Amicus Curiae Brief — Amgen Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Sanofi, et al.

NO. 21-757

In the

Supreme Court

of the United States

________________

AMGEN INC., et al.,

v.

Petitioners,

SANOFI, AVENTISUB LLC, et al.,

Respondents.

________________

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

________________

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNERS

ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT

OF NEITHER PARTY

________________

Vanessa Yen

Karen Cochran

Counsel of Record

President

Evan Diamond

Henry Hadad

KING & SPALDING LLP

Chair,

Amicus Brief Committee

1185 Ave. of the

Samantha Aguayo

Americas

Deputy Executive Director 34th Floor

& Chief Policy Counsel

New York, NY 10036

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

(212) 556-2100

vyen@kslaw.com

OWNERS ASSOCIATION

1501 M Street NW

Suite 1150

Washington, DC 20005

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Intellectual Property Owners Association

January 3, 2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................ 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE

ARGUMENT ............................................................ 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 4

I.

Section 112(a) Grounds Enablement in the

Perspective of a Person Skilled in the Art, and

Strikes a Balance Between Ensuring Claimed

Inventions Are Not Unfairly Avoided and Are

Not Given Undue Breadth .................................. 4

II. The Enablement Analysis Is a Fact-Intensive

Inquiry Aided by, but Not Exhaustively

Limited to, the Federal Circuit’s “Wands

Factors” Test, as Applied from the

Perspective of a Person Skilled in the Art........ 11

III. U.S. Patents are Presumed Valid, and the

Patent Challenger in Federal District Court

Litigation Must Prove § 112(a) Invalidity by

Clear and Convincing Evidence ........................ 13

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 14

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Alcon Rsch. Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc.

745 F.3d 1180 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................ 8

Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours

& Co.

750 F.2d. 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ............................... 8

Bilski v. Kappos

561 U.S. 593 (2010) .................................................. 5

Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc.

339 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................................ 7

Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.

323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ................................ 10

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo

Kabushiki Co.

535 U.S. 722 (2002) .................................................. 2

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.

Co.

339 U.S. 605 (1950) .................................................. 4

Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.

802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ................................ 7

In re Angstadt

537 F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A. 1976) ............................ 7, 10

In re Borkowski

422 F.2d 904 (C.C.P.A. 1970) .................................. 8

In re Bosy

360 F.2d 972 (C.C.P.A. 1966) .................................. 7

In re Geerdes

491 F.2d 1260 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ................................ 9

iii

In re Myers

410 F.2d 420 (C.C.P.A. 1969) .................................. 7

In re Storrs

245 F.2d 474 (C.C.P.A. 1957) .................................. 6

In re Wands

858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988) .................. 3, 5, 11, 12

Loom Co. v. Higgins

105 U.S. 580 (1881) .................................................. 7

Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited P’ship

564 U.S. 91 (2011) .............................................. 3, 13

Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde

242 U.S. 261 (1916) .............................................. 6, 9

Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs

459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied,

127 S. Ct. 2062 (2007).............................................. 8

Mowry v. Whitney

81 (14 Wall.) U.S. 620 (1871)................................... 6

Statutes

35 U.S.C. § 112(a) ............................................. passim

35 U.S.C. § 282(a) ..................................................... 13

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Amicus curiae Intellectual Property Owners

Association (IPO)1 is an international trade

association representing a “big tent” of diverse

companies, law firms, service providers, and

individuals in all industries and fields of technology

that own, or are interested in, intellectual property

(IP) rights. IPO represents some of the most

innovative companies in the United States. IPO’s

almost 200 corporate members develop, manufacture,

and sell technology-based products in a wide range of

industries. IPO is committed to serving the interests

of all intellectual property owners in all industries and

all fields of technology.

Founded in 1972, IPO’s mission is to promote high

quality and enforceable IP rights and predictable legal

systems for all industries and technologies. IPO

advocates effective, affordable, and balanced IP rights

before both Congress and the United States Patent

and Trademark Office (USPTO) and has filed amicus

curiae briefs in this Court and other courts on

significant issues of intellectual property law. The

members of IPO’s Board of Directors, which approved

the filing of this brief, are listed in the attached

Appendix.2

1 No counsel of record for any party authored this brief in whole

or in part, and no person or entity other than amicus curiae made

a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this

brief. All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.

2 IPO procedures require approval of positions in briefs by a

two-thirds majority of directors present and voting.

2

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

IPO’s corporate members invest tens of billions of

dollars annually on research and development and

employ hundreds of thousands of scientists, engineers,

and others in the United States to develop, produce,

and market innovative new products and services. To

protect their inventions, IPO’s members collectively

hold tens of thousands of U.S. patents and account for

a substantial portion of the patent applications filed

every year at the USPTO.

This case presents an issue of substantial

practical importance to IPO. The legal doctrine and

statutory provision at issue here—“enablement”

under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)—have been a critical

component of United States patent law from the

earliest days of the nation and remain so today. The

enablement standard of § 112(a) reflects the balance

between the public disclosure function of the patent

specification (i.e., teaching others skilled in the art to

make and use the claimed invention) and the timelimited innovation encouragement functions of patent

claims (i.e., granting the patentee the right to exclude

others from infringing the claimed invention).

The enablement analysis under § 112(a) should be

applied in a predictable and fair manner that is

consistent with the statutory language and

longstanding precedent and should not “disrupt the

settled expectations of the inventing community.” See

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,

535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002). Section 112(a) and this

Court’s precedent require that the enablement

analysis is to be performed from the perspective of a

3

“person skilled in the art.” In assessing § 112(a)

enablement, courts are to consider whether a skilled

person reading the patent specification (and armed

with the prior art knowledge and technical skills

available to a skilled person) could make and use the

claimed invention without undue experimentation.

Taken together, these principles ground enablement

in a fact-specific, flexible analysis that is adaptable to

the particular technological field at hand and reflects

the understanding, knowledge, and abilities of a

skilled person in that field.

The Federal Circuit also has developed the eightcomponent “Wands factors” analysis that is a helpful

tool for evaluating and balancing the various

competing considerations in the enablement analysis

under § 112(a), though it is not an exhaustive list of

all relevant considerations. The ultimate question

under § 112(a) remains whether, on the factual record

at hand, the specification would enable a person

skilled in the art to make and use the claimed

invention without undue experimentation.

Further, it is important to maintain the

appropriate burden of proof when assessing

enablement under § 112(a). For example, when

enablement arises as an invalidity defense in federal

district court, the burden always rests on the patent

challenger to prove lack of enablement by clear and

convincing evidence. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited

P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 100-03 (2011). Likewise, because

the § 112(a) enablement analysis is a fact-intensive

inquiry that can depend heavily on technical evidence

regarding the perspective of a person skilled in the art,

it is important for courts on appeal to give due

4

deference

to

the

fact-finder’s

credibility

determinations in weighing competing expert

evidence. See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde

Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 611 (1950).

ARGUMENT

I.

Section 112(a) Grounds Enablement in the

Perspective of a Person Skilled in the Art,

and Strikes a Balance Between Ensuring

Claimed Inventions Are Not Unfairly

Avoided and Are Not Given Undue Breadth

1. The statutory standard for enablement is

found in 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), which states:

The specification shall contain a written

description of the invention, and of the

manner and process of making and using

it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms

as to enable any person skilled in the art

to which it pertains, or with which it is most

nearly connected, to make and use the

same . . . .3

This statutory language derives from predecessor

statutes dating back to the founding of the country,4

Unless otherwise noted, all emphasis is added, and all

internal citations and internal quotation marks are omitted.

3

The 1836 and 1870 Patent Acts included provisions with

essentially the same statutory language (see Act of July 4, 1836,

ch. 357 § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26,

16 Stat. 198, 201). The 1793 Patent Act further provided that the

written description “shall . . . distinguish [the invention] from all

other things before known” (Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 3,

1 Stat. 318, 321–22)—a requirement that the 1836 Act

4

5

and was carried forward into the 1952 Patent Act as

35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (pre-AIA), now recodified as

§ 112(a) (AIA).

The language of § 112(a) first addresses what the

patent specification (i.e., the body of the patent) must

contain: “a written description of the invention, and of

the manner and process of making and using it.”

Second, § 112(a) provides that the aforementioned

written description is to be “in such full, clear, concise,

and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in

the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the

same.” Put simply, the enablement inquiry under the

statutory language of § 112(a) asks whether, for a

“person skilled in the art,” the written description

is sufficiently “full, clear, concise, and exact” to

“enable” the skilled person to “make and use” the

invention claimed.

As discussed below, while the Federal Circuit has

developed helpful frameworks to assess whether a

patent’s specification comports with the statutory

enablement requirement, such as the “Wands factors”

(see Section II infra), it is important that the

enablement analysis remains faithful to the statutory

language of § 112(a) and the balance reflected by that

language. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602

(2010) (“[C]ourts should not read into the patent laws

limitations and conditions which the legislature has

not expressed.”).

2.

This Court and others have ruled that

enablement under § 112(a) and its statutory

subsequently eliminated in conjunction with introducing patent

claims separate from the specification.

6

predecessors is assessed from the perspective of a

“person skilled in the art”—the intended audience for

patents. See, e.g., In re Storrs, 245 F.2d 474, 478

(C.C.P.A. 1957) (“In determining the certainty

required [under § 112(a)], it cannot be forgotten that

the disclosure is not addressed to the public generally,

but to those skilled in the art.”) (citing Mowry v.

Whitney, 81 (14 Wall.) U.S. 620 (1871)); Mowry, 81

U.S. at 644 (“The specification . . . is to be addressed

to those skilled in the art, and is to be comprehensible

by them.”).

A patent specification thus need not disclose all

information known to a person skilled in the art—such

that a skilled person could fill in the patent disclosure

with their knowledge. In other words, a patent

specification might be sufficiently enabling when read

in view of the technical comprehension, prior art

knowledge, and routine experimental techniques

available to a person skilled in the art, though it may

not be apparent as such to a lay person. See, e.g.,

Mowry, 81 U.S. at 644 (“The specification . . . may be

sufficient, though the unskilled may not be able to

gather from it how to use the invention. . . . Addressed

as it is to those skilled in the art, it may leave

something to their skill in applying the invention

. . . .”). The extent of description sufficient to enable a

claimed invention may vary depending on the nature

of the technological art at hand and the knowledge and

abilities of a person skilled in that art. See, e.g.,

Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270

(1916) (“[T]he certainty which the law requires in

patents is not greater than is reasonable, having

regard to their subject matter.”); Mowry, 81 U.S. at

644 (“[I]t is evident that the definiteness of a

7

specification must vary with the nature of its

subject.”).

For example, because patents are “directed to

those skilled in the art,” this Court and others have

held that the “specification need not teach or point out

in detail that which is well-known in the art.” In re

Myers, 410 F.2d 420, 424 (C.C.P.A. 1969); see also In

re Bosy, 360 F.2d 972, 976 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (“That

which is common and well known [to a person skilled

in the art] is as if it were written out in the patent.”)

(quoting Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 586

(1881)); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.,

802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[A] patent need

not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in

the art.”). Accordingly, the “omission” of some claimed

subject matter from the specification “is not fatal” to

enablement under § 112(a) “where . . . the disclosure

is sufficient to enable those skilled in the art to

practice the invention.” See Myers, 410 F.2d at 424

(emphasis in original).

Likewise, “an applicant is not required to describe

in the specification every conceivable possible and

future embodiment of his invention.” Cordis Corp. v.

Medtronic AVE, Inc., 339 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir.

2003); see also In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 503

(C.C.P.A. 1976) (explaining that patentees “are not

required to disclose every species encompassed by

their claims even in an unpredictable art,” and that

“each case must be determined on its own facts”)

(emphasis in original). While specific “working

examples” can be helpful to consider in assessing

enablement under § 112(a), “the number and variety

of examples are irrelevant if the disclosure is

8

‘enabling’ . . . .” See In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 910

(C.C.P.A. 1970) (“[T]here is no magical relation

between the number of representative examples and

the breadth of the claims.”). Depending on the facts, it

is even possible for a patent specification to be

enabling though it contains no working examples of

the claimed invention. See, e.g., id. at 908 (“[A]

specification need not contain a working example if

the invention is otherwise disclosed in such a manner

that one skilled in the art will be able to practice it

without an undue amount of experimentation.”); Alcon

Rsch. Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1189

(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A] patent does not need to

guarantee that the invention works for a claim to be

enabled. . . . [A] patentee is not required to provide

actual working examples . . . .”).

Depending on the level of skill and the facts—

courts have also found that patents can claim more

than their specific exemplary embodiments, and that

patent claims may be enabled even where making and

using the claimed invention may involve some routine

experimentation or testing by a skilled person—so

long as such testing does not amount to “undue

experimentation.” See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,

459 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127

S. Ct. 2062 (2007) (“The fact that some

experimentation may be necessary to produce the

invention does not render the [patent-in-suit] invalid

for lack of enablement.”) (emphasis in original); Atlas

Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750

F.2d. 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“That some

experimentation is necessary does not preclude

enablement; the amount of experimentation, however,

must not be unduly extensive.”); In re Geerdes, 491

9

F.2d 1260, 1265 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“[Whether]

‘experimentation’ is involved in [practicing the

claimed invention] . . . is not determinative of the

question of scope of enablement. It is only undue

experimentation which is fatal.”) (emphasis in

original).

For example, in a case concerning the oil

treatment of metal ores, this Court upheld claims

covering “a large class of [ore] substances and . . .

range of treatment [conditions]”—despite finding that

“preliminary tests” were needed to successfully

practice the invention for each individual ore

potentially within the claim scope. See Minerals

Separation, 242 U.S. at 270-71. The Court found the

specification was “clearly sufficiently definite to guide

those skilled in the art to its successful application,”

even though (1) “[t]he composition of ores [within the

scope of the claims] varie[d] infinitely, each one

presenting its special problem,” and (2) the

specification depended upon “the skill of persons

applying the invention” to test and identify the

appropriate treatment conditions for each ore

embodiment. See id. The Court recognized that a

person skilled in the art would have viewed such

testing as “reasonable” given the subject matter—

including because “it is obviously impossible to specify

in a patent the precise treatment . . . in each case” to

successfully practice the claimed invention across the

“large”—perhaps “infinit[e]”—class of ores within its

scope. See id.

3. Courts have recognized that enablement under

§ 112(a) requires a balanced analysis with sensitivity

to the particular facts of each case, including the

10

knowledge and abilities of skilled persons to whom

patents are addressed, and the practicalities of

disclosure and routine experimentation in the

pertinent art.

Consistent with the decisions of this Court and

others described above, the enablement requirement

should not be read to compel a recitation of every

potential embodiment a claim covers. Applying a

standard where patents can only claim the specific

embodiments actually made and disclosed might not

provide effective patent protection—especially in

fields such as biotechnology where narrow claims are

easily designed around with minor, non-innovative

changes. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe

Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also

Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 502-03 (expressing concern over

“discourag[ing] inventors from filing patent

applications in an unpredictable area”).

On the other hand, courts have held that the

enablement requirement prevents patent claim scope

from extending beyond what a skilled person would be

enabled to make and use without “undue

experimentation.” See Section III infra. In each case,

it is critical to apply the perspective of a person skilled

in the art, including in assessing the ability of such a

person to perform any experimentation required to

make and use the claimed invention, and whether the

amount of experimentation would be undue.

11

II. The Enablement Analysis Is a Fact-Intensive

Inquiry Aided by, but Not Exhaustively

Limited to, the Federal Circuit’s “Wands

Factors” Test, as Applied from the

Perspective of a Person Skilled in the Art

IPO comments briefly here on the Federal

Circuit’s “Wands factors” analysis for assessing

enablement under § 112(a).

1. The “Wands factors,” first promulgated in a

1988 Federal Circuit decision as guidance for patent

examiners, is a list of eight factors for assessing

whether patent claims fail the Federal Circuit’s

“undue experimentation” standard for lack of

enablement under § 112(a)—i.e., whether a person

skilled in the art could not make and use the claimed

invention without “undue experimentation.” See In re

Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The

Federal Circuit has regularly relied upon these factors

in assessing enablement for matters on appeal from

both federal district courts and the Patent Office. The

Federal Circuit’s Wands factors include:

(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary,

(2) the amount of direction or guidance presented,

(3) the presence or absence of working examples,

(4) the nature of the invention,

(5) the state of the prior art,

(6) the relative skill of those in the art,

(7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art,

and

(8) the breadth of the claims.

12

See id.

2. IPO notes that the Wands factors are not an

exhaustive list of all considerations that may be

pertinent to assessing enablement under § 112(a) in a

given case. That said, IPO views the Wands factors as

a useful analytical framework for assessing whether a

patent specification is sufficient to enable a skilled

person to make and use the claimed invention without

undue experimentation.

3. As a creation of the Federal Circuit, the Wands

factors are to be applied consistently with the

statutory language of § 112(a) and the precedent of

this Court—including the statutory requirement that

the enablement analysis is conducted from the

perspective of a person skilled in the art. For example,

while “the breadth of the claims” and “the presence or

absence of working examples” are two considerations

under the Wands factors, they are to be appropriately

balanced against the other Wands factors, including

factors such as “the state of the prior art” and “the

relative skill of those in the art” reflecting the

background knowledge and routine experimental

skills that a person skilled in the art can bring to

making and using the claimed invention.

The Wands factors also reflect a fact-intensive

analysis and should be sensitive and adapt flexibly to

the particular facts in each case—including with

respect to the specific technology at hand and the

specialized understanding, knowledge, and abilities of

a person skilled in the art. Ultimately, the facts in

each case will guide whether the Wands factors and

any other pertinent considerations weigh sufficiently

towards nonenablement under the applicable burden

13

of proof (e.g., clear and convincing evidence of

invalidity as proven by the patent challenger). See

Section III infra.

III. U.S. Patents are Presumed Valid, and the

Patent Challenger in Federal District Court

Litigation Must Prove § 112(a) Invalidity by

Clear and Convincing Evidence

Issued U.S. patents are presumed valid. 35 U.S.C.

§ 282(a). As this Court and others have held, the

burden of proving any invalidity defense in cases

originating in federal district court always falls on the

patent challenger to prove its defense by clear and

convincing evidence. See i4i, 564 U.S. at 100-03. With

respect to § 112(a), this means that the challenger

must show by clear and convincing evidence that the

patent specification fails to enable a person skilled in

the art to make and use the claimed invention—rather

than shifting the burden to the patent holder any time

a patent claim of meaningful breadth is challenged.

Moreover, in a case where each party presents

equally credible fact and expert evidence as to whether

a patent’s written description would have been

sufficient to enable a person skilled in the art to make

and use the claimed invention, the tie goes to the

patentee. In light of the primacy of the “person skilled

in the art” in the statutory language of § 112(a), it is

critical that judges reviewing federal district court

decisions on appeal (or federal district court judges

reviewing jury verdicts) not substitute their lay

judgment for the fact-finder’s credibility assessments

of fact and expert witness evidence regarding the

perspective of a skilled artisan as it relates to the

enablement analysis.

14

Whether or not enablement is ultimately

considered an issue of law, the assessment of whether

the specification is sufficient to enable a skilled person

to make and use the claimed invention—and

particularly, whether the patent challenger has

proved the contrary by clear and convincing

evidence—is necessarily a highly fact-dependent

analysis that should be reviewed with appropriate

deference and caution.

CONCLUSION

Without taking a position on the merits of the

specific underlying case, IPO urges the Court to

acknowledge the controlling statutory requirements of

35 U.S.C. § 112(a), including that the enablement

analysis is to be conducted from the perspective of a

person skilled in the art. IPO further encourages the

Court to continue allowing a fact-specific analysis to

determine whether the specification enables a skilled

artisan to make and use the claimed invention without

undue experimentation—with relevant competing

factors to be balanced and assessed as a whole under

the appropriate burden of proof, and with appropriate

weight given on appeal to the credibility

determinations of fact-finders.

15

Respectfully submitted,

Karen Cochran

President

Henry Hadad

Chair,

Amicus Brief Committee

Samantha Aguayo

Deputy Executive Director

& Chief Policy Counsel

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

OWNERS ASSOCIATION

1501 M Street NW

Suite 1150

Washington, DC 20005

Vanessa Yen

Counsel of Record

Evan Diamond

KING & SPALDING LLP

1185 Ave. of the Americas

34th Floor

New York, NY 10036

(212) 556-2100

vyen@kslaw.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Intellectual Property Owners Association

January 3, 2023

APPENDIX

1a

Appendix

APPENDIX — MEMBERS

OF THE BOARD OF

DIRECTORS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

OWNERS ASSOCIATION

Steve Akerley

InterDigital Holdings,

Inc.

Brett Alten

Hewlett Packard

Enterprise

Matthew Anderson

Medtronic, Inc.

Ronald Antush

Nokia of Americas

Corp.

Tonya Combs

Eli Lilly and Co.

Gwendolyn Dawson

Exxon Mobil Corp.

Buckmaster de Wolf

General Electric Co.

Robert DeBerardine

Johnson & Johnson

Anthony DiBartolomeo

SAP SE

Scott Barker

Micron Technology, Inc.

Daniel Enebo

Cargill, Inc.

Thomas R. Beall

Corning Incorporated

Matthew Fitzpatrick

Procter & Gamble Co.

Tyrome Brown

Dolby Laboratories

Yen Florczak

3M Innovative

Properties Co.

John J. Cheek

Tenneco Inc.

Karen Cochran

Shell Oil Company

Louis Foreman

Enventys

Scott M. Frank

AT&T

2a

Appendix

Darryl P. Frickey

Dow Chemical Co.

Michael C. Lee

Google Inc.

Gary C. Ganzi

Evoqua Water

Technologies, LLC

Elizabeth Lester

Equifax Inc.

Tanuja Garde

The Boeing Co.

Aseem Mehta

Bayer Intellectual

Property GmbH

Robert Giles

Qualcomm Inc.

William Miller

General Mills, Inc.

Laura Ginkel

Merck & Co.

Kelsey L. Milman

Caterpillar Inc.

Krish Gupta

Dell Technologies

Jeffrey Myers

Apple Inc.

Henry Hadad

Bristol-Myers Squibb

Co.

Robin Nava

Schlumberger, Ltd.

Lori Heinrichs

Boston Scientific Corp.

Thomas R. Kingsbury

Bridgestone Americas,

Inc.

Laurie Kowalsky

Koninklijke Philips N.V.

Christina Petersson

Ericsson

Troy Prince

Raytheon Technologies

KaRan Reed

BP America, Inc.

Paul Saraceni

Nike, Inc.

3a

Appendix

Matthew Sarboraria

Oracle USA Inc.

Manny Schecter

IBM Corp.

Derek Scott

Roche, Inc.

Jessica Sinnott

DuPont

Thomas Smith

GlaxoSmithKline

Daniel Staudt

Siemens Corp.

Gillian Thackray

Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.

Phyllis Turner-Brim

HP Inc.

Bryan Zielinski

Pfizer Inc.