Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Isaiah Tyler, Petitioner v. Kentucky Department of Corrections

Supreme Court briefOct 10, 2022

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No.

ORIGINAL

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

OCT I 0 2022

IN THE

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

-t-Sa i a

lyl-eY

— PETITIONER

(Your Name)

vs.

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btp&fUettl-

r^rcedionS— RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

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AfPp.dU_________________________

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

-L sal oh

iyt.fr

(Your Name)

Eask,rn ReflforiCi GorffidiVyul

Gnmp /p.v

(Address)

road

Justice, \M t& bfosL.M LlHl2

(City, State, Zip Code)

(Phone Number)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Do Kentucky's violent offender statute create a liberty interest

protected by due process?

2. Is the Kentucky Department of Corrections in constant violation

of the 8th Amendment and Due Process Clause for the way it applies

the violent offender statute?

3.Was Tyler denied Equal Protection under the 14th Amendment?

LIST OF PARTIES

(V] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[ ] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of

all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

CONCLUSION

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A- KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

APPENDIX B- CIRCUIT COURT ORDER

APPENDIX C — KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT ORDER DENYING DISCRETIONARY

REVIEW

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX F

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A- KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

APPENDIX B- CIRUIT COURT ORDER

APPENDIX C- KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT ORDER DENYING DISCRETIONARY

REVIEW

TABLE OF AUTHORITY

Tyler V. Commonwealth, case No. 2015-SC-000064-MR, ....

KRS 439.3401

....................................................................

KRS 507.040

KRS 507.050 . .»

KRS 506.010

KRS Chapter 510

KRS 531.310

KRS 531.320 rr.,

KRS 530.064(1)(a)

KRS 529.100,7

KRS 508.100 :

KRS 508.010

KRS 508.020 .,

KRS 508.032

KRS 508.060

KRS 509.040

KRS 532.020(2 ) (b) (c) .

KRS 507.040

KRS 507.050

K^S^rCHA'PTER'-S07 or 5,07A

. 77

KKRS 197.045 (T)"( 5) 1 ...................................................................... ..................

joost v. U.S. Parole Commission,647 F.Supp 644,646(D.Kan.1986)...

Hewitt v. Helms,459 U.S. 460,472,103 S.Ct. 86^.^71,74 L.Ed 2d 675

KRS 439.3401 . . ...............................................................................................

ir.

Futrell V.CCommonwealth,471 S.W. 3d 258,277(Ky.2015)

Commonwealth V. Combs,316 S.W. 3d 877,881(Ky.2010)..

Wilson V. Commonwealth,601SS.W. 2d 280,256(Ky.1980).

KRS ‘502.020..................................... ..................................................

KRS 515.020

KRS 39A.020

KRS 439.3401

Bddcham Corp V. Revenue Cabinet,40 S.W. 3d 833,855(Ky.App.2001).... 10

Civil Service Comm'n V. Letter Carriers,413 U.S. 548,571,93 S.Ct.

2880,37 L.Ed 2d 796(1973)...............

.10

Hooper,155 U.S. at 657,15 S.Ct. 207

110

United States V. Coombs,12 Pet.72,76,37 U.S. 72,9 L.Ed 1004(1838).. 10

KRS 439.3401

MCDonald V. Board of Election Comm'rs,394 U.S. 802,808-809(1969)... 11

McGowan V. Maryland,366 U.S. 420,425-426,81 S.Ct. 1101,1104-1105,

6 L.Ed 2d 393(1961)..

til

San Antonio Independent School Dist. V. Rodriguez,411 U.S. 1,93 S.Ct

1278,36 L.Ed 2d 16(1973)................................... ........................................................

Clements V. Fashing? 457 U.S. 957,102 S.Ct. 2836,73 L.Ed @d 508{ ' '■? V

(1982) .................... ................................................ ..................... ........................

KRS 439.3401.................... .................................................................................

11 .

Black's, Law Dictionary 1233(5thsed. 1979).....................................

Ill

Vandertoll V. Commonwealth,110 S.W. 3d 789,795-796(Ky.2003)

KRS 446.010(39)......................................................... .. . ...............................

KRS 439.3401 ................................................................ ............................

Due Process

14th Amendment

8th Amendment

Graham V.:Florida,176 L.Ed 2d 825,130 S.Ct. 2011,500 U.S. 48(2010)

Farmer V. Brennan,511 U.S. 825(1994) <.....;............. ................................

Sandlin V."Conner,515 U.S. 472,481,482-484,115 S.Ct. 2293,132 L.Ed

2d 418(1995) ........................ .......................................................................... ...............

Wilkinson,545 U.S. at 222-23 ...............................................................................

i 12

Greenholtz V. Nebraska Penal Inmates,442 U.S. 1,99 S.Ct. 2100,60

L.Ed 2d 668- — ...................................................................................... .............,. . .-

14th Amendment............. ................... .......................................................................

.13

Greenholtz V. Nebraska Penal Inmates,442 U.S. 1,99 S.Ct. 2100,60

L.Ed 2d 668(1979))

■) )>)))>j))))))))))))))))))))),,),,,,,,,,,,,, j i y

Greenholtz, Id at 12,99 S.Ct. at 2106 ..........................................

Due Process Clause-••.................... ..

-.'--13

i . . ....................................

Dent V. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114,123,9 S.Ct. 231,233,32

L.Ed 623(1889) -rv........................................................................................

Anderson V. Winsett,449 U.S. 1093,101 S.Ct. 891,66 L.Ed 2d 822 (1981 )—•13

Baumann V. Arizona Department Of Corrections,769 F.2d 841,844

(CA9 1985)

Parker V. Corrothers , 750 F.2d 653,661(CA8 1984)—Greenholtz, Id at 446,101 S.Ct. at 2465

-i-t*V''.“V".’'.'• V . . . ,

. . . 1-4

; •

. . . 14

Board of Pardons V. Allen,482 U.S. 369,107 S.Ct. 2415,96 L.Ed

2d 303(1987) .................... ...................................................................................

ti4

Greenholtz V. Nebraska Penal Inmates,442 U.S. 1,99 S.Ct. 2100,60

L.Ed 2d 668(1979)

KRS 439.3401

KRS 446.010(26) •

KRS 446.010(39) •

, 15

-; -:

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix

the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix

the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

[>/] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix —A__ to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

O'] is unpublished.

The opinion of the_____

appears at Appendix_fk

APPeaU

__ court

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

01 is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was ____________________ .

[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date: _________ __

, and a copy of the

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including _

(date) on

(date)

in Application No.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

[J] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was Mm 21.1011

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix _k____

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

--------------------------------- , and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including

(date) on

(date) in

Application No.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

• CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

DUE PROCESS

14Th Amendment

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

. N

STATEMENT OF CASE

The petitioner was tried of First degree robbery in Henderson Circuit

Court in Henderson, Kentucky. He was found not guilty but convicted of

complicity to first degree robbery and second degree persistent felony

offender and recieved a forty(40)year sentence by the jury. Following

his conviction, petitioner recieved a twenty(20)thousand dollar appeal

bond pending decision from the Kentucky Supreme Court on his direct

review

Case No. 2015-SC-000064-MR, Tyler V. Commonwealth of Kentucky.

The court affirm the conviction. The petitioner's appeal bond was revoked

and once in custody of Kentucky Department of Corrections(KYDOC), he

was classified as a violent offender under KRS 439.3401, despite his

offense not being listed under the statue and being acquitted of the

offense that is listed as well as not meeting the criteria setforth in

the statue.

KRS 439.3401. Parole for violent offenders; applicability of section to

victim of domestic violence or abuse; Time of offense; Prohibition

against award of credit. Reads;

(1) As used in this section, "violent offender" means any person who

has been convicted of or plead guilty to the commission of:

(A) A capital offense;

(B) A class A felony

physical injury to a victim:

(D) An offense described in KRS 507.040 or 507.050 where the offense

involves the killing of a peace officer; firefighter, or emergency

medical services personel while the peace officer, firefighter, or

medical services personel was acting in the line of: duty;

(E) A class B felony involving criminal attempt to commit murder under

KRS 506.010 if the victim of the offense is a clearly identifiable

peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical services personel

acting in the line of duty regardless of whether an injury results;

(F) The commission or attempted commission of a felony sexual offense

described in KRS Chapter 510;

(G) Use of a minor in a sexual performance as described in KRS 531.310

(H) Promoting a sexual performance by a minor as described in KRS 531.320

(I) Unlawful transaction with a minor in the first degree as described

in KRS 530.064(1)(a);

(J) Human trafficking under KRS' 529.100 involving commercial sexual

activity where the victim is a minor;

(K) Criminal abuse in the first degree as described in KRS 508.100;

(L) Burglary in the first degree accompanied by the commission or

W.■

attempted commission of an assault described in KRS 508.010, 508.020,

508.032 or 508.060;

(M) Burglary in the first degree accompanied by commission or attempted

commission of kidnapping as prohibited by KRS 509.040.;

(N) Robbery in the first degree; or

(O) Incest as described in KRS 530.020(2)(b) or (c)

The court shall designate in its judgment if the victim suffered death

or serious physical injury.

(2) A violent offender who has been convicted of a capital offense and

who has recieved a life sentence (and has not been sentenced to

twenty-five(25) years without parole or imprisonment for life without

benefit of probation or parole), or a class A felony and recieves a

life sentence or to death and his or her sentence is commuted to

a life sentence shall not be released on probation or parole until

hi 9E ihi has served at least twenty-five(25) years in the penitentiary.

Violent offenders may have a greater minimum parole eligibility date

than other offenders who recieve longer sentences, including a sentence

of life imprisonment

(3)

(A) A violent offender who has been convicted of a capital offense or

class A felony with a sentence of a term of: years or class B felony

shall not be released on probation or parole until he served at least

eighty-five oercent(85%) of the sentence;

(B) A violent offender who has been convicted of a violation of

KRS 507.040 where the victim of the offense was clearly identifiable as

a peace officer, a firefighter, or emergency medical services personel

and the victim was acting in the line of duty shall not be released on

probation or parole until he or she has served at least eight-five

percent(85%) of the sentence imposed.

KRS 507.040 or 507.050 where the victim of the offense was a peace

Officer, a firefighter, or emergency medical services personel and the

victim was acting in the line of duty shall not be released on probation

or parole until he or she has served at least fifty percent(50%) of the

sentence imposed

(D) Any offender who has been convicted of a homocide or fetal homocide

offense under KRS chapter 507 or 507A in which the victim of' the offense

died as a result of an overdose of a schedule I controlled substance

and who is not otherwise subject to paragraph (a),(b) or (c) of this

subsection shall not be released on • probation, shock probation, parole

pr conditional discharge or other form of early release until he or she

has served at least fifty percent(50%) of the sentence imposed

(4) A violent offender shall not be awarded any credit on his sentence '

authorized by KRS 197.045(1)(b)1. In no event shall a violent offender

be given credit on his or her sentence if the credit reduces the term of

imprisonment to less than eighty-five percent(85%) of the sentence.

(5) This section shall not apply to a person who has been determined by

a court to have been a victim of domestic violence or abuse pursuant to

KRS 533.060 with regard to the offenses involving the death of the victim

or serious physical injury to the victim.

The provisions of this subsection shall not extend to rape in the first

degree or sodomy in the first degree by the defendant.

In the case at bar with petitioner Tyler

he was convicted of

complicity to first degree robbery and secondly, death or serious

physical injury didnt occur. To create a protected liberty interest in

the prison context, state regulations must use "explicity mandatory

language" in connection with the establishment of specific substantive

predicates to limit official discretion and thereby require that a

particular outcome be reached upon finding that the relevant criteria

have been met. Joost v. U.S. parole commission,647 F.Supp 644,646

(D.Kan.1986) also see Hewitt v. Helms,459 U.S. 460,472

103 S.Ct. 864

871, 74 L.Ed 2d 675

(1) Tyler's offense for complicity to first degree robbery isn't

described under KRS_439.3401

(2) Death or serious physical injury isn't in his final judgment,

therefore he is not a "violent offender" under state law.

When the state'court was faced with the issue of complicity and

KRS 439.3401, they stated "Complicity is not a seperate offense but

is an alternative theory of the offense charged. Futrell v. Commonwealth

471 S..W. 3d 258,277(Ky. 2015) and in the case of Commonwealth v. Combs,

316 S.W. 3d 877,881(Ky.2010) quoting Wilson v. Commonwealth,610 S.W.

2d 289,286(Ky.1980) " A person who is guilty of complicity to a crime

occupies the same status as one being guilty of the principal offense."

The petitioner was acquitted of the principal offense, first degree

robbery and his alledged codefendants all pled guilty to various charges.

Futhermore, it is .a seperate offense thats why it has different statue

numbers . KRS 502.020-complicity and KRS 515.020 is first degree robbery.

Complicity to first degree robbery isn't the same as first degree

robbery, there decisions have been incorrect and misinterpretation of

law.

KRS 502.020.

Liability conduct of another-complicity

(1) A person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when,

with the intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the

offense, he

(A) Solicits, commands, or engages in a conspiracy with such other person

to commit the offense; or

(B) Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such person in planning or

committing the offense; or

to make proper effort to do so

(2) When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, ~

a person, who acts with the kind of culpability with respect to the result

that is sufficent for the commission of the offense is guilty of that

offense when he:

(A) Solicits or engage in a conspiracy with another person to engage in

the conduct causing such result; or

(B) Aids, counsels or attempts to aid another person in planning or *

engaging in the conduct causing such result; or

fails to make a proper effort to do so.

The statue for first degree robbery reads; KRS 515.020 Robbery in the

first degree;

(1) A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the'course

of committing theft, he or she uses or threatens the immediate use of

physical force upon another person with the intent to accomplish the

theft and when he or she;

(A) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the

crime

(B) Is armed with a deadly weapon;or

any person who is not a participant in the crime

(2) Robbery in the first degree is a class B felony, unless the offense

occurs during a declared emergency as defined by KRS 39A.020 arising

from a natural or manmade diaster, within the area covered by the

emergency declaration and within the area impacted by the diaster in

which case it is a class A felony.

The state court's ruling were truly erred

there is a major difference

between First degree robbery and the petitioner's offense, Complicity

to First degree robbery. These are seperate offenses in which one is

covered under KRS 439.3401 and the other is not. If the General Assembly

wanted Complicity to First degree robbery included in KRS 439.3401,

then it would have been added. Smithkline Beecham Corp V. Revenue Cabinet

40 S.W. 3d 883, 855(Ky.App.2001). This court's duty is "not to destroy

the act if we can, but to construe it

if consistent with the will of

congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations."

Civil Service Comm'n V. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548

571, 93 S.Ct.

2880, 37 L.Ed 2d 796(1973). In discharging that duty, "every reasonable

construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from

unconstitutionality." Hooper,155 U.S. at 657,15 S. Ct. 207

The issue here isn't whether the statute is ambiguous or not but rather

unconstitutional how the Kentucky Department of Corrections applies it.

'A presumption never ought to be indulged, that congress meant to

to excerise or usurp any constitutional authority, unless that

-::7 .

conclusion is forced upon the court by language altogether unambiguous.

United States V. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72,76,37 U.S. 72,9 L. Ed 1004(1838)

lTier statute is clear and concise, complicity isn' t listed under

)

KRS 439.3401 nor does it imply that it should. First degree robbery is

the offense listed under the statute and the petitioner was acquitted

of that offense therefore

he is not a violent offender by law.

Under traditional equal protection principles, distinctions need only

be drawn in such a manner to bear some rational relationship to a

legitimate state end. Classifications are set aside only if they are

based solely on reason totally unrelated to the pursuit of the states

goals and if no grounds can be conceived to justify them.

McDonald V. Board of Election Comm'rs,394 U.S. 802, 808-809(1969);

McGowan V. Maryland,366 U.S. 420,425-426,81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104-1105,6

L.Ed. 2d 393(1961). The court have departed from traditional protections

principles only when the challenged statute places a burden upon

"suspect classes" of persons or on a constitutional right that is deemed

to be fundamental. San Antonio Independent School Dist. V. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 1,93 S.Ct. 1278,36 L.Ed 2d 16(1973); Clements V. Fashing,

457 U.S. 957,963,702 S.Ct. 2836,73 L.Ed 2d 508(1982).

The second issue petitioner argues is that KYDOC is abusing its

discretion by ignoring mandatory language within KRS 439.3401

The statute specifically states "The court shall designate in its

judgment if the victim suffered death or serious physical injury."

This what determines if certain class B felonies are considered violent

or not. It.'s mandatory language not optional, "In common or ordinary

parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term "shall" is a

word of command and must be given a compulsory meaning." Black's Law

Dictionary 1233 (5th Ed,1979). Shall means shall.

Vandertoll V. Commonwealth,110 S.W. 3d 789,795-796(Ky.2003);

KRS £46.010 -Definitions for statutes; (39) shall is mandatory.

• .1

Even if the petitioner's offense for Complicity to First Degree Robbery

was described under Kentucky's violent offender statute, he still

wouldnt be considered a violent offender under state law.:since

death or- serious physical injury isn't in his judgment from the trial

court. The KYDOC is applying KRS 439.3401violent offender status to

all Complicities to first degree robberies and First degree robberies

despite whether or not death or serious physical occured. Rather than

serve eight(8)years before being parole eligible, the petitioner has

to serve twenty(20)years due to his classification as a violent offender.

His classification not only violates Due Process, Equal Protection

under the Fourteenth(l4)Amendment but the Eighth(8th)Amendment as well

by making the petitioner serve more time than he's suppose too. See

Graham V. Florida

176 L.Ed 2d 825, 130 S.Ct. 2011

560 U.S. 48(2010);

Farmer V. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825(1994); Sandlin V. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

481

482-484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed 2d. 418(1995) also see

Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 222-23.

In Greenholtz V. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1,99 S.Ct.2100,60

L.Ed 2d 668, the court held that the mandatory language and structure

of a Nebraska Parole-release statute created an "expectancy of release"

a liberty interest entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause.

The Montana statute at issue in this case provides that a prisoner

eligible for parole "shall" be released when there is a reasonable

probability that no detriment will result to him or the community, and

specifies that parole shall be oredered for the best interests of society

and when the state board~of pardons believes that the prisoner is-;hble

and willing to assume the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.

The board denied him right to^due process by failing to . apply the -r.

... _

statutoty mandated criteria in determing parole eligibility and failing

adequately to explain its reasons for parole denials.

"When scruntized under the Greenholtz standards the Montana statue

clearly creates a liberty interest in parole release that is protected

by due process clause of the the Fourteenth Amendment. Although, as in

Greenholtzy the release decision here is necessarily subjective and

predictive" and the board discretion "very broad" nevertheless, the

Montana statue, like Nebraska statue, uses mandatory language ("shall")

to create a presumption that parole release will granted when the

designated finding are made.

The district court first acknowledged that the case was controlled by

principles established in this court's decision in Greenholtz V.

Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1,99 S.Ct. 2100,60 L.Ed 2d 668(1979).

In Greenholtz, the court held thatidespite the necessarily subjective

and predictive nature of parole-release decision see Id, at 12,99 S.Ct.

at 2106

state.vstatues may create a liberty interests in parole release

that are entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause.

Therdourt concluded that the mandatory language and the structure at the

Nebraska statue at issue in Greenholtz created an "expectancy of release"

which is a liberty interest entitled to such protections action of

government, Dent V. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123,9 S.Ct. 231,233,

32 L.Ed 623(1889) see Anderson V. Winsett

66 L.Ed 2d 822(1981) (White,J.

449 U.S. 1093, 101 S.Ct. 891,

dissenting from denial of Cert.) But as

the following analysis of the decisions of the court of appeals

demosttate, even under the most "restrictive interpretation of Greenholtz"

Buamann V. Arizona Department of Corrections, 7547T.2d 841,844(CA9 1985)

courts have held that the presence of mandatory language in the statute

gives rise to a liberty interest in parole release. The Montana statute,

by its use of the word "shall" and the phrase "subject to the '

following restrictions." Creates a liberty interest under this most

restrictive interpretation;

Court of Appeals decisions since Greenholtz fall into four catergories.

When statutes or regulatory provisions are'phrased in mandatory term,

or explicity create a presumption of release

courts find a liberty

interest. See. Parker V.. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653,661(CA8 1984)

Petitioner Tyler's classification as a "violent offender" is

unconstitutional and should be set aside as a matter of law, both

state and federal. Having to serve eighty-five percent(857) instead

of twenty percent(207) like other nonviolent offenders cannot be •

supported by law. The statute in question creates a liberty interest

by its mandatory language within

by use of the word "shall."

Also the statute lays out specific guidelines and offenses that

subject s one to being a

'violent offender." The Kentucky statute

invokes the protection and entitlements of Greenholtz, Id at 466,

101 S.Ct. at 2465.

The United State Supreme Court has held that statutes that uses

mandatory language when it comes to parole/release liberty interest

are entitled; Board of Pardon V. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 107 S.Ct. 2415

96 L.Ed 2d 303(1987); Greenholtz V. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S.

1,99 S.Ct.2100,60 L.Ed 2d 668(1979). The state courts decision

should be reversed and clarification needs to be provide because the

KYDOC is applying

KRS 439.3401-violent offender to a LI complicities

andrfirst degree robberies regardless if one does;,not meet the

criteria and their subjecting individuals to serve more time than

they should be. Currently petitioner's parole date is June of 2036

and a serve out date of June of '2056, when by law it should be.June

of June of 2024 and serve out date of June of 2032 or 2033, thats

with good time credit and programs. The way the KYDOC applies the

statute is a abuse of discretion and the state courts are abusing

their discretion as well by not upholding and enforcing statues. Whats

the point of having KRS 439.3401 if Kentucky Department Of Corrections

and the state courts arent going to follow :.the guidelines

criteria

and the mandatory language within? Its complete anarchy how they use

the statute and ignore language that is defined as mandatory by the state

see. KRS

446.010(26) and 446.010(39).

REASONS

FOR GRANTING'WRIT OF'CERTIORARI7

There has been so much misinterpretation regarding KRS 439-3401,

that it needs proper clarification at the highest level of this

nation which can only be provided by United States Supreme Court.

This will be a landmark ruling affecting not only the petitioner

but tens of thousands maybe more. Those who are currently convicted

and serving sentence enhanced by the statute but pretrial detainees

as well and also how the court sentences individuals. The petitioner

is addressing federal claims in his Writ of Certiorari and those

need a federal decision rendered.

•

■

CONCLUSION

The-Petitioner prays this court grant his writ of certiorari so not

only can hetgetlr^lifefi'.butatheotens <bfi‘ thousand :of .other s Gan too.

His state and federally protected rights must be .'.enforced as a matter

of law.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

DATE: oflobtr ft* 7blZ

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.