Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Stanford James Stelle, III, Petitioner v. California

i

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate

District, Order Modifying Opinion and Denying Rehearing, December 12, 2022 .................. App. 1

California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate

District, Opinion, November 23, 2022 ........... App. 13

Superior Court of California, County of Riverside, Minute Order, April 30, 2021 ................ App. 49

Superior Court of California, County of Riverside, Minute Order, December 17, 2020 ........ App. 56

Superior Court of California, County of Riverside, Minute Order, October 23, 2020 ............ App. 61

Supreme Court of California, Docket Entry

Denying Review, February 1, 2023 ................ App. 64

Superior Court of California, County of Riverside, Transcript Denying Second Competency

Hearing, October 23, 2020 ............................. App. 65

App. 1

Filed 12/12/2022

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits

courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has

not been certified for publication or ordered published

for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

No. B322499

Plaintiff and

Respondent,

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. INF1500499)

v.

ORDER MODIFYING

OPINION AND DENYING

REHEARING

STANFORD JAMES

STELLE, III,

Defendant and

Appellant.

NO CHANGE IN THE

JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on November

23, 2022, be modified as follows:

1.

On page four, in the second sentence of the

second full paragraph, replace the semicolon

App. 2

with a comma, and insert after that comma,

“the charging documents, a police report regarding the molestation, and defendant’s police interview,” so that the full sentence reads:

Dr. Leitman wrote a four-page report based

solely on an interview with defendant, the

charging documents, a police report regarding

the molestation, and defendant’s police interview.

2.

In the fourth sentence of the same paragraph

(also on page four), which begins, “Because,”

delete the second word,” defendant,” and replace it with “defendant’s answers indicated a

lack of ‘knowledge about important aspects of

the legal system’ and because he,” such that

the sentence reads:

Because defendant’s answers indicated a lack

of “knowledge about important aspects of the

legal system” and because he gave “some bizarre responses” during that interview—including that he “lived in bushes,” “loves to ride

horses,” and has problems remembering

things—Dr. Leitman opined that defendant

“would not be able to cooperate with his attorney” in his defense.

3.

In the immediately following sentence (also

on page 4), which begins, “Dr. Clark,” insert

“in her nine-page report” after the first “and,”

so that the sentence reads:

Dr. Clark also interviewed defendant, and in

her nine-page report observed that he had

“poor eye contact,” a” flat” “affect,” and what

App. 3

appeared to be “impaired” “memory function”

during that interview.

4.

Delete the sentence that begins at the end of

page four and continues onto page five—beginning, “In November 2015”—and replace it

with the following sentence:

In November 2015, the parties stipulated that

the trial court may base its finding of incompetency to stand trial on Dr. Leitman’s and Dr.

Clark’s reports.

5.

In the sentence that immediately follows (on

page five), replace “Based on that stipulation,

the” with “The,” and insert “consequently” after “court,” so that the sentence reads:

The court consequently found defendant

“mentally incompetent to stand trial” and suspended the criminal proceedings.

6.

At the end of page nine, in the first part of the

first sentence following the bullet point labeled “Testimony of Dr. Jones,” replace the

phrase “that the prior diagnosis of malingering was still valid,” with “his prior opinion

that defendant was likely malingering,” so

that the beginning of that sentence reads:

Dr. Jones did not reexamine defendant, but reaffirmed his prior opinion that defendant was

likely malingering because . . .

7.

In the same sentence as immediately above

(but on page 10), after the comma that precedes, “(2) Dr. Gilewski’s diagnosis,” add a

footnote and renumber the subsequent

App. 4

footnotes accordingly. The footnote should

read as follows:

3

Although Dr. Jones acknowledged that he

had not “seen [the] norms for autistic individuals” (that would place defendant on “some

type of autism scale”), he went on to testify

that defendant “appeared to be able to concentrate and to engage” in a way that “an autistic

person . . . lost in their thoughts way out here

. . . might not be able to do.”

8.

Also in the same sentence as immediately

above (on page 10), insert between “(6) defendant’s” and “neurocognitive disorder” the following: “medical records ‘indicate[d]’ that his,”

so that the last part of that sentence reads:

and (6) defendant’s medical records “indicate[d]” that his neurocognitive disorder was

not progressive.

9.

Delete the first full sentence on page 11,

which begins,” However, Dr. Jones testified,”

and replace it with the following sentence:

However, Dr. Jones testified that this email

did not “impact” him in how he “approached

this case” and that he was “not concerned”

about defendant’s release status when evaluating defendant’s mental health.

10. On page 18, in the sentence immediately preceding the heading “B. Analysis,” replace the

word” cast” with the phrase “constitute a substantial change in circumstances or new evidence casting,” so that the sentence reads:

App. 5

Consequently, where the new information

“substantially duplicates evidence already

considered at” the prior hearing or any change

entails “minor changes in the defendant’s

mental state,” it does not constitute a substantial change in circumstances or new evidence casting a serious doubt on the prior

finding and does not warrant convening a new

competency hearing.

11. In the third full paragraph on page 20, in the

second sentence, which begins, “There is also

no support,” insert a fourth footnote after

“Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83,” and

renumber subsequent footnotes accordingly.

The footnote should read:

4

Because a prosecutor’s duty under Brady

to disclose “favorable” evidence to the defense

encompasses evidence that impeaches government witnesses (Turner v. United States

(2017) 137 S.Ct. 1885, 1893), Brady subsumes

the duty of prosecutors to disclose impeachment evidence first recognized in Giglio v.

United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150.

12. In the same sentence where the fourth footnote above is to be inserted, delete”; further,

any discovery error can be harmless (Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 399), and as explained below, was harmless error,” and insert

the following full sentence as the third sentence of the paragraph:

Further, and contrary to what defendant argues in his petition for rehearing, the nondisclosure of favorable evidence violates Brady

App. 6

only if the evidence was” material” to the outcome of the proceeding (People v. Beck & Cruz

(2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 557), and violations of

the Criminal Discovery Act are subject to

harmless error analysis (Buenrostro, supra, 6

Cal.5th at p. 399); as explained below, the ex

parte communication was not material to the

outcome of the competency proceeding and its

omission was harmless here.

13. On page 22, delete the second sentence beneath the heading labeled, “2. October 2020

ruling not to convene a second competency

hearing,” which begins, “Applying the standards,” and replace it with the following sentence (leaving untouched the citation that

follows the original sentence):

Applying the standards set forth above, the

trial court’s ruling was correct as long as substantial evidence supported its findings that

(1) there was no substantial change of circumstances, or (2) there was no new evidence casting a serious doubt on the validity of the trial

court’s prior, May 2019 finding of competency.

14. In the next paragraph, which is the second

full paragraph beneath the heading labeled

“2. October 2020 ruling not to convene a second

competency hearing,” delete the first sentence,

which begins, “Even if we assume,” and replace it with the following sentence:

Even if we assume that the additional evaluations defendant proffered in October 2020

qualify as a “change of circumstances” or as

“new evidence,” the trial court had substantial

App. 7

evidence to support its rulings that the evaluations did not constitute a substantial change

in circumstances or new evidence that cast serious doubt on the trial court’s prior finding

that defendant was competent to stand trial.

15. In the sentence that begins on page 22 and

continues onto page 23, delete the word “new,”

so that the sentence reads:

The evidence defendant proffered was largely

aimed at undermining that subsidiary finding

of malingering.

16. In the first full sentence on page 23, which

reads “But that new evidence,” delete “new evidence did not cast” and replace it with “evidence did not constitute a substantial change

in circumstances or constitute new evidence

that casts,” so that the beginning of the sentence now reads:

But that evidence did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances or constitute

new evidence that casts a serious doubt on

that finding because . . .

17. In the sentence that immediately follows (also

on page 23), delete “cast no,” and insert in its

place, “was not a substantial change in circumstance and was not new evidence casting,”

so that the sentence reads:

And because the evidence of defendant’s malingering remained unassailed, the additional

evidence that his feigned memory loss was

getting worse was not a substantial change in

App. 8

circumstances and was not new evidence casting doubt on the prior finding of competency.

18. In the second full paragraph on page 23, in the

second sentence, which begins with “Thus, defendant concludes,” delete “cast” and insert in

its place “were a substantial change in circumstances and new evidence casting,” so

that the sentence reads:

Thus, defendant concludes, the new diagnoses

were a substantial change in circumstances

and new evidence casting doubt on the trial

court’s prior finding of competency.

19. In the first sentence of the first full paragraph

on page 24, which begins “Second, defendant

argues,” delete the word “new,” and insert

between “thereby” and “casting,” the words

“constituting a substantial change in circumstances and,” so that the sentence reads:

Second, defendant argues that the evidence

regarding the prosecutor’s ex parte communication with Dr. Jones deprives his opinion of

all weight, thereby constituting a substantial

change in circumstances and casting serious

doubt on the court’s finding of malingering.

20. In the first sentence of the following paragraph (also on page 24), which begins, “Third,

defendant asserts,” delete the word “new”; insert “a” between “constituted” and “substantial”; and insert “change in circumstances or

new” between “substantial” and “evidence,” so

that the sentence reads:

App. 9

Third, defendant asserts that the trial court

applied the incorrect analysis in assessing

whether his new evidence constituted substantial evidence that casts serious doubt on

the prior competency finding.

21. On page 25, seven lines down, in the sentence

beginning, “By his argument,” delete the first

appearance of the word “new”; delete “casts”

and insert in its place “constitutes a substantial change in circumstances or new evidence

casting”; and insert after “any” “change in circumstances and any,” so that the sentence

reads:

By his argument, defendant seems to suggest

that a trial court may not evaluate or weigh

whether evidence—even if accepted as true—

constitutes a substantial change in circumstances or new evidence casting a serious

doubt on the prior finding of competency; but

accepting defendant’s suggestion would mean

that any change in circumstances and any

new evidence—no matter how flimsy or how it

fits into the overall tapestry of other evidence—would mandate a new competency

hearing.

22. In the very next sentence (also on page 25),

which begins “We reject this suggestion,” in

the portion of the sentence occurring after the

semicolon: delete “substantial,” and replace it

with “evidence of a ‘substantial’ change in circumstances or of new”; and insert between

“not on” and “evidence” “evidence that shows

App. 10

any change in circumstances or new.” The sentence from the semicolon onward should read:

Rodas conditions a further competency hearing on a showing of evidence of a “substantial”

change in circumstances or of new evidence

that casts a “serious doubt” on the prior finding of competency, not on evidence that shows

any change in circumstances or new evidence

that merely suggests any doubt.

23. In the very next sentence, which is the last

sentence of that paragraph (also on page 25),

beginning, “The trial court used,” insert between “level of ” and “casting,” “a substantial

change in circumstances or new evidence,” so

that the sentence reads:

The trial court used the proper analysis in

this case because it accepted Dr. Gilewski’s

and Dr. Leitman’s evaluations at face value,

but determined that they did not rise to the

level of a substantial change in circumstances

or new evidence casting serious doubt on the

court’s prior finding of malingering in light of

the overwhelming other evidence of malingering that was unaffected by the new evaluations.

24. In the first part of the next sentence (also on

page 25), which begins, “Fourth”: Delete

“there was” and replace it with “the new evaluations constituted a”; insert between “substantial” and “evidence,” “change of

circumstances or new”; delete “that the new

evaluations cast,” and replace it with

App. 11

“casting,” so that the first part of the sentence

reads:

Fourth, defendant urges that the trial court’s

analysis of whether the new evaluations constituted a substantial change of circumstances or new evidence casting serious doubt

on the prior finding of competency was flawed

because . . .

25. On page 28, in the third sentence beneath the

heading” 3. April 2021 ruling not to convene a

second competency hearing,” replace “ ‘substantial evidence’ ” with” a substantial change

in circumstances or new evidence,” so that the

sentence reads:

The trial court did not err in concluding that

those items of evidence did not constitute a

substantial change in circumstances or new

evidence that “casts serious doubt” upon its

prior finding of competency.

26. On page 30, six lines down, insert an additional space before the sentence beginning

“What is more,” so that there are two spaces

between that sentence and the one preceding

it.

27. In the first full paragraph on page 30, in the

first sentence, replace “two” with “three,” so

that the sentence reads:

Defendant offers three arguments in rejoinder.

App. 12

28. At the end of the same paragraph mentioned

above (the first full paragraph), insert the following sentence:

Third, defendant in his petition for rehearing

argues that the weak probative value of the

evidence goes to its weight and not its admissibility; he is wrong, for if defendant were

correct that the slight probative value of evidence could never preclude its admission,

section 352 would be a nullity.

*

*

*

There is no change in the judgment.

Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.

/s/ Chavez

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

/s/ Hoffstadt

HOFFSTADT, J.

/s/ Benke

BENKE, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth

Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

App. 13

Filed 11/23/2022

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits

courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has

not been certified for publication or ordered published

for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and

Respondent,

No. B322499

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. INF1500499)

v.

STANFORD JAMES

STELLE, III,

Defendant and

Appellant.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court

of Los Angeles County, Dale R. Wells, Judge. Affirmed.

Dorsey & Whitney, Lynnda A. McGlinn, RJ Zayed,

and Michael Rowe for Defendant and Appellant.

App. 14

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland,

Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Annie Featherman Fraser, and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

*

*

*

Stanford James Stelle III (defendant) stands convicted of forcing his much younger cousin to engage in

sex acts from the time she was five years old until she

was 12. On appeal, he does not contest his guilt. Instead, he argues that he was not competent to stand

trial or to be sentenced. He also argues that the trial

court erred in excluding evidence of his mental state to

negate the specific intent required for a subset of the

sex crimes. We conclude that his arguments lack merit,

and affirm his convictions and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I.

Facts

A. Defendant and his cousin

Defendant was born in 1978. He completed 11th

grade. He has access to a substantial sum of money

held in a family trust. In 2005, defendant injured the

frontal lobes of his brain in a motorcycle accident.

S. Doe was born in 1998. She is defendant’s cousin.

App. 15

B. Defendant sexually molests his cousin

for nearly a decade, despite knowing it

was “wrong” to do so

From 2003 (when S. Doe was five years old) until

2011 (when she was 13 years old), defendant sexually

molested S. Doe every weekend. Initially, defendant

would massage S. Doe’s chest and stick his finger in

her vagina during the showers he insisted they take

together. Defendant then progressed to making S. Doe

lay on the floor while naked, where he would rub his

penis against her vagina until he ejaculated all over

her chest. Defendant eventually started to orally copulate S. Doe and to demand that S. Doe orally copulate

him, even though she would choke and gag as she did

so.

To ensure that S. Doe would not tell anyone else

about what he called their “little secret,” defendant

would buy S. Doe trinkets, candy, and items of clothing.

The molestation ended in 2013. While at their

grandfather’s 91st birthday party that year, defendant

took S. Doe into a bedroom and pulled off her pants. S.

Doe urged him to stop, but he ignored her pleas. It was

not until she forcefully pushed him off her and she got

away from him that the years of nonstop molestation—

except for the brief period when he was in the hospital

after his 2005 motorcycle accident—ceased.

To family counselors, to police, and to S. Doe, defendant admitted that what he had done was “wrong,”

that it was “over the line,” and that he would “take it

back” if he could. When S. Doe called defendant in

App. 16

March 2015 with law enforcement covertly listening

in, defendant agreed with S. Doe that he had “sexually

touch[ed]” S. Doe and that it was “wrong” to do so, but

refused to say anything more because he did not “want

anybody else to hear what [he was] saying.”

II.

Procedural Background

A. Initial complaint

In March 2015, the People filed a criminal complaint against defendant alleging 14 felonies arising

out of his molestation of S. Doe.

In a 2015 interview by a defense investigator, defendant stated that he knew he was charged with having sex with a minor. He reported that he was innocent

because S. Doe’s mother (defendant’s aunt)—who had

a “drug abuse problem”—“was trying to extort money

from [him] and his family” by making up these allegations and then demanding money in exchange for keeping quiet about them.

B. Adjudication of competency to stand

trial

In May 2015, and after defendant’s attorney did

the same, the trial court “declare[d a] doubt as to defendant’s mental competence” to stand trial and suspended the criminal proceedings.

The trial court appointed two experts to evaluate

defendant—Dr. Michael Leitman (Dr. Leitman) and

Dr. Joy Smith Clark (Dr. Clark). Dr. Leitman wrote a

App. 17

four-page report based solely on an interview with defendant; Dr. Leitman reviewed no other documentation

about defendant and did not administer any tests. Because defendant gave “some bizarre responses” during

that interview—including that he “lived in bushes,”

“loves to ride horses,” and has problems remembering

things—Dr. Leitman opined that defendant “would not

be able to cooperate with his attorney” in his defense.

Dr. Clark also interviewed defendant, and observed

that he had “poor eye contact,” a “flat” “affect,” and

what appeared to be “impaired” “memory function”

during that interview. Because defendant also denied

knowing anything about the legal process, Dr. Clark

opined that a “question remains whether there is some

cognitive impairment or deficit,” but that “malingering”—that is, the possibility that defendant was pretending to have mental competency issues—“cannot be

completely ruled out.”

In November 2015, the parties stipulated to a finding that defendant was not competent to stand trial

based on Dr. Leitman’s and Dr. Clark’s reports. Based

on that stipulation, the court found defendant “mentally incompetent to stand trial” and suspended the

criminal proceedings.

From November 2015 until November 2019, defendant was housed in two mental health facilities.

Those facilities provided the following progress reports:

• March 2016 report. In a report dated March

2016, the first facility reported that defendant was “not

App. 18

yet competent to stand trial.” The report indicated that

defendant likely suffers from “cognitive deficits” such

as having “poor concentration” and being “forgetful,”

but that he was also malingering insofar as he was “exaggerating secondary symptoms [of those deficits] for

[his personal] gain.” Specifically, the report documented that defendant’s results on the Test of Memory

Malingering (TOMM) “indicate[d] [defendant] was

very likely exaggerating memory impairment at the

time of testing.” The report further cited defendant’s

inability to remember his own age as providing additional evidence of his exaggeration of his memory deficits.

• August 2016 report. In a report dated August

2016, the second facility reported that defendant was

not yet competent to stand trial because he was “unable to demonstrate adequate knowledge” regarding

court proceedings. Like the prior report, this report diagnosed defendant as having a “[m]ajor [n]eurocognitive [d]isorder due to [the] [t]raumatic [b]rain [i]njury”

from his 2005 accident, but that defendant was malingering by “exaggerat[ing] his deficits.” Specifically, the

report noted that defendant “has great difficulty expressing himself to his treatment providers but he

speaks rapidly and confidently” to his fellow inmates

and to persons on the phone.

• March 2017 report. In a report dated March

2017, the second facility relayed that defendant was

still not competent to stand trial due to his lack of understanding of the nature of the charges against him.

Despite staff working with defendant with flashcards

App. 19

to teach him court procedure, defendant continued to

express no knowledge. The report noted that defendant’s “brain injury has left him with a somewhat odd

presentation at times, which in a psychiatric setting,

may be mistaken for mental illness.”

In September 2017, the second facility certified to

the trial court that defendant was competent to stand

trial, and submitted an assessment letter in support of

its certification. In the letter, the facility diagnosed defendant with (1) a “[m]ajor [n]eurocognitive [d]isorder,

[d]ue to a [t]raumatic [b]rain [i]njury,” resulting in

“[m]ild” “behavioral disturbances,” and (2) “malingering” because he was “intentionally” “exaggerating” the

“genuine cognitive impairments” caused by his neurocognitive disorder. The letter set forth three reasons

for its finding of malingering: (1) defendant was exaggerating his lack of knowledge about legal processes

because his reported mastery of court-related information had “actually worsened,” which “does not make

sense from a neurocognitive standpoint,” (2) defendant

was “feigning some cognitive and memory problems”

because his lack of memory was “selective,” insofar as

he would accurately remember certain “names and

events” and “provide details,” but would purport to not

remember anything about the charges against him or

the legal process, “despite this being the focus of treatment for the past 14 months,” and (3) defendant would

act forgetful and nonresponsive when being evaluated,

but was “observed speaking rapidly and confidently

while using the telephone and while speaking with his

peers.”

App. 20

After receiving the certification, the trial court appointed Dr. William Jones (Dr. Jones) to evaluate defendant’s competency to stand trial. Dr. Jones reviewed

a January 2019 evaluation prepared by an expert retained by defendant named Dr. Michael Gilewski (Dr.

Gilewski). In that report, Gilewski opined that defendant had a (1) “severe attention, memory, and executive

functioning impairment,” and (2) a “prior diagnosis . . .

for [a]utism [s]pectrum [d]isorder.” Dr. Jones agreed

with Dr. Gilewski that defendant had a genuine neurocognitive disorder stemming from the 2005 brain injury, but found that defendant was malingering by

exaggerating the deficits from that disorder. In support

of his opinion that defendant was malingering, Dr.

Jones cited (1) defendant’s result on a separate TOMM

test Dr. Jones administered in April 2019, which indicated a “high likelihood of malingering,” and (2) defendant’s disoriented affect when being interviewed by

experts, as contrasted with defendant’s affect on 13

recorded jail calls, where defendant “appeared to be

alert and responsive” and engaged in a “higher level of

discourse.”

On May 24, 2019, and based upon the above-stated

information, the trial court declared defendant to be

competent to stand trial and reinstated the criminal

proceedings.

C. Resumption of criminal proceedings

In November 2019, the trial court held the preliminary hearing on the charges in the pending criminal

App. 21

complaint and held defendant to answer for most of

them. The People filed a 13-count information alleging

six counts of engaging in lewd and lascivious conduct

with a minor (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)),1 six counts

of aggravated sexual assault (§ 269, subd. (a)(4)), and

one count of oral copulation with a minor 10 years or

younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b)).

D. Defendant’s

competency

eve-of-trial

challenge

to

A few weeks before trial was set to begin in late

October 2020, defendant’s attorney asked the trial

court to declare a doubt about defendant’s competency

and to suspend the criminal proceedings. Because the

request was not accompanied by any evidentiary support, the trial court denied the request without prejudice.

On October 19, 2020, defendant moved the trial

court to reconsider its ruling. In support of the motion,

defendant supplied evidentiary support—namely, updated evaluations from Dr. Gilewski and Dr. Leitman.

The trial court ruled that a motion for reconsideration

was procedurally improper, but offered to construe the

defense motion as one to suspend the criminal proceedings due to defendant’s incompetence.

The court then held a three-day evidentiary hearing on the question of whether there had been a

1

All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

App. 22

“substantial change of circumstances or new evidence

. . . casting serious doubt on the validity of the prior

finding of the defendant’s competence.” If so, the court

would declare a doubt about defendant’s competency

and suspend the proceedings; if not, the matter would

proceed to trial. The following evidence was presented

at the hearing2:

• Testimony of Dr. Gilewski. Dr. Gilewski testified that (1) he had diagnosed defendant with two

new mental conditions—namely, (a) autism spectrum

disorder and (b) schizotypal personality disorder,

which renders defendant “out of touch with reality,” (2)

that the results of the TOMM test (which indicated

that defendant was malingering) did not account for

these two new mental conditions, and (3) a malingering test Dr. Gilewski administered to defendant (called

the M-FAST test) did not show any malingering. Dr.

Gilewski also opined that defendant’s “mental status

has decreased significantly from the 2016 assessment.”

Dr. Gilewski acknowledged that the severity of the

charges against defendant and their possible sentences gave defendant a motive to malinger, but opined

that defendant’s lack of knowledge about trial procedure and his inability to remember things rendered

him not competent to stand trial.

2

Defendant’s attorney agreed that defendant would have the

right to a jury trial at a second competency hearing should one be

necessary, but that defendant had no right to a jury trial at this

threshold evidentiary hearing to determine the necessity for such

a second hearing.

App. 23

• Testimony of Dr. Leitman. Dr. Leitman testified that the autism and schizotypal personality disorder had “contributed” to the earlier findings of

malingering, and undercut the validity of those findings. Dr. Leitman administered defendant a malingering test (called the SIMS test). Although the results of

that test indicated that defendant was malingering if

the test results were “strict[ly] analy[zed],” Dr. Leitman felt it was appropriate to ignore those results because defendant “doesn’t always see the world the

same way you and I would.”

• Testimony of Dr. Jones. Dr. Jones did not

reexamine defendant, but reaffirmed that the prior diagnosis of malingering was still valid because (1) Dr.

Gilewki’s diagnosis of autism and schizotypal personality disorder did not undermine the TOMM test results because autism exists along a spectrum that

includes people who have a “relatively high intellectual functioning” and because defendant was not “delusional” (and hence not divorced from reality, as

persons with schizotypal personality disorder typically

are), (2) Dr. Gilewski’s diagnosis, as well as defendant’s

current conduct in rocking back and forth and appearing distracted and unfocused on reality, was impossible

to reconcile with defendant’s ability to have “linear”

conversations about the real world, as reflected in 13

recorded jailhouse calls in 2018 and 2019 with his family and friends, (3) the M-FAST test Dr. Gilewski administered was unhelpful because it was designed to

test malingering for “symptoms of severe mental illness” rather than malingering with respect to one’s

App. 24

memory, which was the chief deficit stemming from defendant’s 2005 neurocognitive injury, (4) defendant’s

allegedly faulty memory was “selective” insofar as he

could remember some things but not anything about

criminal procedure, (5) numerous other doctors at the

second mental health facility—including Dominique

Kinney, Joseph Liu, Debra Richards and Melissa

Jajko—had all independently concluded that defendant was malingering by exaggerating his faulty

memory, and (6) defendant’s neurocognitive disorder

was not progressive. Dr. Jones frankly admitted that

all of this evidence indicated a “possibility” and

“likel[ihood]” of malingering, but that he could not

make any absolute, “for sure” diagnosis. Dr. Jones

acknowledged that, prior to completing his first report

in 2019, the prosecutor assigned to the case at that

time had emailed him to advise him that defendant’s

“time” at the second facility “ha[d] expired,” such that

if defendant were “found incompetent [back in 2019],

[defendant could] not continue treatment” and could

“essentially no longer be prosecuted for his crime.”

However, Dr. Jones testified that this email did not affect his analysis because defendant’s release status

had nothing to do with his evaluation of defendant’s

mental health.

• Testimony of correctional officers. Two correctional officers who regularly interacted with defendant testified that defendant did not display any

odd behaviors while in custody (such as rocking back

and forth or giving a “1000-mile stare”), that defendant

interacted normally with other inmates, and that

App. 25

defendant remembered his name and other details

from conversation to conversation.

• Jailhouse calls. Thirteen jailhouse calls between defendant and others were introduced. As Dr.

Gilewski agreed, on those calls, defendant’s conversation and thought processes were not “confused” or “disorganized,” and his “affect” was not “flat”; to the

contrary, defendant on those calls had “focused” and

task-oriented conversations with his family and/or

friends.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the

trial court gave a detailed oral ruling denying defendant’s motion. As a threshold matter, the court ruled

that defendant had not presented any “new evidence”

because Dr. Gilewski’s diagnosis of autism “could have

been raised at the first hearing” (given that it appeared

in Gilewski’s January 2019 report). More to the point,

the court ruled that neither Dr. Gilewski’s nor Dr.

Leitman’s evaluations casted “serious doubt” on the

court’s prior finding that defendant was competent to

stand trial. As the court explained, the prior finding

was based upon the fact that defendant had been malingering by exaggerating any genuine impairments

he had. Although Dr. Gilewski and Dr. Leitman now

opined that the prior finding of malingering was useless because the TOMM test that supported that finding was invalid due to the additional autism and

personality disorder diagnoses, the court determined

that their new opinions did not cast any serious doubt

upon the prior finding of malingering in light of the

still-undisputed facts that (1) defendant’s faulty

App. 26

memory was “selective,” because defendant failed to retain information about the legal system; and (2) defendant was engaging in regular, reality-based and

linear conversations whenever he was not being evaluated, as the correctional officers’ testimony and jail

calls indicated. The court was “very concerned” by the

prosecutor’s ex parte communication with Dr. Jones,

but ruled that the solitary communication did not undermine Dr. Jones’s opinion given Dr. Jones’s testimony that it had not affected his analysis and given

that numerous other doctors came to the very same

conclusion about defendant’s malingering. Summing

up, the court explained that the new evaluations did

not “indicate that [defendant] is not competent” and

did not indicate that he lacked “the ability to assist his

attorney in the preparation of the defense.” “The issue,” the court put it, “is not whether [defendant is]

able to [assist his counsel], the issue is whether he’s

willing to.”

E. Trial

Defendant’s trial began in the fall of 2020.

Defendant sought to call Dr. Gilewski as a defense

witness to testify that defendant suffered from two

“mental disease[s] or defects”—namely, autism and

schizotypal personality disorder—that precluded him

from forming the specific intent necessary to be convicted of any of the lewd and lascivious conduct counts.

The trial court excluded this evidence under Evidence

Code section 352, ruling that Dr. Gilewski’s opinion

App. 27

was not particularly probative on the question of defendant’s mental state at the time of the crimes (that is,

between 2003 and 2012) because Dr. Gilewski’s evaluations all occurred in or after 2019 and because there

was no contemporaneous evidence (from 2003 through

2012) indicating defendant suffered from either condition. As a result, the court reasoned, Dr. Gilewski’s

backwards-in-time extrapolation that defendant suffered from these conditions 10 to 15 years earlier was

speculative, such that the probative value of Dr.

Gilewski’s testimony was substantially outweighed by

the danger that it might confuse the jury and result in

unfair prejudice.

Defendant took the stand. Notwithstanding his

prior admissions to sexually touching S. Doe, defendant testified that the only time he touched S. Doe was

during “tickle fights” and that S. Doe’s allegations were

the product of S. Doe’s mother trying to extort $30,000

from defendant to pay off a drug debt the mother owed.

Defendant testified that his prior admissions of impropriety were lies aimed at placating S. Doe’s mother.

Because defendant, while on the stand, spoke haltingly, rocked back and forth, and seemed confused, the

trial court permitted defendant to call Dr. Gilewski to

testify that defendant suffered from a major neurocognitive disorder and from autism spectrum disorder,

both of which could explain his unconventional behavior while testifying. The trial court then gave an instruction limiting the jury’s use of Dr. Gilewski’s

testimony, informing the jury that persons with “a

developmental disability, or a cognitive, mental, or

App. 28

communication impairment” were not “any more or

less credible than any other witness.” In rebuttal, the

People called two prison officials who testified that defendant acted normally outside of the courtroom.

The jury convicted defendant of all charges.

F. Defendant’s eve-of-sentencing challenge

to competency

Right before sentencing was to occur in February

2021, defendant’s attorney again moved the court to

declare a doubt about defendant’s competency, to suspend the proceedings, and to conduct a second competency hearing. This motion was based upon a January

2021 evaluation performed by Dr. Gilewski, who

opined that (1) additional testing of defendant showed

that defendant was not malingering, chiefly because

defendant’s 2005 traumatic brain injury was “exaggerat[ing] the impairment associated with [defendant’s] autism spectrum and schizotypal [personality]

disorders,” and (2) defendant’s condition was once

again demonstrated by defendant’s confusion during

his presentencing interview with the probation officer,

where defendant purported not to understand Miranda warnings. The court convened an evidentiary

hearing in April 2021. Defendant submitted on Dr.

Gilewski’s updated evaluation. The People offered

transcripts from several more calls defendant made

from jail in February 2021; on those calls, defendant

“remembered things,” “made remarks that were in context consistent with the conversation,” and was able to

App. 29

“track” the conversational thread of the other speaker.

The probation officer testified. In an oral ruling, the

trial court found that this additional evidence did not

cast any serious doubt on the prior finding that defendant was competent (because he was continuing to malinger).

After also denying defendant’s pending motion for

a new trial, the trial court sentenced defendant to

prison for a term of 105 years to life plus 38 years.

G. Appeal

Defendant filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

In this appeal, defendant argues that the judgment against him must be vacated, not due to insufficient evidence of his guilt, but rather because (1) he

was not competent to stand trial or be sentenced, and

(2) the trial court wrongly excluded Dr. Gilewski’s proffered trial testimony that defendant’s autism and neurocognitive injuries precluded him from forming the

specific intent to commit a subset of the charged

crimes. Regarding the first issue, we review the trial

court’s competency rulings with “great deference”

(People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1033), and more

to the point, we “review . . . a trial court’s ruling concerning whether another competency hearing must be

held. . . . for substantial evidence.” (People v. Huggins

(2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 220 (Huggins).) Regarding the

App. 30

second issue, we review the trial court’s evidentiary

rulings for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Flores

(2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 409.)

I.

Defendant’s Competency to Stand Trial

Defendant challenges all three of the trial court’s

competency rulings—namely, (1) the court’s May 2019

ruling finding defendant had regained his competency

to stand trial, (2) the court’s October 2020 ruling finding that defendant remained competent to stand trial,

and (3) the court’s April 2021 ruling finding that defendant remained competent to be sentenced.

A. The law of competency to stand trial, generally

The constitutional guarantee of due process as

well as California statutory law provide that criminal

defendants may be tried and sentenced only if they are

mentally competent at the time of trial and sentencing.

(People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 230 (Rodas); People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 881-882 (Medina).)

A conviction or sentence imposed upon a person at a

time when they are not mentally competent must be

vacated. (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 386

(Buenrostro).)

The substantive standard for assessing competency is a function of federal constitutional law and

California statute. Together, they provide that a criminal defendant is mentally competent to stand trial and

App. 31

be sentenced if he has (1) ‘ “ ‘ “sufficient present ability

to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of

rational understanding,” ’ ” ’ and (2) ‘ “ ‘ “a rational as

well as factual understanding of the proceedings

against him.” ’ ” ’ (Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 386,

quoting Cooper v. Oklahoma (1996) 517 U.S. 348, 354;

Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402; § 1367,

subd. (a).)

The procedures for assessing competency are defined by California statutory and decisional law.

1. Initial assessment of competency

If, at any time prior to judgment where felony offenses are involved, a trial court has a “bona fide

doubt” as to whether a criminal defendant is mentally

competent, the court must (1) suspend the criminal

proceedings, and (2) convene a hearing to determine

the defendant’s competence. (§ 1368, subds. (a), (b) &

(c); People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 884 (Mendoza).) A trial court should have a “bona fide doubt”

about a defendant’s competency whenever “substantial evidence of [defendant’s] incompetence is introduced.” (Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 882; Rodas,

supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 230-231; Mendoza, at p. 884.)

The court’s role in assessing whether there is a “doubt”

is narrow—namely, “to decide whether the evidence of

incompetence is substantial”; the court is “not to resolve” “conflicting evidence regarding competence.”

(Rodas, at p. 234, italics added.)

App. 32

At the hearing on a defendant’s mental competence that is convened once a trial court declares a

doubt, the defendant is presumed to be competent and

thus bears the burden of proving his lack of competence by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1369,

subd. (f ); Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 387.) The

trial court appoints experts to assess the defendant’s

competency. (§ 1369, subd. (a)(1).)

If the trier of fact determines that the defendant

is mentally competent to stand trial or be sentenced,

the court reinstates the criminal proceedings. (§ 1370,

subd. (a)(1)(A).) If the trier of fact determines that the

defendant is not mentally competent to stand trial or

be sentenced, then the court must continue to suspend

the criminal proceedings and take action to attempt to

restore the defendant’s mental competence. (§ 1370,

subds. (a)(1)(B) & (b).) If the doctors treating the defendant indicate that the defendant’s competency has

been restored, the court must convene a restoration

hearing to assess whether the defendant has regained

his mental competence and whether the criminal proceedings may resume. (§ 1372.)

2. Further assessment(s) of competency once

a defendant has been restored to competency

“If, after a competency hearing, [a] defendant is

found competent to stand trial, a trial court may rely

on that finding”—and need not convene a further competency hearing—“unless the court ‘ “is presented [(1)]

App. 33

with a substantial change of circumstances or with

new evidence” [(2)] casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding.’ ” (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p.

231; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1153.) A

substantial change of circumstances or new evidence

“cast[s] a serious doubt” on the validity of the prior

finding only if it “ma[kes] it unreasonable [for the trial

court] to continue to rely on the prior competence finding.” (Rodas, at p. 235.) Consequently, where the new

information “substantially duplicates evidence already

considered at” the prior hearing or any change entails

“minor changes in the defendant’s mental state,” it

does not cast a serious doubt on the prior finding and

does not warrant convening a new competency hearing. (Id. at pp. 234-235; cf. id. at p. 223 [serious doubt

cast when restoration of defendant’s competency turns

on his ingestion of anti-psychotic medication, and defendant stops taking that medication]; In re Sims

(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 762, 775 [same].)

B. Analysis

1. May 2019 determination that defendant

had regained his mental competency

Defendant asserts that the trial court’s May 2019

determination that he had been restored to mental

competency is incorrect. As noted above, our task is

limited to determining whether the court’s determination of competency is supported by substantial evidence. It is.

App. 34

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s

finding that defendant, although suffering from a neurocognitive disorder arising out of his 2005 traumatic

brain injury, was nevertheless competent to stand trial

because defendant was malingering—that is, he was

exaggerating the deficits from that disorder to make it

seem as if he was incapable of understanding the proceedings and assisting his attorney. The court’s finding

was supported by four clusters of evidence. First, defendant’s performance on two separately administered

TOMM tests indicated that there was a “high likelihood” that defendant was exaggerating his lack of

memory (and thereby malingering). Second, defendant’s faulty memory was “selective” insofar as he could

retain knowledge on many topics but never any

knowledge on legal procedures, despite being repeatedly reeducated on those procedures. Third, defendant’s purported difficulties in remembering legal

concepts was getting worse, despite the focus on teaching him those concepts and despite the absence of any

reason for a deteriorating condition (let alone such a

targeted deterioration). Fourth, and most significantly,

defendant appeared to have an “on/off switch” when it

came to his purported mental competency issues: Defendant would demonstrate a faulty memory, a flat affect, a disoriented and confused demeanor, and

hesitation in answering questions when questioned by

evaluators, but would be “alert,” properly oriented and

“responsive,” and would also display a “high level of

[conversational] discourse” when interacting with anyone else, including during the 2015 phone call with S.

Doe, during his interview with the defense investigator

App. 35

and the police, during his regular interactions with

other mental health patients, and during the 13 jail

calls he made in 2018 and 2019. As our Supreme Court

has noted, a defendant’s own words can constitute

‘ “powerfully persuasive” ’ evidence of his competency

(Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 220); here, they most

certainly did.

Defendant resists this conclusion with what boil

down to two arguments.

First, defendant contends the trial court gave too

much evidentiary credence to the “stale, thin, and

questionable [evaluative] reports” from the first facility. In effect, defendant is asking us to weigh the evidence differently than the trial court. This is beyond

our purview where, as here, we are reviewing the trial

court’s finding of competency for substantial evidence.

(People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215 (Houston) [“ ‘We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a

witness’s credibility.’ ”].)

Second, defendant makes the following multistep

argument: Dr. Jones’s opinion (including his administration of one of the two TOMM tests) was wholly

compromised by the prosecutor’s ex parte contact with

Dr. Jones prior to the issuance of his report; his opinion

is entitled to no evidentiary weight whatsoever; and

there is no other evidence supporting the trial court’s

finding that defendant was malingering.

Although we agree with defendant’s position that

the prosecutor’s conduct in sending a court-appointed

expert witness an ex parte communication aimed at

App. 36

influencing his opinion is egregious, we disagree with

defendant’s position that the prosecutor’s conduct invalidates the trial court’s finding that defendant’s competence had been restored. Our disagreement rests on

several reasons.

To begin, our task is to evaluate the evidence before the trial court at the time of its May 2019 ruling,

and the fact of the ex parte communication did not

come to light until 2020. (People v. Panah (2005) 35

Cal.4th 395, 434, fn. 10.) There is also no support for

defendant’s accusation that the prosecutor’s failure to

disclose the ex parte communication at that time violated Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 or the

Criminal Discovery Act (§ 1054 et seq.), as both of

these mechanisms are tied to the discovery of evidence

prior to the adjudication of guilt rather than competence; further, any discovery error can be harmless

(Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 399), and as explained below, was harmless here. Relatedly, we reject

defendant’s suggestion that the failure to disclose the

ex parte communication prejudiced his right to choose

whether to have a jury decide whether his competency

had been restored because a defendant has no right to

a jury determination regarding the restoration of competency. (People v. Murrell (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 822,

826-827; § 1372, subd. (c) [determination of “whether

or not the defendant . . . recovered competence” is to be

“found by the court”].)

Moreover, Dr. Jones’s opinion is not automatically

entitled to no weight, particularly where, as here, Dr.

Jones testified under oath that he was not influenced

App. 37

by the ex parte communication. Defendant cites several out-of-jurisdiction cases as well as California

Rules of Court, rule 5.235, but none of them erects a

“one ex parte and done” rule that would apply on the

facts of this case. (Matter of Kenneth C. v. Delonda R.

(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2006) 10 Misc.3d 1070(A), *44-*45 [ex

parte communication with expert witness does not disqualify the expert]; G.K. Las Vegas Ltd. Partnership v.

Simon Prop. Group (D.Nev. 2009) 671 F.Supp.2d 1203,

1215 [party’s ex parte communication with the neutral

third-party expert that party requested forfeits the

party’s right to use that expert’s opinion]; United

States v. Kight (N.D.Ga., July 12, 2017, No. 1:16-cr-99WSD) 2017 U.S.Dist. Lexis 107922, *8-*12 [party

should not have ex parte communication with court’s

expert, but not specifying the remedy for violation];

United States v. Pogany (3d Cir. 1972) 465 F.2d 72, 78

[impartial experts should be used to evaluate sanity];

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.235(c) [prohibiting ex parte

communication with court-appointed evaluators in

child custody proceedings, but not specifying the remedy for violation].)

Lastly, there is ample evidence aside from Dr.

Jones’s testimony that supports the trial court’s finding of restoration of competency, including defendant’s

“on/off switch,” the selectivity of his memory loss, and

the inexplicable deterioration of his memory when it

came to knowledge about court procedures.

App. 38

2. October 2020 ruling not to convene a

second competency hearing

Defendant next asserts that the trial court’s October 2020 decision not to suspend the criminal proceedings in order to convene a second competency hearing

is incorrect. Applying the standards set forth above,

the trial court erred only if there was (1) substantial

evidence of a substantial change of circumstances or

new evidence, and (2) substantial evidence that the

change or evidence casts a serious doubt on the validity of the trial court’s prior, May 2019 finding of competency. (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 231.) Defendant

urges that he offered two new pieces of evidence—

namely, (1) the updated opinions of Dr. Gilewski and

Dr. Leitman that defendant also suffered from autism

and schizotypal personality disorder that undercut the

efficacy of the TOMM test as a measure of malingering

as to his memory, and (2) the updated opinion of Dr.

Gilewski that defendant’s memory was deteriorating.

Even if we assume that the additional evaluations

defendant proffered in October 2020 qualify as “new

evidence,” the trial court did not err in determining

that this new evidence did not constitute substantial

evidence that cast serious doubt on the trial court’s

prior finding that defendant was competent to stand

trial. As noted above, the trial court’s prior finding of

competency was grounded in its subsidiary finding

that defendant was malingering by exaggerating any

deficits he may have had from the neurocognitive disorder caused by his traumatic brain injury. The new

evidence defendant proffered was largely aimed at

App. 39

undermining that subsidiary finding of malingering.

But that new evidence did not cast serious doubt on

that finding because the two new evaluations in no way

undercut (1) the overwhelming evidence that defendant was regularly toggling between appearing “out of

it” to evaluators and judges, and being perfectly coherent, capable, and grounded in reality when interacting

with everyone else, and (2) the evidence that defendant

was being selective with his faulty memory, choosing

to pretend he could remember nothing about court processes. And because the evidence of defendant’s malingering remained unassailed, the additional evidence

that his feigned memory loss was getting worse cast no

doubt on the prior finding of competency.

Defendant resists this conclusion with a plethora

of arguments, which we have organized into five different clusters.

First, defendant argues that the new diagnoses of

autism and schizotypal personality disorder undermine the results of the TOMM test; that the TOMM

test was the backbone of the trial court’s finding that

defendant was malingering; and that malingering was

the sole reason the trial court concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial notwithstanding his

outward behavior. Thus, defendant concludes, the new

diagnoses cast doubt on the trial court’s prior finding

of competency. This argument ignores that the TOMM

test was only part of the evidence of malingering, and

that the more persuasive evidence of malingering—

namely, defendant’s practice of appearing impaired

during evaluations and interactions with court and

App. 40

judicial officials but acting normal around everyone

else—was in no way called into question by the diagnoses of autism and schizotypal personality disorder,

which according to Dr. Gilewski, had existed since defendant’s childhood and yet in no way affected his ability to be fully coherent and rational when defendant

chose to be.

Second, defendant argues that the new evidence

regarding the prosecutor’s ex parte communication

with Dr. Jones deprives his opinion of all weight,

thereby casting serious doubt on the court’s finding of

malingering. We reject this argument for all of the reasons noted above. At oral argument, defendant further

argued that the invalidation of Dr. Jones’s opinion

means that there was no prior finding that he had been

restored to competency, such that we should treat the

October 2020 hearing as a hearing to determine

whether his competency had been restored in the first

place, rather than a hearing as to whether new evidence casted a serious doubt on a prior finding of competence. Because we have found, as noted above, that

the ex parte communication does not invalidate the

trial court’s restoration of competency finding, that

finding would also apply if we applied the restorationof-competency standard at the October 2020 hearing.

Third, defendant asserts that the trial court applied the incorrect analysis in assessing whether his

new evidence constituted substantial evidence that

cast serious doubt on the prior competency finding.

Citing People v. Kaplan (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 372

(Kaplan), defendant argues that a trial court may

App. 41

decide only whether there is “substantial evidence”

warranting a further hearing and may not “weigh” the

evidence in making that determination. (Id. at pp. 384385.) Defendant misreads Kaplan. Kaplan merely held

that the “substantial evidence” standard “necessary to

trigger an initial competency hearing is the same

standard required to trigger subsequent competency

hearings.” (Id. at p. 384.) As our Supreme Court explained in Rodas, a trial court determining whether to

convene an initial competency hearing may not weigh

the evidence once it has determined that there is substantial evidence of a lack of competence; but the court

is still permitted to evaluate the evidence presented to

determine whether it rises to the level of substantial

evidence in the first place. (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at

pp. 230-231.) By his argument, defendant seems to

suggest that a trial court may not evaluate or weigh

whether new evidence—even if accepted as true—

casts a serious doubt on the prior finding of competency; but accepting defendant’s suggestion would

mean that any new evidence—no matter how flimsy or

how it fits into the overall tapestry of other evidence—

would mandate a new competency hearing. We reject

this suggestion because it would give no weight to the

court’s prior finding of competency, a result that flatly

contradicts our Supreme Court’s instruction to the contrary; Rodas conditions a further competency hearing

on a showing of substantial evidence that casts a “serious doubt” on the prior finding of competency, not on

evidence that merely suggests any doubt. The trial

court used the proper analysis in this case because it

accepted Dr. Gilewski’s and Dr. Leitman’s evaluations

App. 42

at face value, but determined that they did not rise to

the level of casting serious doubt on the court’s prior

finding of malingering in light of the overwhelming

other evidence of malingering that was unaffected by

the new evaluations.

Fourth, defendant urges that the trial court’s analysis of whether there was substantial evidence that the

new evaluations cast serious doubt on the prior finding

of competency was flawed because the court (1) gave

greater weight to the reports from Dr. Jones and from

the second mental health facility, which was error because those reports were not as recent as the ones from

Dr. Gilewski and Dr. Leitman, (2) relied on the jail calls

from 2018 and 2019, which was error because they

were old, (3) gave insufficient weight to the effect of the

ex parte communication on Dr. Jones’s opinion, which

was error because the court should have viewed the ex

parte communication as dispositively negating any

weight of Dr. Jones’s opinion, (4) gave too much weight

to Dr. Jones’s testimony when he just read the transcripts of the 2018 and 2019 jailhouse calls, which was

error because Dr. Gilewski listened to less than half of

them (six out of the 13 calls), and (5) gave too much

weight to the custodial officials’ reports of defendant’s

ability to interact in a normal manner over the opinions of defendant’s paid experts. In all these arguments, defendant is urging us to reweigh the evidence;

we cannot. (Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1215.)

What is more, defendant’s characterization of the evidence is unduly skewed: Defendant complains that Dr.

Jones’s opinion is less worthy of credence because he

App. 43

only read the transcripts of defendant’s 13 jail calls,

but both of defendant’s experts—Dr. Gilewski and Dr.

Leitman—also relied chiefly or solely on the transcripts as well; further, Dr. Gilewski testified that his

review of the audio of some of those tapes showed defendant neither “stutter[ing]” nor “delay[ing]” his responses to questions, which obliterates the notion that

defendant’s oral presentation would have created a different impression than merely reading the transcripts.

Defendant’s argument also ignores the law, which has

affirmed the propriety of considering “testimony from

police or jail personnel regarding the defendant’s apparent mental state.” (Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p.

887.)

Lastly, defendant contends that the trial court’s

ruling is defective because (1) the court mistakenly relayed that Dr. Jones had definitively diagnosed defendant as malingering, when Dr. Jones had actually

testified that malingering was “highly likely,” and (2)

the court neglected to rule on both prongs of the competency test. Defendant is wrong on both scores. Because we are examining the sufficiency of the evidence

irrespective of the trial court’s actual rationale (e.g.,

People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976), any error

in the trial court’s characterization of Dr. Jones’s testimony is irrelevant if we otherwise conclude that the

evidence—properly viewed—does not amount to “substantial evidence.” As explained above, we have so concluded. In any event, the evidence of malingering (from

defendant’s ability to turn his ailment on and off at will

to his selective memory) is overwhelming even though

App. 44

Dr. Jones was careful to speak in probabilities rather

than absolutes. The court’s ruling is also sufficient. Although the court only specifically referenced defendant’s “ability to assist his attorney in the preparation

of the defense,” the court more broadly found that defendant’s proffered evidence did not call his “competence” into question. Because “competence” necessarily

includes the additional finding that a defendant has a

‘ “rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him” ’ (Dusky, supra, 362 U.S. at p.

402), and because the trial court considered—and necessarily rejected—Dr. Gilewski’s diagnosis of schizotypal personality disorder that meant that defendant

was operating in an alternate reality, we may comfortably infer that the trial court’s competence finding encompassed both aspects of the competency test. (E.g.,

Lynn v. George (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 630, 642 [“In the

absence of an express finding, we usually would infer

that the trial court made implied findings to support

its decision, and then test the implied findings for substantial evidence.”].)

3. April 2021 ruling not to convene a second competency hearing

Defendant lastly contends that the trial court’s

April 2021 decision not to suspend the criminal proceedings prior to sentencing in order to convene a second competency hearing was incorrect. Defendant

urges that he offered two new pieces of evidence—

namely, (1) a further updated opinion of Dr. Gilewski

that defendant was not malingering based on

App. 45

administering him another malingering test, and (2)

defendant’s “confused” presentence interview with the

probation officer. The trial court did not err in concluding that those items of evidence did not constitute

“substantial evidence” that “casts serious doubt” upon

its prior finding of competency. Dr. Gilewski’s report is

repetitive of all of his prior reports, and the additional

testing and opinions he offered in this latest report in

no way undermined or otherwise impeached the evidence of defendant’s ability to turn his odd behavior on

and off. And defendant’s confused affect with the probation officer is no different than his confused affect in

front of the jury and the many psychologists who have

evaluated him; more to the point, it adds nothing to the

mix of evidence or the fact that all of those instances

were the product of malingering. Defendant argues

that Dr. Gilewski’s most recent report should be given

greater weight and that Dr. Gilewski is a more persuasive witness. Alas, this is yet another invitation to reweigh the evidence that we must respectfully decline.

II.

Evidentiary Ruling

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not

allowing Dr. Gilewski to testify that defendant’s autism and schizotypal personality disorder precluded

him from forming the specific intent that is an element

of the six lewd and lascivious conduct counts, such that

those particular convictions must be vacated. Relatedly, defendant argues that the trial court also committed an instructional error because the court would

have been required to instruct the jury on how a

App. 46

mental disease or defect can negate specific intent if

Dr. Gilewski’s testimony had been admitted. Because

defendant’s claim of instructional error hinges on

whether the trial court made an incorrect evidentiary

ruling, we start with the evidentiary ruling.

Contrary to what defendant implies, the trial

court did not exclude Dr. Gilewski’s testimony as irrelevant; instead, the court excluded it under Evidence

Code section 352 on the ground that its probative value

was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusing the jury, undue consumption of

time, and the like. (Evid. Code, § 352.) The trial court

did not abuse its discretion in so holding.

The court did not abuse its discretion in ruling

that Dr. Gilewski’s testimony had little probative value

because the court had an ample basis to conclude that

his testimony was speculative: Dr. Gilewski reasoned

that defendant suffered from autism and schizotypal

personality disorder between 2003 and 2012 because

defendant suffered from them in 2019, but Dr. Gilewski

freely admitted he had no contemporaneous evidence

that defendant had either affliction during the relevant 2003 to 2012 timeframe.

The court also did not abuse its discretion in ruling that any probative value this evidence had was

substantially outweighed by the dangers of undue

prejudice and confusing the jury because the speculative basis for Dr. Gilewski’s opinion left the jury to

guess whether defendant’s current afflictions somehow

“related back” to the time of the crimes. The testimony

App. 47

would also have been unduly prejudicial to the People

because it would have raised the specter of a mental

health defense without any support that defendant’s

alleged mental conditions actually precluded the formation of defendant’s specific intent at the time of the

charged crimes. What is more, admitting this evidence

would undoubtedly have opened the door for the People to respond with evidence that Dr. Gilewski’s entire

diagnosis was wrong because it was the product of

years of malingering by defendant. Given the volumes

of reporter’s transcripts devoted to these very topics

prior to trial, the trial court acted within its discretion

in concluding that relitigating this issue before the

jury on the basis of a speculative expert opinion was a

basis for excluding Dr. Gilewski’s testimony under Evidence Code section 352.

Defendant offers two arguments in rejoinder.

First, he asserts that he has a constitutional right to

present a defense. This is true, but that right does not

trump the rules of evidence, including Evidence Code

section 352. (People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592,

626-627 [‘ “[A]s a general matter, the ordinary rules of

evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s [state or federal constitutional] right to present

a defense.” ’].) Second, defendant asserts that People v.

Sotelo-Urena (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 732 warrants reversal. It does not. That case dealt with whether it was

error to exclude expert testimony that persons who are

homeless have a heightened sensitivity to being

threatened because that evidence was relevant to a

claim of self-defense. (Id. at pp. 745-746.) This case is

App. 48

very different, as it deals with whether it was error to

exclude speculative expert testimony under Evidence

Code section 352.

In light of our conclusion that there was no evidentiary error, we need not reach the instructional error

or issues of prejudice.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL

REPORTS.

/s/ Hoffstadt

HOFFSTADT

, J.

We conur:

/s/ Chavez

CHAVEZ

. Acting P. J.

/s/ Benke

BENKE

, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth

Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

App. 49

Superior Court of California, County of Riverside

People of the State of California

Vs.

STANFORD JAMES STELLE III

CASE NO.

INF1500499

MINUTE ORDER

Report and Sentencing

Date: 04/30/21 Time:

12:00 AM

Dept/Div:

3P

Charges:

1) 288.7(B) PC, 1) 269(A)(4) PC, 2) 288.7(B) PC

2) 288(B)(1) PC,

3) 288.7(B) PC, 3) 288(B)(1) PC,

4) 288.7(B) PC, 4) 269(A)(4) PC

5) 269(A)(4) PC, 5) 269(A)(4) PC,

6) 269(A)(4) PC, 6) 288(B)(1) PC,

7) 269(A)(4) PC 7) 288.7(B) PC, 8) 288(A) PC,

8) 269(A)(4) PC,

9) 288(A) PC, 9) 288(B)(1) PC

10) 288(A) PC, 10) 269(A)(4) PC,

11) 288(B)(1) PC, 11) 288(B)(1) PC,

12) 288(B)(1) PC 12) 288A(B)(1) PC,

13) 288(B)(1) PC, 13) 269(A)(4) PC,

14) 288(B)(1) PC

Court finds good cause exists to exclude the public

with the exception of the victims due to the COVID19 pandemic.

This matter is being live streamed for public access.

Honorable Judge Dale R Wells, Presiding

Clerk: E.Mendoza.

Court Reporter: T. Dible

App. 50

People represented by Deputy District Attorney: DDA

Gypsy Yeager.

Defendant represented by PVT John Patrick Dolan.

Defendant Present.

The Court is furnished with a copy of Evaluation

Report.

Oral motion by PVT John Patrick Dolan Re PC 1368

Evaluation is called for hearing

Argument by both counsel.

People’s witness Patrick Hennes, is sworn and

testifies.

Save Minute Order to case.

Witness Patrick Hennes is excused.

People’s witness Jon Lewis, is sworn and testifies.

Exhibit(s) CD audio Jail Calls marked for

Identification for People. (NonTrial)

Exhibit(s) Jail Call log marked for Identification for

People. (Non-Trial)

Exhibit(s) Transcript of Jail call 2/5/21 marked for

Identification for People. (Non-Trial)

Exhibit(s) Transcript of jail call 2/6/21 marked for

Identification for People. (Non-Trial)

Exhibit(s) Transcript of jail call 2/6/21 marked for

Identification for People. (Non-Trial)

Exhibit(s) Transcript of jail call 2/11/21 marked for

Identification for People. (Non-Trial)

Witness Jon Lewis is excused.

Save Minute Order to case.

Motion/Petition denied.

Defendant requests immediate sentence.

App. 51

Defendant waives arraignment for pronouncement of

judgment.

No legal cause why sentence should not now be

pronounced.

Court has read and considered the probation officer’s

report.

Court has read and considered Peoples Sentencing

Memorandum.

Victim Impact Statement presented by: Stevie Doe

Criminal Protective Order-Domestic Violence – CPO

136.2 PC issued. Expires 04/30/2031. Comment: No

Contact.

Protected person(s): Stevie Doe

Defendant has been served with the Criminal

Protection Order.

Defendant was personally present at the court

hearing and no additional proof of service of the

restraining order is required.

Firearms prohibiting notification forms provided to

defendant [BOF110].

Probation is denied and a State Prison sentence is

imposed as follows:

Defendant or crime is disqualified from a county jail

sentence pursuant to PC 1170(h)(3) for the reason:

Current or prior serious or violent felony.

– STATE PRISON SENTENCE –

As to count 1 the court imposes the Indeterminate

sentence of 15 years to Life.

Principal Count Deemed to be Count 1.

As to count 4 the court imposes the Indeterminate

sentence of 15 years to Life.

App. 52

Count 4 to run consecutive to count 1.

As to count 5 the court imposes the Indeterminate

sentence of 15 years to Life.

Count 5 to run consecutive to count 4.

As to count 7 the court imposes the Indeterminate

sentence of 15 years to Life.

Count 7 to run consecutive to count 5.

As to count 8 the court imposes the Indeterminate

sentence of 15 years to Life.

Count 8 to run consecutive to count 7.

As to count 10 the court imposes the Indeterminate

sentence of 15 years to Life.

Count 10 to run consecutive to count 8.

As to count 13 the court imposes the Indeterminate

sentence of 15 years to Life.

Count 13 to run consecutive to count 10.

Save Minute Order to case.

Allow sentence override.

As to Count(s) 2, the Court imposed the MID term of

6 year(s) 0 month(s). Count 2 to run consecutive to

count 13.

As to Count(s) 3, the Court imposed the MID term of

6 year(s) 0 month(s). Count 3 to run consecutive to

count 2.

As to Count(s) 6, the Court imposed the MID term of

6 year(s) 0 month(s). Count 6 to run consecutive to

count 3.

As to Count(s) 9, the Court imposed the MID term of

6 year(s) 0 month(s). Count 9 to run consecutive to

count 6.

App. 53

As to Count(s) 11, the Court imposed the MID term of

6 year(s) 0 month(s).

Count 11 to run consecutive to count 9.

As to Count(s) 12, the Court imposes the MID term of

8 year(s) 0 month(s).

Count 12 to run consecutive to count 11.

Sentenced to State Prison for a determinate sentence

of 38 yrs 0 mos plus indeterminate sentence of 105 yrs

to Life.

Credit for time served of 1733 days actual served plus

259 days pursuant to 2933.1 PC for a total of 1992

days. (Violent Felony)

Credit for Time Served [Department of Mental

Health] of 490 days.

Submit necessary thumb and palm prints, blood and

saliva specimens to Division of Adult Institutions (PC

296(a)).

Pay additional Parole Revocation restitution fine in

the amount of $10000.00 pursuant to 1202.45(c) fine

is suspended unless parole is revoked. [45c] Prison.

Pay restitution fine in the amount of $10000.00

pursuant to 1202.4(B) PC.

Div Adult Institutions to collect obligation pursuant

to 2085.5 PC.

Pay criminal conviction assessment fee of $420.00

[$30 per convicted charge], payable to Division of

Adult Institutions (GC 70373)

Pay Court Operations Assessment $520.00, $40. per

convicted charge. Div of Adult Inst. to collect &

transfer to Trial Court Fund (PC 1465.8(a)(1))

App. 54

Defendant to participate in a counseling or educational program having a substance abuse component

through the Div of Adult Institutions (PC 1203.096)

– Do not knowingly own, possess or have under your

control any firearm, deadly weapon, ammunition, or

related paraphernalia, for life [1202 PC/18 US

922(g)(1)] (CSG2/CSG2A)

– COURT INSTRUCTS DEFENDANT RE: FIREARMS –

The court instructs the defendant that he or she is

prohibited from owning, purchasing, receiving,

possessing, or having – under his or her custody or

control any firearms, ammunition, and ammunition

feeding devices, including, but not limited to

magazines.

Prohibited Persons Relinquishment forms were

provided to defendant.

[BOF1022, BOF1023, and BOF1024]

– PROHIBITED PERSONS RELINQUISHMENT

FORM FINDINGS – COURT FINDS:

Defendant has completed a Prohibited Person

Relinquishment Form.

Defendant has no reportable firearms per the

probation officer’s report.

Pay Victim Restitution [Victim] in amount

determined by Probation [1202.4(f) PC]. Div of Adult

Inst to collect obligation (2085.5 PC)

Any disputes as to amount to be resolved in court

hearing. Enhanced Collection Division to forward

findings to Div. of Adult Institutions.

Victim name Jane Doe, address unknown

Defendant advised of appeal rights.

App. 55

Pursuant to Penal Code section 3000(b)(2)(A)

Defendant shall be on parole for a period of ten years

following release from prison.

Pay booking fees of $514.58; Payable to Division of

Adult Institutions (GC 29550)

You are ordered to prepare and file a disclosure

identifying all assets income and liabilities in which

you held or controlled a present or future interest as

of the date of your arrest for the crime for which

restitution may be ordered.

– Custody Status/Information –

Remains remanded to custody of Riverside Sheriff.

Sentence to be served in State Prison. Sheriff to

deliver defendant to: RECPT. CTR

Close Case.

Minute order printed to Smith Correctional Facility.

Save Minute Order to case.

App. 56

Superior Court of California, County of Riverside

People of the State of California

Vs.

STANFORD JAMES STELLE III

CASE NO.

INF1500499

MINUTE ORDER

Jury Trial (Jury Deliberating)

Date: 12/17/20 Time: 12:00 AM

Dept/Div:

3P

Charges:

1) 288.7(B) PC, 1) 269(A)(4) PC,

2) 288.7(B) PC 2) 288 (B)(1) PC,

3) 288. 7(B) PC, 3) 288(B)(1) PC,

4) 288.7(B) PC, 4) 269(A)(4) PC

5) 269(A)(4) PC, 5) 269(A)(4) PC,

6) 269(A)(4) PC, 6) 288(B)(1) PC,

7) 269(A)(4) PC 7) 288.7(B) PC,

8) 288(A) PC, 8) 269(A)(4) PC,

9) 288(A) PC, 9) 288(B)(1) PC

10) 288 (A) PC, 10) 269 (A)(4) PC,

11) 288 (B)(1) PC, 11) 288 (B)(1) PC,

12) 288(B)(1) PC 12) 288A(B)(1) PC,

13) 288(B)(1) PC, 13) 269(A)(4) PC,

14) 288(B)(1) PC

Honorable Judge Dale R Wells, Presiding

Courtroom Assistant: R. Rubio

Court Reporter: J. Crow

People represented by Deputy District Attorney: DDA

G. Yeager.

Defendant represented by PVT John Patrick Dolan.

Defendant Present.

App. 57

Court finds good cause exists to exclude the public

with the exception of the victims due to the COVID19 pandemic.

This matter is being live streamed for public access.

Court and Counsel Confer regarding: Request #1 from

jury for readack agreeable response drafted by the

Court.

At 9:35 Jurors indicate Request #2.

All parties notified.

All parties are Present in Court.

Court and Counsel Confer regarding: Request #2 from

the jury for transcript

Transcript provided as requested.

At 12:00 Jurors indicate deliberations to resume at

13:00.

Jury retires at 13:00 to resume deliberations.

At 14:50 Jurors indicate verdict reached.

All parties notified.

All parties Present in Court.

At 16:04 the jury returns with a verdict.

We the Jury in the above entitled action, find the

defendant STANFORD

JAMES STELLE III, GUILTY, in count 1 of a violation

of Section 269(A)(4) PC.

Dated: 12/17/2020, and signed by: Juror #2, Jury

Foreperson

We the Jury in the above entitled action, find the

defendant STANFORD JAMES STELLE III,

GUILTY, in count 2 of a violation of Section 288(B)(1)

PC.

App. 58

Dated: 12/17/2020, and signed by: Juror #2, Jury

Foreperson

We the Jury in the above entitled action, find the

defendant STANFORD JAMES STELLE III,

GUILTY, in count 3 of a violation of Section 288(B)(1)

PC.

Dated: 12/17/2020, and signed by: Juror #2, Jury

Foreperson

We the Jury in the above entitled action, find the

defendant STANFORD JAMES STELLE III,

GUILTY, in count 4 of a violation of Section 269(A)(4)

PC.

Dated: 12/17/2020, and signed by: Juror #2, Jury

Foreperson

We the Jury in the above entitled action, find the

defendant STANFORD JAMES STELLE III,

GUILTY, in count 5 of a violation of Section 269(A)(4)

PC.

Dated: 12/17/2020, and signed by: Juror #2, Jury

Foreperson

We the Jury in the above entitled action, find the

defendant STANFORD JAMES STELLE III,

GUILTY, in count 6 of a violation of Section 288(B)(1)

PC.

Dated: 12/17/2020, and signed by: Juror #2, Jury

Foreperson

We the Jury in the above entitled action, find the

defendant STANFORD JAMES STELLE III,

GUILTY, in count 7 of a violation of Section 288.7(B)

PC.

Dated: 12/17/2020, and signed by: Juror #2, Jury

Foreperson

App. 59

We the Jury in the above entitled action, find the

defendant STANFORD JAMES STELLE III,

GUILTY, in count 8 of a violation of Section 269(A)(4)

PC.

Dated: 12/17/2020, and signed by: Juror #2, Jury

Foreperson

We the Jury in the above entitled action, find the

defendant STANFORD JAMES STELLE III,

GUILTY, in count 9 of a violation of Section 288(B)(1)

PC.

Dated: 12/17/2020, and signed by: Juror #2, Jury

Foreperson

We the Jury in the above entitled action, find the

defendant STANFORD JAMES STELLE III,

GUILTY, in count 10 of a violation of Section 269(A)(4)

PC.

Dated: 12/17/2020, and signed by: Juror #2, Jury

Foreperson

We the Jury in the above entitled action, find the

defendant STANFORD JAMES STELLE III,

GUILTY, in count 11 of a violation of Section 288(B)(1)

PC.

Dated: 12/17/2020, and signed by: Juror #2, Jury

Foreperson

We the Jury in the above entitled action, find the

defendant STANFORD JAMES STELLE III,

GUILTY, in count 12 of a violation of Section 288(B)(1)

PC.

Dated: 12/17/2020, and signed by: Juror #2, Jury

Foreperson

We the Jury in the above entitled action, find the

defendant STANFORD JAMES STELLE III,

App. 60

GUILTY, in count 13 of a violation of Section 269(A)(4)

PC.

Dated: 12/17/2020, and signed by: Juror #2, Jury

Foreperson

Jurors 12 Polled on the Verdict(s) and 12 jurors

answer in the affirmative.

Re-Reading of the Verdict(s) as recorded is Waived

Court instructs the jury.

Court orders record of personal juror identifying

information, including name, address, and telephone

number, be sealed until further order.

Jurors are thanked and excused.

Defendant waives time for Sentencing.

Report and Sentence Hearing set on 02/26/2021 at

8:30 in Dept. 3P.

Referred to Probation Department for Sentencing and

Firearm report.

Matter referred to the Probation Department for the

scoring of the Static-99R, returnable on 02/26/2021.

– Custody Status/Information –

Defendant ordered to return on any and all future

hearing dates.

Bail set in the amount of $0.00. Bail not allowed

Save Minute Order to case.

App. 61

Superior Court of California, County of Riverside

People of the State of California

Vs.

STANFORD JAMES STELLE III

CASE NO.

INF1500499

MINUTE ORDER

Jury Trial

Date: 10/23/20 Time:

12:00 AM

Dept/Div:

3P

Charges:

1) 288.7(B) PC, 1) 269(A)(4) PC,

2) 288.7(B) PC 2) 288(B)(1) PC,

3) 288.7(B) PC, 3) 288(B)(1) PC,

4) 288.7(B) PC, 4) 269(A)(4) PC

5) 269(A)(4) PC, 5) 269(A)(4) PC,

6) 269(A)(4) PC, 6) 288(B)(1) PC,

7) 269(A)(4) PC 7) 288.7(B) PC,

8) 288(A) PC, 8) 269(A)(4) PC,

9) 288(A) PC, 9) 288(B)(1) PC

10) 288(A) PC, 10) 269(A)(4) PC,

11) 288(B)(1) PC, 11) 288(B)(1) PC,

12) 288(B)(1) PC 12) 288A(B)(1) PC,

13) 288(B)(1) PC, 13) 269(A)(4) PC,

14) 288(B)(1) PC

Honorable Judge Dale R Wells, Presiding

Courtroom Assistant: M. Garcia

Court Reporter: T. Dible

People represented by Deputy District Attorney: DDA

G. Yeager.

Defendant represented by PVT John Patrick Dolan.

Defendant Present.

App. 62

The court finds good cause to close the courtroom to

the public due to COVID19.

Live Stream is available so the public may listen to

courtroom proceedings.

Evidentiary hearing to assess if the evidence disc

loses a substantial change of circumstances or new

evidence is presented casting serious doubt on the

validity of a prior finding of the defendants

competency is called fo for hearing.

Argument by Counsel.

The court makes the following finding:

As to the defendants present competence; the court

finds that Judge Olson was absolutely right.

Nothing has been shown that indicates he is not

competent nor that he does not have the ability to

assist his attorney in the preparation of the defense.

The issue is not whether he is able to; the issue is

whether hes willing to. The court believes he has

plenty of reasonable anger giving the nature of the

charges and potential consequences if hes found

guilty of those charges.

Non of the evidence casts a serious doubt on the

validity of Judge Olsons 5/24/2019 finding that hes

competent and none of the evidence that was

presented discloses a substantial change of

circumstances that reflects on his ability to assist

counsel in the conduct of his defense in a rational

manner.

The motion is denied.

Mr. Dolan requests to argue further; Request granted.

Argument by Mr. Dolan.

Motion/Petition denied.

App. 63

Save Minute Order to case.

Court and Counsel Confer regarding: Jury trial

schedule

The court orders jurors as follows:

11/02/2020:

83 jurors at 9:00 A.M. and 83 jurors at 1:30 P.M.

11/03/2020:

83 jurors at 9:00 A.M. and 83 jurors at 1:30 P.M.

Court and Counsel Confer regarding: Jury wil be time

qualified to 12/17/2020

Court and Counsel Confer regarding: Motion in limine

scheduling 10/26/20 Jury Trial (In-Progress)

adjourned to 10/26/2020 at 9:00 Dept 3P

– Custody Status/Information –

Remains remanded to custody of Riverside Sheriff.

Bail to Remain as fixed.

Defendant ordered to return on any and all future

hearing dates.

RSO Jail to accept civilian clothing for defendant

Defendant to be dressed out for trial.

Minute order printed to Smith Correctional Facility.

Save Minute Order to case.

Save Minute Order to case.

Save Minute Order to case.

MINUTE ORDER OF COURT PROCEEDING

App. 64

CALIFORNIA COURTS

THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF CALIFORNIA

Supreme Court

Docket (Register of Actions)

PEOPLE v. STELLE

Division SF

Case Number S277945

02/01/2023 Petition for

Defendant’s application to

review denied file the unredacted petition for review under seal

is granted. (Cal. Rules of

Court rule 8.47.) The clerk

of this court is directed to

file the unredacted petition for review under seal.

The petition for review is

denied.

App. 65

Superior Court of California, County of Riverside

People of the State of California

Vs.

STANFORD JAMES STELLE III

Date:

CASE NO.

INF1500499

10/23/20

*

*

*

[380] indicates that these correctional deputies – that

he knows what he’s doing. And he’s trying to

manipulate the system to get what he wants.

Now, in the case of Deputy Carter, the day he was

asked to observe the defendant on Tuesday – and I

don’t see anything wrong with that, I just think that’s

letting him know that, hey, we want to see what your

observations are. He not only based on his testimony

and his observations that day, but on his observations

in previous encounters.

Then we heard from Dr. Leitman. Again, like I

said, a while ago according to Dr. Leitman the DSM

cautioned the psychologist against providing diagnosis

in legal setting and that’s his reason for not doing so.

If that’s the case, why did Dr. Gilewski give one? I don’t

know. And I’m concerned as I said about why Dr.

Leitman’s 2015 report was only four pages where this

one where he’s being paid by defense is 22 pages and

includes testing, includes document review.

And even so, sitting here in court while he listened

to Deputy Carter and observed the defendant on the

App. 66

stand, and he heard that Deputy Carter said I never

seen Mr. Stelle act this way, still when he’s asked the

question does that change your opinion his answer is

no, it doesn’t change my opinion.

As to the defendant’s present competence, I do find

that Judge Olson was absolutely right. Nothing has

been shown to me to indicate that he is not competent,

nor that he has the ability – does not have the ability

to assist his attorney in the preparation of defense. The

issue is not whether he’s able to, the issue is whether

he’s willing to.

[381] I believe that he has plenty of reason to

malinger given the nature of the charges and potential

consequences if he’s found guilty. None of the evidence

cast a serious doubt on the validity of Judge Olson’s

May 24th, 2019, finding that he’s competent. And none

of the evident presented discloses a substantial change

of circumstance that reflects on his ability to assist

counsel. So the question is not whether he can do so,

but whether he’s willing to do so. And so the motion is

denied.

MR. DOLAN: Your Honor, may I be heard on

a couple of things that the Court referred to?

THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. DOLAN: As to Dr. Leitman, the Court I

think saw the date of the original report. Dr. Leitman

was asked to do that report two weeks after the first

arraignment on this case. He did not have five years in

medical health treatment to review in order to prepare

App. 67

that report in 2015. In 2020, he did have five years, and

he detailed out what he reviewed. So I think it’s unfair

to say that Dr. Leitman didn’t give the county the right

deal or he’s somehow being paid to do something

beyond what is reasonable because he definitely was

provided a tremendous amount of material to comment

on this October 2020 report. None of that was available

at the time back in 2015.

As to Dr. Jones, the Court indicated that it was

concerned about the email that came from Victoria

Weiss. And I understand that concern. I should point

out to the Court we didn’t have that email until this

week when Ms. Yeager provided us with some material

that was emailed and that was part of an email chain.

We never had that.

*

*

*