Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Cecelia F. Abadie, Petitioner v. Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board

Supreme Court briefNov 26, 2021

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3n tfjc Supreme Court of tfje QUmteti States

Cecelia F. Abadie, Petitioner

versus

La. Atty. Disciplinary Board,

Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Louisiana Supreme Court

APPENDIX

Cecelia Farace Abadie, pro se

La. Bar No. 19874

20 White Drive

Hammond, Louisiana 70401

985-542-7859

cfabadie@gmail.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Supreme Court Opinion, Reports of

Disciplinary Committee and Recommendation of the

Disciplinary Board

Louisiana Supreme Court, In re: Cecelia F. Abadie,

No. 2020-B-1276 (La. May 13, 2021) Opinion ..

Louisiana Disciplinary Board, In re: Cecelia F.

Abadie, Report of the Disciplinary Committee....... 25

In re: Cecelia F. Abadie, Recommendation of the

Disciplinary Board

Relevant opinions, orders, findings of fact, and

conclusions of law in state and federal courts

Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court for the State of

Louisiana, Dept, of Children & Family Services, In

the Interest of Mark Jenkins, Jr. v. Mark Jenkins,

Sr., No. 2003-NS-1371-0, Section C, Minutes of July

7, 2014........................................................................ 35

24TH Judicial District Court for Jefferson Parish,

State of Louisiana, No: 711-419, Div. A, Mark

Anthony Jenkins v. Latasha Jackson Judgment

February 4, 2015.............................. ....................... 38

Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court, Louisiana Dept of

Children & Fam. Ser., In the Interest of Mark

Jenkins, Jr. v. Mark Jenkins, Sr., NO. 2003-NS1371-0, Sec. C, Minutes of April 4, 2015

Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court, Louisiana Dept of

Children & Fam. Ser., In the Interest of Mark

Jenkins, Jr. v. Mark Jenkins, Sr., No. 2003-NS-13710, Sec. C, Minutes of June 15, 2015

Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit, State of

Louisiana, Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. v. Latasha

Jackson, No.l5-C-399 (5th Cir., La.) July 31, 2015

Disposition................................................................ 44

Jenkins v. Jackson, 216 So.3d 1082 (La. App., 2017),

on appeal of dismissal of petition to nullify the 2015

ruling of the Court of Appeal. Quoted but not put

into Appendix.

Orders on requests for rehearing and writ of

certiorari

Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, In Re:

Cecelia F. Abadie, No:2020-B-01276, Office of

Disciplinary Board Number(s) 17-DB-056, June 29,

2021, application for rehearing denied: three would

grant

Louisiana Fifth Circuit, Mark Anthony Jenkins Sr. v.

Latasha Jackson, No. 15-C-399, Rehearing denied,

September 2, 2015...............................................

Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, Mark

Anthony Jenkins, Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No. 2015CJ-1622, Sept. 4, 2015, Writ Denied, one dissent:

would grant

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, State of Louisiana,

Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No.

16-CA-w82, rehearing denied 3/22/17

Louisiana Supreme Court, No. 2017-C-0652,

Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Latasha Jackson, writ

denied, Hughes, J., would grant, Sept. 6, 2017 ...

United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit,

No. 19-30112, Mark Anthony Jenkins, Plaintiff—

Appellant v. Timothy O’Rourke, Jefferson Parish

Assistant District Attorney, Jefferson Parish

Juvenile Court; Robert M. Murphy, rehearing

denied, February 21, 2020

5. Previous pleadings in which the questions were

raised

Louisiana Supreme Court In re Cecelia F. Abadie,

No. 2020-B-1276, Brief in Opposition to the

Recommendation to the Louisiana Supreme

Court................................................................................. 59

Louisiana Supreme Court, In re Cecelia F. Abadie,

No. 2020-B-12716 Attorney Disciplinary Proceedng, Application for Rehearing, filed May 26,

2021.................................................................................... 61

Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board, In re: Cecelia

Abadie, Docket No. 17-DB 56, Respondent’s PostHearing Memorandum, Aug. 12, 2019

Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board, In re: Cecelia

Abadie, Docket No. 17-DB 56, “Timeline” w.

argument, April 20, 2018..............................

Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, Mark

Anthony Jenkins Sr., Plaintiff -Respondent v.

Latasha Jackson, Defendant- Applicant, Docket No.

15-C- 399, “Opposition to Latasha Jackson’s

Application for Writ” filed June 23, 2015

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal for the State of

Louisiana, No. 16-CA-482, Mark Anthony Jenkins v.

Latasha Jackson, Request for Reconsideration, filed

March 9, 2017

Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Robert M. Murphy et al.

No. 2:18-CV-3122, United States District Court

(E.D.) complaint......................................................... 72

6. Essential Material

Louisiana Civil Code art 203

24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of

Jefferson, State of Louisiana, Mark Anthony Jenkins

v. Latasha Jackson, No.711-419, Rule to Show Cause

Why the Birth Certificate Should Not Be Amended,

filed Oct. 17, 2014

24TH Judicial District Court for the Parish of

Jefferson, State of Louisiana, Mark Anthony Jenkins

v. Latasha Jackson, No. 711-419, Motion and Order

for Appeal, Feb. 24, 2015

Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court, Louisiana Dept of

Children & Fam. Ser., In the Interest of Mark

Jenkins, Jr. v. Mark Jenkins, Sr., No. 2003-NS1371-0, Transcript excerpt of Hearing of June 15,

2015

Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, 15-C-399

Mark Anthony Jenkins Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, App

lication of Latasha Jackson for Supervisory Writ,

June 23, 2015

24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of

Jefferson, State of Louisiana, Mark Anthony Jenkins

v. Latasha Jackson, No. 711-419, Transcript excerpt

of May 16, 2016 hearing on exceptions to Petition to

Nullify

United States District Court (E.D. La.) Mark

Anthony Jenkins v. Robert M. Murphy et al., No.

2:18-CV-3122, 11/27/18 Opinion.............................

United States Court of Appeal for Fifth Circuit, (E.D.

La.), Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Timothy O’Rourke et

al., No. 19-30112, (Jan. 10, 2020) Opinion

Supreme Court of Louisiana, La. Attorney

Disciplinary Board, In the matter of: Cecelia Farace

Abadie, Docket No. 17-DB-056, Committee Hearing

Transcript May 31, 2019, Index to Respondent’s

Exhibit Binder

Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board Office of the

Disciplinary Counsel December 13, 2016 letter

offering private admonition

Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board Office of

the Disciplinary Counsel Letter of January 12, 2018,

rejecting discovery Requests

1. Judgments, Opinions, Recommendations &

Reports

Supreme Court of Louisiana, 13th day of May, 2021

Per Curiam, 2010-B-01276 IN RE: CECELIA F.

ABADIE SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE PER

CURIAM.

Weimer, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part and

assigns; Hughes, J., concurs in part, dissents in part

for the reasons assigned by Weimer, C.J.; Crichton,

J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons;

Griffin, J. concurs in part, dissents in part for the

reasons assigned by Weimer, C.J.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA NO. 2020-B1276 IN RE: CECILIA F. ABADIE

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges

filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel(“ODC”)

against respondent, Cecelia F. Abadie, an attorney

licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS

By way of background, Latasha Jackson gave birth to

a child in September, 1997. Mark Jenkins was listed

as the father of the child’s birth certificate, and he

signed an acknowledgment of paternity. Whether the

acknowledgment was an authentic act is unknown.

Mark and Latasha married after the child’s birth,

but later divorced. Latasha sought child support

through the Department of Children and Family

Services (DCFS) which filed a case against Mark in

the Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court. Mark and

Latasha eventually agreed that Mark would pay

monthly support in the amount of $220.74, and the

judge handling the Juvenile Court case signed the

consent judgment on October 27, 2003.

Sometime in 2011, Mark began to suspect he was not

the biological father of the Latasha’s child, and he

hired respondent to represent him in attempts to end

his child support obligation to Latasha. In August

2011, the Louisiana Department of Health and

Hospitals provided respondent with a copy of the

signed birth certificate of Latasha’s child. The DHH

also provided respondent with a letter verifying that

Mark and Latasha signed an “acknowledgment of

paternity,” which was filed on November 4, 2012.

In February 2012, respondent filed a Petition for

Revocation of Acknowledgment of Paternity, for

Damages Due to Fraud, and for Restoration of

Payments Not Due” against Latasha in the 24th

Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson. In

November 2012, respondent amended the petition to

include the DCFS as a defendant.

In June 2012, Latasha’s counsel filed an Exception of

Prescription on the issue of the revocation of the

acknowledgment of paternity, claiming Mark had

only two years from the date he signed the

acknowledgment to revoke same. On January 22,

2013, Judge Raymond Steib, Jr. denied the exception

of prescription and granted Mark’s motion for

paternity testing. On Latasha’s application for

supervisory writs, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal

reversed Judge Steib’s ruling and granted the

exception of prescription (1st Fifth circuit ruling). In

light to this reversal, the Fifth Circuit also vacated

the order for paternity testing and remanded the

matter to the trial court, respondent filed a writ

application in this court, but her application was

denied as untimely on August 23, 2013. On June 30,

202114, respondent filed in the 24th JDC case a

petition seeking to nullify the 1st Fifth Circuit

ruling. However, she withheld service aof the

petition and never followed up.

Meanwhile, on June 27, 2013, Judge Steib again

ordered paternity testing in the 24th JDC case,

which test proved Mark was not the father of

Latasha’s child. On August 19, 2013, attorney Kristyl

R. Treadaway enrolled as Latasha’s counsel of

records in the 24th JDC case.

In October, 2014 respondent filed in the 24th JDC

case a rule to show cause why Mark’s name should

not be removed from the birth certificate of Latasha’s

child. Following a shoe cause hearing, Judge Steib

held that this not the proper procedure to alter or

amend a birth certificate because the Louisiana

Bureau of Viral Records was not a party to the 24th

case.

Because respondent continued to filed pleading on

the issue of Mark’s revocation of paternity, on

November 20, 2014, Ms. Treadaway filed a second

exception of prescription. In a judgment dated

February 4, 2015, Judge Steib again denied the

exception of prescription and made a finding that

Mark was not the father of Latasha’s child based on

the paternity test result. Ms. Treadaway then filed a

writ application with the Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeal. Respondent opposed the writ application,

essentially arguing that, because neither the BVR or

the DCFS could produce a copy of a signed

acknowledgment of paternity, the issue of whether

Mark can revoke the acknowledgment was not

prescribed. However, previous pleading filed by

respondent in the 24th JDC case indicated that Mark

signed the birth certificate and signed an

acknowledgment of paternity (considered a judicial

confession by the Fifth circuit) when Latasha’s child

was born, the Fifth Circuit reversed Judge Steib’s

ruling and granted the exception of prescription

regarding the issue of Mark’s revocation of his

acknowledgment of legal paternity. (2nd Fifth circuit

ruling). The Fifth Circuit, however, found no error in

Judge Steib’s finding that Mark is not the father of

Latasha’s child bas on the paternity test (which issue

relates to Mark’s claims for damages due to fraud

and for restoration of payments not due.)

The Fifth Circuit’s ruling was dated July 31, 2015

and was signed by Judges Robert M. Murphy,

Stephen J. Windhorst, and Hans J. Lilejeberg.

Respondent filed a writ application with this court,

which the court denied on September 4, 2015.

While Ms. Treadaway’s writ application was pending

with the Fifth circuit, respondent sent a copy of

Judge Steib’s February 4, 2015 judgment, in which

he found that Mark was not the father of Latasha’s

child, to the BVR. Because the BVR as not aware of

Ms. Treadaway’s pending writ application, it

reissued the birth certificate of Latasha’s child on

Mark 16, 2015, pursuant to respondent’s request to

remove Marks name as the father and to change the

child’s last name. Neither Latasha nor Ms.

Treadaway was aware of respondent’s request to

change the child’s last name. Neither Latasha nor

Ms. Treadaway was aware of respondent’s request to

the BVR.

After respondent received the altered birth

certificate, she filed an ex parte motion in the

Juvenile Court case on March 30, 2015, requesting

that Mark’s child support obligation be terminated.

Respondent then had ex parte communications, in

the form of a telephone call and a letter, with the

secretary of Juvenile court Judge Barron Burmaster,

asking the judge to address whether Mark is the

legal father of Latasha’s child.

Beginning in August 2013, respondent filed several

other pleadings in the Juvenile Court case, raising

some of the same issues she raised in the pleadings

she filed in the 24th JDC case. According to

respondent, she filed these duplicative pleadings in

the two courts because she was not sure which court

was the proper venue. Judge Burmaster ruled

consistently that the Juvenile Court does not have

jurisdiction to revoke an acknowledgment of

paternity and until the acknowledgment is revoked,

Mark must pay child support. Nevertheless, an April

27, 2015 minutes entry in the Juvenile Court case

indicated that the “parties stipulate there is no

authentic act of acknowledgment.” On June 15, 2015,

Ms. Treadaway requested and obtained a stay of the

Juvenile court proceedings pending the 2nd Fifth

Circuit ruling.

Thereafter, on September, 15, 2015, in light of the

2nd Fifth Circuit ruling, respondent drafted a letter

addressed to the Jefferson Parish District Attorney

Paul Connick and Louisiana Representative Chris

Broadwater, (the “collusion letter). In the collusion

letter, respondent accused Fifth Circuit Judge Robert

Murphy of collusion with the DCFS against Mark so

Mark would not be reimbursed for the child support

payments he made to Latasha. Respondent also

accused Ms. Treadaway of requesting the stay in the

Juvenile court case as a way to give the Fifth Circuit

time to collude with the DCFS. Respondent sent a

copy of the collusion letter to Ms. Treadaway and

attorney Timothy O’Rourke, who represented the

DCFS in the Juvenile Court case. However,

according to respondent, she did not send the

collusion letter to Mr. Connick or Mr. Broadwater

even though it was addressed to them.

In the meantime, in another attempt to fight the 2nd

Fifth Circuit ruling, on March 10, 2016, respondent

filed in the 24th JDC case a petition to nullify the

2nd Fifth Circuit ruling for lack of jurisdiction and

ill-practice in Ms. Treadaway’s writ application. In

response, Ms. Treadaway filed exceptions of no cause

of action and res judicata, and asked for sanctions

against respondent. In November 2016, Judge Steib

granted the exceptions and dismissed the petition to

nullify, but he denied the request for sanctions. The

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed this judgment

on February 22, 2017, and this court denied

respondent’s writ application on September 6, 2017.

In March 2018, respondent filed a complaint in the

United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Louisiana on Mark’s behalf and against Judge

Murphy and Mr. O’Rourke (the federal lawsuit). The

federal lawsuit accused Judge Murphy, Mr.

O’Rourke, and Ms. Treadaway of conspiring “to allow

Judge Murphy to usurp the issue of legal paternity

from Juvenile Court.” More specifically, the federal

lawsuit alleged that “the conspirators stopped

Juvenile Court from deciding legal paternity so that

it could take the place of biological paternity, which

was the issue decide in the district court.”

Respondent eventually added Ms. Treadaway and

Judge Burmaster as defendants. The federal lawsuit

was dismissed, but respondent appealed the

dismissal. On January 10, 2020, the United States

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal

of the federal lawsuit. On December 14, 2020, the

United States Supreme Court denied respondent’s

petition for writ of certiorari.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In September 2015, Ms. Treadaway filed a

disciplinary complaint against respondent. In

September 2017, the ODC filed formal charges

against respondent, alleging that her conduct as set

forth above violated the following provisions of the

Rules of Professional Conduct Rues l.l( failure to

provide competent representation to a client), 3.1

(meritorious claims and contentions), 3.3( candor

toward the tribunal), 3.5 (engaging in conduct

intended to disrupt a tribunal), 8.2 (a lawyer shall

not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be

false or with reckless disregard as to its truth r

falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a

judge), and 8.4 (a) (violation of the Rules of

Professional Conduct). Respondent answered the

formal charges, essentially denying any misconduct.

Accordingly, the matter proceeded to a formal

hearing on the merits.

Hearing Committee Report

After the testimony and evidence at the hearing, the

hearing committee found all of the witnesses credible

and that each witness appeared to believe they were

testifying truthfully to the best of their abilities. The

committee further found the respondent drafted a

letter to Mr. Connick and Mr. Broadwater, accusing

Judge Murphy of colluding with the Juvenile Court

and DCFS, but respondent did not send the letter to

its intended recipients. Instead, she sent the

collusion letter to Mr. O’Rourke and Ms. Treadway.

Therefore, the committee found respondent did

attack the integrity of a judge and continues to do so.

Additionally the committee found respondent did not

provide competent representation to her client

because she failed to filed a writ application with the

Supreme Court within the time delays, filed

pleadings that were duplicative in both the Juvenile

Court case and the 24th JDC case, confused matters

with multiple pleadings, failed to request service on

certain pleadings, failed to allow a waiver of service

in the federal lawsuit, confused the pending

litigation and disrupted the tribunal by filing

numerous and duplicative pleadings, failed to know

certain procedural ruled and filed pleading that

unduly complicated the proceedings.

Based on these facts, the committee determined

respondent violated Rules 1.1 and 8.2 of the Rules of

Professional Conduct and, violating these rules, also

violated Rule 8.4(a). The Committee, however,

determined ODC failed to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that respondent violated Rules

3.1, 3.3, and 3.5 as alleged in the formal charges.

Specifically, regarding Rule 1.1, the committee found

respondent testified that Mark’s case may have been

the only filiation case she worked on during her more

than 29-year-long law career. The committee also

found that, for the last several years, Mark appears

to have been respondent’s only client. According to

the committee, the record is replete with several

filings that are curious and support the allegations

that respondent failed to provide competent

representation. One or two filings, procedural errors,

or incidents do not rise to the level of incompetency

in the committee’s opinion, but in this case, there are

numerous incidents that collectively rise to

incompetent representation. First, respondent

admitted she missed a crucial deadline to file a writ

application on a ruling against her client, but she

was not upset by it because as she testified, the

missed deadline” had no effect on the case.” Yet, Mr.

O’Rourke, who worked with the DCFS in that

specific area of practice, testified he told Respondent

to file the writ application because he thought she

had a cause of action. The committee determined

that, after the missed deadline, respondent became

determines to pursue an alternate theory of relief for

her client, which led to multiple filings in different

courts. Additionally, the case is procedurally

convoluted due to respondent filing multiple

pleadings and actins simultaneously in two separate

courts, and she failed to establish that both courts

had subject matter jurisdiction over all the issues

upon which she was requesting relief.* Respondent

also filed a motion to have the presiding judge correct

the court minutes from a hearing without a

contradictory hearing, without a certificate of service

or requesting service on opposing counsel, and

without requesting a transcript. Respondent

requested that a lower court act as a supervisory

court over its corresponding court of appeal.

Additionally, she wrote a letter to a judge’s secretary

concerning legal issues and procedural matters and

did not send a copy to opposing counsel. Respondent

further showed her lack of legal knowledge and skill

she when she filed pleadings but did not serve

opposing counselor parties in the underlying cases.

Respondent then filed the federal lawsuit but did not

allow Ms. Treadaway and Mr. O’Rourke to waive

service of the lawsuit, despite their testimony that

they both filed waiver of service. Her actions were

not only inconsiderate but also did not conform to

federal court procedures. She filed a motion to

dismiss child support retroactive to a particular date,

but when she decided she could request that the

dismissal be retroactive to any earlier date, instead

of amending the motion, she dismisses and refiled it.

Other pleadings showed respondent to be naive and

to not know the proper procedures. However, for the

purpose of brevity, the committee chose the above

specific incidents that were brought out at the

hearing and illustrated respondent’s lack of

competence.

Specifically, regarding Rule 8.2, the committee noted

that respondent acknowledges she wrote and

transmitted the collusion letter, which attacked

Judge Murphy’s integrity. Her defense for sending

the letter is that she only sent it to two people and

did not publish it publicly. Respondent’s unspoken

defense however, seems to be that she believes the

allegations contained in the collusion letter and the

federal lawsuit. Respondent based her allegations

against Judge Murphy on speculation and conjecture

rather than on any solid evidence. Therefore, the

committee found the ODC met its burden of proving

that respondent violated Rule 8.2.

With respect to Rule 3.1, the committee determined

that, while neither Ms. Treadaway nor Mr. O’Rourke

may have agreed with all of respondent’s legal

theories, the ODC did not prove by clear and

convincing evidence that respondent filed frivolous

pleadings. *

Regarding Rule 3.3, the committee determined that

respondent intended to show candor to each tribunal.

She appeared to believe the allegations she made in

her pleadings and in the testimony she presented to

the committee. Thus, the ODC did not establish that

respondent knowingly made a false statement to a

tribunal.

Finally, with respect to Rule 3.5, the committee

determined the ODC did not prove that respondent

intentionally disrupted court proceedings. All of

respondent’s action were fueled by a sincere desire to

assist her client, to argue for him before the tribunal,

and to convince each tribunal that her position was

correct, even when she was wrong. No evidence was

presented that respondent acted as she did for the

intended purpose of causing disruption, chaos, or

confusion.

The committee determined respondent knowingly

and intentionally violated duties owed to the legal

system and the public. Her conduct caused actual

harm to the judges and attorneys she wrote about

and filed suit against by hearing their reputations,

causing the stress and anxiety, and causing them to

have to defend against the federal lawsuit.

Specifically, Ms. Treadaway had to pay a $5,000

deductible towards her malpractice insurance to

defend against the federal lawsuit. Mr. O’Rourke was

distressed because he did not know if he would have

to pay out of pocket to defend the lawsuit against

him. If Mark had to pay for all of the filing fees and

legal fees for respondent’s duplicative filings and the

legal fee for her untimely or improper filings, then he

was also harmed.

In aggravation, the committee found substantial

experience in the practice of law (admitted 1990) and

a lack of remorse. In mitigation, the committee found

the absence of prior disciplinary records and the

absence of a dishonest or selfish motive.

After considering respondent’s conduct in the light of

this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar

misconduct, the committee recommended respondent

be suspended from the practice of law for one year,

with all but six months deferred. The committee

further recommended that, following the active

portion of the suspension, respondent be placed on

supervised probation for two years, during which a

probation monitor meet with her monthly to monitor

her practice and review her client files and any

pleadings she signs. Respondent filed an objection to

the hearing committee’s report.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

The board determined respondent knowingly and

intentionally violated duties owed to her client, the

public, and the legal system. She caused harm to

Judge Murphy, Judge Burmaster, Ms. Treadaway

and Mr. O’Rourke by making unsupported

“collusion” allegations against them. These

individuals suffered stress, anxiety and damage to

their reputations. They also had to spend time, and

in Ms. Treadaway’s circumstances, money to defend

against the federal lawsuit. Respondent also harmed

Latasha, who had to pay Ms. Treadaway to respond

to respondent’s duplicative and unnecessary

pleadings. Mark could have been harmed as well if

he had to pay legal and filing fees for these

pleadings. Citing the ABA’s Standards for Imposing

Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the baseline

sanction is ... reprimand to suspension.

The board agreed with the aggravating factors found

by the committee. In additional aggravation, the

board found a refusal to acknowledge the wrongful

nature of the conduct. The board also agreed with the

mitigating factors found by the committee. In

additional mitigation, the board found that

respondent has a good character and reputation.

After considering respondent’s conduct in light to

this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar

misconduct, the board recommended be suspended

from the practice of law for a year and one day.

Respondent filed an objection to the disciplinary

board’s recommendation. Accordingly, the case was

docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme

Court Rule XIX, Sec. 11(G)(1)(b).

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original

jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art V, sec. 5(B).

Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an

independent review of the record to determine

whether the alleged misconduct had been proven by

clear and convincing evidence. In re Banks ,09-1212

(La. 10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57. While we are not bound in

any way by the findings and recommendations of the

hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have

held the manifest error standard is applicable to the

committees ‘s factual findings. See In re Caulfield,

96-1401 (la. 11/25/96). 683 So.2d 714; In re Pardue,

93-2865 (La. 3/11/94), 633 2d 150.

The record of this matter supports a finding that

respondent failed to provide competent

representation to a client and made false statements

about the integrity of a judge. The record is replete

with examples, as listed by the hearing committee, of

the improper pleadings filed by the respondent and

her failure to understand and follow court

procedures. The record also contains a copy of the

collusion letter, in which respondent attacked judge

Murphy’s integrity with reckless disregard for the

truth or falsity of her statement, her explanation as

to why she focused her allegations of collusion on

Judge Murphy makes little sense in light of the fact

that Judge Windhorst and Judge Lilejeberg also

signed the 2nd Fifth Circuit ruling. Respondent then

filed a federal lawsuit against Judge Murphy, later

adding judge Burmaster as a defendant, alleging the

same collusion. Respondent has provided absolutely

no evidentiary support for these allegations of

collusion by members of the judiciary, yet she

continues to make them, even in her brief and oral

argument presented to this court. Based on these

facts, respondent has violated the Rules of

Professional Conduct as found by the committee and

adopted by the disciplinary board.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct,

we now turn to a determination of the appropriate

sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a

sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary

proceedings are designed to maintain high standards

of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity

of the profession, and deter future misconduct.

Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173

(La. 1987) the discipline to be imposed depends upon

the facts of each case and the seriousness of the

offenses involved considered in light of any

aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana

State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520

(La. 1984).

Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated

duties owed to her client, the legal system, and the

legal profession. Her conduct caused significant

actual harm. The baseline for this type of misconduct

is suspension.

Aggravating factors, include a pattern f misconduct,

multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the

wrongful nature of the conduct, and substantial

experience in the practice of law. Mitigation factors

include the absence of a prior disciplinary records,

the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, and

character or reputation.

The heartland of respondent’s misconduct is her

violation of Rule 8.2, which prohibits a lawyer from

making a statement that the lawyer knows to be

false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or

falsity concerning the integrity of a judge. It is clear

respondent was frustrated that her client did not

obtain the relief to which she believed he was legally

entitled. It is an unfortunate fact that in many

instances, litigation leaves one of the parties and its

counsel disappointed by the court outcome. However,

this does not give an attorney license to make

unsupported and reckless allegations of collusion and

conspiracy on the part of the judges who participated

in the matter. Rather, lawyers are expected to be

professionals and to honor their obligations to the

legal system and to the professions. Respondent

failed to do so, and for this misconduct she must be

sanctioned.

Based on this reasoning, and considering the

respondent’s complete lack of remorse, we find the

boards recommended sanction is appropriate.

Accordingly, we will suspend respondent from the

practice of law for one year and one day.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of

the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and

considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it

is ordered that Cecilia F. Abadie, Louisiana Bar Roll

number 19874, be and she hereby is suspended from

the practice of law for one year and one day. All costs

and expenses in the matter assessed against

respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule

XIX, sec. 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty

days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment

until paid.

Supreme Court

State of Louisiana

New Orleans

November 5, 2020

***************************************

LOUISIANA ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY

IN RE: CECELIA F. ABADIE

DOCKET NO. 17 DB-056

REPORT OF HEARING COMMITTEE # 27

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

... For the following reasons, the Committee finds

that Respondent did violate Rules of Professional

Conduct 8.2, 1.1, 8.4(a). The hearing committee

recommends a sanction of a one-year suspension,

with all but six months deferred conditioned on a

two-year period of supervised probation. During the

period of probation, Respondent should be supervised

by a probation monitor who will meet with her

monthly to monitor her practice and review her

client files and any pleadings she signs.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The committee found that all of the witnesses were

credible and that each appeared to believe that they

were testifying truthfully to the best of his/her

abilities.

The committee found that Respondent did draft a

letter to Mr. Connick and Mr. Broadwater that

accused Judge Murphy of collusion with the Juvenile

Court and Department of Children and Family

Services, but Respondent did not send it to its

intended recipient s. Rather, she sent it to Mr.

Rourke and Ms. Treadaway. The committee found

Respondent did attack the integrity of a judge and

continues to do so.

The committee found that Respondent did not

provide competent representation to her client

because she failed to file a writ within the time

delays, did file pleadings that were duplicative in

both the Juvenile Court and 24th Judicial District

Court, did confuse matters with multiple pleadings

filed, did fail to request service on certain pleadings

when it should have been requested, did fail to allow

a waiver of service in the Federal Court suit when

she should have allowed it, did confuse the pending

litigation and disrupt the tribunal by filing the

numerous and duplicative, did fail to know certai25n

procedural rules and did file pleadings that unduly

complicated the proceedings.

... Her Federal Court suit alleges a conspiracy

between opposing counsel and the ruling judges and

alleges the corruption of the Louisiana legal system.

As Timothy O’Rourke testified, the allegations in the

letter Respondent sent were similar to those made in

the Federal Court suit she filed against him, Ms.

Treadway, Judge Burmaster and Judge Murphy.

(Transcript page 123) Respondent did not introduce

any evidence of an actual conspiracy or collusion at

the hearing, just her own opinion and speculation.

However, despite the lack of evidence to support the

belief, Respondent must still believe there is

collusion and a conspiracy because at the time of the

hearing she was still pursuing her Federal Court

without remorse. As she testified, “actually, I’m sorry

because they have — they brought this against me.”

But she is not sorry she made the allegations against

them and has not stopped making the allegations.

While Respondent states that she believes there was

collusion, did not prove it and the facts do not

support it.

... However, the continued slurs and litigation

against opposing counsel and Judge Murphy and

Burmaster coupled with the competency violation do

justify a harsher sanction than a public reprimand,

which will not aid Respondent in the continued

practice of law in a professional manner. ...

CONCLUSION

... The hearing committee recommends a sanction of

a one-year suspension, with all but six months

deferred conditioned on a two-year period of

supervised probation. During the period of probation,

Respondent should be supervised by a probation

monitor who will meet with her monthly to monitor

her practice and review her client files and any

pleadings she signs. Respondent shall be assessed

with the costs and expenses of the proceeding

pursuant to Rule XIX, §10.1.

This opinion is unanimous and has been reviewed by

each committee member, who fully concur and who

have authorized Edythe L. Koonce,to sign on their

behalf.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 4 day of December,

2019.

Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board

Hearing Committee #27

Edythe L. Koonce, Committee Chair

H. Price Mounger, Lawyer Member

James R. Mobley, Public Member

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DISCIPLINARY BOARD RECOMMENDATION TO

THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE: CECELIA F. ABADIE

No: 2020-B-1276

Dear Counsel:

This is to advise that Findings and

Recommendations (Final Charges) was filed in the

above entitled matter. With kindest regards, I

remain,

Very truly yours,

Signed: John Tarlton Oliver

Clerk of Court

By: Bryan Chan

Deputy Clerk of Court

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

... As for the mitigating factors, Respondent

introduced into evidence two character letters which

show that she has good character and a good

reputation in her community. Therefore, this

mitigating factor is found, along with the mitigating

factors of absence of prior disciplinary record and

absence of a dishonest or selfish motive as found by

the Committee.

As to aggravating factors, the Board adopts the

Committee’s finding that Respondent shows no

remorse for her misconduct. As explained by the

Committee, Respondent filed a federal court lawsuit,

pleadings, and memoranda regarding the alleged

conspiracy even after ODC filed its formal charges.

She maintained at the disciplinary hearing that she

intended to continue to pursue the federal court case,

despite its dismissal by the district court. In her

application for admission to the federal Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals, without any substantiation, she

again references the alleged “collusion” in the state

court paternity/child support proceeding and

maintains that Ms. Treadaway and disciplinary

counsel have improperly “puffed up” Ms. Treadsay’s

complaint filed with ODC. In its pre-argument brief,

ODC asserts that Respondent’s continued lack of

remorse and asserting of baseless claims and

allegations could be considered ongoing misconduct.

Indeed, the Board notes that, during her

presentation at oral argument, Respondent again

showed no remorse and demonstrated a lack of

understanding of the improper conduct that was the

subject of the formal charges brought against her.

... Here, Respondent wrote a letter to District

Attorney Paul Connick and State Representative

Chris Broadwater in which she accused Judge

Murphy, the Juvenile Court system, the Department

of children and Family Services of “collusion.” 12

Timothy O’Rourke of the Department of Children

and Family Services and Kristyl Treadaway were

both carbon copied on the correspondence.

Respondent faxed the correspondence to Mr.

O’Rourke and Ms. Treadaway, but did not actually

mail the letter to Mr. Connick or Representative

Broadway. While this letter was not directly

submitted to a court, it was submitted to counsel

involved in the Jenkins v. Jackson litigation. It

caused injury to the individuals accused of being

involved in “collusion” in the form of damage to their

reputation, stress, anxiety, and caused Ms.

Treadaway to expend time and resources in filing a

complaint against Respondent with ODC.

12 Respondent states in her letter, in pertinent part,

that:

“I am an attorney representing Mark Jenkins, Sr., in

the above referenced actions. Recently, DCFS and

Judge Murphy appear to have colluded to prevent

the hearing of the issue of legal paternity in Juvenile

Court on June 15, 2015. Ms. Treadaway, attorney for

Ms. Jackson, requested and obtained a legally

unnecessary continuance from Juvenile Court so that

her writ application from a February 4, 2015

judgment of the 24th JDC, could be used as the

opportunity for the Fifth Circuit to decide the legal

paternity issue de novo. The issues of the existence of

an authentic act of acknowledgment or legal

paternity were not related to the Judgment from

which the writ was taken.

This extraordinary maneuver was needed by DCFS

because DCFS and Treadaway had already confessed

in Juvenile Court that that [sic] there was not

authentic act of acknowledgment. By not having that

evidence in the record of the 24th JDC, where the

issue of an authentic ac had never been litigated or

decided, Judge Murphy was able to ignore the

evidence in the Juvenile Court record and pick from

the record of the 24th JDC selected evidence of a

“judicial confession” to “an acknowledgment of legal

paternity.” Jenkins was thus deprived of the right to

have the evidence in the Juvenile Court applied to

the issue of an authentic act.

This maneuver could not have happened by chance:

it had to be planned by DCFS and Judge Murphy.

DCFS saw the confession in Juvenile Court to the no

existence of an authentic act of acknowledgement as

an open door to possible reimbursement of child

support for Mr. Jenkins. It consulted with Judge

Murphy and it was only a matter of getting a

continuance to stop Juvenile Court from deciding the

issue of legal paternity, and then using the writ

application taken by Ms. Treadaway to have Judge

Murphy to decide it.

I will be happy to send you a copy of my application

for a writ of certiorari, which describes what

happened and why. Also, I can forward Judge

Murphy’s decision. It contains deliberate

misrepresentations of the facts and law in an

exercise to justify deciding the issue that was not

within the scope of the writ application. Judge

Murphy had to find a “judicial confession” to signing

an authentic act of acknowledgment as a substitute

for an actual authentic act of acknowledgment

because only an authentic act of acknowledgment

could make Mr. Jenkins the legal father under

former C.C. Art. 203.”

... In re Mire, 2005-1453 (La. 2/19/16), 197 So.3d 656,

offers guidance as to the 8.2(a) violation (lawyer shall

not make a statement she knows to be false or with

reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning

the integrity of a judge) found in this matter. In

Mire, the Court held that the respondent’s statement

on a writ application, referring to “incompetence

and/or corruption” of the district and appellate court

judges, which arose out of the alleged splicing of a

court reporter’s tapes, and her suggestion that their

decisions were driven by political gain, constituted a

violation of Rule 8.2(a). Mire, 2005-1453, pp. 3-4, 18,

197 So.3d 659, 666. In reaching its decision, the

Court relied upon the case of LSBA v. Karst, 428

So.2d 406 (La. 1983) in explaining the objective

standard to be used in analyzing whether a

statement is knowingly or recklessly false, and

hence, a violation of Rule 8.2. As explained in Karst:

In our opinion, DR 8-102(B) [the predecessor of Rule

8.2(a) is violated when an attorney intentionally

causes accusations to be published which he knows

to be false or which with the exercise of ordinary

care, he should know to be false. The rationale for

DR 8-102(B) appears in Ethical Consideration 8-6,

the pertinent part of which provides:

Adjudicatory officials, not being wholly freed to

defend themselves, are entitled to receive the

support of the Bar against unjust criticism. While a

lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize such

official publicly, he should be certain of the merit of

his complaint, use appropriate language and avoid

petty criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate

statements tend to lessen public confidence in our

legal system. Criticisms motivated by reasons other

than a desire to improve the legal system are not

justified.

This provision clearly illustrates that it is not the

genuineness of an attorney’s belief in the truth of his

allegations, but the reasonableness of that belief and

the good faith of the attorney in asserting it that

determines whether or not one has “knowingly” fade

false accusations against a judge within the meaning

of DR 8-102(B). Consequently, where it is shown that

an attorney knew, or in good faither should have

known of the falsity of his accusations, that

attorney’s unsubstantiated, subjective belief in the

truth of those accusations, however genuine, will not

excuse his violation of DR 8-102(B).

Similar to Ms. Mire, Respondent has made

unsubstantiated, disparaging remarks concerning

the judiciary in both her September 15, 2015 letter

addressed to Mr. Connick and Representative

Broadwater and in her federal court lawsuit brought

on Mr. Jenkins’ behalf against Judge Murphy, Judge

Burmaster, Ms. Treadaway, and Mr. O’Rourke.

Respondent based her allegations against those

individuals on speculation and conjecture rather

than on any solid evidence. While Ms. Abadie

disagreed with the state Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeals July 31, 2015 ruling in its writ disposition

finding a judicial confession of legal paternity by Mr.

Jenkins, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied her

writ on this issue, with Justice Hughes dissenting.

Respondent’s further legal action taken in the state

courts on this issue was unsuccessful. During this

time, instead of objectively accepting the fact that

not all issues were won, she launched her conspiracy

charges against the judiciary and counsel involved in

the paternity/child support....

[cannot find signature page ]

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2. Rulings necessary to ascertain the grounds of

the judgment.

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Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court for the State of

Louisiana

Dept, of Children & Family Services.

In the Interest of Mark Jenkins, Jr. v. Mark

Jenkins, Sr., No. 2003-NS-1371-0, Section C, Date

7/7/2014

JUDGE Baron C. Burmaster

ADA John Fitsmorris

FILED; July 7, 2014

MINUTE ENTRY - JUDGMENT

PETITION FOR CHILD SUPPORT

DISAGREEMENT HEARING

07/07/2014 TAKEN UP

PRESENT WERE; ADA JOHN FITZMORRIS;

KRYSTYL TREADAWAY, ATTY RECIPIENT;

CECELIA ABADIE, ATTY DEFENDANT

COURT CANNOT VACATE ACT OF

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT PATERNITY IN THIS

COURT; HOWEVER, THE COURT CAN VACATE

THE COURT ORDER OF THIS COURT.

ATTY. ABADIE ADVISED IF THE ORIGINAL

COURT ORDER WS BASED ON FRAUD AND

THERE NEVER WAS AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

THEN SHE MAY HAVE AN ARGUMENT.

PARTIES ADVISED IF THERE NEVER WAS AN

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THEN THERE MIGHT BE

SOME KIND OF FRAUD; HOWEVER, IF THERE

TRULY IS AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THERE IS

NO FRAUD.

COURT IS HEREBY ORDERING THE MOTION

FILED BY ATTY ABADIE TO ANNUL THE

JUDGMENT THAT WAS DENIED BE SERVED

AND SET FOR HEARING.

COURT ORDERS THE STATE IS TO PROVE

THERE WAS AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

COURT ORDERS THE STATE TO OBTAIN

SOMETHING FROM VITAL RECORDS

INDICATING DEFENDANT ACKNOWLEDGED

THE CHILD EITHER BY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

BY AUTHENTIC ACT OR BY DEFENDANT

SIGNING PAPERWORK IN ORDER TO HAVE THE

BIRTH CERTIFICATE COMPLETED.

COURT ORDERS THE CHILD SUPPORT STAY

SUSPENDED AS THERE IS GOOD CAUSE

FINDINGS BY PREVIOUS JUDGE. COURT

ORDERS MOTION FOR SANCTIONS TO BE HELD

OPEN.

ATTY FITZMORRIS HEREBY ENTERS A

QUALIFIED OBJECTION AS HE DOES NOT FEEL

GOOD CAUSE HAS BEEN SHOWN WHY THE

SUPPORT SHOULD BE SUSPENDED. ATTY

TREADAWAY JOINS THE OBJECTION. ADA

PERPETUATES HIS OBJECTION.

PARTIES PRESENT NOTIFIED IN COURT OF

HEARING ON PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF

JUDGMENTALONG WITH AMENDMENT TO

PETITION SET FOR 09/15/2014 09:00 AM IN

SECTION C.

PETITION FOR CHILD SUPPORT

RULE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY CHILD SUPPORT

SHOULD NOT BE REINSTATED AND WHY DEFT

SHOULD NOT BE SANCTIONED.

07/07/2014 TAKEN UP

A TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGNIAL OF FILE IN

THIS OFFICE

s/JUDGE BARRON C. BURMASTER

DEPUTY CLERK, JUVENILE COURT, PARISH OF

JEFFERSON LOUISIANA

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24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE PARISH OF JEFFERSON

STATE OF LOUISIANA

NO: 711-419, DIVA

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS VERSUS LATASHA

JACKSON

JUDGMENT

The Exception of Prescription and Rules to Show

Cause why: l) the DNA Test Report should not be

admitted into evidence; 2) plaintiff should not be

found not to be the father of Mark Anthony Jenkins

Jr.; 3) the birth certificate should not be altered to

remove defendant’s name as father; 4) defendant

should not reimburse costs incurred to prove

paternity; 5) the Department of Child and Family

Services should not be ordered to authorize DNA

Diagnostics to calculate the probability of paternity;

and DNA Diagnostics should not be appointed by the

court to do so; came on for hearing on January 21,

2015.

PRESENT: Cecelia Farace Abadie, attorney for/and

Mark Anthony Jenkins; Kristyl R. Treadaway,atty

for/Latasha Jackson. Department of Child and

Family Services was served with notice but did not

attend.

After reviewing the pleadings and hearing the

argument of counsel, the Court, considering the law,

evidence, and testimony of the witness; and for the

reasons this day orally assigned,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED

that the Exception of Prescription filed herein by the

plaintiff, LATASHA JACKSON, be and the same is

hereby denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the DNA Test Report on the parties

is admitted into evidence.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that MARK ANTHONY JENKINS SR. is

not the father of Mark Anthony Jenkins Jr.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that Latasha Jackson Tuchson reimburse

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS SR. the total costs

incurred to obtain the DNA Test, including attorney

fees, test and court costs.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the rule to show

cause why the birth certificate should not be altered

to remove defendant’s name as father; and the rule

to show cause why DCFS should not authorize DNA

Diagnostics to calculate the probability of paternity

of Samuel Scott using a DNA Test Report in the

Juvenile Court record; and why DNA Diagnostics

should not be ordered to perform the calculation are

taken under advisement.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a full accounting

for attorney’s fees and costs to obtain the DNA test

be filed withing 30 days! and any memorandum on

the issue of the DNA Report of Samuel Scott be

submitted within 15 days.

JUDGMENT REDERED AND SIGNED at Gretna,

Louisiana, this 4th day of February, 2015.

Signed: R. Steib, Judge.

**********************************************

JEFFERSON PARISH JUVENILE COURT

PARISH OF JEFFERSON

State of Louisiana

STATE OF LOUISIANA

DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAM. SER.

IN THE INTEREST OF

MARK JENKINS JR. VERSUS MARK JENKINS SR

DOCKET NO. 2003-NS-1371-0

SECTION C

DATE 4/27/2015

JUDGE Barron C. Burmaster

ADA Leita Robertson

Filed :4/27/15

Signed: Deputy Clerk

MINUTE ENTRY - JUDGMENT

PETITION FOR CHILD SUPPORT

CONTRADICTORY HEARING

04/27/2015 TAKE UP

PRESENT WERE:

CECELIA ABADIE, ATTY DEFT

KRISTYL R. TREADAWAY, ATTY RECP

LATASHA JACKSON TUCHSON, Recipient

LEKITA JACKSON, ADA

THE 24TH JDC HAS RULED THAT THE DEFT IS

NOT THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER.

COURT ORDERED ATTY TREADAWAY HAS 30

DAYS TO RESPOND IN WRITING WHY THE

DEFT SHOULD BE HELD LIABILE AS THE

LEGAL FATHER.

COURT ORDERED ATTY ABADIE WILL HAVE 7

DAYS TO RESPOND TO ATTY TREADAWAYS

MOTION.

ATTY ABADIE MOVED ON GOING SUPPORT

PAYMENTS BE SUSPENDED PENDING ATTY

TREADAWAY’S MOTION.

COURT GRANTED ATTY ABADIE’S MOTION.

COURT ORDERED A POSTING HOLD ON ANY

PAYMENTS THAT ARE CURRENTLY IN THE

SYSTEM.

PARTIES STIPULATE THERE IS NO AUTHENTIC

ACT OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND THE

SIGNING OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE WAS

ACCPETED.

PNIC: STATUS HEARING SET FOR 06/15/2015

09:00 AM IN SECTION C.

CLERK OF COURT NOTIFY ALL PARTIES WITH

A COPY OF ENTRY BY U.S. MAIL ALONG WITH

NOTICE OF SIGNING JUDGMENT.

CLERK: Scott D. Alwert

JUDGE Barron C. Burmaster

******************************************

JEFFERSON PARISH JUVENILE COURT

PARISH OF JEFFERSON

STATE OF LOUISIANA

DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAM. SER.

IN THE INTEREST OF MARK JENKINS JR.

VERSUS MARK JENKINS SR

DOCKET NO. 2003-NS-1371-0

SECTION C

DATE 6/15/2015

JUDGE Barron C. Burmaster

ADA Leita Robertson

Filed: 6/15/15

Signed: Deputy Clerk

MINUTE ENTRY - JUDGMENT

PETITION FOR CHILD SUPPORT

STATUS HEARING

06/15/2015 TAKE UP

PRESENT WERE;

CECELIA FARACE ABADIE, ATTY DEFT

KRISTYL R. TREADAWAY, ATTY RECP

LEKITA ROBERTSON, ADA

TIM O’ROURKE, ADA

ATTY TREADAWAY REQUESTED ALL MATTERS

BE STAYED PENDING THE APPEAL RULING.

VITAL RECORDS REMOVED THE DEFT’S NAME

FROM THE CHILD’S BIRTH CERTIFICATE.

CHILD’S NAME WAS CHANGED TO THE

MOTHER’S MAIDEN NAME.

COURT ORDERED ANY AND ALL SUPPORT

PAYMENTS ARE HEAREBY SUSPENDED

PENDING THE 5TH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL

RULING.

ATTY ABADIE IS SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT

FOR THE DEFT.

COURT ORDERED REIMBURSEMENT ISSUES

WILL BE ADDRESSED AT THE TRIAL IF THE

DEFT IS DECLARED AS NOT THE LEGAL

FATHER BY THE 5TH CIRCUIT COURT OF

APPEALS.

COURT ORDERED INCOME ASSIGNMENT IS TO

BE STOPPED AND ANY FUNDS BEING HELD IN

POSTING ARE TO BE RELEASED TO THE DEFT.

COURT ORDERED SUSPENSION OF ONGOING

SUPPORT IS RETROACTIVE TO DATE THE

FATHER’S NAME WAS REMOVED FROM THE

BIRTH CERTIFICATE, 3/16/15.

STATE TO FILE FOR HEARING AFTER A

RULING HAS BEEN MADE IN THE 5TH CIRCUIT.

CLERK OF COURT NOTIFY

DEFENDANT/RECIPIENT WITH A COPY OF

ENTRY BY U.S. MAIL A LOGN WITH NOTE OF

SIGNING JUDGMENT.

Signed

CLERK Scott D. Alwert

JUDGE Barron C.Burmaster

A true copy of the original on file in this office

Juvenile Court

Parish of Jefferson, LA.

*********************************************

On Application For Writs, No. 15-C-399

COURT OF APPEAL, FIFTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

JUNE 23, 2015

Signed^ Susan Buchholz, Deputy Clerk

MARK ANTHONY SR. VERSUS LATASHA

JACKSON

IN RE LATASHA JACKSON

APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE

TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,

PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA,

DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE RAYMOND S.

STEIB, JR. DIVISION “A”. NUMBER 711-419.

Attorneys for the Relator: Kristyl R. Treadaway,

Sandray S. Salley, Laurel A. Salley, Dixon C. Brown,

Attorneys at Law

3445 North Causeway Boulevard, Suite 510

Metairie, LA 70002 (504) 837-5499

Attorneys for Respondent: Timothy P. O’Rourke,

Assistant District Attorney, 1546 Gretna Boulevard,

Harvey, LA 70058 (504) 364-3630

Cecelia F. Abadie, Attorney at Law, 20 White Drive,

Hammond, LA (985) 542-7859.

WRIT GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART

(SEE ATTACHED DISPOSITION)

Gretna, Louisiana, this 31st day of July, 2015

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS, SR. VERSUS

LATASHA JACKSON

NO. 15-C-399

FIFTH CIRCUIT COUR OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

WRIT GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART

On February 15,2012, respondent, M.J., Sr. filed a

petition for revocation of acknowledgment of

paternity, wherein he also asserted claims for

damages due to fraud under La. C.C. Art. 2315, for

restoration of payments not due under La. C.c. art.

2299, and for genetic testing of relator, L.J., and her

minor child, M.J., Jr.

As an initial matter, we note that on May 14 2013

this Court ruled on a prior write application filed by

relator seeking review of the trial court’s January 22,

2013 denial of her exception of prescription, wherein

she claimed that respondent’s claim to revoke his

acknowledgment of paternity was prescribed. M.J.,

Sr. v L.J., 13-C-296 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/14/13)

(unpublished writ disposition). In that writ

disposition, this Court applied the two-year

prescriptive period of La. R.S. 9-406 regarding

authentic acts of acknowledgment, and held that

“[respondent’s] cause of action to revoke his

acknowledgement of paternity has prescribed.” Id at

2. As a result, this Court granted relator’s writ of

application in part, thereby granting relator’s

exception of prescription as to respondent’s claim for

revocation of his acknowledgment of paternity. Id.

In light of this Court’s finding that respondent’s

cause of action for revocation was prescribed under

La. R.S. 9^406, this Court vacated the portion of the

trial court’s judgment that ordered relator to submit

to genetic testing under La. R.S. 9:396. Id. At 3. On

June 26, 2013, the trial court ordered respondent,

relator, and M.J., Jr. to submit to genetic testing in

accordance with La. R.S. 9^396.

In the instant writ application, relator seeks review

of the trial court’s February 4, 2015 judgment, which

denied relator’s second exception of prescription,

found that respondent, M.J., Sr. was not the father of

M.J., Jr., and ordered relator to reimburse

respondent for costs incurred to obtain the genetic

testing, attorney’s fees, and court costs. Relator

contends that the trial court erred in denying her

second exception of prescription, filed on November

20, 2014, wherein she again claimed that

respondent’s claim to revoke is acknowledgment of

paternity was prescribed. Relator also contends in

her writ application that the trial court erred in

ordering her to reimburse respondent for costs

occurred in obtaining the DNA test, attorney’s fees,

and court costs.

In opposition to this writ application, respondent

notes that this Court’s May 14, 2013 writ disposition

granted relator’s first exception of prescription under

La. R.S. 9^406, which involves authentic acts of

acknowledgement of paternity. Respondent now

contends that there is no evidence of an authentic act

of acknowledgment, but rather, the birth certificate

is the only evidence of any acknowledgment of

paternity on his behalf. As such, respondent claims

that this Court’s prior writ disposition does not

preclude his claim to rebut the presumption of legal

paternity created by signing the birth certificate,

which he contends is imprescriptible under former

Article 203 of the Louisiana Civil Code.

Our review of the evidence regarding the form of the

acknowledgment in this case shows that in

respondent’s February 15, 2012 petition and in his

opposition to relator’s first exception of prescription,

he stated that after M.J., Jr. was born on September

18, 1997, respondent signed the birth certificate and

“the acknowledgment of paternity,” which was filed

in Louisiana. Respondent further alleged that

according to the Bureau of Vital Records, a copy of

the acknowledgment was unavailable due to

Hurricane Katrina.

More than one year after this Court’s May 14, 2013

writ disposition, respondent filed a “Rule to Show

Cause Why [Respondent’s] Name Should not be

Removed from the Birth Certificate and Why an

Expert Should Not be Appointed to Calculate

Probability of Paternity” and supporting

memorandum on October 17, 2014, wherein he

alleged as follows^

“Except for the birth certificate, [respondent] could

not remember if he signed any other

acknowledgment at the hospital in 1997. Finally on

September 15, 2014, the Department of Child and

Family Services, formerly the Department of Social

Services, reported to Judge Burmaster that it could

not find any acknowledgment of paternity, authentic

or otherwise in its records. DCFS receives hospital

acknowledgments after they are executed since 1997

when the hospital acknowledgment program was

begun. That fact along with the fact that hospital

acknowledgments were not by authentic act in 1997

was discovered after the appeal to the Fifth Circuit

on the issue of prescription of the right to revoke an

authentic act was over.”

On November 20, 2014, relator filed an exception of

prescription claiming that respondent’s claim to

revoke his acknowledgment of paternity was

prescribed. In opposition to relator’s exception,

respondent alleged that since filing his original

petition for revocation of acknowledgment of

paternity, he “learned that there was never a

notarial act or an authentic act of acknowledgment only a signed birth certificate.”

A declaration that expressly acknowledges an

adverse fact and is made by a party in a judicial

proceeding is a judicial confession that constitutes

full proof against the party who made it. La

Louisiane Bakery Co. v. Lafayette Ins. Co., (La. App.

5 Cir 2/8/11), 61 So.3d 17, 26. An admission in a

pleading falls within the scope of a judicial confession

and is full proof against the party making it. Id at 27.

A judicial confession must be explicit and not merely

implied. Id. In the instant case, we find that

respondent judicially confessed in more than one

pleading that he signed both the birth certificate and

an acknowledgment of paternity at the time of M.J.,

Jr.’s birth in 1997. Therefore, we find that

respondent’s confession constitutes full proof against

him, such that his subsequent allegations suggesting

that he could not remember signing any

acknowledgment other than the birth certificate, or

that neither a notarial, nor an authentic act of

acknowledgment exists, cannot be considered for

purposes of pursuing another attempt to revoke or to

rebut his acknowledgment of legal paternity in this

case.

Moreover, we note that our May 14, 2013 writ

disposition held that “[respondent’s] cause of action

to revoke his acknowledgment of paternity has

prescribed.” M.J., Sr., 13-0296 at 2. Respondent

neither contested the form of his acknowledgment at

the time that writ application was considered by this

Court, nor did he file a timely writ of review to the

Louisiana Supreme Court regarding that decision.

Accordingly, we find that respondent cannot

circumvent this Court’s prior ruling regarding the

prescriptive period applicable to his acknowledgment

of paternity by filing a rule to show cause in the trial

court, which attempts to re-characterize the nature

of that acknowledgment in a manner contrary to

respondent’s judicial confession made at the time of

our prior writ disposition. Therefore, we find that the

trial court erred in denying relator’s exception of

prescription because we have already held that

respondent’s cause of action to revoke his

acknowledgment of legal paternity has prescribed.

Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the trial court

and grant relator’s exception of prescription as to

respondent’s claim to revoke or rebut his

acknowledgment of legal paternity.

Relator also contends that the trial court erred in

finding that respondent was not the father of M.J.,

Jr., and ordering her to reimburse respondent for

costs incurred in obtaining genetic testing, attorney’s

fees, and court costs, as set forth in its February 4,

2015 judgment.

Our review shows that on June 26,2013, the trial

court ordered relator, respondent, and M.J., Jr. to

submit to genetic testing in accordance with La. R.S.

9:396, which authorizes an order for genetic testing

in any civil action in which paternity is a relevant

fact. Although we have found that respondent’s claim

to revoke or rebut his acknowledgment of legal

paternity has prescribed respondent has also

asserted additional claims related to the issue of

biological paternity that has not yet been resolved,

specifically his claims for damages due to fraud

under La. C.C. art. 2315, and for restoration of

payments not due under La C.C. art 229. Therefore,

we find no error in the portion of the trial court’s

February 4, 2015 judgment that admitted the DNA

test report into evidence and found that respondent

is not the father of M.J., Jr. based upon that report.

This finding is consistent with the trial court’s June

26, 2013 order for genetic testing under La. R.S.

9:396, as the issue of biological paternity may, or

may not, relate to respondent’s additional claims

that have not yet been determined.

Moreover, we find no error in the portion of the trial

court’s February 4, 2015 judgment that ordered

relator to reimburse respondent for costs incurred in

obtaining genetic testing, and for court costs. La. R.S.

9:397.1 provides that the court “shall tax the costs to

the party against whom judgment is rendered.”

However, we find that the trial court erred in

ordering relator to pay respondent’s attorney’s fees.

“Louisiana courts have long held that attorney’s fees

are not allowed except where authorized by statute

or contract.” Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 07-2441 (La.

4/8/08), 988 So. 2d 186, 201. In this case, there is no

statute or contract authorizing respondent’s recovery

of attorney’s fees. Although respondent claims that

La. R.S. 9:398.1 allows for the recovery of attorney’s

fees.” Louisiana courts have long held that attorney’s

fees are not allowed except where authorized by

statute or contract.” Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 072441 (La. 4/8/08), 988 So. 2d 186, 201. In this case,

there is no statute or contract authorizing

respondent’s recovery of attorney’s fees. Although

respondent claims that La. R.S. 9:398.1 allows for

the recovery of attorney’s fees, we disagree as that

statute only authorizes attorney’s fees where “the

court renders a judgment in favor of a party seeking

to establish paternity.” (Emphasis added). Because

respondent is not seeking to establish paternity in

this case, we find this statute is not applicable.

Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in

awarding attorney’s fees in favor or respondent and

against relator, and we vacate that portion of the

trial court’s February 4, 2014 judgment.

In conclusion, we grant this writ application in part

and reverse the trial court’s February 4, 2015 denial

of relator’s exception of prescription and dismissing

with prejudice respondent’s claim to revoke or rebut

his acknowledgment of legal paternity of M.J., Jr. We

further grant this writ application in part and vacate

the portion of the trial court’s February 4, 2015

judgment that order relator to pay respondent’s

attorney’s fees. The write application is denied in all

other respects, therefore, the portion of the trial

court’s February 4, 2015 judgment ordering relator to

reimburse respondent for costs incurred for the

genetic testing and for court costs remains in in

effect.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 31st day of July, 2015.

Signed:

Judge Robert M. Murphy

Judge Stephen J. Windhorst

Judge Hans J. Liljeberg

A true copy, Gretna, July 31, 2015

Signed:

Susan Buccholz, Deputy Clerk

Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit

•k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'krk'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k’k'k'k’k'k'kie’je'k’k'k'k'k'k'kicic'k'kie'kic'k'k

REHEARINGS REQUESTS

-k’k’k’k'k'k'k’k’k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k’kic'k'kic'k’k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'kic'k'k'k'k'kJc’k'k

06/29/2021 “See News Release028 for any

Concurrences and /or Dissents

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

LOUISIANA

IN CECELIA F. ABADIE NO. 2020-B-01276

IN RE: Cecelia F. Abadie-Applicant Other; Applying

for Rehearing, Office of Disciplinary Board

Number(s) 17-DB-056

June 29, 2021

Application for rehearing denied.

WJC

SJC

JTG

JBM

Weimer, C.J., would grant.

Hughes, J., would grant.

Griffin, J., would grant.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

June 29, 2021

Signed: Katie Marjanoic, Chief Deputy Clerk of

Court

For the Court

************************************

FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE

STATE OF LOUISIANA

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

POST OFFICE BOX 489

101 DERBIGNY STREET

GRETNA, LA 70054

www. fifthcircuit. or g

September 02, 2015

DEAR SIR/MADAM:

REHEARING WAS THIS DAY DENIED IN THE

CASE ENTITLED.

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS, SR.

VERSUS LATASHA JACKSON

NO: 15-0399

RMM

SJW

HUL

Signed: Cheryl Q. Landrieu, Clerk of Court

’k'k’k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'kJf'k'k'k'kic'k'klck’k'k'kjck’kicleik'k'k'k'k'k'k’k*

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

LOUISIANA

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS, SR.

VERSUS

LATASHA JACKSON

No. 2015-CJ-1622

IN RE: Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. - Plaintiff;

Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish

of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No.

711-419; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 15C-39;

September 4, 2015

Stay denied. Writ denied.

JTK

JLW

GGG

MRC

SJC

HUGHES, J., dissents and would grant for assigned

reasons.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

September 4, 2015

Signed^ Katie Marjanovic

Second Deputy Clerk of Court for the Court

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

2015-CJ-1633

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS, SR.

VERSUS

LATASHA JACKSON

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF

APPEAL, FIFTH CIRCUIT PARISH OF

JEFFERSON

Hughes, J., dissents and would grant the writ.

“Respectfully, this seemingly untimely review and

intervention of the Court of Appeal to decide an issue

not addressed in the trial court’s judgment, based on

the concept of a “judicial confession,” is clearly wrong

given the DNA evidence, the multiple pleadings and

amendments hereto, the stipulation of the parties,

and the inability of DCFS to produce an authentic

act of acknowledgment. This is not justice but

“judicial gotcha.” These matters are best left to the

trial court for trial on the merits and development of

a full record.

The continued efforts of DCFS given the DNA results

in the record are also questionable.”

'k'kif'k'kif'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'krk'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k’k'k'k'k'k'k

FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS

VERSUS LATASHA JACKSON

NO: 16-CA-w82

March 22, 2017

Susan Buchholz, First Deputy Clerk

ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING

Panel composed of Marc E. Johnson, Robert M.

Murphy, and Stephen J. Windhorst

REHEARING DENIED: MEJ, RMM, SJW

********************************************

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

LOUISIANA

NO. 2017-C-0652

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS

VERSUS LATASHA JACKSON

IN RE: Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. — Plaintiff!

Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish

of Jefferson, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No.

711-419: to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16CA-482.

September 6, 2017

Denied.

GGG

BJJ

JLM

MRC

SJC

JTG

HUGHES, J., would grant.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

September 6, 2017

Signed: Deputy Clerk of Court for the Court

*************************************

Case: 19-30112 Document 00515319261, filed 2/21/20

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-30112

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS, Plaintiff - Appellant

TIMOTHY O’ROURKE, Jefferson Parish Assistant

District Attorney, Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court;

ROBERT M. MURPHY, Former Judge of the

Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal; KRISTYL

TREADAWAY; BARRON BURMASTER, Judge

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Louisiana

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion 1/10.2020, 5 Cir

F.3d_J

Before DENNIS, GRAVES, and WILLETT, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM

(X) Treating the Petition for Rehearing En Banc as a

Petition for Panel Rehearing, the Petition for Panel

Rehearing is DENIED. No member of the panel nor

judge in regular active service of the court having

requested that the court be polled on Rehearing En

Banc (FED. R. APP. P. and 5th CIR. R. 35), the

Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.

( ) Treating the Petition for Rehearing En Banc as a

Petition for Panel Rehearing, the Petition for Panel

Rehearing is DENIED. The court having been polled

at the request of one of the members of the court and

a majority of the judges who are in regular active

service and not disqualified not having voted in favor

(Fed. R. App. P and 5th Cir. R. 35), the Petition for

Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

Signed: United States Circuit Judge

*Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt, did not participate in

the consideration of the rehearing en banc.

v) previous pleadings that raised the issues

ic'k'k'k'kic’kic'k'k'kicicie'kieic’kicic'krkie'k'kieit'k'k’kic'k'kific'kic'kitif'k’k'kif

SUPREME COURT

STATE OF LOUISIANA DOCKET NO 2020-B-1276

(Disciplinary)

IN RE: CECELIA F. ABADIE

LOUISIANA DISCIPLINARY BOARD

NUMBER 17-DB-056

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE

RECOMMENDATION TO THE LOUISIANA

SUPREME COURT

Cecelia F. Abadie # 19874,

20 White Drive

Hammond, Louisiana 70401

Phone & Fax 985-542-7859

cfabadie@gmail.com

December 21, 2020

P-4

Obviously, the appellate court’s ruling on legal

paternity was made without supervisory jurisdiction

over that issue. “Persons whose rights may be

affected by State action are entitled to be heard, and

in order that they may enjoy that right they must

first be notified. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.)

223, 17 L.Ed. 531 (1864)

p.ll

B. The Disciplinary Committee’s Report Refused to

Recognize Any of the Facts of the Defense to the

Charge of Impugning the Integrity of the Judge.

1. Pages 5-9 of respondent’s post -hearing

memorandum presented respondent’s defense to the

charge of impugning the integrity of the judge. It

cited the transcript of the hearing, and the court

records to support the facts. It is incredible that the

Committee Report ...actually claimed that

“Respondent did not present any proof of any

misconduct, and did not defend against the Rule 8.2

violation.” The Committee pretended it did not see

Judge Murphy’s ruling in the absence of supervisory

jurisdiction over the legal paternity issue. Willful

blindness was employed in the courts and

disciplinary system to protect Judge Murphy.

**************************** ****★*******★**★•*■***

2021 May 26 PM 2:19

Clerk of Court

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

IN RE: CECELIA ABADIE

NO. 2020-B-1276

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

APPLICATION FOR REHEARING

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

I was charged with impugning the integrity of Judge

Robert M Murphy, who as an appellate judge

intentionally ruled on an issue that had not been

decided in a trial. My allegation is proven in the

following court records that were accepted into

evidence.

ODC'8p The 24th JDC’s Judgment of February 4,

2015 decided that Mark Jenkins was not the

biological father ...based on DNA paternity test

results. [ODC put the other judgment of February 4,

2015 under this number.] Comment added.

R-8 Juvenile Court Minutes of April 27, 2015 ....

R-10 Transcript excerpts from Jefferson Parish

Juvenile Court, State of La., in the Interest of Mark

Jenkins Jr. v. Mark Jenkins Sr. No. 2003-NS-1371,

Sec. “C”, hearing of June 15, 2015....

R-ll Attorney Treadaway’s writ application from the

24th JDC’s February 4, 2015 Judgment was filed on

June 23, 2015 ....

ODC_14b Fifth Circuit Judge Murphy wrote the

Disposition of July 31, 2015 ....

CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE IS REQUIRED

FOR DUE PROCESS (page 4)

A judgment on the merits is “a judgment rendered

through analysis and adjudication of the factual

issues presented.” Barron’s Law Dictionary, 2nd.

Edition, 1984, Steven H. Gifis, p. 252. Adjudication

is “the determination of a controversy and a

pronouncement of a judgment based on the evidence

presented.” Id. p. 11.

A rehearing should be granted because the

“judgment,” rendered by this court is not an

adjudication. If my exhibits submitted into evidence,

and referenced in my brief, are not relevant to

determine whether I supported my allegation with

objective and reasonable evidence, then the court

should be willing to discuss the exhibits and explain

why they are insufficient. To hide the court records I

put into evidence by pronouncing them “not

evidence” is arbitrary and capricious. It is the

antithesis of due process of law, and amounts to

suppression of evidence.

A discussion of the exhibits that I put into evidence

allows the court to explain how those exhibits are not

relevant to the allegation of collusion. Of course, the

court records conclusively prove that Judge Murphy

violated supervisory subject matter jurisdiction.

Judge Burmaster and attorney Treadaway may have

been unwilling participants.

CONCLUSION

Finding a way to avoid or refuse to consider the

evidence is violation of due process of law. I was

eager to present my case to this court, because the

Committee and Board avoided the evidence.

Considering the objective evidence provides support

for the reasonable allegation I made. Furthermore,

the allegation was made in a private letter to

opposing attorneys and not to anyone else. My efforts

to obtain nullification were justified in view of the

unjust ruling made without jurisdiction. I

respectfully ask for rehearing, (p.8)

s/Cecelia Abadie

Cecelia Farace Abadie, La. Bar No. 19874

20 White Drive, Hammond, La. 70401

985-542-7859 phone & fax

cfabadie@gmail.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I served Chief Disciplinary Counsel

with this application for rehearing on May 26, 2015

by faxing it to 225-293-3300.

s/Cecelia Abadie

Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board 2019 Aug 12

pm 2:11

LOUISIANA ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD

IN RE: CECELIA F. ABADIE, DOCKET NO. 17-DB56

RESPONDENT CECELIA FARACE ABADIE POST

-HEARING MEMORANDUM

P-5

On October 17, 2014, Jenkins filed a Rule to Show

Cause why the birth certificate should not be

corrected. The rule asked for admission of the

paternity test results and a ruling that Jenkins was

not the father based on the test results. (ODC-7F)

Treadaway filed an exception of prescription to

rebutting the presumption of paternity created by

the birth certificate. She claimed the right to rebut

had prescribed ten years after the birth certificate

was signed in 1997. (ODC-7H) Respondent argued,

and it was settled law, that the right to rebut the

birth certificate was not subject to prescription,

citing Rousseve v. Jones et al, 704 So.2d (La. 1997)

See attachment “C” ... After the stipulation,

Treadaway was ordered to explain in writing within

30 days why Jenkins was the legal father, as the

Minutes of April 27, 2015 Prove. (R-8)....

Treadaway’s memorandum did not present an

argument for legal paternity at the June 15, 2015

hearing .... She knew legal paternity would not be

decided in juvenile court. (Tr. 51. L.2-9) Instead, she

and Judge Burmaster both stated repeatedly that

Judge Steib had decided legal paternity, R-10, ...)

and that the request for review was pending in the

fifth circuit. Attempts to correct them were ignored.

Those lies were to give Judge Burmaster an excuse

for not deciding legal paternity. ... Seven days after

the hearing Treadaway filed her application for writ.

...Her assignment of error stated: “The district court

erred when it overruled the exception of prescription

filed by Latasha Jackson and found Mark Anthony

Jenkins Sr. to not be the legal father of the minor

child.”

...Treadaway’s lie in the assignment of errors was

what Judge Murphy needed. It gave the appearance

of supervisory jurisdiction. Murphy ignored the court

record that showed only biological paternity had

been before the trial court; the rule to Show Cause,

(ODC-7F), the Exception of Prescription, (ODC-7H),

and the Judgment of Feb. 4, 2015, (ODC-8P).....

Respondent sent the draft letter ( ODC’IA) to

opposing counsel that cited her concerns about the

legal machinations because the actions taken by the

Juvenile Court judge and the appellant judge flew in

the face of due process for her client. p!7

If respondent had accepted the private reprimand (R21, not in ODC exhibits) to end the disciplinary

process, she would have undercut the truth of her

client’s allegations against Judge Murphy, Judge

Burmaster, Treadaway, and O’Rourke in a suit for

their violation of due process of law. P.19

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Cecelia Farace Abadie

Respondent, La Bar No. 19874

Received, Date 04/10/2018 By. Amy D. Panepinto

LOUISIANA ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD

IN RE: CECELIA F. ABADIE, (Bar No. 19874)

DOCKET NO. 17-DB-56

(ODC Investigative No. 0033656)

TIME LINE

II. JUDGE ROBERT MURPHY DECIDED THE

ISSUE OF LEGAL PATERNITY WITHOUT

JURISDICTION TO DO SO; IGNORED THE LAW

AND DEPRIVED MARK JENKINS OF HIS

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HAVE HIS

EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT DECIDING

LEGAL PATERNITY. P.10

4. The disposition violated Mark Jenkins’ Fourteenth

Amendment right to be heard when it decided legal

paternity that was not in the scope of review of the

February 4, 2015 Judgment. P.14

s/Cecelia Abadie

[Because of the extensive history of the Jenkins case,

respondent put the timeline first and continued into

the argument.] added by respondent

Ik*********************************************

Filed June 30, 2015

FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

DOCKET NO 15-C399

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS SR., Plaintiff Respondent

VERSUS LATASHA JACKSON, DefendantApplicant

A CIVIL PROCEEDING

OPPOSITION TO LATASHA JACKSON’S

APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW OF THE

DECISION OF THE 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COURT

JUDGE RAYMOND S. STEIB, DOCKET NO 711419

RENDERED IN OPEN COURT ON JANUARY 21

2015 AND SIGNED ON FEBRUARY 4, 2015.

PLAINTIFF MARK ANTHONY JENKINS SR.’S

OPPOSITIION TO APPLICATION FOR

SUPERVISORY WRITS

5. Defendant is asking this Court to decide de novo

the legal father issue which she and DCFS have

deliberately avoided addressing in a lower court.

The District Court judgment dealt only with the

biological father issue.

Filed 6/30/15

************************************************

Appeal for the Fifth Circuit

Filed Mar 09 2017

Cheryl Quirk, Clerk

COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

DOCKET NO. 16-CA-482

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS, SR., PLAINTIFF &

APPELLANT

VERSUS

LATASHA JACKSON, DEFENDANT & APPELLEE

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT’S

REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM

GRANTING OF EXCEPTIONS & DISMISSAL OF

PETITION IN 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON,

STATE OF LOUISIANA

THE HONORABLE RAYMOND S. STEIB

PRESIDING

DIVISION “A” DOCKET NUMBER 711-419

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS

20 White Drive

Hammond, Louisiana 70401

Telephone & Facsimile: 985-542-7859

May it please the Court:

The Disposition handed down on January 22, 2017

totally ignored, and failed to address, consider or

decide the issue, presented in this appeal, of whether

this court denied plaintiff his civil right to be heard.

Plaintiffs appeal argued that by improperly taking

up the legal paternity issue that was not in the scope

of review of the February 4, 2015 Judgment, this

court denied Mark Jenkins his civil right to have

material evidence before this court improperly took

up the legal paternity issue and ruled “de novo” on

whether there was a signed authentic act of

acknowledgment, which it discretely called an

“acknowledgment of legal paternity,” it “fail(ed) to

give the litigants notice of its sua sponte

determination or to provide the litigants with an

opportunity to be heard on the issue.” Wooley v.

Lucksinger, LEXIS 1863, 14 So.3d 311, 364 (La.

2008). Fair notice to the plaintiff in the instant case,

in which the defendant lied in her Assignment of

Issues, had to be implemented by this court by

confining its review to the issues contained in the

Judgment of February 4, 2015. Respondent was

blindsided, and notice to the Court in the Opposition

Brief and in the Request for Reconsideration was

ignored. As alleged in the Petition, denial of the right

to be heard is a sufficient basis for nullification of the

Fifth Circuit’s rulings. (16 CA 482, v.l, p.131). The

Supreme Court held:

“Even had there been justification for the court of

appeal’s re-determination of the choice of law

decision, the appellate court committed error in

failing to give the litigants notice of its sua sponte

determination or to provide the litigants with an

opportunity to be heard on the issue. HN 175, at 364.

The court of appeal’s failure to provide notice to the

parties was especially egregious, ...” Id. at 335.

When Wooley was brought up in argument on May

16, 2016, the district court opined, “You had notice.

In fact, it was your appeal.” (16 CA 482, vol.l, p. 241,

1. 4-6) That was not correct. The record clearly shows

defendant took a writ application from the February

4, 2015 Judgment. Defendant misrepresented the

contents of the Judgment by listing legal paternity as

an issue. Even though the record showed, and

plaintiff argued in two briefs to the court, that those

issues were not contained in the Judgment, this

court proceeded to improperly take up those issues

on what it knew was an incomplete record.

“Scope of review” is a limitation on this court’s

supervisory authority designed to protect igants from

what happened in this case. The court violated the

jurisprudential rule and that allowed it to violate

Mark Jenkins’ civil right.

Scope of review on a supervisory writ limits the

subject matter over which this court has jurisdiction.

Scope of review gives protection to the civil rights of

the parties. Simply taking up an issue sua sponte

when it is not in the scope of review is egregious and

a basis for annulment of the judgment as provided in

C.C.P. Art. 2002 A( 3). Plaintiff used the term

“subject matter jurisdiction” as it applies to scope of

review. Clearly plaintiff was not discussing the

subject matter jurisdictional limitation provided in

La. Const, art. V, sec 10. Supreme Court

jurisprudence also puts jurisdictional limits on

supervisory review.

CONCLUSION

The court denied plaintiff the opportunity to present

his evidence to this court, which evidence was in the

Juvenile Court where legal paternity was set to be

decided before the issue was usurped by this court.

Respectfully submitted,

s/Cecelia Abadie_________________

Cecelia Farace Abadie, Bar. No. 19874

20 White Drive, Hammond, La. 70401

Phone and fax: 985-542-7859

CERTIFICATION

I certify that a copy of this pleading was either

mailed or faxed to the following on the 8th day of

March, 2017.

s/Cecelia Abadie

Attorney Willie M. Zanders, Sr.

For Latasha Jackson Tuchson

25912 Stonehenge Drive

Denham Springs, LA 70726

Amanda L. Calogero

Assistant District Attorney

Juvenile Court,46 Gretna Blvd., Harvey, Louisiana

***************

Case 2:l8-cv-03122BWA-JVM

Document 1 Filed 03/22/18 Page 1 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

Mark Anthony Jenkins, Plaintiff

Versus

Civil Docket No.

Robert M. Murphy

2:l8-cv- 03122

Former judge of the

Sect.

Louisiana Fifth Circuit

Judge: NJB

And Timothy O’Rourke,

Jefferson Parish ADA

Defendants

MAG: JVM

Attorney for Plaintiff

Mark Anthony Jenkins

Cecelia Farace Abadie

20 White Drive

Hammond, LA 70401

985-542-7859 phone & fax

cfabadie@gmail.com

COMPLAINT

35. ...Her [Treadaway’s] lie was needed to give a

semblance of supervisory jurisdiction, (clarification

added)

40. ...Judge Murphy had a duty to rule within the

limits of supervisory jurisdiction to afford Jenkins

the right to be heard......

42. ...In this situation, the District Court had not

ruled on whether there was an authentic act of

acknowledgment for there to be an error of fact.

52. Judge Murphy saw to it that the issues presented

in plaintiffs writ application were not reviewed. The

Disposition of February 22, 2017, dodged the issue of

lack of jurisdiction by claiming the Fifth Circuit had

jurisdiction over legal paternity on July 31, 2015

because it reviews ruling of lower courts which have

jurisdiction over “civil matters including family and

juvenile court matters in La. Const, art. V, sec. 10.”

That is not subject matter jurisdiction for

supervisory review.

55.e It refused to recognize that on writ applications,

litigants are given notice and the opportunity to be

heard by the court’s adherence to the rules on

supervisory jurisdiction and scope of review.

...V. DAMAGES

77. As a direct and proximate result of the actions

described above, Mark Anthony Jenkins has incurred

damages including:...

2) violation of his right under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution to be given the opportunity to be heard

in the determination of legal paternity.

Respectfully submitted,

“s/ Cecelia Farace Abadie”

Cecelia Farace Abadie, La. Bar No. 19874

FILE FOR RECORD JUNE 30, 2015,

(Respondents note: The Complaint was considered an

attack on Judge Murphy by the Supreme Court.)

******************************************

ESSENTIAL MATERIAL

CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA

Section 2. OF THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

Art. 203 Methods of making acknowledgment,' legal

effect

The acknowledgment of an illegitimate child

shall be made by a declaration executed before a

notary public, in the presence of two witnesses, by

the father and mother or either of them, or it may be

made in the registering of the birth or baptism of

such child.

(l) An acknowledgment or declaration by

notarial act is deemed to be a legal finding of

paternity and is sufficient to establish an obligation

to support an illegitimate child without the necessity

of obtaining a judgment of paternity.

An acknowledgment by registry creates a

presumption of paternity which may be rebutted if

the alleged father proves by a preponderance of the

evidence facts which reasonably indicates he is not

the father, provided such facts are susceptible of

independent verification or of corroboration by

physical data or evidence.

Amended by Acts 1995, No. 425 Sec.l; Acts 1997, No.

1244, sec.l, Repealed by Acts 2005

************************************************

24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

PARISH OF JEFFERSON

STATE OF LOUISIANA

NO. 711-419

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS SR.

VERSUS

LATASHA JACKSON

Filed for Record Oct. 17, 2014

RULE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PLAINTIFF'S

NAME SHOULD NOT BE REMOVED FROM THE

BIRTH CERTIFCATE AND WHY AN EXPERT

SHOULD NOT BE APPOINTED TO CALCULATE

PROBABILITY OF PATERNITY

NOW INTO COURT undersigned counsel

comes MARK ANTHONY JENKINS, plaintiff in this

suit for damages for paternity fraud, and on

suggesting that:

Plaintiff learned that the Department of Child

and Family Services receives copies of all executed

hospital-based acknowledgments of paternity from

the Department of Vital Records since the hospitalbased acknowledgment program was initiated.

Juvenile Court ordered DCFS, to produce their

copy of the Jenkins' acknowledgment to see if it was

in authentic form or not. It also ordered Jackson's

attorney to present a signed birth certificate.

In the hearing on September 15, 2014,

Assistant District Attorney John Fitzmorris stated

that DCFS does not have a copy of any act of

acknowledgment of paternity signed by plaintiff.

4. Since there is no authentic act of acknowledg

ment the Fifth Circuit's decision that the prescriptive

period of R.S.9:406 applied to an authentic act of

acknowledgment signed in 1997, has no legal effect

on this suit or the one in Juvenile Court.

5. Latasha Jackson's attorney presented a signed

birth certificate and Juvenile Court ruled that the

birth certificate is a legitimate acknowledgment of

paternity, which it does not have authority to revoke.

6. This court has jurisdiction to order the removal of

plaintiffs name as father of defendant's son from the

birth certificate and there is no prescriptive period to

revoke acknowledgment by signing the birth

certificate.

7. C.C. Art. 203, which was in effect in 1997, when

the birth certificate was signed, provides that

acknowledgment by registry of the birth certificate

creates a "presumption of paternity" which "may be

rebutted by proof that he is not the father by

physical data or evidence."

8. The DNA Report, ordered by this court and filed in

the record as required by statute, shows that Mark

Anthony Jenkins cannot be the father of Latasha

Jackson's son. Therefore, under former C.C. Art. 203

and the jurisprudence interpreting it, the birth

certificate had no legal effect and the presumption of

paternity is rebutted.

9. Mark Anthony Jenkins paid all costs of the DNA

test, and is entitled to receive reimbursement after

judgment is rendered on paternity.

10. The witness, who testified that he learned that

Mark Jenkins was not Mark Jr.'s father from Samuel

Scott, can testify that Scott said Jackson told him he

was the father when her son was an infant.

11. That hearsay statement can come in under an

exception to hearsay when the statement is made by

the father of the child12. Genetic information on the Jackson-Jenkins DNA

report combined with a DNA Report on Samuel Scott

in the record of the Juvenile Court, case number 12

NS 1421 entitled, "In the Interest of Tyron Houston,

Minor Child of Shante Houston" would allow an

expert to compute the probability of Scott's paternity

of Jackson's son.

13. A layman can compare the allele sizes of Mark

Anthony Jenkins Jr. with those of his mother and

those of Samuel Scott and see that every allele size of

Mark Anthony Jenkins Jr. is found in either his

mother's profile, Samuel Scott's or both. However, if

the court wants the exact probability of paternity, an

expert must be appointed.

14. Both DNA reports were produced by DNA

Diagnostics Center (DDC) by court order. DDC would

compute the probability of paternity using Scott's

DNA information, which is in the public record at

Juvenile Court, if DCFS gives authorization to use

the Houston-Scott report.

15. Plaintiff served a Request for Production on

DCFS on March 14, 2014 requesting that DCFS sign

an enclosed authorization for DDC to use Samuel

Scott's DNA Report to calculate the probability of his

paternity, and it refused.

MARK ANTHONY JENKNS moves that Jackson

and the Department of Child and Family Ser-vices

show cause why; l) the DNA Test Results for the

parties should not be admitted into evidence, and

why the birth certificate should not be denied legal

effect and declared rebutted; 2) why Mark Anthony

Jenkins Jr. 's birth certificate should not be altered

to show Mark Anthony Jenkins is not his father; 3)

why Latasha Jackson hould not pay all costs for the

DNA testing as provided in La. R.S. 9:371.1 by a date

set by this court; 4) why the court should not order

DCFS to authorize use of the DNA information on

Samuel Scott, of order DDC or another expert to use

the DNA information of Samuel Scott, which is in the

public record, to calculate the probability of

paternity; and 8) why DCFS should not be ordered to

pay attorney fees and costs for this rule to compel

them to authorize the calculation.

s/Cecelia F. Abadie Cecelia Farace Abadie,

Bar #19874

Attorney for Mark Anthony Jenkins

20 White Drive, Hammond, LA 70401

Phone 985-542-7859

CERTIFCATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this Rule to Show Cause was

faxed to both opposing counsel at 504-837-5411 and

504-364-3559 this day of October, 2014.

s/Cecelia F. Abadie

Please serve:

Department of Child and Family Services

Latasha Jackson

through attorney of record

Kristyl R. Treadaway

3445 North Causeway Blvd, Suite 510

Metairie, LA 70002

and

Timothy O'Rourke

1546 Gretna Blvd.

Harvey, LA 70058

24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

PARISH OF JEFFERSON

STATE OF LOUISIANA

NO. 711419, DIV. "A”

MARK ANNONY JENKINS SR.

VERSUS

LATASHA JACKSON

ORDER

Considering the above and foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED THAT Latasha Jackson and the

Department of Child and Family Services show cause

on the 18th day of November, 2014 at 9 o’clock a.m.

why. l) the DNA Test Report of the parties should

not be admitted into evidence, and why the signing

of Mark Anthony Jenkins Jr.’s birth certificate by

Mark Anthony Jenkins should not be declared to

have no legal effect, and the presumption of

paternity rebutted; 2) why Mark Anthony Jenkins

should not be found not to be the father of Mark

Anthony Jenkins Jr.; 3) why the birth certificate

should not be altered to show that Mark Anthony

Jenkins is not the father of Mark Anthony Jenkins

Jr. ; 4) why Latasha Jackson should not be ordered to

reimburse Mark Anthony Jenkins for all costs of the

DNA test! 5) why DCFS should not be ordered to sign

an authorization allowing DNA Diagnostics Center

to use the Houston-Scott DNA Report, in the public

record at Juvenile Court, to compute the probability

that Samuel Scott is the father of Mark Anthony

Jenkins Jr., or the Court should not order DNA

Diagnostics Center or another expert to use the

Houston-Scott report to compute the probability of

paternity, 6) why DCFS should not be ordered to pay

attorney fees and costs for this rule to show cause.

day of October, 2014.

Gretna, Louisiana, this.

S/ RAYMOND S. STEIB, JR., JUDGE

Please serve:

Department of Child and Family Services

Through attorney of record:

Timothy O’Rourke

1546 Gretna Blvd.

Harvey, LA 70058

Latasha Jackson, through

Kristyl R.Treadaway

3445 North Causeway Blvd., Suite 510

Metairie, LA 70002

True copy of the original on file in this office

Giselle Le Buie

Deputy Clerk

24th Judicial District Court

Parish of Jefferson

********************************************

FILE FOR RECORD 2015 FEB 24 AM 11:18

Deputy clerk, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, LA

24TH JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

PARISH OF JEFFERSON

STATE OF LOUISIANA

NO. 711-419, DIVISION

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS

VERSUS

LATASHA JACKSON

FILED___________________

MOTION AND ORDER FOR APPEAL

NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel,

comes Latasha Tuckson, formerly Latasha Jackson,

who respectfully represents:

On February 4, 2015, this Honorable Court

signed a judgment denying the Exception of

Prescription filed by Latasha Tuckson, finding that

Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. was not the father of

Mark Anthony Jenkins Jr., and ordering Latasha

Tuckson pay for Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr.’s

attorney fees and costs incurred to prove paternity.

Latasha Tuckson respectfully disagrees with

the Court’s February 4, 2015 Judgment. Accordingly,

she desires to suspensively appeal said Judgment. ...

Respectfully submitted,

SALLY & SALLY

Attorneys at Law

By^ s/ Kristyl R. Treadawy

****************************************

JUVENILE COURT

FOR THE PARISH OF JEFFERSON

STATE OF LOUISIANA

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN &

FAMILY SERVICES

IN THE INTEREST OF MARK JENKINS, JR.

V. MARK JENKINS, SR.

2003-NS-1371, SEC. C

STATUS HEARING

TESTIMONY AND PROCEEDINGS TAKEN

BEFORE THE HONORABLE BARRON C.

BURMASTER, JUDGE, PRESIDING IN THE 15TH

DAY OF JUNE, 2015

APPEARANCES;

Cecelia Abadie, Esq. for the Defendant

Kristyl Treadaway, Esq. for the Recipient

Tim O’Rourke, Esq. Assistant District Attorney

LeKita Robertson, Esq. Assistant District Attorney

page 4

MS TREADAWAY:

“It would be our position, Your Honor, that since

Judge Steib’s finding that Mr. Jenkins is not the

legal father of the child and that judgment is on

appeal, --and like I asked in my memo that the Court

ordered that I submit—I would ask that the Court

not do anything on this case until the appellate court

review of Judge Steib’s ruling is complete. Because

as the Court previously stated that if the Fifth

Circuit overturns Judge Steib’s ruling, he’s still going

to be the legal father and that child support is still

going to be a valid child support order”.

THE COURT: “Okay.”

...........page 21

THE COURT:

“See, I don’t have my whole court record because it’s

on-- the Fifth Circuit has asked for our

records..................... ”

April 12, 2018

To Whom It May Concern,

Attached, please find the requested transcript of the

June 15, 2015 hearing in case number 2003-NS-1371.

This transcription was prepared by Taylor C. Jobes,

Court reporter for Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court.

This transcription is unable to be certified at this

time, specifically, the language of such a certification

states that the court reporter is the officer before

whom the testimony was taken. Due to the fact that

this hearing did not take place before me, Taylor C.

Jobes, and the reporter present at the time of the

hearing is no longer employed in the capacity of court

reporter with the Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court

system. A certified copy of the transcript is not

available.

Sincerely,

s/ Taylor C. Jobes

Court Reporter, Section C

Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court

Rll

FILE FOR RECORD

2015 JUN 23 PM 3:32

DEPUTY CLERK

FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIFTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

15-C-399

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS, SR., PlaintiffRespondent

Versus

LATASHA JACKSON, Defendant-Applicant

A CIVIL PROCEEDING

APPLICATION OF LATASHA JACKSON, FOR

SUPERVISORY WRIT OF REVIEW OF THE

DECISION OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL

DISTRICT COURT

JUDGE RAYMOND S. STEIB,

DOCKET NO. 711-419, RENDERED IN OPEN

COURT ON JANUARY 21, 2015 AND SIGNED

FEBRUARY 4, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

Kristyl R. Treadaway, (#32648)

ISSUES AND QUESTIONS OF LAW

Did the Trial Court err when it found Mark

Anthony Jenkins, Sr.’s cause of action not prescribed

and found Mark Anthony Jenkins Sr. to not be the

legal father of the minor child?

Did the Court properly order that Latasha

Jackson reimburse Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. all

costs incurred in obtaining the DNA test, including

attorney’s fees and court costs?

ASSIGNMENT OR SPECIFICATION OF ERROR

The District Court erred when it overruled the

Exception of Prescription filed by Latasha Jackson

and found Mark Anthony Jenkins Sr. to not be the

legal father of the minor child.

The District Court erred when it ordered that

Latasha Jackson reimburse Mark Anthony Jenkins,

Sr. all costs incurred in obtaining the DNA test,

including attorney’s fees and court costs.

*************************************************

24TH JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT

PARISH OF JEFFERSON

STATE OF LOUSIANA

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS, SR. v. LATASHA

JACKSON, NO. 711-419, DIV. A

PROCEEDINGS

MOTION HEARING

Held on Monday, May 16, 2016

Before the Honorable Raymond S. Steib, Jr.

Judge Presiding in Gretna, Louisiana

APPEARANCES;

CECELIA F. ABADIE, ESQ.

Representing Mark Anthony Jenkins

KRISTYL R. TREADAWAY

Representing Latasha Jackson

Reported by:

Karen H. Frazer, CCR, CDR, OCR

Certified Court Reporter

Page 21. Line 1

“Your Honor, you did not decide legal paternity in

that judgment. You decided biological paternity. And

it is obvious because the decision on paternity was

based on the D.N.A. report.”

THE COURT

“Okay. But what they were looking at was the

prescriptive period to apply....”

REPORTER’S PAGE

I, KAREN H. FRAZER, Certified Court Reporter in

and for the State of Louisiana, the officer, as defined

in Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and /or Article 1434(B) of the Louisiana Code of Civil

Procedure, before whom this proceeding was taken,

do hereby state on the Record: That due to the

interaction in the spontaneous discourse of this

proceeding, dashes (-)have been used to indicate

pauses, changes in thought, and /or talkovers; that

same is the proper method for a Court Reporter’s

transcription of proceedings , and that the dashes(-)

do not indicate that words or phrases have been left

out of this transcript; That any words and /or names

which could not be verified through reference

material have been denoted with the phrase”(spelled

phonetically).”

s/Karen H. Frazer

Karen H. Frazer, CCR, CDR, OCR

************************************

Case 2G8-CV- 03122-BWA-JVM Document 58 Filed

11/27/18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS v. ROBERT M.

MURPHY, CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-3122, sec. M(l)

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed

by defendant Barron Burmaster, to which plaintiff

Mark Anthony Jenkins responds in opposition, and

in support of which Burmaster replies, a Motion to

Dismiss filed by defendant Kristyl Treadaway, to

which Jenkins responds in opposition, and in support

of which Treadaway replies, a Motion to Dismiss

filed by defendant Robert M. Murphy to which

Jenkins responds in opposition, and in support of

which Murphy relies, and in further opposition to

which Jenkins has filed a sur-reply, and a Motion to

Dismiss filed by defendant Timothy O’Rourke, to

which Jenkins responds in opposition, and in support

of which O’Rourke replies. Having considered the

parties’ memoranda and the applicable law the Court

issues this Order & Reasons.

BACKGROUND

This action is a collateral attack on a state court

judgment. The pertinent facts and procedural history

of this case were recited in the Louisiana court of

appeals for the fifth circuit in an appeal stemming

from the underlying state-court litigation

[ “BACKGROUND” consisting of 8 pages is taken

word- for-word from Louisiana Fifth Circuit, Mark

Anthony Jenkins Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, 216 So.3d

1082,1082-89 (La. App), writ denied, 224 So.3d 984

(La. 2017).] Respondent’s note.

when it affirmed the state district court’s dismissal of

the petition to nullify the ruling on legal paternity of

July 31, 2015 legal paternity in its disposition

On March 22, 2018, Jenkins filed this action in

federal court again arguing that the Louisiana court

of appeal for the fifth circuit lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to determine legal paternity in its July

31, 2015 order regarding Jackson’s writ application.

Jenkins names as defendants'- O’Rourke, an assistant

district attorney involved in the state-court

litigation; Murphy, a judge on the Louisiana court of

appeal for the fifth circuit; Treadaway, Jackson’s

attorney in the state-court litigation; and Burmaster,

* a judge on the 24th Judicial District Court Parish

of Jefferson, State of Louisiana. [ *Burmaster is a

judge in Juvenile Court. This interjection was made

by Respondent. ] Jenkins alleges that the defendant

conspired to deprive him of his rights secured by the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

Constitution of the United States of America by

procuring the July 31, 2015 order from the Louisiana

court of appeal when that court allegedly lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the issue of

paternity. Jenkins asserts that his claims are

brought under 42 U.S.C. sections 1893, 1985, 1986,

and 1988, and that he seeks a judgment that the

July 31, 2015 ruling of the state court is null and

void for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction, and

monetary damages.

II.

PENDING MOTIONS

Burmaster, Treadaway and O’Rourke filed motions

to dismiss, arguing that this court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction over Jenkins’ action by operation

of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The defendants

argue that Jenkins is a “state-court loser” who filed

this action in federal court to collaterally attack a

state-court judgment. Jenkins argues that his claims

are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

because the state-court judgment he attacks, the

July 31, 2015 order issued by the Louisiana court of

appeal for the fifth circuit, is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

permits a “party to challenge the subject matter

jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case.”

Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th

Cir. 2001); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “lack of

subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one

of three instances: (l) the complaint alone! (2) the

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts

evidenced by in the record! or (3) the complaint

supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s

resolution of disputed facts.” Id. The party seeking

jurisdiction bears the burden of proof that

jurisdiction does in fact exist. Id.

...In this case, because it is clear that the July 31,

2015 order Jenkins questions is not void for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, it isn’t necessary now for

this court to deduce the Fifth Circuit’s position on

the void ab initio exception......

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of November

2018.

s/ BARRY W. ASHE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

********************************************

Filed January 10, 2020

Lyle Cayce, Clerk

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-30112

D.C. Docket No. 2:18-CV-30112

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS, plaintiff-Appellant v.

TIMOTHY O’ROURKE, Jefferson Parish Assistant

District Attorney, ROBERT M. MURPHY, Former

Judge of the La. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal.

KRISTYL TREADAWAY; BARRON BURMASTER,

Judge, Defendants- Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Louisiana

Before DENNIS, GRAVES, and WILLETT, Circuit

Judges

JUDGMENT

This cause was considered on the record on appeal

and the briefs on file. It is ordered and adjudged that

the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellant pay to

Appellees the costs on appeal to be taxed by the

Clerk of this Court.

Certified as a true copy issued as the mandate on

May 2. 2020. Attest: Lyle W. Cayce, Clerk, U.S.

Court of Appeals. Fifth Circuit

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Filed January 10, 2020

Lyle Cayce, Clerk

No. 19-30112

D.C. Docket No. 2:18-CV-3122

MARK ANTHONY JENKINS, plaintiff-Appellant v.

TIMOTHY O’ROURKE, Jefferson Parish Assistant

District Attorney, ROBERT M. MURPHY, Former

Judge of the La. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal.

KRISTYL TREADAWAY; BARRON BURMASTER,

Judge, Defendants- Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Louisiana

Before DENNIS, GRAVES, and WILLETT, Circuit

Judges

PER CURIAM *

Appellant Mark Anthony Jenkins brought suit in

Louisiana state court in 2012 contesting his

paternity of Mark Anthony Jenkins Jr. and seeking,

inter alia, nullification of an earlier child support

judgment and removal of his

(*Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5 the court has

determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under limited

circumstance set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4) emphasis

added.

name from Mark Anthony Jenkins, Jr.’s birth

certificate. Jenkins v. Jackson, 216 So. 3d 1082,

1084-86 (La. Ct. App. 2017). In July 2015, the

Louisiana appellate court found that Appellant had

judicially confessed that “he signed both the birth

certificate and an acknowledgment of paternity at

the time of [Mark Anthony Jenkins, Jr.’s] birth in

1997”, such that Appellant’s “cause of action to

revoke his acknowledgment of legal paternity has

prescribed.” In a later appeal, the state appellate

court reaffirmed this ruling, and noted it had

jurisdiction to issue the earlier ruling pursuant to its

supervisory jurisdiction over district courts within its

circuit. Jenkins, 216 So.3d 1090 (“because the 24th

Judicial District Court is a district court within our

circuit, this court has the supervisory jurisdiction to

render determinations relevant to Mr. Jenkins’

petition, which included the egal and biological

paternity of [Mark Anthony Jenkins Jr.] “); LA.

CONST. ART. V, sec. 10 9[A] court of appeal ....has

supervisory jurisdiction over cases which arise

within its circuit.”)

Appellant then filed this federal lawsuit

against an assistant district attorney involved in the

underlying litigation, a judge on the state appellate

court, his ex-wife’s attorney, and the state district

court judge, arguing the state appellate court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to determine his legal

paternity and seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. sections

1983, 1985,1986, and 1988. The district court

dismisses Appellant’s action under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), holding that it lacked

jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

because (l) Appellant lost in the state court.” (2) he

alleges injuries caused by that judgment,” (3) that

judgment “was rendered before [appellant] filed this

action,” and (4) Appellant “specifically askes this

[C]ourt to reverse that judgment.” See Exxon Mobile

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284

(2005). The Rooker -Feldman doctrine applies to

“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered

before the district court proceedings commenced and

inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.” The district court further determined

that the state appellate court had jurisdiction to

determine that the state appellate court had

jurisdiction to determine Appellant’s legal paternity.

After careful review of the record in this case,

full consideration of the parties’ briefs, and the

district court’s thorough order and reasons, we affirm

the district court’s judgment for essentially the

reason stated by that court. AFFIRMED.

*************************************************

Page 1

COURT OF LOUISIANA

LOUISIANA ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD

SUPREME OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL

In the matter of Cecelia Farace Abadie

Docket No. 17-DB-056

ieicic

The hearing in the above-entitled matter

commenced, pursuant to notice herein, reported at

Associated Reporters, Inc. 2431 South Acadian

Thruway, Suite 550, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808,

on Friday, May 31, 2019, beginning at 9:05 a.m.

Page 20

RESPONDENT EXHIBIT BINDER PAGE 25

R.l La. R.S. 40:46.ID “Hospital-based paternity

Program;

R.2 La C.C. Art. 203 Formal Acknowledgments;

R.3 La. R.S. 46: 236.1.2 “Family and child support

programs! responsibilities:” to establish paternity!

R.4 La. R.S. 46: 236.1.7 liability for gross

negligence or recklessness, wanton, or intentional

misconduct;

R.5 Hearing Officer Recommendation and Order

for Support, 1997;

R.6 Letter f. DHH

ODC-5A Petition for Revocation of Acknowledgment

Page 21

et cetera!

R.7 DNS Report; (DNA Report) correction by

respondent

R.7A Discovery;

ODC-7f Jenkins’ Rule to Show Cause!

ODC'7h Treadaway’s Exception of Prescription!

ODC'8p District Court Judgment of 2/4/2015

ODC’8j Treadaway’s Brief for Appeal;

ODC-15e Order of Fifth Circuit denying appeal;

allowing writ app.!

R. 8 (page 277) Juvenile Court Minutes 4/27/2015

ODC_8m Motion to Amend a Third Time;

Correspondence of 5/28/2015

R-9

ODC-13p Treadaway’s Memo

ODC-13n Motion to Return the Record;

R.10 Transcript of 6/15/2015 hearing in Juvenile

Court, excerpts!

ODC_13q Juvenile Court Minutes 6/15/2015;

R.ll Treadaway’s Writ Application, filed

6/23/2015

Louisiana Constitution Art. 5, sec. 10;,

R.12

Uniform Rules of Louisiana - Courts of

R.13

Appeal, Rule 1-3

Gonzales v. Xerox Corp, 320 So.2d

R.14

163,165, (La. 1975)

Wooley v. Lucksinger et al., 61 So.3d 507

R.15

(La. 04/01/11) Lexis 706

Jenkin’s Opposition brief;

R.16

Page 22

0DO14b Disposition of 7/31/2015

R.17

Request for Reconsideration/ Rehearing ;

ODC-17b App. for Certiorari;

R.17

(page 465) Justice Hughes’ Dissent;

ODC'8r Motion to dismiss suit against DCFS;

R-18

Pages from transcript of 5/16/2016;

R.-19

Subpoena to Judge Burmaster

R-20

Letter from DA;

Offer of admonition;

R-21

Character references

R-22

.... Page 312

s/Donna Duet Hagen, C.C.R.

Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board

Office of the Disciplinary Counsel

4000S. Sherwood Forest Blvd., Suite 607

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70816

(225)-293-3900. 1-800-326-8022. Fax (225) 293-3300

December 13, 2016

Via Certified Mail: 9214 7969 0099 9790 1611 9820

Cecelia Farace Abadie

20 White Drive

Hammond, LA 70401

Re; Respondent- Cecelia Farace Abadie

Complainant^ Kristyl R. Treadaway

ODC File No.: 0033656

Dear Ms. Abadie:

We have concluded our investigation into the

above referenced matter. Upon review of your file, it

appears that there is clear and convincing evidence

that you violated Rule 8.2(a) of the Rules of

Professional Conduct. Specifically, you made a

written statement of reckless disregard as to the

integrity of Judge Robert Murphy and did transmit

the same to at least two other individuals.

I have discussed this complaint with Chief

Disciplinary Counsel and we are prepared at this

time to resolve this matter by private admonition. An

admonition would require you to pay all costs and

expenses associated with this matter. Those costs

include the investigative expense for service of the

subpoena for you statement, cost of deposition

taken on August 25, 2016, and $250.00 expense for

issuance f the admonition, pursuant to Supreme

Court Rule XIX, Sec. 10.1C(1). In addition, you are

required to pay a $10.00 fee for service to each party,

pursuant to Rule XIX, Appendix A, Rule 7B, for an

estimated total of $588.87. Should you accept this

offer for a private admonition, the Louisiana

Attorney Disciplinary Board will send a finalized cost

statement once the Order issued.

Pursuant to Louisiana Court Rule XIX,

Section 11D, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel

hereby formally recommends resolution of this

matter by way of private admonition. Please note

you have the right to reject this offer and demand

that this matter be disposed of by formal proceeding.

Such a demand must be in writing within 14 days of

your receipt of this notice.

Please advise us in writing no later than 14

days from your receipt of this notice whether you

accept this offer of admonition or whether you

demand to resolve this matter by formal proceeding.

Please further note that pursuant to Rule XIX, Sec.

11D, a failure to demand a formal hearing within 14

days of this notice constitutes consent to the

admonition.

Your prompt attention to this mater will be

greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions,

please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

s/Karen H. Green

Deputy Disciplinary Counsel

KHG/rm 1

Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board

Office of the Disciplinary Counsel

4000 S. Sherwood Forrest Blvd., Suite 607

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70816

(225) 293-3900. 1-800-326-8022. FAX (225) 293-3300

January 12, 2018

Via E-MAIL without attachments Via regular mail

with attachments.

Cecelia F. Abadie

Attorney at Law

20 White Drive

Hammond, LA 70401

Re: 17-DB 056

Dear Ms. Abadie:

In response to your recent request regarding

discovery, please be advised that pursuant to

Louisiana Supreme court Rule XIX, disciplinary

proceedings, except for specified exceptions, are not

subjected to the procedural rules of ordinary

proceedings, except for specified exceptions, are not

subjected to the procedural rules of ordinary

proceedings, as governed by the Louisiana Code of

Civil Procedure. Rule XIX governs the procedure of

discovery in disciplinary proceedings. Discovery in

disciplinary proceedings are intended to be limited

and focused, not broad and wide ranging. See. La. S.

Rule XIX provides that interrogatories, requests for

production of documents and other ordinary

discovery requests, do not apply to disciplinary

proceedings. The exceptions are with regards to

those provisions governing depositions and

subpoenas.

Further be advised that disciplinary proceedings are

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neither criminal nor civil, but are sui generis! La. S.

Ct. Rule XIX, Sec. 18A. Also, the Code of Criminal

Procedure has no applicability to bar discipline cases.

The Civil Code and Rules of Evidence are applicable

except as otherwise provided by Rule XIX! La. S. Ct.

Rule XIX, Section 18(B) and as limited by the

jurisprudence of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Both the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the

Respondent are required to provide minimal post

answer discovery under La. S. Ct. Rule XIX, Section

15, including the mandatory exchange of prospective

witnesses. On December 1, 2017, this office sent you

initial disclosures in compliance with section 15 of

Rule XIX. This includes a list of prospective

witnesses, which you may depose prior to the

deadlines set forth in the scheduling order.

Sincerely

s/Karen H. Green

Deputy Disciplinary Counsel

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.