Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sheila Mikel, Petitioner v. Jennifer Nichols, et al.

Supreme Court briefApr 17, 2023

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APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A: Opinion and Judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit.

(January 19, 2023) ........................ App. 1

Appendix B: Memorandum of Petitioner, Sheila

Mikel, in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of

Tennessee at Chattanooga

(March 31, 2022) ......................... App. 20

Appendix C: Complaint filed on behalf of Petitioner,

Sheila Mikel, in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of

Tennessee at Chattanooga

(December 10, 2020).................... App. 43

Appendix D: The AFCARS Report

U.S. Department of Human Services,

Administration for Children and

Families, Administration on Children,

Youth and Families, Children’s Bureau

https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb

Preliminary FY 2021 Estimates as of

June 28, 2022 - No. 29................. App. 59

App. 1

___________________

APPENDIX A

__________________

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1 (b)

File Name: 23a0011 p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

SHEILA MIKEL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 22-5329

MARGIE QUIN, Commissioner

of the Department of Children’s

Services, in her official capacity;

JENNIFER NICHOLS, in her

individual capacity; TENNESSEE

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN’S

SERVICES; OMNI VISIONS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga.

No. 1:20-cv-00345—Curtis L. Collier, District Judge.

Argued: October 19, 2022

Decided and filed: January 19, 2023

App. 2

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; BOGGS and

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.

COUNSEL ARGUED: William Neil Thomas III,

THOMAS & THOMAS, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for

Appellant. Jordan K. Crews, OFFICE OF THE

TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville,

Tennessee, for state of Tennessee Appellees in their

official capacities. Jeffrey M. Beemer, DICKINSON

WRIGHT PLLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee

Omni Visions. ON BRIEF: William Neil Thomas 111,

THOMAS & THOMAS, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for

Appellant. Jordan K. Crews, OFFICE OF THE

TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville,

Tennessee, for state of Tennessee Appellees in their

official capacities. Jeffrey M. Beemer, Daryl D. Choe,

DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC, Nashville, Tennessee,

for Appellee Omni Visions.

App. 3

OPINION

SUTTON, Chief Judge. Sheila Mikel claims

that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services

took her two foster children without due process of

law. She sued the Department, its Commissioner, and

a private Department subcontractor, seeking damages

along with declaratory and injunctive relief. The

district court dismissed Mikel’s claims against the

Department and Commissioner for want of

jurisdiction and held §that Mikel had failed to state a

claim against the subcontractor. We affirm.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s

Services supervises Tennessee’s foster care system.

See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-5-105(3), 37-5-106(a)(1),

(3). An appointed Commissioner, now Margie Quin

and previously Jennifer Nichols, leads the

Department. The Department subcontracts much of

its day-to-day work to private foster care agencies,

including Omni Visions, Inc.

Plaintiff Sheila Mikel is a resident of

Tennessee. In June of 2016, Mikel took custody of two

Tennessee girls—”AK,” then twelve years old, and

“SK,” then nine years old—as a foster parent. Mikel

describes her relationship with AK and SK as “preadoptive,” R.I at 3, meaning that she had planned to

adopt the girls after taking custody of them. Omni

approved Mikel’s home as a foster home and oversaw

Mikel’s relationship with the girls.

App. 4

All was well until December 2017, when Mikel

submitted her adoption papers to Omni. Omni

removed the girls from Mikel’s custody three days

later, alleging emotional abuse. About a week after

that, Omni “clos[ed] [Mikel’s] home as a foster home.”

Id. at 6. Mikel says that she never abused the girls,

that Omni’s removal was pretextual and in violation

of Tennessee law, and that neither Omni nor the

Department gave her notice or an opportunity to be

heard before commencing the removal process.

After unsuccessfully appealing Omni’s removal

administratively and in state court, Mikel filed this

action against Omni, the Department, and thenCommissioner Nichols. In her complaint, Mikel

alleged claims arising under Tennessee tort law and

1983. She demanded damages from Omni, costs and

expenses, and two injunctions—one limiting the

defendants’ rights to remove future foster children,

one preventing the defendants from “assisting in any

adoption” of the girls. Id. at 11. She also sought

declaratory relief.

The Department, Nichols, and Omni filed

motions to dismiss. The district court granted the

motions. It held that Tennessee’s sovereign immunity

blocked Mikel’s suits against the Department and

Nichols in her official capacity, that Mikel had not

properly served process on Nichols in her individual

capacity, and that Mikel had failed to state a claim

against Omni under 1983. It then declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Mikel’s state-law

claims. Mikel appealed.

App. 5

II.

Sovereign immunity generally bars lawsuits

against States or their agencies. See, e.g., Torres v.

Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 142 S. Ct. 2455, 2461—62

(2022). While a State may waive its immunity from

suit, Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535

U.S. 613, 618—19 (2002), Mikel does not claim that

Tennessee has waived anything here. And while

Congress can abrogate a State’s sovereign immunity

to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not do so

when it enacted 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,

342—43 (1979). State entities in fact are not “persons”

under 1983 in the first place. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, to the extent

Mikel seeks relief against Tennessee agencies, her

lawsuit fails twice over—first due to sovereign

immunity, second due to the inapplicability of § 1983.

Sovereign immunity also limits, but does not

entirely prohibit, lawsuits against state officials in

their official capacity. Under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.

123, 159—60 (1908), federal courts may award

injunctive and declaratory relief against state officials

when the relief is “designed to end a continuing

violation of federal law.” Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S.

64, 68 (1985); see, e.g., Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins,

540 U.S. 431, 437—38 (2004). They may not, however,

entertain actions that essentially seek a monetary

recovery from a State. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.

651, 663 (1974). Put differently, Ex parte Young

applies only when a plaintiff targets “an ongoing

violation of federal law and seeks” prospective relief.

App. 6

Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm ‘n of Md., 535

U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quotations omitted).

As to Mikel’s lawsuit against the Department,

there is little room to maneuver. The Department is a

state agency. Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 766

(6th Cir. 2003). Sovereign immunity thus protects it,

frill-stop. Id. Plus, the Department is not a “person”

under the statute anyway. Will, 491 U.S. at 71.

The same is not true for the current

Commissioner, Quin. True, if Mikel had sought money

damages from Quin in her official capacity, sovereign

immunity would have stood in her way. E.g., Ernst v.

Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

But Mikel’s complaint did not demand damages from

Quin or otherwise seek recovery of money from the

State of Tennessee. Mikel instead alleged that Quin

violated federal law in depriving Mikel of her foster

children and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.

That kind of claim sits well within the heartland of Ex

parte Young.

It makes no difference whether Mikel’s §1983

claim fails on the merits. To ascertain whether

sovereign immunity defeats an action seeking

injunctive relief against a state official, we ask only

whether the action alleges an ongoing violation of

federal law. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 646. We do not ask

whether the allegation is true. Because Mikel’s

complaint seeks to state a claim for a violation of

federal law, it falls outside the scope of Tennessee’s

sovereign immunity.

App. 7

Nor is it true that Mikel failed to allege an

“ongoing ‘ violation of federal law. She alleges that

Quin and the Department unlawfully took AK and SK

from her, surely an “ongoing” or “continuing” action.

See In re Flint Water Cases, 960 F.3d 303, 334 (6th Cir.

2020). The girls indeed remain outside Mikel’s custody

to this day. Just as state officials may commit

“ongoing” violations when they unconstitutionally

retain possession of a person’s identifiable property,

see, e.g., Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 221—22

(1897); Fla. Dep’t of Slate v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458

U.S. 670, 697—98 (1982) (plurality op.), so the same

may be hue when they keep children they allegedly

have no right to keep.

All in all, while sovereign immunity bars

Mikel’s suit against the Department, it does not bar

Mikel’s claims against Quin.

III.

That leaves Mikel’s claims against Quin and

Omni. These claims run into another hurdle

standing—one Mikel can clear with respect to 0m.ni

but not with respect to Quin. Standing requires (1) an

actual injury (2) caused by a defendant’s challenged

conduct (3) that a favorable decision likely will

redress. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560—

61 (1992). “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing

separately for each form of relief sought.” Friends of

the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env. Ser-vs. (TOC), Inc., 528

U.S. 167, 185 (2000).

App. 8

Damages and attorney’s fees. Mikel seeks

damages only from Omni, and she has standing to

pursue them. When Omni took AK and SK away from

Mikel, Mikel suffered an injury. Chafin v. Chafin, 568

U.S. 165, 172—73 (2013). Omni inflicted that injury

by participating in the removal process. And even a

dollar in damages would help mitigate the injury that

Omni inflicted. Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct.

792, 801—02 (2021). That adds up to standing.

Mikel’s standing to seek costs and attorney’s

fees follows from her standing to seek damages. An

interest in recovering litigation expenses, to be sure,

does not create standing on its own. Lewis v. Cont ‘l

Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990). When a litigant

has standing to seek damages, however, she has

standing to recover fees and costs as well. See, e.g.,

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,

107—08 (1988). Because Mikel has standing to seek

damages, she has standing to seek attorney’s fees too.

Injunctive relief. Mikel also seeks two

injunctions: one limiting “further activity” by the

defendants “[i]nvolving the removal of children from

foster homes,” and another barring the defendants

from “assisting in” any future adoption of AK or SK.

R.1 at 11. But these injunctions would not redress

Mikel’s injuries, meaning Mikel lacks standing to seek

them.

Injunctions redress “present ongoing” or

“imminent future” injuries. Shelby Advocs. for Valid

Elections v. Hargett, 947 F.3d 977, 981 (6th Cir. 2020)

(per curiam). Injuries are “present” when they have

App. 9

already come about, and “imminent” when they are

certain or perhaps substantially likely to occur in the

future. Id. at 981—82; compare Clapper v. Amnesty

Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401-02 (2013), with Susan B.

Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014).

A “person who has been accorded a procedural

right to protect his concrete interests can assert that

right without meeting all the normal standards for

redressability and immediacy.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572

n.7. When a litigant seeks to remedy a procedural

wrong, she instead needs only to show “some

possibility” that an injunction will afford her redress.

Klein v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 753 F.3d 576, 579 (6th

Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). But “a bare

procedural violation, divorced from any concrete

harm,” is not a present or imminent injury that an

injunction can redress. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S.

330, 341—42 (2016).

These principles create problems for Mikel’s

demands for injunctive relief against Quin and Omni.

Start with Mikel’s injuries. Mikel suffered a present,

ongoing injury when she lost custody of her girls. That

loss, however, is the only injury supporting Mikel’s

standing theory. Among other things, Mikel has not

pled that she plans to foster more children going

forward. As a result, she cannot argue that she faces

“imminent” risks of losing future foster children. Cf

Clapper, 568 U.S. at Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 158.

Likewise, although the defendants allegedly deprived

Mikel of custody over her girls without adequate

process, Mikel did not suffer a separate injury from

the inadequate process she received. Divorced from

App. 10

AK and SK, such an injury would be a “bare

procedural violation” insufficient for standing by

itself. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341-42.

Losing custody of AK and SK, in turn, is not an

injury that either of Mikel’s proposed injunctions

against Quin and Omni could redress. Recall that

Mikel sought an injunction restricting removal of

future foster children and another preventing the

defendants from “assisting in” any adoption of the

girls. R.1 at 11. Neither injunction, however, creates

even “some possibility” of returning AK or SK to

Mikel. Klein, 753 F.3d at 579 (quotations omitted). AK

and SK have already been removed, so limiting future

foster-child removals would not alter AK or SK’s

custody status. And while barring Omni or Quin from

assisting in AK or SK’s adoption might prevent AK or

SK from being adopted, this outcome would not return

them either. Mikel has not said that she presently

intends to adopt AK or SK and has not otherwise

explained how an injunction against adoption would

protect her concrete interests. Given this reality,

whether AK and SK get adopted or not, they will still

remain outside Mikel’s hearth and home.

Declaratory

relief

Mikel

requests

two

declaratory judgments: one establishing that the

contract between Omni and the Department is void

and another announcing “a violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.” R.1 at 11 . Both requests fail.

Declaratory judgments are not get-out-ofstanding-free cards. Because federal courts may not

issue advisory opinions, all declaratory judgments

App. 11

must have “a conclusive character.” Aetna Life Ins. Co.

of Hartford v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937). A

declaratory judgment, put differently, may issue only

when “it is substantially likely” to redress a plaintiff’s

actual

imminent

injuries.

Franklin

Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 803 (1992) (plurality

op.); see, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env’t Study

Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75—76 & n.20 (1978); Friends

of Tims Ford v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 585 F.3d 955, 971

(6th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a declaratory

judgment must “affect[l]the behavior of the defendant

towards the plaintiff’ (emphasis omitted) (quoting

Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987)).

Neither of Mikel’s proposed declaratory

judgments has a “conclusive character.” Haworth, 300

U.S. at 241. For starters, declaring that Omni’s

contract with the Department is void would not

redress any injuries Mikel has suffered. Omni issued

AK and SK’s removal notice long ago. Hence voiding

Omni’s contract would not lead AK and SK to return

to Mikel. And because Mikel does not operate a foster

home now and has not suggested that she intends to

do so later, Mikel lacks a legally cognizable interest

that could support an award of prospective relief. Cf

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105—06

(1983).

So too for a “[d]eclaration of a violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1983.” R.1 at 11. The problem, as before, is

that Mikel does not explain how a declaratory

judgment of this sort would offer her redress. Entering

the realm of the possible and the hypothetical, we

suppose, it could be said that a declaratory judgment

App. 12

could raise the odds that the Department would

return the children. But Mikel’s complaint made no

such suggestion, leaving this many other speculative

possibilities. Because Mikel has not argued anything

to this effect, we see no good reason to tread where

Mikel has not.

All in all, while Mikel has standing to seek

attorney’s fees and damages from Omni, she lacks

standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief

against Omni or Quin.

IV.

Jurisdictional brambles cleared, we turn to the

merits. Mikel sought damages only from Omni, the

last party standing as it were. And the only claim left

against Omni is Mikel’s due process claim under

§ 1983.

“No state,” the Due Process Clause says, shall

“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

To violate the guarantee, a “State” must “deprive” a

“person” of “liberty” or “property.” Id. Omni does not

argue that it is not a “State” for Due Process purposes,

and Mikel does not allege that she had a property

interest in her status as a foster parent. As a result,

we need ask only whether Omni deprived Mikel of

“liberty” when it took AK and SK away from her.

Protected liberty interests can arise either from

the Constitution itself or from state law. Neither

App. 13

source in this instance gave Mikel a liberty interest in

her relationship with AK and SK.

The

Constitution.

The

Fourteenth

Amendment’s promise of “liberty” encompasses,

among other things, “those privileges long recognized

… as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by

free men.” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408

U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262

U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). What these privileges are has

never been clear, perhaps because free men pursuing

happiness tend to disagree over what “long,”

“recognized,” “essential,” and “orderly” mean or ought

to mean. Nor do today’s facts bring things into focus:

the Supreme Court has explicitly declined to decide

whether foster parents have liberty interests in their

relationships with foster children. Smith v. Org. of

Foster Fam. for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 84647 (1977).

Where the Supreme Court has drawn blurred

lines, however, our circuit has drawn comparatively

crisp ones. The key case is Renfro v. Cuyahoga County

Department of Human Services, 884 F.2d 943 (6th Cir.

1989). A family had fostered a girl for more than six

years, starting when the girl was fourteen months old.

Id. at 944. Child services took the girl away, alleging

abuse. Id. We held that the family lacked a liberty

interest in its relationship with the child. Id.”[T]he

foster care relationship,” we explained, was “a

temporary arrangement created by state and

contractual agreements,” one which (under Ohio law)

vested “limited” legal rights in the foster family. Id.

App. 14

For that reason, the family’s foster relationship did

not create a constitutional liberty interest. Id.

Mikel took custody of AK and SK under a

contract with Omni and the Department. As in Renfro,

her foster relationship with her girls was a “temporary

arrangement created by state and contractual

agreements,” id.; Mikel had not adopted the girls, or

for that matter come particularly close to

consummating their adoption, and had not otherwise

established a permanent legal relationship with them.

Id. As in Renfro, that means Mikel lacked a

constitutional liberty interest in her status as a foster

parent. Id.

Mikel seeks to distinguish Renfro in three ways,

none persuasive. First, Mikel says, her relationship

with her girls was “pre-adoptive” rather than

“temporary.” But under Tennessee law, foster

relationships, pre-adoptive or not, are designed to be

temporary. Dawn Coppock, Coppock on Tennessee

Adoption Law 226—27 (7th ed. 2017). The temporary

nature of Tennessee foster placements “provides

sufficient notice” to foster parents like Mikel “that

their rights are limited.” Renfro, 884 F.2d at 944.

Second, Mikel continues, a court had

terminated the girls’ biological parents’ rights before

Mikel took custody of them. Terminating the girls’

parents’ rights is a necessary step on the path to

adoption. Diminishing the girls’ biological parents’

rights, however, does not greatly expand Mikel’s.

Mikel’s relationship with the girls remains “created by

App. 15

state and contractual agreements” regardless of the

girls’ biological parents’ rights. Id.

Third, Mikel concludes, Tennessee law gives

foster parents preference in adoption proceedings.

Undeniably,

Tennessee

law

affords

greater

protections to foster parents than the Ohio rules at

issue in Renfro. But the first preference to adopt that

Tennessee law gives to foster parents does not, on our

view, entitle them to the same constitutional

protections as natural or adoptive parents. It also does

not change the reality that Mikel’s relationship is

circumscribed by state and contractual agreements.

Out-of-circuit cases do not change this

conclusion. Mikel relies most heavily on Elwell v.

Byers, 699 F.3d 1208, 1217 (10th Cir. 2012), where a

foster family had “cared for [a foster child] nearly his

entire life and [was] on the verge of adopting him,” and

a state court had previously approved the family’s

“adoption plan.” Id. The Tenth Circuit held that this

arrangement created a liberty interest. Id. But to

recite these facts distinguishes them. Mikel did not

care for the girls for their entire lives, and her

adoption plan did not make it out of the starting gate.

We need not decide whether a different conclusion

would apply if the facts changed so materially.

Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1982),

is further afield. In Rivera, a woman had fostered her

half-brother and sister. Id. at 1024. She had lived “as

a family” with the children for many years before

entering into a formal foster arrangement, and the

biological mother had “expressly asked” the claimant

App. 16

to parent the children. Id. The Second Circuit found a

constitutional liberty interest. Id. at 1024—25. Here,

by contrast, Mikel neither lived with nor shared a

blood relationship with the girls before taking custody

of them as a foster parent.

Mikel’s other out-of-circuit cases, if anything,

cut against her position. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec ‘y of

Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 814 (l1th

Cir. 2004) (rejecting view that foster parents possess

liberty interests in foster relationships because, in

regulating foster relationships, “the state is not

interfering with natural family units that exist

independent of its power, but is regulating ones

created by it”). Other out-of-circuit cases squarely

reject views analogous to Mikel’s. See, e.g., Rodriguez

v. McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328, 337 (2d Cir. 2000)

(holding that no liberty interest arises in foster

arrangements between “biologically unrelated”

persons, and distinguishing Rivera because it involved

a blood relationship).

Tennessee law. Tennessee law also vest Mikel

with a liberty interest in foster parenting. “Statecreated liberty interests arise when a state places

substantive limitations on official discretion.” Tony L.

ex rel. Simpson v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1185 (6th

Cir. 1995) (quotations omitted). A statute places

substantive limits on official discretion when it (1)

contains mandatory language (2) requiring specific

substantive outcomes (3) when specific substantive

predicates are met. See, e.g., Fields v. Henry County,

701 F.3d 180, 186 (6th Cir. 2012).

App. 17

Mikel offers no rule of Tennessee law that

passes this test. Mikel principally cites statutes and

Department rules that, she says, required the

Department to offer notice and a hearing before taking

away the girls. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-2-415(a)(16);

Tenn. Dep’t Childs. Servs. Admin. Pol’ys & Procs.

16.27. Bare notice or hearing requirements, however,

do not make substantive outcomes contingent on

substantive predicates. See, e.g., Fields, 701 F.3d at

186 (hearing); Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d

652, 656 (6th Cir. 1993) (notice). They make

substantive outcomes contingent on procedural

predicates—the adequacy of notice or a hearing. Even

if Omni violated Mikel’s procedural rights under

Tennessee law, that did not mean it violated her

federal due process rights.

Mikel also says that Omni lacked authority

under Tennessee law to remove the girls, that its

removal lacked an evidentiary basis, and that it

justified its removal using testimony that would have

been inadmissible under the Federal and Tennessee

Rules of Evidence. Even if Mikel were right as to each

point, none of these facts helps her state a claim under

1983. See,e.g., Stanley v. Vining, 602 F.3d 767, 769

(6th Cir. 2010) (“[V]iolation of a state statute or

regulation is insufficient alone to make a claim

cognizable under § 1983.”).

We affirm.

App. 18

APPENDIX B

FILED

Jan 19, 2023

DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-5329

SHEILA MIKEL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No.

MARGIE QUIN, Commissioner of the Department of

Children’s Services, in her

official capacity; JENNIFER

NICHOLS, in her individual

capacity; TENNESSEE

DEPARTMENT OF

CHILDREN’S SERVICES;

OMNI VISIONS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

1:20-CV-345

Judge Curtis

L. Collier

App. 19

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; BOGGS and

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga.

THIS CAUSE was heard on the record from the

district court and was argued by counsel.

IN CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is

ORDERED that the judgment of district court is

AFFIRMED.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

App. 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT

CHATTANOOGA

SHEILA MIKEL,

Plaintiff,

Case No.

1:20-CV-345

Judge Curtis L.

Collier

JENNIFER NICHOLS,

Commissioner of the

Department of Children’s

Services, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court are two motions to dismiss the

complaint of Plaintiff, Sheila Mikel, which asserts

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Tennessee law

arising from the removal of two foster children from

her care. (Docs. 12, 15.) Defendants Tennessee

Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and its

Commissioner, Jennifer Nichols (the Commissioner”),

move to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction and insufficiency of service

of process or, in the alternative, failure to state a claim

on which relief may be granted. (Doc. 12.) Defendant

App. 21

Omni Visions, Inc. (“Omni”) moves to dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim on

which relief may be granted. (Doc. 15.) Plaintiff has

responded in opposition to both motions (Docs. 17, 19),

and Defendants have replied (Docs. 18, 20). For the

reasons set out below, the Court will GRANT both

motions to dismiss.

1. BACKGROUND 1

Plaintiff became the pre-adoptive foster mother

of two minor girls (the “Children”) on June 30, 2016.

(Doc. 1 ¶¶8-9). Plaintiff had previously provided

therapy to the Children while they were in the foster

care of others. were in the foster care of others. (Id. ¶

10.) On December 4, 2017, Plaintiff submitted

paperwork to Omni, a contractor with DCS to provide

custodial services for children in DCS’s custody, for its

assistance in completing her adoption of the children.

(Id. ¶¶ 7, 13.) Three days later, on December 7, 2017.

Omni issued a notice of removal taking the Children

from Plaintiffs care as of December 6, 2017. (Id. ¶ 15.)

The notice relied on a purported imminent threat to

the Children’s emotional well-being. (Id.)

On December 8, 2017, Plaintiff appealed the

notice of removal. (Id. ¶ 22.) On December 13, 2017,

Omni sent Plaintiff a letter closing her home as a

foster home in good standing, subject to her request

1 This summary of the facts accepts all the factual allegations in

Plaintiffs complaint as true, see Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d

461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009).

App. 22

for reopening. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff’s appeal was

dismissed on April 19, 2018. (Id.¶ 29.) She then filed

an appeal with the DCS Commissioner, who affirmed

the dismissal. (Id. ¶ 33).

Plaintiff alleges numerous violations of

Tennessee laws and regulations occurred in the

removal of the Children and the subsequent

administrative proceedings. (See id. ¶¶1, 15-20, 22,

24, 25, 27, 29.)

Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Chancery

Court for Bradley County, Tennessee, which was

dismissed as moot on July 10, 2019, in that Plaintiff’s

foster home was no longer open and the Children could

therefore not be returned to her care. (Id. ¶ 34 & at

Ex. E.) She appealed to the Tennessee Court of

Appeals, which affirmed. (Id. ¶ 35 & at Ex. F.) The

Tennessee Supreme Court denied her application for

permission to appeal on November 18, 2020. (Id. ¶ 36

& at Ex.G.)

Meanwhile, Plaintiff filed an action in this

Court on June l, 2018, which was dismissed under the

doctrine of abstention on November 20, 2018. (Id. ¶¶

31-32 & at Ex. D.)

Plaintiff filed her current complaint in this

Court on December 10, 2020, asserting three causes of

action: Count One asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against all Defendants; Count Two seeks

punitive damages against Omni for outrageous

conduct; and Count Three seeks an injunction against

Defendants to prevent them from helping another

App. 23

foster family adopt the Children. (Id. ¶¶ 43—55.) The

relief Plaintiff seeks is “[a] permanent injunction

against the Defendants from further activity

[i]nvolving the removal of children from foster homes

until it submits a plan satisfactory to this Court that

the acts and conduct complained of herein will not

recur”; a declaration that Defendants have violated

Plaintiff’s rights under § 1983; a declaration that the

contract between DCS and Omni is invalid;

compensatory and punitive damages from Omni; and

injunctive relief “prohibiting Defendants from

assisting in any adoption of” the Children. (Id. at 11.)

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendants’ motions to dismiss rely variously

on Rules 12(b)(l), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 12(b)(1)

When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the

plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction. Davis

v. United States, 499 F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2007). A

Rule motion may present either a facial attack, which

questions the sufficiency of the pleadings, or a factual

attack, which challenges the factual existence of

subject-matter jurisdiction. United States v. Ritchie,

15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). “When reviewing a

facial attack, a district court takes the allegations in

the complaint as true,” though conclusory allegations

and legal conclusions will not prevent dismissal.

App. 24

Gentek Bldg. Prods. v. Sherwin-Williams Claims, 491

F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007)

Rule 12(b)(5)

When a defendant moves to dismiss for

insufficient service of process under Rule 12(b)(5), “the

plaintiff bears the burden of proving that proper

service was effected.” Frederick v. HydroAluminum

S.A., 153 F.R.D. 120, 123 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (citing

Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Universal Decor & Interior

Design, Inc., 635 F.2d 434. 435 (5th Cir. 1981)); see

also Shires v. Magnavox Co., 74 F.R.D. 373, 377 (E.D.

Tenn. 1977) (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur

R. Miller, Fed. Practice & Procedure: Civil 528 1353

(burden is on party serving process to establish its

validity). To resolve a motion to dismiss for

insufficient service of process, “[t]he court must look to

matters outside the complaint to determine what

steps, if any, the plaintiff took to effect service.”

SignalQuest, Inc. v. Tien-Ming Chou, 284 F.R.D. 45,

46 (D.N.H. 2012) (quoting C3 Media & Mtg. Grp., LLC

v. Firstgate Internet, Inc., 419 F. supp. 2d 419, 427

(S.D.N.Y. 2005)).

Rule 12(b)(6)

A defendant may move to dismiss a claim for

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept all

of the factual allegations in the complaint as true and

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466

(6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue

App. 25

Shield of Mich., 49 F.3d 710, 716 (6th Cir. 2005)). The

court is not, however, bound to accept bare assertions

of legal conclusions as true. Papasan v. Allain, 478

U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a

court must determine whether the complaint contains

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). Although a complaint need only

contain a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677—78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2)), this statement must nevertheless

contain “factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged,” Id. at 678. Plausibility “is

not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the

court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not

‘show[n]’— ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at

679 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678.

III.

DISCUSSION

The Court will address each of Plaintiffs 1983

claims in turn: first as to DCS, then the Commissioner

in her official capacity, the Commissioner in her

App. 26

individual capacity, and Omni.The Court will then

address Plaintiff’s state-law claim for outrageous

conduct against Omni.

A. Section 1983 Claim Against DCS

DCS moves to dismiss Plaintiffs claim against

it based on sovereign immunity from suit under the

Eleventh Amendment and on the grounds that it is not

a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. (Doc. 13 at

7—8.) In response, Plaintiff argues that an exception

to Eleventh-Amendment immunity applies to DCS.

(Doc. 17 at 7.) Plaintiff does not respond, however, to

DCS’s argument that it is not a “person” amenable to

suit under § 1983.

DCS’s motion under Rule 12(b)(l) implicates the

Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and Plaintiff

therefore bears the burden of proving subject-matter

jurisdiction exists. See Davis, 499 F.3d at 594.

Section 1983 provides in part as

follows:

Every person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of

any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an

App. 27

action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). A state does not

come within the definition of a “person” who may be

sued under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (“a State is not a person within

the meaning of 1983”). An agency of the state is

treated as the state for purposes of § 1983, and it is

thus also not a “person” who may be sued under §

1983. Reese v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 3 Fed. App’x

340, 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (“state agencies . . are not

considered a ‘person’ for purposes of liability under

1983”); see also Graham v. Nat ‘l Collegiate Athletic

Ass’n, 804 F.2d 953, 960 (6th Cir. 1986) (state

university “is a state agency cloaked with Eleventh

Amendment immunity”). As an agency of the state,

DCS cannot be sued under § 1983.

Plaintiff does not address these principles. She

argues instead that DCS is subject to an exception to

Eleventh Amendment immunity under Ex parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) 2 (Doc 7.) The Ex parte

Young exception applies only to state officials, not to

states or state agencies. Lawson v. Shelby Cnty.,

Tenn., 211 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2000); see also

MacDonald v. Vill. of Norport, Mich., 164 F.3d 964,

970 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining Ex parte Young

2 Plaintiff asserts that DCS “concedes” it is subject to the Ex parte

Young exception. (Doc. 17 at 7.) DCS denies having made such

a concession. (Doc. 18 a 1.) The Court has closely reviewed DCS’s

motion and memorandum (Docs. 12, 13) and sees no such

concession.

App. 28

doctrine as applying to state officials who are sued in

their official capacities). This is true because “[t]he

idea behind [the Ex parte Young] exception is that a

suit against a state officer is not a suit against the

state when the remedy sought is an injunction against

an illegal action, for an officer is not acting on behalf

of the state when he acts illegally.” Lawson. 211 F.3d

at 335. The rationale for Ex parte Young cannot apply

to states or state agencies, who have no other capacity

in which to act.

DCS, as a state agency, is not subject to suit

under 1983. The Court will therefore GRANT DCS’s

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against it. Because

DCS’s motion implicates the Court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claim

against DCS without prejudice.

B. Section 1983 Claim Against the

Commissioner in Her Official Capacity

The Commissioner moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s

claim against her in her official capacity based on

immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.

(Doc. 13 at 8—9.) She argues that the Ex parte Young

exception does not apply to her, both because “Plaintiff

has not alleged the violation of a recognized federal

right” and because “Plaintiff has not alleged an

ongoing violation of federal law.” (Id. at 9 (emphasis

in original).) More specifically, the Commissioner

argues that there is no federal right at stake because

“foster parents do not have a constitutionally

protected liberty interest in a continued relationship

App. 29

with their foster child.” (Id. at 9, 14—15.) Plaintiff

responds that such a federal right does exist and that

the relief Plaintiff seeks is prospective injunctive

relief, as allowed under Ex parte Young. (Doc. 17 at 7,

1 1—13.)

The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he

Judicial power of the United States shall not be

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,

commenced or prosecuted against one of the United

States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or

Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend.

XII. Although the language of the Eleventh

Amendment only forbids federal suits against a state

by non-citizens of that state, the bar of the

Amendment also extends to federal suits against a

state by its own citizens. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 276.

Under the exception established by Ex parte

Young, however, a federal court may hear an action

against a state official in his or her official capacity if

the “complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal

law and seeks relief properly characterized as

prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n

of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quoting Idaho v.

Coeur D ‘Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296

(1997)). As stated in the previous section, the theory

behind the Ex parte Young “exception is that a suit

against a state officer is not a suit against the state

when the remedy sought is an injunction against an

App. 30

illegal action, for an officer is not acting on behalf of

the state when he acts illegally.” 3

Lawson, 211 F.3d at 335. The law the state official is

alleged to have violated must be a federal law, not a

state law, for Ex parte Young to apply: “Case law is

legion that the Eleventh Amendment . . . directly

prohibits federal courts from ordering state officials to

conform their conduct to state law.” Johns v. The

Supreme Ct. of Ohio, 753 F.2d 524, 526 (6th Cir. 1985)

(citing Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)).

The Commissioner argues that “the Due

Process Clause does not give rise to a constitutionally

protected liberty interest in the foster-care

relationship.” (Doc. 13 at 14.) Plaintiff responds that

the cases on which the Commissioner relies are

distinguishable and the Commissioner ignores onpoint authority that recognizes such an interest.

Because the Commissioner’s motion goes to the

Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff bears the

burden of proving jurisdiction exists. See Davis, 499

F.3d at 594. In other words, Plaintiff bears the burden

of establishing that a constitutionally protected

3 Thus, an official-capacity action against a state actor seeking

prospective relief, such as an injunction, is not treated as an

action against the state, and a state official sued in an official

capacity therefore is a “person” under 1983 in a suit for injunctive

relief. Wolfel v. Morris, 972 F.2d 712, 719 (6th Cir. 1992).

App. 31

liberty interest exists in her foster-care relationship

with the Children.

The Commissioner relies on Renfro v. Cuyahoga

County Department of Human Services, in which the

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit declined to

recognize a constitutionally protected liberty interest

in a six-year-long foster-care relationship that had

begun when the child was fourteen months old. 884

F.2d 943, 944 (6th Cir. 1989). Although the Court of

Appeals “recognize[d] the strong emotional bond that

might evolve in a foster care situation,” it “hesitate[d]

to characterize this relationship as a constitutionally

protected liberty interest.” Id. The Court of Appeals

further noted that “[t]he nature of the foster care

relationship is distinctly different from that of the

natural family” in that “it is a temporary arrangement

created by state and contractual arrangements.” Id.

Plaintiff distinguishes Renfro on the grounds

that it involved Ohio law, under which the foster

parents had no mechanism to challenge their foster

child’s removal. (Doc. 17 at 11.) This distinction does

not help Plaintiff. The question is whether a foster

parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest

in his or her relationship with the foster child. The

Renfro Court declined to find such an interest in a

relationship four times longer than Plaintiffs

relationship with the Children. Whether Ohio law

provided greater or lesser procedural protections to

foster parents than Tennessee law is irrelevant to

whether a federal liberty interest exists.

App. 32

The Commissioner also relies on Zak v. Pilla, in

which plaintiffs sued an adoption agency under 1983

for failing to act on their adoption application,

charging a denial of their due-process and equalprotection rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments. 698 F.2d 800 (6th Cir.1982). The Court

of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the action, holding

the district court lacked jurisdiction over the action.

Id. at 801. The Court of Appeals pointed out that

“[e]ven where parents have enjoyed temporary

custody of an adoptive child under state adoption

agency procedures, they do not necessarily acquire a

constitutionally protected interest so as to invoke

federal jurisdiction.” Id.

Plaintiff distinguishes Zak on the grounds that

it was a per curiam opinion. (Doc. 17 at 11.) A per

curiam opinion is simply one “attributed to the entire

panel of judges who have heard the appeal and not

signed by any particular judge on the panel.” Per

Curiam, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The

per curiam nature of an opinion does not diminish its

precedential value. Rather, it is this Court’s

understanding that per curiam opinions are employed

where the propositions of law involved are

straightforward and uncontroversial. Plaintiff also

attempts to distinguish Zak on factual grounds, in

that it involved an agency’s refusal to act on the

plaintiffs’ adoption application, rather than the

removal of a foster child from the plaintiffs’ care. (Doc.

17 at 11.) The Court is unable to discern how this

factual difference undermines the relevance of Zak’s

statement that having temporary custody of an

App. 33

adoptive child does not necessarily create a

constitutionally protected interest in the relationship.

The Commissioner cites two other cases as to

which Plaintiff makes no argument. In Sherrard v.

Owens. the Court of Appeals declined to make a broad

determination of “whether foster parents have a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in the

relationship between them and foster children placed

in their homes,” but held that plaintiffs holding a

temporary six-month license for a foster home did not

have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in

continuing as foster parents to two children placed

with them. 644 F.2d 542, 543 (6th Cir. 1981). In

Ballard v. Johnson, the district court for the Eastern

District of Michigan reviewed Sixth Circuit and other

decisions on the subject, concluding that “[t]he nature

and extent of the liberty interests possessed by foster

families, if any, must . . . be derived from ‘the

expectations and entitlements of the parties’ under

state law, and not the Due Process Clause.” Civ. No.

15-11039, 2017 WL 1151166. at *6 (6th Cir. Mar. 28,

2017) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for

Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845—46 (1977)).

Neither of these cases ends the inquiry, because

Sherrard does not make a decision beyond its facts and

Ballard, as a district-court opinion, is not controlling.

Nevertheless, they are persuasive, and they add

weight to the Commissioner’s argument that Plaintiff

App. 34

does not have a constitutionally protected liberty

interest in her relationship with the Children. 4

Plaintiff relies on two cases to show the

existence of a constitutionally protected liberty

interest in her relationship with the Children. She

describes these rights as ‘the substantive and

procedural due process rights of a pre-adoptive mother

not to be deprived of her children.” (Doc. 17 at 12.) She

points first to Smith, in which the Supreme Court

stated that “biological relationships are not [the]

exclusive determination of the existence of a family,”

noting that the marriage relationship is not biological

and yet is “[t]he basic foundation of the family in our

society” and “its importance has been strongly

emphasized in our cases.” 431 U.S. at 843. Plaintiff

notes that Smith went on to state that the Court

“cannot dismiss the foster family as a mere collection

of unrelated individuals.” Id.at 844. Plaintiff

acknowledges that Smith does “not specifically hold[]

that the status of a foster parent is constitutionally

protected.” (Doc. 17 at 12.)

There is a significant gap between saying a

foster family is not just a collection of unrelated

individuals and saying foster parents have a

4 The Commissioner also cites a number of opinions from courts

of appeals for other circuits finding no constitutionally protected

liberty interest in the foster-care relationship. (See Doc. 13 at 15

n. 13.) The Court finds it unnecessary to consider these cases as

additional support for the Commissioner’s position given the

relevant controlling cases and the arguments of the parties.

App. 35

constitutionally protected liberty interest in their

relationships with their foster children. The Supreme

Court in Smith ultimately found it unnecessary to

resolve the “complex and novel questions” involved in

whether there is a constitutionally protected liberty

interest in the foster-care relationship. Id. at 847.

Before moving on to its specific decision, however, the

Supreme Court pointed out the significant distinctions

between the foster family and the natural family.

First, in a foster family, “the claimed interest derives

from a knowingly assumed contractual relation with

the State,” such that “it is appropriate to ascertain

from state law the expectations and entitlements of

the parties.” Id. at 845—46. This cuts significantly

against Plaintiff as it regards the Ex parte Young

exception, which requires the violation of a federal

law, not a state law, if the exception is to apply. See

Johns, 753 F.2d at 526. Second, the Supreme Court in

Smith noted that “ordinarily procedural protection

may be afforded to a liberty interest of one person

without derogating from the substantive liberty of

another,” but in a foster-parent relationship, tension

between the rights of natural parents and foster

parents is “virtually unavoidable.” Smith, 431 U.S. at

846. While Smith does not foreclose Plaintiff’s

argument for the existence of a constitutionally

protected liberty interest, it does not strongly support

it, either.

In the second case on which Plaintiff relies, the

Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognize[d]

that the typical foster care arrangement generally

does not create a liberty interest in familial

association.” Elwell v. Byers, 699 F.3d 1208, 1217

App. 36

(10th Cir. 2012). It nevertheless held that the

plaintiffs had a constitutional liberty interest in their

relationship with their foster child under the specific

circumstances of that case. Id. at 1216—17. Those

circumstances included the facts that the rights of the

child’s biological parents had been terminated; the

plaintiffs were the only parents the child had known,

since he had been with the plaintiffs for nearly his

entire life, from the age of three months old; and they

were only a month away from an adoption hearing

when the child was removed from their custody. Id. at

1211, 1216—17. The Tenth Circuit declined to “define

precisely where the liberty interest threshold falls on

this spectrum, but conclude[d] that the [plaintiffs] fall

on the protected side of that line under the facts of this

case.” Id. at 1217. Elwell does not persuade the Court

that Plaintiff has a protected liberty interest in her

foster-care relationship with the Children. Like the

Sixth Circuit cases discussed above, Elwell declined to

find that the typical foster-care relationship creates a

constitutional liberty interest. Even if the Court were

to follow the reasoning of this non-binding, out-ofcircuit case, Plaintiff has not shown her circumstances

are sufficiently close to the plaintiffs’ in Elwell for its

reasoning to apply. There, the child was placed with

the plaintiffs at three months old and had known no

other parents; here, the Children were placed with

Plaintiff when they were old enough to have been in

therapy with Plaintiff before the placement, staying

with her for a year and a half before their removal.

There, the removal took place a month before the

scheduled adoption hearing; here, the removal took

place three days after Plaintiff submitted her adoption

papers.

App. 37

Because this is a jurisdictional matter, Plaintiff

bears the burden of proving she has a constitutionally

protected liberty interest such that the Ex parte Young

exception applies. See Davis, 499 F.3d at 594.

Considering Elwell along with Smith and the Sixth

Circuit decisions in Renfro, Zak, and Sherrard, the

Court concludes Plaintiff has not shown she has a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in her

foster-parent relationship with the Children. The

Court will accordingly GRANT the Commissioner’s

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against her in her

official capacity. Because the Commissioner’s motion

implicates the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the

Court will dismiss this claim without prejudice.

Section 1983 Claim Against the

Commissioner in Her Individual

Capacity

The Commissioner moves to dismiss Plaintiff s

claim against her in her individual capacity under

Rule 12(b)(5) on the grounds of insufficient service of

process. (Doc. 13 at 11—12.) She notes that the only

return of service for her shows service on the

Tennessee Attorney General’s Office. (Id at 12 (citing

Doc. 10 at l ).) Service on the Tennessee Attorney

General is not a permitted method of service on an

individual. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).

Plaintiff

does

not

respond

the

Commissioner’s argument regarding service on the

Commissioner in her individual capacity. (See Doc.

17.) It is Plaintiffs burden to prove she effected proper

App. 38

service of process. See Frederick, 153 F.R.D. at 123.

Plaintiff has not shown she has done so. Therefore, the

Court will GRANT the Commissioner’s motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against her in her individual

capacity and dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against the

Commissioner in her individual capacity without

prejudice under Rule 12(b)(5).

D. Section 1983 Claim Against Omni

Omni moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

against it for failure to state a claim on which relief

may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 16 at 4—5.)

Omni argues Plaintiff cannot state a claim under 1983

because she did not have a constitutionally protected

liberty interest in her relationship with the Children,

citing many of the cases relied on by the

Commissioner, among others. (Id.) Plaintiff, as with

the Commissioner’s motion, seeks to distinguish or

discredit Omni’s cases and relies on Smith and Elwell

to show she has a constitutionally protected liberty

interest in her relationship with the Children. (Doc. 19

at 1—6.)

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a

plaintiff must “demonstrate that a person acting

under color of state law ‘deprived [him] of rights,

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States.”‘ Barker v. Goodrich, 649

F.3d 428, 432 (6th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original)

(quoting Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810,

817 (6th Cir. 2005)). Unlike the context of Ex parte

Young, where the right in question must arise from

App. 39

federal law to avoid Eleventh Amendment immunity,

the right in a 1983 action may arise either from the

Due Process Clause or from the laws of a state. See Ky.

Dep ‘t of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)

(quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983)

(receded from on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472 (995))).

The Court has already concluded Plaintiff does

not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest

in her foster-parent relationship with the Children.

See supra § III(B). Plaintiff offers no new support for

her position in her response to Omni’s motion; the new

arguments she offers focus on distinguishing out-ofcircuit cases cited by Omni. The Court accordingly

adopts for purposes of Omni’s motion its conclusion

above, that Plaintiff does not have a constitutionally

protected liberty interest in her foster-parent

relationship with the Children. 5

Plaintiff points to the safeguards enacted by the

state of Tennessee for the foster parent relationship as

establishing a liberty interest: “presumption of

preference in adoption for foster families with a

duration of twelve months, notice before removal, no

5 Although the burden of proof is different in considering Omni’s

motion to dismiss than the Commissioner’s, as Omni’s motion is

brought under Rule 12(b)(6), this shift in the burden is not

enough to persuade the Court that a constitutionally protected

liberty interest exists when the Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit has consistently declined to find one and when the factual

circumstances in Elwell, on which Plaintiff places strong

reliance.

App. 40

removal without threat of physical injury, and the

requirement of foster parent conferencing.” (Doc. 19 at

6.) To create a protected liberty interest, a state must

place substantive limits on official discretion,

mandating particular substantive outcomes if certain

criteria are met. Tony L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182.

explain how the Tennessee provisions on which she

relies—a presumption of preference as to adoption,

1185 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461

U.S. 238, 249 (1983)). “State-created procedural rights

that do not guarantee a particular substantive

outcome are not protected by the Fourteenth

Amendment, even where such procedural rights are

mandatory.” Id. (citing Pusey v. City of Youngstown,

11 F.3d 652, 656 (6th Cir. 1993)). Plaintiff does not

explain how the Tennessee provisions on which she

relies—a presumption of preference as to adoption,

notice before removal, restrictions on removal, and

conferencing

requirements—mandate

particular

substantive outcomes. (See Doc. 19 at 6.)

Because Plaintiff has not shown the existence

of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in her

6 Plaintiff does not address the substantive-outcome standard for

a state to create a protected liberty interest in her response to

Omni’s motion to dismiss. (See generally Doc. 6.) She also does

not respond to the Commissioner’s explicit arguments on this

standard in her response to the Commissioner’s motion.

(Compare Doc. 13 at 15-18 (explaining standard and arguing why

each of the state laws or regulations on which Plaintiff relies fail

to meet it) with Doc. 17 at 8 (asserting without explanation that

the “Constitution affords [Plaintiff] protection under Tennessee

law) and 11-13 (arguing existence of constitutionally protected

interest solely on federal constitutional grounds).)

App. 41

relationship with the Children, her complaint fails to

state a claim on which relief can be granted against

Omni under 1983. Therefore, the Court will DISMISS

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Omni with prejudice.

Outrageous-Conduct Claim Against

Omni

The dismissal of all of Plaintiffs federal-law

claims leads to the question of the Court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction over her single remaining statelaw claim against Omni for outrageous conduct. Statelaw claims brought in a federal-question case can only

be heard through the exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.. The discretionary. District

courts may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a state-law claim if:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

the claim raises a novel or complex issue

of State law,

the claim substantially predominates

over the claim or claims over which the

district court has original jurisdiction,

the district court has dismissed all

claims over which it has original

jurisdiction, or

in exceptional circumstances, there are

other compelling reasons for declining

jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. §1367(c). In making its discretionary

decision, a district court should weigh “the values of

judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350

App. 42

(1988); accord Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc.,

994 F.2d 1 178, 1 182 (6th Cir. 1993).

The third rationale of § 1367(c) applies here

because the Court will dismiss all of the claims over

which it has original jurisdiction. See supra § III(A)—

(D). When all federal claims have been dismissed, the

preferred disposition of state-law claims is dismissal.

Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 952 (6th

Cir. 2010) (citing Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Exp.

Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254—55 (6th Cir. 1996)).

Therefore, the Court will DISMISS Plaintiffs

outrageous-conduct claim against Omni without

prejudice.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 12, 15)

will be GRANTED. The Court will DISMISS

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Omni WITH

PREJUDICE and will dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining

claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE, as they are being

dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

An appropriate order will enter.

CURTIS L. COLLIER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

App. 43

APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

SHEILA MIKEL,

)

Plaintiff,

)

1:20-cv-345

JENNIFER NICHOLS,

)

Commissioner of the

)

Department of Children’s

)

Services,

)

DEPARTMENT OF

)

CHILDREN’S SERVICES,

)

And OMNI VISIONS, Inc.,

)

Defendants.

)

[Filed December 10, 2020]

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, Sheila Mikel, by her attorneys,

Thomas & Thomas, for her Complaint, alleges:

This Complaint is brought for injunctive

relief and damages as a result of the total disregard by

the Department of Children’s Services (hereinafter the

“Department”), Omni Visions, Inc. (hereinafter

“Omni”) and their personnel of the statutory,

regulatory, and constitutional mandates which govern

their operations. This action involves the removal of

App. 44

foster children from their foster mother by Omni, a

private company independent from the Department,

the foreclosure by Omni of any review of its conduct

and the approval of the Department of the whole

process by its denial of administrative review of what

was done. By their refusal to acknowledge the

constitutional and other rights of the Plaintiff, and

there is evidence of such a systemic infirmity in its

entire operation with respect to foster children that

this Court should enjoin further operation of the

Department with respect to the removal of foster

children until it can submit a plan to this Court for a

methodology with which these infirmities can be

eliminated.

Plaintiff, Sheila Mikel (hereinafter

“Sheila”), is a resident of Bradley County, Tennessee,

residing in Cleveland, Tennessee.

Defendant, Jennifer Nichols (hereinafter

“Nichols”), is the Commissioner of the Department of

Children’s Services of the State of Tennessee and is

named as a defendant both in her official and in her

individual capacity. She may be served at 315

Deadrick Street, Nashville, Tennessee 37242.

Defendant, Department, is part of the

Executive Branch of the State of Tennessee and is

located at 315 Deadrick Street, Nashville, Tennessee

37243.

Defendant, Omni, is a corporation

organized and existing under the laws of the State of

Tennessee with its principal place of business at 301

App. 45

Perimeter Park Drive, Suite 235, Nashville,

Tennessee 37211 and may be served there. Omni,

either itself or through related corporations does

business with the States of Tennessee, North

Carolina, Georgia, and Kentucky in the operation of

foster homes.

At all relevant times herein, either

Nichols or Bonnie Homrich was responsible for the

policies and operations of the Department.

Prior to, and on July 1, 2017, the

Department and Omni entered into a contract for

Omni to provide custodial services for children in the

custody of the Department and the State of Tennessee

(hereinafter the “Contract”, a copy of which is attached

as Exhibit A). Under the provisions of the Contract,

Omni agreed, among other things, to abide by the

regulations of the Department in connection with the

children for whom it would provide foster care. To the

extent

that

Defendants

contend

that

the

aforementioned Contract gives Omni the authority to

engage in the conduct hereinafter referred to, it is

illegal and contrary to the provisions of the authority

given by the Legislature of the State of Tennessee only

to the Department.

Prior to June 30, 2016, the custody of

two girls, AK and SK (hereinafter The “K Girls”), was

awarded to the Department by the Juvenile Court of

Bradley County, Tennessee, pursuant to a finding of

severe dependency and neglect.

App. 46

Prior to June 30, 2016, Omni approved

the home of Sheila as a pre- adoptive foster home,

having been urged by Omni to become not just a foster

mother but to become a pre-adoptive foster mother to

adopt the girls.

10.

On or about June 30, 2016, the

Department transferred custody of the K Girls to

Sheila as their pre-adoptive foster mother. Prior to

that date Sheila had provided therapy treatment to

the K Girls while they were in the foster care of others,

and their transfer to Sheila was approved by the

Department with its knowledge of the therapy having

been provided by her.

11.

From June 30, 2016, and through the

summer of 2017 Sheila nurtured and cared for the K

Girls with what she believed was support from the

Department and from Omni, and she also continued to

receive encouragement from Defendants to adopt the

K Girls.

12.

In the summer of 2017 Sheila

experienced what she believed to be unusual

experiences with one of the K Girls. As a result, she

sought the advice of a psychiatrist who had been

treating one of the K Girls with the approval of the

Department. That psychiatrist diagnosed one of the K

Girls with a syndrome known as Dissociative Identity

Disorder (“DID”). Since its approved therapist had not

made this diagnosis, the Department questioned the

diagnosis and requested an independent diagnosis.

Such an independent diagnosis was performed, and

the diagnosis of the psychiatrist was partially

App. 47

confirmed with a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress

Syndrome with Moderate Dissociation.

The

Department disagreed that this diagnosis was a

diagnosis of DID and began to accuse Sheila with

providing “therapy” to the K Girls for DID, which

Sheila was not doing. The Department did continue to

send the K Girls for therapy with its approved

therapist, John Arias, whose further participation will

be set forth below. While the psychiatrist referred to

above who did diagnose one of the K Girls with DID

was a licensed Doctor, John Arias was not.

13.

At about the same time as the

controversy began to arise with respect to the DID

diagnosis, Sheila was preparing her papers for the

adoption of the K Girls. All of those papers were

submitted to Omni by December 4, 2017, for its

assistance in completing the adoption.

14.

During the period from July 1, 2016 to

December 4, 2017, Omni had been receiving a

minimum of $8,400 per month for the K Girls under

its Contract with the Department, but Omni was

paying Sheila only $2,100. If the K Girls were to be

adopted, the payments to Omni for the K Girls would

cease, so it was necessary for Omni to find a way to

block the adoption, and, as described below, it did so,

with the complicity of the Department.

15.

On December 7, 2017, three days after

she had completed the submission of her adoption

papers, Omni, not the Department, hurriedly

prepared and issued a Notice of Removal for the K

Girls to be taken from Sheila. (A copy of the Notice is

App. 48

attached hereto as Exhibit A.) The Notice, dated

December 7, 2017, stated that the K Girls would be

taken on December 6, 2017, the day before the

issuance of the Notice of Removal. The Notice also

provided that they were being taken immediately

because of an imminent threat, not to their physical

well-being, but to their emotional well-being. The

Notice was based upon a letter, dated December 6,

2017, from John Arias. In addition to the fact that

John Arias was not a medical doctor, his license as a

therapist was suspended in June 2016, and he was

placed on probation for a period of three years. It is not

known whether his license was reinstated by the time

of his December 6, 2017, letter.

16.

Under the law of the State of Tennessee

a Notice of Removal may only be issued by the

Department. Nevertheless, an Omni representative,

Steve Dunn, signed and issued a Notice of Removal for

the K Girls.

17.

As alleged above, the K Girls were

removed immediately and without notice to Sheila

under the pretext that Sheila presented an imminent

threat to their emotional well-being. This pretext was

supported only by the letter dated December 6, 2017,

from a therapist although at least two psychiatrists

had seen the K Girls.

18.

Under Regulations promulgated by the

Department a Child and Family Team Meeting

(hereinafter “CFTM”) is required to be held by the

Department before the Department may remove a

child from a foster parent. No such meeting was held

App. 49

by the Department before December 6, 2017, in

connection with the removal of the K Girls. In fact, no

such meeting was ever held by the Department.

19.

Under Regulations promulgated by the

Department, a foster parent such as Sheila is required

to be given fourteen days’ notice of any CFTM

meeting. No such notice was given to Sheila of any

such meeting, since no such meeting was held.

20.

On December 6, 2017, a representative of

Omni, not the Department, removed the K Girls from

Bowman Hills School, a private school for which

Sheila was paying and from which one was expecting

to graduate in May 2018. In removing the K Girls from

their school, a representative of Omni lied to the

school with respect to the reason for taking them,

since at that time Omni had no Notice of Removal,

which was not created until the next day. A

representative of Omni stated to the school that the K

Girls were being taken to a meeting.

21.

Since their removal, the Department and

Omni have refused to inform Sheila of the

whereabouts of the K Girls.

22.

On or about December 8, 2017, Sheila

Mikel appealed from the Notice of Removal, and

although the Department was required to complete its

portion of the papers related to the appeal, it refused

to do so without explanation.

23.

On December 13, 2017, Omni sent a

letter to Sheila closing her home as a foster home but

App. 50

closing it in good standing, subject to her request that

it be reopened.

24.

Under Regulations promulgated by the

Department, an appeal from a Notice of Removal

would normally stay the effectivity of a removal.

Although, as alleged above, an appeal was taken by

Sheila from the Notice of Removal, the Department

refused to stay proceedings and return the K Girls to

her custody.

25.

After the filing of the Appeal from the

Notice of Removal, a hearing was Scheduled before an

Administrative Law Judge, who, upon information

and belief, is employed by the Department. In

addition, correspondence from the Judge Is sent on

Department stationary.

26.

Sheila’s Appeal was originally set for

January 18, 2018, but on January 12, 2018, the

Department filed a motion to dismiss Sheila’s appeal

on the grounds that the appeal was “moot” because her

home had been closed by Omni and she had no home

to which the K Girls could be returned. Sheila objected

to that motion upon the grounds that her home had

been closed in good standing. The Administrative

Judge agreed and denied the motion. The hearing was

rescheduled for March 27, 2018.

27.

On March 21, 2018, the Department

filed yet another “Emergency Motion” to Dismiss,

raising the same grounds that had previously been

raised and for which the motion had been denied. In

support of this motion, however, the Department

App. 51

stated that a “key” witness for it would be unavailable

for the full hearing. That witness was Omni’s Steve

Dunn, the person from Omni who had signed the

Notice of Removal and who, apparently, participated

in the preparation of the letter of December 13, 2017,

closing Sheila’s foster home. A hearing was scheduled

on the motion for April 11, 2018, and the March 27,

2018, hearing date was changed to April 19, 2018.

28.

On April 11, 2018, a hearing was held on

the Department’s renewed Motion to Dismiss, and at

the hearing Steve Dunn testified that the letter of

December 13, 2017, sent by Omni to Sheila, closing

her home in good standing, was false. In opposition to

the motion Sheila argued that the matter should be

heard on a full record and that the closure issue be

heard with the evidence on the merits of the validity

of the Notice of Removal. The Administrative Judge

agreed, and the matter was scheduled for a plenary

hearing on April 19, 2018.

29.

When the parties convened on April 19,

2018, without a written motion or the receipt of

further evidence, the Department renewed its motion

to dismiss, and the Judge granted it. The Department,

therefore, succeeded in having no public review of its

conduct in connection with the removal of the K Girls

from Sheila.

30.

After her appeal was dismissed by the

Administrative Judge, Sheila became concerned that

the new foster parents, whose identity had been kept

from her, would commence adoption proceedings for

the K Girls. Since the commencement of such

App. 52

proceedings may vest primary jurisdiction in the court

in which it is filed, Sheila, through counsel, requested

the identity of the new foster parents. By letter, dated

May 16, 2018, that request was refused by counsel for

the Department. (A copy of the letter is attached

hereto as Exhibit C.) If adoption proceedings are

commenced, the actions of the Defendants in assisting

in those proceedings will impair Sheila’s rights in this

proceeding.

31.

After her appeal from the Notice of

Removal was dismissed by the Administrative Law

Judge, Sheila filed an action in this Court on or about

June 1, 2018, bearing Case No. 18-cv-00117.

32.

Upon motion of the defendants in that

action, the complaint was dismissed under the

doctrine of abstention, specifically without prejudice

to re-commencement after review by the Tennessee

courts. A copy of that order and decision is attached

hereto as Exhibit D.

33.

After her appeal from the Notice of

Removal was dismissed, Sheila appealed to the

Commissioner of the Department of Children’s

Services, who affirmed the dismissal of the Notice of

Appeal on the grounds that it was moot on September

21, 2018.

34.

After

the

affirmance

the

Commissioner of the Department of Children’s

Services, Sheila commenced an action in the Chancery

Court of Bradley County, Tennessee to review the

decision of the Commissioner and to assert

App. 53

independent grounds for the invalidity of the decision.

Upon motion of the Defendants in that action, it was

dismissed in a two-page opinion and order, entered

July 9, 2019. A copy of that decision and order is

attached as Exhibit E.

35.

An appeal was taken from the decision of

the Bradley County Chancery Court to the Court of

Appeals of Tennessee, and that court affirmed the

decision of the Chancery Court on July 21, 2020,

without considering the independent grounds for

reversal and the constitutional grounds raised. A copy

of that decision is attached as Exhibit F.

36.

An Application for Permission to Appeal

from the decision of the Court of Appeals was made to

the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee, and on

November 18, 2020, that Court denied the

Application. A copy of that order is attached hereto as

Exhibit G.

37.

Omni and the Department have engaged

in unlawful and illegal acts in removing the K Girls

from Sheila for reasons other than the best interests

of the K Girls. The conduct of the Defendants has

denied Sheila procedural and substantive due process

and has denied her constitutional right to mother the

K Girls.

38.

The conduct of the Defendants goes

beyond the pale of the expectations of a civilized

society operating under a system of governance in

which the actions of the Executive Branch of the

government must be scrutinized by the Judicial

App. 54

Branch to ensure compliance with the requirements of

the Constitutions of the State of Tennessee and the

United States.

39.

As a result of the unfettered, unlawful

and illegal conduct of the Defendants, Sheila has

suffered extreme emotional damage and has incurred

substantial expense in defending herself and her

foster children from the acts of the Defendants.

40.

After all the conduct referred to above

had been called to the attention of the Department and

Omni, they have persisted in contending that they

have done nothing wrong. This attitude is consistent

with the attitude taken by the Department with

respect to others, who cannot afford to fight it.

41.

Unless restrained and preliminarily and

permanently enjoined, Defendants will continue their

illegal activities. Those activities also warrant the

imposition of compensatory damages against all

Defendants.

42.

Plaintiff also seeks other relief in

connection with her allegations. She is asking this

Court, as a condition of the removal of any injunction

issued, to require the Department to submit to it a

plan to ensure that the conduct alleged herein, and all

similar conduct, will not recur. Until then, the

Department should be enjoined from further foster

care removal activity, and those responsibilities

transferred to another branch of government.

App. 55

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

43.

Plaintiff repeats

allegations of paragraphs 1-42.

and

realleges

the

44.

Under the provisions of T.C.A. §37-24125 (20) the Tennessee legislature has mandated

that after a child has been with a foster parent for

twelve months, the foster parent is to be the first

choice for adoption.

45.

Under

the

Regulations

the

Department a person who has been a foster parent for

twelve or more months has a right to contest the

removal of a foster child and is to be given fourteen

days-notice of that removal and a right to contest the

removal.

46.

Sheila has a protectable family interest

in maintaining her relationship with the K Girls.

47.

The conduct of the Defendants has

deprived Sheila of her constitutional Liberty right to a

protectible family interest under color of state law in

violation of 42 U. S. C. §1983.

48.

Unless enjoined, the activity of the

Defendants will continue.

49.

Sheila has also suffered damage in an

amount to be determined.

App. 56

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

50.

Plaintiff repeats and realleges the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 42

against Omni only.

51.

The conduct of Omni in this and other

similar situations is conduct outrageous as to shock

the conscience of a reasonable person.

52.

The conduct of Omni has resulted in

emotional damage to Sheila in such a mount as may

be determined by a jury.

53.

The conduct of Omni is in such blatant

disregard for the rights of Sheila and is so shocking as

to warrant the imposition of punitive damages.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

54.

Plaintiff repeats and realleges

allegations contained in paragraphs 1-42.

the

55.

Upon information and belief, because of

the history of these proceedings it is believed that

Defendants will encourage and assist the family with

whom the K Girls have been placed to adopt them. All

that is required to commence those proceedings is that

the K Girls be in the possession of the new foster

family for a period of 6 months. Unless restrained and

enjoined from assisting the foster family to adopt the

K Girls, the rights of Sheila may be permanently

foreclosed.

App. 57

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands relief and

judgment as follows and a jury to try the case:

A permanent injunction against the

Defendants from further activity Involving the

removal of children from foster homes until it submits

a plan satisfactory to this Court that the acts and

conduct complained herein will not recur;

§ 1983;

Declaration of a violation of 42 U.S.C.

Declaration of the invalidity of the

Contract between the Department and Omni;

An award of compensatory and punitive

damages against Omni;

A restraining order and preliminary and

permanent injunctions prohibiting Defendants from

assisting in any adoption of the K Girls; and

Costs and expenses.

App. 58

THOMAS & THOMAS

By:_/s/ W. Neil Thomas, III___________

W. Neil Thomas, III, BPR #4536

One Park Place

6148 Lee Highway

Chattanooga, Tennessee

423-910-9100

wnthomas@twtlawfirm.com

Of Counsel:

Curtis Bowe, III, Esq. BPR #17037

Bowe & Associates

707 Georgia Avenue

Chattanooga, TN 37402

App. 59

APPENDIX D

The AFCARS Report

U. S. Department of Human Services,

Administration for Children and

Families, Administration on Children,

Youth and Families, Children’s Bureau

https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb

Preliminary FY1 2021 Estimates as of

June 28, 2022 - No. 29

See Fold-Out Exhibits

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.