Amicus Curiae Brief — Gerald E. Groff, Petitioner v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General

No. 22-174

In the Supreme Court of the United States

GERALD E. GROFF,

Petitioner,

V.

LOUIS DEJOY, POSTMASTER GENERAL,

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

Respondent.

——————

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE STATES OF

WEST VIRGINIA, LOUISIANA,

AND 20 OTHER STATES

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE

WEST VIRGINIA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

State Capitol Complex

Building 1, Room E-26

Charleston, WV 25305

lindsay.s.see@wvago.gov

(304) 558-2021

LINDSAY S. SEE

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS

Senior Deputy Solicitor

General

GRANT A. NEWMAN

Assistant Solicitor General

SPENCER J. DAVENPORT*

Special Assistant

Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of West Virginia

[additional counsel listed after signature page]

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 generally

prohibits an employer from discriminating against an

individual “because of such individual’s * * * religion.” 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), (2). The statute defines “religion”

to include “all aspects of religious observance and

practice, as well as belief, unless an employer

demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably

accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s

religious observance or practice without undue hardship

on the conduct of the employer’s business.” Id. § 2000e(j).

In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63

(1977), this Court stated that an employer suffers an

“undue hardship” in accommodating an employee’s

religious exercise whenever doing so would require the

employer “to bear more than a de minimis cost.” Id. at 84.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether this Court should disapprove the morethan-de-minimis-cost test for refusing Title VII religious

accommodations stated in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.

Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).

2. Whether an employer may demonstrate “undue

hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business” under

Title VII merely by showing that the requested

accommodation burdens the employee’s co-workers

rather than the business itself.

II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented ............................................................ I

Introduction and Interests of Amici Curiae ..................... 1

Summary of Argument ........................................................ 5

Argument .............................................................................. 7

I.

The Sky Will Not Fall ................................................... 7

II. Hardison Stands Alone .............................................. 11

III. States’ Interests Are Critical ..................................... 17

Conclusion ........................................................................... 22

III

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Burns v. S. Pac. Transp. Co.,

589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978) ........................................... 8

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,

573 U.S. 682 (2014) ................................................... 9, 11

Connecticut v. Teal,

457 U.S. 440 (1982) ....................................................... 19

Dykzeul v. Charter Commc’ns Inc.,

No. 18-05826, 2019 WL 8198218

(C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2019) .............................................. 12

EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.,

575 U.S. 768 (2015) ......................................................... 3

Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v.

Smith,

494 U.S. 872 (1990) ....................................................... 10

Est. of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,

472 U.S. 703 (1985) ....................................................... 11

In re Frushour,

433 F.3d 393 (4th Cir. 2005) ......................................... 11

Gillette v. United States,

401 U.S. 437 (1970) ......................................................... 3

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente

Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) ......................... 8

Haynes v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc.,

521 S.E.2d 331 (W. Va. 1999) ....................................... 15

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Holt v. Hobbs,

574 U.S. 352 (2015) ......................................................... 9

Iowa Beer & Liquor Control Dep’t Store

1023 v. Iowa C.R. Comm’n,

337 N.W.2d 896 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983) ......................... 15

Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter &

Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,

140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020) ................................................... 10

Loc. 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n

v. EEOC,

478 U.S. 421 (1986) ....................................................... 19

Marshall v. Pollin Hotels II, LLC,

170 F. Supp. 3d 1290 (D. Or. 2016) ............................. 16

N. Shore Univ. Hosp. v. State Hum. Rts.

Appeal Bd.,

82 A.D.2d 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)........................... 12

Nakashima v. Or. Bd. of Educ.,

131 P.3d 749 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) ................................. 14

Par. Nat. Bank v. Lane,

397 So.2d 1282 (La. 1981)............................................. 21

Pasaye v. Dzurenda,

375 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (D. Nev. 2019) ............................. 9

Plourde v. Scott Paper Co.,

552 A.2d 1257 (Me. 1989) ............................................. 15

Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,

444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.1971) .......................................... 15

V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,

463 U.S. 85 (1983) ......................................................... 21

Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water,

141 S. Ct. 1227 (2021) ............................................... 4, 11

Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water,

952 F.3d 821 (6th Cir. 2020) ..................................... 2, 11

State ex rel. Surnaik Holdings of WV, LLC

v. Bedell,

852 S.E.2d 748 (W. Va. 2020) ....................................... 21

Suarez v. State,

517 P.3d 474 (Wash. Ct. App. 2022) ............................ 14

Tisby v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility,

152 A.3d 975 (N.J. Super. Ct.

App. Div. 2017) .............................................................. 12

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,

432 U.S. 63 (1977) ......................................... 1, 2, 7, 8, 19

United States v. Lee,

455 U.S. 252 (1982) ..................................................... 7, 8

US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,

535 U.S. 391 (2002) ....................................................... 12

Yellowbear v. Lampert,

741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014) ........................................... 8

Yott v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp.,

602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979) ........................................... 1

VI

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1869 .................................................................. 11

29 U.S.C. §207 ............................................................... 11, 16

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 ............................................................... 1

42 U.S.C. § 2000e .................................................................. 1

3 COLO. CODE. REGS. § 708-1-50.1 .................................... 13

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1461 ............................................... 12

CAL. GOV. CODE § 12926 .................................................... 12

CAL. LAB. CODE § 1031 ...................................................... 16

COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-40 ............................................. 13

IND. CODE § 22-2-14-2 ........................................................ 16

ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 850.............................................. 16

MINN. STAT. § 15A.22 ......................................................... 13

N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4 ............................................... 13

N.J. STAT. § 10:5-12 ............................................................ 12

N.J. STAT. §§ 10:5-12 .......................................................... 12

N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 ....................................................... 12

OFFICIAL GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-573 ............................... 13

OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.275................................................. 16

OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.290................................................. 16

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 305 .............................................. 16

VII

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Regulations

KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 21-33-1............................................ 13

W. VA. CODE R. § 77-1-4.6 ................................................. 15

W. VA. CODE R. § 77-1-4.6.1 .............................................. 15

Other Authorities

118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972)................................................. 19

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Francis

Bowen & Phillips Bradley eds., Henry

Reeve trans., Vintage Books 1990) ............................. 18

Alan Reinach, Why We Need State RFRA

Bills: A Panel Discussion,

32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 823 (1999) ............................... 17

Amicus Br. for Christian Legal Society, et

al., Patterson v. Walgreen Co.,

140 S. Ct. 685 (2020) (No. 18-349),

2018 WL 5098484 ............................................................ 2

Anton Sorkin, A “Cruel Choice” Made

Law: Freewheelin’ Accommodation

Claims and Harms of Conviction

Endemic to Adverse Action,

52 U. MEM. L. REV. 703 (2022) ...................................... 7

VIII

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Christopher M. Fournier, Faith in the

Workplace: Striking A Balance

Between Market Productivity and

Modern Religiosity,

15 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 229

(2016) .......................................................................... 4, 20

Christopher N. Elliott, Federalism and

Religious Liberty: Were Church and

State Meant to Be Separate?

2 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 5 (2000) ...................... 20

Dallan F. Flake, Bearing Burdens:

Religious Accommodations That

Adversely Affect Coworker Morale,

76 OHIO ST. L.J. 169 (2015)...................................... 4, 20

Dallan F. Flake, Restoring Reasonableness

to Workplace Religious

Accommodations,

95 WASH. L. REV. 1673 (2020) ..................................... 20

Debbie N. Kaminer, Religious

Accommodation in the Workplace:

Why Federal Courts Fail to Provide

Meaningful Protection of Religious

Employees,

20 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 107 (2015) ................................ 2

IX

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Elise Gurney, Colorado Shifts to SkillsBased Hiring to Fill State Government

Workforce Needs and Hire More

Individuals with Disabilities,

COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS

(Jan. 10, 2023) ............................................................... 19

Eugene Volokh, The EEOC, Religious,

Accommodation Claims, and Muslims,

WASH. POST (June 21, 2016, 4:39 p.m.) ......................... 2

Hon. Christine M. Durham, What Goes

Around Comes Around: The New

Relevancy of State Constitution

Religion Clauses,

38 VAL. U. L. REV. 353 (2004) ...................................... 21

Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The

Problem of Burdens on the Free

Exercise of Religion,

102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989) ........................................ 7

J. Haberkorn, Two Years Later, Few

Hobby Lobby Copycats Emerge,

POLITICO (Oct. 11, 2016, 5:19 p.m.) ............................. 10

Jeffrey M. Jones, How Religious Are

Americans?, GALLUP (Dec. 23, 2021)......................... 18

JOHN J. COLEMAN, III, DISABILITY

DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT

(2022 supp.) ................................................................... 15

X

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Karen Engle, The Persistence of

Neutrality: The Failure of the

Religious Accommodation Provision to

Redeem Title VII,

76 TEX. L. REV. 317 (1997)............................................. 1

Liz Farmer, The Great Resignation’s

Impact on Local Government,

ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOV’T

(Jan. 20, 2022) ............................................................... 19

Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N. Busick,

Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An

Empirical Study of Federal Religious

Freedom Cases,

48 SETON HALL L. REV. 353 (2018) ............................ 10

Mark L. Rienzi, Religious Liberty and

Judicial Deference,

98 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 337 (2022) ........................... 10

Matthew P. Mooney, Between a Stone and

a Hard Place: How the Hajj Can

Restore the Spirit of Reasonable

Accommodation to Title VII,

62 DUKE L.J. 1029 (2013) .............................................. 3

Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect

Religious Freedom?,

123 YALE L.J. 770 (2013) ............................................... 5

Religious Landscape Study, PEW RSCH.

CTR. (2014), https://bit.ly/3KpOpZ3

(last visited Feb. 24, 2023) ........................................... 18

XI

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

SOCIAL CAP. PROJECT, U.S. CONG. JOINT

ECON. COMM. — REPUBLICANS, SCP

REP. NO. 8-19, THE SPACE BETWEEN:

RENEWING THE AMERICAN TRADITION

OF CIVIL SOCIETY (Dec. 18, 2019) ............................... 18

Stephanie H. Barclay, First Amendment

“Harms”, 95 IND. L.J. 331 (2020) ............................... 17

TANENBAUM, WHAT AMERICAN WORKERS

REALLY THINK ABOUT RELIGION:

TANENBAUM’S 2013 SURVEY OF

AMERICAN WORKERS AND

RELIGION (2013) ........................................................... 20

INTRODUCTION AND INTERESTS

OF AMICI CURIAE

Few would quibble with the idea that Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a landmark law—one of the

most significant pieces of legislation of our time. And in

it, Congress barred workplace discrimination based on,

among other things, “religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Congress thus insisted that employees don’t need to shed

their religious identity when they go to work. They

shouldn’t be punished for bringing that identity to life

through religious practice, either. See id. § 2000e(j)

(defining “religion” to include “all aspects of religious

observance and practice, as well as belief”).

Unfortunately, five decades ago this Court effectively

nullified Title VII’s broad protection for religious exercise

by making it far too easy for employers to avoid their

statutory obligations. Title VII excuses employers from

“reasonably accommodat[ing]” an employee’s religious

observance or practice only when the accommodation

would cause “undue hardship on the conduct of the

employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). But in Trans

World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977),

the Court recast “undue hardship,” construing the term in

dicta to make the exception apply whenever

accommodation would require the employer “to bear more

than a de minimis cost.”

Shortly after Hardison, one circuit found it “difficult

to imagine” a “standard less difficult to satisfy” than this

new de minimis test. Yott v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 602

F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 1979). That court was right. Most

religious-accommodation claims since Hardison have

proven dead on arrival, save the few times when the

“employer had made no attempt to accommodate.” Karen

2

Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the

Religious Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title

VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 373 (1997). Now, “virtually any

type of cost constitutes undue hardship.” Debbie N.

Kaminer, Religious Accommodation in the Workplace:

Why Federal Courts Fail to Provide Meaningful

Protection of Religious Employees, 20 TEX. REV. L. &

POL. 107, 138 (2015).

The Court’s early choice to rewrite the standard has

inflicted real harms. Religious minorities—“people who

seek to worship their own God, in their own way, and on

their own time”—are often the ones most adversely

affected. Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 952 F.3d

821, 829 (6th Cir. 2020) (Thapar, J., concurring); see also

Hardison, 432 U.S. at 96-97 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

This unequal impact is predictable. Employers are more

likely to accommodate religious beliefs that are more

familiar because they are widely held—say, a Sunday

Sabbath or Christmas Day already built into the

calendar—and less likely to accommodate beliefs not as

well known in some communities—like a Seventh-day

Adventist whose Sabbath starts sundown Friday or a

Muslim employee who celebrates Eid. See Amicus Br. for

Christian Legal Society, et al. at 23-24, Patterson v.

Walgreen Co., 140 S. Ct. 685 (2020) (No. 18-349), 2018 WL

5098484 (finding that 62 percent of cases that turned on

“undue hardship” since 2000 involved members of nonChristian faiths or Christians who observe Saturday

Sabbaths); see also Eugene Volokh, The EEOC, Religious

Accommodation Claims, and Muslims, WASH. POST

(June 21, 2016, 4:39 p.m.), http://bit.ly/3lX0RVL (writing

that Muslim Americans account for approximately a

quarter of religious accommodation cases despite

comprising 1.1% of the national population).

3

So scores of failed religious-accommodation claims

have come to fill the case reporters. And for every public

example, many others lurk in the background. Many

employees won’t file claims or will “accept any offered

accommodation—even when it does not adequately

accommodate their religious observance—because courts

are unwilling to require more.” Matthew P. Mooney,

Between a Stone and a Hard Place: How the Hajj Can

Restore the Spirit of Reasonable Accommodation to Title

VII, 62 DUKE L.J. 1029, 1050 (2013). This situation is a

long way from the “favored treatment” that Title VII

intended for religious practices. EEOC v. Abercrombie &

Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 775 (2015). And it is

altogether unjustifiable given that Hardison is “[b]ereft

of any textual support and incompatible with this Nation’s

founding promises.” Pet.Br.4.

This Court can now correct course and restore Title

VII’s plain meaning.

Amici States—West Virginia, Louisiana, Alabama,

Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,

Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New

Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,

Texas, Utah, and Virginia—are deeply concerned with

protecting their residents’ right to earn a living while

“avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates of

conscience.” Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 453

(1970). They also aren’t just bystanders, unaffected by

any doctrinal change. Amici are themselves large

employers who will be held to the more protective

standard if the Court reinstates Title VII’s religiousaccommodation provisions. Even so, Amici believe that

accommodating religious observance and practice is well

worth it. Religious accommodation makes for a better

workforce for both employees and employers.

4

Yes, returning to the plain meaning of “undue

hardship” might lead to more accommodation requests

and claims, which could in turn lead to more costs. But a

tsunami of new litigation and expense is unlikely:

“[R]eligious accommodation requests are equivalent to

only six percent of the disability claims that allege the lack

of a reasonable ADA accommodation.” See Christopher

M. Fournier, Faith in the Workplace: Striking A Balance

Between Market Productivity and Modern Religiosity, 15

SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 229, 251 (2016) (predicting no

great increase in religious-accommodation claims under a

more permissive standard). So in reality, returning to a

genuine undue-hardship standard should cause little more

than a ripple. And that’s in large part because other state

and federal civil-rights laws already hold employers to a

more robust interpretation of “undue hardship.” See

Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 141 S. Ct. 1227,

1228 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of

certiorari). Many employers must comply with various

state laws that define “undue hardship” to mean

“significant difficulty or expense,” for instance. So

concern that employers cannot accommodate a stricter

standard is unfounded.

And ultimately, when considering the costs of

recalibrating the undue-hardship standard the Court

should also weigh the costs of trudging on with the feeble

more-than-de-minimis-cost test. That test has led to

inconsistent and unfair treatment of employees. See

Dallan F. Flake, Bearing Burdens: Religious

Accommodations That Adversely Affect Coworker

Morale, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 169, 215 (2015) (describing

circuit split over whether employers must accommodate

requests not to work weekends because it might affect

morale). It has also forced thousands of people to

suppress their religious beliefs at work or decline job

5

opportunities to preserve their faith and practices. See

Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?,

123 YALE L.J. 770, 791 (2013). So increased compliance

costs under a new standard would flow from the fact that

Hardison has unjustifiably depressed religious

accommodations for several decades. Restoring Title

VII’s promise would thus return employer costs—and

offsetting benefits, such as improved employee morale—

to where they should have always been.

Religious respect shouldn’t disappear over concerns of

a few dollars and cents. Amici urge this Court to so hold.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Court should reject Hardison’s more-than-deminimis-cost test for refusing reasonable religious

accommodations under Title VII. Lurking beneath the

test’s outward flaws are several myths that the Court

should dispel.

I. One misconception is the fear that employers of all

sizes and sorts will be hamstrung by a surge of religious

accommodation requests without Hardison’s Title VII

gloss. As a legal matter, Congress already weighed the

tradeoffs and decided that the burdens of accommodation

are worth the benefits—Hardison was wrong to revisit

that calculation. As a factual matter, this fear rests on no

empirical data or other actual evidence. It grew instead

from untested hypotheticals and assumptions. The Court

has heard and rejected this brand of speculation before.

It should do so again. In short, the sky will not fall if the

Court overrules Hardison. What will happen instead is a

restoration of the full respect for religious practice that

Title VII was meant to secure all along.

6

II. Another worry is that employers won’t know how

to handle an enlivened “undue hardship” standard. But

every day, employers comply with “undue hardship”

standards in other federal laws that give the term more

meaning

than

Hardison’s

more-than-de-minimis

approach does. From providing accommodations for

employees with disabilities to preserving veteran

employment to carving out work breaks for nursing

mothers, employers make “undue hardship” tests work in

many contexts that require a “significant difficulty or

expense” (or similar) showing. States, too, have passed

accommodation laws that define “undue hardship” as

involving significant difficulty or costs. This pervasive use

of a higher standard makes Hardison all the more

anomalous—and can give the Court confidence that

interpreting undue hardship according to its plain text will

not strike employers with unmanageable pain.

III. A last myth is the notion that all employers favor

Hardsion. The amici States’ voice is unique and

authoritative on the matter: States often employ more

people than anyone else within their borders, and state

and local employees are often the ones seeking the sort of

religious accommodations that the Court is evaluating

here. And yet, the amici States are ready to see Hardison

go. The States believe that the benefits are worth any

added burdens. Our people deserve to access and remain

in the workforce knowing that their rights to religious

observance are durable. A religiously diverse workforce

helps everyone. And strong respect for religious liberty

in general benefits the States and our residents alike.

7

ARGUMENT

I.

The Sky Will Not Fall.

Hardison gave “new life” to fears of “unforeseen

complications and speculative hardships” that might arise

if courts understood Title VII to demand more than a lax

“undue hardship” test. Anton Sorkin, A “Cruel Choice”

Made Law: Freewheelin’ Accommodation Claims and

Harms of Conviction Endemic to Adverse Action, 52 U.

MEM. L. REV. 703, 716 & n.32 (2022) (collecting cases

citing the “floodgate/steamroller effect … in various

settings”). The gist of the concern is that “grant[ing] even

the most minor special privilege to religious observers to

enable them to follow their faith,” Hardison, 432 U.S. at

87 (Marshall, J., dissenting), would “likel[y]” spur a swarm

of accommodation requests from “employees whose

religious observances … prohibit them from working” in

the way their employers want, id. at 85 n.15 (majority op.).

Even though expressed as a footnote, this worry about a

“spectral march” of future claimants seems to have played

an outsized part in the Hardison majority’s decision. Ira

C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens

on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933,

947 (1989).

The “floodgates” concern is often heard in litigation—

but it does not hold up here. Yes, the Court should respect

the appropriate “undue hardship” limit that Congress set

to keep from propping open the religious-accommodation

door too wide and for too long. See, e.g., United States v.

Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982) (rejecting exemption, under

the Free Exercise Clause, from paying social security tax

because “mandatory participation is indispensable to the

fiscal vitality of the social security system”). “[A]n

organized society,” after all, both “guarantees religious

8

freedom to a great variety of faiths” and “requires that

some religious practices yield to the common good.” Id. at

259. But the speculative harms that animate Hardison’s

defenders are different. They are not the sort that could

(much less should) justify reading right out of the statute

“all efforts under Title VII to accommodate work

requirements to religious practices.” Hardison, 432 U.S.

at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

A troubling assumption from at least some of the

“floodgates” crowd is that many employees would

opportunistically lie their way into special treatment by

claiming a religious need. Yet next to no evidence

supports that idea. See Burns v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 589

F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting for lack of evidence

the argument that allowing accommodations “would open

the gate to excusing vast numbers of persons”). And

perhaps worse, this assumption conflicts with the general

practice courts employ when they encounter religiousobservance claims.

Typically, courts presume that

religious objections are sincere and rooted in religious

faith (though that presumption can be overcome). See,

e.g., Lee, 455 U.S. at 257. So upholding Hardison based

on this worry might enshrine a hostility to religion unseen

in modern religious-freedom doctrine—one that assumes

that, in a nontrivial number of cases, requests for

accommodations are insincere.

But most often, the speculation at the heart of

Hardison’s floodgates rationale is another version of “the

classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I

make an exception for you, I’ll have to make one for

everybody, so no exceptions.” Gonzales v. O Centro

Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436

(2006). Courts have shot down this kneejerk reaction

many times, often twice over—once when an issue first

9

arises as an improper consideration, and again later on for

lacking the vindication of time and application. The reason

for that is simple: “It can’t be the case that the speculative

possibility that one exception conceivably might lead to

others is always reason enough to reject a request for the

first exception.” Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 62

(10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.) (emphasis in original). Even

more so when Congress has already chosen to require the

exception in the mine-run of cases.

This case is not the first time the Court has had a

chance to expose and debunk this flawed line of reasoning.

In 2015, for example, the Court took up the case of a

Muslim prison inmate who was denied “permission to

grow a [half-inch] beard” as his faith required. Holt v.

Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 359 (2015). The state corrections

department resisted the accommodation in part because it

thought that granting it might lead many other prisoners

to “request beards for religious reasons.” Id. at 368. But

citing O Centro, the Court rejected the argument just as

it had in “similar … analogous contexts” before. Id.

(explaining similarly rejected speculation “that the filing

of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning

religious objections to Saturday work might … dilute the

unemployment compensation fund” and hurt employers’

ability to schedule “necessary Saturday work”). As far as

the amici States can tell, Holt did not trigger “a flood of

other inmates [to] declare themselves believers” in a new

religion just to “enjoy [the] benefit[]” of a half-inch beard.

Pasaye v. Dzurenda, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1159, 1170 (D. Nev.

2019).

Holt followed closely another case in which the Court

rejected a slippery-slope argument that challenges to the

Affordable Care Act under the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act would trigger a “flood of religious

10

objections” demanding “almost every conceivable kind” of

“constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic

obligations.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573

U.S. 682, 732, 735 (2014) (quoting Emp. Div., Dep’t of

Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-89 (1990)).

Those considerations were flawed from the start (and the

Court said so). They were also discredited later when “no

such flood occurred at all.” Mark L. Rienzi, Religious

Liberty and Judicial Deference, 98 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

337, 395 (2022). Empirical research has shown that

“religious liberty claims and victories remain scarce,”

“government win rates have [not] undergone a dramatic

change since Hobby Lobby,” and RFRA is “primarily used

to protect less privileged minority religions.” Id.; see also

J. Haberkorn, Two Years Later, Few Hobby Lobby

Copycats Emerge, POLITICO (Oct. 11, 2016, 5:19 p.m.),

https://politi.co/3K79mrB (describing how fears of an

exemption rush “haven’t been borne out” in the

“anticlimactic response” to Hobby Lobby).

In short, “predictions that Hobby Lobby would open

the floodgates” fell flat. Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N.

Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An Empirical

Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48 SETON

HALL L. REV. 353, 356 (2018). And even if faux revivals

leading to mass litigation were to start breaking out,

judges have the tools to resolve them: “Courts have had

no problem weeding out weak or insincere RFRA claims”

after Hobby Lobby and similar rulings, like Little Sisters

of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,

140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020). Id.

So refusing to accommodate reasonable requests from

faith-driven employees betrays a lack of faith on the part

of employers. Hardison’s demise will not trigger sudden

and irreparable work stoppages or crushing financial loss,

11

especially as the statute allows flexibility in cases of

genuine employer hardship. See Est. of Thornton v.

Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 712 (1985) (O’Connor, J.,

concurring) (“Title VII calls for reasonable rather than

absolute accommodation.”). Instead, “enforc[ing] [Title

VII] as written” will honor the “sensible balanc[ing]” test

that Congress chose. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 736. The

Court should scatter the speculative concerns that have

propped up Hardison until now.

II.

Hardison Stands Alone.

Fears that employers won’t be able to manage a

different “undue hardship” standard are also unfounded

because employers already do under a host of other laws.

Hardison’s weak spin on the Title VII religious

accommodation standard is the outlier.

For one thing, federal law is comfortable with a higher

standard. As members of the Court have already noted,

Congress rejected Hardison’s interpretation in favor of a

“significant difficulty or expense” standard in the

Americans with Disabilities Act, the Uniformed Services

Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, and the

Affordable Care Act. See Small, 141 S. Ct. at 1228

(Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). “Undue

hardship” is applied similarly for jury service and under

the Fair Labor Standards Act. Small, 952 F.3d at 827

(Thapar, J., concurring) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1869(j) (jury

service); 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(3) (FLSA)). And even where

Congress doesn’t define “undue hardship,” courts have

most often given the term its plain meaning—a meaning

more stringent than “de minimis.” Id. (quoting In re

Frushour, 433 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he

adjective ‘undue’ indicates that Congress viewed gardenvariety hardship as an insufficient excuse.” (cleaned up))).

12

So Hardison’s interpretation of “undue hardship” stands

out from the rest of the U.S. Code.

The same is true looking to state law.

First, many state legislatures have rebuffed

Hardison’s approach in favor of a “significant difficulty or

expense” standard in the religious-discrimination context.

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1461(15). These statutes

often list additional factors employers (and reviewing

courts) must consider when determining whether a

hardship is truly undue—like California’s focus on the

nature and cost of accommodation, the overall resources

of the affected facilities and business as a whole, the type

of operations at stake, and the geographic spread between

facilities. See CAL. GOV. CODE § 12926(u). Frameworks

like these help ensure that employees’ rights are

protected while safeguarding employers from financial

distress. They also provide courts flexibility to apply the

laws “in a practical way” to “case-specific” circumstances.

US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-02 (2002);

accord Dykzeul v. Charter Commc’ns Inc., No. 18-05826,

2019 WL 8198218, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2019).

Still other States have adopted other kinds of stricter

standards for religious accommodations. In New Jersey,

for instance, “employers cannot impose any condition

upon employees that ‘would require a person to violate ...

sincerely held religious practice or religious observance.’”

Tisby v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 152 A.3d 975, 97980 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017) (quoting N.J. STAT.

§ 10:5-12(q)(1)). The dictate is not absolute, but employers

can claim an exemption only where they would “incur an

undue hardship,” defined as “unreasonable expense or

difficulty, unreasonable interference with the safe or

efficient operation of the workplace or a violation of a bona

fide seniority system or a violation of any provision of a

13

bona fide collective bargaining agreement.” N.J. STAT.

§§ 10:5-12(q)(1)-(3).

The list goes on. Other States, like New York, use

much the same approach. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296, et

seq.; accord N. Shore Univ. Hosp. v. State Hum. Rts.

Appeal Bd., 82 A.D.2d 799, 799-800 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)

(holding that employer failed to accommodate employee’s

Sabbath observance by requiring the employee to find coworkers to cover her shift). North Dakota uses similar

factors, as well. It requires employers to grant a

reasonable accommodation so long as it does not “disrupt

or interfere with the employer’s normal business

operations; threaten an individual’s health or safety;

contradict a business necessity of the employer; or impose

an undue hardship on the employer” based on factors like

cost and the business’s size. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4 to

-03(2). And Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act, which

forbids refusing to hire or firing an employee based on

religion, COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402, et seq., lets

employers decline to grant an accommodation only after

working with the employee in good faith and only if “an

undue hardship would result from each available

alternative method of accommodation,” 3 COLO. CODE

REGS. § 708-1-50.1(A)-(B).

Still other States have tailored their laws to specific

kinds of recurring accommodations requests.

For

example, Georgia requires businesses with employees

“whose habitual day of worship has been chosen by the

employer as a day of work [to] make all reasonable

accommodations to the religious, social, and physical

needs of such employees so that those employees may

enjoy the same benefits as employees in other

occupations.” OFFICIAL GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-573. In

Minnesota, public employees who “observe[] a religious

14

holiday on days which do not fall on a Sunday or a legal

holiday” can take those days off. MINN. STAT. § 15A.22.

Likewise, Kansas requires its employers to make

reasonable accommodations for employees to observe

their Sabbath or other holy days if the accommodation

doesn’t cause undue hardship. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 2133-1(b) (listing example of an undue hardship where “the

employee’s needed work cannot be performed by another

employee of substantially similar qualifications during the

period of absence”).

Finally, some state courts have specifically rejected

the more-than-de-minimis-cost test when construing

“undue hardship” under state laws. Quite recently, for

instance, the Washington Court of Appeals rejected the

Hardison formulation and instead held that an undue

hardship results only when an accommodation would

cause an employer “significant difficulty or expense.”

Suarez v. State, 517 P.3d 474, 482-86 (Wash. Ct. App.

2022), review granted in part, denied in part, No. 1013868, 2023 WL 1818610 (Wash. Feb. 8, 2023). An Oregon

court also held that the legislative choice to use “the term

‘undue hardship’” was “clearly at odds with the de minimis

standard,” and so construed it instead to mean “a

significant or substantial burden taking into account all

relevant circumstances.” Nakashima v. Or. Bd. of Educ.,

131 P.3d 749, 759-62 (Or. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d on other

grounds sub nom., 185 P.3d 429, 442 (Or. 2008) (holding

that lower tribunal erred in applying a “de minimis burden

test” to a statute barring religious discrimination in statefunded school activities).

Each of these laws shows that employers can

effectively manage religious-accommodation requests

even when operating under standards worlds apart from

Hardison’s.

15

Second, that observation is unsurprising given that

States also routinely enforce more stringent

accommodation tests in areas beyond religion. At least 35

States echo the federal Rehabilitation Act when

addressing disability, requiring covered employers to

afford reasonable accommodations that enable the

employee to perform the job’s essential functions without

imposing undue hardship on the employer. See JOHN J.

COLEMAN, III, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN

EMPLOYMENT § 8:1 (2022 supp.). Some call for even more.

In West Virginia, for example, the undue hardship

standard means any action “requiring significant

difficulty or expense.” W. VA. CODE R. § 77-1-4.6.

Relevant factors include the employer’s size and financial

resources, the nature and cost of the accommodation, and

the “possibility that the same accommodations may be

able to be used by other prospective employees.” W. VA.

CODE R. §§ 77-1-4.6.1 to .4. Considerations like these

“balance the interests of the employee in continued

employment and the interests of the employer in avoiding

unreasonable burdens or expenses.” Haynes v. RhonePoulenc, Inc., 521 S.E.2d 331, 344 (W. Va. 1999).

And States have found plenty of other ways to provide

for better disability accommodation than a milquetoast

Hardison-like standard. Iowa, for example, uses its own

brand of the undue hardship standard, which looks in part

at whether rejecting the accommodation was a “business

necessity”—that is, “necessary to the safe and efficient

operation of the business.” Iowa Beer & Liquor Control

Dep’t Store 1023 v. Iowa C.R. Comm’n, 337 N.W.2d 896,

900 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Robinson v. Lorillard

Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971)). Maine offers a

slightly different version of the undue hardship standard,

requiring the employer to take reasonable steps to

accommodate a potential employee’s disability, but not

16

requiring the employer to eliminate essential functions of

the job. Plourde v. Scott Paper Co., 552 A.2d 1257, 1262

(Me. 1989).

Nor is disability the only area where employers are

already grappling with a meaningful “undue hardship”

standard under state law. For example, federal law

requires employers to provide nursing mothers break

time and a private space to express milk, with an exception

for smaller employers that can show an “undue hardship.”

29 U.S.C. §207(r)(1)-(3). Some States in turn mirror that

obligation in their own law. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE

§ 1031. But some other States have gone even further

than this federal floor. Vermont’s “Nursing mothers in

the workplace” law uses a “substantially disrupt”

standard and makes it unlawful to “retaliate or

discriminate” against employees for exercising their

rights. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 305. And “[t]o the extent

reasonably possible,” Indiana law requires employers to

provide a refrigerator for milk storage or allow employees

to bring their own. IND. CODE § 22-2-14-2(b). These

protections cover millions of nursing mothers each year.

Several States also have laws barring employers from

disciplining employees who are victims of spousal abuse or

domestic violence, or that require employers to provide

time off from work in these situations. E.g., ME. REV.

STAT. tit. 26, § 850. Oregon’s version requires reasonable

safety accommodations unless they would cause an undue

hardship. OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.290. And similar to

other state regimes, it defines “undue hardship” well

above more-than-de-minimis. It requires “significant

difficulty and expense” to the employer, including

“consideration of the size of the employer’s business and

the employer’s critical need for the eligible employee.” Id.

§ 659A.275; see also Marshall v. Pollin Hotels II, LLC,

17

170 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1307 (D. Or. 2016) (finding that

company provided reasonable accommodations when it

repeatedly attempted to help employee obtain a

restraining order and counseling and supervisor offered

to send trespass notice to assailant). Despite the

disturbing prevalence of domestic violence in America,

employers have not been heard to complain about this

stronger accommodation requirement.

All these laws show that employers already

accommodate their workers under standards stricter than

more-than-de-minimis-cost. They will no doubt adjust

quickly to a heftier federal standard for religious

practices, too. What’s more, these laws reveal Hardison’s

test as the odd man out. Hardison deviates from the

ordinary standards for workplace accommodations in

diverse contexts. So any consideration of increased

accommodation costs should account for how Hardison

has let employers effectively shirk their responsibilities

under Title VII by using an unusually weak standard for

the past fifty years. The right question is thus not how

much it will cost employers to accommodate their

employees’ religious beliefs going forward. Rather, it is

whether we can afford to continue derogating employees’

rights in this important area.

III.

States’ Interests Are Critical.

Lastly, the States stand to bear the lion’s share of the

burdens that might flow from tossing Hardison—but also

have much to gain. States are “[g]overnment employers”

who “account for a disproportionate share” of Sabbath

observance and other religious accommodation cases.

Alan Reinach, Why We Need State RFRA Bills: A Panel

Discussion, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 823, 838 (1999). Yet

the amici States are still eager to assume the task of

18

offering meaningful accommodation under Title VII.

After all, States have long been committed to supporting

our religious citizens’ right to join and remain in the

workforce. Cf. Stephanie H. Barclay, First Amendment

“Harms,” 95 IND. L.J. 331, 384 (2020) (describing broader

societal benefits from religious accommodation generally).

Durable religious-accommodation protections increase

freedom of conscience and lead to better workplaces. And

a reinvigorated Title VII standard will let state and

federal law speak with the same voice.

States want to see robust accommodations for their

religious workers in part because a fulfilled workforce is a

key marker of both a stable society and a healthy

economy. Americans know this better than anyone; work

is part of our national identity. “In America no one is

degraded because he works.” 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 152 (Francis Bowen & Phillips

Bradley eds., Henry Reeve trans., Vintage Books 1990).

Rather, “[t]he notion of labor” is “held in honor” as “the

necessary, natural, and honest condition of human

existence.” Id. at 152. And when an unaccommodated

religious observance or other workplace obstacle gets in

the way, the result is often a “decline in civic engagement.”

SOCIAL CAP. PROJECT, U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM. —

REPUBLICANS, SCP REP. NO. 8-19, THE SPACE BETWEEN:

RENEWING THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

(Dec. 18, 2019), https://bit.ly/3SpabOw.

If employees are driven from a job because they find

it incompatible with their religious mandates, that

attrition can also cause worker shortage for States and

other employers. Religious observers are a huge portion

of the American population, so losing even a small part of

them could squeeze employers. See Jeffrey M. Jones,

How Religious Are Americans?, GALLUP (Dec. 23, 2021),

19

http://bit.ly/3EpPwnC (49% of Americans surveyed said

religion was “very important” to them); Religious

Landscape

Study,

PEW RSCH. CTR.

(2014),

https://bit.ly/3KpOpZ3 (last visited Feb. 24, 2023)

(reporting that 53% of Americans believe religion is “very

important” in their lives). The States have always been

aware of the challenge of finding and keeping strong

employees—and have only become more acutely aware of

it as of late. See Elise Gurney, Colorado Shifts to SkillsBased Hiring to Fill State Government Workforce Needs

and Hire More Individuals with Disabilities, COUNCIL

OF STATE GOV’TS (Jan. 10, 2023), https://bit.ly/3xrBQVi

(“State governments ... fac[e] unprecedented workplace

shortages.”); Liz Farmer, The Great Resignation’s

Impact on Local Government, ROCKEFELLER INST. OF

GOV’T (Jan. 20, 2022), https://bit.ly/3IOHjfp (“2021

marked the highest number and rate of state and local

government job openings in the past 20 years, suggesting

that governments are understaffed and unequipped to

deal with additional losses”). So States want it to be clear

that religious adherents are welcome in government jobs.

All the more because Congress passed Title VII for

exactly this reason—to “open employment opportunities,”

not close them. Loc. 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n

v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448 (1986) (emphasis added).

Indeed, when Congress amended Title VII to provide for

religious accommodation, it did so mainly to make sure

that “Sabbatarians” would remain part of the workforce.

Hardison, 432 U.S. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting)

(quoting 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972)). It makes sense,

then, that the statute would reject “practices that would

deprive or tend to deprive” a worker of “employment

opportunities.” Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453-54

(1982). States stand to benefit greatly from the expanded

pool of skilled labor that comes with these protections.

20

Once state employees are in the workplace, religious

accommodations produce better performance from them,

too. Religiously observant employees who are offered

accommodation are more likely to feel respected. See

Fournier, supra, at 244 (“When employees witness their

employers going above and beyond to provide religious

accommodations, those employees will feel more valued.”).

This respect grows into better morale across the entire

workforce. One study, for instance, found that “workers

at companies that do not provide flexible hours for

religious observance are twice as likely as workers at

companies that do provide this flexibility to say they do

not look forward to coming to work.” TANENBAUM, WHAT

AMERICAN WORKERS REALLY THINK ABOUT RELIGION:

TANENBAUM’S 2013 SURVEY OF AMERICAN WORKERS AND

RELIGION 19 (2013). And improved morale in turn fosters

improved performance; “overwhelming research” shows

that morale “impacts performance at both the individual

level and for the organization as a whole.” Flake,

supra, at 174-77; see also Dallan F. Flake,

Restoring Reasonableness to Workplace Religious

Accommodations, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1673, 1722 (2020)

(“[M]ore employee-friendly accommodations would likely

boost employee morale, leading to greater productivity,

creativity, loyalty, and profitability.”).

A state workforce that allows reasonable and

meaningful leeway for religious practice also gives the

broader public more confidence that their government is

representing their interests. If voters believe that anyone

with sincerely held religious practices will be cast out of a

government job, then they may come to expect that the

government will disrespect religious faith in other ways,

too. On the other hand, a religiously plural state

government workforce might be expected to protect all

religions in all important ways within the State.

21

Of course, States have pursued some of these benefits

by implementing employee-favorable tests for religious

accommodation under their own laws—as explained

above. See also Christopher N. Elliott, Federalism and

Religious Liberty: Were Church and State Meant to Be

Separate?, 2 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 5 (2000)

(“[S]tates, instead of Congress, have … prescribe[d] the

legal, political, and social course for religious liberties.”);

Hon. Christine M. Durham, What Goes Around Comes

Around: The New Relevancy of State Constitution

Religion Clauses, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 353, 370 (2004)

(“[S]tate constitutions currently afford a friendlier venue

for litigants in religious liberty cases.”). But especially in

a time of increased cross-state mobility and remote work,

it would be all the better to see a uniform, national

standard from a Title VII that fulfills its original promise.

And dispensing with Hardison would also erase the

stain that the case has left on some States’ own laws. The

States have been carrying much of the load Title VII

dropped post-Hardison when it comes to robust

workplace religious freedom laws. But these protections

are far from uniform, and Hardison is a key reason why.

It remains true that many States “find the weight of the

federal jurisprudence to be persuasive.” State ex rel.

Surnaik Holdings of WV, LLC v. Bedell, 852 S.E.2d 748,

761 (W. Va. 2020); see Par. Nat. Bank v. Lane, 397 So.2d

1282, 1285 (La. 1981) (similar). That’s especially so for

States that have “look[ed] to Title VII law as a matter of

course in defining the scope of their own laws.” Shaw v.

Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 106 (1983). As a result,

some state courts have reflexively applied Hardison’s

reasoning—such as it is—in construing their own States’

laws. See W. Va. & La. Pet. Amici Br.4-9 (describing the

problems from “[s]tate courts nationwide” using

Hardison “in interpreting their own state anti-

22

discrimination laws”). Relegating Hardison’s dicta to the

dustbin would signal to those courts that they should

rethink things, too.

In sum, if the Court gives “undue hardship” the weight

it deserves, then States—as well as employees and other

employers—stand to benefit in many important ways.

The Court should therefore hold that “an employer must

incur significant difficulty or expense before it is excused

from offering an accommodation.” Pet.Br.3.

CONCLUSION

The Court should dispense with the Hardison

standard and return “undue hardship” to its ordinary,

plain meaning.

Respectfully submitted.

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE

WEST VIRGINIA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

State Capitol Complex

Building 1, Room E-26

Charleston, WV 25305

lindsay.s.see@wvago.gov

(304) 558-2021

LINDSAY S. SEE

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS

Senior Deputy Solicitor

General

GRANT A. NEWMAN

Assistant Solicitor General

SPENCER J. DAVENPORT *

Special Assistant

*admitted in the District of

Columbia; practicing under

supervision of West Virginia

attorneys

Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of West Virginia

23

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL

STEVE MARSHALL

Attorney General

State of Alabama

DANIEL CAMERON

Attorney General

State of Kentucky

TREG TAYLOR

Attorney General

State of Alaska

JEFF LANDRY

Attorney General

State of Louisiana

TIM GRIFFIN

Attorney General

State of Arkansas

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General

State of Mississippi

ASHLEY MOODY

Attorney General

State of Florida

AUSTIN KNUDSEN

Attorney General

State of Montana

CHRIS CARR

Attorney General

State of Georgia

MICHAEL T. HILGERS

Attorney General

State of Nebraska

RAÚL LABRADOR

Attorney General

State of Idaho

JOHN M. FORMELLA

Attorney General

State of New Hampshire

BRENNA BIRD

Attorney General

State of Iowa

DAVE YOST

Attorney General

State of Ohio

KRIS KOBACH

Attorney General

State of Kansas

GENTNER DRUMMOND

Attorney General

State of Oklahoma

24

ALAN WILSON

Attorney General

State of South Carolina

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

Attorney General and

Reporter

State of Tennessee

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General

State of Texas

SEAN D. REYES

Attorney General

State of Utah

JASON MIYARES

Attorney General

State of Virginia