Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Dkyle Jamal Bridges, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefDec 10, 2022
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NO. 22-
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_____________________
DKYLE BRIDGES
Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Respondent
____________________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
____________________
LUTHER E. WEAVER, III, ESQUIRE
Weaver & Associates, P.C.
123 S. Broad Street, Suite 2102
Philadelphia, PA 19109
(215) 790-0600 (Phone)
Attorney for Petitioner
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.
Did the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment justify the
warrantless search of Petitioner’s vehicle, which had in plain view only innocuous
objects–i.e., cell phones and condoms–that could not have given rise to a reasonable
belief that it contained evidence of sex trafficking?
2.
By what standard of review should a Court of Appeals consider a District
Court’s denial of a Franks hearing?
3.
Did the District Court violate Petitioner’s constitutional right to
confront witnesses against him by admitting into evidence testimonial hearsay?
4.
Did the District Court commit a procedural error of law by failing to
adequately consider all of the factors required for sentencing pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)?
-i-
PARTIES BELOW
The parties before the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit were as follows:
1.
The Petitioner, Dkyle Bridges, was represented by Luther E. Weaver,
III, of the law firm of Weaver & Associates, P.C., 123 S. Broad Street, Suite 2102,
Philadelphia PA, 19109. Attorney Weaver was appointed to represent the Petitioner
pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act.
2.
The United States of America was represented by Jennifer A.
Williams, then the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania,, Robert A. Zauzmer, Assistant United States Attorney and Chief of
Appeals, 615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250, Philadelphia, PA 19106. and Jessica A.
Urban, Trial Attorney, Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, U.S. Department
of Justice.
RELATED CASES
United States v. Anthony Jones, United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, Docket No. 22-2064 (Appeal of co-defendant, pending)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -iPARTIES BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -iiRELATED CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -iiTABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -vCITATIONS OF THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF
OPINIONS AND ORDERS ENTERED IN THE CASE . . . -viiiCONCISE STATEMENT OF THE BASIS FOR JURISDICTION . . . 1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 1
CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
I.
The warrantless search of Petitioner’s vehicle was not
justified by the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment because when the police detained him, there
was in plain view only innocuous objects–i.e., cell phones
and condoms–that could not have given rise to a
reasonable belief that his car contained evidence of sex
trafficking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
II.
This Court should grant certiorari to resolve the circuit
split concerning the standard of review to be employed by
a Court of Appeals when considering a District Court’s
denial of a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware. . . 13
A.
The district court judge never ruled on Petitioner’s
Franks motion and, thereby denied it sub silentio
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B.
The circuits are split on the issue of what standard
of review is to be applied by a Court of Appeals
when considering a District Court’s denial of a
Franks hearing.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
C.
The District Court should have conducted a Franks
hearing because the affidavit submitted in support
of the search warrant contains materially false
statements.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
III.
The District Court violated Petitioner’s constitutional
right to confront the witnesses against him at trial by
admitting into evidence testimonial hearsay. . . . . . . . 21
IV.
The District Court committed a procedural error of law in
failing to adequately consider all of the factors required
for sentencing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). . . . . . . 29
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
-iii-
APPENDIX
Judgment, filed September 15, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a
Opinion of Third Circuit, filed September 15, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3a
Notice of Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals,
filed April 7, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27a
Judgment in a Criminal Case, filed March 31, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . 29a
Order, filed March 19, 2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39a
Order, filed March 20, 1019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43a
Superseding Indictment, filed November 1, 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44a
-iv-
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Commonwealth v. Lagenella, 623 Pa. 434, 446, 83 A.3d 94, 101 (2013) . . 7, 8
Commonwealth v. Peak, 230 A.3d 1220, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2020) . . . . . . . . . 8
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 28
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-17, 20
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Maryland v. Dyson, 517 U.S. 465 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Sherwood v. Mulvill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
United States v. Becton, 601 F.3d 588, 594(D.C. Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
United States v. Allen, 631 F.3d 164, 171 (4th Cir. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
United States v. Baxter, 889 F.2d 731, 733 (6th Cir. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
United States v. Cahill, 355 F. App'x 563, 565 (2d Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . 15
United States v. Calisto, 838 F.2d 711 (3d Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
United States v. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2002) . . . . . 15
United States v. Desu, 23 F.4th 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
-v-
United States v. Donahue, 764 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 59 (2d Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 126 n.21 (2d Cir. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . 15
United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 742, n.2 (3d Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . 18
United States v. Hester, 910 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
United States v. Kattaria, 553 F.3d 1171, 1177 (8th Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . 16
United States v. Martin, 332 F.3d 827, 833 (5th Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
United States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550, 563 (3d Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
United States v. One Parcel of Property Located at 15 Black Ledge, 897 F.2d
97, 100 (2d Cir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 665 (3d Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
United States v. Reiner, 500 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
United States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1984)
.................. 9
United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1219 n.37 (11th Cir. 2009) . . . . . . 16
United States v. Smith, 576 F.3d 762, 764 (7th Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 782 (9th Cir. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 304 (6th Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
United States v. Wells, 223 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
United States v. Yusef, 461 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
United States v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 263 (3rd Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 783 (3d Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 18
Federal Rules:
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Sup. Ct. R. 10(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Sup. Ct. R. 10(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Federal Statutes:
18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1)
........................................... 2
18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
18 U.S.C. § 1951(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
28 U.S.C. §1254 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
State Statutes:
75 Pa.C.S. § 6309.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
75 Pa.C.S. § 6309.2(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
75 Pa.C.S. § 6309.2(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
75 Pa.C.S. § 6309.2(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
-vii-
CITATIONS OF THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL
REPORTS OF OPINIONS AND ORDERS ENTERED IN THE
CASE
Order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, Docket No. 2:18-cr-00193-NIQA, filed March 19, 2019, denying
Petitioner's Motion to Suppress physical evidence. (A. 39a)
Order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, Docket No. 2:18-cr-00193-NIQA, filed March 20, 2019, denying
Petitioner's Motion to Suppress all physical evidence obtained from the July 12,
2017 search of the 2013 Ford Taurus. (A. 43a)
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, filed
September 15, 2022, denying Petitioner's appeal. (A-5a) This Opinion is informally
reported at United States v. Bridges, No. 21-1679, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 25847 (3d
Cir. Sep. 15, 2022) (A. 3a)
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit filed
September 15, 2022. (A. 1a)
-viii-
CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE BASIS FOR JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court in this matter is
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit was entered on September 15, 2022. (A. 1a).
Pursuant to Rule 13 of the Rules of the United States Supreme Court, this
Petition was required to be filed within ninety (90) days of the filing of the
judgment, or by December 14, 2022. Therefore, this Petition has been timely filed.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
INVOLVED
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime may have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
1
CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 1, 2018, the Government filed a six-count Superseding
Indictment charging Petitioner and two others with various federal sex offenses,
including Conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking via force, fraud, and coercion, and
in the sex trafficking of minors, 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) (Count One); Sex Trafficking via
force, fraud, and coercion, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(1) (Counts Two and Three);
Sex Trafficking of minors and via force, fraud, and coercion, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1),
(b)(1), (b)(2), (c) (Counts Four, Five and Six); and with aiding and abetting, 18
U.S.C. § 2. Each of the substantive counts of the Indictment, Counts Two through
Six, related to five specific individual victims of the alleged conspiracy. Count Two
related to Victim "Z.W.," Count Three related to Victim "J.S.," Count Four related to
Victim “B.T.,” Count Five related to Victim "N.G.," and Count Six related to Victim
“L.C.” A Notice of forfeiture was filed. (A. 44a).
The case was assigned to the Honorable Nitza I. Quinones Alejandro, United
States District Court judge.
On November 14, 2018, Petitioner was arraigned on the Superseding
Indictment. He pled not guilty to all counts.
Relevant Pretrial Proceedings
1.
Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence
On October 19, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence
that was seized from a 2013 Ford Taurus on July 12, 2017. On November 2, 2018,
the Government filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion.
2
A hearing on the Motion to Suppress was held on February 15, 2019. On
February 28, 2019, post-hearing briefs on the suppression issue were filed by
Petitioner and by the Government.
On March 19, 2019 and on March 20, 2019, the District Court issued two
separate orders denying Petitioner’s Motion to Suppress. (A. 39a-43a), and evidence
seized from the car was introduced during Petitioner’s trial.
2.
Motion For a Franks hearing
On January 18, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion to Conduct a Franks hearing.
A hearing on pretrial motions was held on January 23, 2019. The Franks Motion
was argued by Petitioner’s trial counsel: “Defense Counsel addressed the Court, re:
Defendant Bridges' Motion to Conduct Franks Hearing.”
On January 31, 2019, the District Court entered an order appearing to grant
the Franks hearing request and scheduling it for February 14, 2019.
On February 12, 2019, the Government filed a Response in Opposition to
Petitioner’s Franks Motion.
The Franks issue was argued again during a motions hearing on February
15, 2019, where docket entry No. 153, states: “Defense counsel addressed the Court,
re: Defendant Bridges' Motion to Conduct Franks Hearing (Doc No 121).”
On March 20, 2019, the District Court entered an order denying Petitioner’s
suppression motion. The Order incorrectly states that Petitioner’s suppression
motion was made “pursuant to Franks v. Delaware.” (A. 43a). It is unclear whether
3
the court intended to deny both the suppression motion and the motion for a Franks
hearing.
Trial
A jury trial began on March 22, 2019. J.S., Z.W. and N.G. testified at the
trial, but B.T. and L.C. did not. However, testimonial statements of the latter two
victims, as well as from other witnesses who did not testify, were introduced into
evidence during the course of the trial. Petitioner was not provided with the
opportunity to cross-examine these witnesses, and no demonstration of their
unavailability appears on the record.
On April 10, 2019, the jury found Petitioner guilty on all counts.
Sentencing
On March 29, 2021, the District Court conduced a sentencing hearing, at
which Petitioner objected to Paragraph 115 of the Presentence Investigation Report,
p. 23, regarding his local theft conviction, being counted as a part of his Criminal
History Score pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c), on the ground that this offense did
not constitute a prior sentence for Guideline purposes, as defined by U.S.S.G. §
4A1.2(a)(1).
After considering those objections and argument from counsel, the District
Court imposed a sentence of 420 months on each of Counts 1 through 6, to be served
concurrently, for a total of 35 years of incarceration. Petitioner was also ordered to
be placed on 10 years of supervised release on each count to be served concurrently.
4
Financial penalties were also imposed: a $600.00 special assessment and restitution
in the amount of $53,000 and $30,000. (A. 31a-37a).
Petitioner’s counsel objected to the sentence imposed as being substantively
unreasonable and placed several procedural error objections to the sentence on the
record before the close of the hearing.
Appeal
On April 7, 2021, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals. (A. 27a).
On September 15, 2022, the Third Circuit filed an Opinion affirming the
judgment and sentence of the District Court. (A. 3a-24a)
5
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I.
The warrantless search of Petitioner’s vehicle was not justified by the
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment because when the police
detained him, there was in plain view only innocuous objects–i.e., cell
phones and condoms–that could not have given rise to a reasonable belief
that his car contained evidence of sex trafficking.
This case asks the compelling issue that merits review by this Court whether
the warrantless search of Petitioner’s vehicle was justified by the automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment. The Third Circuit held that the police were
justified in believing that the vehicle contained evidence of sex trafficking because
while detaining Petitioner for sex trafficking, they saw in plain view inside his
vehicle cellphones and boxes of condoms. “This pre-existing suspicion combined with
the objects in plain view in the vehicle gave rise to probable cause to believe that
the vehicle contains evidence of sex trafficking.” (A. 8a) This decision raises the
issue whether unobjectionable and benign objects found in plain view can give rise
to probable cause that the vehicle contained evidence of criminal behavior. The
panel decision of the Third Circuit decided an important question of federal law
that has not been but should be settled by this Court. Therefore, under Sup. Ct. R.
10(c), this issue is of the “character” that this Court considers.
During the suppression hearing, the Government relied upon a Police
Directive, based upon a Pennsylvania statute, to justify the impoundment of the
car, which as demonstrated below, was inapplicable. Special Agent Jackson testified
that while conducting a sting operation at the Motel 6 in Northeast Philadelphia, he
saw a black Ford Taurus with Delaware tags parked in the motel parking lot. From
6
prior investigation, he believed that Petitioner might be inside, so he and the other
officers converged on it and ordered the two occupants, Petitioner and a woman, to
exit the vehicle. They demanded that both produce identification, but after learning
that Petitioner’s license was suspended, they impounded the vehicle solely for that
reason pursuant to a departmental policy. After being impounded, the vehicle was
subjected to an inventory search.
The Philadelphia police department relied upon its “Live Stop” Program,
Directive 92, promulgated on June 23, 2010, which states that according to the
Pennsylvania Vehicle Code § 6309.2, any vehicle may be impounded when it is
determined, during a lawful vehicle investigation that the operator is in violation of
several statutes, including Ҥ1543(a) --Driving While Operating Privilege is
Suspended or Revoked.”
The police Directive purportedly relies upon 75 Pa.C.S. § 6309.2. However,
this statute only applies if an individual “operates a motor vehicle or combination
on a highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 6309.2(a)(2). There
was no evidence presented that Petitioner had done so. Therefore, the police were
not at liberty to impound the vehicle.
Also, subsection (a)(1) of the statute only permits the police to “immobilize” a
vehicle if the license of the “operator” has, inter alia, been suspended. The only
exception to this rule is if the “interest of public safety” would so demand, i.e., the
vehicle poses public safety concerns warranting its towing and storage at an
impound lot. Commonwealth v. Lagenella, 623 Pa. 434, 446, 83 A.3d 94, 101 (2013).
7
The record reflects no public safety concerns that would justify the vehicle’s towing
to and storage in an impound lot. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Peak, 230 A.3d 1220,
1227 (Pa. Super. 2020) (vehicle stopped in front of a gas pump, obstructing the
business therein). Therefore, the police were not permitted to impound it, and the
vehicle was not properly within their lawful custody while and after being towed
away.
In Lagenella, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the statute
provides that one who operates a vehicle while his license is suspended—thus
rendering towing unnecessary—can appear before the “appropriate judicial
authority,” to seek release. 75 Pa.C.S. § 6309.2(b). If 24 hours elapses and the
operator does not make such an application, then the “judicial authority” will notify
the police, who will contact the appropriate towing and storage agent to tow the
vehicle. 75 Pa.C.S. § 6309.2(c). The Lagenella Court observed: “Thus, upon
immobilization, the vehicle's operator may seek release of the vehicle from the
judicial authority, not the police; and only upon the vehicle operator's failure to
obtain a certification of release within 24 hours will the judicial authority notify law
enforcement, who, at that time, shall arrange for the towing and storage of the
vehicle. These procedures indicate that a vehicle that is simply immobilized is not
within the lawful custody of the police.” Lagenella, 83 A.3d at 105. Therefore, the
police may conduct a warrantless search only of a vehicle that has been lawfully
impounded. If the impoundment was unlawful, then no search may occur.
8
The District Court attempted to sidestep these issues by holding that when
the police ordered Petitioner and his female companion out of the car, they
conducted a valid Terry stop1, which was supported by a reasonable articulable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. (A. 40a, fn. 1, p. 2). This reasoning is
mistaken. In United States v. Hester, 910 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 2018), the Third Circuit
held that a traffic stop is a seizure of everyone in the stopped vehicle. Assuming
that the police in this case engaged in a “traffic” stop, they would be required to
support it by "reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity [wa]s afoot[.]"
Id. at 87. Even if, for the sake of argument, one were to assume that the police had
such reasonable articulable suspicion, the Terry stop would justify only the search
of the people involved. It would not justify the seizure and search of the vehicle
itself. United States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1984) (A search of a passenger
compartment cannot be justified by the mere reasonable suspicion that validates an
investigatory stop).
The search of Petitioner and his female companion did not lead to any
evidence demonstrating that they were armed and dangerous or were involved in
sex trafficking. Indeed, Petitioner was not arrested or charged with any crime.
Rather, he was released. Almost a year passed before formal charges were brought
against him.
1
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
9
The District Court further held–and the Third Circuit agreed–that a warrant
would not be necessary because the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment
permits vehicle searches without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. (A. 41a, fn. 1, p. 3, citing
United States v. Donahue, 764 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2014)). Under the automobile
exception, a vehicle may be searched without a warrant when evidence or
contraband may possibly be removed from the scene due to the mobility of a vehicle,
and it is not practical to secure a warrant without jeopardizing the potential loss of
evidence. For instance, the automobile exception allows an officer to make a
warrantless traffic stop and search a trunk of a vehicle when gun parts were
observed in plain view on the front seat of the vehicle. Alternatively, the officer may
be able to establish probable cause based upon a tip by a reliable confidential
informant. See, e.g., Maryland v. Dyson, 517 U.S. 465 (1999) (evidence from
confidential informant that defendant had gone to buy drugs and would return in a
car with a specific license plate).
Here, however, the police only knew that Petitioner was alleged to be involved
in the prostitution trade. They had no reason to believe that the car he was in had
any contraband or any specific evidence that might lead to an arrest. Indeed, the
District Court did not point to the phones and condoms as justifying the belief that
the vehicle contained evidence. The Government did not present any evidence at the
suppression hearing demonstrating that any of the officers had probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contained evidence of a crime. Indeed, Agent Jackson
10
testified that as soon as it was learned that Petitioner’s license was suspended, his
car was impounded. The police then went down that road rather than justify the
search by invoking the automobile exception. The District Court mentioned the
automobile exception only in passing. The Third Circuit moved that exception out of
the shadows and placed it front and center in support of its affirmance of the denial
of the suppression motion.
In so doing, it stumbled into an area of the law that requires clarification by
this Court. Under the plain view doctrine, "if police are lawfully in a position from
which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent,
and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it
without a warrant." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993). In order for
the object's incriminating character to be immediately apparent, the police must
have probable cause to believe the object is contraband without conducting a further
search. Id. Documents may be immediately apparent as incriminating if an officer's
brief glance can confirm that they are evidence of criminal activity. See United
States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550, 563 (3d Cir. 1994). Further, police officers have a
lawful right of access to "that portion of the interior of an automobile which maybe
viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police
officers." Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983). In the case at bar, a brief glance
did not show that the objects in plain view–i.e., cellphones and condoms–were
evidence of criminal activity.
11
Absent their view of these objects, the officers in the case at bar had no
probable cause to believe that Petitioner’s vehicle contained evidence of a crime.
The Third Circuit conflated the “automobile” exception with the “plain-view”
exception and, in so doing, misapplied both. This case raises the issue of what types
of evidence that are in “plain view” might be applicable to invoke the “automobile”
exception. This Court has not had the opportunity to flesh out the contours of the
evidence. Under the “plain-view” exception, the Government’s attempt to justify the
search must necessarily fail because the incriminating nature of the objects was not
immediately apparent. This Court should grant certiorari to determine whether
such evidence might serve to provide a factual basis for the invocation of the
“automobile” exception.
12
II.
This Court should grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split concerning the
standard of review to be employed by a Court of Appeals when considering a
District Court’s denial of a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware.
This Court should grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split concerning the
standard of review to be employed by a Court of Appeals when considering a
District Court’s denial of a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154
(1978). Instead of addressing the correct standard of review, the Third Circuit cited
United States v. Desu, 23 F.4th 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2022) for the proposition that it
“review[s] for clear error a district court’s determination regarding whether false
statements in a warrant application were made with reckless disregard for the
truth.” (A. 9a) However, the panel that considered Petitioner’s appeal identified the
incorrect standard because the District Court judge never ruled on the Franks
issue. Therefore, she denied the request for a motion sub silentio. The issue before
the Third Circuit and, in turn, before this Court, is the appropriate standard to be
applied in an appeal from a denial of a Franks motion. The Circuits are split on
this issue, so under Sup. Ct. R. 10(a), this issue is of the “character” that this Court
considers.
A.
The District Court judge never ruled on Petitioner’s Franks
motion and, thereby denied it sub silentio.
On January 18, 2019, Defendant made a motion for a Franks hearing. [ECF
121] On January 23, 2019, the District Court judge conducted a conference, which
has never been transcribed. The minute entry on the docket indicate that the
13
parties discussed the motion. [ECF 123] On January 31, 2019, the District Court
judge entered an order granting the Franks hearing and scheduling it for February
14, 2019. [ECF 133] On February 12, 2019, the Government filed a written response
to Defendant’s motion for a Franks hearing. [ECF 147]
On February 14 and 15, 2019, the District Court conducted a suppression
motion hearing. At the end of the February 15, 2019 hearing, counsel for Bridges
mentioned the outstanding Franks motion. [N.T. 2/15/19, p. 151] The District Court
judge stated her belief that the motion has “been addressed to a certain degree” and
invited argument. [Id.] Defense counsel noted that the Government relied primarily
upon United States v. Brown, a case he distinguished, arguing that the FBI agent
conducted no independent investigation about the reliability of the informant,
Karen Allen. Since the FBI had no reason to believe that Ms. Allen was reliable,
there was an issue that required a hearing. [N.T. 2/15/19, pp. 152-158]
The District Court judge’s rulings are confusing; either she never ruled on
the Franks issue or she denied the request for a hearing. In either event, the Third
Circuit incorrectly invoked the standard of review to be employed when considering
a district court’s determinations considering the truth or falsity of statements made
in a warrant application and its substantial-basis review of a magistrate judge’s
probable cause determination. The Third Circuit should have considered the
standard of review to be employed when considering the denial of a Franks hearing.
14
B.
The circuits are split on the issue of what standard of review is
to be applied by a Court of Appeals when considering a District
Court’s denial of a Franks hearing.
The circuits are split on the issue of the appropriate standard of review to be
employed in an appeal from the denial of a Franks hearing. According to United
States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 665 (3d Cir. 2012), the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Circuits employ a mixed standard, reviewing legal determinations de novo and any
supporting factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Allen, 631 F.3d 164,
171 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Martin, 332 F.3d 827, 833 (5th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2002). By contrast,
the First, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits review a district court's decision for clear
error, though it is unclear to what extent that clear-error review maps onto the
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits' mixed standard. See United States v. Smith, 576
F.3d 762, 764 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Reiner, 500 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir.
2007); United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 304 (6th Cir. 2002). The Second
Circuit has apparently sided with mixed review, though then-Judge Sotomayor
questioned the validity of that choice. Compare United States v. Cahill, 355 F.
App'x 563, 565 (2d Cir. 2009) (reviewing factual findings supporting the denial of a
Franks hearing for clear error), and United States v. One Parcel of Property
Located at 15 Black Ledge, 897 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1990) (same), with United
States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 126 n.21 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J.) (questioning
the propriety of clear-error review and noting that the Second Circuit has not
"explain[ed] why that was the appropriate standard"). Meanwhile, the Eighth
15
Circuit has carved its own path, reviewing the district court's decision for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Kattaria, 553 F.3d 1171, 1177 (8th Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (per curiam). The Eleventh Circuit and D.C. Circuit have not yet decided
what standard to use. See United States v. Becton, 601 F.3d 588, 594(D.C. Cir.
2010) (bypassing the need to adopt a standard); United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d
1191, 1219 n.37 (11th Cir. 2009) (same, though noting that a district court's decision
to deny an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress is normally reviewed for
abuse of discretion).
C.
The District Court should have conducted a Franks hearing
because the affidavit submitted in support of the search
warrant contains materially false statements.
The District Court should have conducted a Franks hearing because the
affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant application to search the Ford
Taurus contains materially false statements or statements made with reckless
disregard for the truth and omits information that should have been made available
to U.S. Magistrate Judge before he issued the warrant. The affidavit of FBI Agent
Nicholas Grill, avers:
5. One or about June 20, 2017, the FBI received
information from a confidential source (CS) who wished to
remain anonymous that a young woman was being
trafficked by BRIDGES. The young woman will be
identified herein as Victim #3 (V3), who law enforcement
knows to have been involved in prostitution as a minor.
CS stated that BRIDGES is very violent towards V3 and
that V3. has known BRIDGES since she was 16 years old.
BRIDGES has hit her in the face and even dragged her
from a moving car which left wounds all over her back
and legs. BRIDGES is further alleged to have kicked V3
16
out of a moving car while in Philadelphia during the
winter months without any pants and left her there. CS
has stated that BRIDGES has forced V3 to perform oral
sex on him. BRIDGES is also alleged to have threatened
the life of V3’s mother and threatened to kidnap family
members if the mother tried to get her daughter back
from him. CS has stated that BRIDGES has multiple girls
working for him, and he pimps them out in multiple
states. CS provided telephone number (302) 438-1959 for
V3.
In his Motion for a Franks hearing, Petitioner denied each of these
statements. Furthermore, as attached to the Motion, Victim #3 denied them and
had sworn in an affidavit stating that she did not work for Petitioner and knew of
no other women who did.
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), this Court held that:
[w]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary
showing that a false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was
included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the
allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of
probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a
hearing be held at the defendant’s request. In the event
that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless
disregard is established by the defendant by a
preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s
false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining
content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the
search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the
search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause
was lacking on the face of the affidavit.
Id. at 155-156.
Inclusion of material misrepresentations constitutes false statements under
Franks. Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 783 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Wells,
17
223 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that the affidavit contained a material
misstatement, when officer alleged that the defendant’s twelve year old dark blue
Buick matched the description of the suspect vehicle, when the witness had
described the suspect vehicle as new dark green or black Lincoln); Sherwood v.
Mulvill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997) (Officers falsified affidavit to conceal the
fact that drugs were purchased not by an informant, but by an unwitting
participant in the transaction); United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 742, n.2 (3d
Cir. 1993); United States v. Calisto, 838 F.2d 711 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v.
Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 782 (9th Cir. 1985) (Defendant was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing based on preliminary showing of inaccuracies and omissions in the search
warrant affidavit), amended by, 769 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Baxter, 889 F.2d 731, 733 (6th Cir. 1989).
In United States v. Yusef, 461 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2006), the Third Circuit held
as follows:
In evaluating a claim that an officer both asserted and
omitted facts with reckless disregard for the truth, we
hold that: (1) omissions are made with reckless disregard
for the truth when an officer recklessly omits facts that
any reasonable person would want to know; and (2)
assertions are made with reckless disregard for the truth
when an officer has obvious reasons to doubt the truth of
what he or she is asserting.
Id. at 383; (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 783 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Here, the Government allegedly relied upon an anonymous confidential
source, or informant, that provided the foundation of the information to support the
18
warrant. The Third Circuit has held that “informants are not presumed to be
credible, and the Government is generally required to show by the totality of the
circumstances either that the informant has provided reliable information in the
past or that the information has been corroborated through independent
investigation. United States, v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 263 (3rd Cir. 2005). There is no
information contained within the affidavit that this source is reliable because of
previous credible information. According to the affidavit, the source is anonymous
and no additional information supports her credibility.
However, in its November 2, 2018-filing, the Government’s Omnibus
Response to Defense Motions, the Government revealed that the confidential source
was not anonymous as the affidavit avers. According to footnote #5 on page 14,
“B.T.’s mother was referred to as an anonymous confidential source in the affidavit
in order to protect her identity from disclosure as long as possible.” The agents
deliberately omitted/withheld this information from the judicial magistrate, thus
showing a reckless, if not intentional, disregard for the truth. This information was
of critical importance, as the judicial magistrate may view information from an
interested and closely connected family member quite differently from a
confidential informant who may have an ongoing relationship with law
enforcement.
The District Court was also informed via the Motion that on July 27, 2018,
the CS and Victim # 3 exchanged several audio text messages. In those messages,
the CS contradicts that she had any direct knowledge of Petitioner engaging in sex
19
trafficking, being violent towards Victim # 3, threatening her or pimping out other
girls, as the affidavit reflects.2
In determining probable cause, courts have consistently recognized the value
of corroboration by independent police work. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240
(1982). The text messages highlight the lack of independent police investigation.
Petitioner made a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement
knowingly and intentionally made, or made with reckless disregard for the truth,
was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and that the false statement
was necessary to the finding of probable cause. The Fourth Amendment required
that a hearing be held. Franks. at 155-156. The District Court failed to address the
issue.
This Court should, therefore, grant a Writ of Certiorari.
2
She also testified to a lack of direct knowledge at trial.
20
III.
The District Court violated Petitioner’s constitutional right to confront the
witnesses against him at trial by admitting into evidence testimonial
hearsay.
The District Court violated Petitioner’s Constitutional Right to Confront the
Witnesses Against Him at Trial by admitting into evidence testimonial hearsay. In
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004), this Court held that the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause “prohibits the introduction of testimonial
statements by a nontestifying witness, unless the witness is ‘unavailable to testify,
and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’” Id. at 54.
The Confrontation Clause does not bar the introduction of a statement “unless its
primary purpose was testimonial.” Id. at 245.
Ex parte examinations and interrogations used as a functional equivalent for
in-court testimony are the "core class of 'testimonial' statements" that directly
implicate the right of confrontation. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 at 68. When a statement
does not fall within this "core class," it is still testimonial if it was taken with the
primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. Michigan
v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011). The court should analyze the circumstances in
which the statement was taken to assess what reasonable participants would
perceive the primary purpose to be. Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2016).
Each of the substantive counts of the Indictment name five separate victims
of the charged conspiracy: "Z.W." (Count Two), "J.S." (Count Three), “B.T.” (Count
Four), "N.G." (Count Five) and “L.C.” (Count Six). Victims J.S., Z.W. and N.G.
testified at trial, Victims B.T. and L.C. did not. However, testimonial statements of
21
these two victims, as well as from other witnesses who did not testify, were
introduced into evidence during the course of the trial. Furthermore, testimonial
hearsay statements from a prostitution customer were introduced into evidence
through a police officer over the objections of defense counsel.
1.
H.N.’s statements to Officer Lis.
Officer Lis, a Tinicum police officer, testified about statements made by H.N.,
who was stopped and questioned following a commercial sexual encounter. Officer
Lis testified that H.N. told him that H.N. had solicited prostitution services by
responding to an advertisement from Backpage and that such services were
performed at the Motel 6. The Third Circuit incorrectly held that the District
Court’s allowance of this testimony should be held to a “plain error” standard
because trial counsel failed to object, holding that “[a]lthough H.N.’s statements
were testimonial, the District Court did not plainly err in admitting Officer Lis’s
testimony. See United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 59 (2d Cir. 2003) (where a
defendant “failed to preserve [his] objection to the Confrontation Clause violation . .
. , we evaluate the district court’s admission of testimony in violation of the
Confrontation Clause for plain error”).” (A. 14a-15a)
In fact, the record plainly shows that trial counsel did, in fact, object to this
testimony:
P/O Lis: . . . Once I gathered the marijuana from the vehicle, I
proceeded to talk to Mr. Nim about his whereabouts prior at the Motel
6, which at that point in time he did admit to me everything that
22
happened at the Motel 6.
MR. SKIPPER: Objection as to what Mr. Nim said, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MS. URBAN:
Q. Let me break in with a question there. What was it that Mr. Nim
said about what he had been doing?
A. He proceeded to -MR. SKIPPER: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I overruled it
Defense counsel objected, but the District Court overruled that objection.
This Court should agree that Petitioner suffered the loss of his constitutional right
to cross-examine H.N.
2.
Z.W.’s testimony recounting B.T.’s statements.
At trial, during direct testimony of Z.W., who was named as a victim in Count
Two, the Government elicited testimony that B.T., who was named as a victim in
Count Four but did not testify, told Z.W. that she was only 16 years old, one of the
elements which had to be met by the Government. Defense counsel objected to this
testimony, but the District Court overruled that objection.
Although Petitioner’s appellate counsel raised this issue in his brief, the
Third Circuit did not address it. This Court should agree that Petitioner suffered
the loss of his constitutional right to cross-examine Z.W.
3.
Statements by B.T., L.C. and N.G. to law enforcement.
On April 3, 2019, the Government called Corporal Joseph Kendrick of the
Newark, Delaware Police Department as a witness. Corporal Kendrick testified to
23
arresting B.T. and another female on November 23, 2016 for prostitution. After
her arrest, B.T. was interviewed by police. Corporal Kendrick testified that during
the interview, B.T. provided the name of her ex-boyfriend and his telephone
number, which the police checked against a police database and discovered that the
name of her boyfriend was Petitioner.
On April 5, 2021, during direct examination, the Government elicited from
FBI Agent C.J. Jackson that when B.T. was interviewed following her arrest on
November 23, 2016, in Newark, Delaware, he testified that "... and it was the name
of Dkyle Bridges was mentioned in interview." Trial counsel’s objection to this
testimony was overruled.
On April 8, 2021, during redirect examination, the Government elicited from
FBI agent C.J. Jackson the fact that statements were taken from L.C. and N.G. by
the police after they were arrested on November 15, 2016, for prostitution. The
following testimony was permitted by the trial court:
Q.
And to be clear than, have you heard on the
recorded video that she had said that
someone other than the friend of Kris had
driven her?
A.
I would have to see that portion of the video. I recall she
was saying that someone by the name of K to bring her up
there.
Defense Counsel: Objection.
The Court: Overruled.
24
The Government then established that L.C. and N.G. had both given
statements to the police identifying the person who brought them to the motel to
perform as prostitutes as “K” or “D,” both references which during the course of the
trial had been made as identifying Petitioner.
The hearsay statements of B.T., L.C. and N.G. were testimonial in nature. No
evidence was placed on the record that they were unavailable as witnesses, and the
trial court issued no findings regarding their status as witnesses. There was no
prior opportunity for the Petitioner to cross-examine these witnesses prior to their
hearsay statements being admitted into evidence by the Government, and as
permitted by the trial court in overruling numerous objections to the same.
The testimony that was introduced was also critical to the Government's
ability to prove the elements of the offenses, and critical for the Petitioner to defend
against the same. This hearsay evidence helped to place evidence on the record that
B.T. was a minor, a key element that the Government had to prove. Other hearsay
evidence was introduced by the Government to prove force, fraud and coercion,
essential elements for all six counts of the Indictment. Other hearsay evidence was
introduced by the Government to connect Petitioner with certain prostitution
transactions.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant part,
provides that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him...”
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the defendant was convicted
25
in state court of assault, but asserted that the admission of his wife's statement to
police, after the defendant invoked state marital privilege to preclude her testimony
at trial, violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. The
Supreme Court of Washington upheld the conviction.
In its opinion, this Court noted that the procedural guarantee of
confrontation applies to both federal and state prosecutions. Id., 541 U.S. at 42;
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965). In the appeal, the State of Washington
asserted that this Court’s precedent allowed the use of the wife's statement, which
arguably controverted defendant's assertion of self-defense, since the wife was
unavailable as a trial witness due to marital privilege, and her statement to the
police had sufficient indicia of reliability. Based on these facts and legal positions,
this Court examined the development of the Confrontation Clause to determine
what was required to satisfy the confrontation guarantee.
This Court observed that the common law in 1791 conditioned the
admissibility of an absent witness's examination on (1) unavailability and on (2) a
prior opportunity to cross-examine. It held that the Sixth Amendment therefore,
incorporates those limitations, observing that the fact that numerous early state
decisions applying the same test confirmed that these principles were received as
part of the common law in this country. Id., 541 U.S. at 54. In reaching these
conclusions, it stated: “Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have
been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” 541 U.S. at 59.
26
This Court acknowledged that, while the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation
protection is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that testimonial
hearsay is its primary object, and interrogations by law enforcement officers fall
squarely within that class. 541 U.S. at 53. It then noted the required distinction
between testimonial hearsay and non-testimonial hearsay with regard to the
Confrontation Clause protections:
Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly
consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States
flexibility in their development of hearsay law--as does
Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such
statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny
altogether. Where testimonial evidence is at issue,
however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the
common law required: unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.
541 U.S. at 68.
This Court explained further that the mere test of reliability, sufficient for
non-testimonial hearsay, was insufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements
of the Confrontation Clause, a procedural guarantee, when the hearsay was
testimonial in nature. 541 U.S. 61-62. While not exhausting the list of testimonial
hearsay, this Court definitely identified police interrogations as meeting that
definition, as one of the practices with close kinship to the abuses at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed. 541 U.S. at 68.
Based on the facts before it in Crawford, this Court reversed the defendant’s
conviction, noting that the State admitted Defendant’s wife’s testimonial statement
against the defendant, despite the fact that he had no opportunity to cross-examine
27
her, ruling: “That alone is sufficient to make out a violation of the Sixth
Amendment.” 541 U.S. at 68. The Court further declined to search the record for
indicia of reliability of the statement, holding that "Where testimonial statements
are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.” 541 U.S. at
68-69.
It is clear, based upon the facts and the law outlined above, that Petitioner’s
right to confrontation was violated at trial. The testimony cited above was clearly
testimonial in nature, and went to the very heart of the elements that the
Government was required to prove to convict. The majority of the hearsay
testimony introduced into evidence were statements given to law enforcement
officers, and therefore, were testimonial in nature. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. There
was no showing, as required, that any of the these absent witnesses were
unavailable to be called as witnesses, or that Petitioner was given a prior
opportunity to cross-examine them.
This Court should, therefore, grant a Writ of Certiorari.
28
IV.
The District Court committed a procedural error of law in failing to
adequately consider all of the factors required for sentencing pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).
When sentencing a defendant, the District Court must follow a three-step
sentencing procedure as set forth in United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d
Cir. 2006) ("Gunter I"), which includes meaningful consideration all of the § 3553(a)
factors. Petitioner contends that the District Court did not reasonably or adequately
considered all of the § 3553(a) factors as required, including (a) his history and
characteristics, § 3553(a)(1); (b) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide just
punishment for the offense; to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and
to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, § 3553(a)(2)(A), (B) and
(c); and (c) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities, § 3553(a)(6). As a
result, Petitioner contends that the sentence of the District Court must be vacated.
29
CONCLUSION
This Court should, therefore, review the Opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit and Grant this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
Respectfully submitted:
/s/ Luther E. Weaver, III
Luther E. Weaver, III, Esquire
WEAVER & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
123 S. Broad Street, Suite 2102
Philadelphia, PA 19109
(215) 790-0600
Attorney for Petitioner, Dkyle Bridges
30
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.