Amicus Curiae Brief — United States, Petitioner v. Helaman Hansen

Supreme Court briefJan 25, 2023

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No. 22-179

_______________________________________________

In the Supreme Court of the United States

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

HELAMAN HANSEN,

_____________

Petitioner,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

____________

BRIEF FOR THE STATE OF MONTANA AND

24 OTHER STATES AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

_____________

AUSTIN KNUDSEN

Attorney General

KATHLEEN L. SMITHGALL

Deputy Solicitor General

CHRISTIAN B. CORRIGAN

Solicitor General

PETER M. TORSTENSEN, JR.*

Assistant Solicitor General

*Counsel of Record

MONTANA DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE

215 N. Sanders Street

Helena, MT 59601

peter.torstensen@mt.gov

(406) 444-2026

Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of Montana

(Additional Counsel listed on signature page)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OF AMICI

CURIAE ....................................................................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 2

ARGUMENT ................................................................ 3

The Ninth Circuit’s decision threatens the

constitutionality of similarly worded criminal

statutes in all 50 states ........................................ 7

II. The Court should clarify the showing required to invalidate a criminal statute on

overbreadth grounds .......................................... 12

A. Overbreadth claims should require

showing more than a hypothetical danger of chilling protected speech ................... 14

B. Overbreadth claims should require a

showing that the charged crime is overbroad ............................................................ 20

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 23

APPENDIX A: State Statutes Using “Encourage”

or “Induce” Language ......................................... App. 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000) ............................................... 21

Broadrick v. Oklahoma,

413 U.S. 601 (1973) .............................. 13, 15-17, 22

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org.,

142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022) ........................................... 16

Dombrowski v. Pfister,

380 U.S. 479 (1965) ..................................... 4, 13, 23

Ford v. State,

262 P.3d 1123 (Nev. 2011)..................................... 11

Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,

336 U.S. 490 (1949) ................................................. 6

Heath v. Alabama,

474 U.S. 82 (1985) ............................................... 1, 9

INS v. St. Cyr,

533 U.S. 289 (2001) ................................................. 6

Jennings v. Rodriguez,

138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) ............................................... 6

L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp.,

528 U.S. 32 (1999) ......................... 2, 4, 7, 13, 15, 23

Mathis v. United States,

579 U.S. 500 (2016) ............................................... 21

iii

Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,

466 U.S. 789 (1984) ........................................... 7, 22

Morissette v. United States,

342 U.S. 246 (1952) ............................................... 12

NAACP v. Button,

371 U.S. 415 (1963) ................................................. 3

Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States,

3 F.3d 1555 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ................................. 17

NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton,

49 F.4th 439 (5th Cir. 2022) ............................ 14, 16

New York v. Ferber,

458 U.S. 747 (1982) ................................ 4, 14-16, 22

Packingham v. North Carolina,

137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) ........................................... 18

People v. Graves,

368 P.3d 317 (Colo. 2016) ...................................... 17

State v. Gates,

221 P.2d 878 (Utah 1950)................................ 10, 11

State v. Lilburn,

875 P.2d 1036 (Mont. 1994) .................................. 17

State v. Ray,

882 P.2d 1013 (Mont. 1994) .................................. 10

State v. Sage,

841 P.2d 1142 (Mont. 1992) .................................. 10

State v. Sanchez,

448 P.3d 991 (Idaho 2019)..................................... 17

State v. Smith,

476 P.3d 1178 (Mont. 2020) .................................. 10

State v. Stubbs,

502 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016) .................... 17

State v. Washington-Davis,

881 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. 2016) ............................... 11

Summers v. Anchorage,

589 P.2d 863 (Alaska 1979) ............................. 11, 12

Taggart v. Lorenzen,

139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019) ............................................. 3

United States v. Gagliardi,

506 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007) ................................... 11

United States v. Hansen,

25 F.4th 1103 (9th Cir. 2022) .................................. 5

United States v. Hansen,

40 F.4th 1049 (9th Cir. 2022) ... 5, 7-8, 12-14, 18, 20, 22

United States v. Morrison,

529 U.S. 598 (2000) ............................................... 14

United States v. Salerno,

481 U.S. 739 (1987) ................................................. 4

United States v. Sineneng-Smith,

140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020) ........................... 3, 13, 15, 16

United States v. Stevens,

559 U.S. 460 (2010) ................................... 15, 16, 18

United States v. Williams,

553 U.S. 285 (2008) ......... 2, 3, 5-7, 10, 15-16, 18, 21

Virginia v. Hicks,

539 U.S. 113 (2003) ........................... 4, 7, 19, 20, 23

Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican

Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) ................................ 4, 14

Statutes

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) ..................................... 1, 5

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i) ........................................... 5

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12C–45(a) (2022)......... 19

ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.434(a)(1) (2022) ... 8, 18, 19

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–1103(B) (2022) .......... 9, 19

CAL. PENAL CODE § 266i(a)(2)-(5) (2022)..................... 8

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-701(1)(a) (2022)........... 8

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.697(2) (2022) .................... 9

LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.3(A)(1) (2022).......................... 9

MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3–805(a)(3)(iii) (2022)...... 19

MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3–805(a)(3)(v) (2022)...... 19

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–602(1)(c) (2022) ............... 18

N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-190.16 (2022) ................... 8

S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-100(2)-(3) (2022) ................... 8

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-111.4 (2022) .......................... 9

Other Authorities

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of

Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991) ................ 13

S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 308

(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &

Adm. News 3182 ...................................................... 9

A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) ........................ 6

INTRODUCTION AND

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Relying on a strained textual analysis of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)’s criminal prohibition on encouraging or inducing noncitizens to unlawfully enter or

reside in the United States, the Ninth Circuit invalidated that law on the grounds that it is

unconstitutionally overbroad. More than ever, illegal

immigration imposes tremendous economic, social,

and fiscal burdens on the states. The decision below,

if left undisturbed, will impede the enforcement of

criminal immigration laws nationwide, leading to

significant adverse consequences for the Amici

States.

Not only that, but the decision below also undermines the Amici States’ interest in enforcing their

own criminal laws. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82,

93 (1985) (“Foremost among the prerogatives of sovereignty is the power to create and enforce a criminal

code.”). Every state has enacted criminal laws that

prohibit encouraging or inducing unlawful conduct,

see Amici States’ Appendix (“App.”) A, so if this Court

endorses the Ninth Circuit’s expansive application of

the overbreadth doctrine, many of those state criminal laws will be vulnerable to constitutional

challenges. For these reasons, the states of Montana,

Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,

Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma,

South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,

Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming, submit

this amicus brief in support of Petitioner.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is a

narrow, but extraordinary, exception to the traditional rules favoring as-applied constitutional

challenges and case-specific standing. See L.A. Police

Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32,

39 (1999). When a criminal defendant successfully

invokes the overbreadth doctrine, a court invalidates

a law if its mere existence, as opposed to its application, deters or “chills” potential speakers—even if the

statute has been constitutionally applied to the defendant. For that reason, this Court has “vigorously

enforced the requirement that a statute’s overbreadth be substantial, not only in an absolute sense,

but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate

sweep.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292

(2008).

The Ninth Circuit’s expansive interpretation of

the overbreadth doctrine in this case exemplifies why

courts should apply the doctrine sparingly and only

as a last resort. Every state has enacted criminal

laws employing language similar to the language the

Ninth Circuit declared constitutionally suspect, so

the states’ laws are now vulnerable to overbreadth

challenges. But several of the states’ highest courts

have rejected such facial attacks, emphasizing that

statutory terms like “encourage” and “induce” carry

well-understood criminal-law meanings that the panel simply ignored. This Court should reject the Ninth

Circuit’s anemic textual analysis and remind the

lower courts that a statutory term with an estab-

lished meaning “brings the old soil with it.” See Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019)

(quotation omitted).

This Court should also take this opportunity to refine the overbreadth doctrine to ensure it does not

erode Article III standing or invade the separation of

powers. When, as here, a statute’s threat to speech is

merely hypothetical, an overbreadth claim must fail.

And when a defendant, like Hansen, is charged with

an aggravated crime, it is not enough for the defendant to assert that the statutory elements of a lesser

crime are unconstitutionally overbroad. Instead, the

defendant must show that the crime for which he was

charged or convicted is facially unconstitutional.

ARGUMENT

The overbreadth doctrine allows a federal court to

strike down a statute if it would violate the First

Amendment in a substantial number of other cases

not before the court, even if the law’s application to

the defendant is “perfectly constitutional.” See Williams, 553 U.S. at 292. This doctrine has been

justified, not by the text or history of the First

Amendment, but “solely by reference to policy considerations and value judgments.” United States v.

Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1584 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring). In other words, because “[First

Amendment] freedoms are delicate and vulnerable,

as well as supremely precious in our society,” see

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963), invalidating facially overbroad statutes is sometimes

necessary, even if doing so departs from traditional

principles of adjudication, see Dombrowski v. Pfister,

380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).

Facial challenges to validly enacted statutes are

disfavored. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008). Among

other reasons, such claims “often rest on speculation,” “run contrary to the fundamental principle of

judicial restraint,” and “threaten to short circuit the

democratic process by preventing laws embodying

the will of the people from being implemented in a

manner consistent with the Constitution.” Id. at 45051. So, to prevail on a facial challenge, a challenger

bears a heavy burden: He must show “that no set of

circumstances exists under which the Act would be

valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745

(1987).

Facial overbreadth challenges, however, only require the challenger to show that a “substantial

number” of its applications are unconstitutional,

“judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate

sweep.” Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449 n.6

(quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769-71

(1982)). But overbreadth invalidation is “strong medicine” that should only be employed as a “last resort.”

See L.A. Police Dep’t, 528 U.S. 32, 39. To that end,

this Court has taken care to ensure that this “limited” exception does not “swallow” the traditional rule

favoring as-applied challenges. Virginia v. Hicks,

539 U.S. 113, 119-20 (2003). The Court has thus

“vigorously enforced the requirement that a statute’s

overbreadth be substantial, not only in an absolute

sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 292.

The Ninth Circuit held that § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv),

which prohibits “encourag[ing]” or “induc[ing]”

noncitizens to unlawfully enter or reside in the United States, was unconstitutionally overbroad. United

States v. Hansen, 25 F.4th 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2022).

But that unduly expansive construction of

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) was driven by multiple errors of

statutory interpretation. First, the panel “blindly

rel[ied] on lay-dictionary definitions” and failed to

consider the established criminal-law meaning of

“encourage” and “induce.” See United States v. Hansen, 40 F.4th 1049, 1059 (9th Cir. 2022) (Bumatay, J.,

dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).

Had the panel considered these established meanings, it would have recognized “§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is

an ordinary [criminal] solicitation and aiding-andabetting statute [that] poses no free-speech concerns.” See id.; see also U.S. Br. 15. Second, the

panel disregarded the statute’s mens rea requirements, which substantially narrow the reach of the

statute. See id. at 1067 (explaining that the statute

“requires a criminal mens rea consistent with criminal complicity”); id. at 1068 (explaining that

Hansen’s offense requires proof that he “acted to obtain ‘commercial advantage or private financial gain’”

(quoting § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i))). Third, the panel improperly invoked the surplusage canon, largely

because it failed to analyze § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) as a

solicitation provision, but also because it failed to

recognize

that

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)

and

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II) prohibit the aiding and abetting

of different things. See id. at 1069. Shorn of these

errors, § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) reaches only criminal conduct, or speech integral to that conduct, which may

be proscribed consistent with the First Amendment.

See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.

490, 498 (1949) (“[F]reedom [of] speech” does not “extend[] its immunity to speech or writing used as an

integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute”).

Even if doubt remained about § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)’s

reach, the panel should have invoked the constitutional avoidance canon and construed the statute as

a criminal solicitation and facilitation offense. A.

Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation

of Legal Texts 249 (2012) (explaining that the canon

rests “upon a judicial policy of not interpreting ambiguous statutes to flirt with constitutionality”). If

there is “a serious doubt” about the constitutionality

of a statute, courts must “first ascertain whether a

construction of the statute is fairly possible by which

the question may be avoided.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018). Here, there is no

doubt that it is “fairly possible” to construe

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) as a criminal solicitation and facilitation offense, so the Ninth Circuit erred when it

refused to do so, see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300

(2001).

Construed properly, § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)’s “plainly

legitimate sweep” vastly exceeds any hypothetical

applications to protected speech.

See Williams,

553 U.S. at 292; Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119-20. But the

Ninth Circuit ignored this Court’s admonition that

“the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to

render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.”

Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,

466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984). Rather, “there must be a

realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment

protections of parties not before the Court.” Id. at

801 (emphasis added). If uncorrected, the Ninth Circuit’s errors threaten real danger to the Amici States’

ability to enforce their own similarly worded criminal

statutes.

I. The Ninth Circuit’s decision threatens the

constitutionality of similarly worded criminal statutes in all 50 states.

The overbreadth doctrine permits a court to invalidate a law based not on the facts or parties before it,

but rather based on a finding that the challenged law

prohibits “a substantial amount of protected speech.”

Williams, 553 U.S. at 292 (2008). But because overbreadth invalidation is a “nuclear option,” Hansen,

40 F.4th at 1070 (Bumatay, J., dissenting from the

denial of rehearing en banc), it should only be applied

as a “last resort.” L.A. Police Dep’t, 528 U.S. at 39.

Setting caution aside, the Ninth Circuit invalidated a

70-year-old criminal law that the federal government

uses to prosecute smuggling and other activities that

facilitate unlawful immigration, see U.S. Br. 37-38,

which threatens other federal and state statutes employing the terms “encourage” or “induce.”

All 50 states utilize the terms “encourage” or “induce” in their criminal codes, so the Amici States are

naturally concerned about the ramifications of the

Ninth Circuit’s expansive application of the overbreadth doctrine. See App. A. States have long used

these terms to proscribe criminal conduct, particularly criminal conduct involving minors or prostitution.

See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.434(a)(1) (2022)

(1983 law punishes an offender who “aids, induces,

causes, or encourages a person who is under 13 years

of age to engage in sexual penetration with another

person”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 266i(a)(2)-(5) (2022)

(pandering crime originally enacted in 1953 prohibits

“induc[ing]” or “encourag[ing] another person to become a prostitute”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6701(1)(a) (2022) (1987 law defining contributing to

the delinquency of a minor as “induc[ing], aid[ing], or

encourag[ing] a child to violate any state law”); N.C.

GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-190.16 (2022) (1985 law criminalizing first degree sexual exploitation of minor

including “induc[ing]” or “encourag[ing]” minors to

engage in unlawful sexual activity); S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 16-15-100(2)-(3) (2022) (1952 law making it unlawful to “induce, persuade or encourage” prostitution).

The Ninth Circuit’s laissez-fare application of the

overbreadth doctrine—“the nuclear option of First

Amendment jurisprudence,” Hansen, 40 F.4th at

1058 (Bumatay, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)—leaves these important laws

vulnerable to broad constitutional attacks.

States routinely use “encourage” or “induce” to define crimes directly.

Consider some examples.

Arizona law defines manslaughter to include encouraging a minor to commit suicide. See ARIZ. REV.

STAT. ANN. § 13–1103(B) (2022). Kentucky defines

“phishing” as “induc[ing] another person to provide

identifying information” online. See KY. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 434.697(2) (2022). Louisiana establishes that

“[c]omputer-aided solicitation of a minor” includes

“induc[ing]” a minor to “engage or participate in sexual conduct or a crime of violence.” LA. STAT. ANN.

§ 14:81.3(A)(1) (2022). And Utah uses the words “induce” and “encourage” in a statute defining the crime

of “[f]inancial exploitation of a vulnerable adult.”

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-111.4 (2022). The states’ reliance on these terms to define criminal conduct is

commonplace, so the Ninth Circuit’s decision threatens to upend these criminal laws, undermining the

states’ “power to create and enforce a criminal code.”

See Heath, 474 U.S. at 93.

And states use these same terms to define solicitation crimes. See Ariz. Cert. Amici Br. 5 (collecting

state laws criminalizing solicitation). In the federal

context, the purpose of criminalizing solicitation is

“to allow law enforcement officials to intervene at an

early stage where there has been a clear demonstration of an individual’s criminal intent and danger to

society.” S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 308

(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm.

News 3182, 3487; see also id. (“[A] person who makes

a serious effort to induce another person to commit a

crime of violence is a clearly dangerous person and

that his act deserves criminal sanctions whether or

not the crime of violence is actually committed.”);

Williams, 553 U.S. at 298 (“Many long established

criminal proscriptions … criminalize speech … that

is intended to induce or commence illegal activities.”).

Likewise, States have strong justifications for criminalizing solicitation and intervening before an

individual commits a crime. The Ninth Circuit erred

in refusing to give the terms “encourage” and “induce” their well-understood meaning in criminal law.

See U.S. Br. 4-7 (tracing the established meaning of

“encourage” and “induce” from the late 1800s until

now).

State courts, interpreting their own laws, have

correctly construed the verbs “encourage” and “induce” consistent with the terms’ meaning in criminal

law. These terms are often used to describe solicitation or facilitation of a crime. See, e.g., State v.

Smith, 476 P.3d 1178, 1180 (Mont. 2020) (“The solicitation charge arose from jailhouse phone calls

between Smith and his sister and mother, in which

the State alleged Smith encouraged his family to

convince his victim, T.W., not to testify.”); State v.

Ray, 882 P.2d 1013 (Mont. 1994) (upholding a solicitation conviction for commanding, encouraging, or

facilitating the commission of two sexual assaults);

State v. Sage, 841 P.2d 1142 (Mont. 1992) (upholding

a solicitation conviction for encouraging the commission of incest with defendant’s minor daughter); see

also State v. Gates, 221 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah 1950)

(interpreting the use of the word “encourages” in a

prostitution statute to mean “to entice, induce, inveigle or persuade”).

The Ninth Circuit’s decision stands at odds with

several state supreme court decisions rejecting the

conclusion that criminal statutes using the terms

“induce” or “encourage” are constitutionally overbroad.

See, e.g., State v. Washington-Davis,

881 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. 2016); Ford v. State, 262 P.3d

1123 (Nev. 2011); Summers v. Anchorage, 589 P.2d

863 (Alaska 1979). In Washington-Davis, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied this Court’s overbreadth

framework and concluded that a statute barring the

“encouragement” of prostitution was not overbroad

because “the prevention of prostitution” fell within

the plainly “legitimate sweep” of the statute.

881 N.W.2d at 539. The court rejected “purely speculative” hypotheticals and determined that no

evidence in the record showed that the statute had,

or would likely have, a chilling effect on speech. Id.

at 540. The Nevada Supreme Court likewise held

that the pandering statute was not overbroad because the “specific intent required … narrows the

statute to illegal employment proposals.”

Ford,

262 P.3d at 1130. Thus, even where the statute

failed to define “induces” or “encourages,” these

words “are words of common usage that have plain

and ordinary meanings.” Id. at 1132 (quoting United

States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 147 (2d Cir. 2007)).

And the Alaska Supreme Court determined that its

prostitution statute was narrow because it was directed solely at “lawless prostitution activities.”

Summers, 589 P.2d at 867 (internal quotation omitted).

Just as the states have interpreted statutes using

the terms “encourage” and “induce” based on their

common usage and plain meaning, the federal government, too, has incorporated these well-settled

understandings into § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). See U.S. Br.

21. And the history informs the common usage of

these words in modern criminal statutes as well as

their plain meaning. See Morissette v. United States,

342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (“[W]here Congress borrows

terms of art … it presumably knows and adopts the

cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed

word ….”); but see Hansen, 40 F.4th at 1054 (Gould,

J., concurring in the order denying the petition for

rehearing en banc) (finding that the historical foundation of solicitation and facilitation offenses was

“interesting but largely irrelevant”). The decision below overtly ignored the “legal tradition” and

“centuries of practice” interpreting state and federal

criminal laws with the terms “encourage” and “induce.” Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263. Deploying the

“nuclear option” in this case conflicts with a multitude of decisions reached in the states and threatens

the use of these terms in state criminal laws in all 50

states.

II. The Court should clarify the showing required to invalidate a criminal statute on

overbreadth grounds.

The void-for-overbreadth rule substantially relaxes the standards for facial challenges and departs

from traditional standing principles without a clear

basis in the text or history of the First Amendment.

See Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1584 (Thomas, J.,

concurring). This Court has historically justified

overbreadth invalidation as a necessary tool to prevent the chilling of “constitutionally protected speech

or expression.” See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.

601, 612 (1973); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 855

(1991) (explaining that “First Amendment overbreadth is largely a prophylactic doctrine, aimed at

preventing a ‘chilling effect’”). For that reason, the

Court has long cautioned federal courts that overbreadth invalidation is “strong medicine” that should

be applied with caution. L.A. Police Dep’t, 528 U.S.

at 39.

In the First Amendment context, the Court has

justified the overbreadth doctrine’s ‘strong medicine’

because of free speech’s “transcendent value to all society, and not merely to those exercising their rights.”

Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 486. Given the doctrine’s

“suspect historical roots” and “shaky foundation,”

Hansen, 40 F.4th at 1071-72 (Bumatay, J., dissenting

from the denial of rehearing en banc), the Court

should reaffirm that it should be applied rarely and

only as a “last resort,” L.A. Police Dep’t, 528 U.S. at

39.

A. Overbreadth claims should require showing more than a hypothetical danger of

chilling protected speech.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision “conjured up a parade of horribles theoretically prosecutable under the

law,” rather than focusing on § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)’s

“broad legitimate sweep.” Hansen, 40 F.4th at 1058,

1072 (Bumatay, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).

Federalism concerns counsel

against applying the overbreadth doctrine to facial

challenges against state laws because “[i]nvalidatethe-law-now, discover-how-it-works-later judging”

“deprives ‘state courts [of] the opportunity to construe a law to avoid constitutional infirmities.’”

NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439, 449 (5th Cir.

2022) (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 768).

Without question, Congress and state legislatures

must legislate within the bounds of the First

Amendment. But legislatures, both federal and

state, are presumed to legislate within constitutional

boundaries. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.

598, 607 (2000). When courts use hypotheticals in

place of real-world conduct to invalidate statutes on

their face, it “short circuit[s] the democratic process

by preventing laws embodying the will of the people

from being implemented in a manner consistent with

the Constitution.” Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at

451. And it “frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people.” Id. (internal quotation

omitted).

Constitutional rights are personally held and

cannot generally be asserted for others. Broadrick,

413 U.S. at 610 (stating that “a person to whom a

statute may constitutionally be applied will not be

heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it

may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others”). And “[t]his general rule reflects two ‘cardinal

principles’ of our constitutional order: the personal

nature of constitutional rights and the prudential

limitations on constitutional adjudication.” L.A. Police Dep’t, 528 U.S. at 39.

But this Court has recognized a narrow exception

to these general principles when a statute is facially

overbroad under the First Amendment. Ferber,

458 U.S. at 767-68. The overbreadth doctrine “allows

a litigant without a legal injury to assert the First

Amendment rights of hypothetical third parties, so

long as he has personally suffered a real-world injury.” Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1587 (Thomas, J.,

concurring).

The Court has applied the First

Amendment overbreadth exception on several limited

occasions. See, e.g., Williams, 553 U.S. at 288 (reviewing whether federal statute criminalizing

“pandering or solicitation of child pornography” was

overbroad under the First Amendment); United

States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 464, 482 (2010) (concluding federal statute criminalizing “the commercial

creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of

animal cruelty” was overbroad and, thus, “invalid

under the First Amendment”). This case provides

the Court with an opportunity to clarify that the

overbreadth doctrine does not apply when the indi-

vidual bringing the challenge, like Hansen here, falls

within the core of the statutory proscription. 1

Regardless of its precise contours, the scope of the

overbreadth doctrine “must be carefully tied to the

circumstances in which facial invalidation of a statute is truly warranted.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769; see

also NetChoice, 49 F.4th at 450 (stating that this

Court “has only applied [the overbreadth doctrine]

where there is a substantial risk that the challenged

law will chill protected speech or association”). After

all, it is “hardly novel” that a law should only be invalidated for overbreadth if “it reaches a substantial

number of impermissible applications.”

Ferber,

458 U.S. at 771. A statute’s overbreadth must be

“substantial,” both in relation to its plainly legitimate

sweep and in its “application to real-world conduct,

not fanciful hypotheticals.” See Stevens, 559 U.S. at

485 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Williams, 553 U.S.

at 301-02). If a statute’s overbreadth is only hypothetical, it is best “cured” through as-applied

1 And given that several members of this Court have recently

questioned the doctrinal underpinnings of this exception, it is

especially important clarify the overbreadth doctrine’s proper

scope. See Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1583 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“It appears that the overbreadth doctrine lacks any

basis in the Constitution’s text, violates the usual standard for

facial challenges, and contravenes traditional standing principles.”); cf. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct.

2228, 2275-76 (2022) (reexamining abortion cases because these

cases “diluted the strict standard for facial constitutional challenges,” flouted “the rule that statutes should be read where

possible to avoid unconstitutionality,” and “distorted First

Amendment doctrines”).

challenges. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16; cf. Nat’l

Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 3 F.3d 1555,

1567 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Silberman, J., dissenting from

the denial of rehearing en banc) (questioning the

wisdom of “tossing out the constitutional baby with

the arguably unconstitutional bath water”).

Many state courts have correctly refused to invalidate laws when the threat to speech is merely

hypothetical. See, e.g., State v. Lilburn, 875 P.2d

1036, 1041 (Mont. 1994) (refusing to apply the overbreadth doctrine to invalidate a “hunter harassment

statute” because defendant failed to make a “clear

showing that the potential invalid applications of the

statute [were] both real and substantial” (internal

quotation omitted)); State v. Sanchez, 448 P.3d 991,

997-98 (Idaho 2019) (concluding that the “hypothetical situations raised by [the defendant] are not

persuasive for finding the statute overbroad” when

the statute covered “a wide range of conduct … within the state’s power to prohibit” (cleaned up)); People

v. Graves, 368 P.3d 317, 328-29, ¶ 38 (Colo. 2016)

(concluding that even if the criminal statute might

chill hypothetical protected expressive conduct, any

burden was slight “compared to the easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable conduct to

which the statute applies”) (internal quotation omitted); State v. Stubbs, 502 S.W.3d 218, 235 (Tex. Ct.

App. 2016) (“Merely imagining some possible unconstitutional applications does not suffice to

demonstrate a realistic danger that in fact the statute will be overbroadly applied.”).

But the Ninth Circuit ignored these principles,

striking down § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) as overbroad based

on judicially imagined, hypothetical situations having nothing to do with Hansen. This Court has long

recognized that speech integral to criminal conduct—

that is, “speech that constitutes criminal solicitation

or facilitation”—is categorically excluded from First

Amendment protection. Hansen, 40 F.4th at 1061

(Bumatay, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing

en banc) (citing Williams, 553 U.S. at 297); see also

Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468-69 (“Incitement” and “speech

integral to criminal conduct” are “well-defined and

narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention

and punishment of which have never been thought to

raise any Constitutional problem.”) (internal quotation omitted). This point is particularly important to

Amici States because state legislatures have long

used similar language to define state crimes. See

App. A.

In a world where individuals can solicit large audiences using a myriad of online platforms, criminals

can cause great harm to others by soliciting—i.e., encouraging or inducing—unlawful conduct. Cf.

Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736

(2017) (“For centuries now, inventions heralded as

advances in human progress have been exploited by

the criminal mind.”). And many of the states have

passed laws to combat precisely this type of criminal

conduct. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–602(1)(c)

(2022) (criminalizing “encourag[ing], induc[ing] or

otherwise purposely caus[ing] another to become or

remain a prostitute”); ALASKA STAT. ANN.

§ 11.41.434(a)(1) (2022) (“An offender commits the

crime of sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree if

being 16 years of age or older, the offender ... induces ... or encourages a person who is under

13 years of age to engage in sexual penetration with

another person.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–

1103(B) (2022) (defining one form of manslaughter as

“intentionally providing advice or encouragement

that a minor uses to die by suicide with the

knowledge that the minor intends to die by suicide”);

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12C–45(a) (2022) (defining “[d]rug induced infliction of harm to a child

athlete” as “encourag[ing] the ingestion of a drug by a

person under the age of 18 with the intent that the

[underage person] ingest the drug for the purpose of

a quick weight gain or loss in connection with participation in athletics”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3–

805(a)(3)(iii) & (v) (2022) (including within statute

defining crime of misuse of electronic mail using “a

computer or a computer network to ... encourage others to disseminate information concerning the sexual

activity ... of a minor” or “encourage others to engage

in the repeated, continuing, or sustained use of electronic communication to contact a minor”).

States possess a vital interest in enforcing these

criminal statutes to protect victims of this conduct.

But the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the terms

“encourage” or “induce” are unconstitutionally overbroad based solely on hypothetical applications risks

grave harm. If the Ninth Circuit’s decision survives,

it will generate “substantial social costs” when its

flawed reasoning is used in future cases. Hicks,

539 U.S. at 119-20 (“[T]here are substantial social

costs created by the overbreadth doctrine when it

blocks application of a law to constitutionally unprotected speech … [or] unprotected conduct.”). The

Court should reinforce the requirement that overbreadth challenges based on fanciful hypotheticals,

rather than real-world applications, must fail.

B. Overbreadth claims should require a

showing that the charged crime is overbroad.

The Ninth Circuit further erred by failing to consider the overbreadth of the actual offense of

conviction. Hansen was charged with two counts of

an aggravated offense—the offense defined by

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i)—but the panel considered only the constitutionality of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).

See Hansen, 40 F.4th at 1052 (Gould, J., concurring

in the order denying the petition for rehearing en

banc). As Judge Collins correctly observed, the panel

failed to consider “whether the statutory language

defining the aggravated version of the offense at issue—i.e.,

the

offense

defined

8 U.S.C.

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), (B)(i)—is facially unconstitutional.” Id. at 1074 (Collins, J., dissenting from the

denial of rehearing en banc). Had the Ninth Circuit

considered whether the “additional element” of encouraging or inducing a noncitizen to illegally enter

the United States for a commercial advantage or private financial gain “substantially narrows the reach

of the relevant language,” there should been “little

doubt” that the statute’s legitimate sweep “greatly

exceeds any plausible overbreadth.” Id.

To ensure that the overbreadth doctrine operates

consistently with notions of Article III standing and

the separation of powers, the Court should clarify

that application of the overbreadth doctrine requires

reviewing courts to examine the entire criminal offense with which a defendant is charged (or

convicted). See Williams, 553 U.S. at 293 (“The first

step in overbreadth analysis is to construe the challenged statute; it is impossible to determine whether

a statute reaches too far without first knowing what

the statute covers.”). State legislatures often codify

aggravated offenses, and in a criminal prosecution

for an aggravated crime, all elements of that crime

must be found by a trier of fact. See, e.g., Mathis v.

United States, 579 U.S. 500, 504 (2016) (“Elements

are the constituent parts of a crime’s legal definition—the things the prosecution must prove to

sustain a conviction.” (internal quotation omitted));

see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490

(2000) (“[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a

crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum

must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.”).

When a defendant is charged with an aggravated

offense, the overbreadth doctrine must account for

the existence of aggravating circumstances that constitute elements of the charged crime. Requiring a

court to examine the entirety of the applicable statutory language, including aggravating circumstances,

reinforces that facial overbreadth should be used

“sparingly and only as a last resort.” Broadrick,

413 U.S. at 613. This approach would help prevent

“[h]ypothetical rulings,” which are “inherently

treacherous and prone to lead [courts] into unforeseen errors; they are qualitatively less reliable than

the products of case-by-case adjudication.” Ferber,

458 U.S. at 781 (Stevens, J., concurring).

Thus, if a defendant is charged with an aggravated crime—as Hansen was here—the defendant

should be required to demonstrate that the aggravated crime (not just the lesser offense) is facially

overbroad. For example, Hansen’s conduct of encouraging or inducing noncitizens to illegally enter

the United States for his personal financial gain

(with each victim paying between $550 and $10,000,

see U.S. Br. 7) falls squarely within the legitimate

aim of the aggravated circumstances set forth in the

statute. U.S. Br. 36-40; see also Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 799 (“In the development of the

overbreadth doctrine the Court has been sensitive to

the risk that the doctrine itself might sweep so broadly that the exception to ordinary standing

requirements would swallow the general rule.”). If

an aggravating element “substantially narrows the

reach of the relevant [statutory] language [such]

that” the statute’s “plainly legitimate sweep greatly

exceeds any plausible overbreadth,” Hansen, 40 F.4th

at 1074 (Collins, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (internal quotation omitted)—as it

does here—courts should decline to facially invalidate that statute on overbreadth grounds.

Without question, First Amendment freedoms are

of “transcendent value to all society.” Dombrowski,

380 U.S. at 486. But “striking down a statute on its

face at the request of one whose own conduct may be

punished despite the First Amendment,” L.A. Police

Dep’t, 528 U.S. at 39, imposes “substantial social

costs [by] block[ing] application of a law … to constitutionally unprotected conduct,” Hicks, 539 U.S. at

119. Allowing the Ninth Circuit’s decision to stand

threatens widespread uncertainty in the states’ ability to enforce their criminal laws that use these

terms. This Court should take this opportunity to

reemphasize the limited application of the First

Amendment’s “nuclear option” and its preference for

as-applied challenges.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit should be reversed.

January 25, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

AUSTIN KNUDSEN

Attorney General

KATHLEEN L. SMITHGALL

Deputy Solicitor General

CHRISTIAN B. CORRIGAN

Solicitor General

PETER M. TORSTENSEN, JR.*

Assistant Solicitor General

*Counsel of Record

MONTANA DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE

215 N. Sanders Street

Helena, MT 59601

(406) 444-2026

peter.torstensen@mt.gov

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

State of Montana

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL

STEVE MARSHALL

Attorney General of

Alabama

TREG TAYLOR

Attorney General of

Alaska

KRISTIN K. MAYES

Attorney General of

Arizona

TIM GRIFFIN

Attorney General of

Arkansas

ASHLEY MOODY

Attorney General of

Florida

CHRISTOPHER M. CARR

Attorney General of

Georgia

RAÚL R. LABRADOR

Attorney General of

Idaho

THEODORE E. ROKITA

Attorney General of

Indiana

BRENNA BIRD

Attorney General of

Iowa

KRIS KOBACH

Attorney General of

Kansas

DANIEL CAMERON

Attorney General of

Kentucky

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General of

Mississippi

ANDREW BAILEY

Attorney General of

Missouri

MIKE HILGERS

Attorney General of

Nebraska

DAVE YOST

Attorney General of

Ohio

GENTNER F. DRUMMOND

Attorney General of

Oklahoma

ALAN WILSON

Attorney General of

South Carolina

MARTY J. JACKLEY

Attorney General of

South Dakota

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

Attorney General and

Reporter of Tennessee

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of

Texas

SEAN D. REYES

Attorney General of

Utah

JASON MIYARES

Attorney General of

Virginia

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General of

West Virginia

BRIDGET HILL

Attorney General of

Wyoming

APPENDIX A

State Statutes Using

“Encourage” or “Induce” Language

ALABAMA

Citation

Statutory Text

Foster parent engaging

in a sex act, etc., with a

foster child: ALA. CODE

§ 13A-6-71(c) (2022)

“A person commits the

crime of soliciting a sex

act or sexual contact with

a foster child if he or she

is a foster parent and solicits, persuades,

encourages, harasses, or

entices a foster child under the age of 19 years to

engage in a sex act including, but not limited to,

sexual intercourse, sodomy, or sexual contact, as

defined by Section 13A-660.”

“A person commits the offense of home repair fraud

when the person intentionally and knowingly ...

Enters into an agreement

or contract for consideration, written or oral, with

a person for home repair

and the offending person

knowingly engages in ...

Home repair fraud:

ALA. CODE § 13A-9111(1)(b) (2022)

App. 2

[u]se or employment of

any deception, false pretense, or false promises in

order to induce, encourage, or solicit a person to

enter into any contract or

agreement.”

ALASKA

Sexual abuse of minor

in first degree: ALASKA

STAT. ANN. § 11.41.434

(a)(1) (West 2022)

“An offender commits the

crime of sexual abuse of a

minor in the first degree if

[the offender] aids, induces, causes, or

encourages a person who

is under 13 years of age to

engage in sexual penetration with another person”

Sexual abuse of a mi“An offender commits the

nor in the second

crime of sexual abuse of a

degree: ALASKA STAT.

minor in the second deANN. § 11.41.436 (a)(1)- gree if [the offender] aids,

(2), (4) (West 2022)

induces, causes, or encourages a person” to

sexually abuse a minor

Cruelty to Animals:

“A person commits cruelty

ALASKA STAT. ANN.

to animals if the per§ 11.61.140 (a)(6)(B)(ii) son ... knowingly ... under

(West 2022)

circumstances not proscribed under AS

11.41.455 ... causes, induces, aids, or

encourages another per-

App. 3

son to engage in sexual

conduct with an animal”

ARIZONA

Solicitation; classifica- “A person ... commits sotions: ARIZ. REV. STAT. licitation if, with the

ANN. § 13-1002(A)

intent to promote or facili(2022)

tate the commission of a

felony or misdemeanor,

such person commands,

encourages, requests or

solicits another person to

engage in specific conduct

which would constitute

the felony or misdemeanor

or which would establish

the other’s complicity in

its commission.”

Manslaughter: ARIZ.

“A person who is at least

REV. STAT. ANN. § 13eighteen years of age

1103(B) (2022)

commits manslaughter by

intentionally providing

advice or encouragement that a minor uses to

die by suicide with the

knowledge that the minor

intends to die by suicide.”

Pandering; methods;

“A person is guilty of a

classification: ARIZ.

class 5 felony who knowREV. STAT. ANN. § 13ingly ... [c]ompels,

3209(3) & (4) (2022)

induces or encourages

any person to reside with

that person, or with any

App. 4

Contributing to delinquency: ARIZ. REV.

STAT. ANN. § 13-3613

(2022)

other person, for the purpose of prostitution ... [or

c]ompels, induces or encourages any person to

become a prostitute or engage in an act of

prostitution.”

“A person who by any act,

causes, encourages or

contributes to the dependency or delinquency of a

child ... is guilty of a class

1 misdemeanor.”

ARKANSAS

Accomplice—

“A person is an accomplice

Definition: ARK. CODE

of another person in the

ANN. § 5-2-403(a)

commission of an offense

(West 2022)

if, with the purpose of

promoting or facilitating

the commission of an offense, the person: Solicits,

advises, encourages, or

coerces the other person to

commit the offense ....”

Encouraging the sui“A person commits the ofcide of another person: fense of encouraging the

ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10- suicide of another person

107 (West 2022)

if: The person uses persistent language, either

spoken or written, to purposely encourage

another person to commit

App. 5

suicide; and [a]s a proximate result of the person’s

encouraging the suicide

of the other person, the

other person commits suicide or attempts to commit

suicide and the attempt

results in serious physical

injury.”

Contributing to the de- “A person commits the oflinquency of a minor:

fense of contributing to

ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27- the delinquency of a minor

29 (West 2022)

if, being an adult, the person knowingly aids,

causes, or encourages a

minor [to do various

acts].”

Unlawful use of en“A person commits unlawcryption: ARK. CODE

ful use of encryption if the

ANN. § 5-41-204(a)(2)

person knowingly uses or

(West 2022)

attempts to use encryption, directly or indirectly,

to ... [a]id, assist, or encourage another person

to commit any criminal

offense[.]”

Frivolous, groundless,

“Any officer or any person

or malicious prosecuwho knowingly brings or

tions: ARK. CODE

aids and encourages anANN. § 5-53-131 (West other person to bring a

2022)

frivolous, groundless, or

malicious prosecution ....”

App. 6

CALIFORNIA

Criminal Profiteering;

“‘Criminal profiteering acdefinitions: CAL. PENAL tivity’ means an act ...

CODE § 186.2(a)(29)

made for financial gain or

(West 2022)

advantage ... in which the

perpetrator induces, encourages, or persuades a

person under 18 years of

age to engage in a commercial sex act.”

Pandering and pander- “By promises, threats, vioing with a minor;

lence, or by any device or

punishment: CAL. PEscheme, causes, induces,

NAL CODE § 266i(a)(2)persuades, or encourages

(5) (West 2022)

another person to become

a prostitute.”

Suicide; aiding, advis“Any person who delibering, or encouraging:

ately aids, advises, or

CAL. PENAL CODE

encourages another to

§ 401(a) (West 2022)

commit suicide is guilty of

a felony.”

Soliciting, inducing,

“Every person 18 years of

encouraging, or intimi- age or older

dating minor to commit who ... solicits, induces,

certain felonies: CAL.

encourages, or intimiPENAL CODE § 653j(a)

dates any minor with the

(West 2022)

intent that the minor shall

commit a felony ....”

Lewd or lascivious acts “The fact that a person …

with child under age

has used obscene or harm14: CAL. PENAL CODE

ful matter to induce,

§ 1170.71 (West 2022)

persuade, or encourage

App. 7

the minor to engage in a

lewd or lascivious act shall

be considered a circumstance in aggravation of

the crime ....”

Controlled substances

“[P]robation shall not be

violations involving the granted to … [a] person

use of minors as agent: who … solicits, induces,

CAL. PENAL CODE

encourages, or intimi§ 1203.07(a)(2) (West

dates a minor with the

2022)

intent that the minor shall

violate [laws pertaining to

controlled substances.]”

COLORADO

Criminal Solicitation:

“[A] person is guilty of

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. criminal solicitation if he

§ 18-2-301(1) (West

or she commands, induc2022)

es, entreats, or otherwise

attempts to persuade another person ... to commit

a felony.”

Contributing to the de- “Any person who induces,

linquency of a minor:

aids, or encourages a

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. child to violate any state

§ 18-6-701(1)(a) (West

law that is a felony vic2022)

tims rights act

crime ... commits first degree contributing to the

delinquency of a minor.”

Misuse of official in“Any public servant [who]

formation: COLO. REV.

[a]ids, advises, or enSTAT. ANN. § 18-8-402

courages another [to do

App. 8

(West 2022)

an act constituting misuse

of official information]

with intent to confer on

any person a special pecuniary benefit.”

Uniform controlled

“A person ... commits a

substances act; special level 1 drug felony and is

offenders: COLO. REV.

a special offender [if] …

STAT. ANN. § 18-18[t]he defendant solicited,

407(1)(e) (West 2022)

induced, encouraged, intimidated, employed,

hired, or procured a

child ... to act as the defendant’s agent ....”

Recruitment of juve“A person commits reniles for a criminal

cruitment of a juvenile for

street gang: COLO. REV. a criminal street gang if

STAT. ANN. § 18-23-102 he or she is eighteen years

(West 2022)

of age or old and ...

[k]nowingly solicits, invites, recruits,

encourages, coerces, or

otherwise causes a [juvenile] to actively

participate in or become a

member of a criminal

street gang[.]”

CONNECTICUT

Coercion: CONN. GEN.

“A person is guilty of coerSTAT. ANN. § 53acion when he compels or

192(a) (West 2022)

induces another person

to engage in conduct

App. 9

Enticing a juvenile to

commit a criminal act:

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 53a-225(b) (West

2022)

which such other person

has a legal right to abstain from engaging in ....”

“A person is guilty of enticing a juvenile to commit

a criminal act if such person is twenty-three years

of age or older and knowingly causes, encourages,

solicits, recruits, intimidates or coerces a person

under eighteen years of

age to commit or participate in the commission of

a criminal act.”

DELAWARE

Criminal youth gangs: “Any person who solicits,

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, invites, recruits, encour§ 617(b)(1) (West 2022) ages or otherwise causes

or attempts to cause a juvenile or student to

participate in or become a

member of a criminal

street gang … is guilty of

a class G felony.”

Acts constituting coer- “A person is guilty of coercion: DEL. CODE ANN.

cion when the person

tit. 11, § 791 (West

compels or induces a per2022)

son to engage in conduct

which the victim has a legal right to abstain from

engaging in ....”

App. 10

Unlawful use of a

payment card: DEL.

CODE ANN. tit. 11,

§ 903(a) (West 2022)

Endangering the welfare of a child: DEL.

CODE ANN. tit. 11,

§ 1102(a)(3) (West

2022)

Sexual Solicitation of a

child: DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 11, § 1112A(a)(2)

(West 2022)

“A person is guilty of unlawful use of a payment

card when the person uses

or knowingly permits or

encourages another to

use a payment card [in a

defined unlawful manner].”

“A person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a

child when ... [t]he person

knowingly encourages,

aids, abets or conspires

with the child to run away

from the home of the

child’s parents, guardian

or custodian ....”

“A person is guilty of sexual solicitation of a child if

the person, being 18 years

of age or older, intentionally or knowingly ... [u]ses

a computer, cellular telephone or other electronic

device to communicate

with another person, including a child, to solicit,

request, command, importune, entire, encourage,

or otherwise attempt to

cause a child to engage in

a prohibited sexual act.”

App. 11

FLORIDA

Attempts, solicitation,

“A person who solicits anand conspiracy: FLA.

other to commit an offense

STAT. ANN. § 777.04(2) prohibited by law and in

(West 2022)

the course of such solicitation commands,

encourages, hires, or requests another person to

engage in specific conduct

which would constitute

such offense ... commits

the offense of criminal solicitation ....”

Causing, encouraging, “[A] person who intentionsoliciting, or recruiting ally causes, encourages,

criminal gang memsolicits, or recruits anothbership: FLA. STAT.

er person to become a

ANN. § 874.05(1)(a)

criminal gang member

(West 2022)

where a condition of membership or continued

membership is the commission of any crime

commits a felony of the

third degree ....”

Identification card:

“[T]he term ‘offer to sell’

FLA. STAT. ANN.

includes every induce§ 877.18(2) (West 2022) ment, solicitation,

attempt, or printed or media advertisement to

encourage a person to

purchase an identification

card.”

App. 12

GEORGIA

Parties to crime: GA.

“A person is concerned in

CODE ANN. § 16-2the commission of a crime

20(b)(4) (West 2022)

only if he ... [i]ntentionally

advises, encourages,

hires, counsels, or procures another to commit

the crime.”

Arson in the first de“A person commits the ofgree: GA. CODE ANN.

fense of arson in the first

§ 16-7-60(a) (West

degree when, by means of

2022)

fire or explosive, he or she

knowingly damages or

knowingly causes, aids,

abets, advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or

procures another to damage [anything listed in

section (a).]”

Contributing to delin“A person commits the ofquency, unruliness, or

fense of contributing to

deprivation of minor:

the delinquency or deGA. CODE ANN. § 16-12- pending a minor or

1(b)(1) (West 2022)

causing a child to be a

child in need of services

when such person ...

[k]nowingly and willfully

encourages, causes,

abets, connives, or aids a

minor in committing a delinquent act[.]”

App. 13

HAWAII

Criminal solicitation:

“A person is guilty of crimHAW. REV. STAT. ANN.

inal solicitation if, with

§ 705-510(1) (West

the intent to promote or

2022)

facilitate the commission

of a crime, the person

commands, encourages,

or requests another person to engage in conduct

or cause the result specified by the definition of an

offense ....”

Promoting minor“A minor commits the ofproduced sexual imag- fense of promoting minores in the second

produced sexual images in

degree: HAW. REV.

the second degree if the

STAT. ANN. § 712minor ... [i]ntentionally or

1215.6 (West 2022)

knowingly commands, requests, or encourages

another minor [listed electronic device] to transmit

to any person a nude photograph or video of a

minor or the minor’s self.”

IDAHO

Principals defined:

“All persons ... [who] aid

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18- and abet in [a crime’s]

204 (West 2022)

commission, or, not being

present, have advised and

encouraged its commission ... are principals in

any crime so committed.”

App. 14

Hazing: IDAHO CODE

ANN. § 18-917(2) (West

2022)

Definition of Solicitation: IDAHO CODE ANN.

§ 18-2001 (West 2022)

“‘[H]aze’ means to subject

a person to bodily danger

or physical harm or likelihood of bodily danger or

physical harm, or to require, encourage,

authorize or permit that

person to be subjected

[listed acts].”

“A person is guilty of criminal solicitation to commit

a crime if with the purpose of promoting or

facilitating its commission

he solicits, importunes,

commands, encourages

or requests another person to engage in specific

conduct which would constitute such crime ....”

ILLINOIS

Contributing to the de- “Any parent, legal guardipendency and neglect

an or person having the

of a minor: 720 ILL.

custody of a child under

COMP. STAT. 5/12Cthe age of 18 years com25(a) (West 2022)

mits contributing to the

dependency and neglect of

a minor when he or she

knowingly ... causes, aids,

or encourages such minor to be or to become a

dependent and neglected

App. 15

minor[.]”

Drug induced infliction “A person commits drug

of harm to a child ath- induced infliction of harm

lete: 720 ILL. COMP.

to a child athlete when he

STAT. 5/12C-45(a)

or she knowing(West 2022)

ly ... encourages the

ingestion of a drug by a

person under the age of 18

with the intent that the

person under the age of 18

ingest the drug for the

purpose of quick weight

gain or loss in connection

with participation in athletics.”

Financial exploitation

“‘Deception’ means ... the

of an elderly person or use or employment of any

a person with a disabil- misrepresentation, false

ity: 720 ILL. COMP.

pretense or false promise

STAT. ANN. 5/17in order to induce, en56(c)(4) (West 2022)

courage or solicit the

elderly person or person

with a disability to enter

into a contract or agreement.”

INDIANA

Aiding, inducing or

“A person who knowingly

causing an offense:

or intentionally aids, inIND. CODE ANN. § 35duces, or causes another

41-2-4 (West 2022)

person to commit an offense commits that

offense ....”

App. 16

Contributing to delinquency: IND. CODE

ANN. § 35-46-1-8(a)

(West)

“A person ... who knowingly or intentionally

encourages, aids, induces, or causes a child to

commit an act of delinquency ... commits

contributing to delinquency ....”

IOWA

Contributing to delin“It shall be unlawful ...

quency: IOWA CODE

[t]o knowingly encourANN. § 709A.1 (1)-(4)

age, contribute, or in any

(West 2022)

manner cause such child

to violate any law of this

state, or any ordinance of

any city.”

Student athlete prohi“[A] person shall not give,

bitions: IOWA CODE

offer, promise, or attempt

ANN. § 722.11 (2)(a)

to give any money or other

(West 2022)

thing of value to a student

athlete or immediate family member of a student

athlete ... [t]o induce, encourage, or reward the

student athlete's application, enrollment, or

attendance at an institution of higher education

[or] induce, encourage,

or reward the student athlete’s participation in an

intercollegiate sporting

App. 17

event ....”

KANSAS

Criminal solicitation:

“Criminal solicitation is

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21commanding, encourag5303(a) (West 2022)

ing or requesting another

person to commit a felony,

attempt to commit a felony or aid and abet in the

commission or attempted

commission of a felony for

the purpose of promoting

or facilitating the felony.”

Contributing to a

“Contributing to a child’s

child’s misconduct or

misconduct or deprivation

deprivation: KAN. STAT. is ... [k]nowingly causing

ANN. § 21-5603(a)(1)or encouraging a child”

(2) (West 2022)

[1] “to become or remain a

child in need of care”;

[2] “commit a traffic infraction” or misdemeanor;

[3] to commit a felony; or

[4] to violate terms of probation or conditional

release.

Furnishing alcoholic

“Furnishing alcoholic bevbeverages to a minor:

erages to a minor for illicit

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21purposes is ... to encour5607(b) (West 2022)

age or induce such child

to commit or participate

in, any act defined as a

crime ....”

App. 18

KENTUCKY

Spreading false rumors “Any person

regarding solvency of

who ... counsels, aids, profinancial institutions:

cures, or induces another

KY. REV. STAT. ANN.

to start, transmit or circu§ 434.310 (West 2022)

late [any false rumor

regarding solvency of a

financial institution].”

Phishing: KY. REV.

“A person is guilty of

STAT. ANN.

phishing if he or she

§ 434.697(2) (West

knowingly or intentionally

2022)

solicits, requests, or takes

any action to induce another person to provide

identifying information by

means of a Web page,

electronic mail message,

or otherwise using the Internet ....”

LOUISIANA

Criminal assistance to “Criminal assistance to

suicide: LA. STAT. ANN. suicide is ... [t]he inten§ 14:32.12 (2022)

tional advising or

encouraging of another

person to commit suicide

....”

Computer- aided solici- “Computer-aided solicitatation of a minor: LA.

tion of a minor is

STAT. ANN. § 14:81.3(A) committed when a per(1) (2022)

son ... knowingly contacts

or communicates [with a

minor] … for the purpose

App. 19

Pandering: LA. STAT.

ANN. § 14:84(A)(1)

(2022)

Bribery of parents of

school children: LA.

STAT. ANN. § 14:119.1

(A)(1) (2022)

of or with the intent to

persuade, induce, entice,

or coerce the person to engage or participate in

sexual conduct or a crime

of violence ….”

“Pandering” includes

“[e]nticing, placing, persuading, encouraging, or

causing the entrance of

any person into the practice of prostitution, either

by force, threats, promise,

or by any other device or

scheme.”

“Bribery of parents of

school children is the giving or offering to give,

directly or indirectly, any

money [to a legal guardian] as an inducement to

encourage, influence,

prompt, reward, or compensate any such person

to permit, prompt, force,

or cause any such child to

attend any such school in

violation of any law of this

state”

MAINE

Criminal solicitation:

“A person is guilty of crimME. REV. STAT. ANN.

inal solicitation if the

App. 20

tit. 17-A, § 153(1)

(2022)

Sexual misconduct

with a child under 14

years of age: ME. REV.

STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,

§ 258(1) (2022)

Tampering with a witness, informant, juror

or victim: ME. REV.

STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,

§ 454(1)(A) (2022)

person, with the intent to

cause the commission of

the crime, and under circumstances that the

person believes make it

probable that the crime

will take place, commands

or attempts to induce another person [to commit a

crime].”

“A person is guilty of sexual misconduct with a

child under 14 years of

age, if that [adult] knowingly displays any

sexually explicit materials

to another person ... with

the intent to encourage

the other person to engage

in a sexual act or sexual

contact.”

A person is guilty of tampering with a witness or

informant if, believing

that an official proceeding .... or an official

criminal investigation is

pending or will be instituted, the actor ...

[i]nduces or otherwise

causes, or attempts to

cause, a witness or in-

App. 21

formant ... to testify or inform in a manner the

actor knows to be false; or

withhold testimony, information or evidence.”

MARYLAND

Use of personal identi- “A person may not use the

fying information to

personal identifying ininvite, encourage, or

formation or identity of an

solicit another to comindividual without consent

mit sexual crime: MD.

to invite, encourage, or

CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW solicit another to commit a

§ 3-325(b)

sexual crime against the

individual.”

Misuse of electronic

Including within statute

mail: MD. CODE ANN.,

defining crime of misuse

CRIM. LAW § 3of electronic mail using “a

805(a)(3)(iii) & (v)

computer or a computer

(West 2022)

network to ... encourage

others to disseminate information concerning the

sexual activity ... of a minor” or “encourage

others to engage in the repeated, continuing, or

sustained use of electronic

communication to contact

a minor”

Sex trafficking: MD.

“A person may not knowCODE ANN., CRIM. LAW ingly ... persuade, induce,

§ 3-1102(a)(1) (iii)

entice, or encourage an(West 2022)

other to be taken to or

App. 22

placed in any place for

prostitution”

Blank or incorrect

“In this section, ‘offer for

identification card: MD. sale’ includes to induce,

CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW solicit, attempt, or adver§ 8-302 (West 2022)

tise in a manner intended

to encourage a person to

purchase an identification

card.”

MASSACHUSETTS

Encitement of child

As used in this section,

under age 18 to engage the term “entice” shall

in prostitution, human mean to lure, induce,

trafficking or commer- persuade, tempt, incite,

cial sexual activity:

solicit, coax or invite ....

MASS. GEN. LAWS

Whoever, by electronic

ch. 265, § 26D(c) (West communication, knowing2022)

ly entices a child under

the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution[,]

human trafficking[,] or

commercial sexual activity

... shall be punished ....”

Compulsion or coercion “Any appointing authority

to refuse appointment

or appointing officer ...

or promotion: MASS.

who ... compels, or inducGEN. LAWS ch. 268,

es by the use of threats or

§ 8B (West 2022)

other form of coercion, any

person on an eligible

list ... to refuse an appointment or promotion by

such authority or officer to

App. 23

Posing or exhibiting

child in state of nudity

or sexual conduct:

MASS. GEN. LAWS

ch. 272, § 29A(a) (West

2022)

any position in the classified civil service shall be

punished ....”

“Whoever, ... with a lascivious intent, hires, coerces,

solicits or entices, employs, procures, uses,

causes, encourages, or

knowingly permits such

child to pose or to be exhibited in a state of

nudity, for the purpose of

representation or reproduction in any visual

material, shall be punished ....”

MICHIGAN

Presence of minor

“[A] person who encourwhere alcohol is sold:

ages or induces in any

MICH. COMP. LAWS

way the minor child to enANN. § 750.141 (West

ter [a bar without

2022)

parental supervision] or to

remain therein shall be

deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.”

Contributing to neglect “Any person who shall by

or delinquency of chilan act, or by any word,

dren: MICH. COMP.

encourage, contribute

LAWS ANN. § 750.145

toward, cause or tend to

(West 2022)

cause any minor child ...

to become neglected or delinquent ....”

App. 24

Procuring or inducing

A person who …

persons to engage in

[i]nduces, persuades,

prostitution: MICH.

encourages, inveigles, or

COMP. LAWS ANN.

entices a person to become

§ 750.455(b) (West

a prostitute [is guilty of a

2022)

felony.]”

MINNESOTA

Solicitation, induce“[Whoever intentionally]

ment, and promotion of solicits or induces an inprostitution: MINN.

dividual to practice

STAT. ANN.

prostitution [will be sen§ 609.322(1) (a)(1)

tenced to imprisonment].”

(West 2022)

Cellular telephone

“A person commits the

counterfeiting: MINN.

crime of cellular counterSTAT. ANN. § 609.894(4) feiting in the first degree

(West 2022)

if the person knowingly

possesses or distributes [a

counterfeiting device] and

agrees with, encourages,

solicits, or permits one or

more other persons to engage in or cause, or obtain

cellular telephone service

through, cellular counterfeiting.”

MISSISSIPPI

Assisting Suicide:

“A person who willfully, or

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97in any manner, advices,

3-49 (West 2022)

encourages, abets, or assists another person to

take, or in taking, the lat-

App. 25

Procuring prostitutes:

MISS. CODE ANN. § 9729-51(2)(a) (West 2022)

ter’s life, or in attempting

to take the latter’s life, is

guilty of a felony ....”

“A person commits the felony of promoting

prostitution if the person ... [k]nowingly or

intentionally entices,

compels, causes, induces,

persuades, or encourages

by promise, threat, violence, or by scheme or

device, another person to

become a prostitute ....”

MISSOURI

Endangering the wel“A person commits the offare of a child in the

fense of endangering the

first degree: MO. ANN.

welfare of a child in the

STAT. § 568.045(1)(3)

first degree if he or

she ... [k]nowingly encourages, aids or causes

a child ... engage in conduct which [is a controlled

substances offense].”

Misuse of official in“A public servant commits

formation: MO. ANN.

the offense of misuse of

STAT. § 576.050(1)(3)

official information if [the

(West 2022)

public servant] [a]ids, advises, or encourages

another [to do an act constituting misuse of official

information] with purpose

App. 26

of conferring a pecuniary

benefit on any person.”

MONTANA

Solicitation: MONT.

“A person commits the ofCODE ANN. § 45-4fense of solicitation when,

101(1) (West 2022)

with the purpose that an

offense be committed, the

person commands, encourages, or facilitates

the commission of that offense.”

Promoting prostitution: “A person commits the ofMONT. CODE ANN. § 45- fense of promoting

5-602(1)(c) (West 2022) prostitution if the person

purposely or knowingly ... encourages,

induces, or otherwise

purposely causes another

to become or remain a

prostitute[.]”

Sexual abuse of chil“A person commits the ofdren: MONT. CODE

fense of sexual abuse of

ANN. § 45-5-625(1)(c)

children if the person

(West 2022)

knowingly ... persuades,

entices, counsels, coerces,

encourages, directs, or

procures a child ... to engage in sexual conduct,

actual or simulated, or to

view sexually explicit material or acts for the

purpose of inducing or

App. 27

persuading a child to participate in any sexual

activity that is illegal[.]”

NEBRASKA

Contributing to the de- “Any person who, by an

linquency of a child:

act, encourages, causes,

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.

or contributes to the de§ 28-709(1) (West 2022) linquency or need for

special supervision of a

child ... so that such child

becomes, or will tend to

become, a delinquent

child, or a child in need of

special supervision, commits contributing to the

delinquency of a child.”

Visual depiction of

“It shall be unlawful for a

sexually explicit conperson to knowingly emduct: NEB. REV. STAT.

ploy, force, authorize,

ANN. § 28-1463.03(3)

induce, or otherwise

(West 2022)

cause a child to engage in

any visual depiction of

sexually explicit conduct

which has a child as one of

its participants or portrayed observers.”

NEVADA

Principals: NEV. REV.

“Every person [who] diSTAT. ANN. § 195.020

rectly or indirectly,

(West 2022)

counsels, encourages,

hires, commands, induces or otherwise procures

App. 28

another to commit a felony, gross misdemeanor or

misdemeanor is a principal, and shall be

proceeded against and

punished as such.”

Pandering and sex

“A person ... is guilty of

trafficking: NEV. REV.

sex trafficking if the perSTAT. ANN. § 201.300(2) son … [i]nduces, causes,

(West 2022)

recruits, harbors, transports, provides, obtains or

maintains a child to engage in prostitution ….”

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Criminal street gang;

“Any person who solicits,

solicitation: N.H. REV.

invites, recruits, encourSTAT. ANN. § 644:20

ages, or otherwise causes

(2022)

or attempts to cause another individual to become

a member of ... a criminal

street gang ... shall be

guilty of a class A felony.”

Computer Pornography “No person shall knowingProhibited: N.H. REV.

ly [do enumerated acts]

STAT. ANN. § 649-B:3(I) for purposes of facilitat(2022)

ing, encouraging,

offering, or soliciting sexual conduct of or with any

child, or the visual depiction of such conduct.”

NEW JERSEY

Prohibited activities

“A person is a recruiter for

App. 29

related to pyramid

promotional schemes:

N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 2C:20-39(a)(2) (West

2022)

a pyramid promotional

scheme if he solicits or

induces any other person

to participate in a [pyramid scheme] …. Recruiter

for a pyramid promotional

scheme is a crime of the

fourth degree.”

Prostitution and relat- “‘Promoting prostitution’

ed offense: N.J. STAT.

is ... [e]ncouraging, inANN. § 2C:34-1(a)(4)(c) ducing, or otherwise

(West 2022)

purposely causing another

to become or remain a

prostitute[.]”

NEW MEXICO

Promoting prostitution: “Promoting prostitution

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30consists of any person ...

9-4(D) (West 2022)

knowingly inducing another to become a

prostitute[.]”

Criminal solicitation:

“[A] person is guilty of

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30criminal solicitation if,

28-3(A) (West 2022)

with the intent that another person engage in

conduct constituting a felony, he solicits,

commands, requests, induces, employs or

otherwise attempts to

promote or facilitate another person to engage in

conduct constituting a fel-

App. 30

ony within or without the

state.”

NEW YORK

Coercion in the third

“A person is guilty of coerdegree: N.Y. PENAL

cion in the third degree

LAW § 136.60 (McKinwhen he or she compels or

ney 2022)

induces a person to [do

various conduct].”

Tampering with a wit- “A person is guilty of tamness in the fourth

pering with a witness

degree: N.Y. PENAL

when, knowing that perLAW § 215.10 (McKinson is or is about to be

ney 2022)

called as a witness in an

action or proceeding ... he

wrongfully induces or attempts to induce such a

person to absent himself

from, or otherwise to avoid

or seek to avoid appearing

or testifying at, such action or proceeding[.]”

Sex trafficking: N.Y.

“A person is guilty of sex

PENAL LAW § 230.34(2) trafficking if he or she in(McKinney 2022)

tentionally advances or

profits from prostitution

by ... making material

false statements, misstatements, or omissions

to induce or maintain the

person being patronized to

engage in or to continue to

engage in prostitution ac-

App. 31

tivity[.]”

NORTH CAROLINA

Soliciting; encouraging “It is unlawful for any

participation: N.C.

person to cause, encourGEN. STAT. ANN. § 14age, solicit, or coerce a

50.17(a) (West 2022)

person 16 years of age or

older to participate in

criminal gang activity.”

First degree sexual ex- “A person commits the ofploitation of a minor:

fense of first degree sexual

N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.

exploitation of a minor if,

§ 14-190.16 (West

knowing the character or

2022)

content of the material or

performance, he ... [u]ses,

employs, induces, coerces, encourages, or

facilitates a minor to engage in ... sexual activity

for a live performance or

for the purpose of producing material that contains

a visual representation

depicting this activity[.]”

Child abuse a felony:

“Any parent or [guardian

N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.

of a] child, who commits,

§ 14-318.4(a1) (West

permits, or encourages

2022)

any act of prostitution

with or by the child is

guilty of child abuse ....”

NORTH DAKOTA

Criminal solicitation:

“A person is guilty of crimN.D. CENT. CODE ANN. inal solicitation if he

App. 32

§ 12.1-06-03(1) (West

2022)

Encouraging minors to

participate in a criminal street gang: N.D.

CENT. CODE ANN.

§ 12.1-06.2-03(1) (West

2022)

commands, induces, entreats, or otherwise

attempts to persuade another person to commit a

particular felony ....”

“Any [adult] who knowingly or willfully causes, aids,

abets, encourages, solicits, or recruits a [minor] to

participate in a criminal

street gang is upon conviction guilty of a class C

felony.”

OHIO

Compelling prostitu“No person shall knowingtion: OHIO REV. CODE

ly ... [i]nduce, procure,

ANN. § 2907.21 (West

encourage, solicit, re2022)

quest, or otherwise

facilitate ... [a] minor to

engage in sexual activity

for hire ....”

Personating an officer: “No person, with purpose

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

to defraud or knowing

§ 2913.44 (West 2022)

that he is facilitating a

fraud, or with purpose to

induce another to purchase property or services,

shall personate a law enforcement officer, or an

inspector, investigator, or

agent of any governmental

agency.”

App. 33

Contributing to unruliness or delinquency:

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2919.24(B)(1) (West

2022)

“No person ... shall ...

“[a]id, abet, induce,

cause, encourage, or contribute to a child or a

ward of the juvenile court

becoming an unruly child

or a delinquent child.”

OKLAHOMA

Aiding Suicide: OKLA.

“Every person who willfulSTAT. ANN. tit. 21,

ly, in any manner,

§ 813 (West 2022)

advises, encourages,

abets, or assists another

in taking his own life, is

guilty of aiding suicide.”

Child under 18 years of “No person shall … [b]y

age—inducing, keeppromise, threats, violence,

ing, detaining or

or by any device or

restraining from prosscheme ... cause, induce,

titution: OKLA. STAT.

persuade, or encourage a

ANN. tit. 21,

child under eighteen (18)

§ 1088(A)(1) (West

years of age to engage or

2022)

continue to engage in

prostitution ....”

OREGON

Tampering with a wit- “A person commits the

ness: OR. REV. STAT.

crime with a witness if ...

ANN. § 162.285(1)

[t]he person knowingly

(West 2022)

induces or attempts to

induce a witness ... to offer false testimony or

unlawfully withhold any

testimony; or … to be ab-

App. 34

sent from any official proceeding to which the

person has been legally

summoned.”

Hazing: OR. REV. STAT. “‘Haze’ means ... [t]o inANN. § 163.197(4)(a)(D) duce, cause or require an

(West 2022)

individual to perform a

duty or task that involves

the commission of a crime

or an act of hazing.”

Endangering the wel“A person commits the offare of a minor: OR.

fense of endangering the

REV. STAT. ANN.

welfare of a minor if the

§ 163.575(1)(a) (West

person knowingly ...

2022)

[i]nduces, causes or permits an unmarried [child]

to witness an act of sexual

conduct or sadomasochistic abuse ....”

PENNSYLVANIA

Criminal Solicitation:

“A person is guilty of solic18 PA. STAT. & CONS.

itation to commit a crime

STAT. ANN. § 902(a)

if with the intent of pro(West 2022)

moting or facilitating its

commission he commands,

encourages or requests

another person to engage

in specific conduct which

would constitute such

crime ....”

Promoting Prostitu“[P]romoting prostitution

tion: 18 PA. STAT. &

[includes] encouraging,

App. 35

CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 5902(b)(3) (West

2022)

inducing, or otherwise

intentionally causing another to become or remain

a prostitute.”

RHODE ISLAND

Pandering or permit“It shall be unlawful for

ting prostitution—Not any person, by any promallowed: R.I. GEN.

ise or threat, by abuse of

LAWS ANN. § 11-34.1person, or by any other

7(a) (West 2022)

device or scheme, to cause,

induce, persuade, or encourage a person to

become a prostitute ....”

Exploitation of elders;

“‘Deception’ means ...

Definitions: R.I. GEN.

[u]sing any misrepresenLAWS § 11-68-1 (West

tation, false pretense, or

2022)

false promise in order to

induce, encourage, or

solicit an elder person to

enter into a contract or

agreement.”

SOUTH CAROLINA

Unlawful issuance,

“[T]he term ‘offer to sell’

sale, or offer to sell

includes every induceidentification card or

ment, solicitation,

document purporting

attempt, printed or media

to contain age or date

advertisement to encourof birth: S.C. CODE

age a person to purchase

ANN. § 16-13-450

an identification card.”

(2022)

Prostitution; further

“It shall further be unlawunlawful acts: S.C.

ful to ... [c]ause, induce,

App. 36

CODE ANN. § 16-15100(2)-(3) (2022)

First degree sexual exploitation of a minor:

S.C. CODE ANN. § 1615-395(A) (2022)

persuade or encourage

by promise, threat, violence or by any scheme or

device a female to become

a prostitute ....”

“An individual commits

the offense of first degree

sexual exploitation of a

minor if, knowing the

character or content of the

material or performance,

he … uses, employs, induces, coerces,

encourages, or facilitates

a minor to engage in or

assist others to engage in

sexual activity ....”

SOUTH DAKOTA

Aiding and abetting

“Any person who intensuicide: S.D. CODIFIED

tionally in any manner

LAWS § 22-16-37 (2022) advises, encourages,

abets, or assists another

person in taking or in attempting to take his or

her own life is guilty of a

Class 6 felony.”

Promoting prostitution: “Any person who ...

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §

[e]ncourages, induces,

22-23-2 (2022)

procures, or otherwise

purposely causes another

App. 37

to become or remain a

prostitute ... is guilty of

promoting prostitution.”

TENNESSEE

Prostitution: TENN.

“‘Promoting prostitution’

CODE ANN. § 39-13means ... [e]ncouraging,

512(4)(A) (West 2022)

inducing, or otherwise

purposely causing another

to become a prostitute[.]”

Offenses by supervi“It is an offense for a susors and employees:

pervisor to intentionally ...

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39- [i]nstruct, direct, or en16-410(a)(1) (West

courage an employee to

2022)

make a false statement,

entry, notation, or report

during or in relation to an

audit.”

TEXAS

Criminal Responsibil“A person is criminally reity for Conduct of

sponsible for an offense

Another: TEX. PENAL

committed by the conduct

CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) of another if ... acting with

(West 2022)

intent to promote or assist

the commission of the offense, he solicits,

encourages, directs, aids,

or attempts to aid the other person to commit the

offense[.]”

Criminal Solicitation:

“A person commits an ofTEX. PENAL CODE ANN. fense if, with intent that a

§ 15.03(a) (West 2022)

capital felony or felony of

App. 38

Smuggling of Persons:

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 20.05(a)(2) (West

2022)

the first degree be committed, he requests,

commands, or attempts to

induce another to engage

in specific conduct

that ... would constitute

the felony ....”

“A person commits an offense if the person

knowingly ... encourages

or induces a person to

enter or remain in this

country in violation of federal law by concealing,

harboring, or shielding

that person from detection

....”

UTAH

Criminal responsibility “Every person, acting with

for direct commission

the mental state required

of offense or for confor the commission of an

duct of another: UTAH

offense who directly comCODE ANN. § 76-2-202

mits the offense, who

(West 2022)

solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or

intentionally aids another

person to engage in conduct which constitutes an

offense shall be criminally

liable as a party for such

conduct.”

Financial exploitation

“‘Deception’ means ... the

App. 39

of a vulnerable adult—

Penalties: UTAH CODE

ANN. § 76-5-111.4

(West 2022)

use or employment of any

misrepresentation, false

pretense, or false promise

in order to induce, encourage, or solicit a

vulnerable adult to enter

into a contract or agreement.”

Exploiting prostitution: “An individual is guilty of

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76- exploiting prostitution if

10-1305(1)(b) (West

the individu2022)

al ... encourages,

induces, or otherwise

purposely causes another

to become or remain a

prostitute[.]”

VERMONT

Contributing to juve“A person who causes, ennile delinquency: VT.

courages, or contributes

STAT. ANN. tit. 13,

to the delinquency of a

§ 1301 (West 2022)

minor shall be imprisoned

....”

Home improvement

“A person commits the offraud: VT. STAT. ANN.

fense of home

tit. 13, § 2029(b)(3)

improvement fraud when

(West 2022)

he or she enters into a

contract or agreement ... and he or she

knowingly ... uses or employs any unfair or

deceptive act or practice in

order to induce, encour-

App. 40

age, or solicit such person

to enter into any contract

or agreement or to modify

the terms of the original

contract or agreement[.]”

VIRGINIA

Recruitment of persons “Any person who solicits,

for criminal street

invites, recruits, encourgang: VA. CODE ANN.

ages, or otherwise causes

§ 18.2-46.3(A) (West

or attempts to cause an2022)

other [or juvenile] to

actively participate in or

become a member of what

he knows to be a criminal

street gang.”

Causing or encourag“Any person 18 years of

ing acts rendering

age or older, including the

children delinquent,

parent of any child,

abused: VA. CODE ANN. who ... willfully contrib§ 18.2-371 (West 2022) utes to, encourages, or

causes any act, omission,

or condition that renders a

child delinquent, in need

of services, in need of supervision, or abused or

neglected … is guilty of a

Class 1 misdemeanor.”

Inducing another to

“If any person procure or

give false testimony:

induce another to commit

VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2perjury or to give false

436 (West 2022)

testimony under oath in

violation of any provision

App. 41

of this article, he shall be

punished ....”

WASHINGTON

False advertising:

“Any person, firm, corpoWASH. REV. CODE ANN. ration or association who

§ 9.04.010 (West 2022) with intent to sell or in

any wise dispose of merchandise ... induce[s] the

public in any manner to

enter into any obligation

relating thereto, ... makes,

publishes, disseminates,

circulates, or places before

the public ... [a false advertisement] ... shall be

guilty of a misdemeanor

....”

Barratry: WASH. REV.

“Every person who brings

CODE ANN. § 9.12.010

on his or her own behalf,

(West 2022)

or instigates, incites, or

encourages another to

bring, any false suit at law

or in equity in any court of

this state, with the intent

thereby to distress or harass a defendant in the

suit ... is guilty of a misdemeanor ....”

WEST VIRGINIA

Procuring for house of

“Any person who shall

prostitution: W. VA.

procure an inmate for a

CODE ANN. § 61-8-7

house of prostitution, or

App. 42

(West 2022)

Solicitation to commit

certain felonies: W. VA.

CODE ANN. § 61-11-8a

(West 2022)

who, by promises, threats,

violence, or by any device

or scheme, shall cause,

induce, persuade or encourage a person to

become an inmate of a

house of prostitution ...

shall be punished ....”

“‘solicitation’ means the

willful and knowing instigation or inducement of

another to commit a felony

crime of violence against

the person of a third person[.]”

WISCONSIN

Sexual exploitation of a “Whoever ... [e]mploys,

child: WIS. STAT. ANN.

uses, persuades, induces,

§ 948.05(1)(a), (2)

entices, or coerces any

(West 2022)

child to engage in sexually

explicit conduct for the

purpose of recording or

displaying in any way the

conduct [with knowledge

of the character and content of the sexually

explicit conduct may be

penalized.]”

Contributing to truan- “[A]ny person 17 years of

cy: WIS. STAT. ANN.

age or older who, by any

§ 948.45 (West 2022)

act or omission, knowingly

encourages or contrib-

App. 43

utes to the truancy ... of a

person 17 years of age or

under is guilty of a Class

C misdemeanor.”

WYOMING

Solicitation to commit

“A person is guilty of solicfelony: WYO. STAT.

itation to commit a felony

ANN. § 6-1-302(a) (West if, with intent that a felo2022)

ny be committed, he

commands, encourages

or facilitates the commission of that crime under

circumstances strongly

corroborative of the intention that the crime be

committed but the solicited crime is not attempted

or committed.”

Sports bribery: Wyo.

“A person is guilty of

Stat. Ann. § 6-3sports bribery if ... [h]e

609(b)(i)(A) (West

bribes or offers to bribe a

2022)

participant or official in

an athletic contest with

the intent to ... [i]nduce a

participant to lose or limit

the margin of victory or

defeat[.]”

Abandoning or endan“No person shall knowinggering children: WYO.

ly ... [c]ause, encourage,

STAT. ANN. § 6-45aid or contribute to a

403(b)(i)-(ii) (West

child’s violation of any law

2022)

of this state [or] [c]ause,

App. 44

encourage, aid or permit

a child to enter, remain or

be employed in any place

or premises used for prostitution or for professional

gambling[.]”

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.