Amicus Curiae Brief — Penobscot Nation, Petitioner v. Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General of Maine, et al.

Nos. 21-838, 21-840

In The

PENOBSCOT NATION,

Petitioner,

v.

AARON M. FREY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MAINE, ET AL.,

Respondents.

UNITED STATES,

Petitioner,

v.

AARON M. FREY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MAINE, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petitions for Writs of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

BRIEF OF MEMBERS OF THE

CONGRESSIONAL NATIVE AMERICAN

CAUCUS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONERS

Seth Davis

Hyland Hunt

225 Bancroft Way

Counsel of Record

Berkeley, CA 94704

Ruthanne M. Deutsch

DEUTSCH HUNT PLLC

Maggie Blackhawk

300 New Jersey Ave. NW

Amanda L. White Eagle

900

NYU-YALE AMERICAN INDIAN Suite

Washington,

DC 20001

SOVEREIGNTY PROJECT

(202) 868-6915

40 Washington Square S

hhunt@deutschhunt.com

New York, NY 10012

David Lieberman

POWDERHOUSE LAW LLC

20 Park Pl., Suite 438

Boston, MA 02116

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE................................. 1

INTRODUCTION

AND

SUMMARY

OF

ARGUMENT ......................................................... 2

ARGUMENT ................................................................ 6

I.

The Court Of Appeals’ Failure To Apply Indian

Canons Of Construction Absent A Formal

Treaty Conflicts With Decisions Of This Court

And Other Courts Of Appeal. ............................... 6

A. The First Circuit stands alone in adopting

a distinct doctrine for agreements that are

not formal treaties. .......................................... 8

B. The First Circuit compounded the conflict

by diminishing reservation borders

without a clear congressional statement. ..... 14

II. The Decision Below Is Wrong And Misconstrues

The Agreement. ................................................... 15

A. Congress intended to preserve the treaty

borders of the Reservation. ........................... 16

B. Refusal to consider historical context and

the parties’ intent caused the First Circuit

to misread the Agreement. ............................ 20

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 25

APPENDIX

(i)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d

482 (1st Cir. 1997).................................................. 16

Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United

States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918) ................................ 23, 24

Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194

(1975) .......................................................... 7, 8, 9, 12

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546

(1963) .................................................................... 7, 8

Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912) ......................... 9

Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. U.S.

Department of Interior, 228 F.3d 82

(2d Cir. 2000).......................................................... 11

Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686

(2019) .................................................................. 6, 21

In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)

737 (1866) ............................................................... 10

McGirt v. Oklahoma. 140 S. Ct. 2452

(2020) ...................................................................... 14

Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of

Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172

(1999) ...................................................................... 12

iii

Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians,

471 U.S. 759 (1985) ................................................ 20

Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) .................. 7, 15

United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians

v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339

(1941) ............................................................ 9, 10, 11

United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371

(1905) ...................................................................... 22

Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah v.

Myton, 835 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir.

2016) ....................................................................... 15

Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d

1087 (10th Cir. 1985) ............................................. 15

Washington v. Washington State

Commercial Passenger Fishing

Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) ...................... 6, 24

Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25

(1982) ...................................................................... 11

Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564

(1908) .................................................................... 6, 8

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)

515 (1832) ......................................................... 17, 23

STATUTES

25 U.S.C. § 1721 .................................................... 1, 18

iv

25 U.S.C. § 1723 .................................................. 13, 18

25 U.S.C. § 1724 ........................................................ 13

25 U.S.C. § 5302 ........................................................ 23

26 U.S.C. § 7873 ........................................................ 22

30 M.R.S.A. § 6201 ...................................................... 2

30 M.R.S.A. § 6203 .............................................. 19, 24

30 M.R.S.A. § 6207 ........................................ 13, 15, 23

30 M.R.S.A. § 6212 .................................................... 13

Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25

U.S.C. § 1451 .......................................................... 22

Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act

of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-420, 94 Stat.

1785 ........................................................................ 18

Trade and Intercourse Act of 1793, 1

Stat. 329 ................................................................. 17

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

126 Cong. Rec. H. (daily ed., Sept. 22,

1980) ....................................................................... 18

126 Cong. Rec. S. (daily ed. Sept. 23,

1980) ....................................................................... 18

H.R. Rep. No. 96-1353 (1980) .................................... 18

H.R. Rep. No. 101-877 (1990) .................................... 21

v

S. Rep. No. 90-841 (1967) .......................................... 21

S. Rep. No. 96-957 (1980) .......................................... 18

OTHER AUTHORITIES

44 Fed. Reg. 7235 (Jan. 31, 1979) ............................. 17

Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian

Law as Paradigm within Public

Law, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1787 (2019) ........................ 7

Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian

Law (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) ................. 9, 22

Seth Davis, The Constitution of Our

Tribal Republic, 65 UCLA L. Rev.

1460 (2018) ............................................................... 8

William H. Rodgers, Jr., Treatment As

Tribe, Treatment As State: The

Penobscot Indians and the Clean

Water Act, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 815

(2004) ...................................................................... 17

Charles F. Wilkinson, American

Indians, Time, and the Law: Native

Societies in a Modern Constitutional

Democracy (1987) ................................................. 4, 8

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Amici are U.S. Representatives Sharice L. Davids

and Raúl M. Grijalva, Co-Chair and Vice-Chair,

respectively, of the Congressional Native American

Caucus, a coalition of Members of Congress working to

improve nation-to-nation relationships between the

United States and the 574 sovereign tribal nations.

For over 20 years, the Caucus has worked to protect

tribal sovereignty, satisfy federal trust obligations,

and improve the lives of American Indians, Alaska

Natives, and Native Hawaiians. Amici are committed

to ensuring that the United States fulfills its trust

responsibilities and protects tribal sovereignty as set

forth in the U.S. Constitution and treaties.

As current leaders of the Caucus representing

both political parties, amici have worked to strengthen

the relationships between the United States and

Indian tribes through legislation that secures the vital

sovereign interests of tribal governments, including

the implementation of treaties and agreements with

Native nations such as the Maine Indian Claims

Settlement Act of 1980, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721 et. seq. (the

“Agreement”). 2 That Agreement was enacted to set

1 Counsel of record for all parties received timely advance

notice of intent to file this brief and consented to filing of the brief.

S. Ct. R. 37.3(a). No counsel for any party authored this brief in

whole or in part, and no person or entity other than amici curiae

or their counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund

the brief’s preparation or submission.

2 This brief refers to the Agreement as it was formerly codified

at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735. The Agreement ratified Maine’s Act to

Implement the Maine Indian Claims Settlement, 30 M.R.S.A.

(1)

2

the boundaries of the Penobscot Nation reservation

under federal law, recognize the sovereignty of the

Penobscot Nation, and preserve the rights of the

Nation’s members to sustenance fishing, hunting, and

trapping within its reservation without interference

from the State of Maine—aims that are all

undermined by the court of appeals’ decision.

Amici write separately to provide the Court with

their unique congressional perspective on interpreting

treaties and agreements with Native nations—

especially those agreements codified legislatively.

When enacting such agreements, Congress fulfills the

trust responsibility of the United States to Indian

tribes, furthers the congressional policy of tribal selfdetermination, and legislates against the backdrop of

Supreme Court precedent. The court of appeals’

decision upends those principles and gravely

misconstrues the text, history, and purpose of the

Agreement, with severe consequences that could

reverberate for the many other Native nations with

reservation

boundaries

set

by

agreements

memorialized in statutes, or similar treaty

substitutes, rather than formal treaties. The Court’s

review is urgently needed to forestall this upheaval.

INTRODUCTION

AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In the first decades of the Republic, the Penobscot

Nation entered into two treaties with Massachusetts

that ceded certain aboriginal lands on either side of

§§ 6201 et seq., which this brief refers to as the “Implementing

Act.”

3

the Penobscot River. But not, all agree, the submerged

lands below the river itself. Massachusetts broke

federal law when it entered those treaties, and the

United States, on behalf of the Penobscot Nation, sued

to press the Nation’s claims to the unlawfully ceded

land. The agreement negotiated by the Penobscot

Nation, the United States, and Maine (as

Massachusetts’ successor) to resolve those claims

struck a clear bargain, codified in Maine and federal

statutes: the unlawful treaties were ratified, the

Penobscot Nation was compensated for the cession of

those lands, and the Nation’s sovereignty over the

lands that had not been ceded by treaty was

reaffirmed, including especially its rights to fish in the

river.

Contravening the codified agreements’ text,

purpose, and history, the court of appeals’ myopic and

hypertextual interpretation places the Nation in a

worse position than the unlawful treaties from 1796

and 1818 did: forcing the Nation to cede without

compensation all of the land under the river—and thus

all sovereignty over the only place where the Nation’s

fishing rights matter—simply because a dictionary

defines “island” as a piece of land. This judgment is

untenable in light of the parties’ intent—including the

intent of Congress—an intent which is revealed under

the rules this Court has repeatedly applied when

interpreting treaties and agreements with Native

nations.

The court of appeals dodged these principles by

reasoning the codification of the parties’ agreement

was not a treaty, and therefore was subject only to

“ordinary tools of statutory construction.” App. 10a;

4

see id. 38a. 3 But, as the dissent recognized, such tools

point to the opposite result. In contravention of

longstanding Supreme Court precedent, the court of

appeals failed to consider the intent of the parties in

reaching the agreement—including Congress’s intent

to act as a trustee for the Penobscot Nation in

fashioning an agreement to settle a longstanding

dispute arising from Maine’s illegal acquisition of the

Nation’s lands. Compounding that error, the court of

appeals did not follow this Court’s rules to require a

clear statement for enactments diminishing

reservation boundaries, and to resolve any

ambiguities in treaties and agreements with Native

nations in favor of those nations.

What’s more, by creating a distinctive doctrine

for reservations whose borders are set by an

agreement memorialized in a congressional act, rather

than a formal treaty, the court of appeals created a

conflict with potentially wide-ranging consequences.

Whether a formal treaty, or a congressional act

codifying a settlement involving a prior illegal treaty,

the doctrinal rules should be the same. The Penobscot

Nation is not alone in having its reservation borders

set by agreement or “treaty substitute” rather than by

a formal treaty. See Charles F. Wilkinson, American

Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a

Modern Constitutional Democracy 63-64 (1987). Many

Native nations across the United States have their

reservation borders set by executive order or

legislation. See Appendix. This Court, as well as the

3 Citations to the Petition Appendix are to the Appendix in No.

21-838.

5

Second and Tenth Circuits, have interpreted these

executive orders and statutes using the principles

applicable to the interpretation of Indian treaties.

The court of appeals refused to do so, and

therefore it did not interpret the Agreement

considering the intent of the parties, did not resolve

any ambiguity in favor of the Penobscot Nation, and

did not require a clear statement from Congress before

interpreting the Agreement to further diminish the

reservation borders. Had it applied any one of those

principles, much less all of them, the result would have

been different.

In memorializing the Agreement in a statute,

Congress intended to confirm the borders of the

Penobscot Reservation where they had been

established by treaty for over one hundred years, to

resolve the unlawful purchases of land by the state of

Massachusetts on either side of the Penobscot River,

and to protect the Penobscot Nation’s sustenance

fishing, hunting, and trapping rights. Congress did not

intend to diminish the Penobscot Reservation borders

beyond that set by treaty and to cede lands implicitly

and without compensation. Interpretations of the

Agreement must reflect Congress’s intent and the

background understandings that Congress takes for

granted when drafting agreements with Native

nations, including the federal trust relationship and

Supreme Court precedent that makes clear that words

like “islands” refer to encompassing waters when

those waters are an essential part of tribal selfsufficiency. This Court should grant the petitions for

review to restore the rule that the well-established

6

methodology for interpreting Indian treaties applies

as well to claims settlement acts.

ARGUMENT

I.

The Court Of Appeals’ Failure To Apply

Indian Canons Of Construction Absent A

Formal Treaty Conflicts With Decisions Of

This Court And Other Courts Of Appeal.

This Court has long recognized that special rules

apply in the context of “interpretation of agreements

and treaties with the Indians.” Winters v. United

States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908). These agreements are

“essentially … contract[s] between two sovereign

nations.”

Washington

v.

Washington

State

Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.

658, 675 (1979). Therefore, they “‘must be interpreted

in light of the parties’ intentions, with any ambiguities

resolved in favor of the Indians,’” Herrera v. Wyoming,

139 S. Ct. 1686, 1699 (2019) (quoting Minnesota v.

Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172,

206 (1999)), and the agreement’s terms must be

construed “‘in the sense that they would naturally be

understood by the Indians,’” id. (quoting Fishing

Vessel Assn, 443 U.S. at 676).

The decision below dodged these fundamental

principles because, it reasoned, “the Settlement Acts

are not treaties. … They are statutes. The treaty

cannon has no bearing on their interpretation.” App.

38a. The decision thereby created out of whole cloth a

distinctive doctrine for agreements reached outside of

the formal treaty process, even agreements (as here)

meant to settle disputes arising from concededly

7

illegal treaties. In refusing to apply the Indian canons

to such legislation, the First Circuit ruled in conflict

with decisions of this Court and other courts of

appeals. Moreover, by interpreting the Agreement to

diminish reservation borders without requiring a clear

statement of congressional intent to cede lands

without compensation, the decision conflicts with this

Court’s precedent. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463,

470-472 (1984). In effect, the court of appeals has

created an end run around this Court’s precedents on

reservation

diminishment

and

agreement

interpretation by refusing to apply those precedents to

an agreement ratified outside of the formal treaty

process.

These wrong turns have potentially grave

consequences beyond the instant dispute. From the

late nineteenth century to today, the United States

has moved away from formal treaties and towards

multi-sovereign agreements that appear on their face

as typical legislation. See Maggie Blackhawk, Federal

Indian Law as Paradigm within Public Law, 132

Harv. L. Rev. 1787, 1815 (2019) (charting the

similarities between trends in federal Indian law and

“twentieth-century international lawmaking [] made

largely

by

ex

ante

congressional-executive

agreements”). In the context of federal Indian law, this

Court has held affirmatively that “treaty-substitutes”

are indistinguishable from agreements ratified by

treaty. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 205

(1975) (documenting the 1871 shift away from “the

contract-by-treaty method of dealing with Indian

tribes” and holding agreements ratified by legislation

are indistinguishable from treaties); Arizona v.

8

California, 373 U.S. 546, 596-97 (1963) (holding

reservations established by executive order are

indistinguishable from reservations established by

treaty). 4 Like other agreements with Native nations

or “treaty-substitutes,” the Agreement here resolved a

range of issues through negotiations and

memorialized an agreement among three sovereigns

(the Penobscot Nation, the United States, and Maine).

The First Circuit’s approach to interpreting such an

agreement is inconsistent with congressional intent,

risks upsetting settled expectations for many Native

nations’ agreements with the United States made

outside of the Article II treaty process, and cries out

for this Court’s review.

A.

The First Circuit stands alone in

adopting a distinct doctrine for

agreements that are not formal

treaties.

1. Unlike the First Circuit, this Court has never

distinguished between formal treaties and other intersovereign agreements in the context of “interpretation

of agreements and treaties with the Indians.” Winters,

207 U.S. at 576; Antoine, 420 U.S. at 205; Arizona, 373

U.S. at 596-97. Statutory codifications of agreements

4 Wilkinson, supra, at 63-67 (charting the 1871 shift away from

treaties toward “treaty substitutes” and the Supreme Court’s

treatment of “treaty substitutes” as interchangeable in Antoine

and Arizona v. California); see also Seth Davis, The Constitution

of Our Tribal Republic, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 1460, 1468-70 (2018)

(explaining that since 1871, when Congress ended formal

treatymaking with Native nations, “negotiations memorialized in

statutes and executive orders” have substituted for treaties).

9

with Native nations are treated no differently than

treaties and such agreements are preserved unless

Congress’s intent to abrogate them unilaterally is

“unambiguous,” “clear[,] and plain.” United States ex

rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S.

339, 346, 353 (1941).

Ample Supreme Court precedent applies federal

Indian law’s rules of interpretation and canons of

construction to myriad agreements, statutes, and

executive orders, not just to formal treaties. See

Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 2.02[1], at

114-15 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012). Thus, in

Antoine, the Court explained that the Indian canons

inform interpretation of both treaties and statutes

“ratifying agreements with the Indians.” 420 U.S. at

199. In Choate v. Trapp, the Court presumed

“conclusively” that Congress intended for courts to

read a statute ratifying an agreement with an Indian

tribe to favor Indians, if the text is “‘susceptible of

[that] more extended meaning.’” 224 U.S. 665, 675

(1912) (“In view of the universality of this rule,

Congress is conclusively presumed to have intended

that the legislation under which these allotments were

made to the Indians should be liberally construed in

their favor in determining the rights granted to the

Choctaws and Chickasaws.”). To determine whether

the text is so “susceptible,” the Court eschewed the

“‘technical meaning of the[] words’” in favor of the way

they would “‘naturally be understood by the Indians.’”

Id. Courts must thus look to a tribe’s understanding

both to determine whether an agreement codified in

statute is ambiguous and to resolve that ambiguity in

favor of the tribe, in contrast to the “strict

10

construction” approach applied to typical statutes. Id.

(“The rule of strict construction would have compelled

a holding that the property was liable. But Mr. Justice

Davis, in speaking for the court [in In re Kansas

Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 760 (1866)], said that

‘enlarged rules of construction are adopted in

reference to Indian treaties.’”).

The Court’s decision in United States ex rel.

Hualpai Indians, exemplifies the proper approach. In

that case, this Court interpreted Congress’s act

“creating the Colorado River reservation [as] . . .

making an offer to the Indians, including the

Walapais, which it was hoped would be accepted as a

compromise of a troublesome question.” 314 U.S. at

353. In describing Congress’s act as an offer to

contract, the Court did not simply turn to plain text

and dictionary definitions. Instead, the Court reflected

upon the intent of all parties to the act and recognized

that the Tribe could decline—which it did. Id. at 354

(“the Walapais did not accept the offer which Congress

had tendered”). Further, in interpreting the effect of

Congress’s act creating the Reservation on the Tribe’s

aboriginal title, the Court employed “the rule of

construction recognized without exception for over a

century,” including in Choate, that the Tribe’s

understanding be considered in determining whether

the statute presents an ambiguity that must be

resolved in favor of Indians. Id. Because there was not

a “clear and plain indication” that Congress intended

to extinguish aboriginal title, the Court concluded

“that the creation of the Colorado River reservation

was, so far as the Walapais were concerned, nothing

more than an abortive attempt to solve a perplexing

11

problem.” Id. at 353-55. When the Court turned to a

subsequent executive order creating a reservation, it

again looked to the understanding of the Tribe before

concluding that its rights had been ceded. See id. at

357-58 (“[I]n view of all of the circumstances, we

conclude that [the] creation [of the Reservation] at the

request of the Walapais and its acceptance by them

amounted to a relinquishment of any tribal claims to

lands which they might have outside that reservation

…”). 5

The Second Circuit similarly has applied this

Court’s methodology for interpreting treaties and

other agreements to a settlement act, reading the act

in light of the intent of the parties and the Indian

canons. In Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. U.S.

Department of Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 84-85 (2d Cir.

2000), the Second Circuit addressed the question

whether the Connecticut Settlement Act limited the

Secretary of the Interior’s authority to take land into

trust for the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe of Indians.

Citing this Court’s canons for the interpretation of

Indian treaties, the Second Circuit analogized the Act

to a “compact between two states that had been

ratified by Congress” and construed the Act in favor of

the Tribe. Id. at 91 n.3, 92-93.

5 This Court has long taken an identical approach with respect

to agreements with non-Native foreign governments—treating

Art. II treaties, executive agreements, and acts of Congress

interchangeably as “treaties” and applying principles of treaty

interpretation. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1982)

(“Congress has not been consistent in distinguishing between Art.

II treaties and other forms of international agreements.”).

12

The court of appeals’ decision here conflicts with

these precedents. Rather than require Maine to

survive the “uphill battle” of showing that Congress

“abrogate[d] Indian treaty rights” in the Agreement,

Mille Lacs Band, 526 U.S. at 202, the First Circuit

simply deemed the body of Supreme Court precedent

on treaties inapposite, stating “that the Indian canons

are inapplicable” and that the Penobscot Nation’s

understandings are “beside the point” even if one

assumes that the Agreement is ambiguous as to the

boundaries of the Reservation. App. 32a, 36a-37a n.20.

This holding conflicts with this Court’s precedents.

2. This conflict reverberates beyond the proper

interpretation of the Penobscot Nation Reservation.

Since 1871, when Congress ended formal

treatymaking, Native nations and the United States

have negotiated these sorts of agreements in lieu of

treaties. See Antoine, 420 U.S. at 202-03. More than 90

Native nations have reservation boundaries that are

set by statute or executive order. See Appendix.

Interpreting these treaty substitutes requires

discerning the intent of the parties, including Native

nations and Congress, just as interpreting treaties

does, because treaty substitutes address the same sort

of inter-sovereign issues that are resolved by treaty.

The inter-sovereign issues addressed in the

Agreement codified by statute here (which itself

resolved a dispute arising from illegal treaties) are

indicative. First, the Agreement resolved the issue of

Massachusetts unlawfully purchasing lands on either

side of the River. Congress established two funds of

approximately $40 million to be used for the benefit of

the Penobscot Nation and then it retroactively ratified

13

the 1796 and 1818 treaty purchases. 25 U.S.C.

§ 1723(a)(1), 1724(a)-(d). Second, Congress set terms

for future relationships between the Nation, Maine,

and the United States, including formally adopting the

longstanding recognition by Maine of the Penobscot

Nation. Third, Congress approved a lawmaking

commission, populated jointly by Maine and the

Nation, that would regulate fishing within the

Penobscot Nation reservation. See 30 M.R.S.A. § 6212.

Fourth, the Agreement protected fishing rights

“within the boundaries” of the reservation. See id.

§ 6207(4). Further, just like a formal treaty, the

Agreement defined the borders of the Penobscot

Nation reservation.

3. The Court should review the First Circuit’s

decision that jettisoned long-standing principles of

federal Indian law requiring courts to interpret intersovereign agreements, whatever their form, in light of

the parties’ intent and to resolve ambiguity in favor of

tribal nations. That doctrinal dodge mattered here. As

Judge Barron explained in dissent, there is “especially

good reason” to apply the Indian canons here “given

the particular role Congress was playing in settling

these lands claims in the face of assertions that the

Nonintercourse Act had been violated.” App. 123a.

Furthermore, the evidence concerning the negotiation

of the settlement, Congress’s enactment of the

Agreement, and the Agreement’s implementation in

the years immediately following its enactment suggest

that the Penobscot Nation and the United States

government understood the Agreement to reserve the

Nation’s aboriginal rights to the uplands of the islands

and waters and submerged lands adjacent to them. Id.

14

113a; see Pet. in No. 21-840 at 26-29. Had the

agreement-related canons been applied, this shared

understanding would have prevailed. But the court

majority ruled that the agreement-related canons are

irrelevant because “the Settlement Acts are not

treaties.” App. 38a.

B.

The First Circuit compounded the

conflict by diminishing reservation

borders

without

a

clear

congressional statement.

The court of appeals’ newly minted approach to

the interpretation of inter-sovereign agreements also

conflicts with this Court’s precedent and the precedent

of other circuits concerning the diminishment of

reservation boundaries. In McGirt v. Oklahoma, this

Court explained that Congress “wields significant

constitutional authority when it comes to tribal

relations” and that only “‘Congress can divest a

reservation of its land and diminish its boundaries.’”

140 S. Ct. 2452, 2462 (2020) (quoting Solem, 465 U.S.

at 470). Under the Solem test, “once a reservation is

established, it retains that status ‘until Congress

explicitly indicates otherwise.’” Id. at 2469 (quoting

Solem, 465 U.S. at 470).

The en banc Tenth Circuit has properly applied

this approach to a dispute involving reservation

boundaries set by statute. In Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah,

the Tenth Circuit explained that there must be “clear

support for a finding” that Congress intended to

diminish the boundaries of an Indian reservation,

including a reservation whose borders were

15

established by statute. 773 F.2d 1087, 1088 (10th Cir.

1985) (Ute III); see also Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah

v. Myton, 835 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 2016)

(Gorsuch, J.) (discussing Ute III).

Unlike the Tenth Circuit, the First Circuit did not

require clear evidence that Congress intended to

diminish reservation boundaries. Had it done so, the

result would have been different. Under Maine’s view,

adopted by the First Circuit, the Agreement made the

Penobscot Nation Reservation smaller than it was

under the illegal 1796 and 1818 treaties. But no clear

statement orders as much. In drafting the Agreement,

Congress did not include “[e]xplicit reference to

cession” of lands beyond those ceded by the earlier

treaties on either side of the River, nor did it offer an

“unconditional commitment . . . to compensate” for any

additional land cessions. Solem, 465 U.S., at 470. To

the contrary, Congress preserved the tribal members’

sustenance-fishing rights “within . . . [the Penobscot

Nation’s] reservation[],” 30 M.R.S.A. § 6207(4), and,

accordingly, preserved also the tribal sovereignty

necessary to engage in those sustenance practices in

the River—the only place the Nation’s members can

fish. The First Circuit’s failure to apply the antidiminishment canon to the Agreement only

compounded the conflict resulting from its decision to

sidestep fundamental Indian canons of construction.

II.

The Decision Below Is Wrong

Misconstrues The Agreement.

And

For reasons outlined in the petitions, even

“ordinary” canons of constructions, when properly

16

applied, warrant reversal here. See, e.g., Pet. in No.

21-838 at 19-23. A fortiori, when the Indian canons

and clear statement rule for diminishment are applied

to these inter-sovereign agreements—as they should

be under the Court’s precedents and in consonance

with the practice in other courts of appeals—only one

conclusion is possible: The Penobscot Reservation

includes the waters and submerged lands of the Main

Stem of the Penobscot River. The Agreement evinces

clear congressional intent to preserve, not diminish,

the Reservation’s boundaries.

Congress intended to “‘strengthen[] the

sovereignty of the Maine Tribes’” by “‘recognizing their

power to control their internal affairs.’” Akins v.

Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 489 (1st Cir. 1997)

(quoting S. Rep. No. 96-957, at 14 (1980)). Congress

did not intend to leave Maine with the discretion to

ignore the Nation’s sovereignty over its waterways

and subsistence fishing rights, much less to diminish

the Nation’s reservation borders beyond what the

Nation ceded in earlier treaties. Any ambiguity must

be construed in light of the intent of the parties to the

Agreement to preserve, not diminish the Nation’s

sovereign rights, including Congress’s intent in

memorializing the Agreement.

A.

Congress intended to preserve the

treaty borders of the Reservation.

In 1796 and 1818, the state of Massachusetts

entered into two treaties with the Penobscot Nation.

According to the 1796 treaty, the Nation agreed to cede

lands “on both sides of the [Penobscot] River” in

exchange

for

nominal

compensation

from

17

Massachusetts of “blue cloth for blankets,” hats, salt,

ammunition, corn, and rum. App. 93a-94a. The 1818

treaty included additional cession of lands “on both

sides of the Penobscot [R]iver” for nominal

compensation of four hundred dollars and a future

promise of “two drums” and “one box of pipes,” among

other similar items. Id. 95a-96a. Neither treaty ceded

land within the River, with the Penobscot Nation

retaining its aboriginal rights thereto. Both the state

of Maine and the Nation relied for over a hundred

years on these two treaties and the land cessions

within them.

The treaties, however, violated federal law. The

1793 Nonintercourse Act prohibited purchase of lands

from a Native nation “unless the same be made by

treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the

constitution.” Trade and Intercourse Act of 1793, § 8,

1 Stat. 329, 330. This Court later affirmed that the

recognition of Native nations and the regulation of

reservation borders was within the power of the

national government alone. See Worcester v. Georgia,

31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832). Yet the state of Maine

continued to maintain a direct relationship with the

Penobscot Nation and continued to claim the lands on

either side of the river.

In the 1970s, the Penobscot Nation strengthened

its direct relationship with the United States

government—gaining recognition and seeking to

confirm its reservation borders at the federal level. See

44 Fed. Reg. 7235, 7236 (Jan. 31, 1979) (recognizing

the Penobscot Nation). The United States initially

sued Maine due to Maine’s purchase of lands on either

side of the River. See William H. Rodgers, Jr.,

18

Treatment As Tribe, Treatment As State: The

Penobscot Indians and the Clean Water Act, 55 Ala. L.

Rev. 815, 830-31 (2004). But the unlawful taking of

lands and the establishment of reservation borders

was ultimately resolved not by court judgment, but

through negotiations between the state of Maine, the

Penobscot Nation, and the United States.

With the Agreement, Congress quickly ratified

the result of negotiations between the parties. The

Maine legislature adopted its Implementing Act only

one month after the Agreement was announced in

March 1980. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1353, at 13 (1980). At

the federal level, Senate legislation was introduced

just three months after the agreement, with a House

bill following shortly thereafter. Id. Congress passed

the bill in September 1980, 126 Cong. Rec. H. 92759285 (daily ed., Sept. 22, 1980); 126 Cong. Rec. S.

13198-13202 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980), and the

President signed it in October, Maine Indian Claims

Settlement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-420, 94 Stat.

1785. Thus, the Agreement was codified quickly,

reflecting its status as a product of inter-sovereign

negotiation.

Throughout the legislative process, Congress’

explicit intent was to reach a “fair and just settlement”

of the Penobscot Nation’s “land claims,” 25 U.S.C.

§ 1721(a)(7), which the Agreement extinguished, id.

§ 1723. The Senate Report concluded the “settlement

strengthens the sovereignty of the Maine Tribes,” and

confirmed the Penobscot Nation’s “permanent right to

control hunting and fishing . . . within [its]

reservation[].” S. Rep. No. 96-957, at 14, 16-17.

19

Congress nowhere evinced an intent to approve

further cessions of the Penobscot Nation’s territory

beyond what was ceded in the unlawful but

retroactively ratified treaties between Massachusetts

and the Nation. The Reservation-defining text of the

Implementing Act, as ratified by the Agreement,

makes clear that the parties, including Congress,

intended to only resolve the status of the 1796 and

1818 land cessions. Section 6203(8) of the

Implementing Act defines the “Penobscot Indian

Reservation” to include “the islands in the Penobscot

River reserved to the Penobscot Nation by agreement

with the States of Massachusetts and Maine.” 30

M.R.S.A. § 6203(8). It goes on to state that the relevant

islands “consist[] solely of Indian Island, also known

as Old Town Island, and all islands in that river

northward thereof that existed on June 29, 1818,

excepting any island transferred to a person or entity

other than a member of the Penobscot Nation

subsequent to June 29, 1818.” Id.

As this statutory text reflects, the parties

negotiated the Agreement to resolve the pending

litigation challenging the past cessions of land “on

both sides of the Penobscot [R]iver,” and not to cede

those rights that the Penobscot Nation had always

retained to the submerged lands and waters of the

River. See App. 101a, 103a (Judge Barron, concurring

in part and dissenting in part).

20

B.

Refusal to consider historical

context and the parties’ intent

caused the First Circuit to misread

the Agreement.

The court of appeals’ insistence on a hypertechnical reading of isolated terms, rather than

affording weight to the intent of the parties to the

agreement and considering the full statutory context

as required, led it to misinterpret Congress’ intent.

The court’s majority concluded that the Agreement

excludes the waters of the Penobscot River from the

Penobscot Reservation because it refers to “islands”

and “lands” in defining the Reservation. App. 9a-14a.

According to the court’s majority, the plain meaning of

these words, as ascertained by reference to

dictionaries,

unambiguously

forecloses

any

interpretation that would include the River within the

Reservation. Id. Thus there was no need “to look to

legislative history or Congressional intent,” in the en

banc majority’s view. Id. 10a-11a. 6

The First Circuit’s failures to apply the unique

principles of interpretation from federal Indian law

compounded its poor judgment of congressional intent.

As this Court has explained, “standard principles of

statutory construction do not have their usual force in

cases involving Indian law.” Montana v. Blackfeet

6 The majority went on to find that nothing in the history,

context, or purpose of the Agreement would change its

interpretation. App. 27a. This analysis was colored from the

outset, however, from the court’s wrong decision not to view the

Agreement’s history, context, and purpose from the viewpoint of

the Penobscot Nation.

21

Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985). In

exercising its paramount constitutional authority to

structure the United States’ relationship with Indian

tribes, Congress relies upon the Indian canons of

construction. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 90-841, at 8 (1967)

(discussing, in context of Indian Civil Rights of Act of

1968, that under the canon Indian tribes enjoy “full

powers of internal sovereignty” unless Congress has

“expressly” legislated otherwise); H.R. Rep. No. 101877, at 24 (1990) (discussing “established rule of

construction of the law that Congress’s actions

towards Indians are to be interpreted in light of the

special relationship and special responsibilities of the

Government towards the Indians”). When Congress

legislates against the backdrop of this Court’s

longstanding practice, it expects that courts will

construe its Indian-related legislation to favor

Indians, particularly where (as here) statutes

memorialize agreements with Indian tribes and

reserve Indian territories. The text of the Agreement

should have been (but was not) construed “‘in the

sense that [it] would naturally be understood by the

[Penobscot].’” Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1699 (quoting

Fishing Vessel Assn, 443 U.S. at 676).

The Penobscot could not possibly have

understood the act to implicitly cede additional

reservation lands without compensation for new

cessions. The Penobscot Nation began negotiations to

rectify the prior unlawful land cessions, and the

Agreement compensated them for settling those

claims. But there is no “natural understanding” that a

settlement of the Nation’s claims to land on either side

of the River would include implicit cession of

22

additional reservation lands under the river. Any

ambiguity in the definition of “reservation”—borders

more often defined by land characteristics than by

water—reflects at most the quick drafting of the

Agreement and must be resolved in favor of the

Penobscot Nation.

Congress recognizes that Indian tribes’ control

over tribal lands and natural resources is of

paramount importance to tribes and tribal peoples.

See, e.g., Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C.

§ 1451 (recognizing importance of tribal control over

“utilization and management of their own resources”).

Congress, therefore, regularly supports Indian tribes’

hunting and fishing activities. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.

§ 7873(a) (removing federal income and employment

taxation from tribal members who engage in “fishing

rights-related activity” under statutory authority). As

the Court put it in United States v. Winans, hunting

and fishing “were not much less necessary to the

existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they

breathed.” 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).

Congress therefore does not lightly abrogate

Indian tribal sovereignty or Indian hunting and

fishing rights. Instead, it understands that the Indian

canon of construction preserves “tribal property rights

and sovereignty . . . unless Congress’s intent to the

contrary is clear and unambiguous.” Cohen, supra,

§ 2.02[1], at 114 (citing, among others, Mille Lacs

Band, 526 U.S. at 202).

The Agreement does not suggest—much less

clearly state—that Congress intended to cede the

Penobscot Nation’s rights to the waters of the

23

Penobscot River, within which its members have

always fished. Precedent therefore demands an

interpretation of the Agreement that recognizes those

hallmarks of tribal sovereignty and protects them

from conflicting state law.

Far from clearly abrogating the Penobscot

Nation’s control over sustenance activities, Congress

preserved the tribal members’ sustenance-fishing

rights “within . . . [the Penobscot Nation’s]

reservation[],” 30 M.R.S.A. § 6207(4). Statutory

context then, an “ordinary” tool of statutory

construction, shows what the clear statement rule

reinforces: Congress preserved the tribal sovereignty

necessary to engage in sustenance practices in the

River—the only place the Nation’s members can fish.

This construction, moreover, is consistent with

the United States’ trust responsibility towards Indian

tribes. When Congress acts to reserve Indian

territorial rights, it does so against the backdrop of

this responsibility. In Alaska Pacific Fisheries v.

United States, the Court recognized that when

Congress acts as a trustee to reserve Indian lands, its

aim is “to encourage, assist and protect the Indians.”

248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918). This trust responsibility dates

back to the first treaty relationships between Indian

tribes and the United States. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6

Pet.) at 551-56, 560-61. The political branches have

defined the trust responsibility in terms of the Indian

self-determination policy, which provides that “the

United States is committed to supporting and

assisting Indian tribes in the development of strong

and stable tribal governments.” 25 U.S.C. § 5302(b).

24

As with the statute at issue in Alaska Pacific

Fisheries, Congress acted here to support tribal selfsufficiency. When Congress reserved the “‘the body of

lands known as Annette Islands’” for the Metlakahtla

Indians in 1891, the Court reasoned that Congress

intended to reserve not only the “upland of the islands”

but also “the adjacent waters and submerged land.”

248 U.S. at 87. Why? Because its purpose was to

support the Metlakahtla people’s efforts to “become

self-sustaining.” Id. at 89. In construing that statute,

the Court concluded that a “geographical name was

used, as is sometimes done, in a sense embracing the

intervening and surrounding waters as well as the

upland.” Id. So, too, here.

As was true of the Metlakahtla Indians, the

Penobscot Nation “could not sustain themselves from

the use of the upland alone.” Id. Congress reserved the

Penobscot Nation’s “islands” in order to protect the

Tribe’s hunting and fishing rights, which, as the 1980

hearings on the Agreement showed, was an “area[] of

particular cultural importance.” App. 106a. Congress

did so while expressly referring to the agreements

between the Penobscot Nation and the States of

Massachusetts and Maine, which reflected the

Nation’s understanding from those agreements that

its sovereign powers and sustenance fishing rights

would be reserved and respected. See 30 M.R.S.A.

§ 6203(8).

As a “contract between two sovereign nations,”

Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. at 675, any

interpretation of the Agreement must reflect this

intent of Congress, reinforced by the backdrop of

Alaska Pacific Fisheries, to include in the Penobscot

25

Reservation all lands not previously ceded by treaty—

including the Main Stem of the Penobscot River.

Congress’s reservation of “islands” within the

Penobscot River must be construed as the Penobscot

Nation reasonably understood it: as a reservation of

the Penobscot Nation’s aboriginal rights to the

uplands of the islands and the waters and submerged

lands adjacent to them in the River’s Main Stem,

bank-to-bank. The First Circuit erred in concluding

otherwise, and did so in a way that could cast doubt on

settled understandings of many other Native nations’

non-treaty agreements.

CONCLUSION

The petitions should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

Seth Davis

Berkeley, CA

Hyland Hunt

Counsel of Record

Ruthanne M. Deutsch

DEUTSCH HUNT PLLC

Maggie Blackhawk

Amanda L. White Eagle

NYU-YALE AMERICAN INDIAN David Lieberman

SOVEREIGNTY PROJECT

POWDERHOUSE LAW LLC

January 6, 2022

APPENDIX

Reservations Established by Statute

Acoma Pueblo

Act of Dec. 22, 1858, ch. 5, 11 Stat. 374

Auburn Rancheria

Auburn Indian Restoration Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1300l-2

Bridgeport Reservation

Act of Oct. 18, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-452,

88. Stat. 1368

Burns Paiute Indian Colony

Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-488, 86 Stat. 806

Cheyenne River Reservation

Act of Apr. 30, 1888, ch. 206, 25 Stat. 94

Colorado River Indian Reservation

Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 127, 13 Stat. 541

Coquille Reservation

Coquille Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 101-42,

103 Stat. 91 (1989)

Crow Creek Reservation

Act of Apr. 30, 1888, ch. 206, 25 Stat. 94

Fort Apache Reservation

Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 2. 30 Stat. 62

Gila River Indian Reservation

Act of Feb. 28, 1859, ch. 66, 11 Stat. 388

Isleta Pueblo

Act of Dec. 22, 1858, ch. 5, 11 Stat. 374

Lac Vieux Desert Reservation

Act of Sept. 8, 1988, Pub. Law No. 100-420,

102 Stat. 1577

Lower Brule Reservation

Act of Apr. 30, 1888, ch. 206, 25 Stat. 94

Mashantucket Pequot Reservation

Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement Act,

25 U.S.C. § 1753

(1a)

2a

Miccosukee Reservation

Florida Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1982,

25 U.S.C. § 1745

Mohegan Reservation

Act of Oct. 19, 1994, Pub. Law No. 103-377,

108 Stat. 3501

Pascua Pueblo Yaqui Reservation

Priv. L. No. 88-350, 78 Stat. 1196 (1964)

Penobscot Reservation

Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980,

25 U.S.C. 1723

Pine Ridge Reservation

Act of Apr. 30, 1888, ch. 206, 25 Stat. 94

Rosebud Indian Reservation

Act of Apr. 30, 1888, ch. 206, 25 Stat. 94

Santa Ana Pueblo

Act of Feb. 9, 1869, ch. 26, 15 Stat. 438

Standing Rock Reservation

Act of Apr. 30, 1888, ch. 206, 25 Stat. 94

Susanville Indian Rancheria

Act of Oct. 14, 1978, Pub. Law No. 95-459,

92 Stat. 1262

Tonto Apache Reservation

Act of Dec. 6, 1972, Pub. Law No. 92-470,

49 Stat. 332

Yavapai-Apache Nation Reservation

Act of June 7, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-117, 49 Stat. 332

Reservations Established by Executive Order

Agua Caliente Indian Reservation

Indian Office, Executive Orders Relating to Indian

Reserves, From May 14, 1855, to July 1, 1902, at

25 (1902) (“Compilation”) (May 15, 1876)

Battle Mountain Reservation

Exec. Order No. 2639 (June 18, 1917)

Exec. Order No. 2803 (Feb. 8, 1918)

3a

Benton Paiute Reservation

Exec. Order No. 2225 (July 22, 1915)

Big Cypress Reservation

Exec. Order No. 1379 (June 28, 1911)

Big Pine Reservation

Exec. Order No. 1496 (Mar. 11, 1912)

Bishop Reservation

Exec. Order No. 1496 (Mar. 11, 1912)

Blackfeet Indian Reservation

Compilation at 54-55 (July 5, 1873)

Bois Forte Reservation

Compilation at 52 (Dec. 20, 1881)

Cabazon Reservation

Compilation at 25 (May 15, 1876)

Cahuilla Reservation

Compilation at 24-25 (Dec. 27, 1875)

Capitan Grande Reservation

Compilation at 24-25 (Dec. 27, 1875)

Chehalis Reservation

Compilation at 111-12 (Oct. 1, 1886)

Cocopah Reservation

Exec. Order No. 2711 (Sept. 27, 1917)

Coeur d'Alene Reservation

Compilation at 40-41 (Nov. 8, 1873)

Cold Springs Rancheria

Exec. Order No. 2075 (Nov. 10, 1914)

Colville Reservation

Compilation at 125 (Apr. 9, 1872)

Duck Valley Reservation

Compilation at 68-69 (Apr. 16, 1877)

Elko Colony

Exec. Order No. 2824 (June 27, 1930)

Fort Berthold Reservation

Compilation at 82 (Apr. 12, 1870)

4a

Fort Hall Reservation

Compilation at 42 (June 14, 1867)

Fort Independence Reservation

Exec. Order No. 2264 (Oct. 28, 1915)

Fort McDermitt Indian Reservation

Exec. Order No. 1606 (Sept. 16, 1912)

Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation Reservation

Exec. Order (Sept. 15, 1903)

Fort Yuma Indian Reservation

Compilation at 35 (July 6, 1883)

Goshute Reservation

Exec. Order No. 1903 (Mar. 23, 1914)

Havasupai Reservation

Compilation at 15 (Mar. 31, 1882)

Hoh Indian Reservation

Compilation at 126 (Sept. 11, 1893)

Hollywood Reservation

Exec. Order No. 1379 (June 28, 1911)

Hoopa Valley Reservation

Compilation at 20 (June 23, 1876)

Hopi Reservation

Compilation at 9 (Dec. 16, 1882)

Hualapai Indian Reservation

Compilation at 9 (Jan. 4, 1883)

Inaja and Cosmit Reservation

Compilation at 24-25 (Dec. 27, 1875)

Jemez Pueblo

Exec. Order No. 537 (Dec. 19, 1906)

Jicarilla Apache Nation Reservation

Compilation at 77 (Feb. 11, 1887)

Kalispel Reservation

Exec. Order No. 1904 (Mar. 23, 1914)

Maricopa (Ak Chin) Indian Reservation

Exec. Order No. 1538 (May 28, 1912)

5a

Mesa Grande Reservation

Compilation at 24-25 (Dec. 27, 1875)

Mescalero Reservation

Compilation at 74 (May 29, 1873)

Moapa River Indian Reservation

Compilation at 69 (Mar. 12, 1873)

Morongo Reservation

Compilation at 25 (Aug. 25, 1877)

Muckleshoot Reservation

Compilation at 128 (Apr. 9, 1874)

Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation

Compilation at 61-62 (Mar. 19, 1900)

Northwestern Shoshone Reservation

Compilation at 68 (May 10, 1877)

Ontonagon Reservation

Compilation at 47 (Sept. 25, 1855)

Paiute (UT) Reservation

Exec. Order No. 2229 (Aug. 2, 1915)

Pala Reservation

Compilation at 24-25 (Dec. 27, 1875)

Picayune Rancheria

Exec. Order No. 1522 (Apr. 24, 1912)

Pyramid Lake Paiute Reservation

Compilation at 71 (Mar. 23, 1874)

Quileute Reservation

Compilation at 133 (Feb. 19, 1889)

Round Valley Reservation

Compilation at 31 (Mar. 30, 1870)

Salt River Reservation

Compilation at 14 (June 14, 1879)

San Carlos Reservation

Compilation at 17 (Dec. 14, 1872)

San Felipe Pueblo

Compilation at 77-78 (June 13, 1902)

6a

Santa Clara Pueblo

Exec. Order No. 344-B (July 29, 1905)

Seminole (FL) Trust Land

Exec. Order No. 1379 (June 28, 1911)

Shoalwater Bay Indian Reservation

Compilation at 133 (Sept. 22, 1866)

Siletz Reservation

Compilation at 95 (Nov. 9, 1855)

Spokane Reservation

Compilation at 134 (Jan. 18, 1881)

Summit Lake Reservation

Exec. Order No. 1681 (Jan. 14, 1913)

Sycuan Reservation

Compilation at 24-25 (Dec. 21, 1875)

Torres-Martinez Reservation

Compilation at 25 (May 15, 1876)

Tule River Reservation

Compilation at 34 (Jan. 9, 1873)

Tuolumne Rancheria

Exec. Order No. 1517 (April 13, 1912)

Turtle Mountain Reservation

Compilation at 85 (Dec. 21, 1882)

Uintah and Ouray Reservation

Compilation at 109 (Oct. 3, 1861)

Walker River Reservation

Compilation at 72 (Mar. 19, 1874)

Zia Pueblo

Exec. Order No. 3351 (Nov. 6, 1920)

Exec. Order No. 3637 (Feb. 16, 1922)

Zuni Reservation

Compilation at 79 (Mar. 16, 1877)