................. 22

J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,

564 U.S. 873 (2011) .............................................................................................................. 22

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,

569 U.S. 108, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) .......................................................................... 14, 17

Matter of Warrant to Search Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by

Microsoft Corp.,

829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................ 15

Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,

550 U.S. 437 (2007) .................................................................................................. 14, 17, 24

Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, Ltd.,

561 U.S. 247 (2010)......................................................................................................... 17, 18

RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community,

136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) .......................................................................................................... 18

Sale v. Haitian Ctr. Council Inc.,

509 U.S. 155 (1993) ............................................................................................................... 18

Smith v. United States,

507 U.S. 197 (1993) ............................................................................................................... 18

Travis v. United States,

364 U.S. 631 (1961) .............................................................................................................. 16

United States v. Cabrales,

524 U.S. 1 (1998) ............................................................................................................. 15, 16

United States v. Hayes,

No. 12 MJ 3229, 2015 WL 1740830 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20. 2015) ..................................... 22

United States v. Johnson,

323 U.S. 273 (1944)......................................................................................................... 15, 17

7

United States v. Noriega,

683 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D. Fl. 1988) ...................................................................................... 22

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,

494 U.S. 259 (1990) ............................................................................................................... 22

Statutes

18 U.S.C. §1956 ................................................................................................................... 10, 19

18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(1) ............................................................................................... 1, 10, 20, 21

18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(2) ............................................................................................... 1, 10, 20, 21

18 U.S.C. §1956(c)(4)................................................................................................................ 20

18 U.S.C. §1956(c)(5)................................................................................................................ 20

18 U.S.C. §1956(f)(1) ................................................................................................................ 19

18 U.S.C. §1962 ......................................................................................................................... 10

18 U.S.C. §1962(d) .......................................................................................................... 1, 10, 18

28 U.S.C. §1254(1) ...................................................................................................................... 9

Other Authorities

Article III, Section 2, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution.......................................... 15

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution....................................................... 25

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution ...................................................... 25

Supreme Court Rule 13.1.......................................................................................................... 9

Rules

Fed. R. Cr. P. 29 ........................................................................................................................ 12

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 ............................................................................... 16

8

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Rossen Iossifov petitions the Court for a writ of certiorari to review

the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

———♦———

OPINIONS BELOW

The Sixth Circuit’s conviction affirming Iossifov is attached as

Appendix 1. The district court’s Final Judgment and the Order denying

his motion to dismiss are attached as Appendices 2 and 3.

———♦———

JURISDICTION

The Sixth Circuit entered judgment on August 12, 2022. See

Appendix 1. This petition is timely filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule

13.1. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

———♦———

9

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves application of 18 U.S.C. §1956 and 18 U.S.C.

§1962. The texts of these provisions are contained in Appendix 4.

———♦———

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

An Indictment was returned on July 5, 2018 charging Iossifov with

one count of conspiring to engage in racketeering activity in violation of

18 U.S.C. §1962(d) (Count 1) and one count of knowingly conducting and

attempting to conduct financial transactions affecting interstate and

foreign commerce, which transactions involved the proceeds of fraud in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(1) and (a)(2) (Count 3).

When the

allegations against Iossifov are boiled down to their essence, the United

States claims that Iossifov, who had never stepped foot on the United

States soil or communicated with anyone in the United States before his

indictment, knowingly used his legitimate Bulgarian Bitcoin exchange

business to exchange Bitcoin into foreign currency for Romanian codefendants who were engaged in defrauding American citizens in an

internet fraud scheme.

10

The United States alleged (and Iossifov does not deny) that most of

Iossifov’s Romanian co-defendants were engaged in a scheme in which

they would post advertisements on online sales platforms like eBay or

Craigslist for non-existent goods like motor vehicles and would convince

unsuspecting victims to purchase debit cards and send them as payment

for the non-existent items. An American middleman would then convert

the debit cards to money orders which were ultimately converted to

Bitcoin for a percentage of the profit from the fake sale. There was no

evidence presented at trial that Iossifov had any contact with any of the

American fraud victims.

Iossifov is a Bulgarian citizen who after working in a factory and

operating an accounting business, opened a Bitcoin exchange business in

2014 which was called RG Coin. Iossifov registered the business with the

Bulgarian government, advertised on the internet, and opened an office

with a sign on the door advertising the name of the business. When

dealing with customers, he used his own legal name or the name of his

business (which was derived from the initials of his name-Rossen

Georgiov) and, unlike the Romanian customers who it was later

11

determined were engaged in fraudulent activity, never attempted to

conceal his identity.

Iossifov was not aware that the Romanian customers later charged

with fraud were engaged in fraudulent activities until an arrest and

extradition warrant was served on him at his home in the early morning

hours of December 11, 2018. The United States introduced evidence at

trial that most of RG Coin’s customers were not engaged in fraudulent

activities. At trial, the only direct evidence offered by the United States

that Iossifov was aware of the fraudulent activities of the Romanian

customers was the testimony of a co-defendant, Andrei Stocia, about a

hearsay statement allegedly made by Razvan Sandu, a co-defendant who

had not been apprehended and who did not testify at trial.

Iossifov moved for a Judgment of Acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Cr.

P. 29 at the close of proof by the United States and at the conclusion of

all proof based upon the lack of jurisdiction over him and the insufficiency

of the evidence as to his knowledge of the fraudulent activities of his

customers. The trial court denied both motions. A jury verdict was

ultimately returned convicting Iossifov of Counts 1 and 3. Iossifov was

12

sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one hundred twenty-one (121)

months and was ordered to pay restitution of $2,642,297.43.

———♦———

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This Court should grant certiorari and review Iossifov’s conviction

because the trial court improperly exercised jurisdiction.

The Indictment alleged that Iossifov exchanged Bitcoin for currency

with knowledge that some of the Bitcoin had been acquired with the

proceeds from an online fraud scheme carried out in the United States.

There were no allegations that Iossifov engaged in any activities in the

United States, let alone in the Eastern District of Kentucky.

This Court has recognized that questions involving the United

States’ prosecution of a foreign citizen raise important and delicate

issues. In F. Hoffmann-La-Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 164165 (2004), this Court stated:

[T]his Court ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to

avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign

authority of other nations (citations omitted). This rule

of construction reflects principles of customary

international law – law that [we must assume] Congress

ordinarily seeks to follow. (citations omitted) This rule

13

of statutory construction cautions courts to assume that

legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign

interests of other nations when they write American

laws. It thereby helps the potential conflicting laws of

different nations work together in harmony – a harmony

particularly needed in today’s highly interdependent

commercial world.

Similarly, in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007),

this Court stated that the presumption against extraterritorial

application of United States law reflected the “presumption that United

States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.” Id. at 454.

Likewise, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), this

Court held that the presumption against extraterritoriality “serves to

protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other

nations which could result in international discord.” See also Kiobel v.

Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (citing Benz v.

Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) (“The

presumption against extraterritorial application helps ensure that the

Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that

carries foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by the political

branches.”)); Matter of Warrant to Search Certain E-Mail Account

Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir.

14

2016) (applying presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S.

law to hold that the Stored Communication Act (“SCA”) does not

authorize a U.S. Court to enforce a SCA warrant against a U.S. service

provider for customer communications located outside the U.S.).

The

trial court should have granted Iossifov’s motion to dismiss because the

allegations in the Indictment lacked the required nexus, either

geographically or from the perspective of a cognizable United States

interest to the charged conduct. The Indictment did not allege that

Iossifov was engaged in any activities in the United States and there was

no evidence introduced that Iossifov had any contact with any of the

American fraud victims.

In criminal cases, questions of venue take on a constitutional

dimension. United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 (1944). Because venue

was improper here, the trial court misapplied the law in not dismissing

for improper venue. In United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1 (1998), this

Court held: “[t]he Constitution twice safeguards the defendant’s venue

right.” Id. at 6. This Court cited to Article III, Section 2, cl. 3 of the United

States Constitution, which provides that “[t]rial of all crimes...shall be

held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed.” Id.

15

In addition, the Court cited the Sixth Amendment, which provides

criminal defendants with the right “to a speedy and public trial, by an

impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been

committed.” Id.

Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure implements the

above-noted rights, providing that “the government must prosecute an

offense in a district where the offense was committed.” Rule 18 further

provides that “[t]he court must set the place of trial within the district

with due regard for the convenience of the defendant, any victim, and the

witnesses, and the prompt administration of justice.” This Court has

stated that venue provisions are intended as safeguards to protect

defendants from bias, disadvantage, and inconvenience in the

adjudication of charges against them. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S.

631, 634 (1961). This Court has placed particular significance on proper

venue in criminal cases:

[Issues of venue] are matters that touch closely the fair

administration of criminal justice and public confidence

in it, on which it ultimately rests. These are important

factors in any consideration of the effective enforcement

of the criminal law. They have been adverted to, from

time to time, by eminent judges; and Congress has not

been unmindful of them. Questions of venue in criminal

cases, therefore, are not merely matters of formal legal

16

procedure. They raise deep issues of public policy in the

light of which legislation must be construed. If an

enactment of Congress equally permits the underlying

spirit of the constitutional concern for trial in the

vicinage to be respected rather than to be disrespected,

construction should go in the direction of constitutional

policy even though not commanded by it.

United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276.

Likewise, Iossifov’s conviction must be reversed because the trial

court lacked extraterritorial jurisdiction to hold him responsible for the

offenses of conviction. As noted above, while “United States law governs

domestically, [it] does not rule the world.” Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,

550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007). This premise leads to the presumption against

extraterritoriality, a “longstanding principle of American law that

legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to

apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”

Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (citing EEOC

v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)); Foley Bros., Inc. v.

Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-285 (1949). This presumption exists to avoid

international discord that can result when United States law is applied to

conduct in foreign countries. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S.

108, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244

17

(1991); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957). The

presumption “applies regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict

between the American statute and a foreign law,” Morrison, 561 at 255

(citing Sale v. Haitian Ctr. Council Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173-174 (1993)), and

reflects the notion that “Congress generally legislates with domestic

concerns in mind.” Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993). Since there

was no basis for prosecuting Iossifov in the United States, his conviction

must be reversed.

Count 1 of the Indictment charged Iossifov with being a participant

in a racketeering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(d). In RJR

Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016), this Court

set forth the governing interpretation of extraterritorial application of

the RICO statute. The Court held that the extraterritorial application of

RICO’s criminal provisions, including its conspiracy provision, 18 U.S.C.

§1962(d), only apply extraterritorially “to the extent that the predicates

alleged in [the] case[s] themselves apply extraterritorially.” Id. at 2102.

The Court held that: (1) for RICO to apply extraterritorially, the

predicate statute must “manifest an unmistakable congressional intent

to apply extraterritorially,” (2) not all RICO predicates have

18

extraterritorial effect, and (3) “inclusion of some extraterritorial

predicates does not mean that all RICO predicates extend to foreign

conduct.” Id. If a predicate statute does not apply extraterritorially,

conduct committed abroad is not indictable under the statute and cannot

qualify as a predicate RICO act. Id.

The trial court erred in not dismissing Count 1 for the separate and

independent reason that RICO does not have extraterritorial application

here because the predicate act statute alleged does not have

extraterritorial application. With respect to Iossifov, the Money

Laundering and Control Act (“MLCA”) statute, 18 U.S.C. §1956, is the

predicate statute charged as part of the alleged RICO conspiracy. The

MLCA explicitly addresses the question of extraterritoriality, stating that

a money laundering prosecution is appropriate if, in relevant part, “the

[prohibited] conduct is by a United States citizen or, in the case of a nonUnited States citizen, the conduct occurs in part in the United States.” 18

U.S.C. §1956(f)(1). It is undisputed that Iossifov is not a United States

citizen. Thus, for the MLCA to apply extraterritorially against him, he

must have engaged in conduct occurring, in part, in the United States.

19

Since he did not, the predicate money laundering count does not apply

extraterritorially.

As a predicate act to the RICO charge (Count 1), the Indictment

alleged in Count 3 that Iossifov and other alleged co-conspirators

conspired to commit offenses against the United States in violation of 18

U.S.C. §1956(a)(1) and (a)(2). One element of Section 1956(a)(1) is the

conduct or attempted conduct of a financial transaction involving the

proceeds of specified unlawful activity. Additionally, one element of

Section 1956(a)(2) requires the transport, transmittal, or transfer (or an

attempt of the same) of a monetary instrument or funds.

Section 1956(c)(4) defines the term “financial transaction” to mean

a transaction that involves either (i) the movement of funds, (ii) one or

more monetary instruments, or (iii) the transfer of title to any real

property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft. Section 1956(c)(5) provides that a

“monetary instrument” means (i) coin or currency (U.S. or foreign),

travelers’ checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders, or (ii)

investment securities or negotiable instruments, in bearer form or

otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery. The

Treasury Department and the IRS have addressed the government’s

20

classification and treatment of “virtual currency” like Bitcoin in IRS

Notice 2014-21. Under IRS Notice 2014-14, Bitcoin is not currency and

should be treated as personal property. As a result, the Bitcoin involved

in the alleged transactions does not qualify as funds or a monetary

instrument as required under Sections 1956(a)(1) and 1956(a)(2).

Moreover, because the subject Bitcoin is not currency, a monetary

instrument, or represent title in any real property, vehicle, vessel, or

aircraft, the Bitcoin transactions that Iossifov allegedly participated in

do not qualify as a “financial transaction” as required under Section

1956(a)(1).

Finally, Iossifov’s conviction must be reversed for jurisdictional

reasons because his right to due process was violated by the trial court’s

improperly finding that it had jurisdiction over his case. The Due Process

Clause protects a defendant’s right not to be coerced except by lawful

judicial power. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966). A court may

subject a defendant to jurisdiction only when the defendant has sufficient

contacts with the sovereign “such that the maintenance of the suit does

not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” J.

21

McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (citing Int’l Shoe

Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

Prosecution of Iossifov violated his due process rights and his

conviction must be reversed. Federal courts routinely recognize that

foreign nationals facing criminal prosecutions have due process rights

under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See, e.g.,

United States v. Hayes, No. 12 MJ 3229, 2015 WL 1740830, at *3-4

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20. 2015) (finding that a criminal complaint creates a

cognizable relationship between a foreign defendant and the court in

which the complaint has been filed such that the defendant may properly

challenge due process violations in that forum); In re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401

(7th Cir. 2009) (Lebanese citizen living in Kuwait properly raised due

process objections to his Indictment); United States v. Noriega, 683 F.

Supp. 1373, 1374-75 (S.D. Fl. 1988) (indicted de facto head of a foreign

government permitted to file motion attacking indictment based on due

process concerns); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278

(1990) (Justice Kennedy stating in his concurring opinion that “[a]ll would

agree, for instance, that the dictates of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment protect the [foreign national] defendant.”).

22

The Indictment alleges that Iossifov participated in Bitcoin

exchange transactions that were completed entirely outside of the United

States through Iossifov’s Bitcoin exchange company consistent with

Romanian law. Iossifov’s company – RG Coins – is a Bulgarian entity

registered to conduct business in Bulgaria. Iossifov did not conduct

business in the United States nor did any of the alleged Bitcoin

transactions involve U.S. businesses or U.S. citizens. Iossifov is a

Bulgarian citizen, who had never set foot in the United States before his

extradition. Iossifov did not reside in the United States during the period

of the charged conduct and did not transact business for his company from

within the United States.

The charged conduct involving Iossifov does not have substantial

effect on the United States. The allegations in the Indictment against

Iossifov focus solely on conduct that was part of Iossifov’s everyday

business activity in operating his legitimate Bitcoin exchange company in

Bulgaria. Such conduct is not enough to create a substantial effect on the

United States. If such minor incidental “connections” to the United States

stemming from a defendant’s operation of his legitimate business

consistent with the laws of his country could serve as a basis of jurisdiction,

23

almost any business transaction could, rendering basic principles of

international law and the presumption against United States jurisdiction

voiced by the Supreme Court in Microsoft, meaningless.

Iossifov operated a legitimate Bitcoin exchange company in

Bulgaria, subject to the legal requirements and regulations governing

such a business under Bulgarian law. There are no allegations that

Iossifov had any involvement in the fraudulent activity alleged in the

Indictment. Iossifov simply participated in Bitcoin exchange transactions

through his business in which “some” of the Bitcoin was allegedly

purchased by unrelated third parties using the proceeds of fraudulent

activity. The only established link between Iossifov and these third

parties is that they were all Romanian citizens. Given that Iossifov is a

Bulgarian citizen that owns and operates a Bulgarian Bitcoin exchange

company, transactions involving citizens from Romania, a neighboring

country, were common and expected.

Because the conduct charged in the Indictment has neither a

substantial effect on the United States nor implicates a United States

security or other interest, the assertion of jurisdiction violates Iossifov’s

due process rights. For that reason, this Court should grant certiorari to

24

remedy the improper exercise of jurisdiction over Iossifov’s prosecution

and ensure that future prosecutions are not undertaken in violation of

the United States Constitution.

———♦———

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Iossifov’s conviction and sentence violated Iossifov’s rights under

the Fifth and/or Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

This Court should grant certiorari and determine that the trial court

improperly

exercised

jurisdiction.

Unconstitutional

assertion

of

jurisdiction in extraterritorial prosecutions will continue to occur unless

certiorari is granted, and this Court addresses the issues raised in this

Petition. Consequently, the Court should grant certiorari and vacate

Iossifov’s conviction.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John Kevin West

John Kevin West (KY #81802)

STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC

41 South High Street, Suite 2200

Columbus, Ohio 43215

(614) 458-9889 phone; (614) 221-0952 fax

kevin.west@steptoe-johnson.com

Counsel for Petitioner Rossen Iossifov

25

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 33.1(h), I certify that the

foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari contains 3783 words, excluding

the Cover Page, the Table of Contents, the Table of Authorities and the

Certificate of Service.

26

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned counsel hereby certifies that on November 10,

2022, the foregoing was served via e-mail upon the following:

Haley Trogdlen McCauley

Assistant United States Attorney

260 West Vine Street, Suite 300

Lexington, KY 40507-1612

Haley.mccauley@usdoj.gov

/s/ John Kevin West

John Kevin West

Counsel for Petitioner Rossen Iossifov

27