Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Alexander Moskovits, Petitioner v. Bank of America, N.A., et al.

App. 1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

April 19, 2022, Decided

21-886

ALEXANDER MOSKOVITS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. .

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., SCHOEMAN UPDIKE

KAUFMAN & GERBER LLP, BETH L. KAUFMAN,

SILVIA S. LARIZZA, CALVIN B. GRIGSBY, ROGER

J. BERNSTEIN, BARRY R. OSTRAGER, SUED

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A JUSTICE OF THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW

YORK, DOES 1 THROUGH 10,

Defendants-Appellees.

Present: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge,

BARRINGTON D. PARKER, BETH ROBINSON,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

In December 2018, Plaintiff-Appellant Alexander

Moskovits ("Moskovits"), a pro se litigant and resident

of Brazil, filed suit in New York state court against

Bank of America, N.A., the country of Brazil, three

Brazilian states, two Brazilian nationals, and a

App. 2

United States resident named Calvin Grigsby,

alleging unjust enrichment and breach of contract

based on certain alleged business transactions.

Moskovits v. Grigsby, 132 N.Y.S.3d 741 (Table), 69

Misc. 3d 1215[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 51345[U], 2020

WL 6704176, at *1-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 12, 2020).

In November 2020, after removal of the case to federal

court, Moskovits's voluntary dismissal of Brazil and

the Brazilian states as defendants, and remand to the

state court, New York State Supreme Court Justice

Barry Ostrager dismissed the action. See 132

N.Y.S.3d 741, Id. at *3-8; see also Moskovits v.

Grigsby, No. 19-cv-3991, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

100793, 2020 WL 3057754, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. June

9, 2020). Before dismissing the suit, Justice Ostrager

sealed past and future entries to the case to everyone

except the court and the parties because of the

"inflammatory and threatening nature of some of the

filings by plaintiff." [Fn.]l * * *

While his appeal of the state court decision was

pending, [Fn.]2 Moskovits filed the present case in

district court against Bank of America and Grigsby,

both of whom were defendants in the state court

action; Schoeman Updike Kaufman & Gerber LLP,

Beth L. Kaufman, and Silvia S. Larizza, counsel for

Bank of America in the state court action; Roger J.

Bernstein, counsel for Grigsby; Justice Ostrager

individually and as a Justice of the New York

Supreme Court; and "Does 1-10," including but not

limited to the individuals constituting the "Court

Administration" referenced in the state court sealing

order (collectively, "Defendants-Appellees"). See

Moskovits v. Bank of America N.A., No. 20-cv-10537,

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48005, 2021 WL 965237, at *1

App. 3

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2021); Amended Compl.

8-15.

His complaint arose from Defendants-Appellees’

involvement in the sealing order and related

proceedings, alleging (1) conspiracy to violate his

First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988,

(2) deprivation of his right to a fair and public hearing

under Article 10 of the United Nations Universal

Declaration of Human Rights in violation of the Alien

Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and (3) "fraud on the

court." See Amended Compl. ^ 34-62. The district

court sua sponte dismissed his original complaint and

amended complaint, holding that Justice Ostrager

and Does 1-10 were immune from suit and that

Moskovits failed to state a claim for relief under

sections 1983, 1985, and 1988 or pursuant to the

Alien Tort Statute. [Fn.]3 See Moskovits, 2021 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 48005, 2021 WL 965237, at *2-3;

Moskovits v. Bank of America N.A., No. 20-cv-10537,

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12299, 2021 WL 230193, at *47 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2021). Moskovits appeals, and we

now affirm. We otherwise assume the parties'

familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural

history, and the issues on appeal, which we reference

here only as necessary to explain our decision.

Moskovits appeals from both the January 2021 order

dismissing his original complaint and the March 2021

order dismissing his amended complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(1 i) and (iii). * * * Section 1915

requires courts to dismiss an "action or appeal" that

"fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,"

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or "seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief,"

id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Our review of such dismissals

App. 4

is de novo. See Hardaway v. Hartford Pub. Works

Dep% 879 F.3d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 2018). We affirm the

district court’s dismissal on the basis of judicial or

quasi-judicial immunity and failure to state a claim,

largely for the same reasons cited by the district

court.[Fn.]5 See Moskovits, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

48005, 2021WL 965237, at *2-3; Moskovits, 2021 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 12299, 2021 WL 230193, at *4-7. We note

that the district court did not explicitly address

Moskovits's "fraud on the court" claim to the extent

that the claim operated independently of Moskovits's

other allegations. Nonetheless, we conclude that the

district court properly dismissed the claim since the

amended complaint fails to plausibly allege "fraud

which does or attempts toQ defile the court itself, or

is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that

the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual

manner its impartial task of adjudging cases."

Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Area Boliviano, 24 F.3d

457, 460 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Kupferman v. Consol.

Rsch. & Mfg. Corp., 459 F.2d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir.

1972), as corrected (May 12, 1972)); see also Gleason

v. Jandrucko, 860 F.2d 556, 559 (2d Cir. 1988)

(stating that "fraud on the court" claims must involve

conduct that "seriously affects the integrity of the

normal process of adjudication"). We thus need not

reach the parties' arguments as to the alternative

grounds for the district court's decision, including the

Hooker-Feldman doctrine and other abstention

doctrines. See In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort

Statute Litig., 808 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 2015), as

amended (Dec. 17, 2015) (noting that we may affirm

for any reason supported by the record). * * *

App. 5

* * * Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the

district court, * * * (brackets added; footnote 4 and

other irrelevant language omitted).

Footnotes

1 The sealing order came after Moskovits requested "full

disclosure" of transactions between Justice Ostrager and various

entities and stated that he had "initiated a full investigation of

this trial court and all of its extrajudicial affairs." Amended

Compl. | 19. Justice Ostrager asserts that Moskovits filed in

state court a report that included, inter alia, his date of birth,

present and former residential addresses, most of his Social

Security number, contact information, and personal information

about his relatives. Br. for Appellee Justice Barry R. Ostrager at

4. Moskovits argues that he requested "only facts that would

present valid grounds for mandatory statutory recusal,"

Appellant's Br. at 10, and denies that he made threatening

filings.

2 Moskovits appealed from the sealing order in September 2020

and moved to stay the underlying state court proceedings

pending review of the sealing order. Amended Compl. H 21. The

Appellate Division denied his motion for a stay in November

2020 after Justice Ostrager dismissed Moskovits’s suit. See

Moskovits v. Grigsby, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 74772, 2020 WL

6733586, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't Nov. 17, 2020).

Moskovits appealed the state court decision. See Amended

Compl. f 28.

3 In dismissing the original complaint, the district court also

held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Moskovits's

claims. See Moskovits, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12299, 2021 WL

230193, at *3. Yet the order dismissing the amended complaint

relies principally on judicial immunity and failure to state a

claim as grounds for dismissal. See Moskovits, 2021 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 48005, 2021 WL 965237, at *2 ("[T]he amended

complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief

may be granted, and on immunity grounds."). ie * *

5 Moskovits argues that his claim under the Alien Tort Statute

was premised on not only Article 10 of the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights but also Article 19 of the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights and other principles of international law. We

do not consider this argument as it was raised for the first time

App. 6

on appeal. See Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir.

1994) ("[I]t is a well-established general rule that an appellate

court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on

appeal.").

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

March 12, 2021, Decided

20-CV-10537 (LLS)

ALEXANDER MOSKOVITS,

Plaintiff,

-againstBANK OF AMERICA N.A.; SCHOEMAN UPDIKE

KAUFMAN & BERGER, LLP; BETH KAUFMAN;

SILVIA LARIZZA; CALVIN GRIGSBY; ROGER

BERNSTEIN; BARRY OSTRAGER; DOES 1 - 10,

Defendants.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, paid the filing

relevant fees to file this complaint under

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332; the Alien Tort Statute,

28 U.S.C. § 1350; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 [sic];

and Article 10 of the United Nations’ Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. By order dated

January 20, 2021, the Court directed Plaintiff to

amend his complaint to address deficiencies in his

original pleading. * * * Plaintiff filed an amended

complaint on February 24, 2021, and the Court has

App. 7

reviewed it. The action is dismissed for the reasons

set forth below.

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

The Court's prior order detailed the allegations

in Plaintiffs original complaint. Familiarity with that

order is assumed, and the Court will summarize

Plaintiffs allegations here only briefly. This action

arises out of a matter that Plaintiff filed in New York

State Supreme Court, New York County, in 2019.

In the state court case, Plaintiff alleged claims of

unjust enrichment and breach of contract, arising out

of a business deal in Brazil, and he sought millions of

dollars in compensatory and punitive damages

against Calvin Grigsby and Bank of America (BoA),

among others. See Moskovitz v. Grigsby, Ind. No.

650617/2019. * * * On November 12, 2020, the state

court dismissed Plaintiffs claims against Grigsby and

BoA on the merits, and dismissed the claims against

other defendants without prejudice "to an action in

Brazil or another forum, if appropriate." Id., 69 Misc.

3d 1215[A], 132 N.Y.S.3d 741, 2020 NY Slip Op

51345[U]. Plaintiff appealed in the state courts; the

status of those proceedings is unclear. Plaintiff filed

this complaint against Grigsby and his attorney,

Roger Bernstein; Justice Barry Ostrager, who

presided over the state court matter; Schoeman

Updike Kaufman & Berger, LLP (Schoeman), Beth

Kaufman, and Silvia Larizza, the law firm and

attorneys representing BoA; and Doe defendants

"including but not limited to the individuals who here

constituted the 'Court Administration."' Plaintiff

alleges that after the state court matter was

dismissed, Justice Ostrager unlawfully sealed the

entire court record, based on false claims that some of

App. 8

Plaintiffs filings were "threatening," "scurrilous,"

inflammatory," and contained irrelevant and

"personal information" about Justice Ostrager.

Plaintiff asserts that Justice Ostrager did so the day

after Plaintiff asked him to "disclose all of [his]

extrajudicial relationships," which would have shown

that Justice Ostrager either had a conflict of interest

or was biased against Plaintiff. According to Plaintiff,

the other Defendants, "aided and abetted" Justice

Ostrager's "fraud" by making false statements and

submitting fraudulent documents to the court.

Plaintiff seeks millions of dollars in damages, alleging

that the sealing of the entire state court record

violated his constitutional rights, human rights, and

other federally protected rights. * * * Plaintiffs

amended complaint is substantially similar to the

original complaint. In it, Plaintiff names the same

Defendants, alleges essentially the same facts, and

asserts the same legal claims. In the January 20, 2021

order to amend, the Court held that the original

pleading failed to state a claim. The amended

complaint is inadequate for the same reasons stated

in that order. Plaintiff asserts in the amended

complaint that Defendants violated his right to equal

protection because they were "motivated by a classbased, invidious discriminatory animus against [him]

due to his status as a felon." (ECF 22 U 3.) To state an

equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege that he

is a member of a suspect or quasi-suspect class of

persons, see Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1057

(2d Cir. 1995); such classes include, but are not

limited to, classes identified by race, gender, alienage,

or national origin, see Myers v. Cnty. of Orange, 157

F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 1998). The plaintiff must also

App. 9

allege facts showing that the defendants have

purposefully discriminated against the plaintiff

because of his membership in that class. See Turkmen

v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 252 (2d Cir. 2015) {quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, reu'd and vacated in part on

other grounds sub nom., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.

1843, 198 L. Ed. 2d 290 (2017)); Giano, 54 F.3d at

1057. Plaintiff recounts the following facts in support

of his equal protection claim: Defendant Grigsby, in

pro se court filings of 2020, accused Plaintiff of

"devilment" and cited United States v. Moskovits,

86 F.3d 1303 (3d Cir. 1996), clearly demonstrating his

class-based, invidious discriminatory animus against

Plaintiff due to his status as a felon in flagrant

violation of constitutional rights. (Id. If 32.) According

to Plaintiff, once the other defendants "learned of' his

criminal history, they "joined in the class-based

discrimination as evidenced by the flagrant violation

of his rights to expose foreign corrupt practices to

close contracts with [BoA], including but not limited

to attempted murder, to the public and the press." (Id.

Tf 33.) These facts wholly fail to give rise to a viable

equal protection claim. And this argument does not

remedy the other problems with Plaintiffs amended

pleading. Accordingly, the amended complaint is

dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief

may be granted, and on immunity grounds. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii). District courts

generally grant a pro se plaintiff leave to amend a

complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend may

be denied if the plaintiff has already been given an

opportunity to amend but has failed to cure the

complaint's deficiencies. See Ruotolo v. City of New

York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); Salahuddin v.

App. 10

Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because the

defects in Plaintiffs amended complaint cannot be

cured with a further amendment, the Court declines

to grant Plaintiff another opportunity to amend. * * *

CONCLUSION

* * * The amended complaint is dismissed. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii). * * 4c SO ORDERED.

(footnotes omitted)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

January 20, 2021, Decided

20-CV-10537 (LLS)

ALEXANDER MOSKOVITS,

Plaintiff,

' -against*

BANK OF AMERICA N.A.; SCHOEMAN UPDIKE

KAUFMAN & BERGER, LLP; BETH KAUFMAN;

SILVIA LARIZZA; CALVIN GRIGSBY; ROGER

BERNSTEIN; BARRY OSTRAGER; DOES 1-10;

Defendants.

ORDER TO AMEND

LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Alexander Moskovits, a resident of

Brazil, filed this pro se action, for which the filing fee

has been paid, asserting claims under 28 U.S.C. §§

1331, 1332, 1350, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, and

Article 10 of the United Nations’ Universal

Declaration of Human Rights.

App. 11

For the reasons set Forth below, the Court grants

Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within

sixty days of the date of this order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court has the authority to dismiss sua sponte a

complaint for which the filing fee has been paid where

the pleading presents no arguably meritorious issue,

see Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Tenants Corp.,

221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam), or

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v.

Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999), so long as

the plaintiff is given notice and “an opportunity to be

heard.” Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir.

1991) (per curiam); see also Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d

793, 797 (2d Cir. 1988); Wright & Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 301 & n.3. The

Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings

liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir.

2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest

[claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau

of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

(emphasis in original).

BACKGROUND

This action relates to a complaint that Plaintiff filed

in 2019, in New York State Supreme Court, New York

County, alleging claims of unjust enrichment and

breach of contract, and seeking millions of dollars in

compensatory and punitive damages. See Moskovitz

v. Grigsby, Ind. No. 650617/2019. The named

defendants in that case are Calvin Grigsby; Bank of

America N.A. (BoA); Raimundo Colombo; Jorge Siega;

the Federal Republic of Brazil; the State of Santa

Catarina, Brazil; the State of Maranhao, Brazil; and

App. 12

the State of Mato Grosso, Brazil. Defendants removed

the matter to this District, but Judge Broderick

remanded it after determining that diversity

jurisdiction was lacking. See Moskovits v. Grigsby,

ECF 1:19-CV-03391 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2020)

(granting Plaintiffs motion to remand).

In his complaint to this Court, Plaintiff quotes

Judge Broderick’s summary of the allegations in

Plaintiffs state court complaint: Moskovits [Plaintiff]

provided Grigsby with a loan structure which would

allow Grigsby and BOA to secure credit for sub­

sovereign state transactions guaranteed by the

Brazilian Government, and provided Grigsby with

potential clients for such transactions. ... For

Moskovits’s work, Grigsby promised compensation,

valued at 35% of 1% of the transaction value for a

transaction value over $500 million, or 35% of 2% for

a transaction value under $500 million.. .. Moskovits

further alleges that three deals totaling $1.9 billion

were consummated by Grigsby and BOA, using his

financial structure. To date, Moskovits has not

received any compensation in relation to these deals.

(ECF 1 ^1 4.). On November 12, 2020, the state court

dismissed Plaintiffs claims against Grigsby and BoA

on the merits, and dismissed the claims against

Colombo and Siega without prejudice “to an action in

Brazil or another forum, if appropriate.” Id., 132

N.Y.S.2d 741. Plaintiff filed this “complaint for

damages” against individuals and entities involved in

the state court matter, including Grigsby and his

attorney, Roger Bernstein; Justice Barry Ostrager;

the law firm and attorneys representing BoA,

Schoeman Updike Kaufman & Berger, LLP, Beth

Kaufman, and Silvia Larizza; and Doe defendants

App. 13

“including but not limited to the individuals who here

constituted the ‘Court Administration’ as entitled by”

Justice Ostrager. (ECFl at 1.) The complaint contains

the following allegations. Justice Ostrager committed

“fraud on the court” by sealing the “entire commercial

case,” in violation of the First Amendment and Judge

Broderick’s remand order. Justice Ostrager failed to

disclose his prior affiliation with Simpson Thatcher &

Bartlett LLP, which “regularly advised” BoA, and is

“headed” in “Brazil by a relative of the former

Brazilian Senate President (2013) who signed a

document” that Justice Ostrager “ignored ... to

lawlessly dismiss the sealed case in its entirety.”

Justice Ostrager sealed the case the day after

Plaintiff asked him to “disclose all of the extrajudicial

relationships between him and/or his related entities,

case counsel and the parties and/or related entities.”

Justice Ostrager’s allegedly improper sealing

deprived him of jurisdiction under municipal

regulations and state case law. (Id.

13-17.) The

other named Defendants in the case, Grigsby, BoA,

and its attorneys, “aided and abetted” Justice

Ostrager’s fraud by acting “with reckless disregard

for the truth,” and making false statements and

submitting fraudulent documents, all of which

resulted in a “gross deprivation” of Plaintiffs rights.

(Id.) Plaintiff appealed in the state courts; the

complaint does not indicate whether or not that

matter remains pending. On October 7, 2020, First

Department Judge Dianne Renwick referred

Plaintiffs motion for a stay to a full panel, setting

October 16, 2020, as the filing due date for any

opposition, October 23, 2020, as the filing due date for

any reply. Plaintiff alleges that on October 8, 2020,

App. 14

Justice Ostrager issued a “post hoc” order falsely

claiming that he sealed the case because of filings

from Plaintiff that he characterized as “threatening,”

“scurrilous,”

“inflammatory,”

and

containing

“personal information relating to this Court that has

no relevance to these proceedings.” Plaintiff denies

these assertions, describing such filings as “non­

existent.” {Id. t 18-19.) On October 16, 2020,

Defendants Kaufman, Larizza, Schoeman, and

Bernstein relied on previously submitted documents

in their oppositions and “failed to prevent a

continuation of the Star Chamber. Defendants have

aided and abetted rather than prevent the sealing in

violation of the U.S. Constitution and the Law of

Nations.” Attached to the complaint are state court

documents, including orders sealing the case and

dismissing the case, and defense submissions. (ECF

1-1 through 1-11.)

DISCUSSION

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Plaintiff brings this complaint challenging aspects of

the state court proceeding, including Justice

Ostrager’s orders dismissing the case and sealing the

court file. Plaintiffs claims are barred under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The doctrine - created by

two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust

Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923), and District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,

482-86 (1983) — precludes federal district courts from

reviewing final judgments of the state courts. Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,

284 (2005) (holding that federal district courts are

barred from deciding cases “brought by state-court

losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

App. 15

judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court

review and rejection of those judgments.”).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies where the

federal-court plaintiff: (1) lost in state court,

(2) complains of injuries caused by the state-court

judgment, (3) invites the district court to review and

reject the state court judgment, and (4) commenced

the district court proceedings after the state-court

judgment was rendered. Vossbrinck v. Accredited

Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014).

There is no fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine in this Circuit. See Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290

F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that Plaintiffs

claim “sounds in fraud, yet we have never recognized

a blanket fraud exception to Rooker-Feldman.”)

(internal quotation omitted)); Roberts v. Perez, No. 13CV-5612 (JMF), 2014 WL 3883418, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.

Aug. 7, 2014) (“[Cjourts in this District have

consistently held that claims that a state-court

judgment was fraudulently procured are subject to

Rooker-Feldman”). Plaintiff attached to his complaint

state court orders and defense submissions, and

essentially invites this Court to overturn Justice

Ostrager’s decisions. Because Plaintiff (1) lost in state

court; (2) “complains of injuries caused by [a] statecourt judgment;” (3) asks this Court to review and

reject the state court’s judgment; and (4) alleges that

the state court judgment was rendered before he filed

his case in this Court, his claims are barred under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff has already

availed himself of the New York State appellate

process by appealing the state court judgment to the

Appellate Division, First Department, which is the

App. 16

proper process for seeking judicial review of state

court orders, including sealing orders. [Fn.]l

B. Section 1983 Claims

The Court will now consider Plaintiffs claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, to the extent any of those claims are

not precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Section 1983 provides redress for a deprivation of

federally protected rights by persons acting under

color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,

436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978). To state a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by

a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state

actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).

1. Justice Ostrager

Plaintiff focuses a large portion of his complaint on

Justice Ostrager’s actions or omissions in the state

court matter, including the dismissal of the case and

the sealing of the court record, for which Plaintiff

seeks money damages. Judges are absolutely immune

from suit for damages for any actions taken within

the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles u.

Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts arising

out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge

are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579

F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “Even allegations of bad

faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.”

Id. (citations omitted). This is because “[wjithout

insulation from liability, judges would be subject to

harassment and intimidation . . . .” Young v. Selsky,

41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). In addition, as amended

in 1996, § 1983 provides that “in any action brought

against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken

App. 17

in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief

shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Judicial immunity does not apply

when the judge takes action “outside” his judicial

capacity, or when the judge takes action that,

although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of

jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9*10; see also

Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are

judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge’s

jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the

issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). Here, Plaintiff

asserts that Justice Ostrager improperly sealed the

court record, and he suggests that Justice Ostrager’s

failure to “disclose” his prior affiliation with Simpson

Thatcher proves bias or a conflict of interest. But

Plaintiffs claims are based on Justice Ostrager’s

decisions, which are judicial in nature, and amount to

a challenge to Justice Ostrager’s handling of the

state-court case. Plaintiff does not allege facts

showing that Justice Ostrager acted outside his

judicial capacity or took action against Plaintiff

without jurisdiction. It is not clear whether Plaintiff

moved for Justice Ostrager’s recusal in the state court

matter, but even if he did, a judge’s decision to recuse

or not to recuse himself is itself a judicial act

protected by immunity. See Bobrowsky v. Yonkers

Courthouse, 111 F. Supp. 2d 692, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);

Sylvester v. Sorrell, No. 08-CV-88, 2009 WL 819383,

at *3 (D. Vt. Mar. 25, 2009) (deciding that judge’s

refusal to recuse himself was judicial act entitled to

immunity); Haynes v. Schimelman, No. 99- CV-2553,

2000 WL 502623, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 8, 2000)

App. 18

(concluding that judge's decision not to recuse was

covered by judicial immunity).

Because Plaintiff seeks monetary damages

from a defendant who is immune from such relief, and

Plaintiff has not alleged that a declaratory decree was

violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable,

his claims against Justice Ostrager are dismissed on

immunity grounds. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i),

(iii); Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir.

1999) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327

(1989))). For these reasons, Plaintiff claim for

damages against Justice Ostrager must be dismissed.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

2. “Court Administration”

Plaintiff also names Doe defendants, “including but

not limited to the individuals who here constituted

the ‘Court Administration.”’ Plaintiff does not assert

specific facts against these individuals, and it is not

clear to whom Plaintiff is referring. Absolute judicial

immunity has been extended to those nonjudicial

officers who perform acts that are “‘functionally

comparable’ to that of a judge’” or “are integrally

related to an ongoing judicial proceeding.” Mitchell v.

Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 172 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted). Courts have held that this guasi-judicial

immunity applies to New York State court clerks

when they perform tasks that are an integral part of

the judicial process. See Stephens v. Sullivan &

Cromwell LLP, No. 15-CV-1251 (LGS), 2015 WL

1608427, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2015) (County Clerk);

Garcia v. Hebert, No. 08-CV-0095 (DFM), 2013 WL

1294412, at *12 (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2013) (state-court

clerk) (quoting Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66

(2d Cir. 1997)). If Plaintiff is asserting claims against

App. 19

state court employees who perform such acts or “are

integrally related to an ongoing judicial proceeding,”

they are also immune from suit. [Fn.]2.

3. Private Defendants

A claim for relief under § 1983 must allege facts

showing that each defendant acted under the color of

a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or

usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties are therefore

not generally liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank

of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) {citing

Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic

Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello

v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002)

(“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the

Government, not private parties.”). As Defendants

Calvin Grigsby, Roger Bernstein, Schoeman Updike

Kaufman & Berger, LLP, Beth Kaufman, and Silvia

Larizza are private actors who do not work for any

state or other government body, Plaintiff has not

stated a claim against these defendants under § 1983.

4. Conspiracy Claim

Plaintiff asserts that the private defendants “aided

and abetted” Justice Ostrager in violating his rights.

The Court construes this assertion as a claim that

Defendants conspired to deprive him of his federal

constitutional rights. A plaintiff asserting a

conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show

“(1) an agreement between two or more state actors

or between a state actor and a private entity; (2) to act

in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3)

an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing

damages.” Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72

(2d Cir. 1999). To state a conspiracy claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege facts that

App. 20

plausibly show that there exists: (1) a conspiracy;

(2) for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of the

equal protection of the laws, or the equal privileges or

immunities under the laws; (3) an overt act in

furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to his

person or property, or a deprivation of his right or

privilege as a citizen of the United States. Thomas v.

Roach, .165 F.3d 137, 146 (2d Cir. 1999). “[T]he

[§ 1985(3)] conspiracy must also be motivated by some

racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidious

discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’

action.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Vague and unsupported assertions of a

conspiracy claim, either under § 1983 or § 1985(3),

will not suffice. See, e.g., Wang v. Miller, 356 F. App’x

516, 517 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order); Webb v.

Goord, 340 F.3d 105, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2003); Boddie v.

Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997). Plaintiffs

conspiracy claims under §1983 and §1985(3) fail

because they are vague and unsupported, and

because he has not alleged facts suggesting that any

defendant violated his constitutional rights or

discriminated against him. The Court therefore

dismisses those claims for failure to state a claim on

which relief may be granted. [Fn.]3 See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

C. Alien Tort Statute

Under the Alien Tort Statute, “[t]he district courts

shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by

an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the

law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”

28 U.S.C. § 1350; see Sikhs for Justice v. Nath, 893

F.Supp.2d 598, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). (noting that

under the ATS, “federal subject matter jurisdiction

#

App. 21

exists when (1) an alien, (2) claims a tort, (3) was

committed in violation of a United States treaty or the

‘law of nations’ — the latter now synonymous with

‘customary international law.’”). A plaintiff must

plead a violation of a United States treaty or the law

of nations to cross the jurisdictional threshold to bring

a claim under the ATS. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,

630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980). To state a claim

under the law of nations, a complaint must “rest on a

norm of international character accepted by the

civilized world and defined with a specificity

comparable to the features of the 18th-century

paradigms” that the Supreme Court has previously

recognized, such as violation of safe conducts,

infringements of the rights of ambassadors, or piracy.

Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004).

The ATS “applies only to shockingly egregious

violations of universally recognized principles of

international law.” Beanal, 197 F.3d at 167 (citation

omitted). Plaintiff asserts a claim under Article 10 of

the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human

Rights (Declaration), which provides that, “[e]veryone

is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing

by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the

determination of his rights and obligations and of any

criminal charge against him.” The state court matter

giving rise to this complaint is a civil matter, not a

criminal one, but in any event, the Declaration

generally does not “impose obligations as a matter of

international law” that is “enforceable in federal

court.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734

(2004); see also United States v. Chapman, 351

F.App’x 740, 741 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Universal

Declaration of Human Rights is a nonbinding

#

App. 22

declaration that provides no private right of action.”);

Bey v. New York, No. ll-CV-3296, 2012 WL 4370272,

at * 7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2012) (no private right of

action under international treaties, the United

Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or

provisions of the United Nations’ Charter).

Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim under

either the ATS or the United Nations’ Declaration of

Human Rights.

D. Diversity Jurisdiction

To establish jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a

plaintiff must first allege that the plaintiff and the

defendant are citizens of different states. Wis. Dep’t

of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998).

In addition, the plaintiff must allege to a “reasonable

probability” that the claim is in excess of the sum or

value of $75,000.00, the statutory jurisdictional

amount. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Colavito v. N.Y.

Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir.

2006) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Even assuming that Plaintiff has alleged

that there is complete diversity and that the amount

in controversy is met, it is not clear what tort claims

remain in light of the Court’s earlier discussion.

LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit

of an attorney. District courts generally should grant

a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a

complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment

would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116,

123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861F.2d

40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has

cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a

pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at

App. 23

least once when a liberal reading of the complaint

gives any indication that a valid claim might be

stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.

2000) (quoting Gomez u. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171

F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). In light of Plaintiffs pro

se status, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend

his complaint to address the issues discussed in this

order.

CONCLUSION

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this

order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket.

Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended

complaint that complies with the standards set forth

above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint

to this Court’s Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of

the date of this order, caption the document as an

“Amended Complaint,” and label the document with

docket number 20-CV-10537 (LLS). An Amended

Complaint form is attached to this order. No answer

is required at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply

within the time allowed, and he cannot show good

cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. SO ORDERED, (brackets added).

Footnotes

1 See, e.g., In re East 51st Street Crane Collapse Litigation, 966

N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (1st Dep’t May 9, 2013) (rejecting defense

argument that court records should remain sealed under 22

N.Y.C.R.R. 216.1(a), which provides that state courts shall not

seal court records except upon a finding of good cause, because

“the presumption of the benefit of public access to court

proceedings takes precedence,” and the sealing of court papers

is permitted “only to serve compelling objectives, such as when

the need for secrecy outweighs the public’s right” to access.)

(citing Applehead Pictures LLC v. Perelman, 913 N.Y.S.2d 165,

191-92 (1st Dep’t 2010)).

r>

App. 24

2 If Plaintiff intends to sue the New York State Court

Administration (OCA), a state agency, the Eleventh Amendment

would bar Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for damages against OCA.

See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35,

40 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of

New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2009).

3 Plaintiff cites to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which does not create an

independent cause of action. See North Carolina Dep’t of Transp.

v. Crest Street Comm. Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 14 (1986);

Vecchia v. Town of North Hempstead, 927 F. Supp. 579, 581

(E.D.N.Y. 1996). Moreover, pro se plaintiffs are not entitled to

attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). See Kay v. Ehrler,

499 U.S. 432, 437-38 (1991).

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

June 2, 2022, Decided

21-886

ALEXANDER MOSKOVITS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., SCHOEMAN UPDIKE

KAUFMAN & GERBER LLP, BETH L. KAUFMAN,

SILVIA S. LARIZZA, CALVIN B. GRIGSBY, ROGER

J. BERNSTEIN, BARRY R. OSTRAGER, SUED

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A JUSTICE OF THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW

YORK, DOES 1 THROUGH 10,

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER

Appellant, Alexander Moskovits, filed a petition for

panel rehearing, or, in the alternative, for rehearing

en banc. The panel that determined the appeal has

App. 25

considered the request for panel rehearing, and the

active members of the Court have considered the

request for rehearing en banc. IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that the petition is denied.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Case No. 20-CV-10537(LLS)

ALEXANDER MOSKOVITS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BANK OF AMERICA N.A., SCHOEMAN UPDIKE

KAUFMAN & GERBER LLP, BETH KAUFMAN,

SILVIA LARIZZA, CALVIN GRIGSBY, ROGER

BERNSTEIN,BARRY OSTRAGER (sued individually

and as a Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of

New York), and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Alexander Moskovits (Plaintiff), hereby

files a Verified Amended Complaint against Bank of

America, N.A. (BOA), Schoeman Updike Kaufman &

Gerber, L.L.P., (Schoeman), Beth L. Kaufman

(Kaufman), Silvia Larizza (Larizza), Calvin Grigsby

(Grigsby), Roger Bernstein (Bernstein), Barry

Ostrager (Ostrager), and DOES 1 through 10

(including but not limited to the individuals who

constituted the “Court Administration” as entitled by

Ostrager in an Order filed in the New York Supreme

Court, New York County, on October 8, 2020).

App. 26

I. NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. This action for damages involves Star Chamber

proceedings ordered on September 2, 2020 by Justice

Ostrager as directed by the “Court Administration” of

the State Supreme Court, County of New York, which

“fraud upon the court” sealed an entire commercial

case without cause. See [App. 42-44] (Docs.141 & 169,

Moskovits v. Grigsby et al., Index No. 650617/2019).

Plaintiff alleges that the private and state defendants

aided and abetted the commission of a “fraud upon

the court” that grossly violates the First Amendment

to the U.S. Constitution and the Law of Nations. The

sealing of the entire case also violates the remand

order by U.S. District Judge Vernon S. Broderick, see

2020 WL 3057754 (6/9/20), whose order could not

have contemplated a remand to a judge like Ostrager

with a partner in Brazil related to the Brazilian

Federal Senator who signed a critical document

ignored by Ostrager to dismiss the case, after creating

a Star Chamber sealed without “good cause.” See

[App. 42] (Doc. 141) (sua sponte order sealing without

stating any cause and restricting access to Chambers

as to Plaintiffs letter for disclosure of extrajudicial

relationships) (9/2/20) (day after letter filed asking

Ostrager to disclose all extrajudicial relationships

between him or related entities, counsel, parties,

and/or their related entities). See infra at [App. 32-33]

(quoting letter of 9/1/20) (Doc. 135). Ostrager

committed another “fraud upon the court,” when he

falsely represented in a post hoc sua sponte order, see

[App. 43] (Doc. 169) (10/8/20), that the “Court

Administration directed ... the entire file” sealed to

the public due to non-existent “threatening ... filings

by plaintiff.” Id. [App. 43] (Doc. 169).

App.27

2. Plaintiff also states a cause of action for a

conspiracy to deprive him of having and exercising a

right or privilege of a United States citizen, by

impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating the

due course of justice in the state courts of New York

through the sealing of the entire case with the intent

to deny Plaintiff equal protection, motivated by a

class-based, invidious discriminatory animus against

the Plaintiff due to his status as a felon. Plaintiffs

factual averments have evidentiary support and will

likely obtain additional evidentiary support after a

reasonable opportunity for further discovery is

provided. The Plaintiff also states additional causes

of action under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.

§1350, given the flagrant violation of customary

international law embodied in Star Chamber

proceedings sealed to the public, and for the

continuing “fraud upon the court.”

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This action is filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985,

1988(b), seeking monetary damages which exceed

$75,000.00, exclusive of interests and costs.

Jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction are based

on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1343, 1350, and 1367.

There is a complete diversity of citizenship, and the

case raises important federal questions. Venue is

appropriate in this forum as all of the alleged acts

occurred in the Southern District of New York. See

28 U.S.C. § 1391.

III. DAMAGES AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

4. In Moskovits v. Grigsby, et ah, Supreme Court

Index No. 650617/2019, filed on December 26, 2018

(indexed in early 2019), the Plaintiff claims no less

than $7 Million in damages based upon the

App. 28

compensation formula promised to Plaintiff by BOA’s

de facto agent Grigsby. See Moskouits v. Grigsby,

2020 WL 3057754, *2 (6/9/20) (“Moskovits provided

Grigsby with a loan structure which would allow

Grigsby and BOA to secure credit for sub-sovereign

state transactions guaranteed by the Brazilian

Government, and provided Grigsby with potential

clients for such transactions. ...For Moskovits’s work,

Grigsby promised compensation, valued at 35% of 1%

of the transaction value for a transaction value over

$500 million, or 35% of 2% for a transaction value

under $500 million. ...Moskovits further alleges that

three deals totaling $1.9 billion were consummated by

Grigsby and BOA, using his financial structure.

To date, Moskovits has not received any

compensation in relation to these deals.”) (citing

Complaint) (remanding case to state court after its

removal by Republic of Brazil). Post-remand, and over

two months after the sealing, Ostrager ignored a

document signed by the Brazilian Senator related to

his Law Partner, other material facts, and the law to

fraudulently dismiss the case. * * ★

5. The institution of Star Chamber proceedings

sealed to public and press without cause hides

allegations of foreign corrupt practices to close

$1.9+Biilion in unprecedented transactions in New

York between Brazilian states and BOA, and it

constitutes a violation of fundamental constitutional

rights and universally recognized human rights. See

Levy v. Weksel, 143 F.R.D. 54, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)

(“Without such routine exposure to the sunshine of

public scrutiny, what is sometimes called the ‘least

dangerous branch’ might tend to acquire or to appear

to acquire unfortunate aspects of the Star Chamber

App.29

courts of old, contrary to the spirit of the First

Amendment, Article III, and the public trial concept

specifically vouchsafed in criminal cases by the Sixth

Amendment but relevant in civil cases as well.

Indeed, Article 10 of the United Nations Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, the development of

which was led by the United States and which was

adopted by the General Assembly on December 10,

1948, states: ‘Everyone is entitled in full equality to a

fair and public hearing by an independent and

impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights

and obligations’”) (emphasis added; footnote omitted).

To achieve specific and general deterrence, exemplary

damages must be set at a very high value, as a

nominal sum would not have any deterrent effect on

defendants with a net worth of very high value.

6. Plaintiff suggests a very high value for each day

to which he has been subjected to a Star Chamber

sealed to the public in a matter involving two close

home-state cronies of former President Bill Clinton

(Grigsby and Jude Kearney), approximately

$2 Billion in guaranteed credit agreements signed

between BOA and corrupt Brazilian public officials,

all of whom have either been imprisoned or criminally

charged in Brazil, and the attempted murder of

Plaintiff for having protested the misappropriation of

his novel work product to close unprecedented

private credit agreements in the New York

headquarters of BOA via kickbacks.

IV. THE PARTIES

7. Plaintiff ALEXANDER EUGENIO MOSKOVITS

is a human being, juris sui, domiciled in Brazil, and

bestowed with certain inviolable human rights.

Plaintiff was born in Brazil in 1964. Plaintiff is a

App. 30

native Brazilian alien who was certified as a U.S.

citizen at birth while inside of a Mexican prison in

1983 at the age of 19 to become eligible for a Treaty

on the Execution of Penal Sentences.

8. Defendant BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., a citizen

of North Carolina, operates as a Bank, having done

business as “Bank of America Merrill Lynch,” which

association-in-fact operated as a division of Bank of

America Corporation dedicated to multinational

investment banking headquartered in New York City.

9. Defendant SCHOEMAN UPDIKE KAUFMAN &

GERBER LLP is a law firm with offices located at 551

Fifth Ave., 12th Floor, New York, NY 10176, which

partnership has represented the Defendant BANK

OF AMERICA, N.A., during the relevant time period.

* * * [other individual private parties] * * *

14. Defendant BARRY R. OSTRAGER, J.D., ESQ. is

an appointed Justice of the Supreme Court of the

State of New York, County of New York, and an

individual lawyer who practiced in New York as a

Partner and Chief of Litigation for Simpson Thacher

& Bartlett LLP, where he worked for over forty (40)

years. His partnership published that it “regularly”

advised named BOA defendant in www.stblaw.com.

His partnership is headed in Sao Paulo, Brazil by a

relative of the former Brazilian Senate President

(2013), who signed a document ignored by the

Defendant Ostrager to lawlessly dismiss the sealed

lawsuit in its entirety. After U.S. District Judge

Vernon Broderick remanded the case to state court,

see Moskovits v. Grigsby, supra, 2020 WL 832468

(S.D.N.Y. February 20, 2020), Justice Ostrager was

assigned to Moskovits v. Grigsby, et ah, Supreme

Court Index No. 650617/2019, upon BOA counsel,

App. 31

Kaufman, filing for a referral of the case to the

“Commercial Division” of the Supreme Court.

Ostrager is sued both individually and as a Justice of

the Supreme Court of the State of New York.

15. The names and capacities of the Defendants

DOES 1-10 are presently unknown to Plaintiff, who

sues them by such fictitious names. The DOES

include but are not limited to the individuals

constituting the “Court Administration,” as they have

been entitled by Defendant BARRY R. OSTRAGER,

J.D., ESQ. [App. 43] (10/8/20) (“Court Administration

directed ... entire file be sealed” to the public due to

non-existent “threatening ... filings by plaintiff”).

V. RELEVANT BACKGROUND AND

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

16. Plaintiff adopts as correct the summaries of the

“procedural history” and the case “background”

provided by the Honorable U.S. District Court Judge

Vernon S. Broderick. See Moskovits v. Grigsby, 2020

WL 832468 (S.D.N.Y. February 20, 2020). ★ * *

17. Ostrager’s sua sponte Order sealed the case on

September 2, 2020 — the day after Plaintiff filed a

letter demanding disclosure of extrajudicial

relationships among Ostrager, his related entities,

counsel, the parties, including BOA, which Bank has

done business under the name “Bank of America

Merrill Lynch,” and/or their related entities. See infra

* * ★ (quoting letter of 9/1/20) (Doc. 135); [App. 42]

(Doc. 141) (order sealing entire case and restricting

access to Doc. 135 to “Justice Ostrager’s Chambers”)

(9/2/20). The sua sponte Order reads in full as follows:

“The County Clerk is directed to seal this case (all

past and future entries) to everyone except the Court

and the parties to this action. The County Clerk is

App. 32

also directed to seal NYSCEF Document No. 135 to

the public, all parties to the action, and to the Court

except for Justice Ostrager’s Chambers.” [App. 42]

(Doc. No. 141) (9/2/20) (bold in the original).

18. Sealing the entire case and restricting access to

a disclosure demand to Chambers created both a Star

Chamber and a disqualifying impropriety, or the

appearance of impropriety, causing the loss of

jurisdiction under New York law. See Wilcox v.

Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum, 210 N.Y. 370,

377-378 (1914)

(“In this state, statutory

disqualification of a judge deprives him of

jurisdiction.”). All state actors thus lost their

immunity. Plaintiff timely moved to recuse Ostrager

under mandatory disqualification statutes, 22

NYCRR §§ 100.2, 100.3(E)(1). 19. Justice Ostrager

issued another sealing order earlier that same date.

* * * (Doc. 136) (9/2/20) (“The County Clerk is directed

to seal NYSCEF Doc. No. 135 as it contains personal

information relating to this Court that has no

relevance to these proceedings.”). The later Sealing

Order of the same date, [App. 42] (Doc. 141) (9/2/20),

sealed the entire case file and restricted access to

“Chambers” as to Plaintiffs demand for the “full

disclosure” of Justice Ostrager’s extrajudicial

transactions/relationships ... filed September 1, 2020

(9/1/20), which reads, in relevant part:

Plaintiff demands the full disclosure of the following

transactions pursuant to NY law. See also 28 U.S.C.

§ 455(e) (full disclosure of potential grounds for

recusal must be made on the case record). Disclosure

required must include but not be limited to any

present or prior mortgagor-mortgagee relationship,

any present or prior lender-borrower relationship,

App. 33

any present or prior buyer-seller relationship, or any

present or prior relationship.

IN RE: BARRY R. OSTRAGER

* * * any and all transactions of any kind involving

BARRY R. OSTRAGER and any Bank of America

entity; * * * any and all transactions of any kind

involving BARRY R. OSTRAGER and any counsel or

any entity related to any counsel; * * *

IN RE: SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP

* * * any and all transactions of any kind involving

SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP and any

Bank of America entity;

* * * any and all transactions of any kind involving

SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP and any

counsel or any entity related to any counsel; * Sr *

IN RE: ALL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS

* * * any and all transactions at pp. 10-20

(“Properties”) of the 68-page report in re: “BARRY R.

OSTRAGER”, which involved any Bank of America

entity, including but not limited to the low value

transactions in Connecticut.

I respectfully advise Your Honor that I have

initiated a full investigation of this trial court

and all of its extrajudicial affairs* * *

20. Ostrager disregarded 22 NYCRR § 216.1(a)

* * *by sealing the entire case without any cause. •k k k

21. Plaintiff filed timely notice of appeal from the

sealing order on or about September 21, 2020, and

subsequently moved in the First Department for a

stay of the proceedings pending appellate review of

the Order sealing the entire case and the concomitant

judicial disqualification issue.

22. On October 6, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a letter

advising Ostrager of his motion for a stay and noting

App. 34

that “the hubris of ‘cancel culture’ ...contaminated

even this Court, for it to even dare to resurrect ‘Star

Chamber’ proceedings secret to the public and press.”

Plaintiff noted it is an actionable fraud on the court.

23. The letter did not deter any of the defendants,

as all willfully continued to perpetuate the violation

of rights consistent with the alleged aiding and

abetting or conspiracy among the private and public

actors acting under color of State law (Justice

Ostrager and the “Court Administration”) and

consistent with the stated cause of action for

conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of having and

exercising a right or privilege protected by the Due

Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,

acting with a class-based, invidious discriminatory

animus against Plaintiff due to his status as a felon.

24. On October 7, 2020, First Department Judge

Dianne Renwick referred Plaintiffs motion for a stay

to a full panel, setting October 16, 2020 as the filing

due date for any opposition, and October 23, 2020 as

the due date for any reply. 25. On October 8, 2020,

Justice Ostrager issued a post hoc order sua sponte to

fraudulently aid the opposition, falsely stating that

the “Court Administration directed that the entire file

be sealed except to the parties to the action and the

Court because of the inflammatory and threatening

nature of some of the filings by plaintiff.” [App. 43]

(Doc. 169) (10/8/20) (emphasis added).

26. On October 16, 2020, Kaufman, Larizza,

Schoeman, Bernstein, BOA, and Grigsby, relied on

the false claims in the order [App. 43] (Doc. 169) in

their oppositions, knowing that “threatening ...filings

by plaintiff’ did not exist, and thus aided the

App. 35

continuation of the Star Chamber. All Defendants

have aided the continuation of the unprecedented

sealing in violation of the Constitution and the Law

of Nations. Bernstein, for Grigsby, falsely submitted

the “decision to seal the case file is well-grounded in

the scurrilous and highly personal attacks being filed

by Plaintiff’ (emphasis added). Neither Ostrager in

his fraudulent post hoc order [App. 43] (Doc. 169), nor

any Defendant identified any “inflammatory and

threatening ... filings by plaintiff’ as no such “filings

by plaintiff’ exist. The “fraud upon the court” is

established with the “filings by plaintiff’ themselves,

even filed in federal court without any redactions by

the Republic of Brazil when it removed the case.

27. On October 23, 2020, Plaintiff filed his reply

submitting that the Order dated October 8, 2020 was

“post hoc rationalization for the sealing provided for

the first time since the September 2, 2020 sealing

[App. 42] (Doc. No. 141) appealed from, but without

citing any ‘inflammatory and threatening ... filings by

plaintiff because none exist.” Plaintiff submitted that

the adjectives used were “dictated” by Kaufman in

qualifying Plaintiffs off-the-record e-mails. * * *

(“plaintiffs emails contain baseless inflammatory

accusations and threats, which should not be made

part of the public docket. We will provide those to the

Court if it wishes to review them in camera”)

(emphasis added). 28. The stay requested by Plaintiff

pro se was denied. * * *

29. Ostrager failed to disclose that his multinational

partnership published in www.stblaw.com that it

“regularly” advised the defendant named in the case,

“Bank of America Merrill Lynch,” perhaps earning

millions in fees, and that, through his partner Grenfel

App. 36

Calheiros, his partnership operates in Brazil.

Ostrager ignored a key document signed by his

partner’s relative, Senator Renan Calheiros, to

fraudulently and lawlessly dismiss Plaintiffs

meritorious $7Million lawsuit. 30. Defendants

Kaufman, Larizza, and Schoeman, with reckless

disregard for the documentary evidence, falsely

denied that the official document signed by Senator

Calheiros to authorize one of the BOA contracts at

issue referenced BOA or any of the BOA contracts.

■k * *

31. On November 12, 2020, Ostrager dismissed

Plaintiffs meritorious suit ignoring the official

Federal Senate document signed by his law partner’s

relative,

Senator

Renan

Calheiros,

which

particularized the novel guarantee structure

contributed by Plaintiff, and also ignoring the press

release by “Special Counsel” for BOA (Milbank), who

worked on all of the credit agreements at issue, which

described the private credit agreements with

Brazilian states as unprecedented.

32. Defendant Grigsby, in pro se court filings of2020,

accused Plaintiff of “devilment” and cited United

States v. Moskovits, 86 F.3d 1303 (3d Cir. 1996),

clearly demonstrating his class-based, invidious

discriminatory animus against Plaintiff due to his

status as a felon in flagrant violation of constitutional

rights. 33. All defendants learned of Plaintiffs felon

status and joined in the class-based discrimination as

evidenced by the flagrant violation of his rights to

expose foreign corrupt practices to close contracts

with BOA, including but not limited to attempted

murder, to the public and the press. The claimed

discrimination has evidentiary support and will likely

App. 37

obtain additional evidentiary support after

reasonable opportunity for further discovery[.]

a

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION CIVIL ACTION

FOR DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS

(42 U.S.C. § 1983) (Conspiracy or Aiding & Abetting)

***

35. From as early as September 2, 2020, but no later

than October 8, 2020, and continuing through the

date of this filing, all the private and state defendants

agreed to act in concert to violate the Plaintiffs basic

constitutional rights under the First Amendment, as

well as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses

of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

36. By agreeing to act in concert to inflict an

unconstitutional injury against the Plaintiff, the

private and state defendants acted “under color of

state law” in furtherance of their goal to violate

Plaintiffs rights under the First Amendment, as well

as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of

the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The

overt acts in furtherance of the objective to deprive

Plaintiff of said rights, which caused him damages,

include but are not limited to: (a) the order sealing the

case without stating any cause, one day after the

Plaintiff requested full disclosure of extrajudicial

relationships of the court or his related entities with

the parties and counsel. [App. 42] (Doc. 141) (9/2/20);

(b) the post hoc order falsely claiming that the “Court

Administration directed” sealing the “entire file” due

to non-existent “threatening... filings by plaintiff’ was

an overt act from which an agreement among all of

the defendants to cause constitutional injury can be

inferred. See [App. 43] (Doc. 169) (10/8/20);

App. 38

(c) the oppositions filed by Schoeman, Kaufman,

Larizza, and Bernstein, on behalf of BOA and Grigsby

knowingly and willfully relying on the falsehood in

the post hoc order [App. 43] (Doc. 169) (“threatening

... filings”) were overt acts from which an agreement

among all of the defendants to cause constitutional

injury against the Plaintiff can be inferred. (10/16/20);

(d) all orders by Ostrager after instituting Star

Chamber proceedings were overt acts, including but

not limited to the dismissal of Plaintiffs suit by

ignoring a document by his own law partner’s

relative,

Senator

Renan

Calheiros,

which

particularized the guarantee structure contributed by

Plaintiff, and by ignoring the press release of Special

Counsel for BOA (Milbank), hired on all of the deals

at issue, which described the private credit

agreements with Brazilian states as unprecedented;

(e) all filings by Schoeman, Kaufman, Larizza, and

Bernstein, on behalf of BOA and Grigsby, after the

order sealing the entire case, which deliberately

failed to prevent the continuation of Star Chamber

proceedings. 37. The conspiracy among the private

and state defendants also diminished public

confidence in the state judiciary with wanton

disregard for public rights. 38. To achieve specific and

general deterrence, exemplary damages must be set

at a very high value, as a nominal sum would not have

any deterrent effect on defendants with a net worth

of a very high value, such as BOA, Schoeman,

Kaufman, Larizza, Grigsby, Bernstein, and Ostrager.

39. If an attorney is hired, Plaintiff may be allowed

attorney’s fees as part of the costs, * * * 40. Based on

the flagrant violation of rights embodied in the

unprecedented institution of Star Chamber

App. 39

proceedings sealing an entire commercial case, and

Grigsby underscoring Plaintiffs status as a felon, a

trier of fact can reasonably infer that all defendants

have acted with class-based, invidious discriminatory

animus against Plaintiff due to his status as a felon.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION CONSPIRACY

TO INTERFERE WITH CIVIL RIGHTS

(42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2), 1985(3)) * * *

42. From as early as September 2, 2020, but no later

than October 8, 2020, and continuing through the

date of this filing, all the private and state defendants

agreed to act in concert to deprive the Plaintiffs of

basic constitutional rights under the First

Amendment, the Due Process and Equal Protection

Clauses of the 14th Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution. 43. All defendants conspired to impede,

hinder, obstruct, or defeat the due course of justice in

the State Courts, by instituting and continuing Star

Chamber proceedings entirely sealed to the public

with the intent to deny Plaintiff the equal protection

of the law, or equal privileges under the laws, acting

with a class-based, invidious discriminatory animus

against Plaintiff due to his status as a felon. 44. All

defendants conspired for the purpose of depriving

Plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws, or equal

privileges under the laws. The overt acts in

furtherance of the objective to deprive Plaintiff of his

rights, which deprivation caused him damages,

include but are not limited to: [See 1f36(a)-(e) (same)].

45. Plaintiff has been deprived of having and

exercising a right or privilege of a United States

citizen, and therefore he is entitled to the recovery of

damages. 46-49. [See 1fl[37-40 (same)].

App. 40

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

ALIEN’S ACTION FOR TORT

(28 U.S.C. § 1350) (Conspiracy or Aiding & Abetting)

***

51. To the extent that Plaintiffs Brazilian birth

qualifies him as an “alien,” the “fraud on the court”

embodied in Officers of the Court sealing an entire

case deprived an alien of “fair and public” process in

violation of the Law of Nations, see Article 10 of the

“United Nations Universal Declaration of Human

Rights” (“Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair

and public hearing by an independent and impartial

tribunal, in the determination of his rights and

obligations....”), which reflects that a Star Chamber

seal violates a universal right. 52. The institution and

continuation of Star Chamber proceedings violate “a

norm of international character accepted by the

civilized world and defined with a specificity

comparable to the features of the 18th-century

paradigms.” 53. The alleged “fraud upon the court,”

see Fourth Cause of Action, infra, embodied in the

institution and continuation of Star Chamber

proceedings sealed to the public constitutes a tort

committed in violation of the Law of Nations.

54. The alleged “fraud upon the court,” see Fourth

Cause of Action, infra, in which private and state

defendants conspired or aided and abetted each other

to violate Plaintiffs rights also diminished public

confidence in the state judiciary with wanton

disregard for public rights. 55. To achieve specific and

general deterrence, exemplary damages must be set

at a very high value, as a nominal sum would not have

any deterrent effect on defendants with a net worth

of a very high value. 56. The calloused and malicious

App. 41

conduct of these sophisticated defendants has

damaged Plaintiff by causing intense emotional pain

and suffering, leaving Plaintiff feeling anger and

depression as a victim of flagrant dehumanization.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

FRAUD ON THE COURT

***

58. The fraudulent acts “defile the court itself, or is

a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the

judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual

manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are

presented for adjudication.” See Kupferman v.

Consolidated Research and Mfg. Corp., 459 F.2d

1072, 1078 (2d Cir. 1972) (formulation of “fraud on the

court” accepted by this Circuit).

59. The overt acts of fraud by Officers of the Court

in furtherance of the objective to deprive Plaintiff of

his rights, which deprivation caused damages,

include but are not limited to: (a) the order sealing the

case without stating any cause, one day after the

Plaintiff requested full disclosure of extrajudicial

relationships of the court or his related entities with

the parties and counsel. [App. 42] (Doc. 141) (9/2/20);

(b) the post hoc order falsely claiming that the “Court

Administration” directed sealing the entire “file” due

to non-existent “threatening... filings” to aid the

defendants in the Appellate Division. [App. 43] (Doc.

169) (10/8/20); (c) the oppositions filed by Schoeman,

Kaufman, Larizza, and Bernstein, on behalf of BOA

and Grigsby, knowingly and willfully relying on the

falsehood in the post hoc order [App. 43] (Doc. 169)

(“threatening ... filings”) (10/16/20); (d) all orders by

Ostrager after instituting Star Chamber proceedings

were overt acts of fraud,

App. 42

including but not limited to the dismissal of Plaintiff s

suit by ignoring a document by his own law partner’s

relative,

Senator

Renan

Calheiros,

which

particularized the guarantee structure contributed by

Plaintiff, and by also ignoring the press release of

Special Counsel for BOA (Milbank), hired on all of the

deals at issue, which described the credit agreements

with Brazilian states as unprecedented; (e) all filings

by Schoeman, Kaufman, Larizza, and Bernstein, on

behalf of BOA and Grigsby, after the order sealing the

entire case, which deliberately failed to prevent the

continuation of Star Chamber proceedings.

60. Star Chamber proceedings sealed to the public

based upon a falsehood established by the

documentary evidence is a flagrant “fraud on the

court” which damaged Plaintiff in an amount of no

less than $7Million. Even if [an] appeal overturns the

Star Chamber sealing order, it will not compensate

Plaintiff for the damages suffered from the

deprivation of his constitutional and human rights,

(brackets and asterisks added; irrelevant omitted)

NYSCEF DOG NO. 141

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY

PRESENT: HON. BARRY R. OSTRAGER

PART 61 Justice INDEX NO. 650617/2019

X

ALEXANDER MOSKOVITS,

Plaintiff,

-vCALVIN B. GRIGSBY, BANK OF AMERICA

MERRILL LYNCH, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

BRAZIL, STATE OF SANTA CATARINA BRAZIL,

App. 43

STATE OF MARANHAO BRAZIL, STATE OF

MATO GROSSO BRAZIL, RAIMUNDO COLOMBO

JORGE SIEGA, and DOES 1 THROUGH 100,

INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

X

ORDER DIRECTING SEALING

HON. BARRY R. OSTRAGER

The County Clerk is directed to seal this case

(all past and future entries) to everyone except the

Court and the parties to this action.

The County Clerk is also directed to seal

NYSCEF Document No. 135 to the public, all parties

to the action, and to the Court except for Justice

Ostrager’s Chambers.

Dated: September 2, 2020 (emphasis in original)

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 169

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY

PRESENT: HON. BARRY R. OSTRAGER

PART 61 Justice INDEX NO. 650617/2019

X

ALEXANDER MOSKOVITS,

Plaintiff,

-vCALVIN B. GRIGSBY, BANK OF AMERICA

MERRILL LYNCH, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

BRAZIL, STATE OF SANTA CATARINA BRAZIL,

App. 44

STATE OF MARANHAO BRAZIL, STATE OF

MATO GROSSO BRAZIL, RAIMUNDO COLOMBO,

JORGE SIEGA, and DOES 1 THROUGH 100,

INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

X

ORDER DIRECTING UNSEALING

HON. BARRY R. OSTRAGER

The County Clerk is directed to unseal

NYSCEF document no. 141 for access by the

parties to this action and the Court only. As reflected

in the text of NYSCEF document no. 141, the

document was mistakenly sealed. The Court

Administration directed that the entire file be sealed

except to the parties to the action and the Court

because of the inflammatory and threatening nature

of some of the filings by plaintiff.

Dated: October 8, 2020

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY

PRESENT: HON. BARRY R. OSTRAGER

PART IAS MOTION 61EFM Justice

INDEX NO. 152397/2020

X

THE STUYVESANT TOWN-PETER COOPER

VILLAGE TENANTS’ ASSOCIATION, SUSAN

STEINBERG as President and Tenant

Representative and BETH ROSNER, STEVEN

NEWMARK, RORY O’CONNOR and JODI

STRAUSS individually and as ASSOCIATION

members,

Plaintiffs,

App. 45

-vBPP ST OWNER LLC and BPP PCV OWNER LLC,

THE CITY OF NEW YORK and THE NEW YORK

CITY HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

and THE NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF

HOUSING AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL,

Defendants.

X

RECUSAL ORDER

I recuse myself from this case and the related

case Roberts v. BPP PCV Owner (100956/2007). On

March 25, 2021 I made a disclosure to the parties

concerning defendant BPP St Owner LLC, which I

learned is a Blackstone affiliate. Specifically, prior to

my appointment to the bench, I was a partner at

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP. Blackstone was

and is one of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP’s

largest clients. I currently receive a pension from

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP which is derived at

least in part from the substantial revenue the firm

receives from Blackstone.On April 1, 2021, plaintiffs’

counsel requested that I recuse myself from these

cases which I hereby do. This case is referred to the

General Clerks’ Office for reassignment to another

Commercial Division Justice.

HON. BARRY R. OSTRAGER [signature]

Dated: April 1, 2021

App. 46

State of New York

ETHICS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFIED

COURT SYSTEM

***

ANNUAL STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL

DISCLOSURE FOR 2020 CALENDAR YEAR

***

(1)

(a) FIRST NAME

Barry

(b) LAST NAME

Ostrager

THIS STATEMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED

FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION

***

(2)

(a) CURRENT JOB TITLE

Judge, N.Y. Supreme Court Justice-Civil,

First Judicial District

(b) CURRENT WORK ADDRESS

60 Centre Street, New York, NY 10007

***

(12) (b) Describe the parties to and the terms of any

agreement providing for continuation of payments or

benefits to the REPORTING INDIVIDUAL in

EXCESS of $1,000 from a prior employer OTHER

THAN the State. (This includes interests in or

contributions to a pension fund, profit-sharing plan,

or life or health insurance; buyout agreements;

severance payments; etc.).

Do you have any information to enter for this

question?

Yes

App. 47

As a retired Partner of the law Firm Simpson

Thacher Bartlett LLP I am entitled to receive a

pension after my 12/31/14 retirement as an active

partner of the Firm.

(13) List below the nature and amount of any income

in EXCESS of $1,000 from EACH SOURCE for the

reporting individual and such individual’s spouse for

the taxable year last occurring prior to the date of

filing. Nature of income includes, but is not limited to,

all income EARNED BY YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE

(other than that received by you from the employment

listed under item 2 above) from compensated

employment whether public or private, directorships

and

other

fiduciary

positions,

contractual

arrangements, teaching income, partnerships,

honorariums, lecture fees, consultant fees, bank and

bond interest, dividends, income derived from a trust,

real estate rents, and recognized gains from the sale

or exchange of real or other property. Income from a

business or profession and real estate rents shall be

reported with the source identified by the building

address in case of real estate rents and otherwise by

the name of the entity and not by the name of the

individual customers, clients or tenants, with the

aggregate net income before taxes for each building

address or entity. The receipt of maintenance

received in connection with a matrimonial action,

alimony, and child support payments shall not be

listed.

Do you have any information to enter for this

question?

Yes

App. 48

Self SOURCE Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

NATURE Pension CATEGORY OF AMOUNT

H: $1,000,000 to under $3,000,000

***

Self SOURCE Merrill Lynch Brokerage Account

NATURE Dividends CATEGORY OF AMOUNT

Category C-$20,000 to under $60,000

***

The requirements of law relating to the

reporting of financial interests are in the public

interest and no adverse inference of unethical or

illegal conduct or behavior will be drawn merely

from compliance with these requirements.

***

SIMPSON THACHER BARTLETT LLP

PUBLICATION (STBLAW.COM)(2020)

“...The versatility of our practice areas greatly

benefits clients - banks, companies, private equity

firms, public utilities, nonprofits and individuals. We

regularly advise clients such as Alibaba Group, Apax

Partners, Bank of America Merrill Lynch,

Blackstone, Carlyle, Dell, EQT, First Reserve,

Goldman Sachs, HCA, Heilman & Friedman, Hilton,

JPMorgan, KKR, Microsoft, the Republic of Peru,

Seagate Technology, Silverlake Partners, SiriusXM,

Travelers, and scores of others. ...”

(Emphasis added).