Reply Brief — Phillips Manufacturing & Tower Company, et al., Applicants v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 3, 2022

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No. 21A245

In the Supreme Court of the United States

____________________________________________________

PHILLIPS MANUFACTURING & TOWER COMPANY, ET AL.,

Applicants

V.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OSHA, ET AL.

___________________________________________________________________________

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTION

PENDING CERTIORARI REVIEW

___________________________________________________________________________

Patrick Strawbridge

Counsel of Record

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC

Ten Post Office Square

8th Floor South PMB #706

Boston, MA 02109

(703) 243-9423

patrick@consovoymccarthy.com

Jeffrey M. Harris

Daniel Shapiro

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC

1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700

Arlington, VA 22209

(703) 243-9423

Robert Alt

THE BUCKEYE INSTITUTE

88 East Broad Street, Suite 1300

Columbus, OH 43215

(614) 224-4422

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. ii

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1

I.

An Injunction or Stay is Urgently Needed. .......................................................... 2

II.

Applicants Have an Indisputably Clear Right to Relief...................................... 8

A.

The Vaccine Mandate Exceeds the Executive’s Authority. ............................ 8

B.

The Grave Danger Provision Does Not Unambiguously Authorize OSHA to

Impose a Vaccine Mandate...................................................................................... 11

C.

OSHA Failed to Establish Necessity. ............................................................. 12

D.

The Mandate Raises Grave Constitutional Concerns................................... 15

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) 10, 11

Asbestos Info. Ass’n/N. Am. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 727 F.2d 415

(5th Cir. 1984) .............................................................................................................. 12

Barnes v. E-Sys., Inc. Grp. Hosp. Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U.S. 1301 (1991) . 3

F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) ....................................... 15

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) ............................. 10

Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n, Inc. v. U. S. Dep’t of Lab., 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974) 12,

14

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2010) .................................................................. 3

Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) .............. 11

La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355 (1986) .................................................. 9

Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367

(2020) .............................................................................................................................. 9

Music Choice v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 970 F.3d 418 (D.C. Cir. 2020) ..................... 11

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) ........................................ 15

Smith v. Ritchey, 89 S. Ct. 54 (1968) ............................................................................... 3

Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) .................................................... 5

Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994) ................................................. 7

Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 360 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966) ................................. 1, 7, 8

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590 (2016) ............................. 7

United States Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. 1837 (2020)10

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) ................................................................. 16

Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) ........................................................... 10

Statutes

29 U.S.C. §655 ........................................................................................................... 10, 15

Regulations

29 C.F.R. §1910.1030 ...................................................................................................... 12

ii

INTRODUCTION

Due to the absence of an administrative stay, the January 10 compliance

deadline hangs over Applicants like an axe. Unless this Court immediately enjoins or

stays the Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS), Applicants will have no choice but

to fully comply with this unlawful measure. Indeed, each day that passes imposes

new irreparable harms as Applicants expend significant resources in preparation for

the January 10 compliance deadline. This Court must act immediately lest

Respondents succeed in enacting one of the most expansive federal regulations ever

without the opportunity for pre-enforcement judicial review.

In just days, Applicants will be subject to penalties for noncompliance with the

Mandate.1 At the very least, the Court should implement an administrative stay

immediately. If it waits until oral argument on January 7, it may already be too late.

Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 360 F.2d 677, 685-86 (2d Cir. 1966), aff’d sub nom. 387

U.S. 158 (1967), and aff’d, 387 U.S. 167 (1967) (Friendly, J.) (regulations are

“immediately reviewable” when they “operate[] ‘to control the business affairs’ of the

plaintiff and ma[k]e it impossible to ‘cogently plan its present or future operations’ so

long as their validity remained undetermined ... even though review might have been

obtained by provoking an adverse administrative order”).

1 Although the Respondents note (at 15) that OSHA has announced that it is

“exercising enforcement discretion” and thus will not “not issue citations for

noncompliance with the standard’s testing requirements before February 9,” this

discretion is restricted only to those employers who satisfy OSHA that they are

“exercising reasonable, good faith efforts to come into compliance with the standard.”

Id. at n.2. And all other aspects of the policy are still scheduled to take effect on

January 10. Id.

1

I.

An Injunction or Stay is Urgently Needed.

Applicants are facing down a compliance deadline of Monday, January 10.

Applicants must take significant steps over the next week to prepare to comply with

the January 10 deadline including collecting employee information, promulgating

written policies, holding employee information sessions, and informing employees

that they should prepare themselves to submit to the Mandate. Unless this freight

train is stopped immediately, these injuries are unavoidable, compounding, and

irreparable. Respondents’ cursory attempt to dismiss the gravity and imminence of

these harms fail.

First, Respondents (at 78) blithely dismiss Applicants’ concerns about labor

shortages as “speculation.” But Applicants have submitted detailed declarations that

demonstrate both the existing labor shortage and the likelihood, based on first-hand

representations, that their employees would quit rather than comply with the

Mandate. The Mandate would substantially exacerbate Applicants’ existing labor

shortage both by causing them to lose current employees and by making it harder to

hire new employees. Moreover, it would undermine the ability of companies like

Phillips, with just over 100 employees, to compete for labor with companies who have

fewer than 100 employees.

If the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) had taken the

time to do notice and comment rather than rushing to issue an ETS that it knew

would be tied up in litigation for the equivalent time of a full comment period, it would

have known these particularized consequences of the Mandate. Instead, Respondents

2

(at 78) focus entirely upon generalized “empirical data” to counter the detailed

evidence of harm submitted by Applicants. But in awarding interim injunctive relief,

Applicant need only show that they will suffer irreparable harm, not that the entire

industry will. See Smith v. Ritchey, 89 S. Ct. 54, 54 (1968) (Douglas, J., in chambers)

(“[I]t is a federal policy to grant stays where a substantial question is presented and

denial of the stay will do irreparable harm to the applicant.”); see also, e.g.,

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010); Barnes v. E-Sys., Inc. Grp. Hosp.

Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1991) (Scalia, J. in chambers).

The Applicants have presented evidence of irreparable harm and Respondents

have presented no countervailing evidence rebutting the harm to the applicants. The

“empirical” data referenced time and again by Respondents is conclusively rebutted

by the on-the-ground realities faced by Applicants.

Specifically, at least 47 of Applicant Phillips’s employees are not vaccinated

and 17 have said unequivocally that they will not get the vaccine, even if it meant

losing their job at Phillips. See Doc. 4-2 ¶8, Phillips Manufacturing & Tower Co. v.

OSHA, 21-4028 (6th Cir.) (attached as Appendix A). Phillips already has 7 openings

that it cannot fill and its employees are working overtime to keep pace. Id.¶9. The

Mandate will greatly exacerbate this shortage. And Phillips’s analysis has indicated

that the Mandate will cost the company at least $818,635.30 annually in recuring,

training, additional overtime, and other costs. Id. ¶11. These costs do not even factor

in the harm the resulting labor shortage will do to Phillips’s ability to meet its

3

contractual production targets. Failure to meet such targets carries penalties up to

$25,000 per hour that the purchaser is without the product. Id. ¶13.

Respondents also have failed to address Applicant Sixarp’s irreparable losses.

Sixarp is already suffering a labor shortage, with over 30 positions that it is

attempting to fill. Doc. 4-3 ¶8, Phillips Manufacturing & Tower Co. v. OSHA, 21-4028

(6th Cir.) (attached as Appendix B). The Vaccine Mandate will significantly

exacerbate this labor shortage as many Sixarp employees have indicated they would

quit or be terminated rather than be subjected to the Vaccine Mandate, and many

employees would not work for a company that subjected them to such a Mandate. Id.

¶¶7, 8, 10.

Respondents’ silence in the face of Applicant Oberg’s immediate losses is

especially deafening given that its $22 million in lost revenue due to the Mandate

was the centerpiece of Judge Larsen’s discussion of irreparable harm imposed on

business. App. 55-56 (Larsen, J., dissenting) (“The vaccinate-or-test mandate will

exacerbate these shortages, with Oberg estimating that it will lose ‘200 employees—

approximately 30% of its existing workforce.’”). See also In re MCP No. 165, Doc. 3282 ¶13 (attached as Appendix C). Such loses—either from a vaccine mandate, testing

mandate, or both—would be crippling to Oberg and endanger its ability to fulfill

existing orders. Id.

Respondents’ empirical data does nothing to rebut these demonstrated labor

shortage harms to the Applicants. Indeed, Respondents do not even attempt to rebut

4

Respondents’ claims of harm to their business. Accordingly, it is undisputed that these

Applicants will suffer irreparable harm.2

Second, Respondents (at 78) claim that compliance costs are “avoidable

because the Standard permits employers to adopt a mask-and-test policy instead of

requiring vaccination.” But Applicants have submitted detailed data on the costs of

testing requirements. See, e.g., Appendix C ¶13 (“[W]e anticipate that testing our 286

unvaccinated employees could cost more than $32,000 per week, or up to $1.7 million

annually. And this does not account for the lost employee time necessary to

accomplish the testing.”); Appendix A ¶12 (citing to economic analysis performed for

Phillips for conclusion that “annual testing for Phillips will cost an additional $96,200

annually”); Appendix B ¶11 (estimating “more than $44,000 weekly across the

company” for testing costs). These costs are overwhelming—even before the current

test kit supply shortage—and will be borne by the companies because they are not

willing to lose even more of their workforce by passing on testing costs to their

employees. Moreover, a testing-only requirement will still exacerbate labor

shortages. For example, Oberg estimates that it will lose “seven additional employees

in the event [it] mandated only testing.” Appendix C ¶11.

2 Respondents’ contention that these costs will be “offset” in theory is both

irrelevant and directly contradicted by the experience of the Applicants. The

irreparable harm inquiry focuses on actual harms caused by the challenged

measure—not the ability of a party to offset such harms. Cf. Texas v. United States,

809 F.3d 134, 156 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding in the standing context that “[w]eighing []

costs and benefits is precisely the type of ‘accounting exercise,’ in which we cannot

engage. [Plaintiff] has shown injury.”).

5

Third, Respondents (at 79) remarkably claim that Applicants’ costs are

“routine.” But Applicants have shown in detail the disastrous effects of these costs.

See, e.g., id. ¶12 (“Given the difficulty of filling existing openings, the anticipated

losses associated with these Vaccine Mandate would be economically crippling to

Oberg, endangering its ability to fulfill existing orders.”); Appendix A ¶13 (noting the

as a result of the Mandate, “Phillips could be subjected to significant penalties”

caused by labor shortages of up “$25,000 per hour” that Phillips’s customer are

without the product); Appendix B ¶11 (nothing that the ETS “imposes millions of

dollars of potential annual additional costs to Sixarp”). Respondents’ one-size-fits all

data generalizations are no substitute to the actual accountings of Applicants.

Appendix C ¶14 (“These costs are economically unsustainable for Oberg, and would

force us to curtail operations and ultimately eliminate jobs.”); Angela Phillips, I Am

Challenging the Vaccine Mandate to Protect My Workers’ Jobs, Real Clear Policy (Nov.

11, 2021), https://bit.ly/31hYrXS (“Complying with OSHA’s vaccine mandate and

testing requirements risks catastrophic financial consequences. It also means firing

qualified, well-trained, hardworking employees who rely on their jobs at Phillips

Manufacturing & Tower Company to feed their families and pay their mortgages —

for no reason other than to avoid draconian federal fines.”). Applicants know precisely

how much this will cost their businesses—generalized data does nothing to rebut

these showings. Moreover, complying with a regulation later held invalid almost

always produces the irreparable harm of nonrecoverable compliance costs.” Thunder

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Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 220-21 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part

and in the judgment).

Fourth, Respondents (at 79) claim that Applicants must risk enforcement

actions to obtain judicial review. But this is simply not the law. This Court has long

been clear that regulated parties need not risk enforcement actions in order to

challenge a measure. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 600

(2016). Applicants need not wait for OSHA to “‘drop the hammer’ in order to have

their day in court.” Id.; see also Toilet Goods Ass’n, 360 F.2d at 685 (rule reviewable

when its “very promulgation demands conformity and poses, for the plaintiff or others

with whom he must deal, the alternatives of compliance or severe penalties of

forfeiture of disruption of business operations”).

Fifth, Respondents (at 83-84) suggest the Court enjoin “only the portion of the

ETS concerning a vaccination requirement.” But the testing requirement itself

imposes massive costs. See, e.g., Appendix A ¶12 (citing to economic analysis

performed for Phillips for conclusion that “annual testing for Phillips will cost an

additional $96,200 annually”); Appendix B ¶11 (“We have been advised that imposing

weekly testing for COVID-19 could cost $27,600 weekly for the primary Grand Rapids

facility alone, and more than $44,000 weekly across the company.”). Applicants must

begin planning for the testing requirement now including by promulgating written

policies, locating test-kit suppliers, and preparing their workforce. Id. ¶12

(“Preparing to impose the Vaccine Mandate, including the alternative testing

protocols, will require us to devote time and substantial costs immediately, as that

7

ramp-up will take place in the coming weeks and over the Holidays.”). Applicants are

entitled to immediate judicial review on this ground alone. Toilet Goods Ass’n, 360

F.2d at 685-86. Allowing the testing requirement to go into effect would irreparably

harm Applicants.

Sixth, Respondents (at 84) are correct that the purpose of “interim equitable

relief is not to conclusively determine the rights of the parties” and “‘mold [any] decree

to meet the exigencies of the particular case.’” But that is precisely what they are

asking the Court to do. Because the baseline is no Mandate, the ETS irrevocably

alters the status quo. Non-intervention would conclusively determine the rights of

parties because the requirements (except testing) go into force on January 10.

Applicants seek only the normal process—an opportunity to have their day in court

to challenge an administrative measure before it is actually enforced against them.

Absent a stay, they will have to risk enormous enforcement penalties or comply with

the Mandate. This Court should grant a stay to allow full judicial review. See id. at

687 (“The sooner the industry’s claims as to the coverage of the Act in these respects

are determined, the better for everybody.”).

II.

Applicants Have an Indisputably Clear Right to Relief.

A.

The Vaccine Mandate Exceeds the Executive’s Authority.

Respondents’ statutory arguments all rest on the fundamentally flawed

assumption that the major questions doctrine does not apply to the Vaccine Mandate.

That assumption is absurd. The Mandate is one of the most far-reaching, invasive,

and controversial regulatory actions in American history and it is beyond doubt that

the Mandate triggers the major question doctrine’s clear statement rules: “The

8

Mandate derives its authority from an old statute employed in a novel manner,

imposes nearly $3 billion in compliance costs, involves broad medical considerations

that lie outside of OSHA’s core competencies, and purports to definitively resolve one

of today’s most hotly debated political issues.” App. 116-17; see also App. 52 (Larsen,

J., dissenting) (“Now the Secretary claims authority to impose a vaccinate-or-test

mandate across ‘all industries’ on 84 million Americans (26 million unvaccinated) in

response to a global pandemic that has been raging for nearly two years.”); App. 69

(Sutton, C.J., dissenting) (“The Secretary claims authority to require 80 million

Americans—in virtually every type of American business there is—to obtain a

COVID-19 vaccine or, in the alternative, to undertake a weekly COVID-19 test and

wear a mask throughout each workday.”).

Respondents’ discussion (at 55-56) of Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania

demonstrates their fundamental misunderstanding of government power under the

Constitution. That case involved the government’s discretion to a grant religious

exemption from a federal mandate. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home

v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2379 (2020). This case involves the governments’

attempt to impose a new mandate on private parties. This distinction matters

because “an agency literally has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly

enacted legislation of a sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers power upon

it.” La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986). And the major

questions doctrine applies when an “agency suddenly discovers ‘in a long-extant

statute an unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of the American

9

economy.’” App. 52 (Larsen, J., dissenting) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson

Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)); see also App. 70 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting)

(“[T]he federal courts ‘expect Congress to speak clearly when authorizing an agency

to exercise powers’ over large numbers of Americans with respect to contested public

policy choices of vast significance.”) (quoting Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health

& Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2490 (2021)). Because the federal government is one

of limited and specifically enumerated powers and does not possess a general police

power, the major questions doctrine ensures that agencies do not impose new

obligations of “vast ‘economic and political significance’” upon private parties unless

Congress “speaks clearly.” Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014). To be

sure, Little Sisters involved a highly controversial issue—but unlike the ETS, it did

not involve an expansion of federal power—the heart of the major questions doctrine.

United States Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. 1837, 1849-50

(2020) (“Our precedents require Congress to enact exceedingly clear language if it

wishes to significantly alter the balance between federal and state power and the

power of the Government over private property.”).3

Respondents still can point to no unambiguous grant of authority to issue the

Mandate. The OSH Act’s emergency temporary standard provisions simply cannot

bear the weight of one of the most significant expansions of federal power in American

history. Accordingly, its imposition on Applicants is exceeds the authority granted to

3 The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, relied upon by Respondents (at 56),

demonstrates that Congress is aware of COVID-19, has legislated about it, but was

unable to garner enough votes to mandate vaccination.

10

OSHA by Congress and Applicants have a clear right to relief. See Ala. Ass’n of

Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2490 (“[O]ur system does not permit agencies to act unlawfully

even in pursuit of desirable ends.”).

B.

The Grave Danger Provision Does Not Unambiguously

Authorize OSHA to Impose a Vaccine Mandate.

Section 655(c)(1)’s grave danger requirement is not the clear statement of

authority OSHA requires to issue the Mandate. And OSHA’s finding that COVID-19

poses grave danger for purposes of the OSH Act is arbitrary and unsupported by the

record. Because the OSH Act is not an “open-ended grant” of authority to OSHA to

regulate all dangers in society, to qualify as a grave danger, the exposure risk must

be unique to the workplace, rather than a risk inherent in everyday life. Indus. Union

Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642-43 (1980) (“There are many

activities that we engage in every day—such as driving a car or even breathing city

air—that entail some risk of accident or material health impairment.”). OSHA cannot

meet this fundamental standard to invoke its OSH Act authority.

Respondents attempt (at 24-25) to establish grave danger by pointing to broad

data concerning the dangers of COVID-19 in general. But OSHA’s reasoning

regarding the Mandate ultimately boils down to saying that there is a lack of evidence

that workers, particularly those with natural immunity, are not in grave danger. This

is not the affirmative finding of grave danger required by the OSH Act’s exacting

standards. See id. at 653; cf. Music Choice v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 970 F.3d 418,

429 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“[R]ational decisionmaking ... requires more than an absence of

contrary evidence; it requires substantial evidence to support a decision.”). Moreover,

11

Respondents continue to ignore that a majority of the workforce is vaccinated and

thus not at grave risk of complications from COVID-19 infection. See App. 110 (“And

of course, this all assumes that COVID-19 poses any significant danger to workers to

begin with; for the more than seventy-eight percent of Americans aged 12 and older

either fully or partially inoculated against it, the virus poses—the Administration

assures us—little risk at all.”). And they also ignore the variability in the danger

posed by COVID-19 to different age groups. See App. 49 (Larsen, J., dissenting) (“So

an unvaccinated 18-year-old bears the same risk as a vaccinated 50-year-old. And yet,

the 18-year-old is in grave danger, while the 50-year-old is not. One of these

conclusions must be wrong; either way is a problem for OSHA’s rule.”).

C.

OSHA Failed to Establish Necessity.

Respondents’ discussion (at 30-44) fails to provide a basis for OSHA’s flawed

conclusion that the Mandate is necessary.

First, Respondents’ discussion is grounded in the central fallacy that the

necessity standard is akin to a reasonableness standard. But it is well established

that OSHA bears a heavy burden to prove that “the ETS, OSHA’s most dramatic

weapon in its enforcement arsenal, is ‘necessary’ to achieve the projected benefits.”

Asbestos Info. Ass’n/N. Am. v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 426 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Fla.

Peach Growers Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 489 F.2d 120, 130 (5th Cir. 1974). As

Chief Judge Sutton and Judge Larsen exhaustively demonstrate, under the OSH Act,

an “emergency measure must ... be more than ‘reasonably’ needful; it must be closer

to ‘indispensable.’” App. 44-45 (Larsen, J., dissenting); App. 76-77 (Sutton, C.J.,

12

dissenting) (“Once connected, the reference to ‘necessary’ powers to address ‘grave’

dangers in an ‘emergency’ clarifies that ‘necessary’ has the narrower meaning. It

refers only to indispensable or essential measures, not to whatever the Secretary

determines is useful or beneficial.”). This error of law infects the Sixth Circuit’s

decision to vacate the stay below, and OSHA and Respondents’ attempt to establish

necessity.

Second, the availability of obvious alternatives (antibody testing) and a gross

mismatch between the danger (lack of immunity) and the means (vaccinating those

with immunity) preclude a finding of necessity. Respondents continue to fail to

address that OSHA itself has recognized in the past that vaccination is unnecessary

when “antibody testing has revealed that the employee is immune.” 29 C.F.R.

§1910.1030(f)(2)(i) (applying to hepatitis vaccination). Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit

was right to hold that the Mandate does not meet the necessity standard because it

“fails almost completely to address” the fact that “a naturally immune unvaccinated

worker is presumably at less risk than an unvaccinated worker who has never had

the virus.” App. 112.

Third, Respondents cannot establish necessity because OSHA failed to

consider the variability in danger posed by COVID-19 to different age groups and

industries. Studies have isolated individuals in age groups that are not at high risk

from COVID-19. See CDC, Trends in Number of COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in the

US Reported to CDC, by State/Territory, https://bit.ly/3lkVGfR; see also Journal of

Hospital Medicine, Trends in COVID-19 Risk-Adjusted Mortality Rates (Feb. 16,

13

2021), https://bit.ly/3Fto8Uy. Yet OSHA fails account for “what is perhaps the most

salient fact of all: the ongoing threat of COVID-19 is more dangerous to some

employees than to other employees.” App. 112; see also App. 47 (Larsen, J. dissenting)

(“The government’s own data show that unvaccinated workers between the ages of 18

and 29 bear a risk roughly equivalent to vaccinated persons between 50 and 64.”);

App. 78 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting) (“The Secretary could create exemptions for those

least at risk, say cohorts from age 18 to 49, a population range that faces healthcare

risks from COVID-19 at roughly the same level as the Secretary’s own assessment of

what is not a grave risk, with some slightly above and some slightly below.”).

Moreover, “OSHA acknowledge[d] that death rates are higher in ‘[c]ertain

occupational sectors,’ [] yet its rule never considers what results would obtain from

targeting those sectors alone.” App. 47 (Larsen, J., dissenting). These failures

preclude a finding that OSHA tailored its standard to the purported grave danger.

Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n, Inc., 489 F.2d at 130.

Fourth, Respondents continue to utterly ignore their prior position that a onesize-fits-all-industries mandate is inappropriate. The Fifth Circuit recognized that

OSHA itself specifically found that such an approach is inappropriate. See App. 112

(quoting Department of Labor’s Resp. to the Emergency Pet. for a Writ of Mandamus

at 16, 17, 21, 26, In re AFL-CIO, No. 20-1158 (D.C. Cir. May 29, 2020)); see also App.

113 (“[A]n ETS meant to broadly cover all workers with potential exposure to COVID19—effectively all workers across the country—would have to be written at such a

general level that it would risk providing very little assistance at all.”). Nothing has

14

changed in the world since these previous agency findings that make a uniform

standard for all industries appropriate. Cf. F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556

U.S. 502, 515 (2009). OSHA’s prior position continues to go unaddressed. See App.

113-14 (“[A]s OSHA itself has previously acknowledged, an ETS appears to be a

‘poorly-suited approach for protecting workers against [COVID-19] because no

standard that covers all of the Nation’s workers would protect all those workers

equally.’”) (quoting Letter from Loren Sweatt, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y,

OSHA, to Richard L. Trumka, President, AFL-CIO at 3 (May 29, 2020)).

D.

The Mandate Raises Grave Constitutional Concerns.

Respondents implausibly insist that what is arguably the most significant

expansion of federal authority over the States, private business, and private citizens

has precisely no constitutional implications.

Respondents (at 68-69) have attempted to characterize the decision to forgo

vaccination as economic activity. But this would mean that “the power to regulate

commerce” has no limit. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549

(2012). Just as the decision to forgo purchasing health insurance is noneconomic

activity, id., “[a] person’s choice to remain unvaccinated and forgo regular testing is

noneconomic inactivity,” App. 115. And Respondents ignore that Congress lacks “the

same license to regulate what we do not do,” which, if granted, would “fundamentally

chang[e] the relation between the citizen and the Federal Government.” NFIB, 567

U.S. at 555.

15

Respondents still fail to identify any limiting principle to prevent their

interpretation of the federal government’s powers under the Commerce Clause from

becoming a general federal police power. Vaccination has always been “squarely

within the States’ police power.” App. 115. If the federal government may exercise

control over the unvaccinated in such a sweeping, indiscriminate way, there is truly

no limit on federal police powers and no realm left to the exclusive authority of the

States. But the courts “always have rejected readings of the Commerce Clause ... that

would permit Congress to exercise a police power.” App. 116 (quoting United States

v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)). Accordingly, the Vaccine

Mandate exceeds the federal government’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

App. 116 (“[T]he Commerce Clause power may be expansive, but it does not grant

Congress the power to regulate noneconomic inactivity traditionally within the

States’ police power.”).

Respondents (at 71-72) also fail to assuage nondelegation concerns. By

continuing to assert that §655(c) is not limited to workplace-specific dangers,

Respondents have waived the only possible intelligible principle guiding OSHA’s

discretion. But the OSH Act cannot constitutionally “authorize a workplace safety

administration in the deep recesses of the federal bureaucracy to make sweeping

pronouncements on matters of public health affecting every member of society in the

profoundest of ways.” App. 105. Accordingly, to avoid this unconstitutional result,

this Court should reject Respondents’ unbounded interpretation of OSHA’s powers.

App. 117 (“At the very least, even if the statutory language were susceptible to

16

OSHA’s broad reading—which it is not—these serious constitutional concerns would

counsel this court’s rejection of that reading.”); see also App. 55 (“Here, the Secretary

asks for maximum authority and maximum discretion; he wants to issue a rule of

national import, covering two-thirds of American workers, and he wants to do it

without clear congressional authorization, without even public notice and comment,

and with a capacious understanding of necessity.”); see also App. 81-82 (“Because our

interpretation of the relevant statutes avoids these constitutional claims and any

others, we need not address them. [] By contrast, anyone who takes the view that the

Fifth Circuit’s stay should be lifted must come to grips with each of the statutory

imperatives, each of the clear statement requirements, and all of the constitutional

claims.”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Applicants respectfully ask the Court to enter an

injunction against OSHA during the pendency of this appeal, preventing the agency

from implementing or enforcing the Vaccine Mandate. Alternatively, this Court

should vacate the Sixth Circuit’s order dissolving the Fifth Circuit’s stay of the

Vaccine Mandate. At a minimum, Applicants request an administrative stay of the

Mandate to ensure Applicants do not need to continue expending unrecoverable

resources before the Mandate’s legality is determined.

Respectfully submitted,

Patrick Strawbridge

Counsel of Record

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC

Ten Post Office Square

17

8th Floor South PMB #706

Boston, MA 02109

(703) 243-9423

patrick@consovoymccarthy.com

Jeffrey M. Harris

Daniel Shapiro

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC

1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700

Arlington, VA 22209

(703) 243-9423

Robert Alt

THE BUCKEYE INSTITUTE

88 East Broad Street, Suite 1300

Columbus, OH 43215

(614) 224-4422

18

Appendix A

Case: 21-4028

Document: 4-2

Filed: 11/05/2021

Page: 2

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PHILLIPS MANUFACTURING & ToWER

COMPANY,

Petitioner,

V.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

LABOR; UNITED STATES OccUPATIONAL

SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION; )

MARTY WALSH, IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF LABOR;

Case No.

JAMES FREDERICK IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS ACTING ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR

OccUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH,

Respondents.

DECLARATION OF ANGELA R. PHILLIPS

L, Angela R. Phillips hereby declare as follows:

1. I am the Chief Executive Officer of Phillips Manufacturing & Tower

Company (Phillips"). Phillips is a 54-year-old company specializing in the

manufacture of specialty welded steel tubing for automotive, R\V,

appliance, and construction industries.

2. I have been the CEO of Phillips for 12 years and I directly oversee day to

day operations. Based on my position, I have personal knowledge and

Case: 21-4028

Document: 4-2

Filed: 11/05/2021

Page: 3

experience to understand the effects of the OSHA "COVID-19

Vaccination and Testing;

Emergency Temporary Standard" (Vaccine

Mandate") on Phillips.

3. Because of its potential impact on Phillips, I have been monitoring the

emergency temporary standard Vaccine Mandate process since President

Biden's September 2021 announcement.

4. Phillips has 104 employees. It is my understanding that the Vaccine

Mandate applies to businesses with 100 or more employees and would

thus apply to Phillips.

5.

Phillips would not impose a vaccine mandate or testing requirement but

for the Vaccine Mandate.

6. I have invested in

antibody

testing for Phillips's workforce to determine

if they have immunity to CCVID-19. While a

survey conducted of Phillips

employees ("Survey") indicates that 28 employees are fully vaccinated, the

results of the antibody tests indicate that 44

employees tes ted had

COVID-19 antibodies and thus possess immunity

to

COVID-19.

Accordingly, a substantial number of Phillips employees (approximately

16 employees) possess natural

immunity as of the time of the antibody

testing

7. Most of my employees are, and

feet in the manufacturing

always have been, separated by at least six

process. In addition to this natural separation,

2

Case: 21-4028

Document: 4-2

Filed: 11/05/2021

Page: 4

management has encouraged six-foot social distancing as a COVID-19

precaution.

8. The Phillips Survey indicates that at least 47 employees have decided not

to get vaccinated. And of Phillips's unvaccinated employees, 17 employees

have reported that they will not get the vaccine, even if it means losing

their job. An additional 27 unvaccinated employees have indicated that

they would not get vaccinated, but would participate in weekly testing if

that were required to keep their jobs.

9. The Vaccine Mandate would have serious effects on Phillips. General

labor shortages in the area have resulted in Phillips being understaffed.

Phillips currently has 7 openings that it has been unable to fill. Due to this

labor shortage, employees are already working overtime shifts, on average

10-hour shifts, 6 days a week.

10.The Vaccine Mandate will exacerbate this labor shortage. Based on my

experience, requiring vaccination or onerous testing will make it even

more difficult for Phillips to fill its currently open positions, let alone new

vacancies created by the Vaccine Mandate.

11.As indicated by the supporting memorandum, the Vaccine Mandate will

cost Phillips at least $818,635.30 annually in recruiting, training, additional

overtime, and other costs.

12. As indicated by the supporting memorandum, annual testing for Phillips

3

Case: 21-4028

Document: 4-2

Filed: 11/05/2021

Page: 5

will cost an additional $96,200 annually.

13.These costs assume that the Phillips will be able to meet existing product

requirements to customers by using additional overtime from existing

employees.

However,

if Phillips is

unable

to

meet production

requirements because the current labor shortage is significantly worsened

by the Vaccine Mandate, then pursuant to contracts entered into between

Phillips and some customers, Phillips could be subjected to signiticant

penalties. One such contract has a damages provision requiring Philips

to pay $25,000 per hour that the customer is without the product.

Accordingly, Phillips's potential losses from the Vaccine Mandate could

be financially devastating.

14. Out of Phillips's 104 employees, 3 regularly work from home.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foreguiding is correct. Executed on

thistday of_Woyema, at Middletown, Ohio.

Angela R. Phillips

Case: 21-4028

Document: 4-2

Filed: 11/05/2021

Page: 6

MEMORANDUM

To:

Angela Phillips

CEO

Phillips Manufacturing & Tower Company

From: Michael E. Reed

Associate Economist

The Buckeye Institute

Re:

Analysis of the Economic Impact of a Vaccine Mandate

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), at the direction of President Joe

Biden, has promulgated an emergency regulation requiring all businesses of 100 or more

employees to certify that all employees are vaccinated against COVID-19 or take weekly tests to

determine infection. This brief explains the methodology behind calculations of immediate and

continuous economic impact that the mandate will have upon your company, Phillips

Manufacturing & Tower Company (Phillips).

Our analysis measures the regulation’s immediate economic impact related to the anticipated loss

of employees, and the continuous economic impact of costs incurred by weekly testing. Please

note that this analysis does not include damages that could result if Phillips is unable to meet

contractual delivery requirements to customers due to workforce losses. Phillips represents that

some customers include contractual penalties for delivery failures, which could be substantial.

Phillips could also incur legal costs and fees if disputes arise related to production schedules

impacted by labor shortages.

Based upon survey responses from employees, Phillips expects 23 employees (22 percent of its

existing workforce) to leave the company rather than comply with the new OSHA regulation.

We calculate the economic impact of this loss under three time periods using assumptions and

data provided by Phillips (see, e.g., Phillips’ survey). All calculations are based on maintaining

existing company revenue.

•

•

•

Time Period 1 – a four-week period in which the lost employees are not replaced, and the

remaining employees replace lost productivity by working overtime.

Time Period 2 – a four-week period in which replacement employees have been hired and

earn wages, but as they train, they contribute zero to company revenue.

Time Period 3 – a 22-week period in which replacement employees train and contribute

to company revenue at a lower rate than remaining employees, and remaining employees

replace lower productivity by working overtime.

Replacing the lost employees will require recruiting, interviewing, and initial training of new

employees. Phillips estimates that this process will cost $6000 per new employee for an

estimated total one-time cost of $138,000.

Case: 21-4028

Document: 4-2

Filed: 11/05/2021

Page: 7

During Time Period 1, “lost hours” equals the number of lost employees (23) multiplied by the

number of hours (60) worked per week by each employee for a total of 1,380 lost hours per

week, which remaining employees must replace. For each lost employee, 40 hours per week are

paid the average hourly wage ($33.10/hour) and the remaining 20 hours per week are paid the

overtime rate (1.5*wage Mon-Sat, 2.0*wage Sun). According to Phillips, the lost employee

overtime hours are worked at the lower Mon-Sat rate.

The number of additional overtime hours available per remaining employee is 2 hours/day MonSat and 12 hours on Sunday. Each of the remaining 84 employees can make up 12 hours/week on

Mon-Sat and an additional 12 hours on Sunday. Therefore, overtime hours available for

remaining employees to replace lost hours is 12 hours/week Mon-Sat multiplied by the

remaining 84 employees, which yields 1,008 hours available Mon-Sat. The overtime hours

available on Sunday is 12 hours/week per remaining employee, which yields an additional 1,008

hours.

Because the pay rate is lower Mon-Sat, the analysis assumes that of the 1,380 lost hours/week,

1,008 hours are made up Mon-Sat before allocating the remaining 372 overtime hours on

Sunday. (See Table 1.)

Table 1 – Substitution of Additional Overtime for Lost Hours

Lost Hours

Description

Lost Hours by

Type

Lost Base Pay

Hours

23 employees *

40 base hr/week

= 920 hrs

Lost Overtime

Mon-Sat Hours

Remaining Lost

OT Mon-Sat

Hours

Replacement

Hours

Description

Overtime hrs

Mon-Sat (max

1,008 from

above)

1,380 total loss –

Remaining Mon920 base loss =

Sat OT hrs

460 OT hrs lost

460 – 88

(accounted for in

OT Sunday hrs

above row) =

372

Replacement

Hours by Type

Pay Rate

Difference

920 hrs Mon-Sat

1.5 * $33.10 $33.10 = $16.50

1,008 – 920

(from above

row) = 88 hrs

$0.00, both are

paid 1.5 OT rate

372

2.0 * $33.10 –

1.5 * $33.10 =

$16.50

Proper accounting of replacement hours implies that the total lost hours (1,380) is the same as

the replacement hours (920+88+372) put into appropriate context by using the least cost pay rate

difference available.

Multiplying the appropriate replacement hours (Table 1, column 4) by the pay rate difference

(Table 1, column 5) by the assumed number of weeks (4) provides the total cost of replacing lost

employee productivity with remaining employee overtime during Time Period 1: $85,530.40.

During Time Period 2, the method of calculating overtime replacement cost is the same because

although replacement workers have been hired, they do not produce any company revenue.

Case: 21-4028

Document: 4-2

Filed: 11/05/2021

Page: 8

Because Time Period 2 is also 4 weeks, its additional overtime cost is the same as Time Period 1:

$85,530.40. Replacement employees earn $33.10/hour and work 40 hours/week. These wages

present Phillips with a direct cost, which is found by multiplying the number of replacement

employees (23) by 40 hours/week by the average wage ($33.10/hour) by the number of weeks

(4), yielding a total cost of $121,808.

During Time Period 3, our analysis assumes that replacement employees work 60 hours/week

and earn the same total as the lost employees, but the productivity of the replacement workers

during this 22-week period is lower than the lost employees’ productivity. The productivity

difference is replaced by assigning overtime to experienced employees in order to maintain premandate company revenue.

The annual productivity of an experienced employee is $404,000/year and the annual

productivity of a trainee is $300,000/year. The hourly productivity of each is found by dividing

the annual productivity by the expected number of hours worked per year. This calculation yields

a productivity value of $129.49/hour for experienced employees and $96.15/hour for trainees.

The amount of lost productivity in a week is found by taking the difference of the productivity

rates ($129.49/hour - $96.15/hour = $33.34/hour) and multiplying it by the number of hours

worked in a week by replacements (1,380) which yields a total lost productivity of $46,009.20

per week. To make up for this lost productivity, the value of lost productivity per week is divided

by the productivity rate of an experienced employee yielding 355 hours of needed experienced

productivity per week. This extra overtime is charged at the full rate (1.5 * $33.10/hour) because

these hours are in addition to the pre-mandate hours and the replacement employees are earning

the wages of the lost employees. The total cost of this overtime equals the wage per hour (1.5 *

$33.10/hour) times the number of makeup hours per week (355) time the number of weeks in

Time Period 3 (22), which yields a total cost of $387,766.50.

Our analysis of the continuous economic impact incurred due to the new OSHA regulation

focuses on costs associated with Phillips testing its employees weekly. Based upon survey

responses from employees, Phillips estimates that 35 percent of its existing 107 employees will

choose to remain and participate in weekly testing. According to Phillips, each test will cost it

$50 to purchase and process. Multiplying the expected 37 employees choosing testing by 52

weeks by $50/test yields a continuous annual cost of $96,200.

The estimated immediate and continuous economic impact of the new OSHA regulation that will

require Phillips to replace lost employees and conduct on-going weekly employee testing is

summarized in Table 2.

Table 2 – Summary of Economic Impacts

Description

Search and Training

Time Period 1 Additional Overtime

Time Period 2 Additional Overtime

Time Period 2 Replacement Employee Wages

Time Period 3 Additional Overtime

Economic Impact

$138,000.00

$85,530.40

$85,530.40

$121,808.00

$387,766.50

Case: 21-4028

Document: 4-2

Filed: 11/05/2021

Total One-Time cost to Replace Lost

Employees (sum of above)

$818,635.30

Annual Cost for Employee Testing

$96,200/year

First Year Total Cost

$914,835.30

Page: 9

Appendix B

Page: 2

Filed: 11/05/2021

Document: 4-3

Case: 21-4028

)

PHILLIPSMANUFACTURING

& TO\VER )

COMPANY

)

)

and

)

)

SIXARP,LLC,

)

)

Petitioners,

)

V.

)

)

UNITEDSTATESDEPARTMENT

OF

)

LABOR;UNITEDSTATESOCCUPATIONAL)

SAFETYANDHEALTHADMINISTRATION;

)

MARTYWALSH,IN HISOFFICIAL

)

CAPACITY

ASSECRETARY

OF LABOR;

)

DOUGLASL. PARKER,IN HISOFFICIAL ) Case No. 21-4028

CAPACITY

ASASSISTANT

SECRETARY

OF )

LABORFOROCCUPATIONAL

SAFETY

)

ANDHEALTH,

)

)

Respondents.

)

)

DECLARATION OF RICK KING

I, Rick King, hereby declare as follows:

1. I am the President of Sixarp, L.L.C. Sixarp is a full service contract

packaging company specializing in Secondary Packaging operations for

the consumer product, cosmetics, food & beverage, over the counter

(OTq and prescription (Rx) pharmaceuticals, and promotional products

industry as well as primary filling and packaging of oral solid dosage

tablets.

2. As President of Sixarp, I have personal knowledge of out facilities,

operations and experience to understand the effects of the OSHA

"COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard"

('~ accine Mandate") on Sixarp.

Page: 3

3. Sixarp has focused on the potential challenge posed by the emergency

temporary standard Vaccine Mandate process since President Biden's

Case: 21-4028

Document: 4-3

Filed: 11/05/2021

September 2021 announcement.

4. Sixarp owns and operates multiple packaging facilities. Its primary facility

in Grand Rapids, Mich., employs more than 600 people and is thus subject

to the Vaccine Mandate, which I understand applies to businesses with

100 or more employees. We also employ dozens of people at other

facilities, including one in the Columbus, Ohio, area, that I also

understand is subject to the Vaccine Mandate because of the overall size

of Sixarp.

5. Sixarp would not impose a vaccine mandate or testing requirement but

for the Vaccine Mandate.

6. Many of the employees at Sixarp's facilitiescan work in a sociallydistanced

manner, particularly those who work in our warehouse and quality control

divisions. We have encouraged the use of face masks and social distancing

(where practicable) in our facilities. We also have imposed staggered

lunches.

2

7. Based on information made available to us from voluntary company

reporting, at least 60 employees at our Michigan facility have had COVID

and thus possess natural immunity. Only about one-third of the workforce

has indicated it is actually vaccinated. Many of our employees have

Page: 4

indicated they will quit before taking the vaccination.

8. We currently face difficulty in filling our positions; there are more than 20

Case: 21-4028

Document: 4-3

Filed: 11/05/2021

open positions in Grand Rapids and another dozen-plus at our other

facilities.

9. We have had to tum to temporary employment agencies to fill our

positions, and even then still have jobs left unfilled.

10. The Vaccine Mandate will exacerbate this labor shortage. Based on my

experience, requiring vaccination or onerous testing will make it even

more difficult for Sixarp to fill its currently open positions, let alone new

vacancies created by the Vaccine Mandate.

11. We have been advised that imposing weekly testing for COVID-19 could

cost $27,600 weekly for the primary Grand Rapids facility alone, and more

than $44,000 weekly across the company. The Vaccine Mandate thus

imposes millions of dollars of potential annual additional costs to Sixarp.

12. Preparing to impose the Vaccine Mandate, including the alternative testing

protocols, will require us to devote time and substantial costs immediately,

as that ramp-up will take place in the coming weeks and over the Holidays.

3

13.A number of Sixarp's employees have expressed interest in a religious

exemption. Some of our employees are foreign immigrants who distrust

western medicine, others have religious objections based upon the

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foreguiding is correct. Executed on

this J/aay of Ndt..£41:h:4(,at Grand Rapids, Mich.

Wt,l

Rick King

Case: 21-4028

Document: 4-3

Filed: 11/05/2021

Page: 5

teachings of the Amish, Christian Scientist, Scientologist religions.

4

Appendix C

Case: 21-7000

Document: 328-2

Filed: 12/07/2021

Page: 1

)

OBERG INDUSTRIES, LLC,

)

Petitioner,

)

)

V.

)

)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

LABOR; U ITED STATES OCCUPATIONAL

SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION;

MAR.TYWALSH, IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF LABOR;

DOUGLAS L. PARK.ER, IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

LABOR FOR OCCUPATIO AL SAFETY

AND HEALTH,

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Nos. 21-7000(lead), 21-

4027/4028/4031/4032/4033,214080,21-4091/4090,214093/4088/4101/4096,214097/4102/4083

MCL

o. 165

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Respondents.

)

DECLARATION OF RICH BARTEK

I, Rich Bartek, hereby declare as follows:

1.

I am CEO of Oberg Industries. Oberg Industries is a metals contract

manufacturer that was founded in 1948. Oberg manufactures products for a variety of

markets, including medical, food & beverage, commercial and residential building

construction, consumer products, defense, energy and automotive sectors.

2.

Oberg currently employees 697 full-ti.me employees, the vast majority of

Case: 21-7000

Document: 328-2

Filed: 12/07/2021

Page: 2

whom are highly skilled machinists and operators. Oberg operates manufacturing

facilities in four locations: Freeport, Pennsylvania; Sarver, Pennsylvania; Chicago,

Illinois; and Wallingford, Connecticut. .Allbut our Connecticut facility have more than

100 employees on site.

3.

As CEO of Oberg, I have personal knowledge of our facilities, employees,

operations and experience. Moreover, because Oberg is self-insured, I have knowledge

as to many of our employees' experiences with COVID-19 and the available vaccines

to date. I am thus able to describe the effects of the OSHA "COVID-19 Vaccination

and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard" ("Vaccine Mandate") on Oberg.

4.

As mentioned above, we employ hundreds of employees at four different

manufacturing facilities. I understand that all of these facilities would be subject to the

Mandate given the overall size of Oberg.

5.

Oberg Industries has worked hard to address the risks associated with the

pandemic while maintaining safe operations for our employees. Since the spring of

2020, we have hired agencies for deep cleaning services to disinfect work areas;

deployed hand sanitizers, face coverings, and wipes; practiced social distancing where

possible; used temperature checks on employees to screen for infections; emphasized

personal hygiene; implemented flexible work hours, working from home, and staggered

work schedules and lunches; improved HV AC ventilation; formed a COVID

committee to ensure we continue to follow proper procedures; and regularly

communicated our policies and efforts to limit spread.

2

Case: 21-7000

Document: 328-2

Filed: 12/07/2021

Page: 3

6.

These efforts have cost the company more than $84,000 per year.

7.

Since January of 2020, more than 180 employees have tested positive for

COVID-19 and thus possess some form of natural immunity.

8.

We know that 43% of Oberg's full time employees have received the

vaccine (although this may not account for some employees whose vaccines were

administered or covered outside the company's health insurance plan).

9.

Due to the state of the economy and Oberg's need for skilled labor, Oberg

has had difficulty filling its open positions. As of November 2021 there were more than

21 open positions across the company.

10.

Based on communications with employees and the number who have not

yet been vaccinated, we estimate that a vaccination requirement could lead to the loss

of more than 200 employees-nearly 30% of our existing workforce. Even if we lost

only half of those employees, it would equate to a 322 million loss per year in revenue

to the company, based on current efficiencies.

11.

Moreover, we estimate a loss of seven additional employees in the event

we mandated only testing.

12.

Given the difficulty of filling existing openings, the anticipated losses

associated with these Vaccine Mandate would be economically crippling to Oberg,

endangering its ability to fulfill existing orders.

13.

Apart from the employment effects, the Vaccine Mandate will impose

substantial economic hardship on Oberg. We have investigated the feasibility of setting

3

Case: 21-7000

Document: 328-2

Filed: 12/07/2021

Page: 4

up weekly testing at our sites. Due to the limited number of suppliers of the PCR testing

kits (which, per our health insurance contractor, currently costs more than $100 per

kit), we anticipate that testing our 286 unvaccinated employees could cost more than

$32,000 per week, or up to $1.7 million annually. And this does not account for the lost

employee time necessary to accomplish the testing.

14.

These costs are economically unsustainable for Oberg, and would force

us to curtail operations and ultimately eliminate jobs.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foreguiding is correct. Executed on this ~

day of ~s<.~M½V

, at Pennsylvania.

Rich Bartek, CEO, Oberg Industries

4

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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