Amicus Curiae Brief — Charles Barton, Petitioner v. Texas

No. 22-430

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------In the

Supreme Court of the United States

--------------------------------- ʕ --------------------------------Charles Barton and Nathan Sanders,

Petitioners

v.

The State of Texas

Respondent

--------------------------------- ʕ --------------------------------On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

--------------------------------- ʕ --------------------------------BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

THE TEXAS CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS

ASSOCIATION

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

--------------------------------- ʕ --------------------------------J. Edward Niehaus

Counsel of Record

Bodkin Niehaus Dorris & Jolley PLLC

6021 Morriss Rd., Suite 111

Flower Mound, TX 75028

(972) 704-1368

Jason@BNDJlegal.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES .................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ...................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................... 2

ARGUMENT: .......................................................... 3

A)

Texas Courts are not the final arbiter

of federal constitutional claims. ....................... 3

B)

The fragility of any ego should not

determine the propriety of protecting speech.

.................................................................. 5

I. Disfavoring

the

content

of

a

communication does not make the

communication exempt from the First

Amendment. ............................................. 6

II. Texas’ electronic harassment statute

makes no attempt to distinguish between

types or categories of speech, equally

criminalizing private insults and political

debate. ...................................................... 7

1) Matters of Public Concern ................ 7

2) Private Concern ................................ 8

3) Weaponizing the Justice System ..... 8

III. “This hurts my feelings” is not a

sufficient basis to strip speech of

constitutional protection. ....................... 14

Conclusion ........................................................... 16

ii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Supreme Court Cases

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union,

535 U.S. 564, 573, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 152 L. Ed. 2d

771 (2002) ............................................................ 6

Beauharnais v. Illinois,

343 U.S. 250, 254-255, 72 S. Ct. 725, 96 L. Ed.

919 (1952) .......................................................... 15

Bennett v. Mueller,

322 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2003)....................... 3

Biden v. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia

Univ.,

141 S. Ct. 1220, 1221 (2021)............................... 5

Brandenburg v. Ohio,

395 U.S. 444, 447-449, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed.

2d 430 (1969) (per curiam) ............................... 15

Buckley v. Valeo,

424 U.S. 1 (1976)................................................. 8

Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service

Comm'n of New York,

447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)..................................... 8

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,

315 U.S. 568, 571-572, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed.

1031 (1942) ........................................................ 15

Citizens United v. FEC,

558 U.S. 310, 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 880 (2010)

................................................................ 3, 4, 8

iii

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,

420 U.S. 469, 492-494, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 43 L. Ed.

2d 328 (1975)....................................................... 7

Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders,

472 U.S. 749, 762, 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2947 (1985) 8

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,

422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975)..................................... 8

Ex parte Barton,

No. PD-1123-19, 2022 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS

235, at *1 (Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2022) .................. 3

FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469,

127 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2007)........................... 4, 8

First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,

435 U.S. 765, 784-85, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 1420

(1978)............................................................... 4, 5

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,

418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)................................... 15

Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,

336 U.S. 490, 498, 69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed. 834

(1949)................................................................. 15

Grayned v. City of Rockford,

408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972)..................................... 8

Hopkins v. Bonvicino,

573 F.3d 752, 769 (9th Cir. 2009)....................... 3

Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and

Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,

515 U.S. 557, 574, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 132 L. Ed. 2d

487 (1995) .......................................................... 14

Konigsberg v. State Bar,

366 U.S. 36, 49, and n. 10 (1961) ..................... 15

Kovacs v. Cooper,

336 U.S. 77, 85-87 (1949) ................................... 8

iv

Lee v. Runge,

404 U.S. 887, 892, 92 S. Ct. 197, 200 (1971)(J.

Douglas, Dissenting)........................................... 5

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 178, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)

........................................................................... 16

Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co.,

309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S. Ct. 676, 84 L. Ed. 920

(1940)................................................................... 3

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254, 269-270, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed.

2d 686 (1964)....................................................... 4

New York v. Ferber,

458 U.S. 747, 767, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3360 (1982) 3

Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley,

408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)......................................... 5

R. A. V. v. St. Paul,

505 U.S. 377, 414, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2560 (1992)

(J. White, Concurring) ...................................... 16

Rankin v. McPherson,

483 U.S. 378, 387, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 97 L. Ed. 2d

315 (1987) ............................................................ 7

Regalado Cuellar v. United States,

553 U.S. 550, 569, 128 S. Ct. 1994, 2006 (2008)

........................................................................... 12

Reynolds v. Sims,

377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964)................................... 13

Roth v. United States,

354 U.S. 476, 483, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1 L. Ed. 2d

1498 (1957) ........................................................ 15

Saia v. New York,

334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948)..................................... 8

v

Schmutz v. State,

440 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ............. 12

Schneider v. State,

308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939)..................................... 6

Scott v. State,

322 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ............. 3

Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State

Crime Victims Bd.,

502 U.S. 105, 127, 112 S. Ct. 501, 116 L. Ed. 2d

476 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in

judgment) .......................................................... 14

Snyder v. Phelps,

562 U.S. 443, 453, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216

(2011) ....................................................... 7, 14

Stanley v. Georgia,

394 U.S. 557, 565, 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1248

(1969) ......................................................... 5, 7

Texas v. Johnson,

491 U.S. 397, 414, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d

342 (1989) .................................................... 13, 14

Thornhill v. Alabama,

310 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1940) ............................... 4

Time, Inc. v. Hill,

385 U.S. 374, 387-388, 87 S. Ct. 534, 17 L. Ed.

2d 456 (1967)....................................................... 7

United States v. Stevens,

559 U.S. 460, 468-69, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584

(2010)........................................................... 14, 15

United States v. Stevens,

559 U.S. 460, 470, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010)

........................................................................... 16

vi

Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens

Consumer Council, Inc.,

425 U.S. 748, 771, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 48 L. Ed. 2d

346 (1976) .......................................................... 15

Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S. Ct. 1184

(1970)................................................................. 13

Statutes

Tex. Penal Code Ann. 42.07(a)(7) .......................... 12

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07 .................................. 12

Other Authorities

https://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trumpshared-an-unflattering-picture-of-ted-cruzswife-2016-3 .......................................................... 9

https://www.npr.org/2022/10/31/1132906782/elonmusk-twitter-pelosi-conspiracy ........................ 10

https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/feb/17/ted-cruz-dares-donald-trumpto-sue-him-over-negative-campaign-advert ....... 9

S.Doc.117-3,vol.1. Proceedings of the United States

Senate in the Impeachment Trial of Donald

John Trump: Volume I - Preliminary and Floor

Trial Proceedings (Statement by Mr. Manager

RASKIN) ............................................................. 9

vii

Supreme Court Rules

USCS Supreme Ct. R. 37.2(a) .................................. 1

USCS Supreme Ct. R. 37.3(a) .................................. 1

USCS Supreme Ct. R. 37.6 ...................................... 1

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1

The Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers

Association (“TCDLA”) is a non-profit, voluntary

membership organization dedicated to the

protection of those individual rights guaranteed by

the state and federal constitutions, and to the

constant improvement of the administration of

criminal justice in the State of Texas. Founded in

1971, TCDLA currently has a membership of over

3,400 and offers a statewide forum for criminal

defense counsel, providing a voice in the state

legislative process in support of procedural fairness

in criminal defense and forfeiture cases, as well as

seeking to assist the courts by acting as amicus

curiae.

Neither TCDLA nor any of the attorneys

representing TCDLA have received any fee or other

compensation for preparing this brief, which brief

complies with all applicable provisions of the Rules

of Appellate Procedure, and copies have been served

on all parties.

1 Counsel for both Petitioners and Respondent have consented

to the filing of this brief. Both counsel were timely notified of

an intent to file a brief at least ten days prior to the due date.

See USCS Supreme Ct. R. 37.2. No counsel for a party authored

the brief in whole or in part. See id. 37.6. No counsel or party

made a monetary contribution intended to fund the

preparation or submission of this brief. Id.

2

This brief is filed with the consent of the

parties. USCS Supreme Ct. R. 37.2(a); USCS

Supreme Ct. R. 37.3(a).

--------------------------------- ʕ--------------------------------SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

From Twitter jail to Texas jail, weaponizing

hurt feelings is untenable public policy. Electronic

posts within the scope of harassment are plainly

speech as this Court has historically defined speech.

Refusing certiorari allows Texas, and any state that

follow Texas’ lead, to create subdivisions of “nonspeech” by criminalizing hurt feelings. Weaponized

sensitivity is bad public policy. Certiorari should be

granted.

3

ARGUMENT:

A) Texas Courts are not the final arbiter of

federal constitutional claims.

“[T]his Court is the final arbiter of whether

the Federal Constitution necessitate[s] the

invalidation of a state law.” New York v. Ferber, 458

U.S. 747, 767, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3360 (1982). See also

Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 769 (9th Cir.

2009). See, e.g., Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 582

(9th Cir. 2003) ("[S]tate courts will not be the final

arbiters of important issues under the federal

constitution." (quoting Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co.,

309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S. Ct. 676, 84 L. Ed. 920

(1940)))

The Court of Criminal Appeals decided that

this statute implicated conduct, not speech. See Ex

parte Barton, No. PD-1123-19, 2022 Tex. Crim. App.

LEXIS 235, at *1 (Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2022) citing

Scott v. State, 322 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. Crim. App.

2010). Scott was decided October 10, 2010, only nine

months after this Court’s decision in Citizens United

v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 880

(2010)(decided January 21, 2010)(holding that the

act of making political donations is speech within

the scope of First Amendment protection). The

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals conclusion that

‘conduct’ is entirely without First Amendment

protection is inconsistent with this Court’s decision

in Citizens United.

4

The freedom of speech and of the press

guaranteed by the Constitution

embraces at the least the liberty to

discuss publicly and truthfully all

matters of public concern without

previous restraint or fear of subsequent

punishment. ... Freedom of discussion,

if it would fulfill its historic function in

this nation, must embrace all issues

about which information is needed or

appropriate to enable the members of

society to cope with the exigencies of

their period."

First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776, 98 S.

Ct. 1407, 1415 (1978) quoting Thornhill v. Alabama,

310 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1940).

First Amendment standards, “must give the

benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than

stifling speech.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 327,

quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449,

469, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2007)(opinion of Roberts,

C. J.) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376

U.S. 254, 269-270, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686

(1964)). The interpretation that this is not ‘speech’

and is therefore not protected is incorrect. Allowing

that interpretation to stand will allow prosecution

for any number of different viewpoints because

someone may find the viewpoint disagreeable. In the

realm of protected speech, the legislature is

constitutionally disqualified from dictating the

subjects about which persons may speak and the

5

speakers who may address a public issue. First Nat'l

Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85, 98 S. Ct. 1407,

1420 (1978) citing Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley,

408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)

B) The fragility of any ego should not

determine the propriety of protecting

speech.

Today’s digital platforms provide avenues for

historically unprecedented amounts of speech,

including speech by government actors. Biden v.

Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ.,

141 S. Ct. 1220, 1221 (2021). It also presents a vast

array of ways to interact with, befriend, and offend

others.

“Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the

thought of giving government the power to control

men's minds.” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565,

89 S. Ct. 1243, 1248 (1969). Indeed, “…the Bill of

Rights added the guarantees of freedom of speech

and of the press because they did not feel them to be

sufficiently protected by the original Constitution.

This liberty is necessary if we are to have free, open,

and lively debate of political and social ideas.” Lee v.

Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 892, 92 S. Ct. 197, 200 (1971)(J.

Douglas, Dissenting).

6

I.

I.

Disfavoring

the

content

of

a

communication does not make the

communication exempt from the First

Amendment.

The First Amendment is applicable to the

States through the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Bigelow v.

Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811 (1975); Schneider v.

State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939). The First

Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no

law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” “[A]s a

general matter, the First Amendment means that

government has no power to restrict expression

because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,

or its content.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.

460, 468, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) quoting

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S.

564, 573, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 152 L. Ed. 2d 771 (2002)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Texas’ law ignores these limitations,

categorically creates a new First Amendment

exception, and is rife for abuse by political figures

and private individuals alike.

7

II.

Texas’ electronic harassment statute

makes no attempt to distinguish

between types or categories of

speech, equally criminalizing private

insults and political debate.

The largest problem with Texas criminalizing hurt

feelings is that Texas makes no exception in Penal

Code 42.07(a)(7) for important versus trivial

matters. This Court has long recognized the “right

to receive information and ideas, regardless of their

social worth,” finding that right “fundamental to our

free society.” Stanley, 394 U.S. 557, 564

1) Matters of Public Concern

Speech deals with matters of public concern

when it can be fairly considered as relating to any

matter of political, social, or other concern to the

community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news

interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of

value and concern to the public. See Cox

Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492-494,

95 S. Ct. 1029, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1975)(internal

citations omitted); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,

387-388, 87 S. Ct. 534, 17 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1967). The

arguably “inappropriate or controversial character

of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether

it deals with a matter of public concern.” Snyder v.

Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216

(2011) citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,

387, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 97 L. Ed. 2d 315 (1987).

8

2) Private Concern

Speech about a private concern is speech

solely in the individual interest of the speaker and

its specific business audience. Dun & Bradstreet v.

Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 762, 105 S. Ct.

2939, 2947 (1985) Cf. Central Hudson Gas & Elec.

Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447

U.S. 557, 561 (1980).

Regulation of business advertising is a

common example. Compare Grayned v. City of

Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972); United States v.

O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); and Kovacs v.

Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85-87 (1949), with Buckley v.

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of

Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); and Saia v.

New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948).

The Texas law makes no distinction between

private and public concerns in criminalizing hurt

feelings. This could be subject to abuse by politicians

mad about a series of mean tweets or private

individuals upset about trivial disagreements.

3) Weaponizing the Justice System

“[A] statute which chills speech can and must

be invalidated where its facial invalidity has been

demonstrated.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 336,

citing WRTL, supra, at 482-483, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 168

L. Ed. 2d 329 (Alito, J., concurring). We must, in all

things, be wary of the potential for abuse. The Court

of Criminal Appeals determination that electronic

harassment is categorically ‘not speech’ and has no

9

First Amendment

problematic.

protection

is

particularly

Example One

Consider, while it still exists, the problem of

Twitter. Recall the time Trump accused Cruz's

father of plotting President John F. Kennedy's

assassination? Or the time he insulted Heidi Cruz's

looks 2? What about when Trump called Cruz "a

totally unstable individual3" and "worse than

Hillary." This simple combination of tweets, sent

during a contested Presidential primary, is criminal

under the Texas law as interpreted by the Court of

Criminal Appeals.

Example Two

“Trump incited the January 6 attack, and

when his mob overran and occupied the Senate and

attacked the House and assaulted law enforcement,

he watched it on TV like a reality show.” S.Doc.1173,vol.1. Proceedings of the United States Senate in

the Impeachment Trial of Donald John Trump:

Volume I - Preliminary and Floor Trial Proceedings

(2021) (Statement by Mr. Manager RASKIN). “He

reveled in it, and he did nothing to help us as

Commander in Chief. Instead, he served as the

2 https://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-shared-an-

unflattering-picture-of-ted-cruzs-wife-2016-3 (viewed 18 Nov.

2022)

3 https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/17/ted-cruzdares-donald-trump-to-sue-him-over-negative-campaignadvert (viewed 18 Nov. 2022)

10

‘‘inciter in chief,’’ sending tweets that only further

incited the rampaging mob. He made statements

lauding

and

sympathizing

with

the

insurrectionists.” Id.

Could these tweets alarm or annoy a

Congressman or Representative? Certainly.

Example Three

Hypothetically, a disgruntled Republican

could tweet: “I’ll vote for Greg Abbott when he

stands for the Star-Spangled Banner.” Then: “Greg

Abbott and Madison Cawthorn perfectly represent

the spineless GOP.” Reasonable minds may differ as

to the accuracy of the second statement, but all

would likely agree that attacking a politician for

their disability is reprehensible. Is that hypothetical

tweet disgusting? Absolutely. Should it be criminal?

Absolutely not.

Example Four

Elon Musk can’t stay out of the news, or off

Twitter, where the billionaire Tesla CEO has long

used his Twitter account to provoke, joke and troll. 4

By directing the ire of his 110,000,000 followers at

any particular person, Mr. Musk could find himself

in violation of Texas law. Importantly, this law has

no venue requirement. It can be broken from any

place at any time.

4 https://www.npr.org/2022/10/31/1132906782/elon-musk-

twitter-pelosi-conspiracy (Visited 21 Nov. 2022)

11

Example Five

Flipping the political narrative, the problem

of prosecution for loudly stating a widely shared

opinion hits both sides of the political aisle. Tweets

alleging Beto O'Rourke to be a communist and

deriding him for his ridiculous positions on firearms

would be equally subject to criminal prosecution in

any of the 254 counties in which Beto could find a

sympathetic District Attorney.

Example Six

Imagine a student from the University of

Texas Law School, unhappy with a grade from a

professor who emails the professor multiple times

about the grade. The professor, who has submitted

grades and closed the semester and is now writing a

book, ignores the emails. The emails go unanswered,

so the student continues to send them. The issue

remains unresolved, so the student sends an email

an hour until the professor, fed up with the endless

emails, responds that the grade has been submitted

and will remain unchanged.

Example Seven

We need not stay in the realm of candidates

to find problems with this law. Consider any topic of

political contention and you could easily find

strangers on the internet hurling insults and

invective at each other. From abortion to education

to gay marriage, there are no shortage of keyboard

warriors content to scream into the void. Any

12

engagement with these online arguments could be

subject to prosecution.

Common Constitutional Problem in Each

Example

Remember, this Texas law provides: “A

person commits an offense if, with intent to harass,

annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass

another, the person sends repeated electronic

communications in a manner reasonably likely to

harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or

offend another[.]” Tex. Penal Code 42.07(a)(7).

Intent may be inferred, so it need not be

proven. See Regalado Cuellar v. United States, 553

U.S. 550, 569, 128 S. Ct. 1994, 2006 (2008).

Additionally, venue is not an element of the

offense. As it is not a "criminative fact," venue is not

an "element of the offense" under Texas law.

Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014) (An "element" is a fact that is legally required

for a fact finder to convict a person of a substantive

offense. See also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07

(defining "elements of offense" to include conduct,

result, and culpability elements, as well as "negation

of any exception")).

Where intent is inferred and venue is not

required, accusing a family member of murder and

attacking a spouse fall easily within the scope of

42.07(a)(7) as ones that harass or annoy or abuse or

torment Senator Cruz. See Tex. Penal Code

42.07(a)(7). Senator Cruz, Governor Abbott, Rep.

13

Cawthorn, and Beto O’Rourke would each have his

pick of 254 counties in which they could press

charges – since there is no geographic restriction to

the law.

Granted, each would only get one shot, as

multiple county prosecutions would not be

permitted. “Political subdivisions of States -counties, cities, or whatever -- never were and never

have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather,

they have been traditionally regarded as

subordinate

governmental

instrumentalities

created by the State to assist in the carrying out of

state governmental functions.” Reynolds v. Sims,

377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S.

387, 90 S. Ct. 1184 (1970).

Even with only one shot, such a hypothetical

prosecution violates the spirit and the text of the

First Amendment. The “bedrock principle

underlying the First Amendment, it is that the

government may not prohibit the expression of an

idea simply because society finds the idea itself

offensive or disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson, 491

U.S. 397, 414, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342

(1989). These hypothetical tweets are as entitled to

constitutional protection as they are unsavory.

With no geographic restriction, no venue

requirement, and no end to the fragility of ego that

may result in a particular person feeling harassed or

annoyed, criminal prosecution under this law is

untenably problematic. Hurt feelings aren’t fun but

they should not be criminal.

14

III.

“This hurts my feelings” is not a

sufficient basis to strip speech of

constitutional protection.

“[S]peech cannot be restricted simply because it

is upsetting or arouses contempt.” Snyder v. Phelps,

562 U.S. 443, 458, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) “If

there is a bedrock principle underlying the First

Amendment, it is that the government may not

prohibit the expression of an idea simply because

society finds the idea itself offensive or

disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414,

109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989). Indeed,

“the point of all speech protection . . . is to shield just

those choices of content that in someone's eyes are

misguided, or even hurtful.” Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of

Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 132

L. Ed. 2d 487 (1995). Texas, bucking this trend, has

opted to criminalize speech that may annoy, alarm,

abuse, torment, or embarrass another. Whether it be

Twitter jail or Texas jail, this is bad policy.

“From 1791 to the present,” … the First

Amendment has “permitted restrictions upon the

content of speech in a few limited areas,” and has

never “include[d] a freedom to disregard these

traditional limitations.” United States v. Stevens,

559 U.S. 460, 468-69, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010)

quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y.

State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127, 112 S.

Ct. 501, 116 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring in judgment). This recognizes that there

15

are few “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of

speech, the prevention and punishment of which

have never been thought to raise any Constitutional

problem,” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.

568, 571-572, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942).

Those categories include:

x

x

x

x

x

x

obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,

483, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498 (1957),

defamation, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.

250, 254-255, 72 S. Ct. 725, 96 L. Ed. 919

(1952),

fraud, Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia

Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.

748, 771, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 48 L. Ed. 2d 346

(1976),

incitement, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.

444, 447-449, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430

(1969) (per curiam), and

speech integral to criminal conduct, Giboney

v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490,

498, 69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed. 834 (1949)

Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise,

has never been protected for its own sake. Va.

State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens

Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771, 96 S.

Ct. 1817, 1830 (1976) citing Gertz v. Robert

Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974);

Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49, and

n. 10 (1961);

See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69,

130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010).

16

The depths of the fragility of mans’ ego cannot be

the basis for criminalizing speech. Thirty years ago,

this Court struck down an equally overbroad law.

See R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414, 112 S. Ct.

2538, 2560 (1992) (J. White, Concurring)(“Although

the [antibias] ordinance reaches conduct that is

unprotected, it also makes criminal expressive

conduct that causes only hurt feelings, offense, or

resentment, and is protected by the First

Amendment.”). The same result is compelled here.

Conclusion

The First Amendment's guarantee of

free speech does not extend only to

categories of speech that survive an ad

hoc balancing of relative social costs

and benefits. The First Amendment

itself reflects a judgment by the

American people that the benefits of its

restrictions on the Government

outweigh the costs. Our Constitution

forecloses any attempt to revise that

judgment simply on the basis that

some speech is not worth it. The

Constitution is not a document

“prescribing limits, and declaring that

those limits may be passed at

pleasure.”

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470, 130 S.

Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) quoting Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 178, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).

17

Because the majority of the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals erred in categorically exempting protected

speech from the First Amendment, and because that

court is not the final arbiter of a federal

constitutional right, this Court should grant the

petition for certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ J. Edward Niehaus

J. Edward Niehaus

Counsel of Record

Texas Criminal Defense

Lawyers Association

6808 Hill Meadow Dr.

Austin, TX 78736

(972) 704-1368 (counsel)

jason@bndjlegal.com

December 2022