Petition for Writ of Certiorari — V. V., Petitioner v. E. V.

Supreme Court briefJul 15, 2022

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

JUL 1 5 2022

No.

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

I N THE

Supreme Court of tfje fHmteb i§>tateo

v.v.,

Petitioner,

E.V.,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the Supreme Court of Connecticut

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Vanessa Wang

54 Linden Street

New Haven, CT 06511

(475) 313-9839

vanessa@childlessmotherfoundation.org

Petitioner Pro Se

July 15, 2022

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

A Connecticut State law, in relevant part, provides:

“Any family or household member ... who is the victim of domestic violence ...

by another family or household member may make an application to the

Superior Court for relief... The court, in its discretion, may make such orders

as it deems appropriate for the protection of the applicant and such dependent

children or other persons as the court sees fit. In making such orders ex parte,

the court, in its discretion, may consider relevant court records if the records

are available to the public from a clerk of the Superior Court ... Such orders

may include temporary child custody or visitation rights, and such relief may

include, but is not limited to, an order enjoining the respondent from

(1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the applicant;

(2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or

attacking the applicant; or (3) entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of

the applicant ... If the applicant is under eighteen years of age, a parent,

guardian or responsible adult who brings the application as next friend of the

applicant may not speak on the applicant’s behalf at such hearing unless there

is good cause shown as to why the applicant is unable to speak on his or her

own behalf, except that nothing in this subsection shall preclude such parent,

guardian or responsible adult from testifying as a witness at such hearing ...

No order of the court shall exceed one year, except that an order may be

extended by the court...” Conn. General Statute § 46b-15.

Thus, if a divorced parent alleges statutory aggrievement on behalf of the child

against the other parent, in the absence of evidence, Connecticut law provides the

first parent who claims to speak through the child to represent and plead on behalf

of the Child against the other parent, regardless of what the parents’ divorce decree

says, based on a standardless exercise of a judge’s discretion. All states have enacted

similar restraining-order statutes. The questions presented are as follows:

(1)

Does the respondent have standing to assert claims as next friend of the child

against the petitioner under Article III of the United States Constitution?

(2)

Does the federal law preempt a State’s restraining-order statutes under the

Supremacy Clause?

(3)

Does a State violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due-process

and equal-protection by applying the restraining-order statutes to order no

contact, except for commitment to a “facility for the diagnosis, observation or

treatment of persons with psychiatric disabilities,” of the petitioner and her

child?

(4)

Does a state violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause to deny the enforcement

of the parties’ out-of-state divorce decree by applying the restraining-order

statutes?

(5)

Does a state impair the petitioner’s contractual rights under the Contracts

Clause, without due process, by applying the restraining-order statutes to deny

the enforcement of the custody and visitation terms . of. the settlement

agreement incorporated, but not merged into, the divorce decree that spells out

the best interests of the child?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Petitioner is Vanessa Wang. Respondent is Edward Vytlacil. The minor child

V.V. is an eight-year-old female issued from the prior marriage between Petitioner

and Respondent that was dissolved on September 10, 2015 pursuant to New York

Domestic Relations Law § 170(7).

No party is a corporation.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven:

Vanessa Vytlacil v. Edward Vytlacil,

Docket Number NNH-FA19-4073157-S

(Judgment entered Feb. 4, 2022)

V.V. v. Vanessa Vytlacil,

Docket Number NNH-FA22-5052692-S (Feb. 4, 2022)

V.V. v. Vanessa Vytlacil,

Docket Number NNH-FA20-5049453-S (Dec. 23, 2020)

Edward Vytlacil v. Vanessa Vytlacil,

Docket Number NNH-FA20-5049148-S (Nov. 16, 2020)

Connecticut Appellate Court:

V.V. v. E.V.,

Docket Number A.C. 45190

(Judgment entered March 16, 2022)

VVv.VV.,

Docket Number A.C. 44752

(Direct Appeal filed June 1, 2021)

V.V. v. V.V.,

Docket Number A.C. 45304

(Direct Appeal filed Feb. 14, 2022)

Connecticut Supreme Court:

V.V. v. E.V.,

Docket Number S.C. 210373

(Judgment entered May 10, 2022)

United States District Court, District of Connecticut:

Edward Vytacil on behalf of Child V. V. v. Vanessa Vytlacil,

Case Number 3:22-cv-00311

(Notice of Removal filed Feb. 28, 2022)

United States Court of Appeals (2d Cir.):

Edward Vytacil on behalf of Child V. V. v. Vanessa Vytlacil,

Docket Number 22-1472

(Notice of Appeal filed on July 7, 2022)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Statutory Background

II.

Factual Background and Procedural History

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Questions Presented are Exceptionally Important and Warrant Review

in this Particular Case........................................................................................ 15

The issues raised in this case are recurring and ripe for judicial review

Whether Restraining-Order Statutes are pre-empted under the

Supremacy Clause is predominantly legal and ripe for review...

This case is the best possible vehicle to resolve these issues

II.

The Decision Below is Incorrect

Respondent lacks standing as next friend of the Child against Petitioner

under the Restraining-Order Statutes

Restraining-Order Statutes violate Petitioner’s and her Child’s civil

liberties and freedom guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.... 27

i. Equal Protection Clause

ii. Due Process Requirement

Restraining-Order Statutes conflict with the Full Faith and Credit

Clause............................................................................................ .............. .

Restraining-Order Statutes violate the Contracts Clause by

“substantially” impairing contractual obligations...................

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

App. A

Decision of Connecticut Appellate Court

App. B

Orders of Connecticut Superior Court dated Dec. 9, 2021

App. C

Orders of Connecticut Superior Court dated Feb. 4, 2022

App- D

Corrected Orders of Connecticut Superior Court dated Feb. 4, 2022.... 6a

App. E

Decision of Connecticut Supreme Court Denying Review dated May 10,

2022

App. F

Transcript of Connecticut Superior Court Proceedings dated Feb. 4,

2022................................................................................................................. 9a

App. G

Respondent’s Application for Relief from Abuse on behalf of the Child

V.V. against Petitioner dated Jan. 27, 2022

195a

App. H

Order for and Notice of Court Hearing issued by Connecticut Superior

Court on behalf of the Child V.V. against Petitioner dated Jan. 27,

2022

200a

App. I

Order of Protection on behalf of the Child against Petitioner issued ex

parte by Connecticut Superior Court dated Jan. 27, 2022

201a

App. J

Additional Orders of Protection on behalf of the Child issued ex parte

by Connecticut Superior Court dated Jan. 27, 2022

202a

App. K

Judgment of Divorce issued by the Supreme Court of the State of New

203a

York dated Sept. 10, 2015

App. L

Stipulation of Settlement and Agreement dated June 18, 2015......213a

App. M

Respondent’s Certification, dated May 7, 2019

App. N

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions and Court Rules Involved

271a

272a

Vll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,

387 U. S. 136 (1967)................

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,

515 U.S. 200 (1995)........................

Adickes v. Kress Co.,

398 U.S. 144 (1970)

Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,

438 U.S. 234 (1978)................................

Armstrong v. Armstrong,

350 U.S. 568 (1956)....

Califano v. Goldfarb,

430 U.S. 199 (1977)

Califano v. Westcott,

443 U.S. 76 (1979)

California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

495 U.S. 490 (1990).......................................................

Caplin Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,

491 U.S. 617 (1989)........................................

Cohen u. Beneficial Loan Corp.

337 U.S. 541 (1949)...............

Concordia Ins. Co. v. Illinois,

292 U.S. 535 (1934)............

Dartmouth College v. Woodward,

17 U.S. 518 (1819).....................

3, 37

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,

597 U.S.___(2022) (slip opinion)........................

22, 32

D’Oench, Duhme Co. v. F.D.I.C,

315 U.S. 447 (1942)................

37, 38

Estin v. Estin,

334 U.S. 541 (1948)

34, 35

Frontiero v. Richardson,

411 U.S. 677 (1973)....

30, 31

Gershon v. Back,

201 Conn. App. 225, 242 A.3d 481 (2020)

Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters,

415 U.S. 423 (1974)..............................

6, 36

17, 18, 21

Home Bldg. L. Assn. u. Blaisdell,

290 U.S. 398 (1934)...................

37, 40

Honig v. Doe,

484 U.S. 305 (1988)

In re Gault,

387 U.S. 1 (1967)

Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee,

456 U.S. 694 (1982)..........................................................

Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools,

487 U.S. 450 (1988)............................

Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis,

480 U.S. 470 (1987)................................................

Kowalski v. Tesmer,

543 U.S. 125 (2004)

Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,

452 U.S. 18 (1981).....................................

31, 39

M.L.B. v. S.L.J,

519 U.S. 102 (1996)

Mahoney v. Lensink,

213 Conn. 548, 569 A.2d 518 (1990)

Maryland v. Louisiana,

451 U.S. 725 (1981)..

Nastro v. D’Onofrio,

76 Conn. App. 814, 822 A.2d 286 (2003)

Orsi vs. Senatore,

31 Conn. App. 400 (1993)

Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Energy Resources Comm’n,

461 U.S. 190 (1983)................................................

Penna. Coal Co. v. Mahon,

260 U.S. 393 (1922).......

17, 21

Powers v. Ohio,

499 U.S. 400 (1991)

24, 26

Reed v. Reed,

404 U.S. 71 (1971)

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,

331 U.S. 218 (1947).................

18, 19, 20

Santosky v. Kramer,

455 U.S. 745 (1982)

31, 32

Sessions v. Morales-Santana,

582 U.S. 47, __ (2017).......

21, 24, 25, 27, 30

Singleton v. Wulff,

428 U.S. 106 (1976)

Spencer v. Kemna,

523 U.S. 1 (1998)

Sutton v. Leib,

342 U.S. 402 (1952)

34, 36

Thompson v. Thompson,

484 U.S. 174 (1988)....

5, 19, 35

Troxel v. Granville,

530 U.S. 57 (2000)

22, 32, 39

United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,

431 U.S. 1 (1977).................................

Vacco v. Quill,

521 U.S. 793 (1997)

Vitale v. Krieger,

47 Conn. App. 146, 702 A.2d 148 (1997)

Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,

420 U.S. 636 (1975).....

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

555 U.S. 7 (2008)......................................

25, 26

Winters v. New York,

333 U.S. 507 (1948)

33, 34

Wisconsin v. Yoder,

406 U.S. 205 (1972)

Zablocki v. Redhail,

434 U.S. 374 (1978)

29, 32

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)

Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305

(1984) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 666-667 (1988))................................................ 5

Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 100 Stat. 2343 (1988) (codified in

part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 666-667 (1988))...........................................................................

Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A........................... 5, 19

Title IV-D of the Social Security Act in 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101, 88 Stat.

2351 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 657-665 (1988))..............................................

23 PA Consolidated Statutes § 6101 et seq....................................................................

750 IL Com. Stat. 60/200 et seq.

Ala. Code § 30-5-1 et seq

Alaska Statute § 18.66.100 et seq

Ann. Cal. Fam. Code § 6320 et seq.

Ariz. Revised Statutes § 13-3602

Ark. Code § 9-15-101 et seq

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-100 et seq

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-15 et seq.

Conn. General Statutes § 17a-83

Conn. General Statutes § 17a-497

Conn. General Statutes § 17a-504

Conn. General Statutes § 17a-540 et seq

Conn. General Statutes § 46b-15

i, 1, 2, 8

Conn. General Statutes § 46b-15(b)

17, 19, 20

Conn. General Statutes § 46b-15(g)

17, 19, 20

Conn. General Statutes § 46b-15e(b)

Conn. General Statutes § 46b-70

6, 20

Conn. General Statutes § 46b-71

Conn. General Statutes § 46b-71(b)

Conn. General Statutes § 46b-75

Conn. General Statutes § 53a-35a(7)

16, 17

Conn. General Statutes § 53a-35a(8)

16, 17

Conn. General Statutes § 53a-40d

Conn. General Statutes § 53a-41(3)

16, 17

Conn. General Statutes § 53a-41(4)

16, 17

Xll

Conn. General Statutes § 53a-223b

Del. Code Tit. 10 § 1041 et seq

Fla. Stat. § 741.30

Georgia Code § 19-13-1 et seq

HI Rev. Stat. §586-4

Idaho Code § 39-6301 et seq

Indiana code § 34-26-1-1 et seq

Iowa Code § 236.1 et seq

Kan. Stat. § 60-903

Kan. Stat. § 60-3107

Kentucky Rev. Stat. § 403.730 et seq

LA Rev. Stat. § 2135

Maine Rev. Stat. 19-A § 4001

Maryland Code, Fam. Law § 4-504 et seq

Mass. General Laws Ann. c. 209a § 1 et seq

Michigan Compiled Laws Ann. § 600.2950

Minn. Stat. § 518B.01

Miss. Code § 93-21-15

Missouri Rev. Stat. § 455.010 et seq

Mont. Code Ann. § 40-15-201 et seq

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1 et seq

N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-01 et seq

N.H. Rev. Stat. § 173-B:1 et seq

N.J. Stat. § 2C:25-28

N.M. Stat. § 40-13-1 et seq.

N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 170

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 842

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-924

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 33 et seq

Ohio Rev. Code § 3113.31

Okla. Stat. Tit. 22 § 60.2

Oregon Rev. Stat. § 107.700 et seq

R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-15-1 et seq.

S.C. Code § 20-4-10 et seq.

S.D. Codified Laws § 25-10-1 et seq

Tenn. Code § 36-3-601 et seq

Tex. Fam, Code § 81.001 et seq

Utah Code § 78B-7-202

VA. Code § 16.1-253 et seq.

VT. Stat. Tit. 15 § 1101 et seq.

W. Va. Code § 48-27-101

Wash. Rev. Code § 26.44.010 et seq

Wis. Stat. § 813.122

Wyo. Stat. § 35-21-101 et seq.

xiv

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const, art. I, § 10, cl. 1

9, 37, 38, 40

U.S. Const, art. Ill

9, 15, 16, 21, 23, 24, 26

U.S. Const, art. IV, § 1

5, 9, 19, 20, 32, 34, 35, 36, 39

U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2

9, 17, 19, 23, 36

U.S. Const, amend. XIV

27, 31, 32, 34, 38, 39

Conn. Const., amend. XXI

28, 30, 31

RULES OF PRACTICE

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)

17, 18, 19

Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(f)

OTHER AUTHORITIES

25 Am. Jur. 2d Domestic Abuse and Violence § 1

American Bar Association, Section of Family Law, Economics of Divorce: A

Collection of Papers, American Bar Association (1978)............................................... 4

Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Studies in Contract Law (University Casebook Series),

Foundation Press, 9th ed. (2017)...................................................................................... . 2

Renee C. Bauer, Divorce in Connecticut: the Legal Process, Your Rights, and What to

Expect, Addicus Books (2014)

7,8

Joseph M. Bessette, American Justice, Salem Press (1996)

Brief for Petitioner, V.V. v. V.V., Docket No. A.C. 45304 (Appellate Court of the

State of Connecticut, June 2, 2022)

11, 23, 26

Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States, West

Publishing Company, 2nd ed. (1988)..........................................................................

Andrew J. Cherlin, Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage, Harvard University Press

(1981)...............................................................................................................................

Richard H. Chused, Private Acts in Public Places: A Social History of Divorce in

the Formative Era of American Family Law, University of Pennsylvania Press

3,4

(1994)

Sheldon S. Cohen, “To Parts of the World Unknown”: The Circumstances of Divorce

in Connecticut, 1750-1797. Canadian Review of American Studies, vol. 11 no. 3,

275 (1980)................................................................................................................................ 3

Form of Application for Relief from Abuse provided by the Connecticut Judicial

Branch (June 29, 2022), https://www.jud.ct.gov/webforms/forms/fml37.pdf....

N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Microeconomics, South-Western Cengage

Learning, 8th ed. (2016).........................................................................................

Victoria Mather, Evolution and Revolution in Family Law, 25 St. Mary’s L.J. 405

3,4

(1993)

Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979: Joint Hearing on S. 105 before the

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Judiciary Committee and the

Subcommittee on Child and Human Development of the Committee on Labor and

5, 34, 35

Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1980)

Reports prepared by the Connecticut Judicial Branch pursuant to Conn. General

Statutes § 46b-15e (June 29, 2022), for the calendar years between 2003-2005 at

https://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/2005-R-0861.htm

8, 21

Reports prepared by the Connecticut Judicial Branch pursuant to Conn. General

Statutes § 46b-15e (June 29, 2022), for the calendar years between 2017-2021 at

8, 21

https://jud.ct.gov/statistics/prot_restrain/default.htm

Tr. of Oral Arg. Sveen v. Melin, No. 16-1432 (U.S. March 19, 2018)

U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey,

Annual Social and Economic Supplement 1948-2021, Table A-l. Annual

Geographic Mobility Rates, by Type of Movement: 1948-2021, available at

https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/geographicmobility/historic.html......................................................................................................... 4

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control

and Prevention, the National Vital Statistics System, National Marriage and

Divorce Rate Trends (2020).............................. ................................................................. 4

xvi

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (1968), 9(1A) U.L.A. 271

Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (1997), 9(1A) U.L.A. 657 .. 5

Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (amended 2008), 9 U.L.A. 255

1981 Connecticut Public Act 272, Section 2

1986 Connecticut Public Act 337

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XVII

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Vanessa Wang respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The final judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court is unpublished. Petition

Appendix at 8a. (hereinafter “Pet. App.”) The en banc decision and relevant orders of

the Connecticut Superior Court (Pet. App. 3a-7a, 185a-190a) are unpublished.

JURISDICTION

The final judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court was entered on May 10

2022. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent constitutional provisions and statutes involved are reproduced

in the Appendix, Id., at 272a-287a. The challenged statutes, Conn. General Statutes

§ 46b-15, (the full text is set out in the Appendix, Id., 273a-278a, pursuant to Rule

14.1(f) of this Court), in relevant part, provide:

Any family or household member, as defined in section 46b-38a, who is

the victim of domestic violence, as defined in section 46b-1, by another family

or household member may make an application to the Superior Court for relief

under this section. ...

... The application shall be accompanied by an affidavit made under oath

which includes a brief statement of the conditions from which relief is sought.

Upon receipt of the application the court shall order that a hearing on the

application be held not later than fourteen days from the date of the order ...

The court, in its discretion, may make such orders as it deems appropriate for

the protection of the applicant and such dependent children or other persons

as the court sees fit. In making such orders ex parte, the court, in its discretion,

may consider relevant court records if the records are available to the public

from a clerk of the Superior Court or on the Judicial Branch’s Internet web

site. ... Such orders may include temporary child custody or visitation rights,

and such relief may include, but is not limited to, an order enjoining the

respondent from (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the

applicant; (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually

assaulting or attacking the applicant; or (3) entering the family dwelling or the

dwelling of the applicant. ... If an applicant alleges an immediate and present

physical danger to the applicant, the court may issue an ex parte order

granting such relief as it deems appropriate. ... If the applicant is under

eighteen years of age, a parent, guardian or responsible adult who brings the

application as next friend of the applicant may not speak on the applicant’s

behalf at such hearing unless there is good cause shown as to why the applicant

is unable to speak on his or her own behalf, except that nothing in this

subsection shall preclude such parent, guardian or responsible adult from

testifying as a witness at such hearing. ...

No order of the court shall exceed one year, except that an order may be

extended by the court upon motion of the applicant for such additional time as

the court deems necessary. ...

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Statutory Background

In light of the prevalence of contracts, divorce, and restraining orders, whether

the Constitution permits the States to apply restraining-orders statutes to order no

contact, except for commitment to a “facility for the diagnosis, observation or

treatment of persons with psychiatric disabilities” of a child and his or her parent;

deny enforcement of out-of-state divorce decree; and impair contractual obligations

between the divorced parents has profound legal, moral, and practical implications.

Contract law has deep roots in the past, and much of its present structure is

shaped by historical precedents.1 Contrary to laws that impose duties on us, the

obligations imposed by the law of contract are chosen obligations; they are the

products of agreements, promises, and other voluntary undertakings.2 Contracts

1 Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Studies in Contract Law (University Casebook Series), Foundation Press,

9th ed. (2017), at preface.

2 Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, supra, at 1.

formulate a wide range of economic relationships in our society. The principle

underlying economic activities is that people are rational in their undertakings.3 “The

bounty of a contract is essential to the obligation,”4 in the words of Justice Gorsuch

citing Justice Washington in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).

The legitimacy of divorce law rests essentially on individuals’ fundamental

liberty and freedom ingrained in our Nation predated the Revolutionary War.5 At the

turn of nineteenth century, a husband’s dominion over wife took the basic shape of

family law where a wife was in the position of inability to completely divorce from her

husband, which triggered the pioneering States, including early Maryland and the

New England, to adopt divorce legislation that adjudicated private affairs through

the State’s General Assembly to overcome a husband’s control over a wife in the

private realm.6 Though, for women with children, a partial divorce with the “bed and

board arrangements”7 was usually the only practical option, and gradually became

the “custody norm” along with the acceptance of the legality of settlement agreements

to reduce the need for legislative intervention in the process of divorce.8 Around the

Civil War, our conceptual view of marriage started to shift from a permanent to a

transient state.9 The majority of modern divorce laws construe a divorce as an

3 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Microeconomics, South-Western Cengage Learning, 8th ed. (2016),

at 6.

4 Tr. of Oral Arg. Sveen v. Melin, No. 16-1432 (U.S. March 19, 2018).

5 Sheldon S. Cohen, “To Parts of the World Unknown”: The Circumstances of Divorce in Connecticut,

1750—1797. Canadian Review of American Studies, vol. 11 no. 3, p. 275-293 (1980).

6 Richard H. Chused, Private Acts in Public Places: A Social History of Divorce in the Formative Era of

American Family Law, University of Pennsylvania Press (1994), at 18-32.

7 Id., at 21.

8 Id., at 68.

9 Andrew J. Cherlin, Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage, Harvard University Press (1981); Victoria

Mather, Evolution and Revolution in Family Law, 25 St. Mary’s L.J. 405 (1993).

exercise of individual choice rather than a punishment device adopted during the

emergence of divorce between the eighteenth century and the Revolutionary era.10

All States have incorporated some form of no-fault grounds into the divorce laws11

and regulate divorce with the reserved police power by providing default rules and

options to guide individual decision-making with the intent to safeguard fundamental

interests of its people. For instance, the State courts tend to apply “equitable

distribution rule” in property division12 and “tender years doctrine” in deciding

custody of young children; virtually all States have the same standard of “the best

interest of the child” in initial custody determination.13

The national divorce rate had been steadily increasing since the Civil War,

accompanied by a persistently growing domestic migration rate that peaked around

1970.14 Approximately half of all marriages entered into during the past half-century

ended in divorce;15 the prevalence of divorce decree rests upon its enforceability. The

inconsistency of family law rules across the States raised concerns under federal

supremacy. Between the 1970s and 1990s, the widespread adoption of uniform acts

among States16 and mandates of federal legislation attempted to standardize family

10 Richard H. Chused, supra, at 66-67.

11 Victoria Mather, supra, at 409-410.

12 Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States, West Publishing Company,

2nd ed. (1988); American Bar Association, Section of Family Law, Economics of Divorce: A Collection

of Papers, American Bar Association (1978), at 21.

13 Victoria Mather, supra, at 413-415.

14 U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social

and Economic Supplement 1948-2021, Table A-l. Annual Geographic Mobility Rates, By Type of

Movement: 1948-2021, available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/timeseries/demo/geographic-mobility/historic, html

15 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,

the National Vital Statistics System, National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends (2020).

16 Victoria Mather, supra, at 412.

law statutes and stabilize an opportunist’s approach of “migratory divorce” that had

contributed to “a national epidemic of parental kidnapping.” 17 In a series of

Congressional legislation, for instance, the Family Support Act of 1988,18 the Child

Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984,19 the Parental Kidnapping Prevention

Act of 1980 (the “PKPA”),20 and Title IV-D of the Social Security Act in 1974,21 the

federal law mainly address post-divorce disputes concerning the enforcement of child

custody and support orders under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The federal

statutes only attempt to improve interstate enforcement efforts and do not directly

affect original child support awards or child custody determinations. In accord with

the federal mandates, all fifty States have enacted the Uniform Interstate Family

Support Act of 2008; 22 adopted in some form of the Uniform Child Custody

Jurisdiction Act of 1968 (UCCJA);23 and, except for Massachusetts, enacted the

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act of 1997 (replacement of

UCCJA reconciling the PKPA).24

Under Connecticut law, the State legislature’s definite and clear intent to

afford out-of-state divorce decrees, defined as “Foreign Matrimonial Judgment”

17 “At the time the PKPA was enacted, sponsors of the Act estimated that between 25,000 and 100,000

children were kidnaped by parents who had been unable to obtain custody in a legal forum. See

Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979: Joint Hearing on S. 105 before the Subcommittee on

Criminal Justice of the Judiciary Committee and the Subcommittee on Child and Human

Development of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1980)

(hereinafter PKPA Joint Hearing) (statement of Sen. Malcolm Wallop).” Thompson v. Thompson,

484 U.S. 174, 181 (1988).

18 Pub. L. No. 100-485, 100 Stat. 2343 (1988) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 666-667 (1988)).

19 Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (1984) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 666-667 (1988)).

20 Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.

21 Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101, 88 Stat. 2351 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 657-665 (1988)).

22 Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (amended 2008), 9 U.L.A. 255.

23 Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (1968), 9(1A) U.L.A. 271.

24 Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (1997), 9(1A) U.L.A. 657.

pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-70, more protection than the Full Faith and

Credit Clause minimum, by enacting General Statutes §§ 46b-70 to 46b-75. Pet. App.

283a-284a. The State’s legislative comment to § 46b-71(b) further provides: “[w]hen

modifying foreign matrimonial judgment, Connecticut Superior Court’s failure to

apply substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction constitutes plain error.” The

Connecticut appellate courts repeatedly applied the Plain Error Doctrine in wellsettled authorities at common law holding that “[Conn. General Statutes §] 46b-71

provides that the Superior Court where the foreign dissolution judgment is registered

. jr ' -^>

has jurisdiction to modify the judgment, provided that it applies the substantive law

of the foreign jurisdiction.” Gershon v. Back, 201 Conn. App. 225, 246, 242 A.3d 481

(2020). “Clearly, when modifying a foreign matrimonial judgment, the courts of this

state must apply the substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction, and failure to do so

constitutes plain error.” Vitale v. Krieger, 47 Conn. App. 146, 149, 702 A.2d 148 (1997).

Meanwhile, in virtue of the common recognition that marriage is not a

permanent institution and, under our Constitutional guarantee that no party in a

marriage is the property of the other, the legal system began more actively dealing

with the subject of domestic violence after much psychological and sociological

research conducted since the 1960s that deepened our understanding of the problems

in the private domain. Statutes were enacted, giving the victims of domestic violence

greater and more efficient protection to address their needs. In contrast to divorce or

contract law, domestic-abuse prevention proceedings did not exist at common law but

are wholly statutory.25 The purpose of restraining orders is similar to a preliminary

injunction to enjoin a person from taking a particular action in relation to another

person. The statutory relief afforded by a restraining order is temporary, with a

limited duration. All fifty States have statutes authorizing a court to issue a

restraining order against the alleged perpetrator of domestic violence, upon

application by the intimate partner or former partner of the alleged perpetrator.26

Although the law varies among jurisdictions, this type of restraining order typically

orders the respondent to refrain from further contact with the applicant, usually

establishes custody and visitation for minor children, if necessary, and may order

child or spousal support.27 Restraining orders have become prevalent in recent years

mostly because restraining-order adjudication is of relatively low cost and easy access

to the judicial system in the form of providing injunctive interventions in domestic

relations,28 comparing to, for instance, the costs of divorce litigations.29

25 2 5 Am. Jur. 2d Domestic Abuse and Violence § 1 (2022).

26 Ala. Code § 30-5-1 et seq.; Alaska Statute § 18.66.100 et seq.; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3602; Ark. Code

§ 9-15-101 et seq.; Ann. Cal. Fam. Code § 6320 et seq; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-100 et seq.; Conn. Gen.

Stat. § 46b-15 et seq.; Del. Code Tit. 10 § 1041 et seq.; Fla. Stat. § 741.30; Georgia Code § 19-13-1 et

seq.; HI Rev. Stat. §586-4; Idaho Code § 39-6301 et seq.; 750 IL Com. Stat. 60/200 et seq.; Indiana

code § 34-26-1-1 et seq.; Iowa Code § 236.1 et seq.; Kan. Stat. §§ 60-903 and 60-3107; Kentucky Rev.

Stat. § 403.730 et seq.; LA Rev. Stat. § 2135; Maine Rev. Stat. 19-A § 4001; Maryland Code, Fam.

Law § 4-504 et seq.; Mass. General Laws Ann. c. 209a § 1 et seq.; Michigan Compiled Laws Ann.

§ 600.2950; Minn. Stat. § 518B.01; Miss. Code § 93-21-15; Missouri Rev. Stat. § 455.010 et seq.; Mont.

Code Ann. § 40-15-201 et seq.; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-924; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 33 et seq.; N.H. Rev. Stat.

§ 173-B:1 et seq.; N.J. Stat. § 2C:25-28; N.M. Stat. § 40-13-1 et seq.; N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 842; N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 50B-1 et seq.; N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-01 et seq.; Ohio Rev. Code § 3113.31; Okla. Stat.

Tit. 22 § 60.2; Oregon Rev. Stat. § 107.700 et seq.; 23 PA Consolidated Stat. § 6101 et seq.; R.I. Gen.

Laws § 15-15-1 et seq.; S.C. Code § 20-4-10 et seq.; S.D. Codified Laws § 25-10-1 et seq.; Tenn. Code

§ 36-3-601 et seq.; Tex. Fam. Code § 81.001 et seq; Utah Code § 78B-7-202; VT. Stat. Tit. 15 § 1101

et seq.; VA. Code § 16.1-253 et seq.; Wash. Rev. Code § 26.44.010 et seq.; W. Va. Code § 48-27-101;

Wis. Stat. § 813.122; Wyo. Stat. § 35-21-101 et seq.

27 Joseph M. Bessette, American Justice, Salem Press (1996), at 677.

28 Supra, n. 25.

29 “In Connecticut, attorneys who practice in the divorce area typically charge from $150 per hour to

as high as $750 per hour.” Renee C. Bauer, Divorce in Connecticut: the Legal Process, Your Rights,

Connecticut Restraining-Order Statutes under § 46b-15 was enacted by the

State’s General Assembly in 198130 and amended frequently, 31 almost every year

between 1995 and 2017. A clerk of the Connecticut Superior Court assigns a distinct

docket number to each restraining-order application. Restraining-order dockets are

not available to the public on the Connecticut Judicial Branch’s Internet website, but

only from a clerk of the Superior Court for a limited duration varying between seven

to ten years. General Statutes § 46b-15e (b) designate the responsibilities of the Chief

Court Administrator to annually collect data on the number of restraining orders

issued. In Connecticut, over the past two decades, an average of 4,687 restraining

orders were issued annually ex parte, and 3,000 after hearing, under § 46b-15.32

Connecticut Restraining-Order Stgtutes—if applied according to their terms, though

vague and uncertain—give a judge over broad authority, based on a standardless

and What to Expect, Addicus Books (2014), at 48. “A typical divorce process involves, but not limited

to, “[Step 11] If there are minor children, parties attend parent education class, develop a parenting

plan .... [Step 12] Both parties prepare financial statements, ... for the family during the marriage.

[Step 13] The court schedules a case management conference.... [Step 14] Motions are filed if the

parties cannot agree on support, custody, and other temporary arrangements pending a divorce. ...

[Step 15] Both sides conduct discovery to obtain information.... [Step 16] Each party confers with

his or her attorney to review facts.... [Step 17] Spouses, with attorneys, attempt to reach agreement

through written proposals, mediation, settlement conferences, or other negotiation. [Step 18] If the

parties cannot reach an agreement, the parties attend an early settlement and receive a

recommendation as to a fair settlement in their case. ... [Step 19] The parties attend economic

mediation to resolve any financial disputes for which there is no agreement. [Step 20] The parties

reach an agreement on all issues .... OR The parties try their case before a trial court judge who

makes a decision on all disputed issues in the case.” Supra, at 3-4.

30 1981 Connecticut Public Act 272, Section 2.

31 In 1986, the provision of § 46b-15(b) containing the discretionary language that give a superior

court judge the authority to award statutory relief was amended by adding “such order may

include temporary child custody or visitation rights;” and by replacing the term of “adult person”

with “family or household member as defined in section 46b-38a.” 1986 Connecticut Public Act 337.

32 See the reports prepared by the Connecticut Judicial Branch pursuant to Conn. General Statutes

§ 46b-15e(b), containing restraining order and protection order information for the calendar years

between 2003-2005 and 2017-2021, respectively, available at https://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/2005R-0861.htm; https://jud.ct.gov/statistics/prot_restrain/default.htm.

exercise of its discretion, to order (1) no-contact between a child and his or her parent

except for commitment of the child and that parent to a “facility for the diagnosis,

observation or treatment of persons with psychiatric disabilities” within the meaning

of the Connecticut Patients’ Bill of Rights, General Statutes § 17a-540 et seq. Pet.

App. 281a-283a; (2) modification of the custody and visitation terms of the parents’

out-of-state divorce decree; and (3) substantial impairment of the contractual

obligations with respect to the care, custody and decision-making rights and

responsibilities concerning the child that bind the parents under an independently

survived settlement agreement.

This case presents an exceptional situation with three varying applications of

restraining-order-statute interventions regulating a parent-child relationship in

denying the enforcement of an out-of-state divorce decree and its independently

survived settlement agreement between the parents. This case is also unusually

important because it brings to light the fundamental questions of constitutional law

under the Supremacy Clause, Full Faith and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause

Fourteenth Amendment, and standing requirement under Article III of the United

States Constitution, on which there is an acknowledged conflict of authority that only

this Court can resolve. This Court should grant certiorari.

II.

Factual Background and Procedural History

Petitioner and Respondent were married in a civil ceremony on April 12, 2013

in New York and commenced an action of divorce on May 2, 2014. The child V.V.

(hereinafter “Child”) is an eight-year-old female born to Petitioner in December 2013.

The parties’ marriage was dissolved pursuant to New York Domestic Relations Law

§ 170 (7) and the Judgment of Divorce was entered in the Supreme Court of the State

of New York, County of New York, on September 10, 2015 (Cooper, J.) Pet. App. 203a212a. In the best interests of the child, the parents settled and resolved the issues

raised in the divorce action by the Stipulation of Settlement and Agreement dated

June 18, 2015 (hereinafter “Settlement Agreement” or “Agreement”), Id., at 213a270a, incorporated in, but not merged into, the Judgment of Divorce.

Pursuant to the Judgment of Divorce and Article 2 of the Agreement, the

parents share joint legal custody of, and joint decision-making rights and

responsibilities concerning the Child and Petitioner is the primary custodian of the

Child and facilitates Respondent’s visitation schedule. Id., at 207a; 216a-232a. If the

parents are unable to agree on a decision regarding a material matter concerning the

Child (including whether an issue is a material matter), the parents shall exhaust

the first remedial attempt in good faith to resolve their differences and work together

to reach a resolution with Parent Coordinator, before either parent has the right to

invoke a Court of competent jurisdiction. Id., at 217a. Article 18 of the Agreement

provides its independently survived Binding Effect and waiver for modification. Id.,

at 266a-267a.

Up until May 2019, the Judgment of Divorce had been followed faithfully, the

Agreement had been executed accordingly, and the Child grew into a healthy,

confident, and empathetic grade-schooler, and was able to adapt at ease between two

separable households of the parents. On May 7, 2019, Respondent through counsel

filed a certified copy of the parties’ Judgment of Divorce and Settlement Agreement

in the Connecticut Superior Court. Id., at 271a. Since then, Respondent through

counsel has pleaded numerously, in separate Superior Court dockets, to modify the

parties’ Judgment of Divorce issued from the New York court in seeking sole custody

of the Child; termination of his non-modifiable “Basic Child Support” obligation to

Petitioner; and restraint against all contact between the Child and Petitioner, (See

Brief for Petitioner 87-91; 272-279; 300-306, V.V. v. V.V., Docket No. A.C. 45304

(Appellate Court of the State of Connecticut, June 2, 2022)(hereinafter “Pet’r Brief’))

alleging whenever there was contact between Petitioner mother and the Child, either

Petitioner or the Child is of “mental disability,” in the absence of evidence. See, supra,

at 500, 560, 586; Pet. App. 199a.

In seeking no-contact orders between the Child and Petitioner, Respondent

petitioned three consecutive applications made of Connecticut Restraining-Order

Statutes under General Statutes § 46b-15. Each of the three applications was

commenced upon the “Application for Relief from Abuse” form33 filed by Respondent

along with his Affidavit (hereinafter the “first, second, or third Restraining-Order

Application,” respectively) and was granted ex parte upon default and for a hearing

by the Connecticut Superior Court. See, supra, at 272, 299; Pet. App. 200a-202a.

Respondent’s first Restraining-Order Application filed on October 30 was

heard and dismissed on November 16, 2020 for “failure to meet his burden of proof.”

See, supra, at 280-283. But the subsequent two other applications were granted; and

33 The “Application” form provided by the Connecticut Judicial Branch can be found on the Judicial

Branch Website at https://www.jud.ct.gov/webforms/forms/fml37.pdf.

two consecutive restraining orders were issued, each with a duration of one year, on

behalf of the Child against Petitioner on December 23, 2020 and February 4, 2022

when the child was at the age of seven and eight, respectively.

Respondent’s second Restraining-Order Application was filed on behalf of the

Child on December 11, 2020—seven days after Petitioner filed a grievance complaint

on December 4th against Respondent to the Yale University under Title IX of the

Education Amendments of 1972 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for

discrimination, harassment, and retaliation against Petitioner (a doctoral student

enrolled in the same Department of Economics where Respondent was employed as

a Professor) for asserting her rights (hereinafter “Title IX Complaint”). See, supra, at

284-298. On December 23, 2020, the Connecticut Superior Court heard Respondent’s

second Application, while the Child was neither represented by counsel nor present

at the trial. Petitioner raised the issue, at court and upon Motion to Dismiss, that

Respondent’s Restraining-Order Application was not served upon Petitioner and the

court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction in the action commenced upon

Respondent’s Application sought against Petitioner on behalf of her Child. See, supra,

at 474-481. The Superior Court improperly removed Petitioner at trial and proceeded

ex parte with Respondent’s testimony alone in issuing a no-contact restraining order,

invoking General Statutes § 46b-15. See, supra, at 482, 324-326.

On May 20, 2021, Petitioner requested the Superior Court to appoint

independent counsel for the guardian ad litem of the Child. See, supra, at 331-333.

On June 15, 2021, Respondent’s Attorney, Attorney Gayle A. Sims, filed her

appearance as counsel for the Child and simultaneously represented Respondent in

the same and substantially-related litigations in the Superior Court; and on August

24 in the Connecticut Appellate Court. See, supra, at 341; 349. On September 17,

2021, Petitioner moved the court for an Expedited Motion to Disqualify Respondent’s

Attorney from representing the Child. See, supra, at 351-366. The Connecticut

Superior Court, Hon. Jane K. Grossman, denied Petitioner’s motion for an

appointment of independent counsel for the Child. See, supra, at 367-368. On

November 24, 2021, Petitioner moved the court for a protective order against

Respondent’s Attorney from conducting discovery pending the Superior Court’s

determination of Petitioner’s motion to disqualify Respondent’s Attorney from

representing the Child and the Statewide Grievance Committee’s resolution of

professional misconduct of Respondent’s Attorney. See, supra, at 379-384. Grossman,

J. denied Petitioner’s request for a protective order in its summary judgment issued

on December 9, 2021. Pet. App. 3a. On January 27, 2022, shortly after the prior

restraining order issued by the Superior Court on December 23, 2020 expired while

its appeal was pending, 34 Respondent, for the third time in a row, filed an

“Application for Relief from Abuse” form on behalf of the Child against Petitioner. Id.

at 195a-199a. Respondent’s third Application was again granted upon default, a no

contact restraining order issued ex parte by the Superior Court, and a hearing

scheduled on February 4, 2022. Id., at 200a-202a.

34 Docket No. A.C. 44752, V.V. u. V.V., Appellate Court of the State of Connecticut, directly from the

Superior Court’s judgment issued on May 20, 2021.

On February 1, 2022, Petitioner entered her appearance as the next friend of

the Child under General Statutes § 46b-15 in the Superior Court clerk’s docket

assigned

for

Respondent’s

third

Restraining-Order

Application.

Petitioner

simultaneously filed, including but not limited to, Motion for Protective Order against

Respondent’s Attorney from conducting discovery; three Applications for Issuance of

Subpoena; and Request to Bring Items into the Courthouse. The Superior Court

(Grossman, J.) instantly denied all said filings. See supra, at 100-112. Petitioner filed

her Motion to Dismiss dated February 2, 2022 on the ground that the Superior Court

lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction. See supra, at 124-149. To date, said

Motion to Dismiss is still pending.

At the February 4, 2022 hearing, the Connecticut Superior Court (Grossman,

J.) referred to the question of custody and visitation in the parties’ foreign

matrimonial post-judgment matter, at the same time tried Respondent’s third

Restraining-Order Application brought on behalf of the Child de novo. The Superior

Court improperly waived the Child’s due process right to appoint independent counsel

but solicited Respondent’s Attorney to represent the Child at trial, over Petitioner’s

objection. Pet. App. 45a. Nor was Petitioner notified prior to the trial that the Child

was to be represented by Respondent’s Attorney. The counsel for the guardian ad

litem for the Child, Attorney Corrine Boni-Vendola, attended the February 4, 2022

hearing only as a “credible” witness, but refused to appear as counsel for the Child in

the Restraining-Order action. Pet. App. 12a, 45a. Grossman, J. concluded the hearing

by issuing a restraining order invoking General Statutes § 46b-15 with the statutory

relief (see ante, at 9) upon the court’s findings as follows (en banc):

“this situation does meet the standards under [§] 46b-15, that based on the

evidence before it, the court finds that the [child] would be at risk of

psychological harm if the restraining order were not in place.” Id., at 185a.

On February 28, 2022, Petitioner removed the Superior Court action commenced

upon Respondent’s third Restraining-Order Application to the United States District

Court, inter alia, challenging the constitutionality of Connecticut Restraining-Order

Statutes. On March 16, 2022, the Connecticut Appellate Court denied Petitioner’s

direct appeal on the ground that there were no orders issued on February 4, 2022 and

the December 9, 2021 order was not appealable. Id., at la-2a. On May 20, 2022, the

Connecticut Supreme Court denied its review of Petitioner’s petition for certification

to appeal from the Connecticut Appellate.Court. Id., at 8a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Questions Presented are Exceptionally Important and Warrant

Review in this Particular Case.

The issues raised in this case are recurring and ripe for

judicial review.

Although the restraining order disputed in this case is of a duration of one year,

the controversy presented meets the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”

exception to the mootness doctrine under Article III of the United States Constitution.

Because first, the substantial majority of the restraining orders issued under a State’s

statute are in their duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or

expiration; second, the claims presented in this case reveal that “there [is] a

reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subject to the same

action again.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998) (citation omitted). Said

restraining order is the second no-contact order to enjoin contact between Petitioner

and her Child issued under Connecticut Restraining-Order Statutes and upon the

third recurrence of the same dispute between the same parties in this case where

Respondent sought a no-contact order on behalf of the Child against Petitioner. See

ante, at 12-15. This Court held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”

exception applies when “the claimant had demonstrated that the recurrence of the

dispute was more probable than not. Regardless, then, of whether respondent has

established with mathematical precision the likelihood...” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305

320 (1988). In applying this holding to the present case, this controversy is “capable

of repetition, yet evading review,” hence not moot for review.

Additionally, the issues raised in this present case are ripe for review because

they satisfy the two-part “fitness” and “hardship” test established by this Court in

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). First, this case meets the

“hardship” requirement of the ripeness doctrine under Article III, because it presents

a post-enforcement challenge to a State’s statute which is served with codified

retribution of “an immediate and substantial impact” for noncompliance. Connecticut

Restraining-Order Statutes threaten noncompliant parties with criminal liabilities

in violation of a restraining order. For example, Conn. General Statutes § 53a-223b

classifies criminal violation of a civil restraining order issued pursuant to §46b-15 as

class D or D felony; §§ 53a-41(3) and (4) and 53a-35a (7) and (8) provide the fine and

imprisonment for the conviction of a felony, respectively, in relevant part:

For a class C felony, an amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars, and a term

not less than one year nor more than ten years; for a class D felony, an amount

not to exceed five thousand dollars, and a term not more than five years.

Moreover, Conn. General Statutes § 53a-40d codify a separate punishable crime for

a repeated violation of a civil restraining order issued under § 46b-15. Pet. App. 279a280a. This Court further held that a pre-enforcement challenge to such regulation or

state statute is ripe for review. See Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Energy Resources Comm’n,

461 U.S. 190 (1983). This Court opined in Pacific Gas & Elec, that courts ordinarily

must entertain challenges to state legislation that threatens affected entities with

serious penalties if they fail to comply with the legislation by modifying their behavior.

Following this principle, this court shall find that this case satisfies “the hardship to

the parties of withholding court consideration.” Id., at 191-192.

Whether Restraining-Order Statutes are pre-empted under the

Supremacy Clause is predominantly legal and ripe for review.

This case also presents the reserved issue in this Court’s decision in Granny

Goose Foods, Inc. u. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423 (1974) whether a State’s RestrainingOrder Statutes are pre-empted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause. Rule 65(b)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in relevant part, provides:

“[the temporary restraining] order expires at the time after entry—not to

exceed 14 days—that the court sets, unless before that time the court, for good

cause, extends it for a like period or the adverse party consents to a longer

extension. The reasons for an extension must be entered in the record.”

Whereas Provision §§ 46b-15(g) and 46b-15(b) of Connecticut’s Restraining-Order

Statutes, in relevant part, provide: “[n]o order of the court shall exceed one year” and

“such orders may include temporary child custody or visitation rights.” Ante, at 2.

This Court affirmed that “under federal law, [temporary restraining orders]

should be restricted to serving their underlying purpose of preserving the status quo

and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and

no longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc., 415 U.S., at 439. “Once a case has been removed

to federal court, federal law, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, controls

the future course of proceedings, notwithstanding state court orders issued prior to

removal.” Id., at 424. This Court further explained that the purpose of Congress in

establishing the rule of decision for resolving the discrepancy in the durations of

temporary restraining orders between the federal and state laws as follows: “an ex

parte temporary restraining order issued by a State court prior to removal remains

in force after removal no longer than it would have remained in effect under state

law, but in no event does the order remain in force longer than the time limitations

imposed by Rule 65(b), measured from the date of removal.” Id., at 439-440. Petitioner

removed the Restraining Order action to the federal court after the restraining order

was issued by the State court. Following this Court’s decision in Granny Goose Foods,

Inc., the federal law governs the future course of proceedings regarding a State court’s

restraining order upon and after removal and the State court’s restraining order shall

expire by the time limitations imposed by Rule 65(b).

The basic principle enshrined in the Clause—federal supremacy—is wellsettled. See, e.g., California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 495 U.S. 490

(1990); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218. 236 (1947). Preemption cases

are primarily exercises in statutory interpretation, rather than constitutional

analysis. When evaluating whether federal law pre-empts state law, this Court

announced in Rice its principle by “starting] with the assumption that the historic

police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that

was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Id., at 230. Within the cognizance

of the Supremacy Clause, the federal law governing interstate child-custody and

child-support decree enforcement can be found in an array of legislation enacted by

Congress between the 1980s and 1990s. (See ante, at 5.) Congress manifests its

express intent to afford child-custody decrees the “Full Faith and Credit Given to

Child Custody Determinations.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738A under the PKPA. The Supremacy

Clause required state officials to comply with Congress’ directive under the PKPA

when enforcing or modifying out-of-state child custody decrees. The PKPA afford the

Full Faith and Credit to out-of-state decrees for the “clear and manifest” purpose of

preventing the situations where a divorced parent “who does not have custody to

snatch the child from the parent who does and take the child to another State to

relitigate the custody issue in a new forum” for the purpose of obtaining a favorable

court ruling. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 182 (1988).

The scope of provisions,

§§ 46b-15(b) and 46b-15(g), of Connecticut

Restraining-Order Statutes is inconsistent with Rule 65(b) and the above-mentioned

federal law. Although a State action in the nature of regulating “domestic relations”

is not subject to the restrictions placed on historic police powers of the States,

Connecticut by applying Restraining-Order Statutes to deny enforcement or modify

the child-custody provisions of an out-of-state divorce decree, based on a judge’s

standardless exercise of its discretion, is not functioning as police; its scheme is

tantamount to “regulation” and further threatens the “regulated” parent and child

with criminal penalties for noncompliance.

The provisions of Connecticut

Restraining-Order Statutes do not accord with the child’s best interest at all, instead

authorize a judge “unbounded” discretion to award “temporary child custody or

visitation right” of whatever duration of “temporary” to “a parent, guardian, or

responsible adult” who bring an application, regardless of what a child custody order

provides. The instrument of the Statutes serves the practical effect of sub silentio

encouraging a parent who does not have custody to snatch the child from the parent

who does; take the child to another State; race to the courthouse to seek a restraining

order alleging some form of harm on behalf of the child against the other parent; and

relitigate the custody issue in a new forum from the conditions imposed by a State’s

restraining order, in violation of the PKPA and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

The Connecticut Superior Court’s applications of restraining-order-statute

interventions regulating a parent-child relationship overthrow the purpose of the

statutes and contravene the state’s interests and public policy. The State legislature’s

intent to afford out-of-state divorce decrees more protection than the Full Faith and

Credit Clause minimum is definite and clear as manifested in General Statutes

§§ 46b-70 to 46b-75. See ante, at 5-6. Accordingly, Provision §§ 46b-15(b) and 46b-15(g)

of Connecticut Restraining-Order Statutes “on those subjects must therefore give way

by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.” Rice, 331 U.S., at 236. Petitioner challenged the

constitutionality of a State statute, while the Connecticut Supreme Court denied its

review. Although, as this Court has noted, waiting until state courts have had a

chance to interpret a challenged law may sharpen the issues for review, because “the

question of pre-emption is predominantly legal,”... “the resolution of the pre-emption

issue need not await that development.” Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S., at 201. Indeed,

the restraining-orders statute is ripe for adjudication, because it further satisfies the

“fitness” prong of the ripeness doctrine under Article III of our Constitution.

This case is the best possible vehicle to resolve these issues.

Not only is now the right time for this Court to intervene, but this unique case

is as clean a vehicle as this Court will see. Connecticut Restraining-Order Statutes

reflect the State legislature’s intent to address domestic violence prevention. All

States have substantially similar restraining-order or civil-protective-order statutes.

(See ante, at 8, n. 32) Thus, this Court’s ruling will have ramifications throughout the

entire Nation. This case is jurisprudentially significant: only this Court can resolve

the conflict between the federal law and a State statute regulating “domestic relations”

on this issue of federal supremacy concerns. This case squarely presents the

constitutional questions reserved by this Court in Granny Goose Foods, Inc. (whether

the federal law pre-empted a State’s restraining-order statutes) and Sessions v.

Morales-Santana, 582 U.S. 47,

(2017) (slip op., at 7) (how does Article III of the

United States Constitution distinguish between mother and father in asserting rights

on behalf of their child as the third party against each other under a State’s

restraining-order statutes?)

The issues raised in this case are prevalent and exceptionally important as

they address the fundamental question of whether the Constitution permits a State

to apply Restraining-Order Statutes to interfere with the fundamental liberty

interest of a parent in the care, custody, and control of his or her child—“perhaps the

oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court” Troxel v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) and “deeply rooted in [our] history and tradition.”

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S.

(2022) (slip op., at 2).

“The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental

concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the

parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an

enduring American tradition.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).

This case involves a State statute, on the text of the statute alone, allows the

court to alter the touchstone of our divorce law regarding child-custody determination,

specifically in the post-judgment enforcement or modification of out-of-state divorce

decrees, in complete disregard of the best interests of the child, against public policy.

If a State is allowed to exercise its police powers regulating “domestic relations” in

such a way, without any restrictions, it leaves no room for any reliance interest of a

divorcee upon a settlement agreement that binds independently upon the two

divorced. Under Connecticut Restraining-Order Statutes, a judge can, based on a

standardless exercise of its discretion, sweep away, to whatever duration of

“temporary” with possible extension, the child’s interests in securing unhampered,

free, and natural development of love, affection, and respect for one of two divorced

parents and due-process rights against government interference, in the absence of

evidence of any harm caused by that parent to the child.

The issues are also practically significant because the statutory retribution

for noncompliance with a State’s restraining-order statutes allow the State’s superior

courts adjudicating “domestic relations” to invoke the criminal justice system to alter

the composition of families. Traditionally, our criminal justice system is designed to

handle criminal matters, rather than civil matters such as child-custody

determinations. The dispute, in this case, is initiated through the child-custody terms

of an out-of-state divorce decree, and the criminal justice system may find itself in

the awkward position of deciding how to strike a balance between a divorce decree

and civil restraining orders if their terms are in conflict. Furthermore, the facts of the

case cleanly present the issues for resolution and make it an especially compelling

candidate for this Court’s review. In particular, the Connecticut Superior Court

viewed the entire record of the foreign matrimonial post-judgment matter in issuing

a restraining order under General Statutes § 46b-15. Petitioner preserved all

constitutional claims in the Superior Court upon appeal. (See Pet’r Brief 151-156).

The presence of a viable Supremacy Clause claim is a strong reason to grant certiorari

in this case, thus permits this Court to view the heart of the matter de novo.

II.

The Decision Below is Incorrect

Respondent lacks standing as next friend of the Child against

Petitioner under the Restraining-Order Statutes.

The doctrines of justiciability under Article III of the United States

Constitution guide this Court’s determination of whether a case and controversy is

appropriate for adjudication. In accord with these ancient principles of jurisprudence,

this Court has established the Article III requirement for a third party’s standing to

assert claims on behalf of a minor in several cases involving third-party-standing

determination, see, e.g., Sessions, 582 U.S., at

(slip op., at 7); Kowalski v. Tesmer,

543 U.S. 125 (2004); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 401 (1991).

When a third-party’s standing is at issue, this Court held in Powers that

“certain, limited exceptions” applied to the fundamental restriction on a third-party’s

lack of standing to “rest a claim to relief premised on the legal rights or interests of

third parties.” Id,., at 410. To meet such exceptions to Article Ill’s standing

requirement, this Court provided three important criteria, “(1) the litigant [on behalf

of third parties] must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a

‘sufficiently concrete interest’ in the outcome of the issue in dispute; (2) the litigant

must have a close relation to the third party; and (3) there must exist some hindrance

to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.” Id., at 411 (citation

omitted). This Court applied the three-criterion exception to the standing doctrine in

considering Kowalski and held that “[t]he attorneys lack third-party standing to

assert the rights of Michigan indigent defendants denied appellate counsel,” Id., at

125, because, as the court further explained, it was not that “an attorney-client

relationship” is insufficient to satisfy third-party standing but rather the attorneyclient relationship asserted in Kowalski was a “hypothetical” one. Id., at 127.

In Sessions, this Court considered the child-parent relationship in determining

the third-party standing of the respondent in asserting equal protection rights under

the Fourteenth Amendment on behalf of his deceased father. The Court upheld that

the child-parent relationship satisfied the “close relationship” requirement, and the

-•

“hindrance” requirement was met because “[the deceased father’s failure to assert a

claim in his own right ‘stems from disability,’ not ‘disinterest.’” Id., (slip op., at 7).

This case presents a third-party’s standing challenge to the above-mentioned

authorities, because none controls this case. In this case, however, both Respondent

and Petitioner satisfy the third-party’s “close relationship” requirement, and the

“hindrance” requirement was satisfied because the Child’s “failure to assert a claim

in [her] own right ‘stems from disability,’ not ‘disinterest,’” Ibid., due to the fact that

the child is of tender years. If this Court starts by assuming Respondent can assert

third-party’s standing on behalf of the Child against Petitioner, the Court shall

equivalently conclude that Petitioner is the “best available proponent” (quoting

Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 116 (1976)) of the Child’s rights under a State statute

and our Constitution against Respondent’s asserted claims. This is incompatible with

our established authorities.

In Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008), this Court

held that “[i]ssuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable

harm is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary

remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the Respondent is

entitled to such relief.” Ibid, (citation omitted). Meanwhile, Connecticut RestrainingOrder Statutes are silent as to the applicable standard of proof. In view of the entire

record of the foreign matrimonial post-judgment matter before the court, Pet. App.

89a, the Connecticut Superior Court issued a no-contact restraining order, invoking

General Statutes § 46b-15, upon the court’s finding that “the [child] would be at risk

of psychological harm if the restraining order were not in place.” Id., at 185a. The

Superior Court’s conclusion that the Child would suffer a “hypothetical” injury does

not meet the first criterion of the third-party’s standing requirement under Article

III for Respondent to assert claims on behalf of the child against Petitioner, because,

as this Court held, “the litigant [on behalf of third parties] must have suffered an

‘injury-in-fact,’” Powers, 499 U.S., at 411, to satisfy the standing requirement.

At common law, “[t]he only real test for whether a person attempting to bring

an action as the minor’s next friend is a proper person to do so is whether that person’s

interests are adverse to those of the child.” Orsi v. Senatore, 31 Conn. App. 400, 416

(1993). By applying the “adverse interest test” established in Orsi, this Court shall

find that a serious conflict of legal interests existed between the Child and

Respondent that impaired Respondent’s ability to serve as the next friend of the Child.

Instead, Respondent sought a series of Restraining-Order Applications to advance his

nonjusticiable interests that are adverse to the Child’s interests and meant to subject

the Child to his maltreatment “continuously,” (see Pet’r Brief 500; 560) and in

retaliation against Petitioner because she filed a Title IX Complaint against him at

the Yale University of which the Superior Court was informed and aware. See supra,

at 732; 736. Nevertheless, under Connecticut Restraining-Order Statutes, the

Superior Court standardlessly, without good cause shown as to why the Child is

unable to speak on her own behalf, picked sides of presuming Respondent spoke on

behalf of the Child against Petitioner. The Superior Court ruled the fact that

Petitioner appeared on the record as the next friend of the Child in the Restraining-

Order Action was irrelevant in deciding Respondent was entitled to plead on behalf

of the Child against Petitioner. Pet. App. 11a. The decisions above are flat wrong.

This case presents an issue reserved in our authorities that, when the two

opposing parents in this case both satisfy the “close relationship” requirement on

behalf of a third party—the minor Child—who meets the “hindrance” requirement,

Sessions, 582 U.S., at

(slip op., at 7), whether one parent has more rights to assert

a claim on behalf of the child than the other parent does under a State’s restrainingorder statutes. This Court shall grant the petition and take up this issue anew

because it implicates the standing requirement of our ancient doctrines of

justiciability under our Constitution.

Restraining-Order Statutes violate Petitioner’s and her Child’s

civil liberties and freedom guaranteed under the Fourteenth

Amendment.

Connecticut Restraining-Order Statutes violate Petitioner’s and her child’s

Fourteenth Amendment rights for the following five reasons. First, the statutes

permit the court to issue orders that are solely discretionary, not on the merits of the

legal issues, to ex parte enjoin one of the two divorced parents from taking care,

custody, and control of his or her child and restrain all contact between that parent

and his or her child as long as “a parent, guardian or responsible adult who brings

the application as next friend of the [child] applicant” alleges statutory aggrievement

on behalf of the child, in the absence of evidence of the alleged harm.

Second, the statutes do not place on “a parent, guardian or responsible adult”

seeking a restraining order on behalf of a minor child against the other family

members—the other parent in this case—the burden of proof that such person has

standing to seek such order, or such order is in the child’s best interest.

Third, the statutes are not child custody or visitation statutes; however, they

permit a standardless exercise of a judge’s discretion to invoke the statutes and award

the temporary child custody and visitation rights to “a parent, guardian or

responsible adult” who brings an application so long as he or she alleges some form

of harm on behalf of the child against another family member of the child’s.

Fourth, the statutes are invoked if “a parent, guardian or responsible adult”

who brings an application alleges either the child or the respondent is of (perceived)

“mental disabilities” in the absence of evidence and the child would be “at risk of

psychological harm if the restraining order were not in place.” Pet. App. 185a. The

scope of the statutes is beyond what they were designed for. The State, by no means,

has any compelling interest in denying equal protection of the law “in the exercise or

enjoyment of [an individual’s] civil or political rights” on the ground of “mental

disability” Conn. Const., amend. XXI, Id., at 272a, in the application of the statutes.

Lastly, the statutory process for issuing a restraining order on behalf of a

minor child fails to meet the requirement of “fundamental fairness” and violates the

child’s due process rights to appoint independent counsel, assessing the child’s

interests at stake. Without the child’s due process rights being protected, Connecticut

Restraining-Order Statutes are used for a purpose contrary to the State’s legislative

intent, but instead to weaponize the child in retaliation against the other parent, so

long as one of the divorced parents races to the courthouse.

Equal Protection Clause

“Whether a State statute is valid or invalid under the equal protection clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment often depends on how the statute is construed and

applied.” Concordia Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U.S. 535, 545 (1934). In the three varying

applications made of the Statutes in this case, Petitioner and the Child are

scrutinized, not as a parent and her child, but rather in a way that the (perceived)

“mental disability” of Petitioner’s and/or her child’s is the “overriding, predominant

force” in the fact-finding process to meet the standard of proof of the statutory

aggrievement to the Child alleged by Respondent on behalf of the Child against

Petitioner. This case presents an equal protection challenge to a State’s statute based

on the extension of standard categories to include “mental disability” of an individual

or of his or her associates resting upon the well-endorsed concept held by this Court

that the equal protection afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment “enjoy a greater

elasticity than the standard categories might suggest.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.

Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 268 (1995). This Court has held that a State’s statute imposing

infringements upon “a ‘fundamental right’ ... triggers strict scrutiny when

government interferes with an individual’s access to it.” Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public

Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 451 (1988).

Restraining-Order Statutes shall be viewed subject to strict scrutiny. The case

further meets the narrow tailoring requirement associated with the strict scrutiny

because the invocation of the Statutes based on the mental-disability differential

contravenes the State’s compelling interests. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,

399 (1978). In defining the interest in equality protected by the Equal Protection

Clause, the State’s compelling interest in affording equal protection of the law to

individuals of “mental disability” is explicitly expressed in the Constitution of the

State of Connecticut. Connecticut Constitution afford the equal protection guarantee

to the (perceived) “mentally ill” in the same manner as the “sane” peers; and prohibit

the denial of equal protection of the law “in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her

civil or political rights” under the classification of “mental disability.” Conn. Const.

amend. XXI. “[Rjegardless of whether a patient’s admission status [to a ‘facility’

defined in § 17a-540(l)] is voluntary or involuntary, the state may not subject any

citizen ‘to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution.’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Mahoney v. Lensink, 213 Conn. 548, 571, 569 A.2d

518 (1990). Although Restraining-Order Statutes do not explicitly regulate

commitment of the “mentally ill”, their scheme is tantamount to “regulation” and

infringes the “regulated” parties’ fundamental rights.

Suppose to the contrary by setting the mental-disability-based differential

aside, in determining whether a restraining order should be awarded on behalf of the

child, under the equal protection guarantee of the Constitution of the United States,

“States must treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases accordingly.” Vacco v.

Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). Nevertheless, the state issued a no-contact restraining

order on behalf of the Child against Petitioner mother in favor of Respondent father

in this case. “Prescribing one rule for mothers, another for fathers, we declared

unconstitutional in Reed, Frontiero, Wiesenfeld, Goldfarb, and Westcott.” Sessions,

582 U.S., at

(slip op., at 9) (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v.

Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975);

Califano u. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979)).

Assuming, arguendo, that the findings of the fact were correct-—Petitioner and

her Child were indeed of (perceived) “mental disability.” Connecticut Constitution

explicitly include “mental disability” as a protected class for purposes of equal

protection guarantee and prohibit “segregation or discrimination in the exercise or

enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights” under the classification of “mental

disability.” Conn. Const., amend. XXI. This then leads to the conclusion that, under

the federal and state constitutions, irrespective of whether a child is of (perceived)

“mental disability”, a State can equally invoke the restraining-order statutes and

issue no-contact orders to enjoin a parent from contacting his or her child, so long as

“[the other] parent, [a] guardian or responsible adult” who brings an application on

behalf of the child, in an exercise of a judge’s “unbounded” discretion as if performing

a coin toss. The scope of the statutes goes to both sides of a coin for the issuance of a

no-contact restraining order to the “mentally ill” parents equally in the same manner

as the “sane” peers. This Court shall grant the petition and view the validity of the

Restraining-Order Statutes in this extraordinary situation under the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

ii.

Due Process Requirement

“[T]he Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are each protective of the

individual as against ‘state’ action.” Adickes v. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 186 (1970). In

Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) and Santosky v. Kramer,

455 U.S. 745 (1982), “the Court was unanimously of the view that ‘the interest of

parents in their relationship with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come

within the finite class of liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,’

and that ‘[f|ew consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural

family ties.’” M.L.B. v. S.L.J, 519 U.S. 102, 103 (1996) (citation omitted).

This case involves a State action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment

that resulted in imposing “great and immediate irreparable injury” to Petitioner and

her child due to the practical effect of the “severance of natural family ties” Id., at

103, caused by the State’s twice, consecutive issuance of no-contact restraining orders

against Petitioner on behalf of her minor child, without due process, each of a

duration of one year, in the clear absence of all jurisdictions. “State power over

domestic relations is not without constitutional limits. The Due Process Clause

requires a showing of justification ‘when the government intrudes on choices

concerning family living arrangements’ in a manner which is contrary to deeply

rooted traditions.” Zablocki, 434 U.S., at 399; see also Troxel, 530 U.S., at 66; Dobbs,

597 U.S., at

(slip op., at 2). Upon close tailoring, the provisions of Connecticut

Restraining-Order Statutes providing a judge’s authority in regulating “domestic

relations” in such manner, as evidenced in the instances of their applications in this

case, contravene the State’s interests and defeat the purpose of the statutes. First,

when enforcing or modifying an out-of-state divorce decree, Connecticut legislature’s

intent to comply with Congress’ directive under the PKPA that the State shall afford

the Full Faith and Credit to foreign decrees was clear and manifest. Ante, at 5-6.

Second, Connecticut law on commitment of the “mentally ill” provide the

commitment due process where the State probate courts, rather than the superior

courts, are vested with the jurisdiction of the commitment of a person, including a

child, with psychiatric disabilities pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-497. Pet. App.

280a.

Additionally,

Connecticut

law criminalize

“[fraudulent or malicious

application, order, request, certification or report re commitment or mental disorder

of child” under General Statute § 17a-83 and codify the “[pjenalty for wrongful acts

re the commitment or psychiatric disabilities of another person” under § 17a-504. Id.,

at 281a. Because Connecticut Restraining-Order Statutes equally impose criminal

penalties for violation, this court shall grant the petition to view the statutes with a

higher, standard of certainty involved in the unconstitutional vagueness review of its

provisions. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).

The or ders issued under Connecticut Re straining-Order Statutes are solely

discretionary. The Superior Court, without resolving the jurisdiction issues, including

whether Respondent has “standing” to assert a claim on behalf of the Child, proceeded

with Respondent’s Application made of Restraining-Order Statutes pled “on behalf of

the Child” against Petitioner. “Subject-matter jurisdiction, then, is an Art. Ill as well

as a statutory requirement.” Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee,

456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). The Superior Court, regardless, issued a restraining-order

awarding Respondent the sole custody of the Child, in the clear absence of jurisdiction.

Nor has Respondent on behalf of the Child sought the relief of the temporary custody

or visitation rights of the Child in his Application. Pet. App. 197a. This Court held

that when the provisions of the statute contain discretionary language, the exercise

of discretion must be “cabined by the purposes” of the statute; the discretion created

by the statute cannot be used to defeat the purposes of the statute. See Caplin

Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 639 (1989). This case provides the

court a unique occasion to view the uncertainty and vagueness of a State’s statute in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment that is derived from both its terms of

provisions and “application of a standard of conduct to the varying circumstances of

different cases.” Winters, 333 U.S., at 534.

Restraining-Order Statutes conflict with the Full Faith and

Credit Clause.

By the 1950s, the common law revealed that suits where the state of the

domicile of one spouse, using constructive service, entered a decree that changes

every legal incidence of a separation decree issued from its original legal forum had

been widespread. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S.

402 (1952); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568 (1956). This Court had applied the

divisible divorce doctrine developed in Estin to accommodate the conflict between the

status of the States as independent sovereigns and the Full Faith and Credit Clause

of the United States Constitution arose from the so-call “migratory divorce” or “forum

shopping” as mentioned above, {see ante, at 5, n. 17) with rarely invoked “public policy

exception” permitting one State to resist recognition of the full faith and credit due

judgments. Id., at 545.

For close to seven decades, the problems associated with “forum-shopping”

remain today. Congress has since enacted in series of legislation to address

widespread incidences that cause jurisdictional deadlocks among forum States,

especially when there are children in marriage relationship at stake. See ante, at 5.

For instance, under the PKPA, Congress’ principal aim was to extend the

requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to child custody determinations. At

the time the PKPA was enacted in 1980, the issues in state courts that systematically

contributed to “a national epidemic of parental kidnapping” (Ante, at 5, n. 17) were,

as the Thompson court further explained, “[bjecause courts entering custody orders

generally retain the power to modify them, courts in other States were no less entitled

to change the terms of custody according to their own views of the child’s best interest.”

Id., at 180 (citation omitted). The provisions of the Statutes neglect the child’s best

interests, instead authorize the State “unbounded” discretion in issuing a restraining

order to award “temporary child custody or visitation right” under § 46b-15 (b), with

a duration of one year plus possible extension under § 46b-15 (g), to “a parent,

guardian, or responsible adult” who brings an application, regardless of what the outof-state child custody orders provide. The State’s Restraining-Order Statutes were

designed to provide low-cost, rapid access to the judicial system to meet the needs of

victims of domestic violence. Their applications, however, as seen in this case, defeat

the purpose of the statutes by weaponizing a child against his or her parent so long

as the other parent races to the courthouse to evade the Full Faith and Credit due

judgment in a new forum. In the words of Justice Douglas in Estin, “the tail must go

with the hide.” Id., at 544. In almost a half-century since Congress’ enactment of the

PKPA, this case raises caution when harnessing innovations of judicial machinery

and presents the concerns reflected in the federal supremacy that demand this court’s

view of a State’s statute weighing under the Supremacy Clause and Full Faith and

Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.

Restraining-Order Statutes violate the Contracts Clause by

“substantially” impairing contractual obligations.

Upon the New York court granting the Judgment of Divorce, each party was

fully informed by its independent counsel regarding the perspective to modify its

terms in a different forum. The parties undertook the step of entering into the

Agreement specifying each party’s respective contractual rights and obligations with

respect to the care, custody, and decision-making rights and responsibilities

concerning the Child, and further expressly waived such right of seeking a

modification of the Agreement under its Provision 4 of Article 18. Pet. App. 267a. The

Agreement provides its own independently survived “Binding Effect” from the parties’

Judgment of Divorce. Id., at 266a. In Sutton, 342 U.S., at 405, “[this Court] have

searched the numerous cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on

the subject of migratory divorce for a definitive holding as to the judicial status of

such divorce in the state that decreed it. It appears to be assumed that the decree is

valid and binding in the state where it is rendered.” Ibid. “A stipulation of settlement

not merged into the [divorce] judgment is independently binding on the parties, and

[state] courts may not impair the parties’ contractual rights under the agreement by

modifying the divorce judgment.” Gershon v. Back, 201 Conn. App. 225 (2020).

This case presents individuals’ undertaking upon divorce to self-regulate by

entering into an independently binding settlement agreement incorporated, but not

merged into, the divorce decree. This self-regulation approach has been prevalently

applied since the emergence of divorce in the eighteenth century when divorce was

regulated legislatively through a State’s General Assembly. (See ante, at.3, n. 6) The

modern version of this approach incorporates provisions in a binding agreement that

specifically address the public policy concerns arose from the “national epidemic of

parental kidnapping” that Congress intended to remedy by enacting the PKPA.

Whether

State’s

Restraining-Order

Statutes

substantially

impair

contractual obligations is vitally important, subject to the constitutional analysis

under the Contracts Clause. “The contracts clause, which prohibits a State from

passing any ‘Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts,’ is an example of the part

the common law must play in our system.” D’Oench, Duhme Co. v. F.D.I.C, .315 U.S.

447, 470 (1942). In Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819), this Court

held “[a]n act of the state legislature of New Hampshire, altering the charter [‘granted

by the British crown to the trustees of Dartmouth College, in New Hampshire, in the

year 1769’,] without the consent of the corporation, in a material respect, is an act

impairing the obligation of the charter, and is unconstitutional and void.” Ibid.

Since Dartmouth, a modern Contracts Clause interpretation was developed

and more widely applied by this Court that weighs between the intended meaning of

the words of the Constitution and the reserved police power of the States to safeguard

the vital interests of its people. See, e.g., Home Bldg. L. Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.

398, 434-435 (1934); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470

472 (1987). The question raised in this case essentially inquires whether the

development of the Contracts Clause shall progress along with the development of

the law of domestic relations. Specifically, can a State’s Restraining-Order Statutes

be applied post-divorce to dissolve all contractual obligations that independently bind

two divorcees in a settlement agreement, without the consent of one of the two?

This Court held in D’Oench, Duhme Co. that “upon a long line of authority

that in applying the [contracts] clause we are not bound by the State’s views as to

whether there is a contract.” Id., at 470. The Connecticut Appellate Court decision

was wrong because the Connecticut Superior Court issued an order on February 4

2022 that modified the child custody terms of the parties’ Judgment of Divorce issued

in the New York court and Agreement that independently binds the parties. Pet. App.

4a-7a. The Superior Court also issued an order on December 9, 2021 that denied

Petitioner’s motion for a protective order against Respondent’s Attorney from

conducting discovery into the Child’s records, pending Petitioner’s motion to

disqualify Respondent’s Attorney from representing the Child. Id., at 3a.

As analyzed in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), this Court

held that “[t]he matters embraced in such an order are not of such an interlocutory

nature as to affect, or to be affected by, a decision on the merits;” and “[t]he order is

appealable because it is a final disposition of a claimed right which is not an

ingredient of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it.” Id., at

546-547. The December 9, 2021 order is appealable because it is a final disposition of

a claimed right entitled to Respondent’s Attorney in the Superior Court’s order that

(1) violates the Child’s due process right to independent counsel under the Fourteenth

Amendment; (see, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 2 (1967); Lassiter, 452 U.S., at 18) and

(2) substantially impaired Petitioner’s contractual. rights under the Agreement

regarding the joint legal custody of, and joint decision-making rights and

responsibilities concerning her Child and infringed Petitioner’s liberty interest in the

care, custody, and control of her Child further guaranteed under the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Troxel, 530 U.S., at 65.

The State’s interest is to faithfully administer the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

The reserved police power of the State in this case regarding the enforcement of an

out-of-state judgment that has been filed in Connecticut was that “[i]n accordance

with this federal mandate,

[Connecticut]

legislature enacted the Uniform

Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, General Statutes § 52-604 et seq, which

permits an out-of-state judgment that has been filed here to be enforced in the same

manner as an in-state judgment.” Afasiro v. D’Onofrio, 76 Conn. App. 814, 822 A.2d

286 (2003). Meanwhile, at the February 4, 2022 hearing, the Superior Court

acknowledged that there was an out-of-state Agreement concerning the parties’ joint

decision-making rights and responsibilities of the Child but ruled that the parties’

contractual rights under the Agreement were not relevant (Pet. App. 89a, 129a-130a,

153a) in deciding Respondent’s third application made of Restraining-Order Statutes

to dissolve all executed contractual obligations between the parties post-judgment,

without due process. Since specific contractual provisions concerning the parties’ joint

decision-making rights and responsibilities concerning the child are involved here,

including a waiver for modification, a direct result of Connecticut Restraining-Order

Statutes applied is in complete disregard of the contractual rights between the

parents independently bound by the Agreement that spells out the best interest of

the Child.

The scope of the State’s Restraining-Order Statutes sweeps too broadly; the

statutory relief afforded constitutes “substantial impairment” under the Contracts

Clause. This Court has struck down state statutes under Contracts Clause

protections to a contractual relationship. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. u. New

Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234

(1978); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). Accordingly, Connecticut

Restraining-Order Statutes are overbroad and utilized for illegitimate purpose in

their applications contravening the purpose of the statutes and public policy. As a

result, the applications made of the statutes are no longer valid exercises of the

State’s police power to “safeguard the vital interests of its people;” (quoting Home

Bldg. L. Assn., 290 U.S., at 434) and “contravened the rights of [Petitioner’s] under

the Contracts Clause of the Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.” (quoting Penna. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Vanessa Wang

54 Linden Street

New Haven, CT 06511

(475) 313-9839

vanessa@childlessmotherfoundation.org

Petitioner Pro Se

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