Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Robert R. Snyder, Petitioner v. Kathleen Allison, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, et al.

Supreme Court briefNov 11, 2021

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

(«< I2'

AlO

No. %!

In Cfje

Supreme Court of tl)e Xtnite5 States

ROBERT R. SNYDER,

Petitioner,

vs.

KATHLEEN ALLISON, Sec. CDCR,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ROBERT R. SNYDER, In Pro Se

D.O.C. No. AC9136,

480 Alta Road

San Diego, CA 92179

(626) 201-8302

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

•

Did the lower court’s incorrectly apply Christopher v.

Harbury in its attempt justify the dismissal of

Petitioner’s Active Interference claims? Does

Harbury have any relevance to cases seeking

prospective relief only?

•

Did the lower courts improperly apply Lewis v. Casey

to Petitioner’s claims in the same manner?

•

Should the district court have ruled on the

challenges as to the constitutionality of state

regulations that appeared to run contrary to

applicable Federal judicial decisions?

•

Did the Court of Appeals overlook procedural due

process errors including but not limited to having

combined an appealable dismissal Order with a nonappealable screening Order?

•

Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, did

the Court of Appeals decision to uphold the district

court’s determinations.., amount to an unjust legal

error requiring Reversal?

•

Did the Court of Appeals improperly apply Hebbe v.

Pliler’s plausibility standard for the first time on

appeal?

•

Did the Court of Appeals’ minute Memorandum

affirming the lower court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s

Appeal, adequately address all of the claims in

appellant’s comprehensive Opening Brief?

•

Would it be safe to say that actively and

continuously erecting barriers for the sole purpose of

interference with a prisoner’s right of physical access

to prison Law Library.., constitutes an injury per

se? And does this type of deprivation become a

matter involving the impairment of personal liberty?

•

If there were actual pleadings deficiencies that

rendered the complaint implausible, could that be

easily attributable to being arbitrarily denied

physical law library access during critical periods of

time?

•

Based upon the current three-circuit consensus,

should the well-reasoned active interference doctrine

become a constitutionally recognized exception to the

holding in Lewis v. Casey?

iii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner: Robert R. Snyder was the

petitioner in the lower court, district court

and in the court of appeals proceedings.

Respondents: Initially, Kathleen Allison,

CDCR Secretary; A. Mondet, R.J.D Ed.

Supervisor; and Librarians: C. Tiscornia

and D. Nowroozian.

Plaintiff is seeking review of a judgment from

the United States Court of Appeals. There

was no response to the Opening Brief, and of

the original respondents, only the AG (for the

CDCR) was served.

NO RELATED CASES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . .

OPINIONS AND ORDERS

Opinions and Orders from the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals........................................

Opinions and Orders from the Southern District

Court of California............................................

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI . .

ARGUMENT

A: Introduction

B: The Central Issues

C: Other Related Points Helpful In Determining

The Core Questions

D: Reading And Learning Is A Major Life

Activity, The Deprivation Of Which

Impairs Fundamental Personal Liberty. .

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

CONCLUSION

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

VERIFICATION

APPENDIX

Order Finalizing Judgment for the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

September 17, 2021

App. 1-2

Order Affirming the District Court’s Dismissal,

August 26, 2021

App. 3—6

Order Dismissing Plaintiffs Second Amended

Complaint by the Southern District Court

of California, January 8, 2021 .... App. 7—15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Federal Cases

Bounds u. Smith, 430 U.S 817 (1977)

10, 22

Casey v. Lewis,

43 F.3d 1261, (9th Cir. 1994)

9, 13, 21

Chitwood v. Dowd,

889 F.2d 781, (C A 8, 1989)

Christopher u. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403

(2002).............................................

8, 11, 12, 13

Cody v. Weber, 256 F.3d 764, 769 (2001)

Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 7 (1984)

Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105

(N.D. Cal. 1970)...............

Gray u. Salao,

U.S. Dist. Lexis 101711 (2011)

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, (2010)

John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228, 235

(6th Cir., 1992)........................

10, 11

Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487,491

(1969)............................................... 10, 17, 20, 22

vii

Kaufman v. Schneiter,

474 F. Supp. 2d. 1014, 1030-31

(2007, W.D. Wise.)....................

Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343 (1996)

passim

Madewell v. Roberts,

909 F.2d 1203, 1207 (C A 8th 1990)

McDonald u. Smith,

472 U.S 479, 484 (1985)

Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2

(9th Cir., 2009).................................

Pell v. Procunier,

417 U.S. 817, 828 (1974)

Plata v. Schwarzenegger, (2005)

U.S. Dist. Lexus 43796 (*9)

Procunier v. Martinez,

416 U.S. 396 (1974)

Sanders, 724 F.2d 665 (C A 8th 1983)

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S 472, 483-84

(1995).............................................

Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171

(9th Cir., 1989)..........................

Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090

(9th Cir., 2010)....................

9, 10

viii

Smaj v. AT&T,

291 F.3d 955, 956 (7th Cir., 2002)

Snyder v. Nolen,

380 F.3d 279, 290 (7th Cir., 2004)

10, 11

Stone v. Mississippi,

101 U.S. 814, 819 (1879)

Straub v. Monge,

815 F.2d 1467, 1469, 1470

(11th Cir., 1987)................

17, 21

Talk v. Delta Airlines,

165 F.3d 1021, (C A 5, 1999)

Turner v. Safely,

482 U.S. 78, at 90 (1987)

United States v. Contreras, 667 F.2d 976,

979 (11th Cir., 1982)......................

Federal Statutes

28U.S.C. § 1254

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

Federal Rules

Sup. Ct. Rule 14

Sup Ct. Rules 10(a), R. 13, & R. 30

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Robert Snyder respectfully petitions for a writ

of certiorari to review an appeal of the dismissal of a

civil rights complaint by the U.S. District Court for

the Southern District Court of California.

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

Opinions and Orders From the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals.

This court’s mandate was filed on

September 17, 2021. The finalizing of its judgment of

the matter is attached at App. 1 and 2.

The August 26, 2021 court order affirming the

District Courts dismissal of plaintiff-appellant’s civil

rights claim on direct appeal is attached at App.’s 3

through 6 for Case No. 21-55105.

Opinions and Orders From Southern

District Court of California:

The January 8, 2021 order dismissing

Plaintiff s Second Amended Complaint for

declaratory relief is attached at App.’s 7 through 15

for Case No. 19-cv-01741-LAB.

JURISDICTION

This Petition is authorized by United States

Supreme Court rules, Rule 10 subds. (a),(c) and is

timely filed in accordance with Rule 13 and 30. This

action is also 28 U.S.C. § 1254 relative.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

This pro se Petitioner’s case involves issues

related to the First and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The controversy began right after officials

moved the yard’s library into an off-limits

inaccessible security area, which allowed them to

restrict prisoner access more easily. Therefore,

petitioner filed his civil rights Complaint in the

Southern District Court of California in September

2019. From there, over the next 16 months he

diligently pleaded his cause, which amounted to

nothing more than a misadventure. Petitioner

attempted to appeal the dismissal of the TRO: C A

9/No. 19-56521. The case was ultimately dismissed

with prejudice in February of 2021. Snyder filed

both a timely notice of appeal in the Ninth Circuit,

Federal Court of Appeals, along with an Opening

Brief. On August 26th, 2021 the court completed its

review with a 2-page decision affirming the district

court’s denial of relief; their mandate issued on

September 17th, 2021.

Prisoner/petitioner Snyder without counsel,

lodged evidence in the trial court that presented a

strong case against the state actors for flagrant civil

rights violations. Federal Questions were timely, as

well as properly introduced in both the lower courts.

Pars interponere’s complaint set forth a unique

formula claiming the right to relief. Primarily, the

public officials involved had actively and intention

ally interfered with his right to physical access to a

law library. The defaulted claims and retaliation1

features were both minor themes although the court

tried to make much of them for the purpose of

dismissing the case purely on procedural grounds.

The district court’s unwillingness to protect Snyder’s

rights here was error; of which this high court should

be aware.

The facts material to the district court’s

consideration involved a highly coordinated

interference scheme, to deprive prisoners of legal

research at critical periods where deadlines were

pending—all the while pretending these abrupt

1 Either way, the defendants’ retaliation manifested itself

through the cleverly arranged obstacles to physical library

access; Cf. Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1207 (C A 8th

1990); (“The violation lies in the intent to impede access to

Courts.”) See Sanders, 724 F.2d 665 (C A 8th 1983).

library closures were somehow justified by pretextual or otherwise speculative, institutional

concerns. For long periods of time, prison officials

employed strategies to impair Petitioner’s progress

in court. His First Amendment rights were so often

being obstructed by powerful combinations of

misconduct—to such an extent that the ordinary

course of administrative procedures could not

suppress their efforts. The new prisoner’s grievance

system within Cal. DOC has become a byword for

futility...

The state’s current regulatory scheme allows 4

hours weekly for inmates with active cases and only

where a current deadline is pending. The lower

court was confronted with facts suggesting that

prisoners could not make effective use of those 4

hours because the library was missing most

secondary sources of law such as digests, treatises,

law reviews and updated case law. This is besides

the fact that 4 hours even at an academic library

facility, is simply not enough time to conduct

meaningful legal research for one case, never mind

two. Without an ample lot of research time, it is

difficult to know if a single case exists that can draw

a clearer factual comparison—to the instant

matter—than would two or three decisions

constructed side-by-side.

The trial court was unaffected by the highly

detailed second amended complaint. It decided to

again summarily derail the claims under the often

relied upon 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Neither the

magistrate nor the state’s attorneys were allowed to

weigh in over the course of this 30-document suit.

The entire matter was personally handled by the

Chief District Judge. In the process of screening out

Petitioner’s claims, the “CJ” utilized a confusing

mixture of procedures to bulldoze the pro se litigant

right out of the courtroom. The crux of his treatment

was not that the complaints were completely barred

under Casey, rather that the pleadings were

deficient as put forth. Not allowing the state to

defend itself, shortened the appeals process to the

people’s credit. This injuriously prejudiced the

Plaintiff-Appellant in that the state’s attorneys could

not have been as proficient in handling their own

defense. Do these deplorable circumstances

described above warrant renewed constitutional

inquiry?

REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

The state's educational goals for its prisoners

are not quite as important overall as their obligation

to provide medical care. However, with very many

limitations upon our pursuit of hope and happiness..,

learning the law is paramount. In order for

convicted criminals to improve their character, they

need to know that the judiciary will act to safeguard

their constitutionally protected rights to personal

liberties. They are confined with a view towards a

restoration of sanity and improving marketable

skills. Erecting insurmountable barriers to the gates

of knowledge strikes at the very core of our nation's

foundational principles of justice and reform based

incarceration. The Department of Corrections

cannot offer any objective rationale for how and why

library closure still seems to persist.2

In the case at bar, the district court unjustly

upheld the aggressive misconduct of multiple

defendants whom—over the course of years—had

collectively deprived petitioner of his rights to

petition the government for a redress of

grievances. They accomplished this in many ways

and to this day.., the aforementioned privation

continues. The Court of Appeals paid tribute to the

southern district’s dismissal. A grant of certiorari

here would enjoy broad public support. Corrections

agencies are not known to correct systemic,

constitutional deficiencies without judicial

intervention. The legal errors complained of and

described herein, incorrectly precluded the proper

investigation of the truth; i.e., discovery and trial.

The litigation in the lower court only focused

on a limited aspect of a much larger, overall

problem. For the judgment in this case to be allowed

to stand, undisturbed. . , would further encourage

CDCR’s library officials to easily suppress prisoner

speech. The striking rhetoric in the second amended

complaint lodged below, did nothing to overstate the

problem. Violations of the First Amendment are the

worst when a state is defendant. Petitioner supplied

the district court with tangible documents and

nearly a dozen willing witnesses to establish facts

2 As early as 1970, the district court had to order injunctive

relief in Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970).

and circumstances to suggest something much worse

is taking place, than the usual denial of court access.

The prison officials are perpetrating this in a

manner that seems to maintain an appearance of

propriety. Individual wardens wield extensive

independent authority in determining local operating

procedures. These ‘operational silos’ result in a lack

of accountability and responsibility by educational

administrators in Sacramento, Cf. Plata v.

Schwarzenegger, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexus 43796 (*9).

The noted problems are further complicated—

librarians are pointing fingers at custody staff; the

prison officials are pretending they do not know

what’s going on. In many respects, California’s

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

operates under a veil of secrecy that needs to be

pierced; God forbid this caustic mixture of scienter

and malice intent would coalesce statewide.

ARGUMENT

A. Introduction

How does one imprisoned go about obtaining

sufficient legal research when the librarians know

the suit is directed at their colleagues? The records

lodged in the lower courts effectively demonstrated

Petitioner’s difficulties in this regard. The right to

learn the law while incarcerated is a matter of

personal liberty. This case presents the court with

serious questions going to the administration of a

state prison system.

No one, including a prison warden should be

allowed to dispense with a prisoner’s most valuable

asset; the prison’s law library is the sole vehicle for

obtaining meaningful access to the courts. Whether

by local policy, custom or otherwise this case proves

how many unjust interference methods are available

to prison officials. Res ipsa loqitur: (1) defaulted

claims; (2) continuous denial of physical library

access without adequate substitute; (3) retaliatory

disciplinary reports; (4) deficient book collection; (5)

a hostile work environment and more. Each time the

Plaintiffs complaint was dismissed, the librarian’s

confidence led to reduced library access. Everything

that could go wrong with a library setting, went

wrong... And the district court pleadings captured as

much. Once the appeal was filed, the library time

increased; that was right up until it was affirmed...

Despite the lenient standard for a showing of

good cause in the early stages of litigation, vital

inquiry as to causation was prevented. To make

matters worse, petitioner Snyder’s legal action was

ultimately met with what prison litigants call the

‘procedural okey doke’.3 Although the facts

presented below indicate petitioner was injured.., the

district court’s erroneous dismissal relied exclusively

on the misapplied Casey and Harbury combination.

3 Petitioner 'faced roadblocks at every turn' in trying to enforce

his rights; Chitwood v. Dowd, 889 F.2d 781, (C A 8, 1989).

In this case, the majority of the numerous

actual injuries were derived from the ongoing

interference itself. The Ninth Circuit’s post Casey

decision in Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090 (2010)

should have provided safe passage for the PlaintiffAppellant. The fact that all claims were preserved—

from the trial court pleadings—went overlooked. At

the very least, the court failed to uphold Snyder’s

substantial rights.

To bring the factual triptych together in

proper legal context, Petitioner now requests the

Court would direct attention to the failure of

consideration by the appellate courts, along side the

merits of his district court complaint.

B: The Central Issues

It is certain, that at least three circuits have

recognized ‘actual interference’ as the exception to the

‘actual injury’ rule in Lewis v. Casey4 regarding denial of

court access claims; 518 U.S. 343 (1996). To make this

certiorari possible, the court of appeals departed from

their own precedent. Because the Appellant’s brief

plainly depended upon many of its own decisions—■

including Silva supra—it seems now as though the

court welcomed the Constitutional challenge now at

hand.

4 The case history reveals that this arrived from the Ninth

Circuit’s Casey v. Lewis; 43 F.3d 1261, (1994).

To begin, the Opening Brief quoted Silva id. at

1103, “Lewis does not speak to a prisoner’s right to

litigate in the court’s without unreasonable inter

ference...” The language expressed here suggests that

the ninth circuit identifies intentional interference with

physical library access, as an exceptional violation

that was not included in the analysis by the Lewis

Court. Neither Bounds v. Smith nor Lewis v. Casey

treated the question: What happens if custody agents

obstruct library access with physical barriers?

Looking further ahead (Silva id. at 1102)

explains, in Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166,1171 (9th

Cir., 1989) “...that the court must first determine

whether the right of access claimant alleges .., a denial

of adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from

persons trained in the law. Secondly, if the claims do

not involve such an allegation, the court must consider

whether the Plaintiff has alleged an actual injury5 to

court access. Two of our sister courts have recognized

this distinction. See Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 290

(7th Cir., 2004); and John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228,

235 (6th Cir., 1992). Furthermore, “In the interference

line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that ‘the First

Amendment right to petition the government, includes

the right to file other civil actions in court that have a

reasonable basis in law and fact.’ ” [Snyder supra at 290

citing McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S 479, 484 (1985).]

Finally on 1102, the Silva court wrote “The right of

court access does not require prison officials to provide

5 According to the 8th Cir., actual injury may rely upon

something as simple as the state having improperly seized legal

documents; Cody v. Weber, (2001) 256 F.3d 764, 769.

affirmative assistance in the preparation of legal

papers, but rather forbids states from ‘erecting barriers

that impede the right of access of incarcerated persons.”’

(quoting John L. id. at 235; Accord, Snyder id. at 291—

“The right of access to the courts is the right of an

individual, whether free or incarcerated to obtain access

to the courts without undue interference."). We have

nothing to the contrary indicating these statements

were not well reasoned.

It can easily be concluded that when the court

referred to ‘barriers’, it meant barriers ‘to entry’ into

places where inmates or students can both research and

focus without disruption.., while using the ‘tools

necessary to attack their convictions and challenge their

conditions of confinement,’ (Snyder ibid) When

determining what the court meant by ‘tools’ one can

imagine this term applies to computers and quiet

working space. Used law books inside the crowded cells

or adjacent rooms cannot fall into alignment with

‘tools’—which is defined as: a device to help carry out a

particular function. To be fair, prisoners should be

supplied with the same tools as are used by the state’s

attorneys: computers, updated legal sources and a quiet

place to learn/work.

Another legal error was committed by the court

with application of Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S.

403 (2002). There are many problems with this

application. Comparing the instant matter to Harbury

is akin to placing a royal castle aside an apartment in a

low-income housing complex. Besides having no

bearing on Pro Se prisoner litigation.., Harbury also

embraces backwards-looking claims only. In the

Opening Brief, the appellant defended his modest

request for declaratory relief in the same way; his

prayer for prospective relief was the complete opposite

of what relief was sought by the Plaintiff in Harbury.

The district court hereby, incorrectly focused on

Harbury’s language regarding the description of nonfrivolous claims, ‘as if it were being independently

pursued’. This phrase is something that applies to

defaulted claims only. It begs the question, “How does

one go about detailing, therefore in independent pursuit

of a forward-looking event—one that has yet to occur?”

This is likely the same sort of frustration the three

circuits courts encountered when it decided to reconcile

a narrow exception to the actual injury holding; having

recognized that it would not be squarely foreclosed by

the subjective content of Justice Scalia’s decision in

Casey.

Petitioner’s principal claims were grounded in

the First and Fourteenth Amendment due process/

interference claims; although retaliation and defaulted

claims were a minor component. In spite of the highly

detailed, second amended complaint, the district court

disposed of the matter without factual inquiry into

causation. Concerning the application of Casey, the

court’s ruling below was contrary to glowing evidence—

of which proved that the Plaintiff here was routinely

denied these tools without excuse. His papers were

neither lacking in form nor substance. Therefore, it is

likely beyond reasonable dispute that the court of

appeal was aware of Petitioner’s favorable legal position

when it recently affirmed his appeal. Because the

Petitioner sub-judice can locate nothing seminal to

establish clearly defined limits for these facts and

circumstances, he instead suggests a firm word from

1984’s Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 7: "As the Court

of last resort in the federal system, we have supervisory

authority and therefore must occasionally perform a

pure-error correcting function in Federal litigation”—

Marshall, J. Dissenting.

Lastly but not the least bit unimportant, the

Court of Appeals applied its own Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.

3d 338, (2010) inside its one and a half-page declaration

of support for the district court’s summary factual

resolution. Their decision included the phrasing from

Pliler ‘plaintiff must present factual allegations

sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.’ It is

unusual for the appellate court to apply the plausibility

standard here. Of course, the plausibility standard

arrived from Iqbal and Twombly. Not once did the

lower court judge mention these cases; nor any others

that followed them such as Hebbe v. Pliler. Certainly,

had its intention rested with applying a different

procedural obstacle, it would have done so. Instead, the

“CJ” thought it sufficient to rely on Lewis and Harbury

in tandem. Speaking to the same point, in the Ninth

Circuit’s August 26th, 2021 Order they cite Padgett v.

Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009) with “We

do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the

first time in appeal..,” as its bottom line. See App. 6.

This is odd because the appellate court nonetheless did

just that, when it quoted the plausibility standard for

the first time on appeal...

It seems established that Lewis was misapplied

in light of the Ninth Circuit’s own well-recognized

interference doctrine. Their prospective willingness to

adhere to stare decisis may hinge upon whether or not

this important question may find rest in the

constitution. “This court has long recognized that its

‘first duty’ is always to ‘follow the dictates of the United

States Supreme Court..;’ ” United States v. Contreras,

667 F.2d 976, 979 (11th Cir., 1982). It seems odd to

apply their own precedent on a spotted basis, simply

because at the moment.., the active interference

doctrine is limited to three circuits. To remedy the

situation, it appears that this open question may need

constitutional resolution—at a minimum—to ensure

uniform consistency—of their own decrees—on behalf of

Ninth Circuit decisions.

C: Other Related Points Helpful In

Determining The Core Questions.

Meaningful access to court requires physical

access to a law library. Beyond anything disastrous,

the prisoner population should never be deprived

entrance into the library where they keep both law

books alongside other non-legal reading material.

The weeklong closures started several months before

America initiated countrywide quarantining. Once

the pandemic hit, the institution began closing the

library for months at a time. All of this was alleged

in the district court.

One of the major problems for the PlaintiffPetitioner ad litem, was the district court ignored

large portions of the pleadings—those that

challenged the state’s unfair library regulations and

instead, simply focused on bulldozing the whole

matter out of court by applying procedural

hurdles. This was accomplished by the Chief District

Judge; neither the state’s attorney nor any

magistrate ever weighed in throughout the course of

the proceedings. As well, although appellantpetitioner did address this fundamentally unfair

procedure. . , the court of appeals issued a ruling not

much longer than a post-card; Smaj v. AT&T, 291

F.3d 955, 956 (7th Cir., 2002)(Strong authority

requires a court’s opinion to contain sufficient

analysis and/or discussion). This short statement of

its decision failed to explain or justify the Court’s

affirmative, summary disposal of the issues

presented. Trying to argue with the district court

without the benefit of a research facility can be

described in terms of bringing a fire hose to put out a

campfire.

Cert, applicant would prefer to avoid any view

that may depend on the intricacy and/or minutiae of

state regulations—despite this, it might be necessary

to point out the themes that went overlooked in the

trial court. California’s current regulatory scheme

only allows a maximum 4 hours law library time for

prisoners with active cases where either a court

ordered or statutory deadline is pending; all others

may receive 2 hours weekly. By all accounts this is

hardly enough time to work on one case, much less 2

or more. 15 Cal. Admin. Code section 3120(a) places

the duty on the prison Warden to provide a library

on each facility. The facts material to this case,

demonstrated that there was one library for the

whole high-security portion of the prison. The

argument may have been put forth that some

alternative to physical access was available for the

petitioner. Surely they would quote for the court

their usual defense. However, upon consulting the

governing decisions on the matter, one might

discover differently. From Petitioner’s vantage

point, there is no alternative to a library that is

adequately stocked up with all required sources of

State and Federal law.

Were there any other feasible alternative, that

would be personal books because most libraries will

not allow expensive reference books out of their

sight. Evidence was introduced that our book list

was decimated without notice back in 2016 to

exclude digests and various treatises on state law.

“A second factor relevant in deter

mining the reasonableness of a prison

restriction, as Pell shows us, whether

there are alternative means of exer

cising the rights that remain open to

prison inmates. Where ‘other avenues’

remain available for the exercise of the

asserted right (citations omitted) courts

should be particularly conscious of the

‘measure of judicial deference owed to

Corrections officials.’ ” See Pell u.

Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828 (1974)

quoted by Turner v. Safely, (1987) 482

U.S. 78, at 90.

Let us explore the regulatory limitations of

this hypothetical, potential alternative. Due to

ongoing crowded conditions, California’s corrections

system (CDCR) has strict limitations in property to

ensure room for a top-bunk—something that does not

exist in 30 states of the union. Long ago, CDCR

officials adopted Cal. Admin. Code § 3161, which

states in pertinent portion: “Inmates may possess

up to one cubic foot of legal materials/ documents

related to their Active cases, in excess of the six

cubic feet of allowable property in their assigned

quarters/living area. Legal materials/documents in

excess of this limitation shall be disposed of pursuant

to section 3191(c).” Id. (Although prisoners may

request some legal materials in excess of this mere

1 cubic foot be stored—such as lengthy reporter’s

transcripts—law books are not included in that

storable property) as 3161 ibid, goes on to say,

“inmate owned law books in excess of the additional

allowance shall not be stored by the institution/

facility.” For prisoners to receive assistance from

their fellow inmates such as was the matter treated

in Johnson u. Avery, (1969) 393 U.S. 483. . , this

would be required to take place inside a library

setting also.

In addition to the Casey hurdle, the state

officials have regulated their way into legal

immunity with this type of regulatory bullet

proofing.6 Therefore, the only conceivable

6 Straub v. Monge, 815 F.2d 1467,1469 (11th Cir., 1987)

supports petitioner’s position, in that “Regulations and

practices that unjustifiably obstruct the availability of

professional representation or other aspects of the right of

access to the courts, are invalid,” quoting Procunier v. Martinez,

416 U.S. 396 (1974).

alternative has been legislated right out of the

equation by administrative enactment. The Court

today can make significant progress in this

byzantine dilemma by exercising its discretion to

reduce another source of bad faith: lack of legal

development at the national level regarding prisoner

library privation. For instance in Kaufman v.

Schneiter, 474 F. Supp. 2d. 1014, 1030-31 (2007,

W.D. Wise.), the court there ruled that prisons are

not allowed to make inmates choose between library

time and outdoor exercise. Of course, this exact

problem was mentioned in the verified complaint

under FRCP, Rule 11(b) that petitioner lodged in the

Southern District of California. By no means are

they under obligation to enforce this upon their local

prison administrations unless this practice becomes

nationally recognized as constitutionally prohibited.

D: Reading And Learning Is A Major Life

Activity, The Deprivation Of Which Impairs

Fundamental Personal Liberty.

There exists a compelling governmental

interest in educating prisoners. No considerations of

sound public policy could serve to justify the above

expressed limitations being placed around library

time with fast approaching court action due dates.

“No legislature can bargain away

the public health or the public morals.

The people’s themselves cannot do it

much less their servants. The super

vision of both these subjects of govern

mental power is continuing in nature

and they are to be dealt with as the

special exigencies of the moment may

require. Government is organized with

a view to their preservation, and cannot

divest itself of the power to provide for

them. For this purpose the largest

legislative discretion is allowed, and

the discretion cannot be parted with

any more than the power itself.” See

Stone v. Mississippi, (1879) 101 U.S.

814, 819.

These formative ideas apply with equal force

to administrative officials inside the prison systems

—those charged with a duty to incarcerate criminals

with a prospect towards the restoration of sanity. It

is hard to imagine an exigency so great that would

justify the closure of a public library in a free

society. What purpose does a prison’s warden

have in mind that could be ‘reasonably related’ to the

advancement of a neutral institutional goal upon

instructing his librarians to keep the lights out?

There is no such legitimate security interest in this

unconscionable procedure. Imagine if a city council

were to enact a city ordinance with mayoral

approval—one that placed similar restrictions upon

local residents? How could they explain to their

taxpayers that the police power would be used to

severely limit access to books? Probably there would

be no end to the populace outrage. The law reads no

differently when applied to prisoners—their general

welfare as well, depends upon the discipline of

continuing education.7 This is true if one considers,

“Jails and penitentiaries include among their

inmates a high percentage of persons who are totally

or functionally illiterate. . .” See Avery id. at 487.

Most troubling, instant Petitioner specifically

challenged the constitutionality of several state

regulations governing the critical subject matter.

The court(s) in an apparent attempt to insulate the

matter from further review, declined to give any

attention to this essential element of the complaint.

It’s important to remember, “States create a

protectable liberty interest through mandatory

language and prison regulation,..” and “this interest

was for inmates under the Fourteenth Amendment

Due Process clause when the deprivation in question

‘imposes atypical and significant hardship upon the

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidence of prison

life’.” [Gray v. Salao, (2011) U.S. Dist. Lexis 101711

quoting Sandin v. Conner, (1995) 515 U.S. 472, 48384.] Therein lies the liberty implications of seeking

redress in court and being denied the benefit of their

concern.

Mandatory language within the California

Admin. Codes called for circumstances in the library

that were in derogation to many decisions of the

Federal judiciary in multiple jurisdictions; yet a

modest declaratory remedy was too much to ask in

the southern district. Pulling the rug out from under

our legal actions in this way is the worst form of Due

7 “The increasing complexities of our governmental apparatus

at both the local and federal levels have made it difficult for a

person to process a claim or even to make a complaint.” Avery,

id. at 491.

Process violation. With a retaliatory motive, they

completely interfered with Petitioner’s court ordered

library access.8 This said deprivation continues up

to the present day. Their attitude seems to be, “Good

luck with your petition,” (without any legal

research)... It is hard to imagine a more significant

problem than the compound hardships that exist

when one urgent problem cannotixereHredied—■-------without ample library access being a constantly

available, and reliable factor. The Cal DOC realizes

how effective these measures are in reducing their

organization’s liabilities. The original complaint

made reference to similar problems at multiple

CDCR institutions statewide.

Of course, Prisoners retain their right to

pursue a path that leads to happiness; education

being a paramount life activity; Talk v. Delta

Airlines, 165 F.3d 1021, (C A 5, 1999)(major life

activity includes learning). Prison systems that

utilize interference strategies to slow down litigation

are inflicting a grievous harm upon modern

American society. If criminals re-enter society

without a marketable education, then they are likely

to re-offend; therefore taxpayer’s hard earned

contribution is wasted. It follows then, that—even

more so—officials cannot shrink from their duty to

accommodate the Court’s orders that inmates be

provided physical law library access to comport with

the time allotted to file a response. The Lewis

8 The trouble with routine interference is that prison employees

become accustomed in their application of these effective

techniques, thereby becoming the functional equivalent of

requiring a court order before an inmate is allowed to enter the

library. —See Straub, id., at 1470.

decision only modified this court’s comprehensive

treatment found within its Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S

817 (1977) decision. Therefore, come rain, sleet or

snow, ensuring prisoners can both meet court

deadlines and continue in their general studies

without undue interruption.., remains a compelling

governmental interest; strict scrutiny should apply

within the refined meaning of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

The factual basis for this action was not just a

deprivation of personal liberty, it was an affront to

the constitution—a set of acts and omissions

perpetrated by the source of knowledge itself. . .

CONCLUSION

By many accounts, Petitioner’s claims were

unfairly disparaged although the court had a

responsibility towards the Plaintiff and others

similarly situated.., to thoroughly examine the facts

in this case. This failure on behalf of the lower

courts to sanction the arbitrary and discriminatory

acts by the state, was inter alia, violative of

Petitioner’s Due Process rights under the 7th and

14th Amendments to the Federal Constitutional.

Having already suffered constitutional injury by

the library, only to watch the merit of his suit

disregarded by the court, Petitioner is placed in an

even weaker position of negotiation for the next

case.

For 1st Amendment claims of this nature to go

unchecked anywhere, is to stall any and all progress

towards a more perfect union, everywhere. Nowhere

is it easier to profane that sacred guarantee, than

inside the modern-day, state prison. The United

States Constitution is already set on edge with the

task of measuring the integrity of countless

enactmentsahd'procedures. Legislators rarelyTf

ever write laws in bad faith. In light of this, how can

administrative officials dare make inroads towards

the benchmark principles, in placing further burden

upon the judiciary in cases such as this? History has

gradually deposited its wisdom in good faith for all

citizens to absorb. God forbid the California justice

system would remain stagnant in that respect.

Probably nothing less than swinging the

constitutional hammer, will remedy this polycentric

problem. Certiorari is needed here to secure

uniformity between the rulings of the trial courts

and those of the appellate courts; also, to defend the

guiding precedents of this Court against irreverence.

Should the questions presented be passed

upon in a manner favorable to the Petitioner, he

humbly asks this great Constitutional Court to

overturn the mandate and decision of the Court of

Appeals.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.