Amicus Curiae Brief — Geraldine Tyler, Petitioner v. Hennepin County, Minnesota, et al.
Supreme Court briefApr 5, 2023
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No. 22-166
In the
Supreme Court
of the United States
______________
Geraldine Tyler,
v.
Petitioner,
Hennepin County, Minnesota, et al.,
Respondents.
______________
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
______________
BRIEF OF THE ASSOCIATION OF MINNESOTA
COUNTIES (AMC), MINNESOTA ASSOCIATION
OF COUNTY LAND COMMISSIONERS (MACLC),
MINNESOTA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY
OFFICERS (MACO), AND MINNESOTA
ASSOCIATION OF ASSESSING OFFICERS (MAAO)
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
RESPONDENTS HENNEPIN COUNTY,
MINNESOTA, ET AL.
______________
Jay T. Squires
Counsel of Record
Michael J. Ervin
RUPP, ANDERSON, SQUIRES,
WALDSPURGER & MACE, P.A.
333 South Seventh Street, Suite 2800
Minneapolis, MN 55402
(612) 436-4300
jay.squires@raswlaw.com
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
2023 - Bachman Legal Printing n (612) 339-9518
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTERESTS OF THE AMICUS ................................. 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..................................... 3
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 5
I.
PETITIONER ADVOCATES A RESULT
THAT WOULD CREATE PRACTICAL
PROBLEMS AND IMPOSE AN UNDUE
BURDEN ON MINNESOTA COUNTIES. ..... 5
A. Petitioner conveniently overlooks the fact
that most tax forfeitures result in a
substantial loss. .......................................... 5
B. Petitioner proposes a result in this case
that could force Minnesota counties into
the role of de facto realtor, agent, and title
examiner for delinquent taxpayers; creates
unanswered questions; and would have
devastating financial ramifications for
counties. .................................................... 14
C. Petitioner proposes a result that would
permit property owners to walk away from
financial liabilities and leave others
holding the bag.......................................... 17
II.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT INTERFERE
WITH THE CAREFULLY CRAFTED,
COMPLEX LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM AT
ISSUE IN THIS CASE................................... 19
ii
III. PROPERTY OWNERS FACING TAX
FORFEITURE IN MINNESOTA HAVE
MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO RETAIN
THEIR PROPERTY. ...................................... 29
A. Minnesota Statutes provide property
owners with several opportunities to avoid
forfeiture and maintain their equity. ....... 30
B. Programs also exist at the state and local
level that are designed to help property
owners retain their properties. ................ 35
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 38
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Am. Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith,
496 U.S. 167 (1990) ............................................... 16
Automatic Art, L.L.C. v. Maricopa Cty.,
2010 WL 11515708 (D. Ariz. Mar. 18, 2010) ........ 26
Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC,
576 U.S. 121 (2015) ............................................... 27
Balthazar v. Mari Ltd.,
301 F. Supp. 103 (N.D. Ill. 1969) .......................... 27
City of Auburn v. Mandarelli,
320 A.2d 22 (Me. 1974) ......................................... 27
City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp.,
417 U.S. 369 (1974) ............................................... 22
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,
142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022) ....................................... 4, 20
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,
138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) ............................... 20, 21, 28
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982) ............................................... 16
King v. Burwell,
576 U.S. 473 (2015) ................................... 20, 22, 23
Minnesota Automatic Merch. Council v. Salomone,
682 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 2004) ......................... 21, 22
iv
Minnesota Automatic Merch. Council v. Salomone,
682 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 2004) ............................... 21
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
449 U.S. 456 (1981) ............................................... 20
Nelson v. City of New York,
352 U.S. 103 (1956) ......................................... 13, 25
Patchak v. Zinke,
138 S. Ct. 897 (2018) ............................................. 20
Pereida v. Wilkinson,
141 S. Ct. 754 (2021) ............................................. 21
Reinmiller v. Marion Cty., Oregon,
2006 WL 2987707 (D. Or. Oct. 16, 2006).............. 27
State ex rel. S. Bank v. Pilsbury,
105 U.S. 278 (1881) ............................................... 21
Wasiluk v. City of Oneida, New York,
2022 WL 3716279, (N.D.N.Y. 2022) ..................... 26
Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Texas,
142 S. Ct. 1929 (2022) ........................................... 20
Ziglar v. Abbasi,
582 U.S. 120 (2017) ................................... 13, 22, 24
Constitutional Provisions
Minn. Const. Art. 10 § 1............................................ 21
U.S. Const., Art. I § 8, cl. 1 ....................................... 21
v
Statutes
Minn. Stat. § 13.03 ...................................................... 7
Minn. Stat. § 82.67 .................................................... 14
Minn. Stat. § 279.02 .................................................. 31
Minn. Stat. § 280.01 .................................................. 31
Minn. Stat. § 280.41 .................................................. 31
Minn. Stat. § 281.01 .................................................. 31
Minn. Stat. § 281.02 .................................................. 31
Minn. Stat. § 281.17 .................................................. 31
Minn. Stat. § 281.18 .................................................. 33
Minn. Stat. § 281.23 .................................................. 31
Minn. Stat. § 281.37 .................................................. 32
Minn. Stat. § 282.01 ............................................ 14, 33
Minn. Stat. § 282.01 .................................................. 14
Minn. Stat. § 282.07 .................................................. 17
Minn. Stat. § 282.08 .................... 19, 23, 24, 27, 28, 34
Minn. Stat. § 282.241 ................................................ 32
Minn. Stat. § 290B.05 ............................................... 35
vi
Minn. Stat. § 290B.07 ............................................... 35
Minn. Stat. § 290B.08 ............................................... 35
Other Authorities
Brief History, Minnesota Association of County Land
Commissioners,
https://www.mncountylands.org/brief-history (last
visited March 23, 2023)......................................... 15
David Chanen, Hennepin County’s Navigator
Program helps delinquent taxpayers keep their
homes, Star Tribune, April 2, 2019 ................ 30, 36
H.F. 1552 § 2, 92nd Leg. (2021) .......................... 27, 28
H.F. 1929 § 1, 92nd Leg. (2023) ................................ 28
H.F. 2162 § 1, 92nd Leg. (2021) .......................... 27, 28
H.F. 2812 § 2, 93rd Leg. (2023) ................................ 28
Resident and Real Estate Services/Human Services
Navigator, National Association of Counties (May
1, 2018), https://www.naco.org/resources/awardprograms/resident-and-real-estate-serviceshumanservices-navigator ................................................. 36
Town of Oxford v. John A. Smith, 101 Mass. App. Ct.
1104 (Dkt. No. 18 filed 3/10/2022) ........................ 12
S.F. 908 § 1, 92nd Leg. (2021) .................................. 27
1
INTERESTS OF THE AMICUS
The Association of Minnesota Counties
(“AMC”) is a Minnesota-based, non-partisan,
statewide organization comprised of officials from
Minnesota’s 87 counties. AMC’s ultimate goal is to
ensure that Minnesota counties provide efficient,
effective, and high-quality governance to the people
of Minnesota. AMC provides educational programs,
training, research, and communications to county
officials.
It works closely with the Minnesota
Legislature and the state’s administrative branches
to ensure the state adopts and, as appropriate,
amends legislation and policies that allow
Minnesota’s 87 counties to serve their constituents
well.
The Minnesota Association of County Land
Commissioners (“MACLC”) is an association of
fifteen rural counties in northern Minnesota.
MACLC’s mission is to ensure that land—primarily
tax-forfeited forest land—is well-managed for the
benefit of Minnesota residents. Member counties
manage lands held in trust by the State of
Minnesota.
Though not directly owned by the
member county, these “worthless lands nobody
wanted” are classified, managed, and controlled by
the county land departments where the lands are
located. MACLC members manage tax-forfeited land
to ensure that it is suitable for tourism and
recreation; that it provides a viable habitat for the
state’s wildlife and plant populations; and that
commercially-viable and harvestable forest lands are
sustainably preserved after a forfeiture.
2
The Minnesota Association of County Officers
(“MACO”) is comprised of Minnesota county auditors,
treasurers, recorders, financial officers, and
registrars of title. All 87 Minnesota counties are
members. MACO is comprised of the Minnesota
Association of County Auditors, Treasurers, and
Finance Officers (“MACATFO”) and the Minnesota
County Recorders Association (“MCRA”). MACO
promotes statewide uniformity in the practices and
procedures of county officers, and works to ensure
the state’s property tax system is understandable
and equitable to taxpayers and local taxing
authorities.
The Minnesota Association of Assessing
Officers (“MAAO”) exists to support local assessors,
deputy assessors, and appraisers across the State of
Minnesota. MAAO promotes excellence in property
appraisal and assessment administration across the
state. It supports a property tax system that is
understandable and transparent to taxpayers; treats
all taxpayers in a consistent, fair, and equitable
manner; and ensures a stable and reliable source of
revenue for local taxing authorities.
AMC’s, MACLC’s, MACO’s, and MAAO’s
interest in this case stems from the fact that the laws
and issues in the case are not unique to Hennepin
County, Minnesota. Minnesota’s property tax laws
in general, and the tax-forfeiture provisions at issue
in this case in particular, affect all of Minnesota’s 87
counties. Under Minnesota state law, counties are
tasked with administering the state’s tax-forfeiture
process.
The laws and issues in the case are
particularly important to northern Minnesota
counties, who are responsible for managing vast
3
swaths of unwanted, tax-forfeited forest lands.
Because this case involves important questions
related to the state’s property-tax system, it has
statewide implications. AMC, MACLC, MACO, and
MAAO are filing this amicus brief on behalf of all of
Minnesota’s 87 counties to ensure that the Court
considers the perspective of all of Minnesota’s
counties in deciding this case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner asks the Court, in essence, to rewrite Minnesota’s tax-forfeiture system. Petitioner,
however, fails to contemplate or address many of the
numerous issues and practical consequences that
would arise if the Court chooses to do so. Petitioner’s
overly-simplistic proposed solution creates many
unanswered questions, which are overlooked entirely
in Petitioner’s brief. The Court should take note of
those practical consequences in assessing the merits
of Petitioner’s claims.
Minnesota’s property tax system is a large,
complex, and finely-tuned system.
The system
balances a number of interests, both public and
private. The system reflects the policy objectives of
the Minnesota Legislature. Petitioner invites the
Court to focus on just one small piece of the state’s
large, complex, and finely-tuned system, and to
declare that piece invalid. Separation of powers
principles and principles of comity—repeatedly
affirmed by this Court—counsel against such
involvement. The Minnesota Legislature has been
delegated the power to tax, and to balance the
equities and interests involved with a complex
legislative system like the one at issue in this case.
4
If the system is inequitable, it is the job of the
Minnesota Legislature—not the judiciary—to change
it. As this Court just recently confirmed in Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health Org., “courts cannot
substitute their social and economic beliefs for the
judgment of legislative bodies[,]” and “respect for a
legislature’s judgment applies even when the laws at
issue concern matters of great social significance.”
142 S. Ct. 2228, 2284 (2022).
Petitioner would have the Court believe that
Minnesota’s tax-forfeiture system needs revision
because it is inequitable. Petitioner infers that the
objective of Minnesota’s 87 counties is to pursue tax
forfeiture “windfalls.”
That simply is not true.
Contrary to Petitioner’s claim, the primary goal of
the tax-forfeiture process is to avoid forfeitures. This
is reflected in the statutory tax-forfeiture system,
which provides multiple opportunities for property
owners to remain in and retain their properties. It is
also evident from the fact that the State of
Minnesota and local government entities (including
Hennepin County) have programs in place to assist
property owners facing tax forfeiture. Only when
they fail to take advantage of the multitude of
options available to them will one of Minnesota’s 87
counties pursue final tax-forfeiture. In such cases, a
county’s goal is to bring finality to the tax-forfeiture
process, and to return property to productive use, not
to secure a “windfall.”
5
ARGUMENT
I.
PETITIONER ADVOCATES A RESULT
THAT WOULD CREATE PRACTICAL
PROBLEMS AND IMPOSE AN UNDUE
BURDEN ON MINNESOTA COUNTIES.
Petitioner offers up what she asserts is a
simple solution to the purported problem at issue in
this case: Return the surplus proceeds from a taxforfeiture sale to the property owner whose property
has been forfeited. Petitioner’s approach is overly
simplistic. It overlooks the fact that most taxforfeiture sales do not result in a surplus and,
instead, result in a substantial loss. It fails to
account for many of the practical issues that would
arise if the Court were to accept Petitioner’s
proposed solution.
It leaves many unanswered
questions concerning how the system would work in
practice. And it would create the opportunity for
property owners to abuse the system. The Court
should take note of these practical issues in
considering the consequences and implications of
Petitioner’s arguments. The questions Petitioner
leaves unanswered reinforce the fact that
Minnesota’s Legislature—and not this Court—is in
the best position to modify Minnesota’s taxforfeiture system if it believes that doing so is
necessary. See infra, Section II.
A.
Petitioner conveniently overlooks the fact
that most tax forfeitures result in a
substantial loss.
The case presently before the Court involved a
tax forfeiture that allegedly (but without supporting
6
evidence in the record) yielded excess proceeds. 1 Not
every tax forfeiture, however, yields excess proceeds.
In a limited number of cases, a county may decide
not to sell a property. In that case there are no
proceeds and, additionally, the county collects no
property taxes. If a county does decide to sell the
property following a tax forfeiture, the property may
not sell. And, if it does sell, many sales result in a
substantial net loss.
Petitioner, at pages 28–29 of her brief, offers a
number of cherry-picked examples from other states
of alleged extreme loss of equity resulting from taxforfeiture sales. In evaluating the present case, the
Court should look beyond Petitioner’s out-of-state
examples before the Court, which do not tell the full
tax-forfeiture story, particularly in Minnesota. The
Court should be cognizant of the fact that many tax
forfeitures create a substantial burden to
Minnesota’s counties and, ultimately, result in a net
loss. It does not take a leap of faith to conclude
that—more often than not—tax-forfeited properties
are poorly maintained and dilapidated, or have
environmental or other problems.
The following recent examples of tax forfeiture
situations—drawn directly from the experiences of
Minnesota counties—tell the other side of the story.
They demonstrate that tax forfeitures frequently
create a substantial burden and result in a net loss
Petitioner conveniently overlooked the fact that her
property was encumbered by substantial private debt that
likely exceeded the amount of surplus proceeds recouped as a
result of Hennepin County’s tax-forfeiture sale. See Resp’s Br.
at 12.
1
7
for the counties who inherit the tax-forfeited
property. 2
The first example arose from the forfeiture of a
residential property in Pengilly, Minnesota, which is
in Itasca County, Minnesota. The property was
subject to tax forfeiture in 2020. Taxes, penalties,
and interest owed at the time of forfeiture amounted
to $3,179.35. The following are photographs of the
property taken by the county before the property was
forfeited:
The examples below are derived from publicly-available
records provided by Itasca County and St. Louis County,
Minnesota. They are available by making a data request of
either county, see Minn. Stat. § 13.03, and/or by a conducting a
title search of the properties. The property identification
numbers (“PIDs”) of the three properties referenced below are
18-420-0180; 315-0020-01740, 01750, and 01700; and 87-4101310. These are just three of numerous examples provided to
the undersigned counsel by the counties joining in this amicus.
2
8
After the property was forfeited to Itasca County, the
county incurred $43,999.53 in management costs
associated with the property, including the costs of
demolition, remediation, and upkeep of the property
(e.g., mowing, etc.). The county eventually sold the
property at a public auction in 2022 for $14,900.00.
The county suffered a net loss of $32,278.88,
factoring in the taxes owed and remedial costs
associated with the property.
The second example arose from the forfeiture
of a commercial property in Duluth Township,
Minnesota, which is in St. Louis County, Minnesota.
The property—a former elementary school building
purchased by a private entity—was subject to taxforfeiture in 2016. Taxes, penalties, and interest
owed at the time of forfeiture amounted to
$23,352.46. The following are photographs of the
property taken by the county before the property was
forfeited:
9
The property was subject to a significant amount of
trespassing, looting, graffiti, and fire and water
damage after it was abandoned prior to forfeiture;
and the building’s roof had failed and was open to the
elements for many years.
Large quantities of
10
abandoned personal property and illegal dumping
(e.g., appliances, tires, vehicle parts, mattresses,
demo and construction debris, food waste, etc.) had
accumulated on the site.
The county incurred
$95,310.33 in clean-up, remediation, and demolition
costs. The property sold at a public auction for
$62,433.00 in 2019. The county incurred a net loss of
$56,229.79 on the property when accounting for the
taxes owed and remedial costs.
Another example involves the forfeiture of
commercial property (i.e., a former gas station) in the
City of Calumet, which is in Itasca County,
Minnesota. The following is a photograph of the
property taken by the county around the time of
forfeiture in 2014:
$19,551.33 was owed in taxes, penalties, and interest
at that time. Itasca County subsequently removed a
storage
tank
on
the
property,
incurring
approximately $22,441.00 in property management
11
costs, which were partially offset by a grant from the
Minnesota Department of Health. The following is a
photograph showing removal of the tank:
After forfeiture in 2014 and an investigation by the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (“MPCA”) into
pre-forfeiture petroleum release (which occurred
while the tanks were still privately owned), it was
determined that a complete excavation and cleanup
of the property was necessary. The former property
owner has since walked away from all liability for
the site, leaving it to the government to clean up the
mess. To date, approximately $1,007,373.71 has
been
spent
to
complete
contaminated-soil
investigation and clean-up work. Additional work
remains before the property can be sold.
The above-referenced examples provide a
counter-narrative to the circumstances at issue in
the case before the Court. They highlight the other
side of the tax-forfeiture coin, which Petitioner omits
entirely from her brief. To be sure, it does not
require a great leap of deduction to conclude that
stories like these are far more prevalent and common
than the extreme examples set forth in pages 28–29
12
of Petitioner’s brief. 3 The examples show that, in
many cases, counties shoulder a substantial burden
as a result of administration of the tax-forfeiture
process, incurring clean-up, remediation, demolition,
and upkeep costs as a direct result of their
statutorily-mandated tax-forfeiture duties.
The
examples highlight the fact that these costs can be
substantial, well more than the value of the property
itself, and that counties frequently suffer a net loss
as a result of tax-forfeiture proceedings.
Petitioner’s
proposed
solution—returning
surplus proceeds from a tax-forfeiture sale to the
property owner whose property has been forfeited
but leaving the other side of the forfeiture scheme
untouched—would ensure that Minnesota counties
and local taxing districts suffer a net loss as a result
of tax-forfeiture proceedings.
Any time a taxforfeited property is sold and yields surplus proceeds,
a county would be required to return those proceeds
to a property owner, leaving nothing for the county
and local taxing districts. Any time a tax-forfeited
property is sold and results in a net loss, the county
In his amicus curiae brief, Professor Ralph D. Clifford
asserts—based on purported data from Massachusetts—that
Minnesota takes in a net surplus in tax-forfeiture proceeds each
year. See Br. of Amicus Curiae Ralph D. Clifford, at 3–4.
Professor Clifford’s assertion is unreliable given his
acknowledgment that “data from Minnesota [were] not
available” to support his assertion. Moreover, the dependability
of the data relied upon by Professor Clifford to make his
assertion have been called into question in a Massachusetts
case involving the same basic issue in the present case. See
Response to Amicus brief filed for Town of Oxford by Attorney
Peter Brown at 15–24, Town of Oxford v. John A. Smith, 101
Mass. App. Ct. 1104 (Dkt. No. 18 filed 3/10/2022).
3
13
and local taxing districts would be required to eat the
loss, and the property owner who quit paying their
taxes would walk away scot-free.
Petitioner’s
proposed solution is in fact inequitable to
Minnesota’s counties, local taxing districts, and
Minnesota residents, and would ensure that they
suffer a perpetual loss on tax-forfeiture proceedings.
Stepping back and looking at the complete taxforfeiture landscape, it is evident there may be
occasional situations where one might assert that the
equities lie with the property owner. In many other
cases—like those described above—the equities lie
with the municipality that gets stuck with a blighted
property following a tax forfeiture. In situations that
thus require the balancing of the equities between
landowners, local taxing authorities, and residents of
the state as a whole, the Minnesota Legislature—and
not this Court—is in the best position to modify
Minnesota’s tax-forfeiture system if it believes doing
so is necessary. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120,
135–36 (2017) (“When an issue involves a host of
considerations that must be weighed and appraised,
[legislative questions] should be committed to those
who write the laws rather than those who interpret
them.”); Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103,
111 (1956) (“[R]elief from the hardship imposed by a
state statute is the responsibility of the state
legislature and not of the courts.”).
14
B.
Petitioner proposes a result in this case
that could force Minnesota counties into
the role of de facto realtor, agent, and
title examiner for delinquent taxpayers;
creates unanswered questions; and would
have devastating financial ramifications
for counties.
Another practical issue that would arise from
Petitioner’s proposed solution to the alleged infirmity
of Minnesota’s tax-forfeiture system is that it would
force Minnesota’s counties into the role of agent for
previous owners of forfeited properties. Minnesota
counties would, in essence, become a property
owner’s de facto realtor, acting for the benefit of the
property owner. That would create a host of issues
and questions for Minnesota counties. For example,
would Minnesota counties have fiduciary obligations
to property owners when selling tax-forfeited
properties? Under Minnesota law, realtors owe a
fiduciary duty to their clients. See Minn. Stat.
§ 82.67, subd. 3 (describing six fiduciary duties).
Most importantly, they must “act only in [the]
client(s)’ best interest.” Id.
Petitioner fails to specify whether and how
that duty would apply in the tax-forfeiture context.
Would Minnesota counties be required to pursue
maximum value for forfeited properties? How would
value be determined, given that tax-forfeited
properties generally sell for far less than non-taxforfeited properties because of their neglected state?
What if the county sold the property for less than it
was worth (or transferred it to another
municipality)? See Minn. Stat. § 282.01, subd. 1a(d)(e). Would the county be liable to make up the
15
difference? What if a county is unable to sell taxforfeited property at all, and is thus forced to retain
the property? Would property owners be entitled to
anything under those circumstances? If so, how
would the amount of compensation be determined?
And what if a county decided to retain a taxforfeited property for a number of years, only to sell
it later? When Minnesota’s tax forfeiture laws were
established in 1935, there were nearly eight million
acres of tax-forfeited lands in the state. Much of the
land tax-forfeited to the state nearly one-hundred
years ago was retained by northern Minnesota’s
counties for public use. See Brief History, Minnesota
Association of County Land Commissioners,
https://www.mncountylands.org/brief-history
(last
visited March 23, 2023). What if a county decides to
sell land that was forfeited to the state one-hundred
years ago? Are the heirs of a long-deceased property
owner entitled to all excess proceeds, even those
resulting from one-hundred years of the county’s
land-stewardship
efforts
and
property-value
appreciation? What if the property owner has no
descendants? What if it is unclear or there is a
dispute as to who has good legal title to the property?
Does a county have an obligation to go out of its way
to identify who is entitled to excess proceeds under
those circumstances?
If the Court adopts Petitioner’s position and
relief is afforded to Petitioner and others
retroactively, the financial ramifications for
Minnesota counties would be devastating. Counties
across the State of Minnesota—and in other states
that have adopted similar tax-forfeiture laws—
undoubtedly will face a glut of lawsuits by property
16
owners whose properties were previously subject to
tax forfeiture. The financial impact of litigating
these claims and paying surplus proceeds—if there
are any—would be substantial given the number of
tax forfeitures that occur each year. Given that this
Court already sustained a substantially similar taxforfeiture scheme in Nelson (discussed below),
affording Petitioner and others retroactive relief
would be inequitable, and have devastating
consequences for Minnesota counties.
Cf. Am.
Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167,
179–83 (1990) (noting opinion declaring tax
unconstitutional would not apply retroactively
because that would “severely burden[] the
[government’s] operations” and because it would be
“unjust to impose this burden when the [government]
relied on valid, existing precedent in enacting and
implementing its tax”); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that officials are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly-established,
known constitutional rights).
For the above reasons, the practical
implications of Petitioner’s proposed solution are
expansive. The financial and social ramifications
would be devastating for Minnesota counties.
Petitioner’s proposed solution would also create a
host of new questions that will go unanswered if the
Court adopts Petitioner’s simplistic solution. The
fact that devastating financial and social
consequences may occur, and that so many new
questions are created by Petitioner’s proposed
solution, confirms that the legislature, and not this
Court, is best-suited to consider competing interests,
17
and other social and political considerations, and to
address and correct Minnesota’s tax-forfeiture
system if it believes that is necessary. See infra,
Section II.
The legislative process invites the
opportunity to address the impacts of any significant
change in the law. It invites discussion of the type of
questions posed in this section—and would allow the
legislature to address them as part of its deliberative
process—before making a change to the law that
would have serious implications for property owners
and local taxing authorities alike.
C.
Petitioner proposes a result that would
permit property owners to walk away from
financial liabilities and leave others
holding the bag.
Another practical problem created by
Petitioner’s proposed solution is that it creates the
potential for abuse by property owners who were
subject to tax forfeiture. Suppose a property owner
hired a contractor to make improvements to the
property, and then fell into tax-forfeiture and did not
pay the contractor. Or suppose that the property
owner lived in a condominium, owed homeowners
association (“HOA”) dues, and stopped paying them.
That is precisely what happened in this case.
Under Petitioner’s proposed system, the
contractor’s lien against the property would be
cancelled after the tax-forfeiture. See Minn. Stat.
§ 282.07. So would any debt owed to the HOA. Yet
the property owner would then still be entitled to the
proceeds of a tax-forfeiture sale, which would not be
subject to the contractor’s lien or any HOA dues.
That system is inequitable to the contractor and to
18
the HOA, and would in fact provide a windfall to the
property owner. It would leave the contractor or
HOA holding the bag; it would allow manipulation of
the system by the property owner.
Petitioner fails to acknowledge or address any
of the potential practical issues identified above. She
fails to acknowledge the potential consequences of
her proposed solution. While Petitioner overlooks
these potential practical consequences—instead
focusing solely on the self-serving singular issue of
whether she is entitled to proceeds after the county
puts in the time and effort associated with conveying
the property—this Court should not do so. This
Court should be cognizant of the fact that, if it rules
in Petitioner’s favor, it would impose vast and far
reaching undue burdens and new duties on
Minnesota’s counties, and create opportunities for
property owners to abuse Minnesota’s tax-forfeiture
system.
The fact that Petitioner’s proposed solution
creates so many questions, and leaves so many issues
unresolved, leads back to the conclusion that the
statute and broader legislative system at issue in
this case is not a system for the judiciary to address.
Rather, it is a small part of a complex legislative
system. Separation of powers principles dictate
judicial restraint.
19
II.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT INTERFERE
WITH THE CAREFULLY CRAFTED,
COMPLEX LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM AT
ISSUE IN THIS CASE.
Minnesota Statutes include fifteen chapters on
property taxes. See Minn. Stat. Chs. 272–289. One
entire chapter, with sixty-three sections, is devoted
to the process for tax-forfeited land sales. See Minn.
Stat. Ch. 282. The focus of this case is on just one of
those sixty-three sections—Minnesota Statutes
section 282.08. Petitioner asks the Court to put on
blinders and analyze that one section in a vacuum.
But such an analysis ignores the forest for the sake
of the tree. Minnesota Statutes section 282.08 is
part of a large and complex property-tax system.
The Minnesota Legislature carefully crafted the
system, and continues to fine-tune it to meet the
needs of all Minnesotans.
This Court’s prior rulings establish that the
Court gives deference to state legislatures—
particularly when it comes to issues of taxation—in
order to preserve the separation of powers. This
Court gives substantial deference to the legislative
judgments involved in crafting complex legislative
systems for the same reason. This case involves both
issues of taxation and a complex legislative system.
Separation of powers principles counsel against the
Court’s involvement in overturning the legislative
judgments at issue in this case.
Separation of powers principles demand that
the Court defer to legislative judgments because the
legislative branch is vested with the power and “duty
to make laws.” Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 904
20
(2018). The judicial branch, by contrast, is vested
with the “duty of interpreting and applying them.”
Id. The two branches defer to one another when they
are operating in their own spheres. As stated by this
Court in the case of King v. Burwell, “[I]n every case
[the judicial branch] must respect the role of the
Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has
done.” 576 U.S. 473, 498 (2015); see also Minnesota
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469 (1981)
(“[I]t is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the
wisdom and utility of legislation.”). The basis for
judicial deference is well-stated in Epic Sys. Corp. v.
Lewis: “Allowing judges to pick and choose between
statutes risks transforming them from expounders of
what the law is into policymakers choosing what the
law should be. . . . [I]t’s the job of Congress by
legislation, not this Court by supposition, both to
write the laws and to repeal them.” 138 S. Ct. 1612,
1624 (2018).
Just recently, this Court confirmed its
reluctance to wade into controversial, state-specific
legislative determinations, even when they implicate
the United States Constitution.
See Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228
(2022). As the Court noted in Dobbs, “[C]ourts
cannot substitute their social and economic beliefs
for the judgment of legislative bodies.” Id. at 2284.
The Court further noted, “[R]espect for a legislature’s
judgment applies even when the laws at issue
concern matters of great social significance . . . .” Id.
Taxation—which affects every American nearly
every day in one form or another—is undoubtedly a
“matter of great social significance.” See also Ysleta
Del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 1929, 1943 (2022)
21
(“It is not our place to question whether Congress
adopted the wisest or most workable policy.”);
Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 766–67 (2021)
(“It is hardly this Court’s place to pick and choose
among competing policy arguments like these along
the way to selecting whatever outcome seems to us
most congenial, efficient, or fair. Our license to
interpret statutes does not include the power to
engage in such freewheeling judicial policymaking.”).
The need for deference in this case is
important because the case involves the Minnesota
Legislature’s power to tax. The power to tax has
been expressly delegated to the federal and state
legislatures—under both the United States
Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution. See
U.S. Const., Art. I § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes”); State ex rel. S.
Bank v. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. 278, 299 (1881) (noting
“the power of taxation belongs exclusively to the
legislative department of the government”); Minn.
Const. Art. 10 § 1. Courts give special deference to
the legislature on matters of taxation. The special
deference that the judiciary affords to the legislative
branch on matters of taxation was well-stated by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in the case of Minnesota
Automatic Merch. Council v. Salomone, where the
court noted, “[C]ourts are very deferential in their
review of tax legislation” because “taxation policy is
peculiarly a legislative function, involving political
give-and-take.” 682 N.W.2d 557, 561–62 (Minn.
2004).
This Court reached the same basic conclusion
as the Minnesota Supreme Court in City of
Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp. 417 U.S. 369, 376
22
(1974). Alco Parking involved a legal challenge that
is very similar to the legal challenge at issue in this
case. A property owner, like Petitioner in this case,
argued that a tax imposed by a city ordinance
amounted to an unconstitutional taking because it
was inequitable (i.e., “excessive” and “burdensome”).
Id. The Court declined to get involved in the matter
noting, “[The] judiciary should not infer a legislative
attempt to exercise a forbidden power in the form of
a seeming tax from the fact, alone, that the tax
appears excessive.” Id. The principle established in
Salomone and Alco Parking is clear. Courts—at the
highest level and under both the federal and state
constitutions—give great deference to legislative
judgments on issues of taxation in order to preserve
the separation of powers.
In this case, as in
Salomone and Alco Parking, this Court must give
deference to legislative decisions concerning the
Minnesota Legislature’s power to tax, and
Minnesota’s tax-forfeiture scheme in particular.
Deference to the legislature is also particularly
important in this case because it involves a complex
legislative scheme. As this Court noted in Ziglar,
“When an issue involves a host of considerations that
must be weighed and appraised, [legislative
questions] should be committed to those who write
the laws rather than those who interpret them.” 582
U.S. at 135–36. The case of King v. Burwell is
instructive in understanding the need for deference
in matters involving a complex legislative scheme
like those at issue in this case. 576 U.S. 473 (2015).
The King case involved a challenge to the Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”), undoubtedly a complex legislative
scheme. See 576 U.S. at 478. This Court was asked
23
to hone in on just one portion of the ACA, to consider
it in isolation, and to declare that portion invalid.
See id. at 497. The Court refused to do so. See id.
Instead of looking at the section in isolation, the
Court looked to “the broader structure of the Act”
(i.e., the legislative scheme), and how all of the ACA’s
moving parts fit together. Id. at 492. The Court
determined that, while the meaning of the section
“may seem plain when viewed in isolation, such a
reading turns out to be untenable in light of [the
statute] as a whole.” Id. at 497.
The King case stands for the proposition that
courts—including this Court—do not look at small
portions of a complex legislative scheme in isolation.
Rather, they look at the broader structure of the
legislation to determine the legislature’s overarching
purpose. The Court then gives deference to the
legislative scheme to ensure the legislature’s
overarching purpose can be achieved. That is the
only way for the Court to honor the intentions of the
legislature, and to preserve the separation of powers
inherent in our system of government and
governance.
In this case, as in the King case, Petitioner
invites the Court to hone in on just one section of
Minnesota’s large and complex property taxforfeiture system, and to declare it invalid. In this
case, as in King, the Court should decline Petitioner’s
invitation. Minnesota Statutes section 282.08 is part
of the Minnesota Legislature’s broader scheme
governing property taxes in Minnesota.
The
ultimate goal of the scheme is to bring finality after a
property owner fails to pay his or her property taxes.
The system ensures that property is returned to
24
productive use following a tax-forfeiture. Funds from
a tax forfeiture sale may also be used to make
improvements to the forfeited property; to pay off
special assessments; to develop and improve forest
lands; and/or to acquire and maintain county parks
or recreational areas. See Minn. Stat. § 282.08.
Funds also go towards the administrative costs
associated with administering the tax-forfeiture
system as a whole.
In short, the Minnesota Legislature has
developed a legislative scheme that, in its judgment,
is in the best interests of the citizens of the State of
Minnesota. The Court must not contravene the will
and determination of the Minnesota Legislature
through judicial action. Instead, the Court should
“commit[] to those who write the laws” the complex
legislative scheme at issue in this case, given the
“host of considerations that [were] weighed and
appraised” by the legislature in crafting the system.
See Ziglar, 520 U.S. at 135–36.
If the Court sides with Petitioner it would, in
essence, re-write and throw an isolated wrench into
the legislature’s carefully crafted tax-forfeiture
scheme.
Reversal would affect taxing districts’
ability to bring finality to tax-forfeiture processes by
drawing out the process. It would affect their ability
to make tax-forfeited land productive again. It would
deprive them of funding for property improvements,
forests, public parks, and for the administrative costs
associated with administering the state’s taxforfeiture system. It would create a host of practical
problems that would increase administrative
burdens on government employees. Decisions of that
nature—concerning taxation and the allocation of
25
funding—are best left to the legislature, not the
judiciary.
Petitioner suggests in essence that the Court
should reverse the Eighth Circuit’s unanimous
ruling, and invalidate the Minnesota Legislature’s
chosen tax-forfeiture scheme, because the result in
this case is inequitable. In doing so, Petitioner
overlooks the many avenues she had to avoid taxforfeiture. Petitioner had many opportunities over
several years to avoid tax-forfeiture, and did not take
advantage of them. Petitioner also overlooks the fact
that virtually all tax-forfeiture sales do not result in
a surplus and, instead, result in a substantial loss.
But even setting those considerations aside, the
bottom line is that if there is any inequity in
Minnesota’s tax-forfeiture process, it is the job of the
Minnesota Legislature, and not the Court, to correct
the inequity. Nelson v. City of New York, the most
apposite authority in this case, plainly establishes
that the Court defers to a state legislature on
questions regarding the equity of a tax-forfeiture
system. 352 U.S. 103 (1956).
The Nelson case, like this case, involved a
property owner whose property was subject to tax
forfeiture. Id. at 105. The Nelson case, like this one,
involved a state law that allowed municipalities to
collect the surplus proceeds from a forfeiture sale.
Id.
In this case, as in Nelson, the municipal
government collected surplus proceeds several years
after the initial delinquency, and then only “in the
absence of timely action to redeem or to recovery any
surplus.” Id. at 110. The property owner in Nelson
argued that the law was “harsh,” and that that
“extreme hardships [would] result[] from application
26
of the [law].” Id. at 110–11. The property owner
asked the Court to declare the state law
unconstitutional. See id. This Court declined,
specifically on the basis of the separation of powers.
Id. This Court “h[e]ld that nothing in the Federal
Constitution prevent[ed]” the municipality from
retaining surplus proceeds under the circumstances.
Id. at 110. This Court further noted, “[R]elief from
the hardship imposed by a state statute is the
responsibility of the state legislature and not of the
courts.” Id. at 111.
Nelson plainly establishes—in nearly the exact
same tax-forfeiture context at issue in this case—
that this Court defers to the legislature on issues of
tax-forfeiture policy. This is true even when the
policy yields a result that an affected property owner
may perceive as unfair. Deference on such matters is
the only way to preserve the separation of powers.
Nelson indicates that this Court must give deference
to the Minnesota Legislature with respect to the
statute at issue in this case, regardless of the
perceived equity of the statute at issue.
Notably, following Nelson’s lead, courts in
many jurisdictions have determined that perceived
unfairness is not a valid basis for overturning state
laws governing tax-forfeiture proceedings. See, e.g.,
Wasiluk v. City of Oneida, New York, 2022 WL
3716279, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. 2022) (concluding
“Plaintiff has no constitutional claim for the surplus
equity in his former property”); Automatic Art, L.L.C.
v. Maricopa Cty., 2010 WL 11515708, at *6 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 18, 2010) (“Generally, federal courts have been
unwilling to disturb state taxation schemes and find
constitutional violations.”); Reinmiller v. Marion
27
Cty., Oregon, 2006 WL 2987707, at *3 (D. Or. Oct. 16,
2006) (“This court declines [the] invitation to
overturn settled Oregon tax law. As courts have
stated in response to similar challenges to
disbursement of excess proceeds based on state law
after forfeiture sales, the appropriate forum to raise
these concerns is the state legislature.”); Balthazar v.
Mari Ltd., 301 F. Supp. 103, 106 (N.D. Ill. 1969)
(“[O]ppressive [tax-forfeiture] statutes must be
tempered by the legislature, not the courts.”); City of
Auburn v. Mandarelli, 320 A.2d 22, 33 (Me. 1974)
(“Amelioration of the oppressiveness of [a taxforfeiture] statute must be made, if at all, by the
Legislature, not the courts.”); see also Baker Botts
L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 576 U.S. 121, 134 (2015)
(noting “unwillingness to soften the import of
Congress’ chosen words even if we believe the words
lead to a harsh outcome is longstanding”).
There is good reason for this Court to defer to
the Minnesota Legislature in this case. Multiple
bills were introduced in both chambers of the
Minnesota Legislature during the 2021 legislative
session that addressed Minnesota Statutes section
282.08. See, e.g., H.F. 1552 § 2, 92nd Leg. (2021);
H.F. 2162 § 1, 92nd Leg. (2021); S.F. 908 § 1, 92nd
Leg. (2021). One of the bills would have achieved the
precise legislative fix Petitioner is seeking in this
case. See H.F. 1552. The bill, if it had been enacted,
would have required that “any balance” available
after a tax-forfeiture sale be “returned to the person
or entity that owned the property prior to its
forfeiture.” Id.
Additional legislation addressing Minnesota
Statutes section 282.08 has been proposed in the
28
Minnesota Legislature this year, and is currently
pending. See H.F. 2812 § 2, 93rd Leg. (2023); H.F.
1929 § 1, 92nd Leg. (2023). Under either of the
pending legislative proposals, “any balance [after a
tax-forfeiture sale] must be returned to the person or
entity that owned the property prior to its forfeiture.”
Id. Given the circumstances, there is no need for this
Court to re-write Minnesota Statutes section 282.08
through judicial action. The legislature has the
means to do so at its finger tips if it so chooses. See
Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1626 (“Telling, too, is
the fact that when Congress wants to mandate
particular dispute resolution procedures it knows
exactly how to do so.”).
If the Minnesota Legislature believes a
legislative fix is necessary, it will make the fix.
Minnesota’s legislative representatives certainly
know how to make the fix, given the multiple
proposals advanced in the past two legislative
sessions. If the Minnesota Legislature does not
believe a fix is necessary, then it will not make a fix.
The legislature can debate the merits of the
legislative proposals, and their effect on the
legislature’s broader property-tax and tax-forfeiture
schemes. It can discern the will of the people
through a deliberate process, based on feedback from
various stakeholders. It can tweak and modify the
legislation in order to balance the interests of the
citizens of Minnesota. The people can hold its
Minnesota legislators accountable for their final
decision. In light of the fact that the legislature is in
a position to address and “fix” its tax-forfeiture
scheme if its wishes to do so, the Court need not get
29
involved and “fix” the alleged “inequity” in this case
through judicial action.
III.
PROPERTY OWNERS FACING TAX
FORFEITURE IN MINNESOTA HAVE
MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO RETAIN
THEIR PROPERTY.
Petitioner’s brief offers little discussion of the
tax forfeiture process in Minnesota. In fact, the road
to final tax-forfeiture in Minnesota involves multiple
steps, and spans multiple years. Property owners
receive ample notice of the steps in the process. The
road to tax-forfeiture includes numerous statutory
off-ramps designed to help property owners avoid
tax-forfeiture and retain their property and any
equity they may have in it. After final forfeiture
occurs, the Minnesota Statutes offer a repurchase
option to property owners that allows them to get
their properties back in some cases.
The Minnesota Statutes make it abundantly
clear that the objective of Minnesota’s tax-forfeiture
scheme is not to achieve forfeiture and collect an
alleged windfall profit in the process. Rather, the
goal is to keep property owners in their properties
whenever possible. On top of the statutory off-ramps
and repurchase option available to property owners,
programs exist at the state and local level that are
designed to assist property owners facing taxforfeiture, and to help them retain their properties.
The process is fair, balancing municipalities’ need for
finality and property-tax revenue against property
owners’ interests in retaining their properties.
30
Petitioner zooms past the numerous statutory
off-ramps, repurchase options, and support programs
available to property owners. Petitioner proceeds
directly to the very end of the road, where a property
owner’s property is sold, and the local taxing districts
receive
an
alleged
tax-forfeiture
“windfall.”
Petitioner infers that a “windfall” is the ultimate goal
from the outset. That simply is not true. The goal is
never to deprive a property owner of his or her
property in order to obtain a property-tax windfall.
Rather, as former Hennepin County AuditorTreasurer Mark Chapin (previously a named
defendant in this case) stated, “The goal is keeping
the resident in the house, which also benefits their
relatives, spouses, and neighbors.” David Chanen,
Hennepin County’s Navigator Program helps
delinquent taxpayers keep their homes, Minneapolis
Star Tribune, April 2, 2019 (attributing statement to
Auditor-Treasurer Chapin). The legislative scheme,
as well as the various programs available to property
owners, demonstrate that the goal is to help property
owners remain in their property.
A.
Minnesota Statutes provide property
owners with several opportunities to
avoid forfeiture and maintain their
equity.
The goal of helping property owners retain
their properties is evidenced by the fact that the
Minnesota
Statutes
establish
numerous
opportunities for property owners to avoid forfeiture.
The first opportunity for property owners to
exit the road to forfeiture of course is to simply pay
their taxes. Property owners have a full year to come
31
up with the funds to pay their property taxes and
avoid the tax-forfeiture process altogether.
The second opportunity for property owners to
exit the road to forfeiture occurs after a property
owner falls into delinquency, which occurs on
January 1 of the year after their taxes are due. See
Minn. Stat. § 279.02, subd. 1. Delinquent taxpayers
receive notice that if they fail to pay their taxes their
property will be “bid-in” by the state, meaning it is
“sold” to the state. See Minn. Stat. § 279.06–.091.
That doesn’t occur, however, until mid-May in the
year a property owners’ taxes become delinquent.
See Minn. Stat. § 280.01. Property owners thus have
an additional four-and-a-half months to pay their
property taxes and avoid forfeiture.
The third opportunity for property owners to
exit the road to tax-forfeiture is via their right of
redemption. See Minn. Stat. Ch. 281. Minnesota
Statutes section 281.01 guarantees property owners
the right of redemption stating, “Any person claiming
an interest in any parcel of land bid in by the state at
a tax sale may redeem the same.” The right arises
after tax-forfeited property has been “bid in” by the
state, meaning the state has acquired an interest in
the property after a property owner fails to pay
property taxes. See Minn. Stat. § 280.41. Property
owners redeem their property by paying off
delinquent taxes, along with penalties, interests, and
costs. Minn. Stat. § 281.02. In most cases, the
redemption period lasts for three years. See Minn.
Stat. § 281.17.
Property owners receive ample
notices of their right of redemption. See Minn. Stat.
§ 281.23.
32
The fourth opportunity for property owners to
exit the road to forfeiture is through a confession of
judgment. See Minn. Stat. § 279.37. As part of that
process, a property owner agrees that the state may
enter a judgment against the property owner’s
property in the amount of the property owner’s
delinquent taxes, penalties, costs, and interests. Id.,
subd. 1. In exchange, the property owner gets up to
ten years to pay off his or her tax debt through
installment payments. Id., subd. 2. The confession
of judgment process is available to property owners
“at any time prior to the forfeiture of the parcel of
land to the state.” Id., subd. 1. Property owners are
allowed to make a confession of judgment not once,
but twice. Id., subd. 10. The confession of judgment
process functions, in essence, as a payment plan for
individuals facing financial challenges. It gives
struggling property owners time to get their financial
house in order, and to help them maintain their
properties.
The fifth opportunity for property owners to
avoid the consequences of forfeiture—available in
some but not all cases—occurs after final forfeiture.
Even then, years after a property owner first failed
to pay his or her property taxes, the Minnesota
Statutes give a property owner yet another
opportunity to retain his or her property through a
repurchasing process. See Minn. Stat. § 282.241.
The Minnesota Statutes provide a process that
allows property owners to apply to their county board
for permission to repurchase the property for the
sum of delinquent taxes and assessments, together
with penalties, interest, and costs. See id. The
county board has discretion to grant or deny the
33
application.
Counties almost uniformly grant
permission if doing so will correct an “undue
hardship” or “injustice,” or if it serves the “public
interest.” See id. When a county board grants
permission to repurchase, it generally allows a
property owner to repay the delinquent sums in
installment payments, giving the property owner
even more time to redeem their property. Id.; see
Minn. Stat. § 282.01, subd. 4(a) (authorizing ten
annual installments). The statutory right to
repurchase is available up and until tax-forfeited
property is disposed of, which is often many years or
even decades after forfeiture. See id.
In addition to the above-described ways to
avoid forfeiture, a property owner may also decide to
sell his or her property before final forfeiture occurs.
Absolute title to the property does not vest in the
state until the end of the redemption period
prescribed by law—ordinarily three years after a
property owner is delinquent. Minn. Stat. § 281.18.
Rather than attempting to retain property, a
property owner could decide to sell the property, pay
off delinquent property taxes and other debts, and
then retain the surplus equity for himself or herself.
Petitioner and many of the amicus curiae
supporting Petitioner would have the Court believe
that Minnesota’s tax-forfeiture system is one-sided
and inequitable. They would have the Court believe
the system was created for the purpose of giving
Minnesota’s local taxing districts tax-forfeiture
windfalls. A fair look at the system, however,
demonstrates that is not the case. The abovedescribed statutory system is one of grace and second
chances. Property owners have many opportunities
34
to retain their property, and to maintain the equity
in their property. They have many years to take
advantage of the state’s offerings. Contrary to the
position of Petitioner and many of the amicus curiae
supporting her, the statutes at issue in this case
reveal that the state’s tax-forfeiture system was
designed to protect property owners.
Ultimately, the desire to provide property
owners with grace and second chances must be
balanced against taxing jurisdictions’ need for
finality with respect to property where taxes are not
being paid. Minnesota’s local taxing districts rely on
property tax revenue to operate their government
programs. When property owners fail to pay their
property taxes, especially for multiple consecutive
years, Minnesota’s local taxing districts cannot
operate effectively. That harms the community as a
whole. At some point, the desire to provide grace and
second chances must be balanced against local taxing
districts’ rights to collect taxes, and a municipality’s
right to finality when a delinquent property owner
fails to contribute his or her fair share to the cost of
government. The Minnesota Legislature has crafted
a system that balances those two interests. The
Legislature’s chosen system is reflected in Minnesota
Statutes section 282.08, and in the broader taxforfeiture scheme. As noted above, this Court defers
to the Legislature’s judgment and its balancing of the
equities in this matter.
35
B.
Programs also exist at the state and local
level that are designed to help property
owners retain their properties.
The ultimate goal of helping property owners
retain their properties and keep them on the tax rolls
is also evidenced by the fact that state and local
government entities have established various
programs to help property owners avoid taxforfeiture and keep their properties.
At the state level, the Minnesota Department
of Revenue has established a property tax deferral
program for senior citizens that is designed to help
them stay in their properties. Minn. Stat. Ch. 290B
(establishing Senior Tax Deferral Program); see
generally Minnesota Department of Revenue,
Property Tax Deferral for Senior Citizens,
https://www.revenue.state.mn.us/property-taxdeferral-senior-citizens (last updated Dec. 18, 2020).
The program is designed to help fill in the gap for
seniors who lack the income to pay their property
taxes. Property owners pay three percent (3%) of
their total household income towards their property
taxes. Minn. Stat. § 290B.05, subd. 1. The state
pays the remainder of the property owner’s property
taxes as a loan. Minn. Stat. § 290B.07(a). When a
property owner sells his or her property, or
voluntarily cancels the tax deferral, the property
owner then repays the loan, with interest in an
amount not to exceed five percent (5%). Minn. Stat.
§ 290B.08. The program makes property taxes more
affordable by tying payment amounts to income
rather than the value of the property.
36
Hennepin
County
in
particular
has
established a program at the local government
level—referred to as the Navigator Program—that is
designed to assist property owners facing taxforfeiture. See David Chanen, Hennepin County’s
Navigator Program helps delinquent taxpayers keep
their homes, Minneapolis Star Tribune, April 2, 2019.
The program is available to property owners who are
delinquent in paying their property taxes, and are
awaiting tax-forfeiture. Id. “Navigators” provide
holistic support to property owners, connecting them
with social services and other resources (e.g.,
medical, legal, clothing, veteran support, mental
health counseling, etc.). Id. The ultimate goal is to
help property owners maintain the stability
associated with property ownership by avoiding
forfeiture. See id. The program has been successful,
helping many people in Hennepin County avoid taxforfeiture. Id.
Hennepin County received an Achievement
Award from the National Association of Counties in
2018 for its Navigator Program. Resident and Real
Estate Services/Human Services Navigator, National
Association
of
Counties
(May
1,
2018),
https://www.naco.org/resources/awardprograms/resident-and-real-estate-serviceshumanservices-navigator.
The National Association of
Counties provided the following information about
the Navigator Program, and rationale as to why
Hennepin County received the award:
The goals of the program
are to provide resources
and assistance to support
taxpayers staying in their
37
homes, housing relocation
assistance if needed, and to
help stabilize individuals
and families during the
delinquency and forfeiture
process. The program has
been
overwhelmingly
successful in its first year
serving 53 taxpayers with
only 6 losing their homes
to tax-forfeiture. Of the 53
tax-payers, 31 were able to
pay their property taxes
resulting in an amount of
$331,995.29.
Id.
As noted above, Petitioner would have the
Court believe that the goal of Minnesota’s taxforfeiture system is to obtain tax-forfeiture windfalls.
If that were in fact true, it defies logic to believe that
the State of Minnesota, as well as Hennepin County
(i.e., the named-Respondent in this case), would
establish programs explicitly designed to avoid tax
forfeitures.
The programs available to property owners at
the state and local levels—like the statutory scheme
outlined in the Minnesota Statues—demonstrate
that the ultimate goal is not tax forfeiture. Rather,
the goal is to help property owners stay in their
properties and benefit from the security that
property ownership provides. Only property owners
who choose not to take advantage of the numerous
state and local offerings suffer the ultimate
38
consequence—tax-forfeiture.
The
Minnesota
Legislature has determined that forfeiture is an
appropriate result when property owners choose not
to take advantage of statutory relief or state or local
support options. This Court must not disrupt the
legislature’s judgment.
CONCLUSION
The Association of Minnesota Counties (AMC),
Minnesota
Association
of
County
Land
Commissioners (MACLC), Minnesota Association of
County Officers (MACO), and Minnesota Association
of Assessing Officers (MAAO) respectfully request
that the Court affirm the decision of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and affirm the
constitutionality of Minnesota’s carefully-crafted taxforfeiture system.
Respectfully submitted,
Jay T. Squires
Counsel of Record
Michael J. Ervin
RUPP, ANDERSON, SQUIRES,
WALDSPURGER & MACE, P.A.
333 South Seventh St., Suite 2800
Minneapolis, MN 55402
Phone: (612) 436-4300
jay.squires@raswlaw.com
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.