Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Raul Ambriz-Villa, Jr., Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefMay 17, 2022

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No. ______

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

___________________________________________________________

RAUL AMBRIZ-VILLA,

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

____________________________________________________________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

______________________________________________________________

PETITIONER’S APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

______________________________________________________________

DAVID L. BRENGLE

Assistant Federal Public Defender

650 Missouri Ave.

East St. Louis, IL 62201

(618) 482-9050

(618) 482-9057 fax

David_Brengle@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Exhibit 1 United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Opinion

(Mar. 14, 2022) ............................................................................................................... Appendix 1

Exhibit 2 United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Denial of Petition for Rehearing

and Rehearing En Banc (Apr. 12, 2022) ......................................................................... Appendix 6

Exhibit 3 United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Denial of Motion to

Suppress (Aug. 31, 2020)................................................................................................ Appendix 7

Exhibit 4 United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois Final Judgment and

Conviction (Feb. 25, 2021) ........................................................................................... Appendix 16

United States v. Ambriz-Villa, 28 F.4th 786 (2022)

28 F.4th 786

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raul AMBRIZ-VILLA, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-1362

Argued October 26, 2021

Decided March 14, 2022

Synopsis

Background: In prosecution for possession with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of methamphetamine, the United

States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, J. Phil Gilbert, District Judge, 482 F.Supp.3d 777, denied

defendant’s motion to suppress, and defendant entered a guilty plea. Defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Kirsch, Circuit Judge, held that:

defendant voluntary consented to search of his vehicle after traffic stop had been completed, and

168-month sentence was substantively reasonable.

Affirmed.

Procedural Posture(s): Appellate Review; Pre-Trial Hearing Motion; Sentencing or Penalty Phase Motion or Objection.

*788 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 4:19-cr-40095 — J. Phil Gilbert,

Judge.

Attorneys and Law Firms

James M. Cutchin, George A. Norwood, Attorneys, Office of the United States Attorney, Benton, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

David Brengle, Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, East St. Louis, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Flaum, St. Eve, and Kirsch, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

Kirsch, Circuit Judge.

Following a traffic stop, Raul Ambriz-Villa, Jr., was arrested after he agreed to a search of his car that turned up nearly 13

kilograms of methamphetamine. Ambriz-Villa moved to suppress the drugs; the district court denied his motion and,

following his guilty plea, sentenced him to 168 months’ imprisonment. Ambriz-Villa preserved the right to appeal the denial

of his suppression motion and the sentence imposed.

Appendix 1

United States v. Ambriz-Villa, 28 F.4th 786 (2022)

On appeal, Ambriz-Villa argues that both the traffic stop and the subsequent search of his car violated his Fourth Amendment

rights. First, he argues that the scope and manner of the stop was unreasonable, and thus unlawful under the Fourth

Amendment. Second, he contends that the search was unlawful, either because his consent to search was tainted by an

unlawful stop or, even if the stop was lawful, his consent was not voluntary. He also argues that his resulting sentence was

both procedurally erroneous and substantively unreasonable.

We disagree. The stop was not unlawful, and Ambriz-Villa voluntarily consented to the search, which was not tainted by the

stop. Further, we find no procedural error with the district court’s sentencing decision and conclude that Ambriz-Villa’s

sentence is substantively reasonable. Finding no error, we affirm.

A grand jury indicted Raul Ambriz-Villa, Jr., for possession with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of methamphetamine

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(A). Ambriz-Villa moved to suppress the drugs. The district court

in violation of

conducted a hearing during which it watched the dash-cam video footage of the events and heard testimony from the Illinois

state trooper who executed the traffic stop and search of Ambriz-Villa’s car, then found the facts as follows.

Ambriz-Villa drove past Illinois State Trooper John Payton on I-57, where Trooper Payton was parked in his patrol car.

Trooper Payton, who is specially trained in drug interdiction, made several observations about Ambriz-Villa’s car which led

him to suspect potential drug trafficking activity. When Ambriz-Villa’s *789 car crossed the solid white line on the shoulder

of the road, Trooper Payton executed a pretextual traffic stop. As was his custom, Trooper Payton asked Ambriz-Villa to sit

in the front seat of the patrol car as a safety measure for the duration of the traffic stop. While processing a warning for the

traffic violation, Trooper Payton asked Ambriz-Villa about his background and purpose for traveling. Ambriz-Villa said he

owned a tire shop in Nebraska and was driving to Georgia for his nephew’s birthday and that the rest of his family had flown

down. When asked why he chose to drive alone, Ambriz-Villa “floundered nonresponsive,” and then when asked again,

stated that it was because he liked to drive. Still processing the warning, Trooper Payton asked more questions. Throughout

this conversation, Ambriz-Villa’s unusual responses and excessively nervous and evasive reactions raised Trooper Payton’s

suspicion that Ambriz-Villa was involved in criminal activity.

After processing the warning, Trooper Payton handed it to Ambriz-Villa, who then opened the door and began to exit the

patrol car. When Ambriz-Villa was “halfway out the door,” Trooper Payton asked, “Do you mind if I ask you a few more

questions?” Ambriz-Villa agreed, and Trooper Payton then asked whether he was involved in any drug activity (which

Ambriz-Villa denied) and if he would consent to a search of his car. Ambriz-Villa said yes. Trooper Payton asked again “for

clarification”, and Ambriz-Villa again confirmed that he consented to the search of his car. The search uncovered 13

packages (roughly one kilogram each) of methamphetamine.

The district court denied Ambriz-Villa’s motion to suppress, finding that the scope of the stop was not unreasonable and thus

did not violate Ambriz-Villa’s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court also found that Trooper Payton’s tone and

behavior did not suggest coercion and that Ambriz-Villa’s consent was voluntary because “a reasonable person in

Ambriz-Villa’s position—with one foot out the door and a warning ticket in hand—would feel at liberty to disregard the

questions and walk away.”

At his sentencing hearing, Ambriz-Villa requested a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines range, arguing that his drug

trafficking was aberrant behavior. The judge rejected this argument, saying “even assuming this was the first time you did

this, it does not amount in my mind under the [G]uidelines as aberrant behavior.” The district court also considered the

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) but concluded none warranted a variance below the Guidelines range and

sentencing factors listed in

thus imposed a within-Guidelines prison sentence of 168 months.

Appendix 2

United States v. Ambriz-Villa, 28 F.4th 786 (2022)

On appeal, Ambriz-Villa challenges the lawfulness of the stop, the search, and his sentence. We take each argument in turn.

Ambriz-Villa contends that the scope and manner of the traffic stop exceeded the bounds of reasonableness, in violation of

his Fourth Amendment rights. Separately, he argues that the warrantless search of his car was unreasonable because his

consent to search it was invalid. As a result, he argues, the drugs found in his car should be suppressed. When reviewing a

motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual determinations for clear error and the district court’s legal

conclusions, including the reasonableness of a stop, de novo. United States v. Cole, 21 F.4th 421, 427 (7th Cir. 2021);

United States v. Gholston, 1 F.4th 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2021).

*790 1

Ambriz-Villa concedes that Trooper Payton was permitted to stop him based on the traffic violation but argues that the scope

and manner of the stop was unreasonable because Trooper Payton asked him repetitive and persistent questions not tailored

to the reason for the initial stop while he was in the confines of the patrol car. But Trooper Payton was permitted to ask

Ambriz-Villa questions unrelated to the reason for the stop without reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity, even if the

questioning was repetitive and persistent, so long as the questioning did not prolong the duration of the stop, which

Ambriz-Villa does not contest on appeal. See Cole, 21 F.4th at 429 (“[A]n officer may ask questions unrelated to the stop ...

if doing so does not prolong the traffic stop.”). And it makes no difference that Ambriz-Villa was in the patrol car during the

questioning. Trooper Payton was permitted to ask Ambriz-Villa to sit in the patrol car while he wrote the warning. See

United States v. Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 492 (7th Cir. 2019) (an officer may ask a driver to sit in his patrol car during a valid

traffic stop, without any particularized suspicion). Ambriz-Villa provides no authority for the proposition that the legality of

an officer’s questioning differs whether it is done while the traffic offender is outside the patrol car or in it, and we could find

none. Ambriz-Villa was free to respond to the questions, or not, and he makes no argument that he felt coerced into

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439–40, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)

answering these questions. See

(stating that at a traffic stop, “the detainee is not obliged to respond”). What matters is that Trooper Payton’s questioning did

not prolong the duration of the traffic stop. We agree with the district court that the scope and manner of the stop did not

violate Ambriz-Villa’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Ambriz-Villa next argues that his verbal consent to search his car was tainted because the scope and manner of the stop was

overly intrusive and expansive. But as we discussed above, the traffic stop was lawful so his consent to search was not tainted

by an unlawful stop. And there was no impermissible extension of the stop because the traffic stop concluded when he

United States v. Rivera, 906 F.2d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding defendant was not in

received the warning. See

custody after he was given his written warning, “had all his identification, he was told that the investigation was over, he was

free to leave at his pleasure and, indeed, was leaving when the trooper popped the question of consensual search”).

Ambriz-Villa also argues that his consent was not voluntarily given. To evaluate voluntariness of consent to a search, we

look to the totality of the circumstances, considering the following factors: “(1) the person’s age, intelligence, and education;

(2) whether he was advised of his constitutional rights; (3) how long he was detained before he gave his consent; (4) whether

his consent was immediate, or was prompted by repeated requests by the authorities; (5) whether any physical coercion was

United States v. Figueroa-Espana,

used; and (6) whether the individual was in police custody when he gave his consent.”

511 F.3d 696, 704–05 (7th Cir. 2007).

Appendix 3

United States v. Ambriz-Villa, 28 F.4th 786 (2022)

Ambriz-Villa argues that when he was exiting the patrol car to return to his car with the warning violation in his possession,

no reasonable person would have felt free to ignore the trooper’s question and simply walk away. But under the totality of the

circumstances, Ambriz-Villa’s consent was freely given. Ambriz-Villa was in fact leaving: it is undisputed that Trooper *791

Payton had handed him the warning ticket and that Ambriz-Villa was exiting the police car at the time the consent to search

Rivera, a case with very similar facts, we found that a reasonable person in a comparable

was sought. As noted above, in

906 F.2d at 323. Furthermore, the interaction took

position would have felt free to leave at this point of the interaction.

place on a public interstate highway during the day; Trooper Payton showed no weapons or other physical force; and the

language and tone were limited to a series of targeted questions and confirmed whether a search would be allowed.

Next, Ambriz-Villa challenges his sentence, both for procedural error and as substantively unreasonable. We review the

district court’s sentencing decision for procedural error de novo and the substantive reasonableness of the sentence for abuse

of discretion. United States v. Patel, 921 F.3d 663, 669 (7th Cir. 2019).

Ambriz-Villa argues that his criminal behavior was aberrant and that the district court committed procedural error by

considering only the Sentencing Guidelines’ definition of aberrant behavior in policy statement § 5K2.20 in deciding that

Ambriz-Villa’s behavior did not warrant a departure from the applicable Guidelines range. But there’s no indication that the

judge believed he was confined to the Guidelines’ definition of aberrant behavior in deciding Ambriz-Villa’s sentence.

It is perfectly acceptable for a district judge to use the Guidelines as a reference when deciding whether to depart from the

Guidelines range so long as the judge does not treat the Guidelines as mandatory. See United States v. Townsend, 724 F.3d

749, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2013). There is no indication here—and Ambriz-Villa points to none—that the district judge concluded

that he was forbidden from considering Ambriz-Villa’s argument or circumstances due to a Guidelines definition or policy

statement. True enough, the judge concluded that Ambriz-Villa’s conduct did not satisfy § 5K2.20. But that was not the end

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the

of the judge’s consideration of Ambriz-Villa’s circumstances. Rather, in weighing the

judge considered his argument that his behavior was aberrant and rejected it. Id. at 752 (“The sentencing transcript shows that

the judge gave thoughtful consideration not only to § 5K2.20 but also to the possibility, independent of § 5K2.20, that [the

defendant’s] crimes were aberrational.”). The judge acknowledged that Ambriz-Villa was “not a bad person, but [had] made

a bad choice” and knew what he was doing. The judge weighed heavily that “even assuming this was the first time”

Ambriz-Villa had transported drugs, the quantity of drugs was not only high, but the distance traveled was also substantial

and reflected the calculated nature of the crime. As in Townsend, the judge’s approach was free from legal error.

Finally, we turn to Ambriz-Villa’s argument that the term of his sentence—though within-Guidelines for his offense—was

§ 3553(a) factors. A within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively

outside the bounds of a reasonable balancing of the

reasonable. See Patel, 921 F.3d at 672. Ambriz-Villa may rebut this presumption only by showing that his sentence does not

§ 3553(a) factors. Id. To this end, Ambriz-Villa stresses to us that he has strong factors in favor of

comport with the

mitigation. But we do not re-weigh the *792 factors on appeal. Rather, our review is limited to ensuring the sentence is

“logical and consistent” with the factors. United States v. Bonk, 967 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2020). Here, the district court

§ 3553(a) factors, concluding the facts did not “warrant a variance below the Guidelines range.” The judge

considered the

Appendix 4

United States v. Ambriz-Villa, 28 F.4th 786 (2022)

noted that Ambriz-Villa was moving a considerable quantity of drugs—nearly three times the amount required to establish a

baseline offense—and that prior community supervision had not successfully deterred his criminal conduct. The district court

logically applied the factors, and to hold otherwise would require us to first weigh the facts differently. That we will not do.

AFFIRMED

All Citations

28 F.4th 786

End of Document

Appendix 5

United States v. Ambriz-Villa, Not Reported in Fed. Rptr. (2022)

2022 WL 1094627

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raul AMBRIZ-VILLA, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-1362

April 12, 2022

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 4:19-cr-40095, J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.

Attorneys and Law Firms

James M. Cutchin, Attorney, George A. Norwood, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Benton, IL, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

David Brengle, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, East St. Louis, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge, AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge, THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

ORDER

*1 Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc on March 28, 2022. No judge in regular active service has

requested a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc, and all judges on the original panel have voted to deny the petition for

rehearing.

Accordingly, the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc is DENIED.

All Citations

Not Reported in Fed. Rptr., 2022 WL 1094627

End of Document

Appendix 6

Case 4:19-cr-40095-JPG Document 53 Filed 08/31/20 Page 1 of 9 Page ID #101

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 19–CR–40095–JPG

RAUL AMBRIZ-VILLA, JR.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Raul Ambriz-Villa, Jr.’s Motion to Suppress. (ECF No. 44).

The Government responded, (ECF No. 47); and the Court conducted a hearing on August 18, 2020,

(ECF No. 51). For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Ambriz-Villa’s Motion to Suppress.

PROCEDURAL & FACTUAL HISTORY

On October 30, 2019, Illinois State Trooper John Payton (“Trooper Payton”) was parked

in his law-enforcement vehicle on I-57 near Mt. Vernon, Illinois. 1 Trooper Payton is a member of

the Criminal Patrol Team and is specially trained in interdiction: to stop and apprehend those

traveling along interstate highways suspected of criminal activity. He has 11 years of experience,

which includes over 70 successful contraband seizures since 2015 and the rescue of an abducted

child. He stops three-to-four drivers per day. And although he is authorized to issue traffic tickets,

his focus is on interdiction. Along with fieldwork, Trooper Payton conducts in-class instruction

and ride-alongs to pass his experience on to rookies.

Ambriz-Villa drove past Trooper Payton while driving south on I-57. He was driving a

2009 Chevy Suburban with a Nebraska license plate. In Trooper Payton’s experience, large

vehicles (like Suburbans) are preferred by drug traffickers because they can haul more contraband.

The facts are drawn from the Indictment, the parties’ briefs, the hearing testimony, and the dash-cam recording.

Appendix 7

Case 4:19-cr-40095-JPG Document 53 Filed 08/31/20 Page 2 of 9 Page ID #102

Trooper Payton also found the vehicle’s dirty exterior and foreign plates as signs of long-distance

interstate travel, consistent with trafficking.

Trooper Payton briefly followed Ambriz-Villa on I-57, during which time Ambriz-Villa’s

vehicle crossed the solid white line on the right-hand shoulder. Trooper Payton then conducted a

traffic stop. He asked Ambriz-Villa for his license and registration. It took Ambriz-Villa near 90

seconds to produce his registration. That struck Trooper Payton as suspect—in his experience,

drug traffickers often drive rentals and do not know where to find the vehicle’s registration.

Trooper Payton also noticed a “masking odor,” like that of an air freshener or cologne, sometimes

used to conceal the tracks of contraband; and two cell phones, sometimes used by traffickers as

“dope phones.” Trooper Payton then asked Ambriz-Villa if he would be willing to continue the

inquiry from his law-enforcement vehicle. 2 Ambriz-Villa agreed.

When Ambriz-Villa sat down, Trooper Payton informed him that he was only receiving a

warning ticket. In Trooper Payton’s experience, innocent drivers relax when they learn that they

are not receiving a moving violation. But Trooper Payton noticed that the news had little effect on

Ambriz-Villa. The dash-cam recording showed Ambriz-Villa’s eyes pacing out the window and

through the mirrors; and Trooper Payton purportedly saw belly breathing and a prominent carotid

artery, which sometimes conveys nervousness.

Several uneasy statements made by Ambriz-Villa also alerted Trooper Payton of the

possibility of criminal activity. While processing Ambriz-Villa’s license, Trooper Payton casually

asked about his background and purpose for traveling. 3 Ambriz-Villa stated that he owned a tire

shop in Nebraska and was traveling to Georgia for his nephew’s birthday. He said that his family

Trooper Payton testified that it is the Criminal Patrol Team’s custom to invite suspects to their law-enforcement

vehicles as a safety measure.

Trooper Payton testified that out-of-state licenses take longer for Illinois police vehicles to retrieve information.

—2—

Appendix 8

Case 4:19-cr-40095-JPG Document 53 Filed 08/31/20 Page 3 of 9 Page ID #103

was going to Georgia too, but they flew instead. Trooper Payton asked why he decided to drive

alone, and Ambriz-Villa floundered nonresponsive. 4 When asked again, he stated that he liked to

drive. After further conversation, Trooper Payton concluded that Ambriz-Villa’s evasiveness and

excessive nervousness were signs of criminal activity.

By the time Trooper Payton printed the warning ticket, Ambriz-Villa was poised to leave.

He took it and got halfway out the door when Trooper Payton interjected—“Do you mind if I ask

you a few more questions?” Ambriz-Villa agreed. Trooper Payton then asked whether he was

involved in any drug or criminal activity, which he denied. Finally, Trooper Payton asked AmbrizVilla if he would consent to a search of his vehicle—he consented. Trooper Payton asked once

again for clarification, and Ambriz-Villa confirmed his consent.

Two other troopers arrived moments earlier in a separate law-enforcement vehicle; Trooper

Payton messaged them while processing Ambriz-Villa’s license. Together, they searched AmbrizVilla’s Suburban. Hidden in the third row, beneath the tray and cupholder and above the rear

driver-side tire, they found around 13 kilograms of methamphetamine.

On November 5, a grand jury in the Southern District of Illinois charged Ambriz-Villa with

Possession with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine. Ambriz-Villa then moved to suppress the

drug evidence under the Fourth Amendment. The Government responded; and the Court conducted

an in-person hearing, during which it heard testimony from Trooper Payton, examined the dashcam recording, and heard oral arguments.

The extent of Ambriz-Villa’s ability to understand the English language remains unclear. Ambriz-Villa’s native

tongue is Spanish. During the traffic stop, he informed Trooper Payton that he immigrated to the United States from

Mexico sometime in the last 20 to 25 years. And he appeared at the August 18 hearing with help from an interpreter,

during which he informed the Court that he does not understand any English. The dash-cam recording, however,

reflects otherwise.

—3—

Appendix 9

Case 4:19-cr-40095-JPG Document 53 Filed 08/31/20 Page 4 of 9 Page ID #104

II.

LAW & ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const. amend.

IV. “No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, then the right

of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or

interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” Union Pac. Ry. Co. v.

Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). “Wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable

‘expectation of privacy,’ he is entitled to be free from governmental intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

So “[in] cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used . . . .”

Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).

“A ‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider

reasonable is infringed.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). And “[a] ‘seizure’

of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory

interests in that property.” Id. That said, “what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and

seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222

(1960).

If the Government violates the Fourth Amendment by conducting an unreasonable search

or seizure, then the exclusionary rule “compel[s] respect for the constitutional guarantee in the

only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Id. “Under this rule,

evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding

against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347

(1974).

—4—

Appendix 10

Case 4:19-cr-40095-JPG Document 53 Filed 08/31/20 Page 5 of 9 Page ID #105

But “[g]iven the nature of an automobile in transit, the [Supreme] Court recognized that an

immediate intrusion” is not unreasonable “in cases involving the transportation of contraband

goods.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806–807 (1982).

An investigatory stop complies with the Fourth Amendment if the

brief detention is based on reasonable suspicion that the detained

individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. An officer

initiating an investigatory stop must be able to point to “specific and

articulable facts” that suggest criminality so that he is not basing his

actions on a mere hunch.

United States v. Uribe, 709 F.3d 646, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22).

“The government bears the burden of establishing reasonable suspicion by a preponderance

of the evidence.” Id. at 650. But reasonable suspicion itself “is a lower threshold than probable

cause” and “considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Bullock,

632 F.3d 1004, 1011 (7th Cir. 2011).

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable

cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be

established with information that is different in quantity or content

than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense

that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less

reliable than that required to show probable cause.

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).

It is now well established “that the Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated

investigations that [do] not lengthen the roadside detention.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S.

348, 354 (2015) (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (“An officer’s inquiries into

matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert

the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not

measurably extend the duration of the stop.”)). And the Supreme Court has “held repeatedly that

—5—

Appendix 11

Case 4:19-cr-40095-JPG Document 53 Filed 08/31/20 Page 6 of 9 Page ID #106

mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434

(1991).

Courts therefore evaluate reasonable suspicion by examining “the totality of the

circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop, including the experience of the officer

and the behavior and characteristics of the suspect.” Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1012. “If there is no

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, a traffic stop can only last as long as it takes to ‘address

the traffic violation that warranted the stop’ and ‘attend to related safety concerns.’ ” United States

v. Walton, 827 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354). In other words,

“[a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can

become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.”

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). “Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied

to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S.

at 354. “However, information lawfully obtained during that period may provide the officer with

reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct that will justify prolonging the stop to permit a

reasonable investigation.” United States v. Figueroa-Espana, 511 F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2007).

As in Caballes, “the initial seizure of [Ambriz-Villa] when he was stopped on the highway

was based on probable cause and was concededly lawful.” 543 U.S. at 407. (See Def.’s Mot. at 5–

6). Even so, Ambriz-Villa argues that Trooper Payton violated his constitutional rights in three

ways.

First, he argues that “Trooper Peyton’s questions to Mr. Ambriz-Villa during the traffic

stop about whether there was anything illegal in the car, whether anything would alert his drug

dog, and whether there were any specific drugs or guns in the vehicle were outside the mission of

the traffic stop” and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. (Id.). The Court disagrees.

—6—

Appendix 12

Case 4:19-cr-40095-JPG Document 53 Filed 08/31/20 Page 7 of 9 Page ID #107

Ambriz-Villa’s assertion that the scope of police questioning is restricted to “ordinary

inquiries” lacks legal support. True enough, “[b]eyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket,

an officer’s mission includes ‘ordinary inquires incident to [the traffic] stop,’ ” Rodriguez,

575 U.S. at 355 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408), which typically “involves checking the

driver’s license, determining whether there are outside warrants against the driver, and inspecting

the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance,” id. (citing Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and

Seizure § 9.3(c) (5th ed. 2019)). But drivers may also be “closely questioned about their identities,

the reason for their travels, their intended destinations, and the like, and may be quizzed as to

whether they have drugs on their persons or in the vehicle.” LaFave, supra, § 9.3(c). And in the

Seventh Circuit, “[a] traffic stop does not become unreasonable merely because the officer asks

questions unrelated to the initial purpose for the stop, provided that those questions do not

unreasonably extend the amount of time that the subject is delayed.” United States v. Martin,

422 F.3d 597, 601–602 (7th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 725

(7th Cir. 2005). See generally Amy L. Vasquez, “Do You Have Any Drugs, Weapons, or Dead

Bodies in Your Car?”: What Questions Can a Policy Officer Ask During a Traffic Stop?, 76 Tul.

L. Rev. 211, 223–23 (2001) (discussing circuit split). The Court therefore disagrees with AmbrizVilla’s assertion that Trooper Payton—while processing the warning ticket—violated the Fourth

Amendment merely by asking questions unrelated to the traffic stop.

Second, Ambriz-Villa argues that Trooper Payton—after processing the warning ticket—

lacked a reasonable suspicion to shift the scope of his investigation from the traffic violation to

potential criminal activity. (Def.’s Mot. at 5–6). The Court disagrees.

Ambriz-Villa’s circumspect behavior and dubious story gave Trooper Payton reasonable

suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop after the warning ticket was issued. A driver’s

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Appendix 13

Case 4:19-cr-40095-JPG Document 53 Filed 08/31/20 Page 8 of 9 Page ID #108

“statements and demeanor” can create “reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.” FigueroaEspana, 511 F.3d at 704; Martin, 422 F.3d at 602. And in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court

reiterated that “due weight must be given . . . to the specific reasonable inferences” that a lawenforcement officer is “entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” 392 U.S. at 27

(emphasis added). Here, Trooper Payton testified to several indicators that, given his experience,

were clues of criminal conduct. Any objective viewer of the dash-cam recording would note

Ambriz-Villa’s particularly skittish behavior, from erratic eye movements to nervous hat

adjustments. Trooper Payton also testified about salt grime on Ambriz-Villa’s Suburban,

suggesting long-distance driving; the Suburban itself, able to haul greater quantities of contraband;

and Ambriz-Villa’s belly breathing and prominent carotid artery, sometimes signs of nervousness.

Taken as a whole, these specific and articulable facts were enough to give Trooper Payton a

reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.

Third, Ambriz-Villa argues that Trooper Paton committed an unreasonable seizure when

he continued his questioning after issuing the warning ticket. (Def.’s Mot. at 7–8). He suggests

that a reasonable person in his position would not have felt free to leave, and thus “[a]ny consent

to stay and talk or search the vehicle by Mr. Ambriz-Villa is tainted by his illegal detainment.”

(Id.). The Court disagrees.

Nothing suggests that Ambriz-Villa was “seized” when Trooper Payton asked him a new

question as he was exiting the vehicle.

[A] person is ‘seized’ only when, by means of physical force or a

showing of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. As

long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to

disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion

upon that person’s liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution

require some particularized and objective justification.

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Appendix 14

Case 4:19-cr-40095-JPG Document 53 Filed 08/31/20 Page 9 of 9 Page ID #109

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980). Trooper Payton’s tone and behavior did

not suggest coercion; and the mere presence of a law-enforcement officer, without more, does not

presuppose an inability to leave. Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501–502 (finding that

although officers’ questioning was “no doubt permissible,” driver “was effectively seized” when

officers identified themselves as narcotics agents “while retaining his ticket and driver’s license

and without indicating in any way that he was free to depart”). A reasonable person in AmbrizVilla’s position—with one foot out the door and a warning ticket in hand—would feel at liberty to

disregard the questions and walk away.

III.

CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES Defendant Raul Ambriz-Villa, Jr.’s Motion to Suppress.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: Monday, August 31, 2020

S/J. Phil Gilbert

J. PHIL GILBERT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Appendix 15

Appendix 16

Appendix 17

Appendix 18

Appendix 19

Appendix 20

Appendix 21

Appendix 22

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.