Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lorenzo Shelton, Petitioner v. United States

No. 21A807

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

LORENZO SHELTON,

Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent

On Petition For A Writ of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals For The Sixth

Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PETER J. STRIANSE

Counsel of Record

TUNE, ENTREKIN & WHITE, P.C.

500 11TH AVENUE NORTH

SUITE 600

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37203

(615) 244-2770

pstrianse@tewlawfirm.com

October 10, 2022

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The first question presented, on which the

circuits are now divided, is whether the Fourth

Amendment’s privacy protections prevent law

enforcement from searching places where a parolee

has standing but at the same time are not

unambiguously the parolee’s “place of residence.”

The second question presented, on which the

circuits disagree with this Court, is whether Fourth

Amendment cell phone protections, articulated by this

Court in cases like Riley v. California, 575 U.S. 373

(2014), apply to parolee searches?

(i)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner,

Lorenzo Shelton.

defendant-appellant

below,

is

Respondent is the United States of America,

appellee below.

RELATED PROCEEDING

United States v. Lorenzo Shelton, No. 20-6348,

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

Judgment entered Mar. 8, 2022.

(ii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (i)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING . . . . . . . . . . . . (ii)

RELATED PROCEEDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (ii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (iv)

OPINIONS AND RULINGS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . 1

JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . 5

I.

THE FIRST QUESTION PROVIDES THE

COURT AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE

A DEEPENING CIRCUIT SPLIT . . . . . . . . . 7

II.

THE SECOND QUESTION PROVIDES

THE COURT AN OPPORTUNITY TO

RECONCILE ITS PAROLEE SEARCH

AND CELL PHONE PRIVACY

JURISPRUDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

APPENDIX A: Opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

(Mar. 8, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

(iii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Pages

Katz v. United States,

389 U.S. 347 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Minnesota v. Olson,

495 U.S. 1 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Morrissey v. Brewer,

408 U.S. 471 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Ornelas v. United States,

517 U.S. 690 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Riley v. California,

575 U.S. 373 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Samson v. California,

547 U.S. 843 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

United States v. Fletcher,

978 F.3d 1009 (6th Cir. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . 7, 12

United States v. Graham,

553 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 9

United States v. Grandberry,

730 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2013) . . . . . . . . . 6, 8, 10

United States v. Hopkins,

830 Fed. Appx. 220 (9th Cir. Nov. 24, 2020) .10

(iv)

United States v. Howard,

447 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . 8–9

United States v. Johnson,

875 F.3d 1265 (9th Cir. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

United States v. Knights,

534 U.S. 112 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 10

United States v. Lara,

815 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

United States v. Pacheco,

884 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 2018) . . . . . . . . . 7, 11

United States v. Risse,

83 F.3d 212 (8th Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

United States v. Shelton,

2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 6159, 2022 WL

684395 (6 Cir. Mar. 8, 2022) . . . . . . . . . passim

United States v. Taylor,

482 F.3d 315 (5 Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

United States v. Wood,

16 F.4th 529 (7th Cir. 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Constitutional Provisions

Pages

U.S. Const. amend IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

(v)

OPINIONS AND RULINGS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is not reported. See App.

A, infra, 14.

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals entered a judgment in

this case on March 8, 2022. This Court’s jurisdiction is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and

particularly describing the place to be searched, and

the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend IV.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

When Petitioner Lorenzo Shelton signed a

Parole Certificate in October 2015, he “agree[d] to a

search, without a warrant, of my person, vehicle,

property, or place of residence by any

Probation/Parole officer or law enforcement officer, at

any time without reasonable suspicion.” RE 47-1

(emphasis added). Both at the time Shelton signed his

agreement and in August of 2016, Shelton personally

resided at 317 Tillman Lane in Nashville, Tennessee.

See RE 47-2, PageID #71. Shelton’s law enforcement

file reflected also reflected that 317 Tillman Lane was

the address of his personal residence. See RE 47-2,

PageID #71–72.

An anonymous woman called law enforcement

in late July of 2016 to tell police that “Shelton was

selling drugs in a rental car behind his house, and

that his house might contain firearms.” United

States v. Shelton, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 6159, 2022

WL 684395, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 2022) (emphasis

added). Officers descended upon 317 Tillman Lane

several days later. See id. When police realized

Shelton was absent, they summoned Shelton1 to his

residence. See id; RE 47-2, PageID# 79, 85, 101.

Officers searched Shelton’s residence at

Tillman Lane, consistent with the terms of his Parole

1 Tennessee State Parole Officer Pasqualetto acknowledged at

the evidentiary hearing that he lied to Shelton, telling him that

he was instead only engaging in a house visit, while encouraging

him to return home. See RE 80, PageID# 317–19. Had Shelton

not returned to 317 Tillman Lane, Tennessee Department of

Correction rules would have prevented Pasqualetto from searing

Shelton’s residence. See id. at PageID# 431–42.

2

Certificate, and found firearms, heroin, and Suboxone

Film strips.2 See RE 47-2, PageID# 73–74, 87, 89, 112.

Officers also searched Shelton’s vehicle, within which

they found four cell phones and approximately

$11,000 in cash. See id. at PageID# 97, 113.

During these parolee searches, Shelton sat on

the front porch with a fifth cell phone. See Shelton,

2022 U.S. App LEXIS 6159 at *2. An officer took

Shelton’s phone mid-text and “looked through other

text messages and pictures on the cellphone.” Id. As

police examined the cell phone, Shelton received a

phone call and text from the same number, which

police traced to a physical address of “3565

Chesapeake Bay [sic] Drive.” See id. at *3.3 Despite

having found evidence at Tillman Lane consistent

with that of a residential home, Police took Shelton to

3565 Chesapeake Drive. See RE 47-2, PageID# 73,

114.

A young boy and his twenty-year-old sister

came to the door of the Chesapeake Drive home when

police knocked. See Shelton, 2022 U.S. App LEXIS

6159 at *3. The children told police that Shelton had

been spending some time at the Chesapeake Drive

house “for about two weeks.” Docket Entry 19,

Suboxone Film is a prescription medicine that contains the

active ingredients buprenorphine and naloxone. It is used to

treat adults who are dependent on (addicted to) opioids (either

prescription or illegal).

3 Police also asked Shelton questions while detained on the front

porch, and in response to one question Shelton told the officers

that he had moved to Chesapeake Drive two weeks prior. See RE

80, PageID# 344. This questioning came without a Miranda

warning, and at no point during this questioning did Shelton

provide police with a new residential address on Chesapeake

Drive.

2

3

PageID# 22. Shelton visited Chesapeake primarily

because he “was dating [the kids’] mother.” Shelton,

2022 U.S. App LEXIS 6159 at *3. Police asked the kids

to show them Shelton’s room—which was deadbolt

locked—and the children complied. See id. After using

Shelton’s keys to unlock the room, police found “more

heroin, money, a money counter, a Ruger 9mm pistol,

and a photograph of Shelton.” Id.

Relying heavily upon the evidence police found

at the Chesapeake Drive address, the Government

charged Shelton with one count of possession with

intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); one count of

possession with intent to distribute a substance

containing heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1);

one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924; and one

count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a

drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

924(c)(1)(A). See id. Shelton sought suppression of the

evidence obtained at 317 Tillman Lane and 3565

Chesapeake Drive, but the district court denied his

motions. See id. The jury found Shelton guilty on all

counts and delivered a thirty-year prison sentence. Id.

Shelton appealed to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, arguing: (1) police’s

search of 317 Tillman Lane violated the Fourth

Amendment, since police conducted the search

arbitrarily and unreasonably; (2) police’s search of

3565 Chesapeake Drive violated the Fourth

Amendment, since police did not have probable cause

nor did Shelton’s Parole Certificate unambiguously

allow for a search of an unconfirmed alternative

4

residence; (3) police’s search of Shelton’s cell phone

violated this Court’s holding in Riley v. California, 575

U.S. 373 (2014), and its progeny; and (4) the Trial

Court improperly permitted an incompetent witness

to provide testimony against Shelton at trial. See

generally Docket Entry 19. The Sixth Circuit affirmed

the Trial Court, denying each of Petitioner’s

arguments. See Shelton, 2022 U.S. App LEXIS 6159

at *4–5.

Shelton filed a pro se petition for writ of

certiorari on May 29, 2022. Upon obtaining

representation, Shelton withdrew his pro se petition

and filed an “Application for an Extension of Time

Within Which to File a Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit.” This Court granted Shelton two extensions,

setting his petition deadline ultimately for October 10,

2022.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

As this Court has repeatedly explained, “[t]he

Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Katz

v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). But not all

persons in the United States are protected equally by

the Fourth Amendment. See generally Samson v.

California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). This Court has held

that Parolees’ privacy interests are “severely

diminished . . . by virtue of their status” since parole

is ”an established variation on imprisonment.” Id. at

852 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477

(1972)).

5

But the law has continued to evolve since this

Court issued its opinion in Morrissey v. Brewer. Parole

search conditions are found throughout American

criminal law, see Samson, 547 U.S. at 852, often

couched within broad language requiring a parolee

“submit his . . . person, property, . . . [or] place or

residence . . . to search at anytime . . . by any [parole]

officer or law enforcement officer.”4 United States v.

Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114 (2001). While this Court

found that the acceptance of “clear and unambiguous

search condition[s] significantly diminish[ ] . . .

expectation[s] of privacy,” Samson, 547 U.S. at 852

(quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 119), many modern

situations give rise to ambiguity and constitutional

questions regarding the scope of their terms.

For one, the circuits continue to deepen a split

on the question of whether a location where a typical

criminal defendant may have Fourth Amendment

standing, see generally Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 1

(1990), but at the same time would not qualify as their

primary residence, is searchable under the parolee

search exception. Compare United States v.

Grandberry, 730 F.3d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 2013) with

United States v. Graham, 553 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2009)

(probationers) and Shelton, 2022 U.S. App LEXIS

6159 at *4 (parolees). Additionally, despite most every

circuit to consider the question finding that the

4 Although the quoted language comes directly from this Court’s

premier case regarding probationers, similar broad waivers are

also reflected in Parole Certificates like Shelton’s. See RE 47-1.

Shelton’s Parole Certificate required that he “agree to a search,

without a warrant, of my person, vehicle, property, or place of

residence by any Probation/Parole officer or law enforcement

officer, at any time without reasonable suspicion.” Id.

6

parolee search exception applies to cell phones and

their internal digital data, that principle of law seems

to directly conflict with this Court’s holding in Riley v.

California. See generally 575 U.S. 373 (2014).

Presumably, the Government cannot force parolees to

waive their constitutional rights without an

unambiguous waiver; and yet, cell phones have not

unambiguously been considered property of a parolee

given their unique status under the Fourth

Amendment. Compare United States v. Fletcher, 978

F.3d 1009, 1018–19 (6th Cir. 2020) with United States

v. Pacheco, 884 F.3d 1031, 1040–41 (10th Cir. 2018)

and Shelton, 2022 U.S. App LEXIS 6159 at *5. Both

questions presented implicate this Court’s precedent,

and thus the Court is best positioned to resolve the

lower court tension on these important criminal

constitutional issues.

I.

THE FIRST QUESTION PROVIDES THE

COURT AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE A

DEEPENING CIRCUIT SPLIT

This Court has not determined the scope of

Fourth Amendment protections afforded to parolees

in situations where their Parole Certificate or similar

waiver contains ambiguous provisions. At issue in

Shelton’s case is the phrase “place of residence” found

in his Parole Certificate. RE 47-1. What Fourth

Amendment protection should be given, if any, to

spaces where a criminal defendant can plausibly

claim standing but at the same time cannot

unambiguously qualify as their place of residence?

The Ninth Circuit only considers the phrase to

apply to one particular location, and uses a “relatively

7

stringent,” “fact-intensive” analysis to answer the

question of which location is a particular parolee’s

place of residence. United States v. Grandberry, 730

F.3d 968, 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ornelas v.

United States, 517 U.S. 690, 703 (1996)). In United

States v. Grandberry¸ the court acknowledged that

Ninth Circuit precedent created a constellation of

“patterns that . . . in most cases . . . [can give] officers

[ ] probable cause to conclude that a parolee lived in a

residence not reported by [the] parolee as his

address.”5 Id. at 976 (quoting United States v.

Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1265 (9th Cir. 2006))

(internal quotation marks omitted). These “clearly

emerge[nt]” criteria for consideration6 include: (1) not

appearing to reside at another address; (2) direct

observations by law enforcement;7 (3) whether the

defendant had a key to the other location;8 and (4)

whether a co-resident implicated the defendant’s

5 Parole certificates in the Ninth Circuit typically provide law

enforcement carte blanche to search “any property under [the

parolee’s] control.” Grandberry, 730 F.3d at 980.

6 These considerations should be “viewed cumulatively rather

than independently for purposes of assessing probable cause as

to residence.” Grandberry, 730 F.3d at 976.

7 Some law enforcement observations are entitled to more

“weight” than others. Grandberry, 730 F.3d at 978. For example,

observing someone’s continued presence may be significant, but

“even if frequent, does not, standing alone, establish probable

cause that the parolee lives there.” Id.

8 This fact, much like Government surveillance, “standing alone,

does not establish probable cause.” Grandberry, 730 F.3d at 979.

As the Ninth Circuit observed, “key access to . . . [an] apartment

would not, without more, lead a reasonably prudent person to

believe that [the keyholder] lived there.” Id. at 980.

8

residential status.9 Id. (citing Howard, 447 F.3d at

1265–66. If judged using this standard, perhaps the

Sixth Circuit would have found that 3565 Chesapeake

Drive did not qualify as a place of residence and, as a

result, would have concluded that police violated

Shelton’s Fourth Amendment rights.

The Sixth Circuit took a different approach

below, concluding that “as a practical matter[,] a

person can have more than one place of residence.”

Shelton, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 6159, 2022 WL

684395, at *4. While not identical, this approach

seems similar in kind to the analysis used by the First

Circuit in the context of probationer residences. See

See generally United States v. Graham, 553 F.3d 6 (1st

Cir. 2009). There, a criminal defendant claimed “that

he did not reside at [an] apartment,” and thus the

police searching that apartment without a warrant

violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 14.

While the First Circuit does not articulate criterion

like the Ninth does, in Graham it noted that police

relied upon “five pieces of information[:]” (1) a police

report situating the defendant at the apartment; (2)

statements from another probation officer; (3)

statements from another apartment owner; (4) law

enforcement observations of known associates near

the apartment; and (5) no evidence that Graham

resided at another main location. Id. at 13 (citing

United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 217 (8th Cir. 1996)

(applying similar analysis to execution of arrest

warrant)). The First Circuit held that this

9 Not all supposed co-resident statements deserve equal weight.

Someone calling a defendant’s location “your place” was too

ambiguous for a clear finding of probable cause. 730 F.3d at 977.

9

information, taken together, could plausibly give

officers “a reasonable belief that Graham resided in

the apartment.” Id. at 14.

Although the Sixth Circuit’s opinion is

unpublished and non-binding, its logic contributes to

the deepening of a growing circuit split and could

invite law enforcement abuse. Shelton’s case

exemplifies this concern: instead of relying upon the

magnitude of different facts and criteria identified by

the First or Ninth Circuits, the court below relied

mainly on statements obtained pre-Miranda warning

and statements from an alleged co-resident minor.

Compare Shelton, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 6159, 2022

WL 684395, at *4 with Grandberry, 730 F.3d at 977

(calling reliance upon co-resident statements a

“weakness”).

None of these circuits seem to strictly adhere to

the “Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry”

identified in cases like Knights and Samson, which is

instead the method of analysis employed for

probationers in the Fifth Circuit. United States v.

Taylor, 482 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting 534

U.S. at 121); but see Taylor, 482 F.3d at 319 n.2

(questioning whether the reasonableness requirement

“has been eliminated”). Instead, different circuits

have created a patchwork of standing rules for

parolees. See, e.g., Grandberry, 730 F.3d at 985

(acknowledging “doctrinal inconsistencies”); Cf.

United States v. Hopkins, 830 Fed. Appx. 220, 222 (9th

Cir. Nov. 24, 2020) (declining to use Grandberry

analysis as “not particularly apt” for the

circumstances of the case). Shelton’s case provides the

Court with an opportunity, and an appropriate

10

vehicle, to bring a developing circuit split to a close

before it snowballs out of control.

II.

THE SECOND QUESTION PROVIDES THE

COURT AN OPPORTUNITY TO

RECONCILE ITS PAROLEE SEARCH AND

CELL PHONE PRIVACY JURISPRUDENCE

This Court should also grant Shelton’s

certiorari petition because his case provides an

opportunity to explain to lower courts how to reconcile

its cell phone privacy jurisprudence and parolee

search exception holdings. “Modern cell phones, as a

category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those

implicated by the search of [other property,]” and that

realization motivated this Court to treat cell phones

with unique sensitivity. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393.

Despite the Government arguing otherwise, this

Court rejected the notion that “officers should always

be able to search a phone’s call log[.]” Id. at 400.

And yet, that’s exactly what police did in

Shelton’s case. See Shelton, 2022 U.S. App LEXIS

6159 at *2. Incident to Shelton’s arrest, police seized

and searched his cell phone’s “text messages and

pictures” until Shelton received a phone call that

police were able to trace back to 3565 Chesapeake

Drive. Id. Curiously, the Sixth Circuit said that this

information “did not come from a search of the phone’s

internal data,” Id. at *5, but even if the court was

incorrect, the court justified its dismissal of Shelton’s

objection by invoking his “lesser expectation of

privacy” as a parolee. Id. (citing Samson, 547 U.S. at

850). Based on modern trends in the circuits though,

11

this result is not unsurprising. See generally United

States v. Wood, 16 F.4th 529 (7th Cir. 2021); United

States v. Pacheco, 884 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 2018);

United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265 (9th Cir.

2017).

Not only is the opinion below not in lockstep

with this Court’s opinion in Riley, but it also conflicts

with the Sixth Circuit’s past opinion in United States

v. Fletcher. Compare Shelton, 2022 U.S. App LEXIS

6159 at *5 with 978 F.3d 1009 (6th Cir. 2020). Ohio’s

parole conditions permit law enforcement to search

any “item of tangible or intangible personal property,”

yet the Sixth Circuit found in Fletcher that such

language “did not clearly or unambiguously allow for

the search of his phones.” 978 F.3d at 1020; see also

United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 611 (9th Cir. 2016)

(explaining in probationer case that “nor does the

word “property” unambiguously include cell phone

data”).

Fletcher’s condition language was more specific

than Shelton’s, and even though Fletcher was a

probationer, the Sixth Circuit protected Fletcher’s cell

phone data. See 978 F.3d at 1018. That panel’s logic

should apply to parolees just as probationers, even

though they hold “diminished” privacy interests.

Samson, 547 U.S. at 850. Probationers and parolees

should not be considered to have waived their

constitutional rights via ambiguous conditions that

guarantee alternatives to imprisonment.

12

CONCLUSION

Petitioner respectfully requests this Court grant his

petition for writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

PETER J. STRIANSE

Counsel of Record

TUNE, ENTREKIN & WHITE, P.C.

500 11TH AVENUE NORTH

SUITE 600

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37203

(615) 244-2770

pstrianse@tewlawfirm.com

October 10, 2022

Counsel for Petitioner

13

APPENDIX A

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 22a0109n.06

No. 20-6348

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[FILED

Mar. 08, 2022

DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LORENZO SHELTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

) ON APPEAL

) FROM THE

) UNITED

) STATES

) DISTRICT

) COURT

) FOR THE

) MIDDLE

) DISTRICT

) OF

) TENNESSEE

Before: COLE, KETHLEDGE, and WHITE, Circuit

Judges.

14

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. A jury found

Lorenzo Shelton guilty of possessing drugs and

firearms while on parole. He argues that the officers

here violated the Fourth Amendment when they

searched his rooms and cellphone for evidence later

used to convict him. We affirm.

I.

In January 2002, Shelton pled guilty in state

court to possessing and selling cocaine, and to

possessing a firearm with intent to use the weapon in

a felony. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison. In

October 2015 Shelton was released on parole. He

signed a parole certificate in which he agreed to

provide his address to his parole officer and to inform

the officer if his address changed. Shelton further

agreed to let officers search his “person, vehicle,

property, or place of residence . . . at any time without

reasonable suspicion” and without a warrant.

In July 2016, Shelton told his parole officer that

he lived at 317 Tillman Lane in Nashville. That

officer,

Michael

Pasqualetto,

soon

received

anonymous phone calls from a woman who said that

Shelton was selling drugs in a rental car behind his

house, and that his house might contain firearms.

Days later, at 7 a.m., Pasqualetto and four

other parole officers visited 317 Tillman Lane for the

purpose of searching it. Shelton was not there, so

Pasqualetto called him and told him to return to

Tillman Lane. Shelton showed up about 20 minutes

later in a rental car. The officers said they were going

to search the house; Shelton replied that he had

moved to a different address two weeks before. That

address included the word “Chesapeake” and had a

“three” in the house number. Shelton verbally

15

consented to a search of the Tillman home, and said

his room had been in the basement. At some point, five

Metro-Nashville Police Department officers also

arrived on the scene.

The parole officers first unlocked Shelton’s

rental car, in which they found four cellphones and

$11,300 in cash. They told Shelton to sit on the front

porch while they searched the house itself. Some

officers stayed with Shelton on the porch; others went

to the basement, which showed no signs of habitation.

The officers then searched a bedroom on the first floor,

where they found Shelton’s driver’s license, men’s

clothing, Pasqualetto’s business card, and mail

addressed to Shelton. In that same room, they also

found three small bags of heroin, digital scales,

sandwich bags, and 905 strips of suboxone, a

controlled substance. In an adjacent bedroom, they

found a sawed-off shotgun.

Meanwhile, on the porch, one of the parole

officers noticed that Shelton was texting on his

remaining cellphone. An officer took it out of his hands

and saw in plain view the message that Shelton had

been typing, which read: “Get everything out m”. The

parole officers then looked through other text

messages and pictures on the cellphone; as they did

so, another number repeatedly appeared on the screen

as it called and texted Shelton’s phone. A police officer

ran that number through a database, which provided

a physical address associated with the phone number:

3565 Chesapeake Bay Drive. The police officers

arrested Shelton and found a set of keys in his pocket.

They put him in a police car and began driving to 3565

Chesapeake. Shelton began to hyperventilate, looked

sick, and threw up upon arrival. The officers called an

ambulance for him.

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Meanwhile, two parole officers knocked on the

door of the Chesapeake house and spoke with a 20year-old woman inside. They asked whether Shelton

had been staying there; she said he had been there

about two weeks and was dating her mother. She

pointed to the room in which Shelton had been

staying, which was locked with a deadbolt. The

officers unlocked the room with the keys that Shelton

had been carrying; inside, they found more heroin,

money, a money counter, a Ruger 9mm pistol, and a

photograph of Shelton.

A grand jury later indicted Shelton on one count

of possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or

more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1);

one count of possession with intent to distribute a

substance containing heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1); one count of being a felon in possession of

a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924;

and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance

of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

924(c)(1)(A). Shelton later moved to suppress the

evidence from the Tillman and Chesapeake searches.

The district court denied the motion. Shelton

proceeded to trial, where a jury found Shelton guilty

on all four counts. The district court sentenced

Shelton to 30 years’ imprisonment. This appeal

followed.

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II.

Shelton challenges the district court’s denial of

his motion to suppress. We review the district court’s

legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for

clear error. United States v. Fletcher, 978 F.3d 1009,

1014 (6th Cir. 2020).

Shelton first challenges the search of the

Tillman address. The officers searched that address

pursuant to Shelton’s parole certificate, which

granted officers permission to search his residence

without probable cause. The only question here,

therefore, is whether the search complied with

Tennessee law regarding parolee searches. See United

States v. Loney, 331 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2003).

Tennessee law bars searches of a parolee’s residence

only if “the search was conducted for reasons other

than valid law enforcement concerns”—such as

searches that are “intended to cause . . . harm” or

“conducted out of personal animosity.” State v.

Stanfield, 554 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tenn. 2018). Shelton has

not made any such showing here. The search of the

Tillman home was therefore lawful.

The same is true as to the Chesapeake address,

for substantially the same reasons. (We pass over the

question whether Shelton has “standing”—in a nonArticle III sense—to challenge the search of that

residence.) Shelton himself told officers that he had

moved to an address that included the word

“Chesapeake”; the young woman who answered the

door at 3565 Chesapeake said that Shelton had been

staying there for two weeks; and that timing matched

up with when Shelton himself had said he moved from

the Tillman address. The officers therefore had

probable cause to think that 3565 Chesapeake was his

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“place of residence” (the term used in the parole

certificate), or at least one of them. Shelton doubts

that officers can have probable cause to think that one

suspect resides at two addresses. But he offers no

authority for that proposition, and as a practical

matter a person can have more than one place of

residence.

Shelton does argue—as part as his challenge to

the Chesapeake search—that the officers unlawfully

searched his cellphone. But the officers were

undisputedly entitled to take the phone from him

while he was attempting to text with it, and in doing

so they saw in plain view an incoming number that

they later traced to the 3565 Chesapeake address.

Nothing in that sequence effected an unlawful search

of Shelton’s cellphone. See United States v. Herndon,

501 F.3d 683, 693 (6th Cir. 2007). Nor is this case like

United States v. Fletcher: the information that led

officers to the Chesapeake address did not come from

a search of the phone’s internal data; and as a parolee

rather than a probationer, Shelton had a lesser

expectation of privacy than Fletcher did. See 978 F.3d

1009, 1018–19 (6th Cir. 2020); Samson v. California,

547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006). The search of the

Chesapeake residence was lawful. Shelton’s final

argument concerns the trial testimony of his cousin,

Latez Murphy, who Shelton says was under the

influence of drugs when he testified. But “[e]very

person is competent to be a witness unless [the

Federal Rules of Evidence] provide otherwise.” Fed. R.

Evid. 601. On this record, the district did not abuse its

discretion when it found that Murphy’s alleged

intoxication affected his credibility, not his

competence. United States v. Callahan, 801 F.3d 606,

622 (6th Cir. 2015). And Shelton’s counsel cross19

examined Murphy accordingly. The district court’s

judgment is affirmed.

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