Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Reshawn Armstrong, Petitioner v. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

APR 1 1 2022

No.

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

RESHAWN ARMSTRONG,

Petitioner

v.

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Courts of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Reshawn Armsreong (pro se)

1130 University Blvd. B9*620

Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401

205) 861-5979

ra 111 l@vmail.com

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a Judge committed ex parte communication

when he accepted information from an unnamed person

other then the Plaintiff and Defendant’s Counsel, so to

use and intimidate the Plaintiff in removing certain

claims from compliant, and should it be grounds to have

case vacated and remanded?

Whether a Judge can disregard established Federal

Rules of Civil Procedures, specifically FRCP 56a, to grant

summary judgment when there are still numerous

genuine disputes to material facts remaining which are

unresolved?

2.

3.

Whether documents that show inconsistencies,

contradictions, policy violations, a declaration statement,

and also a sworn affidavit that an employer made

statements that employees are valuable based on physical

characteristic, specifically race and sex considered direct

evidences and does it also show pretext?

4.

Whether a plaintiff have made a prima facie case

concerning employment discrimination when she’s (1) a

member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the

position sought; (3) was rejected for the position; and (4)

the employer promoted someone outside of her protected

class?

11

Whether the “similar situated in all material

5.

aspects” and that this burden remains with plaintiff at

the prima facie stage to onerous?

6. Whether an employer is liable for the discriminatory

acts of his or her supervisors who have the means to

influence employment decision makers?

7. Whether the Eleventh Circuit should have reviewed

grant of summary judgment as de novo?

8. Should this Court grant this petition and vacate the

judgment and remand this case back to the lower court so

Petitioner can be fully heard and finally have her day in

court to resolve all genuine disputes of materials facts?

Ill

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

For case number 20-10929 filed at the Eleventh Circuit,

Petitioner Reshawn Armstrong (pro se) was the Appellant,

Respondent U.S. Attorney General was the Appellee, and

Elizabeth A. Holt was the Appellee’s Counsel

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Reshawn Armstrong v. U.S. Attorney General

No. 7:i7-cv-01857-LSC (U.S. District Court Northern

Alabama, Nov. 3, 2017)

Reshawn Armstrong v. U.S. Attorney General

No. 20-10929 (11th Circuit Court, Mar. 5, 2020)

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6,Petitioner

Reshawn Armstrong is not a corporation; has no

parent corporation, and no publicly held company

holds 10% or more of its stock.

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Page

1

OPINIONS BELOW,

1

JURISDICTION,

1

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

2

OTHER AUTHORITIES INVOLVED

2

INTRODUCTION

3 -5

STATEMENT OF CASE/FACTS

5*9

REASONS FOR GRANTING PETITION

9*18

CONCLUSION

19

V

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

District Court’s Order for Pretrial Conference

for Bench (02/18/2020)..............................,.......

la

APPENDIX B

District Court’s Memorandum and Opinion

and Order Granting Summary Judgment

(03/03/20...................... ...............................

3a

APPENDIX C

District Court’s Order Granting Summary

Judgment (03/03/20 .................................. .

44a

APPENDIX D

Court of Appeals Opinion (per curiam)

(llthCir.Oct.25, 2022)...........................

46a

APPENDIX E

11th Circuit Order Jan. 12, 2022

Denied Panel Rehearing & En banc

53a

VI

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Staub v. Proctor Hospital 562 US 411 (2011)

6

Texas Dept, of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450

U.S. 248, 253 (1981)..................................................

9

Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, No. 06-5362,

2008 WL 819989 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 2008)............

9

St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510

(1993)////.....................................................................

10

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.

133, 143 (2000)............................................................. 10

U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.

10

711, 715 (1983)

Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 575 US 206 (2015)

11

Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510, 520 (4th

Cir. 2006)..................................................................... 12

Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232

(4th Cir. 1999) (en banc)..................................

Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC, 413 F.3d 1090,

12

Vll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

1095 (9th Cir. 2005)

12

Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736

(8th Cir.2004)...........................................................

12

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 411, U.S.

792 (1973).........................................................

13

Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp, Inc.,

482 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2007)....................................

14

Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chem. Corp., 492 F.3d 589,

594 (5th Cir. 2007)......................................................

14

Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 2002)

14

Aust v. Conroe Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 S.W.3d 222

(Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004)...................................

14

Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d

222, 235-□ 36 (5th Cir. 2015)...................................

14

Haire v. Board of Sup’rs of La. State Univ. Agricultural

& Mech. Coll., 719 F.3d 356, 365 n. 10

(5thCir. 2013)

15

vm

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc., 683 F.3d 1283,

1287 (11th Cir. 2012)................................................

15

B&G Enters., Ltd. v. United States, 220 F.3d 1318,

1322 (11th Cir. 2000).................................................

15

Thornton v. E.I. Du Pont de Numours & Co.,22 F.3d

284, 288 (11th Cir. 1994)

>>>

15

Whatley v. CNA Ins. Co., 189 F.3d 1310, 1313

(11th Cir. 1999)..................................................

15

St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America’s Favorite Chicken

Co., 198 F.3d 815, 819 (llthCir.1999)......................... 16

Statue

28 U.C.S 1254(1).......

42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq

1

2

Other Authorities

Federal Rules of Civil Procedures 56a

Code of Conduct for United State Judge

Canon 1....................................................

Code of Conduct for United State Judge

Canon 3(a)4...............................................

2

16

16

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Petitioner, Ms. Reshawn Armstrong (pro se)

respectfully files this petition for a writ of certiorari to

review the judgments of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and U.S. District Court

for Northern Alabama Western Division.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Eleventh Circuit's order denying panel rehearing

and hearing en banc is at Appendix E, the Eleventh

Circuit opinion (PER CURIAM) is not publish but is at

Appendix D, District Court memorandum and opinion and

order granting summary judgment is at Appendix B and

C, and District Court order for pretrial conference and set

bench trial is at Appendix A.

JURISDICTION

The Eleventh Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for

panel rehearing and hearing en banc on January 12, 2022

(Pet. App. A). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

2

THE STATUTE INVOLVED

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.

2000e et seq.) section 703 (a), states “it shall be an

unlawful employment practice for an employer; 1) to fail

or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or

otherwise to discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual's

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 2) to limit,

segregate, or classify his employees in any way which

would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of

employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect

his status as an employee, because of such individual's

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

OTHER AUTHORITES INVOLVED

Federal Rules of Civil Procedures 56a states, “A party

may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim

or defense or the part of each claim or defense on which

summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law”.

3

INTRODUCTION

The Petitioner, Ms. Reshawn Armstrong, is a black

female who currently works for the Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Prisons as a Senior Officer Specialists.

Ms. Armstrong started her career with the Federal

Bureau of Prisons in 2007 at FCC Coleman. Ms.

Armstrong later transferred from FCC Coleman to FCI

Tallahassee in 2009, and in August of 2012 transferred

from FCI Tallahassee to FCI Aliceville located in Pickens

County, Alabama, which is currently her assigned duty

station. FCI Aliceville is a Federal Correctional

Institution that houses female inmates. Ms. Armstrong

transferred to FCI Aliceville to help with the activation of

institution in preparation of incoming inmates and the

training of newly hired staffs. During this time Ms.

Armstrong joined the Disturbance Control Team (DCT)

and earned her certification as a Basic Prisoner

Transportation (BPT) Officer at FCI Aliceville. Ms.

Armstrong continued her training and earned the

following certifications in Central Inmate Monitoring

(CIMS), National Crime Information Center and National

Law Enforcement Telecommunications (NCIC/NLETS),

Inmate Discipline Certification (IDC), and Case

Management. Ms. Armstrong also has a Bachelor of

Science degree in Criminology.

In or around March of 2015, Ms. Armstrong had

applied for various job announcements for promotion

within the Federal Bureau of Prisons to further her career

with the Agency. Ms. Armstrong received notifications

4

from USA Jobs that her applications were selected as part

of the Best-Qualified group (BQ group) and would proceed

to the last stage of the hiring process which is the

reference check stage. Ms. Armstrong informed both

Warden Areola Washington-Adduci (Warden Adduci) and

Associate Warden Sekou Ma’at (AW Ma’at) she had

applied for various job promotions within the Federal

Bureau of Prisons. AW Ma’at asked Ms. Armstrong if she

had applied for a lieutenant position at FCI Aliceville

which Ms. Armstrong said no, but stated she had applied

for lieutenant positions at other institutions. AW Ma’at

then told Ms. Armstrong she is an excellent worker and

valuable because she is a black female (physical

characteristics) and should apply for a lieutenant at FCI

Aliceville due to it being a female institution and its need

of more female staffs. In August of 2015, after still not

being hired for one of the many positions she applied for,

Ms. Armstrong decided to request her reference checks

and became aware Warden Adduci and AW Ma’at gave

numerous false and derogatory reference checks to

interfere with her applications for promotions which

dated back to March of 2015.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a federal law

that prohibits employers from discriminating against

their employees on the basis of sex, race, color, national

origin, religion, disability, reprisal, and most recently

sexual orientation. This Title makes it unlawful for an

employer to discriminate against an employee or

applicant in hiring and firing; compensation, assignment,

5

classification, transfer, promotion, job advertisements,

recruiting, testing, benefits, pay, disability leave, or any

respect to an employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS

1. In 2015, the petitioner Ms. Reshawn Armstrong

applied for various job announcements for

promotion within the Federal Bureau of Prisons

(FBOP).

2. AW Ma’at asked Ms. Armstrong if she had applied

for lieutenant’s position at FCI Aliceville which Ms.

Armstrong stated no due to Ms. Armstrong was not

interested in being a lieutenant at FCI Aliceville

and therefore did not list FCI Aliceville on her

applications.

3. AW Ma’at told Ms. Armstrong she’s an excellent

worker and valuable because she is a black female

(physical characteristics) and tried to encourage Ms.

Armstrong to apply for a lieutenant position at FCI

Aliceville due to it being a female institution, its

need of more female staffs, and the value he place

on black females.

4. Ms. Armstrong did not list FCI Aliceville, but

instead listed other institutions she was interested

in being a lieutenant at, which Ms. Armstrong was

6

qualified and categorized as part of “best qualified”

group.

5. The best qualified group are applicants with

similar job related competencies or knowledge, and

also skills and abilities who are selected to proceed

to the last stage of the hiring process which is the

reference checks stage.

6. The Federal Bureau of Prisons uses reference check

form BP-A1076 to conduct interview with

applicant’s supervisors regarding job related skills

and abilities of applicants.

7. In August of 2015, Ms. Armstrong became aware

Management at FCI Aliceville, specifically Warden

Adduci and AW Ma’at, had intentionally gave

numerous false and derogatory reference checks to

interfere with her applications for promotion within

the Agency.

8. One of the questions asked on form BP-A1076 is if

applicants had “any disciplinary action taken

against them within the last two years, if known?”

Form does not ask any questions regarding why

disciplinary actions was taken, and/or if applicant

is or was under investigations, due to any

investigations stated on reference checks are

inappropriate and against policy.

7

9. During the reference checks stage, Warden Adduci

had stated Ms. Armstrong had an “open case” for

question “any disciplinary actions within the last

two years, if known?” and AW Ma’at had stated,

“yes” to this same question. Also AW Ma’at gave

inconsistent answers to this same question and also

gave rating for Ms. Armstrong job and abilities

skills that were inconsistence and which also

contradicted her performance evaluations.

10. Ms. Armstrong had no disciplinary action taken

against her in or before 2015, and has never been

suspended since her employment with the Agency.

11. In 2017, after Ms. Armstrong exhausted her

administrative remedies (confirmed by EEOC AJ),

she filed civil action 7:l7-cv01857-LSC in the U.S.

District Court for the Northern Alabama Western

Division against the U.S. Attorney General.

12. Soon after Ms. Armstrong filed her evidences with

the court, the District Court Judge committed ex

parte communication with an unnamed person

other than the Plaintiff and Defendant’s Counsel,

who alleged Ms. Armstrong did not exhaust her

administrative remedies. District Court Judge then

used this inaccurate information to verbally

intimidate Ms Armstrong in removing certain

claims from her complaint, despite the repeated

notices in response to court order, that she intends

to pursue all claims in compliant.

8

13. On August 30, 2019, the Respondent filed a motion

for summary judgment that consisted of irrelevant

and false materials which Ms. Armstrong disputed

in her opposition to summary judgment with

supporting documents on September 13, 2019.

14. The Court then after reviewing both motions for

summary judgment and opposition to summary

judgment, and also motions for sanction and

hearing for judicial notice, entered an order on

February 18, 2020 which informed parties of

pretrial conference scheduled on March 23, 2020 in

pre-paration for bench trail set for April 13, 2020.

(Pett. App. A at la)

15. The day before Ms. Armstrong and the

Respondent’s Counsel were to meet to go over

materials for pretrial conference, the District Court

Judge all of a sudden issued a memorandum of

opinion and order on March 3, 2020 which granted

motion for summary judgment, despite the

numerous genuine disputes of material facts that

still exists. (Pett. App B at 3a and C at 44a)

16. The District Court stated Ms. Armstrong provided

no evidence of discrimination and could not show a

similarly situated comparator outside her protected

classes treated differently; therefore she failed to

make out a prima facie case.

9

17. Ms. Armstrong timely filed her appeal with the

Eleventh Circuit and requested an oral argument

due to the handling and complexity of her case

created by the District Court.

18. On October 25, 2021 the Eleventh Circuit denied

Ms. Armstrong oral argument request and affirmed

District Court grant of summary judgment (without

de novo review), that Ms. Armstrong provided no

evidences of discrimination and could not show that

a similarly situated comparator outside her

protected classes was treated differently, due to

compactors were not similar situated in all materiel

aspects. (Pett. App. D at 46a)

19. On December 7, 2021 Ms. Armstrong filed a

petition for panel rehearing and hearing en banc

which was denied by the Eleventh Circuit on

January 12, 2022. (Pett. App. E at 53a)

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT OF CERTIORARI

I. There is a split amongst the US Courts concerning the

term “similar situated comparator” in an employment

discrimination case which needs uniformity amongst the

Courts^

The Eleventh Circuit stance that “similar situated

comparators be similar in all material aspects” and this

burden remains at the prima facie stage is to onerous, and

undermines the McDonnell Douglas Analysis used by this

10

Court, which this Court did not intend for a prima facie

case to be onerous; Texas Dent, of Community Affairs v.

Burdine. 450 US. 248. 253 (1981).

Other Circuits are in conflict with the Eleventh Circuit

such as the U.S. Court of Appeals for District of Columbia

Circuit which uses a more common sense approach that

aligns more with this Court. In Bradv v. Office of

Sergeant at Arms. Case No. 06-5362 (March 28. 2008), the

district court granted summary judgment to the Office of

Sergeant at Arms (House of Representatives) on grounds

that the plaintiff could not show that a similarly situated

employee outside his racial group was treated differently,

and, therefore, had not made out a prima facie case of

race discrimination. The plaintiff, a supervisor, was

demoted after employees alleged that he sexually

harassed them. The plaintiff, however, like many

plaintiffs, was unable to find another supervisor, not of

his race, who had faced similar charges to whom he could

compare himself. The D.C. Circuit disregarded this issue,

holding that the lack of a similarly situated comparator

was unimportant and that the lower court’s focus on the

prima facie case was misplaced.

The D.C. Circuit reasoned that by the time the lower

court considers an employer’s motion for summary

judgment, the employer will have asserted a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for the challenged decision.

The court held “that’s important because once the

employer asserts a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason;

the question whether the employee actually made out a

11

prima facie case is ‘no longer relevant”. The court cited to

Supreme Court cases that comport with this holding, such

as St Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510

(1993); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530

US. 133, 143 (2000); and U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of

Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)

The D.C Circuit concluded its decision by stating"Lest there be any lingering uncertainty, we state the rule

clearly^In a Title VIIdisparate-treatment suit where an

employee has suffered an adverse employment action and

an employer has asserted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision, the district court

need not-and should not-decide whether the plaintiff

actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell

Douglas. Rather, in considering an employer's motion for

summaryjudgment orjudgment as a matter oflaw in

those circumstances, the district court must resolve one

central question*' Has the employee produced sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer's

assertednon-discriminatory reason was not the actual

reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated

against the employee on the basis ofrace, color, religion,

sex, or national origin?"

Ms. Armstrong asserts to many victims of employment

discrimination, especially in the Southeast Region of this

Country (Florida. Alabama, and Georgia) can not even

make it to a iurv and/or bench trial due to the Eleventh

Circuit stance that compactors be similar situated in all

12

material aspects and that this burden remains at the

prima facie stage. This viewpoint allows an employer to

use any differences they can find, whether it be relevant

or not, whether years ago or days ago, and/or whether a

compactor had chosen the color red instead of blue in

order to justify its discriminatory motives, due to no

concrete meaning of the term “similar situated

compactors and whether it should be at the prima facie

stage. This Highest Court can resolve this question once

and for all, which will help ease the burden of future

victims of discrimination to at the very least, have their

cases make it to trial.

II. The Eleventh Circuit and District Court for Northern

Alabama Western Division Decision’s Are Wrong.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedures 56a, makes it

clear that summary judgment shall not be granted for a

movant when there are still genuine disputes to material

facts remaining that shows the movant is not entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law, yet in Ms.

Armstrong's case the District Court did the exact opposite

of this rule, which the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. This

Court has held a grant of summary judgment is only

appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to anv

material facts, and as such any grant of a summary

judgment that violates Federal Rules of Civil Procedures

56a must be vacated; Youns v. United Parcel Service. Inc.

575 US206 (2015).

This Court has also held that a plaintiff can show Prima

Facie either through direct evidences and/or

13

circumstantial evidences which Ms. Armstrong has shown

both.

III. When Direct Evidence Has Been Presented, The

McDonnell Douglas Analysis Is Not Required.

A plaintiff can make a prima facie case with direct

evidences, which direct evidence can be statements that

reveal a discriminatory motive for the adverse

employment action which proves discrimination without

inference or presumption; Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.,

435 F. 3d 510, 520 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Taylor v. Va.

Union Univ., 193F.3d219, 232 (4th Cir.1999) (en banc)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Direct

evidence “typically consists of clearly sexist, racist, or

similarly discriminatory statements or actions by the

employer.”, cited Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC, 413

F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005). In Griffith v. CityofDes

Moines, 387F 3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004) the Eight

Circuit defined direct evidence as followsDirect evidence is evidence showing a link between the

alleged discrimination and the challenged decision,

sufficient enough to support a finding by a reasonable fact

finder that an illegitimate criterion was motivated by

discrimination. A plaintiff with strong direct evidences

that illegal discrimination motivated the employer’s

adverse action does not need to demonstrate the

McDonnell Douglas analysis. Ms. Armstrong had provided

direct evidence of intentional discrimination which

showed that her supervisors statements and actions were

14

inconsistent, contradicts, and false so to interfere with her

applications for promotion with employment decision

makers (Staub v. Proctor Hospital 562 US 411 (2011). Ms.

Armstrong also provided a declaration statement from a

co-worker and a sworn affidavit that her claims were true.

The fact is Ms. Armstrong made out a prima facie case

through circumstantial evidences when she met all four (4)

elements of the McDonnell Douglas Analysis, (McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green 411, US. 792 (1973% and also

through direct evidences provided to District Court in

support of her all her claims which a reasonable jury

and/or judge could have determine discrimination had

occurred. At that time, District Court should have

required the Respondent to give a legitimate non

discriminatory reason why on March 30, 2015 for job

announcement HR-N-2015-0009-HON, did Warden

Adduci state "open case” to question "disciplinary action

within the last two years, if known; why on April 1, 2015

(for the same job announcement HR-N-2015-0009- HON)

did AW Ma'at state "ves" to question “disciplinary action

within the last two years, if known” and gave rating that

contradicts Ms. Armstrong’s performance evaluations;

why on April 3, 2015 for job announcement MEN-20150030-0002, did AW Ma' at state "ves" to “disciplinary

action within the last two years, if known” and gave

rating that contradicts Ms. Armstrong’s performance

evaluations; why on April 23, 2015 for job announcement

HRN- 2015-0007-0044-EXC-LOM-0005, did AW Ma'at

state "none" to “disciplinary action within the last two

years, if known” and gave rating that contradicts Ms.

15

Armstrong’s performance evaluations; why on June 5,

2015 for job announcement WIL-2015-0035, did AW Ma'

at state "unknown” to “disciplinary action within the last

two years, if known” and gave rating that contradicts Ms.

Armstrong’s performance evaluations; why on July 7,

2015 for job announcement BSG-2015-0040- 0001, did AW

Ma* at state "ves” to “disciplinary action within the last

two years, if known” and gave rating that contradicts Ms.

Armstrong’s performance evaluations; why on July 30,

2015 for job announcement PHX-2015-0049, did AW Ma'

at state "ves" to “disciplinary action within the last two

years, if known” and gave rating that contradicts Ms.

Armstrong’s performance evaluations; why on August 19,

2015 for job announcement HR-N-2015-0007-LOM, did

AW Ma’ at state "ves” to “disciplinary action within the

last two years, if known” and gave rating that contradicts

Ms. Armstrong’s performance evaluations; why on

September 15, 2015 for job announcement HRN-2015*

0007-0105-MP-VIM, did AW Ma'at state "Unknown” to

“disciplinary action within the last two years, if known”

and gave rating that contradicts Ms. Armstrong’s

performance evaluations; and finally why were reports of

repeated harassment and hostile work environment not

investigated per Agency’s policies; and why did Agency’s

Officials delete videos of incident concerning incidents of

harassments, and finally why did Agency’s Officials

destroy (unauthorized) and/or lose official government

records, specially months worth of pages from a bound

logbook, when requested during discovery by Ms.

Armstrong (Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp,

Inc., 482 F3d 408 (5th Cir. 2007). See also Nasti v. CIBA

16

Specialty Chem. Corp., 492 F.3d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 2007)

(“A court may infer pretext where a defendant has

provided inconsistent or conflicting explanations for its

conduct.”); Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp,

Inc., 482 F3d 408 (5th Cir. 2007) (shifting explanations

can be evidence ofpretext)! Gee v. Principi, 289F.3d 342

(5th Cir. 2002) (same)! Aust v. Conroe Indep. Sch. Dist.,

153 S. W.3d222 (Tex. App—Beaumont 2004, no pet.)

(shifting explanations given by the employer for its

decision to terminate the plaintiff established a fact issue

over whether its decision was motivated by unlawful

discrimination); cf. Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor,

Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 235" □ 36 (5th Cir. 2015) (reversing

summary judgment for employer in discrimination case

where two company witnesses gave different and shifting

reasons for the decision to terminate the plaintiff).

In, Haire v. Board ofSup’rs ofLa. State Univ.

Agricultural & Mech. Coll., 719 F.3d 356, 365n. 10 (5th

Cir. 2013), the court reversed summary judgment for the

employer in a discrimination case, and held that,

“evidence demonstrating that the employer’s explanation

is false or unworthy of credence is likely to support an

inference of discrimination even without further evidence

of defendant’s true motive, (italics in original).

Also the Eleventh Circuit have repeatedly stated in

other opinions that it reviews grant of summary

judgments as de novo, vet in Ms. Armstrong’s appeal it

chose not to review de novo, but instead as an abuse of

discretion.

17

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court decision

that Ms. Armstrong provided no evidence of employment

discrimination and could not show a similar situated

comparator^ therefore she failed to make out a prima facie

case. The Eleventh Circuit should have

reviewed Ms. Armstrong’s appeal as de novo as it did with

others, so to base their opinion on its own review of case,

especially since the Eleventh Circuit denied Ms.

Armstrong oral argument request. (The 11th Circuit

Court ofAppeals reviews district court's rulings of

summaryjudgment as de novo, construing all facts and

drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmovingparty. Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc., 683

F.3d 1283,1287 (llth Cir. 2012)', The grantor denial of

summaryjudgment is reviewed de novo, B&G Enters.,

Ltd. v. United States, 220F.3d 1318, 1322 (llth Cir.

2000)', Thornton v. E.I. Du Pont de Numours & Co., 22

F.3d284, 288 (llth Cir. 1994). Summaryjudgment is

appropriate ifthere is no genuine issue ofmaterial fact

and the movingparty is entitled to judgment as a matter

oflaw, Whatley v. CNAIns. Co., 189 F.3d 1310, 1313

(llth Cir. 1999). The court must view all evidence and all

factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmovingparty, St.

Charles Foods, Inc. v. America's Favorite Chicken Co.,

198 F.3d 815, 819 (llth Cir. 1999).

IV. Most importantly to uphold the integrity and to

ensure public trust in the US Courts Judiciary System

18

Again soon after Ms. Armstrong filed her evidences

with the District Court, the District Court Judge

committed ex parte communication with an unnamed

person whom alleged Ms. Armstrong did not exhaust her

claims and then used this inaccurate information to

verbally intimate Ms. Armstrong in removing certain

claims from her compliant.

Canon 1 ofthe code ofconduct for United States Judges

states, * A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and

Independence of the Judiciary ‘An independent and

honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our

society. A judge should maintain and enforce high

standards ofconduct and shouldpersonally observe those

standards, so that the integrity and independence ofthe

judiciary may be preserved. The provisions ofthis Code

should be construed and applied to further that objective.

Canon 3(a)(4) 'A Judge should not initiate, permit, or

consider ex parte communications as authorized by law.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedures are established

rules which govern civil procedures in the U.S. District

Courts. These rules are promulgated bv the United States

Supreme Court pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act in

which the United States Congress have seven months to

veto the rules promulgated before it becomes part of the

FRCP. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provides

structure in the US Courts system for the District Court

Judges to follow

19

The U.S. Courts Judiciary System, if no other place,

should be the one place that the people of the United

States of America can depend on when an injustice has

occurred that violates the civil rights of a person. The U.S.

Courts should be impartial, non-bias, follow the rules of

all court procedure, be reasonable in its decision making,

and uphold the laws equally, consistently, and in a

uniform manner amongst all people of this Country,

regardless of who the Plaintiffs and/or Defendants might

be, and regardless to what region of this Country an

employment discrimination had occurred and is filed,

which this Highest Court can and should ensure the

Lower Courts does exactly that.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Reshawn Armstrong (pro sD^

1130 University Blvd. B9-620

Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401

(205) 861-5979

rail 1 l@ymail.com

August H__, 2022