Petition for Writ of Certiorari — William F. Kaetz, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefApr 12, 2022

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Text

No.

91 -76 35

ORIGINAL

Kn tJe Supreme Court of tfte tEniteb Stated

In Re William F. Kaetz — Petitioner

FILED

ApR 1 2 2022

vs.

United States of America — Respondent

On Petition for A Writ of Certiorari To

To the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit Case No. 21-1914

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

William F. Kaetz

437 Abbott Road

Paramus, NJ., 07652

201-753-1063

Pro se Petitioner

Page 1 of 36

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Chief Judge Wolfson of the district of New Jersey created administrative

internal court operation orders in response to the covid-19 pandemic that were used

to blanket all court cases with continuances. Continuance is defined as the

suspension or postponement of a trial or court proceeding. Continuance is made on

a case-bycase basis at the court’s discretion. Courts balance giving the moving

party enough time; the need to make the trial timely and speedy; and the interests

of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(7)(A) also states a motion is required by the parties.

The proper Due Process is motion procedure. There was no Due Process motion

procedure. The orders were issued in other judge's cases, interfered with those other

cases, ruled directly on the legality of other judge's cases, considered matters

pertaining to cases assigned to other judges. The Covid-19 Administrative Internal

Court Operation Orders acted like law aimed at the suppression of particular views

to manipulate the public debate about the pandemic through coercion rather than

persuasion. There is content and viewpoint discrimination from misrepresentations

and propaganda from the CDC, the WHO, Dr. Fauci, political parties, and social

media news that suppressed the Constitution.

Are the administrative internal court operation orders in response to the

covid-19 pandemic an act that lacks authority, jurisdiction, due process, a fraud on

the court, a content and viewpoint discrimination manipulating public debate about

Covid-19 and therefore unconstitutional?

Page 2 of 36

CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED........................................................................

OPINIONS BELOW.......... ...........................................................................

JURISDICTION..............................................................................................

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

ARGUMENT

JURISDICTION AND U.S. CONST. ARTICLE III STANDING....................

PRECEDENTS THAT SUPPORT LACK OF AUTHORITY AND LACK OF

JURISDICTION OF THE COVID 19 CONTINUANCE ORDERS................

Precedents on No Authority to Interfere Another Judge's Case.............................. 12

In Agreement with this Court’s Own Words, Chief Judge Wolfson’s Act is with a

Total Lack of Jurisdiction and Authority...................................................................... 13

Precedents that Prove Judicial Immunity Does Not Apply to the Covid-19

Emergency Administrative Internal Court Operation Orders that Misapplied

Continuances and Defendants’ Actions.......................................................................... 16

Precedents on Content & Viewpoint Discrimination.................................................. 20

Precedents on Fraud on the Court................................................................................... 22

This Court’s Directions to Deal with Bad Court Orders............................................. 25

Precedents on Interpreting Statute................................................................................ 26

There is a Declaratory Decree that was Violated - Precedents on the Oath of

Office...................................................................................................................................... 28

Precedents on Court Dicta................................................................................................ 29

The U.S. Constitution is a Social Contract................................................................... 31

The Oath of Office is to Uphold the Social Contract, the U.S. Constitution.......... 32

REASONS TO GRANTING THIS APPEAL..................................................................... 34

This Area of the Law is Badly in Need of the This Court's Authoritative Voice... 34

This Case is Likely to Produce an Opinion that Will Give Useful Guidance to the

Lower Courts........................................................................................................................ 35

There Would Be a Negative National Impact by this Court by Letting the Lower

Court's Decision Stand

CONCLUSION

Page 3 of 36

CASES

APAnsiv. Obama, 647 F. Supp. 2D 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2009)

Antoine’v. Byrers & Anderson Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432, 124 L. Ed 2d 391, 113 S. Ct.

2167 (1993)......................................................................................................................

Bailey v. U.S., 516 U.S. 137, 144-45, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472, 116 S. Ct 501 (1995)....

Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F 3d, 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 1997).........................................

Cabeda v. AG of the United States, 971 F. 3d 165 (3d. Cir. Aug. 18, 2020).........

Calvary Chapel Dayton Valleyv. Sisolak U.S. 2020. U.S. Lexis 3584, 2020 WL

4251360 (Jul.24.2020)..................................................................................................

Cameronv. Seitz, 38 F. 3d 264 (6th Cir. Mich. October 21, 1994)...........................

Caryv. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98, S. Ct. 1042 55L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978).........

Chowdhurtv. Reading Hospital & Medical Ctr., 677 F. 2d 317, 324 (3d Cir. 1982) 30

Clarkv. Conahan, 737 F. Supp 2d 239 (M.D. Pa. August 25, 2010)........................... 17

Cohens v. Virginia 19 U.S. 264, 399, 5 Ed 257 (1821)..................................................... 29

Corgis Ins. Co., v. Law Offices of Carole F Kafrissen, PC., 186 F. Supp. 2d 567

(E.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2002)...................................................................................................... 30

Coronado-Durazov. LN.S., 123 F.3d 1322, 1324 (9th Cir. 1997)................................ 26

Democratic Natl Comm. v. Wis State Legis., 141 S. Ct. 28 (U.S. October 26, 2020)

.......................................................................................................................................... 27, 32

Dennisv. United States 341 US 494. 520. 71 S. Ct. 857. 95 L. Ed. 1137 (1951)...... 14

Dhalluin v. McKibben, 682 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Nev. 1988)............................................. 12

Downes v. Bidwell 182 US 244. 384. 21 s. Ct. 770. 45 L. Ed. 1088............................. 14

Estate of Cowartv. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475, 120 L. Ed. 2d 379, 112

S. Ct. 2589 (1992)................................................................................................................ 26

Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120-21, 18 L. Ed. 281. (1866)......................................... 14

FECv. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 141 L. Ed. 2d 10 (1998)................... 10

Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 98 L Ed 2d 555 108, S. Ct. 538 (1988)......... 16

Friedman v. Harold, 638 F. 2d 262 1981 U.S. App. Lexis 21048 (1st Cir. 1981)....... 11

Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (U.S. June 17, 2019)................................... 25

Griswold v. Coventry First LLC, Civil Action No. 10-5964 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2015)30

H.K Porter Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 536 F.2d 1115, 1119 (6th Cir. 1976)

Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6, 120 S.

Ct. 1942, 147 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2000)...................................................................................... 26

HazelAtlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944)........................ 22

Herringv. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 386-87 (3d Cir. 2005).................................. 24

Hillv. Dozer, 2018 WL 1418412 at *3 (E.D. Cal., Mar. 22, 2018).............................. 12

Home Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425. 54 S. Ct. 231, 78 L.

Ed. 413(1934)..................................................................................................................... 15

Page 4 of 36

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438, 142 L. Ed. 2d 881, 119 S. Ct.

755 (1999)...........................................................................................................

Iancu v. Brunetti. 139 S. Ct. 2294. 2302 (2019)............................................

in In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449 (1891)...............................................................

Inti Refugee Assistants Projects. Trump, 857 F. 3d 544 (4th Cir. 2017)

28, 33

Lockwoodv. Bowles, 46 F.R.D. 625,634 (D.D.C. 1969)...............................

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526, n. 24, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 167 L. Ed 2d 248

(2007) (quoting SCPAP 412 U.S. at 688)........................................................................ 11

McDonald v. Master Fin. Inc., (In Re McDonald) 205 F. 3d, 606, 612*13 (3rd Cir.

2000)....................................................................................................................................... 29

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 116 L. Ed 2d 9, 112 S. Ct. 286 (1991)......................... 18

Official Comm, of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. Ex. Rel. v. Chinery, 380

F. 3d, 548 3d Cir. N.J. May 29, 2003)...............................................

Palmerv. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 260 - 261 (1971).......................

28, 32

Palmorev. Sidoti\ 466 U.S. 429 (U.S. April 25, 1984)......................

28, 32

Preminger v. Principi, 422 F. 3d. 815 (9th Cir. Cal. Aug. 25, 2005)

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155. 169 (2015,)...........................

Roman Catholic Diocese ofBrooklyn, New York. v. Andrew M. Cuomo. Governor of

New York 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020)

Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 169 F.2d 514, 521*23 (3d Cir. 1948) 23

Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors ofUniv. ofVa. 515 U.S. 819. 829 0995)................ 20

Sheav. Haley. 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 190351 (D. Nev. 2018)........................................ 12

Spokeo Inc., v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (U.S. May 16, 2016)........................................ 11

Stump v. Sparkman 435 U.S. 349, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L Ed 2d 331 (1978)............... 17

Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc, v. FCC 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)............................... 20

U.S. v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 356*57, 128 L. Ed. 2d 319, 114 S. Ct. 1599

(1994)..................................................................................................................................... 26

U.S. v. Warren, 338 F 3d 258 265 (3d Cir 2003)........................................ !.................... 30

United States v. Heath, 103 F. Supp. I. 2 (D. Haw. 1952)............................................ 13

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431, 146 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 1479 (2000)... 26

Womack v. Pearson, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 93226, (W.D. Tenn. 2006)

Page 5 of 36

STATUTES

18 U.S.C. §3161 (h)(7)(A).....

28 U. S. C. §1254(1)..........

28 U.S. Code § 1651 - Writs.

10, 26, 27

18, 29

28 U.S.C. § 456..................

28 U.S.C.A. §§ 136, 137, 756

42 U.S.C. § 1983................

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

5th Amendment.....................................................

6th Amendment.....................................................

Art. II, § I, cl, 8.......................................................

Art. VI, cl. 3............................................................

U.S. Constitution Amendment IX........................

U.S. Constitution Amendment V.........................

U.S. Constitution Amendment VI........................

U.S. Constitution Amendment VIII.....................

U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV.....................

United States Constitution Article IV, Section 4

United States Constitution Article VI................

8, 19

8, 20

9, 22

8, 25

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Model Rules of Profl Conduct R 3.1 (AM. BAR. ASS'N 2013)

National Archives and Records Administration......................

Page 6 of 36

..24

No.

3fn tfie Supreme Court of tje ?Hntteb States;

William F. Kaetz — Petitioner

vs.

United States of America — Respondent

On Writ of Certiorari To

To the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit Case No. 21-1914

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals appears at Appendix PA1 -PA4.

JURISDICTION

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was

11/01/2021. A copy of that order appears at Appendix PA5. A petition for rehearing

was timely filed in my case. A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the

United States Court of Appeals on 1/13/2022. The order denying rehearing appears

at Appendix PA7. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(l).

Page 7 of 36

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

United States Constitution Article IV, Section 4

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a

Republican Form of Government and shall protect each of them

against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the

Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against

domestic Violence.

United States Constitution Article VI

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be

made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be

made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme

Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound

thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the

Contrary notwithstanding. The Senators and Representatives before

mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all

executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the

several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this

Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a

Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

U.S. Constitution Amendment V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous

crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except

in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in

actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be

subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;

nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,

without just compensation.

U,S. Constitution Amendment VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a

speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district

wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have

Page 8 of 36

been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature

and cause of the accusation! to be confronted with the witnesses

against him! to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his

favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

U.S. Constitution Amendment VIII

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor

cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

U.S. Constitution Amendment IX

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be

construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV

Section 1

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the

jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State

wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United

States! nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law! nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

28 U.S. Code § 1651 - Writs

(a)The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress

may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective

jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.

(b)An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of

a court which has jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I filed for a Writ for Mandamus to end the Covid-19 orders. The

administrative internal court operation orders in response to the covid-19 pandemic

overthrew Constitutional rights. The lower courts used the pandemic as means to

Page 9 of 36

justify the overthrow of the constitution that conflicts with this Courts successive

holdings that an emergency cannot overthrow the Constitution. The Writ petitioned

for should have been granted to enforce the Constitution. The lower court errored by

not enforcing the Constitution.

ARGUMENT

Chief Judge Wolfson of the district of New Jersey created administrative

internal court operation orders in response to the covid-19 pandemic that were

issued in other judge's cases, interfered with those other cases, ruled directly on the

legality of other judge's cases, considered matters pertaining to cases assigned to

other judges, and added content and viewpoint discriminations in other judges’

cases.

The alleged findings of the covid-19 administrative internal court operation

orders are content and viewpoints of political views of covid-19 that was inserted

into cases that has nothing to do with facts of the cases and is discriminating

against people’s rights. The content and viewpoint discrimination in and from the

covid orders suppressed the Constitution and acted like law aimed at the

suppression of particular views to manipulate the public debate about the pandemic

through coercion rather than persuasion and is fraud on the court.

There is no provision of law that authorizes or gives jurisdiction to Chief

Judge Wolfson and collaborating defendants to do the things complained of in the

complaint. These acts were done with a total lack of jurisdiction and authority, it is

unconstitutional on many grounds, mainly due process violations because of a

Page 10 of 36

misapplication of continuances and statute 18 U.S.C. §3161 (h)(7)(A). Judicial

immunity does not apply.

The lower court dismissed the case because of my other cases and failed to

right the wrongs presented in this brief and failed to enforce the Constitution.

JURISDICTION AND U.S. CONST. ARTICLE III STANDING

This is a mass tort. This Court has recognized mass tort and has held“standing is easily recognized, for instance, in the case of a “widespread mass tort”

even though “large numbers of individuals suffer the same common Jaw injury”,

FECv. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 141 L. Ed. 2d 10 (1998), and for good

reason- “to deny standing to persons who are in fact injured, simply because many

others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread

government actions could be questioned by nobody,” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549

U.S. 497, 526, n. 24, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 167 L. Ed 2d 248 (2007) (quoting SCPAP 412

U.S. at 688) harm to all - even in the nuanced world of standing law - cannot be

logically equated with harm to no one”.

This Court also recognized, “the fact that injury may be suffered by a large

number of people does not of itself make that injury a nonjusticiable generalized

grievance, The victim’s injuries from a mass tort, for example, are widely shared, to

be sure, but each individual suffers a particularized harm.’ Spokeo Inc., v. Robins,

136 S. Ct. 1540 (U.S. May 16, 2016)

Also, in the Spokeo case, “the concrete-harm requirement does not apply as

rigorously when a private plaintiff seeks to vindicate his own private rights. Our

Page 11 of 36

contemporary decisions have not required a plaintiff to assert an actual injury

beyond the violation of his personal legal rights to satisfy the “injury-in-fact”

requirement.” See, e.g., Caryv. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98, S. Ct. 1042 55L. Ed.

2d 252 (1978) (holding that nominal damages are appropriate when a plaintiffs

Constitutional rights have been infringed but cannot show further injury)

The 1st circuit held, “Economic injury, even on indirect nature, will establish

sufficient concrete adverseness to meet article III “case and Controversy” test.”

Friedman v. Harold, 638 F. 2d 262 1981 U.S. App. Lexis 21048 (1st Cir. 1981)

All the above support the conclusion that this court has jurisdiction and I

have U.S. Const. Article III standing, this case meets the Article III “Case and

Controversy” test because the matter of this case is about a mass tort that caused

economic injury. The lower court misrepresented the case and controversy test.

PRECEDENTS THAT SUPPORT LACK OF AUTHORITY AND LACK OF

JURISDICTION OF THE COVID -19 CONTINUANCE ORDERS

Precedents on No Authority to Interfere Another Judge's Case

Many district courts have concluded that "There is no provision of law that

would authorize the undersigned judge, to reassign [another judge's] case to himself

interfere in that case; or review, vacate, or declare void her judgment in that case."

Hilly. Dozer, 2018 WL 1418412 at *3 (E.D. Cal., Mar. 22, 2018)' "The Court cannot

issue orders in another judge's case." Shea v. Haley. 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 190351

(D. Nev. 2018); "This Court has no authority to consider any matter pertaining to a

case assigned to another judge." Womack w. Pearson, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 93226,

Page 12 of 36

(W.D. Tenn. 2006); "It would be inappropriate for this Court to issue any order

which could affect or interfere with another judge's handling of a case on his or her

docket." AI'Ansiv. Obama, 647 F. Supp. 2D 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2009); “The structure of

the federal courts does not allow one judge of a district court to rule directly on the

legality of another district judge's judicial acts or to deny another district judge his

or her lawful jurisdiction." Dhalluin v. McKibben, 682 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Nev. 1988);

“No express or implied power is granted a chief judge to affect administratively,

directly or indirectly, litigation assigned to and pending before another judge of the

court. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 136, 137, 756." United States v. Heath, 103 F. Supp. I. 2 (D.

Haw. 1952).

Chief Judge Wolfson created administrative internal court operation orders

that were issued in other Judge's cases, interfered with those other cases, ruled

directly on the legality of other judge's cases, considered matters pertaining to cases

assigned to other judges, as to which there is no provision of law that authorizes or

gives jurisdiction to Chief Judge Wolfson to do so in agreement with the many

district court opinions quoted above.

In Agreement with this Court’s Own Words, Chief Judge Wolfson’s Act is with a

Total Lack of Jurisdiction and Authority

Chief Judge Wolfson’s act is with a total lack of jurisdiction and authority, it

is unconstitutional on many grounds, mainly due process violations. Judicial

immunity does not apply. There is no jurisdiction to use an emergency to overthrow

the Constitution.

Page 13 of 36

The Constitution guarantees these rights to us during all times, good or bad,

we encounter a decades*long succession of statements from this Court that confirm

there is no jurisdiction to overthrow the Constitution using an emergency (the

pandemic) supported by this Court’s dicta throughout the ages. “The history of the

world had taught them that what was done in the past might be attempted in the

future. The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally

in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men,

[people], at all times, and under all circumstances. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2,

120*21, 18 L. Ed. 281. (1866). “The Constitution is not to be obeyed or disobeyed as

the circumstances of a particular crisis in our history may suggest". Downes v.

Bidwell 182 US 244. 384. 21 s. Ct. 770. 45 L. Ed. 1088, (Harlan. J. dissenting). “Our

Constitution has no provision lifting restrictions upon governmental authority

during periods of emergency." Dennis v. United States 341 US 494. 520. 71 S. Ct.

857. 95 L. Ed. 1137 (1951) (Frankfurter. J. concurring). Rather, “[t]he People have

decreed that it shall be the supreme law of the land at all times.” Id. Its “full

operation cannot be stayed by any branch of the government in order to meet what

some may suppose to be extraordinary emergencies.” Downes 182 U.S. at 385

(Harlan, J. dissenting). This is because the drafters "foresaw that troublous times

would arise, when rulers and people would become restive under restraint, and seek

by sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed just and proper; and

that the principles of Constitutional liberty would be in peril, unless established by

irrepealable law." Milligan 71 U.S. at 120. The principle that “[government is not

Page 14 of 36

free to disregard the [Constitution] in times of crisis” applies in full force during this

pandemic.” Roman Catholic Diocese ofBrooklyn, New York. v. Andrew M. Cuomo.

Governor ofNew York 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (Justice Gorsuch. concurring.).

“Members of this Court are not public health experts, and we should respect the

judgment of those with special expertise and responsibility in this area. But even in

a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away and forgotten.” Id. At 68 (majority

opinion). "Even if the Constitution has taken a holiday during this pandemic, it

cannot become a sabbatical”. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

In Justice Alito's dissent (joined by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh) to the

court's denial of emergency injunctive relief in Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v.

SisolakU.S. 2020. U.S. Lexis 3584, 2020 WL 4251360 (Jul.24.2020) (Alita, J

dissenting) Justice Alito stated, “We have a duty to defend the Constitution, and

even a public health emergency does not absolve us of that responsibility. ... a public

health emergency does not give Governors and other public officials carte blanche to

disregard the Constitution for as long as the medical problem persists.” There is no

question that our founders abhorred the concept of one-person rule. But the

response to a pandemic (or any emergency) cannot be permitted to undermine our

system of Constitutional liberties or the system of checks and balances protecting

those liberties. For the judiciary to apply an overly deferential standard would

remove the only meaningful check on the exercise of power. The application of

normal scrutiny will only require the government to respect the fact that the

Constitution applies even in times of emergency.

Page 15 of 36

As this Court has observed- "The Constitution was adopted in a period of

grave emergency. Its grants of power to the federal government and its limitations

of the power of the States were determined in the light of emergency, and they are

not altered by emergency." Home Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,

425. 54 S. Ct. 231, 78 L. Ed. 413 (1934). "

It is clear from this Court’s own words through decades-long succession

of statements the Constitution cannot be overthrown with the use of the

Covid-19 emergency. The defendants’ actions are against this Court’s own

words, there is no justification for their actions.

Precedents that Prove Judicial Immunity Does Not Apply to the Covid-19

Emergency Administrative Internal Court Operation Orders that Misapplied

Continuances and Defendants’ Actions

In this Court’s case of Forresters. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 98 L Ed 2d 555

108, S. Ct. 538 (1988) A sex discrimination claim by Forrester was brought upon a

state judge White. “Judge White was acting in an administrative capacity when he

demoted and discharged Forrester. Those acts - like many others involved in

supervising court employees and overseeing the efficient operations of a court - may

have been quite important in providing the necessary condition of a sound

adjudicative system. The decisions at issue however, were not themselves judicial or

adjudicative... such decisions, like personnel decisions made by judges, are often

crucial to the efficient operation of public institutions (some of which are at least as

important as the courts) yet no one suggests that they give rise to absolute

immunity from liability in damages under §1983.”

Page 16 of 36

In Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F. 3d 264 (6th Cir. Mich. October 21, 1994) at 271

judicial immunity analysis of the court stated, “in examining the functions normally

performed by a judge, courts have found that “paradigmatic judicial acts” are those

that involve “resolving disputes between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction

of a court”, Forrester 484 U.S. at 2275 see also Antoine’508 U.S. at 435 - 36

(recognizing that the ‘touchtone’ for judicial immunity has been the “performance of

the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating

private rights.”) Moreover, this court has stated that whenever an action taken by a

judge is not an adjudication between parties, it is less likely that the action will be

deemed judicial.” (Antoine’v. Byrers & Anderson Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432, 124 L. Ed

2d 391, 113 S. Ct. 2167 (1993)).

In Clark v. Conahan, 737 F. Supp 2d 239 (M.D. Pa. August 25, 2010) at 256,

the court recognized, “for judicial immunity to apply, two requirements must be met

(l) jurisdiction over dispute and (2) a judicial act... as to the first, a judge is not

immune only when he has acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction”, Stump v.

Sparkman 435 U.S. 349, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L Ed 2d 331 (1978), as to the second

prong judicial immunity extends only to “judicial acts”, not administrative,

executive, or legislative ones”, Id at 360 - 61, 98 S. Ct. 1099. “Acts which are

traditionally done by judges include issuing orders, resolving cases and

controversies, making rulings, and sentencing criminal defendants. Other actions

such as sending a fax, or hiring or firing subordinates, have been found to be

administrative rather than judicial acts.”

Page 17 of 36

In Barnesv. Winchell, 105 F 3d, 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 1997). The court

recognized, “absolute immunity may be overcome in two situations, first, a judge is

liable for nonjudicial actions! second, a judge is not immune for actions taken in

complete absence of all jurisdiction. Absolute judicial immunity attaches only to

actions undertaken in a judicial capacity. See Forrester 484 U.S. at 227 - 29,

whether an act is judicial depends on the nature and function of the act, not the act

itself’ Mireles 502 U.S. at 13 (quoting Stump 435 U.S. at 362) Typically, this

functional analysis turns on two factors' (l) looking to the nature of the act itself,

whether the act is a “function normally performed by a judge”, and (2) regarding the

expectations of the judge in his judicial capacity,” 502 U.S. 9 at 12 (quoting Stump

435 U.S. at 362). Yet “if only the particular act in question were to be scrutinized”

then the “Stump” formulation would broadly envelope “any mistake of a judge in

excess of his authority”, thereby undermining the purposes behind absolute judicial

immunity. Recognizing this concern, the Mireles court reformulated the relevant

inquiry' even if a particular act is not a function normally performed by a judge, we

are directed to “look at the particular acts” relation to a general function normally

performed by a judge. {Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 116 L. Ed 2d 9, 112 S. Ct. 286

(1991)).”

Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in 1996 with “in any action brought

against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial

capacity, injunctive relief will not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated, or declaratory relief was unavailable”. Only when a declaratory decree is

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violated, or declaratory relief is unavailable would plaintiff have an end-run around

judicial immunity.

In determining immunity, we examine (l) “the nature of the function

performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it”, Forrester v. White, 484

U.S. 219, 229, 98 L Ed 2d 555 108, S. Ct. 538 (1988). We also must determine (2)

whether there was a “clear absence of all jurisdiction”, Stump v. Sparkman, 435

U.S. 349, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L Ed 2d 331 (1978). We also must determine (3) if a

declaratory decree was violated, and declaratory relief was unavailable. 42 U.S.C. §

1983.

The nature of the function, the Covid - 19 emergency administrative orders,

are for internal court employees and for overseeing the efficient operations of a

court, the nature and function is administrative and does not give rise to absolute

immunity from liability in damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a Bivens Action. All

Covid - 19 emergency orders are titled “In Re Court Operations” or

“Administrative” that clearly classifies them as administrative in nature and

function and they are not a result of paradigmatic judicial acts therefore cannot be

deemed judicial acts. Parties did not deal with the judge.

There is a clear absence of jurisdiction to overthrow the Constitution using

administrative orders. The civil rights protected and guaranteed to be protected by

the Constitution of the United States cannot be side-stepped and stayed by any

branch of government in order to meet what some may suppose to be extraordinary

emergencies. The 5th Amendment due process and equal protection rights, and the

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6th Amendment rights to a speedy trial and to confront witnesses have been

overthrown by misapplication of continuances and “ends of justice” provisions in the

speedy trial act using misrepresentations and propaganda from the CDC, the WHO,

Dr. Fauci, and social media news that are not evidence or witnesses or factors or

particulars to any one’s case. They cannot be confronted to question authenticity.

Motion practice was not done. There was no Due Process. It is clear from this

Court’s own words through decades-long succession of statements there is no

judicial immunity for administrative functions that overthrow litigants

Constitutional Rights by misapplying authority with totalitarianism style covid*19

orders.

Precedents on Content & Viewpoint Discrimination

It is established in Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc, v. FCC 512 U.S. 622, 641

(1994) Content-based restrictions "are subject to the 'most exacting scrutiny,'...

because they 'pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a

legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or

manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.’" Id.

(quoting Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. At 641*642). Viewpoint discrimination is

"[w]hen the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by

speakers on a subject." Id. (quoting Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors ofUniv. ofVa.

515 U.S. 819. 829 0995)). "Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of

content discrimination." Id. (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829). "The

government must abstain from regulating speech [the Constitution] when the

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specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the

rationale for the restriction." Id. (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. At 829). 'Viewpoint

discrimination' is forbidden." Id. (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830*831). In a

concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that "[t]he First Amendment [the

Constitution] guards against laws 'targeted at specific subject matter,' [a] form of

speech [the Constitution] suppression known as content-based discrimination." Id.

at 1765*1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S.

155. 169 (2015,)). "This category includes a subtype of laws that go further, aimed at

the suppression of'particular views ... on a subject.'" Id. (Kennedy, J.,-concurring)

(quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829) (alteration in original). "A law found to

discriminate based on viewpoint is an 'egregious form of content discrimination,

which is 'presumptively Unconstitutional.'" Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. At 829*830). "A law found to discriminate based on viewpoint

is an 'egregious form of content discrimination,' which is 'presumptively

Unconstitutional.'" Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Rosenberger, 515

U.S. at 829*830). Therefore,"[t]he Court's finding of viewpoint bias end[s] the

matter." Iancuv. Brunetti. 139 S. Ct. 2294. 2302 (2019).

The Covid-19 Administrative Internal Court Operation Orders acted like law

aimed at the suppression of particular views to manipulate the public debate about

the pandemic through coercion rather than persuasion. There is content and

viewpoint discrimination in and from the covid orders from misrepresentations and

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propaganda from the CDC, the WHO, Dr. Fauci, political parties, and social media

news that suppressed the Constitution.

I personally was thrown in jail cells with Covid-19 positive people, so the gist

of the "Covid-19 Orders" for “safety" did not apply to me, that's unequal protection,

8th Amendment violations, and proves the above true, there was ulterior motives,

most likely political, and this interfered with access to the courts. The Federal

Courts are an Essential Business, there was no reason to close the courts and

eliminate Rights, especially when other courts and essential businesses stayed

open. It is a totalitarian type of government behavior that is opposite of our

Constitutional form of government, a breach of the Constitutional guarantee, a

breach of the social contract, The Constitution.

Precedents on Fraud on the Court

This Court’s Case of Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S.

238 (1944) is important for a full understanding of the meaning of the phrase "fraud

on the court". In an opinion authored by Justice Black, held that- [T]he general rule

[is] that [federal courts will] not alter or set aside their judgments after the

expiration of the term at which the judgments were finally entered... [but]. ...

[e]very element of the fraud here disclosed demands the exercise of the historic

power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten judgments. This is not simply a

case of a judgment obtained with the aid of a witness who, on the basis of afterdiscovered evidence, is believed possibly to have been guilty of perjury. Here, even if

we consider nothing but Hartford's sworn admissions, we find a deliberately

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planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud not only the Patent Office but the

Circuit Court of Appeals.” Id. at 245.

Nearly all the principles that govern a claim of fraud on the court come from

the Hazel- Atlas case. First, the power to set aside a judgment exists in every court.

Second, in whichever court the fraud was committed, that court should consider the

matter. Third, while parties have the right to file a motion requesting the court to

set aside a judgment procured by fraud, the court may also proceed on its own

motion. Indeed, one court stated that the facts that had come to its attention "not

only justify the inquiry but impose upon us the duty to make it, even if no party to

the original cause should be willing to cooperate, to the end that the records of the

court might be purged of fraud, if any should be found to exist." Root Refining Co. v.

Universal Oil Prods. Co., 169 F.2d 514, 521*23 (3d Cir. 1948) Fourth, unlike just

about every other remedy or claim existing under the rules of civil procedure or

common law, there is no time limit on setting aside a judgment obtained by fraud,

nor can laches bar consideration of the matter. The logic is clear- "[T]he law favors

discovery and correction of corruption of the judicial process even more than it

requires an end to lawsuits." Lockwoodv. Bowles, 46 F.R.D. 625,634 (D.D.C. 1969).

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide further guidance. Lawyers

are professionally and ethically responsible for accuracy in their representations to

the court. Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that lawyers

"shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,

unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which

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includes a good-faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing

law." Model Rules of Profl Conduct R 3.1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2013) Similarly, Rule

3.3 provides that " [a] lawyer shall not knowingly ... make a false statement of fact

or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law

previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer." Id. at 3.3(a).

In addition to the rules of professional conduct and an attorney's duty of

candor as an officer of the court, Federal Rule 11 imposes a duty on attorneys to

certify that they have conducted a reasonable inquiry and have determined that any

papers filed with the court are well grounded in fact, legally tenable, and not

interposed for any improper purpose.

An examination of the offender and his duties is important because violations

of Federal Rule 11 or even the rules of professional conduct may give rise to a fraud*

on-the-court claim, even if those violations were not specifically directed to the court

itself. In other words, "[ s]ince attorneys are officers of the court, their conduct, if

dishonest, would constitute fraud on the court." H.K Porter Co. v. Goodyear Tire &

Rubber Co., 536 F.2d 1115, 1119 (6th Cir. 1976) In order to establish fraud on the

court, some courts require the movant to prove by clear and convincing evidence

intentional fraudulent conduct specifically directed at the court itself. Herringv.

United States, 424 F.3d 384, 386-87 (3d Cir. 2005).

A harsh approach is unreasonable, especially if courts consider the victim.

This Court held in Hazel -Atlas made it clear that the fraud-on-the-court rule

should be characterized by flexibility and an ability to meet new situations

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demanding equitable intervention. Because of the equitable and flexible nature of

the rule, this brief contends that courts have ample leeway and discretion to

consider the victim's status * i.e., those parties unable to recognize or combat the

fraud prejudgment * in determining whether to set aside a judgment for fraud on

the court, it should not matter if it was a civil or criminal case when it comes to

fraud on the court.

Covid*19 pandemic orders were a deliberately planned and carefully executed

scheme to defraud the United States Constitution and peoples’ inalienable rights to

perpetrate a totalitarian form of government that violated the Constitutional

Guarantee of Article IV Section 4, a Constitutional Republic form of government.

This Court’s Directions to Deal with Bad Court Orders

Making law that is a usurpation of legislative power. In Gamble v. United

States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (U.S. June 17, 2019) Justice Thomas explained“When faced with a demonstrably erroneous precedent, my rule

is simple- we should not follow it. This view ... follows directly from the

Constitution Supremacy over other sources of law - including our own

precedents. That the Constitution outranks other sources of law is

inherent in its nature, ... The Constitution’s Supremacy is also

reflected in its requirement that all judicial officers, executive officers,

congressmen and state legislators take an oath to “support this

Constitution”, Art. VI, cl. 3; see also Art. II, § I, cl, 8 ...”

“I am aware of no legislative reason why a court may privilege a

demonstrably erroneous interpretation of the Constitution over the

Constitution itself’ ... “the same principle applies when interpreting

statutes and other sources of law; if a prior decision demonstrably

erred in interpreting such a law, federal judges should exercise the

judicial power - not perpetuated a usurpation of legislative power Page 25 of 36

and correct the error. A contrary rule would permit judges to

“substitute their own pleasure” for the law....”

Pursuant to S. Ct. Justice Thomas in Gamble federal courts should fix

demonstrably erroneous interpretations of law, not perpetrate a usurpation of

power - not make law - and adhere to the Constitution. Misapplying 18 U.S.C.

§3161 (h)(7)(A) ends of justice continuances using content and viewpoint

discrimination that have nothing to do with the particulars to cases, one judge

ruling interfering on all cases, is a demonstrably erroneous interpretation of law, a

perpetration of usurpation of power, there is no immunity, my Writ for Mandamus

action has standing.

Precedents on Interpreting Statute

This Court supports my reasoning. “Analysis begins, as it must, with the

language of the statute.” Bailey v. US., 516 U.S. 137, 144-45, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472, 116

S. Ct 501 (1995); Estate of Cowartv. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475, 120 L.

Ed. 2d 379, 112 S. Ct. 2589 (1992); Coronado-Durazov. LN.S., 123 F.3d 1322, 1324

(9th Cir. 1997). “Clear and explicit statutory language is to be applied as written.”

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438, 142 L. Ed. 2d 881, 119 S. Ct.

755 (1999). “Terms utilized in the statute are to be construed according to their

ordinary or natural meaning absent clearly expressed Congressional intent to the

contrary.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431, 146 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 1479

(2000); U.S. v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 356-57, 128 L. Ed. 2d 319, 114 S. Ct.

1599 (1994). “The statute says what it means and means what it says.” Hartford

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Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6, 120 S. Ct. 1942,

147 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2000).

Continuances and 18 U.S.C. §3161 (h)(7)(A) have to go through the motion

process, in this case, it did not. Judge Wolfson created administrative internal

operation orders and procedures in response to covid'19 that continued all cases

without using the motion practice procedure specifically required in the clear and

explicit statutory language of the statutes and rules for continuances. There was no

due process, it was a dictatorship style order. Judge Wolfson’s administrative

internal operation orders is a demonstrably erroneous interpretation of law, a

perpetration of usurpation of power, it does not follow this Court’s statutory

interpretation and congresses intent of the language of the statutes and rules. The

propaganda from the CDC, the WHO, Dr. Fauci, political parties, and social media

news that was used as “findings” to suppress the Constitution are not factors or

particulars of anyone’s case and they cannot be confronted by means of due process

of law that is the motion practice procedure required by the statute.

It is clear that overthrow of the Constitution during what some may suppose

to be an extraordinary emergency is in an act that has a clear absence of

jurisdiction. The fact the government had limitations of power to invade and

trespass one’s privacy and life with alleged claims and to either indict and bring to

trial in a limited time or dismiss the claims, so the rights of that person is not

endlessly invaded is in harmony with the right to be left alone, privacy, the 4th

Amendment and the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Page 27 of 36

There is a Declaratory Decree that was Violated — Precedents on the Oath of Office

28 U.S.C. § 456 is the oath of office statute to uphold the United States

Constitution. This Court has recognized “our oath to uphold the Constitution is

tested by hard times, not easy ones. A succumbing to the temptation to sidestep the

usual Constitutional rules is never costless. It does damage to faith in the written

Constitution as law, to the power of the people to oversee their own government”.

Democratic Natl Comm. v. Wis State Legis., 141 S. Ct. 28 (U.S. October 26, 2020).

“Public officials sworn to uphold the Constitution may not avoid a Constitutional

duty by bowing down to the hypothetical effects of private radical prejudice that

they assume to be both widely and deeply held.” Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429

(U.S. April 25, 1984) Quoting Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 260 - 261 (1971)

(White J., Dissenting) “upholding the Constitution undeniably promotes the public

interests. It is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s

Constitutional rights. The public as a whole has a significant interest to prevent the

violation of a party’s Constitutional rights. The public as a whole has a significant

interest in ensuring protection of first amendment liberties. When a court protects

the Constitutional rights of the few, it inures to the benefit of all”. Inti Refugee

Assistants Project v. Trump, 857 F. 3d 544 (4th Cir. 2017)

In this case before you, it was not in the public interests to overthrow the

Constitution with “ends of justice” continuances that were based on propaganda.

The oath of office decree, ordered by the Constitution by the people upon

judges and codified in the United States statutes 28 U.S.C. § 456 has been violated.

Page 28 of 36

This decree of loyalty to the Constitution is declared publicly at swearing into office

ceremonies. There is not any declaratory relief for this Constitutional overthrow

with the use of covid-19 administrative internal court operation orders. The lower

court has bowed down to the hypothetical effects of private radical prejudices

assumed to be both widely and deeply held and has succumbed to the temptation to

sidestep the usual Constitutional rules and this is never costless.

Conclusion of finding of facts is that all three prongs are met, (l) the nature

of the function performed does not give rise to absolute immunity (2) there is a clear

absence to jurisdiction, and (3) a declaratory decree was violated, and declaratory

relief is unavailable. The plaintiff has standing on his civil rights claims. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, Biven claims apply, there is mass tort, a Writ of Mandamus stopping the

overthrow of the Constitution using the pandemic propaganda is warranted.

Precedents on Court Dicta

This Court in Cohens v. Virginia 19 U.S. 264, 399, 5 Ed 257 (1821) explained,

“it is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are

to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they

go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in

a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision.”

The third Circuit in Official Comm, of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics

Corp. Ex. Rel. v. Chinery, 380 F. 3d, 548 3d Cir. N.J. May 29, 2003) reasoned,

“although the committee is doubtless correct that the Supreme Court’s dicta are not

binding on us, we do not view it lightly, as we have stated: [W]e should not idly

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ignore considered statements the Supreme Court makes in dicta. The Supreme

Court uses dicta to control and influence the many issues it cannot decide because

of its limited docket, “appellate courts that dismiss these expressions [in dicta] and

strike off on their own increase the disparity among tribunals ( for other judges are

likely to follow the Supreme Courts marching orders) and frustrate the evenhanded

administration of justice by giving litigants an outcome other than the one the

Supreme Court would be likely to reach were the case heard there.” McDonald v.

Master Fin. Inc., (In Re McDonald) 205 F. 3d, 606, 612-13 (3rd Cir. 2000).

The U.S. district court of the Eastern District of Pa. explained in Griswold v.

Coventry First LLC, Civil Action No. 10*5964 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2015) “the third

circuit has clarified that “litigants should not totally disregard dictum, of course,

because it indicates the direction or framework of an opinion writer thought, and

thereby serves as a tool for predicting what the court might do when the issue is

properly presented.” Chowdhurtv. Reading Hospital & Medical Ctr., 677 F. 2d 317,

324 (3d Cir. 1982) nonetheless, “dictum unlike holding, does not have the strength

of a decision ‘forged from actual experience by the hammer and anvil of litigation’, a

fact to be considered when assessing its utility in the context of an actual

controversy. Similarly, appellate courts must be cautious to avoid promulgating

unnecessarily broad rules of law.” The third circuit has been clear that- “simply

labeling a statement in an opinion as a ‘holding’ does not necessarily make it so.

Gratuitous statements in an opinion do not implicate the adjudicative facts of the

case’s specific holding do not have the bite of precedent, they bind neither

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coordinate nor inferior courts in the judicial hierarchy, they are classic obiter dicta!

“statement^] of law in the opinion which could not logically be a major premise of

the selected facts of the decision’ US. v. Warren, 338 F 3d 258 265 (3d Cir 2003).”

All the above is put together in a quote from Corgis Ins. Co., v. Law Offices of

Carole F. Kafrissen, P.C., 186 F. Supp. 2d 567 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2002) “a case is

important for the “what” it decides- for “the what” not for “the way” and not for “the

how” ...” It is also footnoted in Cabeda v. AG of the United States, 971 F. 3d 165 (3d.

Cir. Aug. 18, 2020) that methodological stare decisis is disfavored.

The lower court used obiter methodological stare decisis to dismiss the case

without acknowledging the facts and answering the Constitutional question and

challenge to Judge Wolfson’s administrative internal operation orders. The lower

court failed to acknowledge this Court’s marching orders to follow the Constitution

and not to use an emergency to overthrow the Constitution.

The U.S. Constitution is a Social Contract

Social contract principle says that people live together in society in

accordance with an agreement that establishes moral and political rules of

behavior. Some people believe that if we live according to a social contract, we can

live morally by our own choice and not because a divine being requires it.

Over the centuries, philosophers as far back as Socrates have tried to

describe the ideal social contract, and to explain how existing social contracts have

evolved. Philosopher Stuart Rachels suggests that morality is the set of rules

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governing behavior that rational people accept, on the condition that others accept

them too.

Social contracts can be explicit, such as laws, or implicit, such as raising one’s

hand in class to speak. The U.S. Constitution is often cited as an explicit example of

part of America’s social contract. It sets out what the government can and cannot

do. People who choose to live in America agree to be governed by the moral and

political obligations outlined in the Constitution’s social contract.

This Court’s findings in In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449 (1891) at 461 recognized“By the Constitution, a republican form of government is guaranteed to

every state in the union, and the distinguishing feature of that form is

the right of the people to choose their own officers for governmental

administration, and pass their own laws in virtue of the legislative

power reposed in representative bodies, whose legitimate acts may be

said to be those of the people themselves? but while the people are thus

the source of political power, their governments, national and state,

have been limited by written constitutions, and they have themselves

thereby set bounds to their own power as against the sudden impulses

of mere majorities.”

The government and the people have a written social contract, the Constitution,

that set bounds that limit power as against sudden impulses. In this case that

impulse was to discriminate a government contract, The Constitution, because of

the pandemic, a breach of the social contract that this appeal is to correct.

The Oath of Office is to Uphold the Social Contract, the U.S. Constitution

This Court in Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legis., S. Ct. 28 (U.S.

Oct. 26, 2020) said, “our oath to uphold the Constitution is tested by hard times, not

easy ones. A succumbing to temptation to sidestep the usual Constitutional rules is

Page 32 of 36

never costless. It does damage to the faith in the Constitution as law, to the power

of the people to oversee their own government, and to the authority of legislatures

for more we assume their duties the less incentive they have to discharge them.”

This Court also said, “Public Officials sworn to uphold the Constitution may

not avoid a Constitutional Duty by bowing down to the hypothetical effects of

private racial prejudice that they assume to be both widely and deeply held.”

Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (U.S. April 25, 1984)(Quoting Palmer v. Thompson,

403 U.S. 217, 260 - 261 (1971) (White J. Descending)

The fourth circuit also addressed the oath of office and the duty to upholding

the Constitution, “the difference a court gives the coordinate branches is surely

powerful, but even it must yield in certain circumstances, lest the court abdicate its

own duties to uphold the Constitution... upholding the Constitution undeniably

promotes the public interests. It is always in the public interest to prevent the

violation of parties Constitutional Rights... the public as a whole has significant

interest in ensuring protection of the first amendment liberties. When a court

protects the Constitutional Rights of a few, it inures to the benefit of all.” Inti

refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F. 3d 544 (4th Cir. Md. May 25, 2017).

The nineth circuit also said, “generally public interest concerns are

implicated when a Constitutional Right has been violated because all citizens have

a stake in upholding the Constitution.” Preminger v. Principi, 422 F. 3d. 815 (9th

Cir. Cal. Aug. 25, 2005)

Page 33 of 36

The American people have a contract with their government-the

Constitution of the United States of America. Written in 1787 and amended twentyseven times, this document is the basis for U.S. government. (National Archives and

Records Administration) The oath of office is to enforce the contract between the

people and the government, the U.S. Constitution. The defendants have contracts

with me, the Constitution, and breached that contract. The covenant of good faith

and fair dealing must be incorporated into oath of office and the Constitution.

REASONS TO GRANTING THIS APPEAL

This Area of the Law is Badly in Need of the This Court's Authoritative Voice

This Court's Authoritative Voice in the area of using alleged emergencies to

overthrow the Constitution is badly in need. Throughout the covid-19 pandemic

many courts and politicians have overthrown Constitutional rights using what some

may suppose to be extraordinary emergencies. They went about this illegal business

of overthrowing the Constitution with a brazen assurance that the alleged

emergency would justify the illegal business of overthrowing the Constitution. The

voice of this Court needs to be strictly enforced therefore an Order granting this

appeal is needed to show that all lower courts and inferior government officials are

to properly fulfill their official duties and correct an abuse of discretion of

overthrowing the Constitution. This is exceptional circumstances of peculiar

emergency and public importance. It does damage to faith in the written

Constitution as law, and to the power of the people to oversee their own

government.

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This Case is Likely to Produce an Opinion that Will Give Useful Guidance to the

Lower Courts

The guidance produced by this case will produce a positive useful guidance to

all Constitutional and Covid matters. Overthrowing the Constitution is a serious

offence and any type of overthrowing the Constitution, including viewpoint and

content discriminations, suppressing public debate, alterations and suppression of

facts, fraud on the court, should not be tolerated in cases to fabricate a continuance

and to keep people in jail and frustrate litigants. Business of the Courts is a serious

business, this case will strengthen this fact and make it harder to overthrow the

Constitution and individual rights and enforce time constraints on prosecutions.

There Would Be a Negative National Impact by this Court by Letting the Lower

Court's Decision Stand

The courts are backlogged as it is, and the pandemic caused more backlog.

This zealous incriminations with usurpations of power are causing more backlogs

that will be a negative national impact and have serious consequences.

By letting the lower courts’ decision stand, it will send a message that it’s

okay to disrespect the business of the courts, the Constitution is dead, fraud on the

court and usurpation of power is okay, legislation does not matter, delegation of

authority does not matter, we are a totalitarian nation. It is a bad message to send

at any time and could cause civil unrest that is a negative national impact. The

courts below committed an error so important that it must be corrected

immediately. They were inconsistent with accepted Supreme Court precedents and

made a procedural and technical error that can be demonstrated unequivocally.

Page 35 of 36

CONCLUSION

The Certiorari should be granted or a summary reversal as an alternative remedy.

Respectfully submitted,

Date-

H//SL/3lo3£L

SignatureWilliam F. Kaeta'

437 Abbott Road

Paramus, NJ., 07652

201-753*1063

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.