Amicus Curiae Brief — Donald J. Trump, former President of the United States, Petitioner v. Bennie G. Thompson, in His Official Capacity as Chairman of the United States House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, et al.

No. 21-932

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------DONALD J. TRUMP,

Petitioner,

v.

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, ET AL.,

Respondents.

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The District Of Columbia Circuit

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF JACK JORDAN

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------JACK JORDAN

Counsel of Record

3102 Howell Street

North Kansas City, Missouri 64116

jack.jordan@emobilawyer.com

(816) 746-1955

================================================================================================================

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ......................

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............................

1

REASONS TO DENY THE WRIT .......................

2

I.

The Committee’s Requests Irrefutably Support Important Legislative Purposes ........

3

II.

Congress May and Must Obtain and Use

Information to Enforce the Constitution

and Existing Laws against Federal Officials ............................................................ 10

III.

Congress Has the Duty to Exercise Law

Enforcement and Trial Powers .................. 19

IV.

The First Amendment Supports Release of

the Requested Information, Including to

Facilitate Criticism of Official Misconduct

Based on Evidence, not Speculation or Unfair Falsehoods ........................................... 23

CONCLUSION..................................................... 27

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v. NLRB,

522 U.S. 359 (1998) ........................................... 13, 14

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242 (1986) .................................................25

Bridges v. California,

314 U.S. 252 (1941) .................................................26

Burroughs v. United States,

290 U.S. 534 (1934) .................................................11

Butz v. Economou,

438 U.S. 478 (1978) .................................................22

Cohen v. California,

403 U.S. 15 (1971) ...................................................26

Cohens v. Virginia,

19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) .................................14

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,

420 U.S. 469 (1975) .................................................26

Craig v. Harney,

331 U.S. 367 (1947) .................................................26

Garrison v. Louisiana,

379 U.S. 64 (1964) ............................................. 24, 25

Gitlow v. New York,

268 U.S. 652 (1925) ...................................................9

Haas v. Henkel,

216 U.S. 462 (1910) .................................................11

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) ................. 14, 19, 21, 22

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

McGrain v. Daugherty,

273 U.S. 135 (1927) .................................................18

Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966) .................................................15

Morrison v. Olson,

487 U.S. 654 (1988) .................................................23

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254 (1964) ..................................... 23, 24, 25

Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs.,

433 U.S. 425 (1977) ................................. 3, 10, 11, 18

Olmstead v. United States,

277 U.S. 438 (1928) .................................................15

Pennekamp v. Florida,

328 U.S. 331 (1946) .................................................26

Sinclair v. United States,

279 U.S. 263 (1929) ........................................... 10, 18

Terminiello v. Chicago,

337 U.S. 1 (1949) .....................................................26

Texas v. Johnson,

491 U.S. 397 (1989) .................................................26

Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP,

140 S.Ct. 2019 (2020) ........................................ 16, 17

United States v. Rumely,

345 U.S. 41 (1953) ...................................................10

United States v. Will,

449 U.S. 200 (1980) .................................................14

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Watkins v. United States,

354 U.S. 178 (1957) ........................... 3, 10, 17, 18, 19

Whitney v. California,

274 U.S. 357 (1927) .................................................24

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES

U.S. Constitution

Preamble .................................................................12

Amendment I .............................................. 13, 23, 25

Amendment V ............................................. 12, 23, 25

Amendment X .........................................................12

Amendment XII.........................................................4

Amendment XIV ................................... 12, 16, 23, 25

Amendment XX .........................................................5

Amendment XXV ......................................................4

Article I ................................................ 3, 4, 13, 15, 16

Article II .................................................. 4, 13, 15, 16

Article III ....................................................... 4, 12, 15

Article VI ........................................................... 12, 16

5 U.S.C. § 3331 ............................................................16

10 U.S.C. § 253 ........................................................ 6, 16

10 U.S.C. § 254 ..............................................................6

18 U.S.C. § 241 ............................................................15

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

18 U.S.C. § 242 ............................................................14

28 U.S.C. § 453 ............................................................16

OTHER AUTHORITIES

The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison) ....................22

The New York Times, Inside the Capitol Riot:

An Exclusive Video Investigation (June 30,

2021 (Updated Jan. 6, 2022)) at https://www.

nytimes.com/2021/06/30/us/jan-6-capitol-attacktakeaways.html .........................................................7

Transcript of Trump’s speech at rally before US

Capitol riot (Jan. 13, 2021) at https://apnews.

com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trumpcapitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f45

02eb471f27 ................................................................5

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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Amicus Curiae is a lawyer who was a soldier. For

many years in conflicts around the world, Amicus and

people he represents supported and defended our

country and Constitution by risking or giving life or

limb. Many gave their health and happiness. Amicus

now supports American courts fulfilling their duty to

support and defend the Constitution.1

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

To support and defend the Constitution, the Petition should be denied. Congress clearly has the power

to request, reveal, and use (for legislative and other

purposes) all evidence requested. Congress, the people

and the press should have prompt access to evidence of

the truth so that any future criticism, campaign, legislation, impeachment or other law enforcement can be

based on fact and reason, not falsehoods, supposition,

obfuscation or inflammation.

Petitioner repeatedly comingled contentions about

Congress’s constitutional powers with contentions about

Committee powers. Petitioner appeared to be seeking

clearly erroneous and unconstitutional rulings regarding Congress’s powers.

1

Counsel of record for all parties received timely notice of

the intent to file this brief under Rule 37(b) and all kindly consented to the filing of this brief. No one but Amicus Curiae authored any part of this brief or contributed any money that was

intended to or did fund preparing or submitting this brief.

2

Petitioner appeared to imply false limits on legislative purposes and misrepresented Congress’s power

to expose official misconduct, enforce laws and conduct

trials. Instead of addressing the clear meaning of the

plain language of the Constitution and this Court’s relevant precedent, Petitioner relied primarily on mere

conclusory contentions in two decisions that clearly did

not (and clearly could not) limit the foregoing powers

of Congress.

Petitioner’s misrepresentations pertain to matters

that were very much on Petitioner’s mind repeatedly

regarding his two impeachments and two trials therefor, including those of less than one year ago. Such matters may be the unwritten reason for the Petition and

contentions therein. Petitioner’s contentions, if reiterated by this Court, could abridge Congress’s powers to

impeach and convict political candidates and remove

incumbent executive, legislative and judicial branch

employees. Such powers should be exercised, not

abridged, against public officials or candidates responsible for the events of January 6. Congress’s duty (to

the Constitution and the people) is to bar such candidates and remove such officials.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

REASONS TO DENY THE WRIT

“The critical element is the existence of, and the

weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress

in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness.”

3

Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198 (1957). Congress’s interests are of great weight.

I.

The Committee’s Requests Irrefutably Support Important Legislative Purposes.

The “American people’s ability to reconstruct and

come to terms with their history” should not “be truncated by an analysis of Presidential privilege that focuses only on the needs of the present.” Nixon v. Adm’r

of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 452-53 (1977). Congress

clearly should protect present and future “substantial

public interests,” including “restor[ing] public confidence in our political processes” and “facilitating a full

airing of ” blatantly and outrageously unconstitutional

conduct “leading to” the end of one presidency (and intended to prevent another presidency), “and Congress’

need to understand how those political processes had

in fact operated in order to gauge the necessity for remedial legislation.” Id., at 453. “Thus,” Congress’s requests “aid the legislative process and” are “within the

scope of Congress’ broad investigative power.” Id.

Congress has broad power “[t]o make all Laws

which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into

Execution” absolutely “all” the “Powers vested by this

Constitution in the [federal] Government” or “any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8.

Congress may “provide for organizing,” “governing” or

“disciplining, the Militia” or “for calling forth the Militia to execute” federal “Laws” or “suppress Insurrections.” Id.

4

Congress may “constitute Tribunals inferior to the

supreme Court.” Id. “Congress” may “ordain and establish” federal “inferior Courts” below the “one supreme

Court,” and ensure that all “Judges” of such “supreme

and inferior Courts” do “hold their offices” only “during

good Behaviour.” Art. III, § 1.

The Constitution emphasized that “Congress may

by Law, provide for the Case of Removal” or “Inability,

both of the President and Vice President” to “discharge

the Powers and Duties of ” such “Office[s].” Art. II, § 1.

“[T]he Vice President” and “such” others “as Congress

may by law provide” may declare in writing to the

“Senate” President and the “Speaker of the House”

that “the President is unable to discharge” his “powers

and duties.” Amend. XXV, § 4. On January 6, the President and Vice President were (at least) unable to discharge their powers and duties (including the

foregoing).

On January 6, the Vice President had powers and

duties in two branches of government, including as

“President of the Senate.” Art. I, § 3. “The President of

the Senate” with “the Senate and House of Representatives” together “shall” ensure that “the votes” of all

electors “shall” be “counted.” Amend. XII. “Each state

shall appoint” a “Number of Electors” to elect the

“President” and “Vice-President” for a “Term of four

years.” Art. II, § 1. “The Electors” shall vote and the

“person having the greatest number of ” such “votes for

President, shall be the President.” Amend. XII. Thereafter, “[t]he terms of the” incumbent “President and

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Vice President shall end” on “the 20th day of January.”

Amend. XX, § 1.

What many (including Petitioner) did on January

6 made sense only if they expected and intended their

actions would prevent the transfer of power in the constitutionally-prescribed manner. Many in the mob understood that was exactly what Petitioner intended his

words, actions and inaction to accomplish. No one who

fails (or pretends to fail) to understand as much as the

mob should be involved in national government.

Petitioner publicly and expressly summoned “hundreds of thousands” of his most committed and potentially violent supporters “from all over the world.”2 He

summoned them on the day of the count, to the location

of the count, because of the count, and directed them

to target the people counting at the place of counting.

With war cries, Petitioner incited his supporters to

violence and directed who and what to attack. “[A]fter

this,” you’re “going to walk down;” you’re “going to walk

down to the Capitol.” Id. At the Capitol, you “fight.

[You] fight like hell. And if you don’t fight like hell,

you’re not going to have a country anymore.” Id. “So”

you’re “going to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue” to

“take back our country.” Id. Everyone heard and understood.

2

See Transcript of Trump’s speech at rally before US Capitol

riot (Jan. 13, 2021) at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e

9f4502eb471f27.

6

The evidence that Petitioner directed the attacks

included what Petitioner knew, tweeted and failed to

do about the attacks. “The President” was required to

“take” appropriate “measures” to “suppress” the “insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or

conspiracy” on January 6. 10 U.S.C. § 253. At the very

least, “the President” was required to “immediately order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably [ ]

within a limited time.” 10 U.S.C. § 254. Instead, for

hours, Petitioner expressly and publicly encouraged

and allowed violent attackers and the supporting mob

to openly act for Petitioner to physically prevent the

Vice President, House and Senate from counting state

electors’ votes.

Many of Petitioner’s supporters did fight like hell.

The fighters and the mob did prevent the count. For

hours, fighters smashed and bashed through line after

line of Capitol police and Capitol doors and windows.

The fighters (and the mob) showed no fear of—and

some shouted for attackers to take (and even use)—police weapons.

As in any insurrection, the fighters could not take

anything without much support, which many in the

mob obviously and intentionally provided. The mob

very effectively protected the fighters’ backs. The

mob repeatedly lent great physical and psychological

weight to the fighters’ attacks by streaming onto the

Capitol grounds, into the Capitol, and throughout the

Capitol.

7

Even before the most obvious and most violent and

vicious attacks on Capitol police and the Capitol occurred, deadly pipe bombs were discovered nearby.

Petitioner allowed the attacks on Capitol police

and Capitol doors and windows to be so prolonged and

violent that the fighters and the mob eventually took

most of the Capitol interior. They could have taken it

all. They could have taken all the police weapons they

needed to kill or subdue anyone they wanted.

Petitioner knew all or nearly all the foregoing

while he allowed the most vicious and violent fighters

to attack and occupy the Capitol and intimidate,

threaten and hunt the Vice President and Speaker of

the House to prevent the count.

All the foregoing occurred in broad daylight and

was broadcast on national television and social media

while many openly declared or boasted that their attacks and conquests were for Petitioner. For hours before and during their repeated and prolonged attacks,

they prominently displayed flags and signs and shouted

their plan and war cries to “storm the Capitol” to “stop

the steal” for “Trump.” They brought or planned to

take weapons to do it. See https://www.nytimes.com/

2021/06/30/us/jan-6-capitol-attack-takeaways.html.

A violent mob inside the Capitol doing Petitioner’s

express bidding had the power to choose to kill, cripple

or capture the Vice President and members of Congress or their staff or Capitol police and burn the

Capitol. They literally and publicly hunted the Vice

President and the House Speaker. They loudly shouted

8

“Hang Mike Pence.” They flaunted (to current and future Presidents, Vice Presidents, Congresses and

judges) a noose—a historical means and symbol of extreme violence, oppression and intimidation.

Petitioner gave a violent mob the power to choose

to do all of the foregoing to the people, processes and

papers housed in and symbolized by the Capitol and

the buildings of the Supreme Court, the Library of

Congress and the National Archives (where the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution are safeguarded). Literally and legally, Petitioner failed to

support and defend the Constitution. Petitioner, his

fighters and his mob directly or indirectly threatened

the people, papers and property of all three branches

of government that challenged or failed to support Petitioner’s pursuit of power.

For hours, Petitioner participated in, expressly

supported or waited just down the street from all the

foregoing. He knew what was happening. He incited it

and watched it, apparently expecting fury and fire to

consume our national treasures. Whether Petitioner

chose to allow all the foregoing or he was unable to stop

it, Congress clearly has the power and duty to ensure

that Petitioner, any president and any violent mob

never again so cavalierly take or give the power to

threaten all the people, property, processes and principles that Petitioner put and left at risk on January 6.

Congress’s potential legislation and other actions

are vital to the protection of this nation’s most cherished, valuable and vital symbols, property and public

9

servants, and to this nation, itself. Remember Benghazi. Remember the Reichstag.

The Reichstag (housing the German parliament)

was set afire in 1933. Who was responsible is subject to

debate. But the cause is far less relevant than the consequences. That fire propelled fascists to the zenith of

domestic power. Very promptly, their political opponents were blamed, removed from office, arrested and

imprisoned. The fascists’ rise was fast and furious and

marked by many domestic and foreign conquests. But

only twelve years after the fire, Germany, itself, was

burned, devastated and divided among conquerors.

Congress must ensure that Petitioner, any president and any mob have no power to do what Petitioner

and his mob did, threatened or could have done on January 6. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669

(1925):

That utterances inciting to the overthrow of

organized government by unlawful means,

present a sufficient danger of substantive evil

to bring their punishment within the range of

legislative discretion, is clear. Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to

the public peace and [ ] security [ ]. They

threaten [ ] ultimate revolution. And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial, because the effect [ ] cannot be

accurately foreseen. . . . A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering

for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration. [The government can

reasonably act] to extinguish the [threat]

10

without waiting until it has [ ] blazed into

[such a] conflagration. It cannot reasonably

be required to defer the adoption of measures

for [reasonable] peace and safety until the

revolutionary utterances lead to . . . imminent

and immediate danger of [complete] destruction[. It] may [ ] suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency.

II.

Congress May and Must Obtain and Use Information to Enforce the Constitution and

Existing Laws against Federal Officials.

It helps the Petition not at all if “Congress repeatedly referred to the importance of the materials to the

Judiciary” if “they shed light upon issues in civil or

criminal litigation,” which is “a social interest that cannot be doubted.” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 453-54. It is “not

[courts’] function” to test “the motives of committee

members for this purpose.” Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200.

No mere “motives alone” can “vitiate an investigation” by Congress when a legitimate “purpose is being

served.” Id. Any mere “statements of ” any “single Congressman cannot transform the real purpose of the

Committee into something” else. Id., at 229 (Clark, J.,

dissenting) citing United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41

(1953); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 290, 295

(1929).

Moreover, “[a]part from” any “legislative concerns”

Congress “unquestionably” has “broad authority to

investigate, to inform the public, and, ultimately, to

legislate against suspected corruption and abuse of

11

power in the Executive Branch.” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 498

(Blackmun, J., concurring). Congress has the “inherent

power” to “preserve the departments and institutions

of the general government from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or by corruption.” Id., at 499 quoting Burroughs v. United States,

290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934). “Congress has the power” to

“punish obstructions of lawful governmental functions.” Id. citing Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910).

Petitioner repeatedly misrepresented that “Congress cannot use information requests to exercise ‘any

of the powers of law enforcement’ ” because “[t]hose

powers” purportedly “are assigned under our Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary” and because

Congress is not “a law enforcement or trial agency.”

Pet. at 19. Petitioner further misrepresented that “an

investigation into alleged claims of wrong-doing” is

“reserved to the executive and judicial branches.” Id.,

at 20. See also Supp. Br. But the Constitution’s plain

language clearly requires Congress to enforce laws

governing conduct and persons covered by the Committee’s requests.

All the following and copious Supreme Court precedent emphasize that no public official has any power

to violate any right or privilege of any person under the

Constitution. They repeatedly emphasize the supremacy of specific legal authorities and every branch’s

power and duty to enforce them.

“[T]he People” did “ordain and establish this

Constitution” to “establish Justice,” to “secure the

12

Blessings of Liberty” and to “insure domestic Tranquility.” U.S. Const. Preamble. All “powers” relevant here

that were “not delegated to the United States by the

Constitution” were expressly “reserved” to “the people.”

Amend. X.

Absolutely all “Senators and Representatives,”

“members” of “state legislatures, and all executive and

judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the

several States, shall be bound” to “support this Constitution.” Art. VI (emphasis added). Every branch must

enforce the Constitution and the law against all federal officials.

“No person” ever may “be deprived” by any public

official “of life” or any “liberty” or “property, without

due process of law.” Amend. V. See also Amend. XIV § 1.

The “Constitution” and “the Laws” and “Treaties” of

“the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the

Land” and all “Judges” necessarily “shall be bound

thereby.” Art. VI (emphasis added).

Federal “judicial Power” ultimately “shall be vested

in one supreme Court,” but “Congress” clearly “may” at

any “time ordain and establish” as many “inferior

courts” as necessary to enforce the Constitution and

the law. Art. III, § 1. All federal “Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,” may “hold their Offices”

only “during good Behaviour.” Id. Their “judicial Power”

(good behavior) “shall extend” no further than permitted “under this Constitution” and federal “Laws.” Id.,

§ 2.

13

“Each House” of Congress also “shall be the Judge

of ” any “Qualifications of its own Members,” and may

“determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its

Members for disorderly Behavior” and even “expel a

Member.” Art. I, § 5 (emphasis added).

“The President” must in all ways “faithfully execute the Office of President,” and “to the” absolute “best

of ” his “Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution.” Art. II, § 1. “[H]e shall take care that the

Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all”

other executive “Officers” for such purposes. Id., § 3.

His duties necessarily extend to all commands and prohibitions of the Constitution or federal law herein pertaining to electors, the count, the House, the Senate,

the Vice President or the President.

The people also play vital roles in supporting and

defending the Constitution, including by voting and

obtaining and using information. So “Congress shall

make no law” (under any label, e.g., civil, criminal, regulatory or disciplinary) in any way “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press” or “the right of the

people peaceably to assemble” and “petition the government” to “redress” any “grievances.” Amend. I. See

also Section IV, below.

The conduct of the fighters and the mob on January 6 was not peaceable. Any public official who was

responsible must be held responsible. The January 6

attacks (on all three federal branches, state electors,

voters, and the Constitution) were “evil” that “spreads

in” all “directions.” Allentown Mack Sales and Service,

14

Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 375 (1998). It “is hard to

imagine a more violent breach of ” any public servant’s

constitutional duties “than” knowingly “applying [any

purported] rule of primary conduct” that was “in fact

different from the rule or standard formally announced” in the Constitution. Id., at 374. Each public

official “must be required to apply in fact the clearly

understood legal standards that” the Constitution

“enunciates.” Id., 376.

Any public official knowingly violating his oath to

support the Constitution is “worse than solemn

mockery.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,

180 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.). Any public official who

“usurp[s]” any power “not given” in the Constitution

(including knowingly violating any provision of thereof)

commits “treason to the Constitution.” United States v.

Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, n.19 (1980) (Burger, C.J.) quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404

(1821) (Marshall, C.J.). Such conduct can be criminal.

It is a crime for any person to act “under color of ”

any legal authority to “willfully” deprive any person

targeted or victimized on January 6 “of any rights,

privileges, or immunities” that were in any way “secured or protected by the Constitution” or any federal

“laws.” 18 U.S.C. § 242. It is a crime for any person to

“conspire” with any other person to “injure, oppress,

threaten, or intimidate” any person targeted or victimized on January 6 “in the free exercise or enjoyment of

any right or privilege secured to” any of them “by the

Constitution” or federal “laws” or because any of them

15

“exercised” any such “right or privilege.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 241.

The foregoing crimes are and should be of special

concern to all public servants regarding all who swore

to support and defend the Constitution. “Crime is

contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker,

it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to

become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-80 (1966) quoting

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)

(Brandeis, J., dissenting).

Congress can and must legislate and take much

more action to prevent anarchy. “The President, Vice

President and all civil Officers of the United States,

shall be removed from Office” after “Impeachment”

and “Conviction” for “Treason, Bribery, or other high

Crimes and Misdemeanors.” U.S. Const. Art. II, § 4

(emphasis added). “Treason against the United States”

includes “adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid

and Comfort.” Art. III, § 3.

“The House” irrefutably “shall” exercise the

“Power of Impeachment.” Art. I, § 2 (emphasis added).

“The Senate shall” exercise the “Power to try all Impeachments.” Id., § 3 (emphasis added). “When the

President” eventually “is tried, the Chief Justice shall

preside.” Id. (emphasis added). Impeachment is so

important that in any “Cases of Impeachment,” no

“President” has any “Power to Grant Reprieves” or

“Pardons.” Art. II, § 2. “Judgment in Cases of Impeachment” may “extend” to “removal from Office” and to

16

“disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor,

Trust or Profit under the United States.” Art. I, § 3.

Some former public officials clearly must be disqualified. “No person” who “previously” took any constitutionally-required “oath” may “hold any office, civil

or military,” federal or state, after having “engaged in

insurrection or rebellion against the” United States “or

given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.” Amend.

XIV, § 3. Congress has “the power to enforce” the foregoing with “legislation.” Id. § 5. Congress did so, and

Petitioner, himself, violated it. See 10 U.S.C. § 253. Petitioner took such an oath. See Art. II, § 1. All other

members of any branch of federal or state government

took such oaths. See Art. VI. See also 5 U.S.C. § 3331;

28 U.S.C. § 453.

Congress irrefutably does have law enforcement

and trial functions and is not barred from obtaining,

revealing and using information except for legislative

purposes. To urge this Court to contradict the clear

meaning of the Constitution’s plain language, Petitioner presented irrelevant or erroneous contentions.

Congress has no “general power to inquire into private

affairs and compel disclosures” thereof, and “there is

no congressional power” whatsoever “to expose for the

sake of exposure.” Pet. at 15 citing Trump v. Mazars

USA, LLP, 140 S.Ct. 2019, 2032 (2020) (emphasis

added).

“Congress can only request information tethered

to a ‘valid legislative purpose.’ ” Pet. at 18; accord id.,

at 15 quoting Mazars at 2031. “The ‘valid legislative

17

purpose’ requirement stems directly from the Constitution.” Pet. at 20. “Congress’s power to investigate

‘is justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process.’ ” Id. quoting Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197 (emphasis

added). “Congress cannot” request information “for the

sake of exposure.” Id. quoting Watkins at 200.

Significantly and clearly, Mazars pertained only to

“personal financial records.” Pet. at 14. It did not restrict anyone’s access to any evidence of any official

conduct. Watkins even more clearly and emphatically

did not do so, and Petitioner clearly improperly invoked Watkins. Watkins expressly and repeatedly

emphasized Congress’s power to obtain and use information such as the Committee does or may seek, including for the specific purposes Petitioner opposed.

Watkins never was a government employee. See

Watkins, 354 U.S. at 182. So the Court was concerned

with “ruthless exposure of private lives in order to

gather data that is neither desired by the Congress nor

useful to it.” Id., at 205.

Congress had initiated “investigations into the

threat of subversion of the United States Government.” Id., at 195. “This new phase of legislative inquiry involved a broad-scale intrusion into the lives

and affairs of private citizens,” compelling courts to

consider “novel questions of the appropriate limits of

congressional inquiry.” Id., at 195 (emphasis added).

So the Court emphasized “the rights and privileges of

individuals” (id.), i.e., that “an investigation into

18

individual affairs is invalid if unrelated to any legislative purpose” (id., at 198) (emphasis added).

The foregoing followed the Court’s emphasis

on the long history (and clear constitutionality) of

congressional investigations into official conduct without any legislative purpose. “The Nation was almost

one hundred years old before the first case reached this

Court to challenge the use of compulsory process as a

legislative device, rather than in inquiries concerning

the elections or privileges of Congressmen.” Id., at

193-94. Next, the Court emphasized “the danger to effective and honest conduct of the Government if the

legislature’s power to probe corruption in the executive

branch were unduly hampered.” Id., at 194-95 citing

McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Sinclair,

279 U.S. 263 (upholding Congress’s authority to conduct challenged investigations).

Petitioner and courts have misrepresented that

“there is no congressional power to expose for the sake

of exposure.” Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200. This Court repeatedly emphasized the opposite regarding public officials’ official conduct.

“The public is, of course, entitled to be informed

concerning the workings of its government.” Id. “Congress” clearly has “the power” to “inquire into and publicize corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in

agencies of the Government.” Id., n.33. “Congress has

a broad power ‘to inquire into and publicize corruption,

maladministration or inefficiency in agencies of the

Government.’ ” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 499 (Blackmun, J.,

19

concurring). “That was” literally “the only kind of activity described by Woodrow Wilson in Congressional

Government when he wrote: ‘The informing function of

Congress should be preferred even to its legislative

function.’ ” Watkins at 200, n.33 (citation omitted).

“From the earliest times in its history, the Congress

has assiduously performed an ‘informing function’ of

this nature.” Id. (citation omitted).

III. Congress Has the Duty to Exercise Law

Enforcement and Trial Powers.

The primary points of Marbury v. Madison included that nobody—not even the President, Congress

and the Supreme Court all together—can authorize

any purported public servant to violate the Constitution, and no public servant can knowingly allow any

other to violate any person’s constitutional rights. For

more than a hundred years, judges have invoked Marbury to assert judges’ power to void unconstitutional

conduct of legislative and executive branch officials

precisely because judges have the constitutional duty

to do so.

For the same reasons and purposes and under the

same logic, Congress clearly and emphatically has the

duty to impeach, try and convict executive and judicial

officers who knowingly violate Americans’ rights and

privileges under the Constitution or federal law. This

Court should not discourage Congress from exercising

such powers much more vigorously and regularly than

it does.

20

Congress should exercise its impeachment powers

consistently against federal judges, in part, because of

the judiciary’s vital constitutional role and, in part, because the judiciary, despite its professed constitutional

duties (sometimes willfully) fails to remedy its own

constitutional violations. This Court can grant only an

extremely small percentage of petitions, no matter how

egregious or blatant the constitutional violations of

lower court judges.

In part for that reason, a significant number of district and circuit court judges are as brazen and deliberate as Petitioner in flouting this Court’s precedent

and violating the Constitution and federal law. They do

so to knowingly violate Americans’ rights and privileges thereunder. Their judgments and opinions provide irrefutable proof. Sometimes, they are essentially

signed confessions.

Such judges include even those who pretend to be

of suitable character and quality that they should sit

on this Court, including Judges Gruender and Stras

(Eighth Circuit). Additional judges include Judges

Benton, Loken and Erickson (Eighth Circuit), Chief

Judge Phillips (Western District of Missouri), and

Judge Contreras (D.C. District Court). Each repeatedly, knowingly, viciously and maliciously violated

judges’ oaths, the Constitution, federal law and litigants’ rights and privileges thereunder and flouted

this Court’s precedent. The evidence is so copious, irrefutable and overwhelming that they could be impeached and convicted quickly.

21

Congress should impeach and convict judges who

knowingly abuse their powers to violate litigants’ constitutional rights. “[I]n declaring what shall be the

supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first

mentioned.” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 180. The Constitution

also repeatedly emphasized that judges are bound by

the Constitution and federal law. See page 12, above.

“Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution”

emphatically and repeatedly “confirms” that “courts”

clearly “are bound by” the Constitution and any judicial contention or conduct “repugnant to the constitution is void.” Marbury at 180. “[T]he constitution

controls any” judicial “act repugnant to it.” Id., at 177.

Any act “repugnant to the constitution” is “void.” Id.

No “act repugnant to the constitution, can become the

law of the land.” Id., at 176. Too many judges pretend

to nothing less.

When judicial conduct constitutes willful “opposition to the constitution,” Congress should impeach, try

and convict judges “conformably to the constitution.”

Id., at 178. “This is of the very essence of judicial duty”

(and Congress’s duty to impeach, try and convict) under the Constitution. Id. “It is emphatically” judges’

“duty” to “say what the law is,” not ignore or knowingly

violate the law. Id., at 177. When applying any “rule,”

judges “must” expressly “expound and interpret that

rule.” Id. They must apply and comply with controlling

legal authority.

Clearly, “the constitution” must “rule” the “government of courts.” Id., at 179-80. Every litigant “has a

right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.”

22

Id. “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists

in the right of every individual to claim the protection

of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the

first duties of government is to afford that protection.”

Id., at 163. Judges “cannot” maliciously “sport away”

any litigant’s “vested rights,” as too many judges do.

Id., at 166.

Allowing such misconduct by any purported public

servant clearly “would subvert the very foundation of ”

the Constitution. Id., at 178. “It would declare, that”

such purported public servants may “do what is expressly forbidden” by the Constitution, giving them “a

practical and real omnipotence.” Id., at 178. Such conduct “reduces to nothing what we have deemed the

greatest improvement on political institutions—a written constitution.” Id.

“No man in this country is so high that he is above

the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government

from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law,

and are bound to obey it.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.

478, 506 (1978).

That is what this suit is about. Power. The allocation of power among Congress, the President, and the courts in such fashion as to

preserve the equilibrium the Constitution

sought to establish—so that “a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same

department,” Federalist No. 51, p. 321 (J.

Madison), can effectively be resisted. Frequently an issue of this sort will come before

23

the Court clad, so to speak, in sheep’s clothing:

the potential of the asserted principle to effect

important change in the equilibrium of power

is not immediately evident, and must be discerned by a careful and perceptive analysis.

But this wolf comes as a wolf.

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting).

IV. The First Amendment Supports Release of

the Requested Information, Including to

Facilitate Criticism of Official Misconduct

Based on Evidence, not Speculation or Unfair Falsehoods.

Congress and the people should not be denied the

requested information. Any discussion of such important issues should be based on evidence and facts.

As the following confirms, the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments strongly protect even false and

extremely unfair criticism of public officials and public

figures. Such protection poses very real hazards for Petitioner, his family, his official and unofficial advisors,

supporting members of Congress, and anyone else

(rightly or wrongly) associated with Petitioner or the

events of January 6. It poses hazards for the integrity

and reasonableness of future campaigns and elections.

The First Amendment was designed to protect

our constitutional form of government and to protect

public officials and the people from violence. See New

York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)

24

quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76

(1927). So “the censorial power is in the people over the

Government, and not in the Government over the people.” Id., at 275 quoting Congressman James Madison.

“The right of free public discussion of the stewardship

of public officials was thus, in Madison’s view, a fundamental principle of the American form of government.”

Id., at 268.

In all relevant respects, all “public men” are “public property,” and “discussion cannot be denied and the

right” and “the duty” of “criticism must not be stifled.”

Id., at 268. “It is as much” the “duty” of “the citizencritic of government” to “criticize as it is the official’s

duty to administer.” Id., at 282 citing Whitney, 274 U.S.

at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Accord id., at 270

quoting Justice Brandeis. “The interest of the public

here outweighs the interest” of any public official “or

any other individual. The protection of the public requires not merely discussion, but information.” Id., at

272.

“The public-official rule” extremely strongly “protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials,” so

“anything which” even “might touch on” any “official’s

fitness for office is relevant. Few personal attributes

are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty,

malfeasance, or improper motivation.” Garrison v.

Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964). So “the New York

Times rule” clearly “absolutely prohibits” any type of

“punishment of truthful criticism” of the foregoing.

Id., at 78.

25

“Truth may not be the subject of ” any type of “either civil or criminal [or quasi-criminal] sanctions

where discussion of public affairs is concerned.” Id., at

74. Moreover, the “constitutional guarantees” in the

First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments “require” a

universal “federal rule that prohibits” any “public official from” penalizing or preventing criticism “relating

to” any “official conduct” except a “falsehood” that “was

made with ‘actual malice’ [i.e.], with knowledge that it

was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was

false.” New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.

The “First Amendment” further “mandates a ‘clear

and convincing’ standard” of proof regarding each material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 252 (1986). That “requirement must be” applied

whenever “New York Times applies.” Id., at 244. Such

burden cannot be borne regarding either falsehood or

actual malice when all evidence of the truth is concealed.

Without access to the truth, criticism justifiably

can be false and exceedingly unfair. Critics certainly

may resort “to vilification of ” public officials. New York

Times, 376 U.S. at 271. Any “speech concerning public

affairs” is “the essence of self-government,” so “debate

on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and

wide-open,” and “it may well include vehement, caustic,” and “unpleasantly sharp attacks on” current or former “public officials” or candidates. Garrison, 379 U.S.

at 74-75.

26

Judges commonly pretend otherwise, but even a

“judge may not” punish any critic who “ventures to

publish anything that [merely] tends to make [a judge]

unpopular or to belittle him” even by using “strong language, intemperate language,” or “unfair criticism.”

Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947). Accord

Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp

v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946). The “citizenry is the

final judge of the proper conduct of public business.”

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495

(1975).

Public officials cannot even “excise” a purportedly

“scurrilous epithet from the public discourse” merely

“because it” was “offensive.” Cohen v. California, 403

U.S. 15, 22 (1971). Precisely “because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this

area,” the “Constitution leaves matters of taste and

style” to critics, and “so long as the means are peaceful,

the communication need not meet standards of acceptability.” Id., at 25. Moreover, a “principal function of

free speech” is “to invite dispute. It may indeed best

serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of

unrest” or “even stirs people to anger.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1989) (cleaned up) quoting

Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). If an “opinion” actually “gives offense,” that “is a reason for according it constitutional protection.” Id., at 409.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

27

CONCLUSION

The Petition should be denied promptly. All public

servants should enforce constitutional compliance and

eschew violence.

Respectfully submitted,

JACK JORDAN

Counsel of Record

3102 Howell Street

North Kansas City, Missouri 64116

jack.jordan@emobilawyer.com

(816) 746-1955