Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Richard Dwayne Blalock, Petitioner v. Oklahoma
Supreme Court briefMay 4, 2022
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APPENDIX A
ORDER DENYING FROM THE OKLAHOMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
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*1051603376*
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
or ™ s™ or
RICHARD DWAYNE BLALOCK,
Petitioner,
v.
MAR - 2 2022
JOHN D. HADDEN
clerk
No. PC-2022-98
STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Respondent.
ORDER AFFIRMING DENIAL OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Petitioner, pro se, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by
the District Court of Tulsa County in Case No. CF-2009-3294. Before
the District Court, Petitioner asserted that the State lacked jurisdiction
to convict and punish him. See McOirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S.Ct. 2452
(2020). In State ex rel. Matloffv. Wallace, 2021 OK CR 21, 497 P.3d
686, cert, denied, 142 S.Ct. 757 (2022), this Court determined that the
United States Supreme Court decision in McGirt, because it is a new
procedural rule, is not retroactive and does not void final state
convictions. See Matloff, 2021 OK CR 21, ^ 27-28, 40, 497 P.3d at
691-92, 694.
The convictions in this matter were final before the July 9, 2020,
decision in McGirt, and the United States Supreme Courtis holding in
PC-2022-98, Richard Dwayne Blalock v. State of Oklahoma
McGirt does not apply. We decline Petitioner’s invitation to revisit our
holding in Matloff
Therefore, the District Court’s order denying post-conviction
reHef is AFFIRMED Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2022), the
MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this
decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
WITNESS OUR HANDS AND THE SEAL OP THIS COURT this
___ day of
, 2022.
SCOTT ROWLAND, Presiding Judge
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DAVID B. LEWIS, J
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APPENDIX B
ORDER DENYING FROM THE TULSA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
*1051399712*
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TULSA COUNTY
STATE OF OKLAHOMA
RICHARD DWYANE BLALOCK,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Respondent
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Certified copy to Dvfendcnt
|P|RI£T C|gUB^
CF-2009-3294
Judge Smith
JAN 1 1 2022
^aspaasas
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S APPLICATION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
This matter came on for consideration on
\ ~^
, 202lpursuant to the Application for
Post-Conviction Relief, for Appointment of Counsel, and an Evidentiary Hearing (“Application”)
filed by Petitioner Richard Blalock (“Petitioner”) on May 14,2021.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Richard Blalock (“Petitioner”) pled guilty and was found guilty on August 24,
2009 in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CF-2009-3294 of Count One (1): Shooting
with Intent to Kill, Count Two (2): Possession of a Firearm After Former Conviction of a Felony,
Count Three (3): Endeavoring to Manufacture Controlled Drugs, and Count Four (4): Unlawful
Possession of Controlled Drug. The District Court sentenced Petitioner to thirty-five (35) years in
the Department of Corrections for Count One, fifteen (15) years in the custody of the Department
of Corrections for Count Two, twenty-five (25) years in the custody of the Department of
Corrections, and fifteen (15) years in the custody of the Department of Corrections for Count Four
All counts were ordered to run concurrent and this sentence was ordered to run concurrent with
Tulsa County District Court Case CF-2009-2332. Although Petitioner was advised of his appeal
rights, he did not appeal this judgment and sentence. Petitioner has now filed his first application
for post-conviction relief, wherein he claims that the State did not have jurisdiction to prosecute
him, pursuant to McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S.Ct 2452, 2482-2483, 207 L.Ed.2d 985 (2020),
because he is “Indian” and the offense occurred in “Indian Country.”
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1. A representative of the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma Enrollment Office would
testify that Petitioner was a citizen of the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma on the dates
of the offenses July 4,2009 and July 6,2009. This representative would testify Petitioner
became enrolled as a citizen of the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma on March 5, 1983.
2. A representative of the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma Enrollment Office would
testify that Petitioner has some degree of Indian blood.
3. The Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma is a federally recognized tribe.
4. A representative of the Tulsa Police Department would testify that Petitioner committed
the offenses he was convicted of within Tulsa County.
5. A representative ofthe Muscogee Creek Nation or a representative of the Cherokee Nation,
or an expert witness testifying on Petitioner’s behalf, would testify that the location of the
offense Petitioner was convicted of in the above case occurred within the Muscogee Creek
Nation and/or the Cherokee Nation.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I.
MCGIRT SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO VOID A
CONVICTION THAT WAS FINAL WHEN MCGIRT WAS DECIDED.
A.
Application of Retroactivity Principles to Indian Country Claims
United States v. Cuch, 79 F.3d 987 (10th Cir. 1996) is the most relevant decision to
the specific issue, presented by this case, of the proper forum for prosecution after the
issuance of a new decision, regarding disestablishment or diminishment of an Indian
reservation. In Cuch, the Tenth Circuit considered the question of whether it should
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retroactively apply the Supreme Court’s decision in Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994),
that a reservation’s boundaries had.been diminished, to vacate convictions that were made
final prior to that decision. See Cuch, 79 F.3d at 989-90. The Tenth Circuit started by noting
"[t]he Supreme Court can and does limit the retroactive application of subject matter
jurisdiction rulings," citing the Court's decision in Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U:S. 665 (1973). Cuch
79F.3dat990. The Cuch court recounted the principles that underlie retroactivity analysis:
"finality and fundamental fairness." Cuch, 79 F.3d at 991. "A subset of the principle of finality
is the prospect that the invalidation of a final conviction could well mean that the guilty
will go unpunished due to the impracticability of charging and retrying the defendant after a
long interval of time." Id.
The Cuch court also considered that the issue of fairness to petitioners did not support
retroactivity: 'There is no question of guilt or innocence here" and these cases "involved
conduct made criminal by both state and federal law." Id. at 992. The petitioners do not
"assert any unfairness in the procedures by which they were charged, convicted, and
sentenced" and the Supreme Court's recent reservation boundaries decision does not "bring[]
into question the truth finding functions of the ... courts that prosecuted Indians for acts
committed within the historic boundaries of the ... Reservation." Id. Similarly, Cuch
distinguished cases where courts retroactively applied decisions holding the crime at issue
could not be constitutionally punished by any court or where the acts committed were not
actually criminalized by the statute of conviction. Id. at 993-94. There is not "complete
miscarriage of justice to these movants that would mandate or counsel retroactive
application of Hagen to invalidate these convictions." Id. at 994 (internal marks omitted).
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Rather, the question solely "focuses on where these Indian defendants should have been
tried for committing major crimes." Id. at 992. As a result, the court found "the
circumstances surrounding these cases make prospective application
of Hagen
unquestionably appropriate in the present context." Id. at 994.
Cuch also rejected the argument that a decision on reservation boundaries “did not effect a
‘change’ in federal law, but merely clarified what had been the law all along.” Id. The Cuch court
dismissed “the Blackstonian common law view that courts do no more than discover the law,”
noting that in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the Supreme Court recognized under
American law “such a rule was out of tune with actuality.” Id. at 994-95. In other words, “the
Supreme Court admitted that ‘[t]he past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.’”
Id at 995 (quoting Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371,374 (1940)).
“While the jurisdictional nature of a holding makes the retroactivity question more critical, the
nature of the case alone does not dispense with the duty to decide whether the Court may in the
interest of justice make the rule prospective where the exigencies of the situation require such
application.” Cuch, 79 F.3d at 995. (citations and internal marks omitted). Instead, “the rule of law
is strengthened when courts, in their search for fairness, giving proper consideration to the facts
and applicable precedent, allow the law to be an instrument in obtaining a result that promotes
order, justice and equity.” Id. (citation and internal marks omitted).
B.
McGirt Shall Not Apply Retroactively to Void a Final State Conviction
In Stateexrel, District Attorney v. Wallace, 2021 OK CR 21, _P.3d_, 2021 WL 3578089,
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) recently stated that it found persuasive the
analysis and authorities provided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
Cuch, in considering the “independent state law question of collateral non-retroactivity for
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McGirt.”1 Id at .*| 26. The OCCA also explained that new rules of criminal procedure “generally
do not apply retroactively to convictions that are final, with a few narrow exceptions.” Id. at | 8
(emphasis in original).
Related to its analysis of the McGirt decision under these principles, the Wallace court first
determined that the holding in McGirt only imposed procedural changes and was “clearly a
procedural ruling.” Id at ^ 27. Second, the Wallace court held that the “procedural rule announced
in McGirt was new.” Id. at 128. Third, the court explained in detail in Wallace that the OCCA’s
“independent exercise of authority to impose remedial constraints under state law on the collateral
impact of McGirt and post-McGirt litigation is consistent with both the text of the opinion and the
Supreme Court’s apparent intent.” Id at ^ 33. Ultimately, the OCCA held that “McGirt and our
post-McGirt reservation rulings shall not apply retroactively to void a conviction that was final
when McGirt was decided.”2 Id. at f 15 See
6 and 40.
As discussed above, the Tulsa County District Court found Petitioner guilty August 24,
2009 and sentenced him accordingly. Since Petitioner did not appeal this judgment and sentence
within the ten-day time limit, his conviction became final on September 3,2009. See O.S. T. 22,
Ch. 18, App., Rule 2.1.
Since Petitioner’s conviction was final long prior to the July 9, 2020 decision in McGirt,
this Court holds that the McGirt decision does not apply retroactively in Petitioner’s state post
conviction proceeding to void his final conviction. See Wallace, 2021 OK CR 21, at
6, 40.
Accordingly, the Court also denies Petitioner’s Application on this basis.
1 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S.Ct. 2452 (2020).
2 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,295 (1989) defines “a final conviction as one where judgment
was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time to petition for certiorari had
elapsed).” Wallace, 2021 OK 21, at 12, n.l.
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