Petition for Writ of Certiorari — William Eugene Moon, Petitioner v. Tennessee

No.

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

WILLIAM EUGENE MOON

Petitioner

v.

STATE OF TENNESSEE

Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to

the Tennessee Supreme Court

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Paul Andrew Justice III

1902 Cypress Drive

Murfreesboro, TN 37130

(615) 419-4994

drew@justicelawoffice.com

Counsel for Petitioner

Question Presented

I.

Was the Defendant denied a speedy trial?

Related Proceedings

State of Tennessee v. William Eugene Moon, M2019-01865-SC-R11-CD slip

op. (Tenn. April 20, 2022).

State of Tennessee v. William Eugene Moon, M2019-01865-CCA-R3-CV slip

op. (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2021).

The Parties

The Petitioner is William Eugene Moon, the Defendant in this criminal case.

The Respondent is the State of Tennessee, the Plaintiff.

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Table of Contents

Question Presented..........................................................................................................i

Related Proceedings.........................................................................................................i

The Parties.......................................................................................................................i

Table of Contents............................................................................................................ii

Table of Authorities.......................................................................................................iii

Introduction.....................................................................................................................1

Jurisdiction......................................................................................................................1

Federal Law at Issue — The Sixth Amendment...........................................................2

Statement of the Case.....................................................................................................2

Reasons to Grant Certiorari...........................................................................................7

I.

THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A SPEEDY TRIAL..........................7

A.

B.

Tennessee's Elimination of the Right to a Speedy Trial...............7

Criteria for Granting Certiorari...................................................11

1.

2.

Supreme Court Rule 10(c)..................................................11

Supreme Court Rule 10(b)..................................................12

Conclusion......................................................................................................................14

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Table of Authorities

Court Cases

Page(s)

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)...............................................................8,9,10,11

Cain v. Smith, 686 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1982)................................................................12

Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975)..........................................................8

Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)...........................................................11

Prince v. State of Alabama, 507 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1975)...........................................13

Redd v. Sowders, 809 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1987)..........................................................13

State v. Utley, 956 S.W.2d 489 (Tenn. 1997)............................................................7,13

State v. Wood, 924 S.W.2d 342 (Tenn. 1996).................................................................9

United States v. Butler, 426 F.2d 1275 (1st Cir. 1970)...............................................12

United States v. Calloway, 505 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1974)..........................................13

United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986),.....................................................10

Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 (2009)..........................................................................9

Wells v. Petsock, 941 F.2d 253 (3rd Cir. 1991).......................................................13,14

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1257..............................................................................................................1

Other Authorities

6th Amendment..........................................................................................................2,11

Sup. Ct. R. 10.......................................................................................................11,12,14

iii

Introduction

In denying a speedy trial claim, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that an

accusation of generic street crime by eyewitnesses was "complex," that a delay of

one year always weighs in the government's favor, that government-caused delay

weighs in the government's favor, and that pretrial incarceration and anxiety do not

count as prejudice. Such holdings deviate markedly from this Court's speedy trial

jurisprudence, not to mention the rulings of the other federal courts. DefendantPetitioner William Moon asks for a writ of certiorari, and ultimately reversal.

Jurisdiction

This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which

authorizes petitions for certiorari after a state's highest court rules on a federal

question. In this case, the judgment of the Tennessee Supreme Court was issued on

April 20, 2022, (Pet. Appx 3). Therefore, this petition is timely on July 19, 2022.

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Federal Law at Issue

Sixth Amendment

"In all prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right

to a speedy and public trial[.]"

Statement of the Case

The Petitioner, William Moon, was arrested for supposedly pulling out a gun

and pointing it at a police officer while being arrested. (Pet. Appx 5). Moon was

charged with Attempted First Degree Murder, and also a weapons charge for using

a firearm to do it. (Pet. Appx 5). At trial, the evidence all centered around

eyewitness testimony. (Pet. Appx 6). The supposedly victimized police officer,

Michael Wilder, said that Moon pulled the gun and pointed it at him, but that he

somehow wrestled it away and then shot Moon. (Pet. Appx 5). Four other nearby

eyewitnesses (including another police officer) saw the incident but did not see

Moon holding any gun. (Pet. Appx 6). Moon himself also denied holding the gun.

(Pet. Appx 29-31). He acknowledged, though, that he possessed a gun in his pants.

(Id.) The defense theory was that the arresting officer scuffled with Moon trying to

arrest him (while being overly rough), panicked upon seeing the gun, shot Moon for

no good reason, and then lied afterward. In the end, the jury did find Moon guilty.

(Pet. Appx 3). He was convicted of Attempted Second Degree Murder, and also

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Employing a Weapon During a Dangerous Felony ( Id.) Nonetheless, on April 20,

2022, the Tennessee Supreme Court overturned the convictions based on

evidentiary error. (Id.)

Still, one issue where the Tennessee Supreme Court denied any relief at all

was Moon's speedy trial claim. (Pet. Appx 9-11). The incident happened on

December 17, 2017. (Pet. Appx 9). Criminal charges, namely affidavits of complaint

and arrest warrants, were taken out on December 21, 2017. ( Id.) Since Moon was

recovering in an out-of-state hospital from being shot, the warrants were not served

until January 24, 2018. (Id.) Moon's first court appearance was on February 02,

2018. (Id.) Moon did not request any continuance. (Pet. Appx 66). When the

preliminary hearing did not happen timely as expected (and as required by the

Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure) but instead got continued, Moon filed a

"Demand for Speedy Trial." (Pet. Appx 56). It was filed on March 07, 2018. (Pet.

Appx 9). He filed the demand to ensure that the hearing did not get continued

again. On March 08, 2018, the general sessions court bound the case over to the

grand jury. (Id.) Moon was indicted on April 10, 2018. ( Id.) He was arraigned on

April 17, 2018. (Id.) At his next court appearance on May 09, 2018, he requested a

trial date. (See Pet. Appx 19). On May 23, 2018, he again requested a trial date.

(Pet. Appx 19 and 52) Specifically, he asked for the soonest trial date available.

(Pet. Appx 52 and 56). The court set the case for trial, albeit many months out. Trial

was first set for November 28, 2018. (Pet. Appx 5).

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Then, in November, at the State's request, the court continued the trial even

further. (Pet. Appx 5). It continued the case over defense objection. ( Id.) The reason

for continuing the trial was that the State had another case set for trial on that

same week (which it had already drug out for multiple years), and it preferred to try

the other case instead. ( Id.) Over defense objection, the court thus continued Moon's

trial to February 2019. (Id.) At first it was reset for Friday February 01, 2019. ( Id.)

Later, the judge changed it to February 11, 2019 so that the trial would not be

interrupted by a weekend. (Pet. Appx 20).

On January 16, 2019, Moon filed a motion to dismiss the case based on the

violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. (Pet. Appx 41, Motion).

The motion was heard January 23, 2019. (Pet. Appx 19-20). At the hearing, Moon

testified. (Id.) He said that he had been incarcerated ever since he was brought back

to Tennessee from the out-of-state hospital. (Pet. Appx 65-67). For most of the

pretrial jail time, he was held solely on this case. (Pet. Appx 67). The other case —

for which the officer had originally been trying to arrest him, before shooting him —

was dismissed on March 08, 2018. (Id.) Moon testified that he had no felony

convictions. (Pet. Appx 67-68). Despite the lack of meaningful criminal history, he

was being held pretrial under maximum security. ( Id.) For most of the pretrial

delay, he was only allowed out of his cell for two hours a day. ( Id.) Moon testified

that he never got to see the sun at all. (Pet. Appx 69). Generally speaking, the

confinement was "pretty bad." (Pet. Appx 67-68). Moreover, having such serious

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charges hanging over him was something that he specifically worried about every

day. (Pet. Appx 69-70). Worrying about it made him "depressed." ( Id.)

In his written motion and at the hearing, Moon's attorney recounted that he

had sought the speediest trial date available. (Pet. Appx 56 and 80-81). He had only

sought one continuance the whole time, namely three weeks at the arraignment to

obtain the dashboard video in discovery. (Pet. Appx 74-75).

On February 07, 2019, the judge denied Moon's motion to dismiss via written

order. (Pet. Appx 50). The court acknowledged Moon's chronology. (Pet. Appx 51). It

acknowledged that Moon had demanded a speedy trial and had sought the earliest

trial date available. (Id.) But it found that the trial was speedy enough. (Pet. Appx

52-53). The trial court faulted Moon for not filing a motion to reduce bond if he

wanted to avoid pretrial incarceration. (Id.)

The trial was held on February 11-14, 2019, and it centered around

eyewitness testimony. (Pet. 5-6). The State produced a total of four witnesses, all

law enforcement officers. One was the accuser who shot Moon, Corporal Michael

Wilder. (Pet. Appx 21-24). The next was a nearby officer, Karl Pyrdom, who saw the

incident. (Pet. Appx 24-25). Unlike Wilder, Pyrdom did not see Moon holding any

gun, or hear Wilder calling out any commands to drop a gun. ( Id.) He did, however,

collect Moon's gun off the ground where Moon fell. ( Id.) The third witness was an

officer, Sergeant Harry Conway, who inspected the gun and introduced it into

evidence. (Pet. Appx 25-26). The fourth witness was an officer, Special Agent

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Elizabeth Williams, who tested some drug residue on a plastic bag that Moon had

chewed on. (Pet. Appx 26). Moon was found guilty. The conviction was then

overturned on April 20, 2022. (Pet. Appx 3).

In denying the speedy trial claim, the Tennessee Supreme Court recited the

four speedy trial factors: (1) Length of the delay, (2) Reason for the delay, (3)

Demand for a speedy trial, and (4) Prejudice. (Pet. Appx 9). But it held that the

length of the delay weighed against Moon because, in Tennessee, thirteen months of

awaiting trial is "customary promptness." (Pet. Appx 10). It also held that a case

like this was "complex." (Id.) As for the reason for the delay, it agreed that almost

the entire delay was caused by the State. ( Id.) Still, it weighed the "reason" factor in

favor of the State, failing to hold the State responsible for any negligence, or for

overcrowded courts. (Id.)1 As for prejudice, it held that Moon's pretrial incarceration

for the entire time, and also his pretrial anxiety, did not count as "discernible

prejudice." (Pet. Appx 11). Since no exculpatory evidence was lost, it weighed the

prejudice factor in favor of the government. ( Id.) In the end, the court did grant that

one factor alone weighed in Moon's favor, namely that he had demanded a speedy

trial. (Pet. Appx 10). But since it weighed all the other factors in favor the

government, it denied the speedy trial claim. (Pet. Appx 11).

1

At the hearing on Moon's motion, the trial judge appeared to acknowledge that his trial dockets

are crowded, resulting from "bureaucratic indifference" by the State. (Pet. Appx 81).

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Reasons to Grant Certiorari

I.

THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A SPEEDY TRIAL.

The courts of Tennessee do not take the right to a speedy trial seriously. Nor

do they take this Court's jurisprudence about it seriously. This decision from the

Tennessee Supreme Court has now held that despite ongoing requests for a speedy

trial, despite the fact that an accused suffers from pretrial incarceration and

anxiety, and no matter how simple the evidence, the government may automatically

and systematically delay criminal trials in excess of one year. On each of the three

factors (out of four) held against William Moon, this Court has previously ruled the

opposite. Even on the fourth factor ("demand"), this Court's jurisprudence would

give it greater weight than the lower court seemed to do. Besides this Court,

Tennessee has also ruled contrary to other federal courts, further justifying

certiorari. If the constitutional right to a speedy trial is ever again going to apply in

Tennessee, it will be up to this Court to implement it.

A.

Tennessee's Elimination of the Right to a Speedy Trial

First, as to the length of the delay, the Tennessee Supreme Court has

purported to overrule this Court. Tennessee holds that the government always has,

at minimum, an amount "approaching" twelve months to bring someone to trial.

Without at least that much delay, a speedy trial motion cannot even be considered.

State v. Utley, 956 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Tenn. 1997) (Eight-month delay categorically

7

insufficient for speedy trial claim). The law holds that for a speedy trial claim, the

clock begins ticking either upon the initiation of formal criminal charges through

indictment, or upon the arrest of the defendant — whichever is earlier. Dillingham

v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975). With Moon, there were thirteen months of

delay. (Pet. Appx 10). The Tennessee Supreme Court held that thirteen months of

delay was "very brief," and that the delay weighed in favor of the government. ( Id.)

But that rule contradicts this Court's less stringent rule. In Barker v. Wingo, this

Court squarely held that in some cases, even "nine months" may be a delay "wholly

unreasonable." 407 U.S. 514, 528 (1972). With Moon, the Tennessee Supreme Court

also said that this case based on eyewitness testimony (mainly from one officer) was

"complex." (See Pet. Appx 10). But this Court has applied the term "complex" to

describe a "serious, complex conspiracy charge." Id. at 530-31. It has contrasted

such complexity with simpler cases about "ordinary street crime." Id. Given that

only one eyewitness even accused Moon, namely a police officer, given that three

other witnesses (all police officers) merely provided minor supplemental testimony

such as collecting and examining items from the scene, and given that the incident

literally occurred outside — near the street — any purported crime here would

easily be "ordinary street crime." The Tennessee Supreme Court, by holding in

effect that every case is "complex," and by holding that the government always has

at least one year free to spin its wheels doing nothing, has eliminated the speedy

trial right from Tennessee.

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But it gets worse. On the reason for the delay, again the Tennessee Supreme

Court defied this Court. It acknowledged that the delay here "was caused almost

exclusively by the State," and yet it weighed the "reason" factor in favor of the

State. (Pet. Appx 10). This Court has expressly held the opposite — that delays

caused by the government should be weighed in favor of dismissal. See, e.g.,

Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2009) (Basing its result almost entirely on

the dichotomy of whether the government, versus the defense, is "more to blame" for

the delay). In the end, the lower court has thus held that even if a trial court gives

out a trial date ten months after an arrest — despite the accused's request for the

"soonest trial date available" (see Pet. Appx 51) — and even if the State then

continues the trial still further, in order to do another case instead, the State is not

to blame for any delay. (Pet. Appx 10). In contrast, this Court has squarely and

repeatedly held that "overcrowded courts" are held against the government. See,

e.g., Barker, 407 U.S., at 531. They weigh in favor of dismissal. Here the trial judge

acknowledged that his trial dockets are crowded, resulting from "bureaucratic

indifference." (Pet. Appx 81). Cf. State v. Wood, 924 S.W.2d 342, 346-47 (Tenn.

1996) (Using that term in reference to overcrowded courts). Whether we want to call

the delay "negligence," or some nicer word, the law is clear that such delays weigh

in favor of dismissal. They do not weigh in favor of the government. That does not

make any sense at all.

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As for the "demand" factor, the lower court did supposedly weigh that factor

in favor of Moon, but even there, it disregarded this Court's language about how to

apply the factor. A demand for a speedy trial is entitled to "strong evidentiary

weight." Barker, 407 U.S., at 531-32. If a demand is entitled to strong evidentiary

weight, then it was even more wrong for the Tennessee Supreme Court to say that

the record showed no negligence by the State. The "evidentiary weight" of the

speedy trial demand was strong evidence all by itself. See id. While it is true that

other evidence can potentially override the weight of a speedy trial demand, see

United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 314-15 (1986), no such evidence was

even argued here.

Finally, on prejudice, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that pretrial

incarceration and pretrial anxiety do not matter. Namely, it held that Moon's

incarceration and pretrial anxiety were "no discernible prejudice." (Pet. Appx 11). It

said so even though Moon was confined to his cell twenty-two hours a day. ( Cf. Pet.

Appx 67-68). It then weighed the prejudice factor in favor of the government, solely

on the basis that Moon couldn't show the loss of any exculpatory evidence. ( Id.) But

this Court has expressly held that pretrial incarceration and pretrial anxiety are

both serious forms of prejudice by themselves, and that they support a speedy trial

claim. A defendant does not have to show the loss of evidence. Instead, "a defendant

confined to jail prior to trial is obviously disadvantaged by delay[,] as is a defendant

released on bail but unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion

10

and his own anxiety." Barker, 407 U.S. at 527 (emphasis added). This Court further

expounded at some length on pretrial incarceration:

We have discussed previously the societal disadvantages of lengthy pretrial

incarceration, but obviously the disadvantages for the accused who cannot

obtain his release are even more serious. The time spent in jail awaiting trial

has a detrimental impact on the individual. It often means the loss of a job; it

disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness. Most jails offer little or no

recreational or rehabilitative programs. The time spent in jail is simply dead

time. Moreover, if a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to

gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense.

Imposing those consequences on anyone who has not yet been convicted is

serious.

Barker, 407 U.S. at 532-33. Likewise, this Court has held that anxiety and public

scorn are another serious form of prejudice. Id. In fact, they were the primary

grounds on which this Court dismissed the indictment in Klopfer v. North Carolina,

386 U.S. 213 (1967). A defendant is not required to show all three forms of

prejudice.2 Minimizing pretrial incarceration and anxiety were two of the main

reasons why the Founders even set the Sixth Amendment in stone in the first place.

Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. For Tennessee to say that they mean nothing is simply to

ignore this Court's rulings and to ignore a major purpose of the Sixth Amendment.

B.

Criteria for Granting Certiorari

1.

Supreme Court Rule 10(c)

In the end, this Court should grant certiorari and reverse the judgment.

Moon has no preference as to whether the Court implements the reversal

2

Strictly speaking, a speedy trial can be won without any showing of prejudice at all. Doggett v.

United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992). But it helps to show prejudice. Id.

11

summarily, or otherwise, but the ruling needs to be fixed. Otherwise, the

constitutional right in Tennessee will be lost. According to Rule 10(c) of the

Supreme Court, the Court prefers to take cases where "a state court . . . has decided

an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this

Court." That much has been shown. Indeed, Tennessee has turned speedy trial

jurisprudence on its head.

2.

Supreme Court Rule 10(b)

Further, this Court prefers cases where "a state court of last resort has

decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with the decision of

another state court of last resort or of a United States court of appeals[.]" Sup. Ct.

R. 10(b). Here that much is also true. The Tennessee Supreme Court has now held

that a case based around one eyewitness (and some supplemental law enforcement

officers) is "complex," such that a 13-month delay weighs in favor of the

government. (Pet. Appx 10). In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has found that a delay of

11 ½ months for a "mundane garden-variety robbery" was "clearly excessive." Cain

v. Smith, 686 F.2d 374, 381-82 (6th Cir. 1982). Likewise, the First Circuit has held

that, absent some good excuse, a delay of nine months for a case built on

eyewitnesses is overly long. United States v. Butler, 426 F.2d 1275, 1277-78 (1st

Cir. 1970).

12

In essence, the Tennessee Supreme Court allows the government an

automatic 12 months to spin its wheels, doing nothing, before a speedy trial claim

may even be considered. See Utley, 956 S.W.2d, at 494. Then, after the 12-month

span is satisfied, it still takes some hefty amount longer before the "delay" factor

can actually help the defendant. ( See Pet. App. 10). In contrast, the D.C. Circuit has

held that any delay in excess of one year has "prima facie merit." United States v.

Calloway, 505 F.2d 311, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Tennessee Supreme Court now

holds that delays caused by the government are weighed in favor of the government.

Yet other courts hold that where an accused has demanded a speedy trial, the

prosecution has an affirmative duty to take steps to bring about the trial, and that

failure to do so weighs against the government. See, e.g., Prince v. State of

Alabama, 507 F.2d 693, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1975).

The Tennessee Supreme Court holds that pretrial incarceration is not

prejudice. Yet the Sixth Circuit has held that 10 months of pretrial incarceration

was indeed prejudice. Redd v. Sowders, 809 F.2d 1266, 1272 (6th Cir. 1987).

Likewise, the Seventh Circuit has held 10 months of delay as too long. See Strunk

v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973) (Brought before this court simply to decide the

proper remedy for the violation). Likewise, the Third Circuit has held that pretrial

incarceration of 7 months is harmful prejudice. Wells v. Petsock, 941 F.2d 253, 257

(3rd Cir. 1991). While the Wells court considered the prejudice insufficient to justify

dismissal of the indictment in that case, it said that harsher-than-average

13

conditions of confinement would probably change the result. 941 F.2d at 257. Here

Moon was held longer than 7 months. And he was also held in maximum security —

never allowed to go outside or see the sun, and only allowed out of his cell for two

hours a day. (Pet. Appx 67-69). Such conditions are harsh.

All in all, the Tennessee courts have now disagreed not only with this Court,

but also with other jurisdictions across America. If this Court does not step in to fix

the situation, not only will this Court's own authority be demeaned, but there will

be conflicts in the law left unresolved across jurisdictional lines. For both reasons,

Rule 10 of the Supreme Court supports review.

Conclusion

Defendant-Petitioner William Moon prays that this Court grant the writ of

certiorari, directed to the Supreme Court of Tennessee. Beyond that, he asks that

the judgment be reversed, and that the indictment be dismissed.

Respectfully submitted,

Paul Andrew Justice III

Attorney for William Moon

1902 Cypress Drive

Murfreesboro, TN 37130

(615) 419-4994

drew@justicelawoffice.com

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