Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ariadna Ramon Baro, Petitioner v. Lake County Federation of Teachers Local 504, IFT-AFT/AFL-CIO, et al.

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Appendix Table of Contents

Page

OPINION, United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit (January 6, 2023)............... App. 1

FINAL JUDGMENT, United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

(January 6, 2023) .............................................. App. 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, United

States District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois (February 28, 2022). ........... App. 13

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE, United States

District Court for the Northern District of

Illinois (February 29, 2022). ............................. App. 33

ORDER, United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit (February 7, 2023) ........... App. 35

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

(April 24, 2020). ................................................. App. 37

App. 1

In the United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 22-1722

ARIADNA RAMON BARO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LAKE COUNTY FEDERATION

OF TEACHERS LOCAL 504,

IFT-AFT/AFL-CIO and

WAUKEGAN COMMUNITY

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 60,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:20-cv-02126 – John F. Kness, Judge.

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ARGUED DECEMBER 6, 2022 – DECIDED JANUARY 6, 2023

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Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit

Judges.

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Ariadna Ramon Baro was

an English-as-a-second-language teacher for Defendant Waukegan Community School District No. 60

(“the District”) in August 2019 when she signed a union membership form – a contract to join Defendant

Lake County Federation of Teachers Local 504,

App. 2

IFT-AFT/AFL-CIO (“the Union”), the union that represents teachers in the District. This form authorized

the District to deduct union dues from her paychecks

for one year. Ramon Baro alleges she learned later that

she was not required to join the Union and she tried to

back out of the agreement. But the Union insisted that

her contract was valid and the District continued deducting dues from her paychecks. In response, Ramon

Baro filed this lawsuit, arguing that the dues deduction violated her First Amendment rights under Janus

v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal

Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). The district court dismissed the suit. Because Ramon Baro

voluntarily consented to the withdrawal of union dues

and the enforcement of a valid private contract does

not implicate her First Amendment rights, we now affirm.

I.

Background

A. Factual Allegations1

Ramon Baro worked as an English-as-a-secondlanguage teacher in the District during the 2019–2020

school year. As part of orientation, she attended a

presentation by the Union. A representative explained

how much dues would be and gave each teacher a Union Membership Application. Although the Union’s

1

Because the district court dismissed this complaint at the

pleading stage, the following allegations are taken from Ramon

Baro’s complaint and assumed true. Proft v. Raoul, 944 F.3d 686,

690 (7th Cir. 2019).

App. 3

representative did not claim that membership was required – and no one from the district made any representations about union membership – Ramon Baro

assumed it was mandatory and signed the application.

It read, in relevant part:

I hereby apply to be a member of the Lake

County Federation of Teachers, AFT Local 504

and authorize the Lake County Federation of

Teachers, AFT Local 504 to act as my exclusive representation with my employer[.]

...

I authorize you to deduct from my earnings on

a regular pro rata basis, and time frame as set

forth in my collective bargaining agreement,

the following:

1.

An amount equal to the current annual membership dues. . . . This voluntary authorization and assignment

shall be irrevocable, regardless of

whether I am or remain a member of

the Union, for a period of one year

from the date of authorization and

shall automatically renew from year

to year unless I revoke this authorization by completing a revocation

form between August 1 and August

31.

2.

. . . This authorization is signed

freely and voluntarily and not out of

any fear of reprisal; I will not be favored or disadvantaged because I exercise this right. This authorization

App. 4

shall continue in effect from year to

year unless terminated by me by

written notification. . . .

A few days after she signed the contract, Ramon Baro

learned that union membership was, in fact, optional.

She sent letters to the District and the Union, trying

to revoke her membership.

Nevertheless, the District began deducting dues

from Ramon Baro’s paychecks in January 2020. The

following month, Ramon Baro contacted her union representative and reiterated that she wanted to revoke

her membership in the Union and stop paying dues. In

response, the President of the Union informed her that

she would have to wait until August to resign, per the

membership agreement.

Ramon Baro then filed this lawsuit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the continued deduction of

dues violated her First Amendment rights under Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486, and seeking a refund for the

dues she had paid. The President of the Union sent her

a letter just a few days later, confirming that she was

no longer a member of the Union and that dues would

stop being withheld from her paycheck. He enclosed a

check for $829.30, which he said included “a full refund

of all [Ramon Baro’s] dues plus an additional five hundred dollars for [her] efforts in pursuing this matter.”

The District stopped withholding her dues the same

day. But two days later, Ramon Baro returned the

check and moved forward with this lawsuit.

App. 5

B. Procedural History

At the district court, the District and the Union

moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).

The court granted the motion, explaining that Ramon

Baro’s “voluntary choice to join her school’s local union

– even if ill-informed – means that [she] is bound by

the terms of the union membership agreement and

thus cannot show that the deduction of dues from her

paycheck violated the First Amendment.” She timely

filed this appeal.

II.

Analysis

“We review a dismissal order under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo.” Proft, 944 F.3d at

690. We find, as the district court held, that neither the

First Amendment nor ordinary contract principles entitle Ramon Baro to relief.

A. Janus Does Not Apply to Union Members

Ramon Baro insists that when the District withheld union dues from her paychecks, it violated her

First Amendment rights under Janus. In Janus, the

Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of

statutory “agency-fee” schemes for public sector unions. Under these agency-fee arrangements, “[e]mployees who decline[d] to join the union [we]re not assessed

full union dues but [were required] instead [to] pay

what [wa]s generally called an ‘agency fee,’ which

amount[ed] to a percentage of the union dues.” Janus,

138 S. Ct. at 2460. This left government employees

App. 6

with no option but to subsidize a union in some way.

Compelled union subsidization, the Court held, violated nonmembers’ First Amendment rights. Id. at

2486.

Ramon Baro’s claim that she has a right to rescind

her union membership is based on a single paragraph

in Janus:

Neither an agency fee nor any other payment

to the union may be deducted from a nonmember’s wages, nor may any other attempt be

made to collect such a payment, unless the

employee affirmatively consents to pay. By

agreeing to pay, nonmembers are waiving

their First Amendment rights, and such a

waiver cannot be presumed. Rather, to be effective, the waiver must be freely given and

shown by ‘clear and compelling’ evidence.

Id. (cleaned up). She reads this passage as creating a

right for any government employee who, like her,

“agree[s] to pay” a union. Because “waiver cannot be

presumed,” Ramon Baro contends that once a nonmember signs a membership agreement and agrees to

pay union dues, a secondary waiver analysis is triggered, requiring a court to look beyond the membership agreement for further “clear and compelling

evidence” that the employee consented to pay the union.

We rejected this reading of Janus in Bennett v.

Council 31 of the American Federation of State, County

& Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 991 F.3d 724, 731

(7th Cir. 2021). The plaintiff in Bennett was a union

App. 7

employee who had signed her union membership contract before Janus was decided and believed the holding in Janus permitted her to void the contract. We

ruled that Janus’s reasoning was limited to nonmembers who were being forced to subsidize union speech

with which they had chosen not to associate. Id. (citing

Belgau v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 2020), cert.

denied, 141 S. Ct. 2795 (2021) and Fischer v. Governor

of New Jersey, 842 F. App’x 741, 752 (3d Cir. 2021), cert.

denied sub nom. Fischer v. Murphy, 142 S. Ct. 426

(2021)). By contrast, “Janus said nothing about union

members who, like Bennett, freely chose to join a union

and voluntarily authorized the deduction of union

dues, and who thus consented to subsidizing a union.”

Id. at 732. All circuits to consider the issue have agreed

that Janus creates no new waiver requirement before

a valid union contract can be enforced. See Oliver v.

Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Loc. 668, 830 F. App’x 76, 79 (3d

Cir. 2020); Hendrickson v. AFSCME Council 18, 992

F.3d 950, 962 (10th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.

423 (2021); Belgau, 975 F.3d at 951; Fischer, 842 F.

App’x at 753. The voluntary signing of a union membership contract is clear and compelling evidence that

an employee has waived her right not to join a union.

Attempting to distinguish her case from Bennett,

Ramon Baro points to the timing of her union membership. It is true that Bennett joined her union before Janus was decided while Ramon Baro joined the Union

after Janus was decided. But the timing makes no difference. What matters is the nature of each person’s

decision to sign a private contract. Like Bennett,

App. 8

Ramon Baro voluntarily signed a valid contract, became a union member, and accepted the terms and conditions of union membership. Accordingly, our holding

in Bennett controls and Janus – a case about the First

Amendment rights of employees who choose not to join

unions – does not apply to Ramon Baro. Her § 1983

claim fails on these grounds alone.

B. Ordinary Contract Principles

Ramon Baro nevertheless argues that Bennett

should not control because she did not know that joining the Union was optional, and so her decision to do

so, unlike Bennett’s, was not voluntary. But Ramon

Baro’s union membership is established by contract,

and the First Amendment does not immunize agreements from ordinary contract law principles. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991)

(“[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First

Amendment simply because their enforcement . . . has

incidental effects” on free speech); Bennett, 991 F.3d at

731 (citing Belgau, 975 F.3d at 950). Indeed, every circuit court to consider the issue has held the same. See

Belgau, 975 F.3d at 951; Fischer, 842 F. App’x at 753;

Hendrickson, 992 F.3d at 962; see also Hoekman v.

Educ. Minn., 41 F.4th 969, 978 (8th Cir. 2022).

Applying ordinary Illinois contract principles, we

see that Ramon Baro’s voluntariness argument is untenable:

Illinois follows the objective theory of intent,

whereby the court looks first to the written

App. 9

agreement and not to the parties’ subjective

understandings. . . . The status of a document

as a contract depends on what the parties express to each other and to the world, not on

what they keep to themselves.

Hampton v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.3d 709, 714 (7th Cir.

2009) (cleaned up); see also Lewitton v. ITA Software,

Inc., 585 F.3d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Only if the ‘contract’s language is susceptible to more than one interpretation’ would we look to extrinsic evidence to

determine the parties’ intent.”) (quoting Camico Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Citizens Bank, 474 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir.

2007)). In this case, the objective intent of the parties

was clear from the face of the membership agreement.

By the plain language of the contract, the agreement

was a “voluntary authorization and assignment,” intended to “be irrevocable, regardless of whether [Ramon Baro is] or remain[s] a member of the Union, for

a period of one year.” Ramon Baro’s signature on the

contract further attested that it was “signed freely and

voluntarily.” Under Illinois contract law, such unambiguous language means that our analysis does not

consider the subjective understanding of the parties.

In other words, Ramon Baro’s belief that the contract

was mandatory is irrelevant. See Hendrickson, 992

F.3d at 962 (applying New Mexico contract law);

Fischer, 842 F. App’x at 752–53 (applying New Jersey

contract law).2

2

These same contract principles explain why Ramon Baro’s

suggestion that dismissing her claim would sanction coercion and

fraud by unions is unfounded. Fraud and coercion are common

App. 10

In sum, the First Amendment protects our right to

speak. It does not create an independent right to void

obligations when we are unhappy with what we have

said. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

defenses which can void contracts in the first place. See, e.g., Keystone Montessori Sch. v. Vill. of River Forest, 187 N.E.3d 1167,

1178 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021), reh’g denied, (July 20, 2021), appeal denied, 183 N.E.3d 909 (Ill. 2021).

App. 11

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[SEAL]

Everett McKinley Dirksen

United States Courthouse

Room 2722 –

219 S. Dearborn Street

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Office of the Clerk

Phone: (312) 435-5850

www.ca7.uscourts.gov

FINAL JUDGMENT

January 6, 2023

Before

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

ARIADNA RAMON BARO,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

No. 22-1722 LAKE COUNTY FEDERATION OF

TEACHERS LOCAL 504, IFTAFT/AFLCIO and WAUKEGAN COMMUNITY

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 60,

Defendants-Appellees

Originating Case Information:

District Court No: 1:20-cv-02126

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division

District Judge John F. Kness

The judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED,

with costs, in accordance with the decision of this court

entered on this date.

App. 12

/s/

Christopher Conway

Clerk of Court

App. 13

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ARIADNA RAMON BARO,

Plaintiff,

No. 20-cv-02126

v.

Judge John F. Kness

LAKE COUNTY FEDERATION

OF TEACHERS LOCAL 504,

IFT-AFT/AFL-CIO and

WAUKEGAN COMMUNITY

UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT #60,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

(Filed Mar. 28, 2022)

On August 20, 2019, Plaintiff Ariadna Ramon

Baro, a public-school English teacher, signed a membership agreement to join a teacher’s union under the

mistaken belief that such membership was required.

Under the terms of that agreement, Plaintiff authorized the union to deduct annual membership dues from

her salary. When Plaintiff realized her mistake—that

union membership and paying union dues were not, in

fact, required—Plaintiff attempted to resign her membership and revoke her dues authorization. On September 13, 2019, Plaintiff received an email from the

union asserting that “you will pay union dues regardless of whether or not you are a member,” which Plaintiff interpreted to mean that her request to resign was

effectively denied. In January 2020, the school began

App. 14

to deduct dues from Plaintiff ’s salary on the union’s

behalf.

On April 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed a § 1983 claim

against her employer and the Union for violating her

First Amendment rights under Janus v. Am. Fed’n of

State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, ___ U.S. ___,

138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). On April 10, 2020, the Union

sent Plaintiff a formal acknowledgment of her resignation, assurance that dues would no longer be deducted

from her earnings, and a check for a full refund of the

dues, plus five hundred additional dollars to compensate Plaintiff for her troubles. Plaintiff refused to accept the check and instead amended her complaint to

add a claim for punitive damages.

Now before the Court are Defendants’ fully briefed

motions to dismiss. As explained below, Plaintiff ’s voluntary choice to join her school’s local union—even if

ill-informed—means that Plaintiff is bound by the

terms of the union membership agreement and thus

cannot show that the deduction of dues from her

paycheck violated the First Amendment. Accordingly,

Defendants’ motions are granted, and the case is dismissed.

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ariadna Ramon Baro, a citizen of Spain,

relocated to Waukegan, Illinois in 2019 to begin work

as an English-as-a-second-language teacher for high

school students in the Waukegan Community Unit

School District #60 (the “District”). (First Amended

App. 15

Complaint (“FAC”), Dkt. 7 ¶ 10.) On August 20, 2019,

Plaintiff attended an orientation meeting at which a

representative of Defendant Lake County Federation

of Teachers, Local 504, IFT-AFT/AFL-CIO (the “Union”) presented information about the teachers’ union.

(Id. ¶ 11.) Believing that membership in the Union was

required, Plaintiff filled out the union membership

card and returned it to the representative. (Id.) Under

the terms of that union membership agreement, Plaintiff agreed to authorize the Union “to deduct from

[Plaintiff ’s] earnings on a regular pro rata basis . . .

[a]n amount equal to the current annual membership

dues as certified by [the Union] . . . for a period of one

year[.]” (FAC, Exh. A.)

A few days later, Plaintiff “learned that union

membership and paying the union was, in fact, not required,” contrary to her prior belief. (Id. ¶ 12.) She then

sent letters to both the District and the Illinois Federation of Teachers (the Union’s affiliated entity) resigning her membership. (Id. ¶ 13.) In those letters,

Plaintiff declared that her earlier dues-deduction authorization “was signed under a framework Janus

declared unconstitutional.” (Id., Exhs. B & C.) On September 13, 2019, Plaintiff received an unrelated email

from “Mr. Weber,” a fellow teacher and a union representative, stating that “you will pay union dues regardless of whether or not you are a member.” (Id. ¶ 14.)

This statement, Plaintiff admits, was not true. (Id.

¶ 14.) But Plaintiff believed at the time that this

emailed statement “meant that her request to resign

was effectively denied.” (Id. ¶ 15.)

App. 16

In January 2020, the District began deducting Union dues from Plaintiff ’s paycheck and remitting them

to the Union. (Id. ¶ 16.) On February 3, 2020, Plaintiff

again contacted her Union representative and the District’s payroll department to explain that she wanted

to resign her membership and stop paying dues. (Id.

¶ 17.) But the payroll department told her that it could

not stop deducting the dues and that she would have

to speak to her Union representative. (Id.) The Union

president then contacted Plaintiff and explained that

she would have to wait until the withdrawal period in

August 2020 to resign her membership and stop the

deduction of dues. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed her first complaint in this case on

April 3, 2020, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.

§ 2201(a) against Defendants for violating her First

Amendment rights by allegedly withholding Plaintiff’s dues without Plaintiff’s consent. (Id. ¶ 18; Dkt.

1.) Specifically, Plaintiff sought various declarations

regarding Defendant’s violation of Plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights under Janus, an injunction barring

the further deduction of her Union dues, damages in

the form of all dues collected from her, and costs and

fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (See Dkt. 1.) On April 15,

2020, Plaintiff received a letter from the Union acknowledging her resignation and explaining that dues

would no longer be deducted. (FAC ¶ 18.) The letter included a check for $829.30, which represented “a full

refund of all [Plaintiff ’s] dues plus an additional five

hundred dollars for your efforts in pursuing this matter.” (Id. ¶ 18, Exh. F.) Plaintiff returned the check (id.

App. 17

¶ 20) and filed an amended complaint on April 24, 2020

that added a claim for punitive damages (See FAC).

Now before the Court are Defendants’ fully briefed

motions to dismiss. (Dkts. 20, 22.) For the reasons

discussed below, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are

granted.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “challenges the

sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820

(7th Cir. 2009). Each complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Those allegations

“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Put another way, the complaint must present a “short, plain,

and plausible factual narrative that conveys a story

that holds together.” Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 23

F.4th 774, 777 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation omitted). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must

accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations and

draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff ’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. But even though factual allegations are entitled to the assumption of truth, mere

legal conclusions are not. Id. at 678-79.

App. 18

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that Plaintiff ’s complaint

must be dismissed under both 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1).

(Dkts. 21, 22.) Defendants first argue that Plaintiff ’s

claim does not implicate the First Amendment because

Plaintiff voluntarily entered into a private agreement

with Defendants. (Dkt. 21 at 5-7; Dkt. 22 at 1-2.) Defendants also contend that their tender to Plaintiff,

made after Plaintiff brought this action, eliminated

any case or controversy between the parties. (Dkt. 21

at 9-14; Dkt. 22 at 2-3.) As matter of jurisdiction, the

Court first addresses the issue of mootness.

A. Plaintiff ’s case is not moot

If a case becomes moot at any point during the proceedings, it is “no longer a Case or Controversy for purposes of Article III and is outside the jurisdiction of the

federal courts.” Big Shoulders Cap. LLC v. San Luis &

Rio Grande R.R., Inc., 13 F.4th 560, 570 (7th Cir. 2021).

A case is moot when “the issues presented are no

longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” L.A. Cnty. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625,

631 (1979) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,

496 (1969)). The party asserting mootness bears a

“heavy burden of proof ” in demonstrating it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could

not reasonably be expected to recur.” Freedom From

Religion Found., Inc. v. Concord Comm. Schs., 885 F.3d

1038, 1051 (7th Cir. 2018). The proper test for mootness

is “whether it is still possible to fashion some form of

App. 19

meaningful relief to the [Plaintiff ] in the event [she]

prevails on the merits.” Holder v. Ill. Dept. of Corrs.,

751 F.3d 486, 498 (7th Cir. 2014). To answer this question, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff remains injured and what relief Plaintiff requests.

At the crux of Plaintiff ’s alleged injury is a constitutional deprivation; namely, that Defendants violated

Plaintiff ’s First Amendment rights under Janus by

withholding union dues from Plaintiff ’s pay. To remedy

this, Plaintiff requests: (1) a declaration that the union

membership card she signed did not waive her First

Amendment rights under Janus and that Defendants’

actions thereby violated Plaintiff ’s constitutional

rights; (2) actual damages for all union dues collected

from her; (3) punitive damages against the Union; and

(4) costs and attorneys’ fees. (FAC at 8-9.) After Plaintiff filed this case, but before she filed the operative

complaint, the District ceased withholding union dues

from Plaintiff ’s paycheck and remitting them to the

Union, and the Union voluntarily attempted to fully

refund garnished dues plus a $500 check for Plaintiff ’s

“efforts in pursuing this matter.” (Id. ¶¶ 18-19, Exh. F.)

Plaintiff returned the check, (id. ¶ 20) and filed an

amended complaint with an added claim for punitive

damages.

As a general rule, an unaccepted settlement offer

does not render a case moot. Campbell-Ewald Co. v.

Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 162 (2016). And the Seventh Circuit has overruled a number of its decisions to the

extent they hold that “a defendant’s offer of full compensation moots the litigation or otherwise ends the

App. 20

Article III case or controversy.” Chapman v. First Index,

Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).1 Chapman went

so far as to suggest that “[e]ven a defendant’s proof

that the plaintiff has accepted full compensation . . . is

an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional

bar.” Id. Under Chapman, Defendant’s attempted reimbursement cannot create a jurisdictional bar to

Plaintiff ’s claim for damages. As a result, Plaintiff ’s

claim for monetary relief is not moot. For the same reason, Plaintiff ’s requested declaratory relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2201 also survives a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge.

See NewPage Wis. Sys. Inc. v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO/CLC, 651 F.3d 775, 776 (7th

Cir. 2011) (“Declaratory judgment actions are authorized as long as there is an actual controversy between

the two parties”).

Without regard to whether any prospective injunction would provide meaningful relief to Plaintiff,2

1

Chapman explained that “[i]f an offer to satisfy all of the

plaintiff ’s demands really moots a case, then it self-destructs.

Rule 68 is captioned ‘Offer of Judgment.’ But a district court cannot enter judgment in a moot case. . . . So if [Defendant tendered

an offer that] made this case moot, even if [Plaintiff ] had accepted

it the district court could not have ordered [Defendant] to pay.”

Chapman, 796 F.3d at 786.

2

Before Plaintiff filed her operative complaint, the Union

had already ceased the challenged conduct: the Union acknowledged Plaintiff ’s request to become a nonmember and ceased

deducting dues from her paycheck. (FAC, Exh. F.) Although a defendant’s voluntary cessation of challenge conduct “does not necessarily render a case moot,” if a defendant “sincerely self-corrects

the practice at issue, a court will give this effort weight in its

App. 21

Plaintiff ’s claims for damages and declaratory relief

satisfy the “Article III minima of injury-in-fact” to

maintain “requisite standing.” Havens Realty Corp. v.

Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 371 (1982). It is well established that “even the availability of a ‘partial remedy’

is ‘sufficient to prevent [a] case from being moot.’ ” Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) (quoting

Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S.

9, 13 (1992)). Thus, so long as Plaintiff has some available remedy—even if not “fully satisfactory”—Plaintiff ’s case is not moot. Id.

In view of Chapman, Plaintiff ’s claim for monetary damages and declaratory relief are not rendered

moot by Defendant’s voluntary attempts to provide a

remedy. Because a case or controversy exists, the Court

mootness determination.” Freedom From Religion Found., 885

F.3d at 1051 (citing Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Schober, 366 F.3d

485, 492 (7th Cir. 2004)). Even viewed in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff, the complaint does not suggest the Union’s conduct is

reasonably expected to recur. Plaintiff admits that the statement

she received—that she would have to “pay union dues regardless

of whether or not [she became] a member”—“was not true.” (Dkt.

7 ¶ 14.) For its part, the Union disavows its “legally inaccurate”

statement in the letter as a “misstatement.” (Dkt. 21 at 7.) Plaintiff further concedes that she “might not ever face the unconstitutional conduct alleged in her complaint again given [the Union’s]

voluntary cessation,” and that the Union’s conduct “may make

[Plaintiff ’s] requested injunctive relief . . . moot.” (Dkt. 27 at 9.)

Although the pleadings create no reason to believe that Defendant could “resurrect the older procedure in the future,” Boyd v.

Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 89 (7th Cir. 1975), Plaintiff, for the reasons

identified in this opinion, maintains justiciable claims for damages and declaratory relief. Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150

(1996).

App. 22

retains its jurisdiction under Article III and can proceed to address Defendants’ motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6).

B. Plaintiff ’s complaint does not implicate the First Amendment

In 2018, the Supreme Court held that “[n]either

an agency fee for any other payment to the union

may be deducted from a nonmember’s wages, nor may

any other attempt be made to collect such a payment,

unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay. By

agreeing to pay, nonmembers are waiving their First

Amendment rights, and such a waiver cannot be presumed.” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486 (emphasis added).

But “Janus said nothing about union members who . . .

freely chose to join a union and voluntarily authorized

the deduction of union dues, and who thus consented

to subsidizing a union.” Bennett v. Council 31 of the Am.

Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO, 991 F.3d

724, 732 (7th Cir. 2021).

Janus held that the First Amendment prohibits

unions from forcing compulsory payroll deductions—

i.e., “fair share” fees—from workers who are not union

members. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486. In Janus, the

plaintiff was not a member of the union, but the collective bargaining agreement nevertheless required him

to pay agency fees to the union, which in turn spent

that money in part on lobbying and advertising on behalf of the union. Id. As the Supreme Court explained,

compelling nonmembers to subsidize the activities of a

App. 23

public sector union by automatically deducting fairshare fees runs afoul of the First Amendment absent

an employee’s affirmative consent and waiver of such

right as shown by “clear and compelling evidence.” Id.

Plaintiff ’s claim presupposes that the Supreme

Court’s decision in Janus established a First Amendment right for all public employees—including union

members—not to subsidize a union by means of deduction of union dues without first affirmatively consenting to waive that right. But the Seventh Circuit

expressly rejected that reading of Janus in Bennett v.

AFSCME Council 31, joining instead “a swelling chorus of courts” that have held Janus does not, as a matter of law, require a constitutional waiver before union

dues are deducted from employees who have chosen to

join a public sector union. Bennett, 991 F.3d at 730-31.

As here, the plaintiff in Bennett signed a union

membership card and later asserted that the Janus decision voided her dues-deduction authorization. Id. at

730. But the Seventh Circuit held that the union and

school district did not violate the plaintiff ’s First

Amendment rights by continuing to deduct union dues

from her paychecks after she revoked her union membership, explaining that the signing of a union membership card authorized the deduction of union dues

“in the context of a contractual relationship” and that

“[t]he First Amendment does not confer a constitutional right to disregard promises that would otherwise be enforced under state law.” Id. at 731 (cleaned

up).

App. 24

Bennett fatally undermines Plaintiff ’s claim that

her “Janus rights” were violated by Defendants’ conduct. Indeed, Plaintiff ’s own allegations establish that

she signed the union membership agreement voluntarily, meaning that she is bound by the contract she entered. See Troesch v. Chi. Tchrs. Union, Loc. Union

No.1, Am. Fed’n of Tchrs., 522 F. Supp. 3d 425, 431

(N.D. Ill. 2021) (dismissing complaint for failure to

state a Janus claim), aff ’d, No. 21-1525, 2021 WL

2587783 (7th Cir. Apr. 15, 2021), cert. denied sub nom.

Troesch v. Chi. Tchrs. Union, 142 S. Ct. 425 (2021). Although the Court need look no further than Janus and

Bennett to dispose of Plaintiff ’s First Amendment

claim, an exploration of the record is necessary to

demonstrate why Plaintiff ’s claim fails.

1. Plaintiff Voluntarily Joined the Union

It is undisputed that Plaintiff signed the union

membership agreement and that such membership

was not a condition of Plaintiff ’s employment. (See

FAC ¶ 11-12.) By its terms, the membership card was

required to “authorize” the deduction of union dues

and to “apply to be a member” in the union. (Id., Exh.

A.) Union membership was thus on an opt-in basis, not

opt-out. (Id. (“I hereby apply to be a member”; “I hereby

authorize . . . the [union] to act as my exclusive representative with my employer[.]”).)

Plaintiff now asserts that there is not “clear and

convincing evidence that she provided affirmative consent to waive her right not to pay” union dues because,

App. 25

although she agreed to the terms of the membership

agreement, Plaintiff did not specifically agree to give

up her rights under Janus not to subsidize union

speech. (Id. ¶ 3.) But this crabbed view finds no support in Janus or Bennett; Janus “said nothing about

union members who, like [Plaintiff ] voluntarily authorized the deduction of union dues.” Bennett, 991

F.3d at 732.

Plaintiff does not dispute that she voluntarily

signed the union membership card. (Dkt. 27 at 6

(Plaintiff “has never alleged that [the] September 13,

2019 statement caused her to involuntarily sign the

union card on August 20, 2019”).) Instead, Plaintiff alleges that “she filled out the union membership form”

because she “[b]eliev[ed] it to be required” and “was

unaware of the Supreme Court’s Janus decision.” (FAC

¶ 11.) A few days later, Plaintiff says, she realized her

mistake and resigned her membership “[p]er the U.S.

Supreme Court’s decision in Janus [sic].” (Id., Exh. B.)

Plaintiff also alleges that the unrelated communication she received from “Mr. Weber” the following

month—stating that Plaintiff “will pay union dues regardless of whether or not [Plaintiff is a] member”—

caused her to believe that her request to resign “was

effectively denied.” (Id. ¶ 15.)

Although Plaintiff admits that the substance Weber’s email “was not true”—Plaintiff concedes Defendants do not deduct union dues from nonmembers—

Plaintiff maintains that she “did not know it was not

true” at the time. (FAC ¶ 14.) This assertion is difficult

to square with Plaintiff ’s Exhibits B and C, which

App. 26

reflect, in detail, Plaintiff ’s apparent certitude—two

weeks before she received the Weber email—that she

was not obligated to remain a union member or to pay

dues as a nonmember:

Effective immediately, I resign my membership from the Union and all affiliated

unions and wish to be considered a nonmember.

Per the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. AFSCME, I cannot be required to pay

any dues or fees to a union to maintain my job.

Therefore, neither the Union nor my Employer is authorized to enforce any authorization I previously gave or may be perceived

to have given pursuant to a signed authorization form, or any authorization that Employer

has inferred on my behalf, allowing Employer

to make an automatic payroll deduction for

Union dues or fees.

Furthermore, any restriction on the timing of revoking a dues/fees deduction is

invalid because any previous authorization was signed under a framework Janus declared unconstitutional.

If you refuse to accept this letter as both an

effective resignation and my immediate revocation of the automatic dues or fees deduction,

please inform me immediately, in writing, of

exactly what must be done to revoke my automatic dues or fees deduction authorization

and resign my membership in the Union.

App. 27

Please respond promptly. Any further collection of dues or fees will constitute a violation

of my rights under the U.S. Constitution.

(Id., Exhs. B & C.)

Plaintiff ’s assertion that she thought her resignation was rejected is also belied by Plaintiff ’s allegation

that, on February 3, 2020, she “again contacted her union representative and the payroll department of the

District”—the details are sketchy—“and explained

that she wanted to resign her membership and stop

paying dues.” (Id. ¶ 17.) If Plaintiff truly believed that

her earlier resignation request was de facto denied by

the Weber email, it is odd that Plaintiff chose to reiterate that previously-ineffective request.

These discrepancies may be immaterial, however,

because the Court is bound to accept Plaintiff ’s factual

allegations as true and to draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff ’s favor. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Doing just that, the Court understands the essence of

Plaintiff ’s narrative to be as follows:

➢

Plaintiff signed a union membership application form on August 20, 2019, authorizing the

Union to deduct dues from Plaintiff ’s earning

“for a period of one year from the date of authorization.” (FAC, Exh. A.)

➢

At the time she signed the form, Plaintiff did

not know that joining the union was optional.

(Id. ¶ 11.)

➢

On August 30, 2019, Plaintiff sent detailed

letters to Defendants attempting to void her

App. 28

previously given authorization because “any

previous authorization was signed under a

framework Janus declared unconstitutional.”

(Id., Exhs. B & C.)

➢

On September 13, 2019, Weber, a union representative, responded “you will pay union dues

regardless whether or not you are a member”

to a group email that happened to include

Plaintiff as a recipient. (Id., Exh. D.) Plaintiff

interpreted the email to mean that her request to resign was denied. (Id. ¶ 15.)

➢

The District began deducting dues from Plaintiff ’s paycheck in January 2020. (Id. ¶ 16.)

➢

Plaintiff sent another letter to Defendants in

February 2020 “explain[ing] that she wanted

to resign her membership and stop paying

dues.” (Id. ¶ 17.)

➢

In response, the Union President explained to

Plaintiff that, by signing the dues authorization card, Plaintiff “became a dues payer for

at least 1 year.” (Id., Exh. E.)

➢

On April 10, 2020, soon after Plaintiff filed her

initial complaint in this case, the Union President sent Plaintiff a letter acknowledging

Plaintiff ’s resignation. (Id., Exh. F.)

Even accepting Plaintiff ’s erroneous beliefs as

true, Plaintiff ’s claim fails as a matter of law. As explained above, Plaintiff voluntarily joined the union.

As for Plaintiff ’s suggestion that her choice is not binding because it was ill-informed, the Court is aware of

no authority (including Janus) that imposes a duty of

App. 29

informed consent to apply for membership in a union.

Put differently, Janus did not mandate the workplace

equivalent of Miranda warnings3 before an employee’s

application to join a public-sector union could be presumed valid. See Bennett, 991 F.3d at 732 (“The Court

[in Janus] made clear that a union may collect dues

when an ‘employee affirmatively consents to pay.’ ”).

2. Plaintiff is Contractually Bound by her

Union Membership Agreement

Plaintiff nonetheless insists that, because she

“was not told that joining or paying the Union was

optional,” the withholding of union dues from her

paycheck violated her First Amendment rights. (Dkt.

27 at 2-5, 11.) But the Seventh Circuit has explained

that Janus “in no way created a new First Amendment

waiver requirement for union members before dues are

deducted pursuant to a voluntary agreement.” Bennett,

991 F.3d at 732 (quoting Belgau v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 940,

952 (9th Cir. 2020)); id. (“one ‘cannot simultaneously

choose to both join the Union and not pay union dues’ ”)

(quoting Oliver v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Loc., 830 F.

App’x 76, 79 n.3 (3d Cir. 2020)). Plaintiff ’s voluntary

act of signing and submitting a union membership

application card means that the concern in Janus—

nonmembers being forced to pay union dues—is not

present here. See Belgau, 975 F.3d at 952 (Supreme

Court only “discussed constitutional waiver because it

concluded that nonmembers’ First Amendment right

3

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

App. 30

had been infringed”); see also Bennett, 991 F.3d at 73233 (“[Plaintiff ] is not a non-member as the term was

used in Janus. . . . [Plaintiff ] does not fall within the

sweep of Janus’ waiver requirement”).

By signing the application card, Plaintiff was

bound to the terms of the membership agreement. As

Bennett explained, the First Amendment does not “render unenforceable any legal obligations or restrictions

that are self-imposed through a contract.” Bennett, 991

F.3d at 731 (cleaned up). Nor does it “confer . . . a constitutional right to disregard promises that would otherwise be enforced under state law.” Id. (quoting Cohen

v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991)). In the

time since Bennett was decided, many courts have recognized that “Janus does not articulate a path ‘to escape the terms’ of an agreement to pay union dues.”

Troesch, 522 F. Supp. 3d at 431 (collecting cases).

Plaintiff voluntarily entered into a one-year contract

with the Union, which necessarily included a duespaying obligation for one year even if Plaintiff later

wanted to escape those terms. (FAC, Exh. A (“This voluntary authorization and assignment shall be irrevocable . . . for a period of one year”).) Regardless of

Plaintiff ’s back-and-forth with the union and its representatives, and regardless of the union’s later decision to grant Plaintiff an early release from the

agreement, Plaintiff can be held to that obligation

without running afoul of Janus and the First Amendment. See Bennett, 991 F.3d at 731.

*

*

*

App. 31

In sum, Plaintiff ’s complaint does not raise a right

to relief beyond the speculative level. See Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555. Plaintiff may now regret her earlier decision to join the Union, but that does not render her

knowing and voluntary choice nonconsensual. Unlike

the proscribed conduct by Janus’ employer, the District’s deductions of dues from Plaintiff ’s earnings

were made in compliance with Plaintiff ’s explicit written instructions. See Troesch, 522 F. Supp. 3d at 431

(dismissing complaint where “Plaintiffs do not identify

‘even a whiff of compulsion’ that led them to sign the

[union] agreements in the first place”). In the light of

Plaintiff ’s voluntary agreement to pay union dues, and

in the absence of any legitimate claim of compulsion,

Plaintiff has failed to state a First Amendment claim

against Defendants.4

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons provided above, the Court grants

Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Dkt. 20, 22). Because

a plaintiff who affirmatively “consented to pay dues to

the union . . . does not fall within the sweep of Janus’s

waiver requirement,” Bennett, 991 F.3d at 733, any

amendment to the complaint would be futile. Accordingly, this dismissal is with prejudice. See Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2013) (leave to

4

Because Plaintiff ’s First Amendment claim does not implicate Janus, the Court need not address whether the Union is a

“state actor” engaging in “state action.”

App. 32

amend need not be granted “if it is clear that any

amendment would be futile”).

SO ORDERED in No. 20-cv-02126.

Date: March 28, 2022

/s/ John F. Kness

JOHN F. KNESS

United States

District Judge

App. 33

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ARIADNA RAMON BARO,

Plaintiff,

No. 21-cv-02126

v.

Judge John F. Kness

LAKE COUNTY FEDERATION

OF TEACHERS LOCAL 504,

IFT-AFT/AFL-CIO and

WAUKEGAN COMMUNITY

UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT #60,

Defendants.

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

(Filed Mar. 29, 2022)

Judgment is hereby entered (check appropriate box):

⧠

in favor of plaintiff(s)

and against defendant(s)

in the amount of $

which ⧠ includes

prejudgment interest.

⧠ does not include prejudgment interest.

Post judgment interest accrues on that amount at

the rate provided by law from the date of this judgment.

Plaintiff(s) shall recover costs from defendant(s).

App. 34

☒

in favor of defendants Lake County Federation of Teachers Local 504, IFT-AFT/AFL-CIO

and Waukegan Community Unit School District #60,

and against plaintiff Ariadna Ramon Baro,

with prejudice.

Defendants shall recover costs from plaintiff.

⧠

other:

This action was (check one):

⧠

⧠

☒

tried by a jury with Judge

presiding, and the

jury has rendered a verdict.

tried by Judge

without a jury and the above

decision was reached.

decided by Judge John F. Kness on defendants’ motions to dismiss (Dkt. 20, 22).

SO ORDERED in No. 20-cv-02126.

Date: March 28, 2022

/s/ John F. Kness

JOHN F. KNESS

United States

District Judge

App. 35

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

February 7, 2023

Before

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 22-1722

ADRIADNA RAMON BARO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Appeal from the United

States District Court

for the Northern

v.

District of Illinois,

LAKE COUNTY FEDERATION Eastern Division.

OF TEACHERS LOCAL 504,

No. 1:20-cv-02126

IFT-AFT/AFLCIO and

WAUKEGAN COMMUNITY John F. Kness, Judge.

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 60,

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER

On consideration of the petition for rehearing

and petition for rehearing en banc, no judge in regular active service has requested a vote on the petition

for rehearing en banc1 and the judges on the original

panel have voted to deny rehearing. It is, therefore,

1

Circuit Judge Doris Pryor did not participate in the consideration of this petition for rehearing en banc.

App. 36

ORDERED that the petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED.

App. 37

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Ariadna Ramon Baro,

Plaintiff,

v.

No. 20-CV-2126

Judge John F. Kness

Lake County Federation

of Teachers Local 504,

IFT-AFT/AFL-CIO and

Waukegan Community

Unit School District #60

Defendants.

First Amended Complaint

(Filed Apr. 24, 2020)

1. Government employees have a First Amendment right not to be compelled to pay any dues or fees

to a union unless an employee affirmatively consents

to waive that right. Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448,

2486 (2018). “[W]aiver cannot be presumed. Rather, to

be effective, the waiver must be freely given and shown

by ‘clear and compelling’ evidence.” Id.

2. For a waiver of constitutional rights to be effective it must be clearly established that there was

an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a

known right or privilege. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S.

1, 4 (1966).

3. In this case, the union membership card Plaintiff Ariadna Ramon Baro signed is not clear and convincing evidence that she provided affirmative consent

to waive her right not to pay money to the union

App. 38

because it was not an intentional relinquishment of a

known right or privilege.

4. Ms. Ramon Baro, therefore, brings this case

under 42 U.S.C § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), seeking

declaratory relief, damages in the amount of the dues

previously deducted from her paychecks, and punitive

damages.

PARTIES

5. Plaintiff Ariadna Ramon Baro is J-1 Visa

holder employed by Defendant Waukegan Community

Unit School District #60 (“District”).

6. Defendant Lake County Federation of Teachers, Local 504, IFTAFT/AFL-CIO (“Union” or “Local

504”) is a labor union with offices at 248 Ambrogio

Drive, Gurnee, Illinois 60031. Local 504 is the certified

exclusive representative for the bargaining unit to

which Ms. Ramon Baro belongs. The Union is a labor

organization under Section 2(c) of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, 115 ILCS 5/2(c).

7. Defendant District has offices at 1201 North

Sheridan Road, Waukegan, Illinois 60085. It serves

nearly 17,000 students in preschool through grade

twelve through its fifteen elementary schools, five middle schools, and a high school program. It is an educational employer under Section 2(a) of the Illinois

Educational Labor Relations Act, 115 ILCS 5/2(a).

App. 39

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

8. This case raises claims under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

9. Venue is proper because a substantial portion

of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in the

Northern District of Illinois. 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2).

FACTS

10. Plaintiff Ariadna Ramon Baro is employed

by the District as an English-as-a-second-language

teacher for high school students. She is a J-1 Visa

holder from Barcelona, Spain employed by the District

under a cultural exchange program. The 2019-2020

school year is her first of three years that she will be

employed by the District.

11. In August 2019, she attended an orientation

meeting held by the District. During the orientation,

the District provided information and training. The

District also gave Local 504 time at the orientation

meeting to speak about the union. During that presentation, Local 504’s representative told Ms. Ramon Baro

and her fellow teachers how much money in union

dues they would have to pay and gave them a form to

sign to join the Union. Ms. Ramon Baro was not told

that joining or paying the Union was optional. Believing it to be required, she filled out the union membership form and turned it in to the representative.

App. 40

Exhibit A. At the time she signed the union membership agreement, she was unaware of the Supreme

Court’s Janus decision.

12. A few days later, Ms. Ramon Baro learned

that union membership and paying the union was, in

fact, not required.

13. On August 30, 2019, she sent letters both to

the District and the Union resigning her membership.

Exhibits B and C.

14. On September 13, 2019, a pair of the union

representatives emailed the teachers of Ms. Ramon

Baro’s school, including Ms. Ramon Baro, to invite

them to join the union. The initial email from one of

the representatives, Cara Wyatt, stated, “I am contacting you to extend an invitation to join the Waukegan

teacher’s union.” In response, another representative,

Nathaniel Weber, stated “Just to clarify, you will pay

union dues regardless of whether or not you are a

member.” Exhibit D. This statement by Mr. Weber was

not true, but Ms. Ramon Baro did not know it was not

true. In fact, the Supreme Court held in Janus, 138

S. Ct. at 2486, that requiring government employees to

pay money to a union with their consent violates the

First Amendment.

15. Ms. Ramon Baro believed the statement by

Mr. Weber—that she would have to pay dues regardless of her union membership status—meant that her

request to resign was effectively denied.

App. 41

16. In January 2020, on her second paycheck of

the month, the District began deducting dues from Ms.

Ramon Baro’s paycheck and remitting them to the Union.

17. On February 3, 2020, Ms. Ramon Baro again

contacted her union representative and the payroll

department of the District and explained that she

wanted to resign her membership and stop paying

dues. The payroll department of the District told Ms.

Ramon Baro that they could not stop dues and she

must speak to the Union. The President of Waukegan

Council of Local 504, Andy Friedlieb, contacted her explaining that she would have to wait until August to

resign her membership and stop union dues from being

deducted. Exhibit E.

18. Ms. Ramon Baro filed her initial complaint in

this case on April 3, 2020. On April 15, she received a

letter from Local 504 President, Michael T. McGue,

dated April 10, 2020, informing her that she is no

longer a member of the Union, and that dues would

stop being withheld from her paycheck. The letter also

included a check for $829.30, representing “a full refund of all [Ms. Ramon Baro’s] dues plus an additional

five hundred dollars for your efforts in pursuing this

matter.” Exhibit F.

19. The District continued to withhold union

dues from Ms. Ramon Baro’s paycheck on behalf of the

Union until the April 15, 2020 paycheck, from which

dues were not withheld.

App. 42

20. Ms. Ramon Baro responded to Mr. McGue’s

letter on April 17, 2020, referring him to her counsel,

and returning the check. Exhibit G.

CAUSE OF ACTION

Local 504 and the District violated

Ms. Ramon Baro’s First Amendment right to

free speech by withholding union dues from

her paycheck without clear evidence that

she intentionally relinquished her right

not to pay money to the Union.

21. The allegations contained in all preceding

paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference.

22. In Janus v. AFSCME, the Supreme Court

held the First Amendment guarantees public employees a right to refrain from subsidizing a union and its

speech. 138 S. Ct. at 2486. “By agreeing to pay, nonmembers are waiving their First Amendment rights,

and such a waiver cannot be presumed.” Id. For a

waiver to be effective, it must be freely given and

shown by “clear and compelling” evidence. Without

clear and affirmative consent by an employee before

money is taken from them, this standard cannot be

met. Id.

23. For a waiver of constitutional rights to be

effective it must be clearly established that there

was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of

a known right or privilege. Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 4.

App. 43

24. One cannot waive a constitutional right—intentionally relinquish a known right—without knowledge that they are entitled to that right and that they

are engaging in an action to waive that right. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).

25. Government employers and exclusive-representative unions cannot presume government workers

have knowledge of their right not to pay money to the

union under Janus. Id. at 465.

26. Thus, government employers and exclusiverepresentative unions may not withhold union dues or

fees from government workers without clear and convincing evidence that those workers have knowledge of

their right not to pay money to a union.

27. At the time she signed the union membership card, Ms. Ramon Baro did not know she had a

right to not subsidize the Union and did not know that

by signing the union membership card she was relinquishing that right.

28. The District and the Union have never had

clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Ramon Baro

had knowledge of her right to not pay money to the union and intentionally relinquished that right.

29. The fact that Ms. Ramon Baro signed the union membership card is not clear and convincing evidence that she knew that she had a right to not join

or pay money to the union or that she intentionally

wished to relinquish that right.

App. 44

30. The union membership card itself does not

provide any indication that by signing it an employee

waives their First Amendment right to not pay

money to the Union. Nor did the Union or the District inform her of her right to not join or pay money

to the Union before she signed the union membership

card. And as a Spanish citizen working on a J-1 visa,

Ms. Ramon Baro would especially have no reason to

have knowledge of American constitutional law.

31. Worse, Ms. Ramon Baro was given false information by a union representative, asserting (wrongly)

that teachers would have to pay union dues regardless

of whether they were members or not. Thus, not only

did Ms. Ramon Baro not have knowledge of her right

not to subsidize the union, but she was informed

(falsely) of the opposite—that she was required to subsidize the union no matter what.

32. When she contacted the Union, informing

them that she had not understood her Janus rights,

she was told that she would have to continue paying

dues until August 2020.

33. Illinois law authorizes union dues deductions

until a limited “opt-out window.” 115 ILCS 5/11.1(a).

34. As a result, the District deducted dues from

Ms. Ramon Baro’s paycheck and gave them to Local

504 under color of state law.

35. Local 504 acted in concert with the District

to collect union dues from Ms. Ramon Baro’s paycheck

without her knowing waiver and refused to allow her

App. 45

to cancel her dues until after she filed this lawsuit. In

doing so, Local 504 acted under color of state law.

36. The actions of Local 504 and the District constitute a violation of Ms. Ramon Baro’s First Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of association

not to join or financially support a union without her

affirmative consent freely given after knowing waiver.

37. Ms. Ramon Baro is entitled to a declaration

that the union membership card she signed does not

constitute clear and convincing evidence that she intentionally relinquished her right to not pay money to

the Union because it does not provide evidence that

she knew of this right or that she intentionally relinquished it by signing the union membership card.

38. Ms. Ramon Baro is entitled to a declaration

that the actions of the District and Local 504 to withhold union dues or fees from her paycheck without

clear and convincing evidence establishing that she intentionally relinquished her right to not pay money to

the Union violate the First Amendment.

39. Ms. Ramon Baro is entitled to a declaration

that the actions of the District and Local 504 to withhold union dues or fees from her paycheck without

clear and convincing evidence establishing that she

knew she had a right to not pay money to the Union

violate the First Amendment.

40. Based on those declarations and findings, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Ms. Ramon Baro is entitled to

damages in the amount of all dues deducted and remitted to Local 504 from April 2019 to present.

App. 46

41. Ms. Ramon Baro is entitled to punitive damages against Local 504 because its actions were at a

minimum recklessly indifferent to Ms. Ramon Baro’s

federally protected rights—if not maliciously motivated—given the fraudulent statement made by its

representative, which caused Ms. Ramon Baro substantial personal and professional distress.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Ms. Ramon Baro respectfully requests that this

Court:

a. Declare that the union membership

card she signed does not constitute clear and

convincing evidence that she intentionally relinquished her right to not pay money to the

Union because it does not provide evidence

that she knew of this right or that she intentionally relinquished it by signing the union

membership card;

b. Declare that the actions of the District and Local 504 to withhold union dues or

fees from her paycheck without clear and convincing evidence establishing that she intentionally relinquished her right to not pay

money to the Union violate her First Amendment rights;

c. Declare that the actions of the District and Local 504 to withhold union dues or

fees from her paycheck without clear and convincing evidence establishing that she knew

App. 47

she had a right to not pay money to the Union

violate her First Amendment rights;

d. Award damages against Local 504 for

all union dues collected from her;

e. Award punitive damages against Local 504 because its actions were at a minimum

recklessly indifferent to Ms. Ramon Baro’s

federally protected rights—if not maliciously

motivated—given the fraudulent statement

made by its representative;

f. Award her costs and attorneys’ fees

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and

g. Award her any further relief to which

she may be entitled and such other relief as

this Court may deem just and proper.

Dated: April 24, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jeffrey M. Schwab

Jeffrey M. Schwab

(IL Bar. No. 6290710)

James J. McQuaid

(IL. Bar. No. 6321108)

Liberty Justice Center

190 South LaSalle Street,

Suite 1500

Chicago, Illinois 60603

Telephone (312) 263-7668

Facsimile (312) 263-7702

jschwab@libertyjusticecenter.org

jmcquaid@libertyjusticecenter.org

Attorneys for Plaintiff