Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Steven A. Taliani, Petitioner v. Illinois

Supreme Court briefFeb 16, 2022

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

FEB t 6 2022

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

STEVEN A. TALIANI

— PETITIONER

(Your Name)

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

— RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

STEVEN A. TALIANI

(Your Name)

Hill Correctional Center

P.O. Box 1700

(Address)

Galesburg, Illinois 61402-1700

(City, State, Zip Code)

(309) 343-4212

(Phone Number)

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

Does the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion and analysis constitute an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the Illinois Supreme

Court's expansion of the Involuntary Intoxication Statute, 720 ILCS 5/6-3 ?

Whether the Illinois Supreme Court errd by weighing evidence without first

holding an evidentiary hearing, where medical experts could formulate

expert opinions as to the "unwarned side-effects of prescription psychotropic

medications" ?

Should Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004) be applied to relieve

a state prisoner of conduct that was once unlawful if the new procedure

alters the range of conduct that the law punishes ?

Should Bousley v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1604 (1998) be applied to relieve

a state prisoner of conduct that a defendant stands convicted of 'an act

the law does not make criminal ?

LIST OF PARTIES

[ ] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[Xl All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of

all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows:

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General for the State of Illinois

100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60601-3218

RELATED CASES

•

People of the State of Illinois v.

Steven A. Taliani

Case Number 94-CF-37, Bureau County, Illinois

Judgment entered July 28, 2017

•

People of the State of Illinois v. Steven A. Taliani

Case Number 3-17-0546, Appellate Court of Illinois,

Third District

Judgment entered March 18, 2020

•

People of the State of Illinois v. Steven A. Taliani

Supreme Court of the State of Illinois

Case Number 125891

Judgment entered October 7, 2021

ii.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

CONCLUSION

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A :

Decision (Oinion) In The Illinois Supreme Court

(2021 IL 125891)(filed October 7, 2021)

APPENDIX B :

Brief and Argument for Petitioner-Appellant in

the Illinois Supreme Court

APPENDIX C :

Petition For Leave To Appeal To The Illinois

Supreme Court

APPENDIX D :

Decision (Opinion) In The Appellate Court of Illinois

Third District (2021 II (3d) 170546)(filed March 18, 2020)

APPENDIX E :

Brief and Argument For Petitioner-Appellant to the

Appellate Court Third District of Illinois

APPENDIX F :

Decision (Order) of the State Trial Court

Bureau County, Illinois (filed July 28, 2017)

APPENDIX G :

Application For Leave To File Successive Petition

For Post Conviction Relief (filed May 18, 2017)

iii.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES

PAGE NUMBER

Bousley v. United States, 533, U.S. 614

118 S. Ct. 1604 (1998)

13, 14, 15

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399

106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986) ....

Jackson v.' Pillion, 773 F. 3d 786 (2013) .........

Park-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95

20ii

People v. Alberts, 383 Ill. App. 374 (Ill. App. 4th Dist 2008)

890 N.E. 2d 1208

322 Ill. Dec. 289

.13,.15, 19, 20, 21, 22

People v. Hari, 218 Ill. 2d 275

843 N.E. 2d 349

300.Ill. Dec. 91 (2006) ............................... 13, 19, 20, 21, 22

People v. Rogers, 123 Ill. 2d 487 (1988) .............................

People v. Rodriguez, 355 Ill. App. 3d 290 (2nd Dist 2005)

823 N.E. 2d 224 ....................................

People v. Taliani, 2021 II 125891 ........................

9, 10, 11

Schluppv. Delo, 513 U.S. 298

115 S. Ct. 851 (1995) ................

15, 16

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348

124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004) ...

13, 14

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984)

Yist v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797

115 S. Ct. 2590 (1991)

IV.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

STATUTES

PAGE NUMBER

720 ILCS 5/6-3(b) (WEST 1994)

3. 17

5, 7, 20, 23, 25

720 ILCS 5/6-3(b) (WEST 200$)

720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (WEST 1994)

720 ILCS 5/3-2 (WEST 1994) ..

Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix

the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix

the petition and is

[ ] reported at

J or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

[X] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix

'A to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[5(1 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the Illinois1 Third District Appellate court

appears at Appendix__Q__ to the petition and is

[5CJ reported at _i ..) 2020 IL App (3d) 170546

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was______________________

[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date: ____________

, and a copy of the

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including______

(date) on

(date)

in Application No.__ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

[X] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was October 7, 2021

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

______________________ , and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[X| An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including February 4, 2022(date) on Deember 6, 2021 (date) in

Application No. 21 a 210___

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

720 ILCS 5/6-3 :

Intoxicated or Drugged Condition

"A person who is in an intoxicated or drugged condition is criminally

responsible for conduct unless such conduct is (b) involuntarily produced

and deprives him of substantial capacity either to appreciate the

criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements

of law." (WEST 1994)

720 ILCS 5/3-2 :

Affirmative Defense

(A) "Affirmative Defense" means that unless the State's evidence

raises the issue involving the alleged defense, the defendant, to raise the

issue, must present some evidence thereon."

"if the issue involved in an affirmative defense, other than insanity,

(B)

is raised, then the State must sustain the burden of proving the defendant

guilty Beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue together with all the other

elements of the offense. If the affirmative defense of insanity is raised,

the defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence

his insanity at the time of the offense." (WEST 1994)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On July 12, 1994, Steven Taliani, committed the offenses of first degree

murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. At the time of the offenses,

Taliani was under the care of a psychiatrist, who prescribed the anxiety medication

Buspar, and the major depressive disorder medication Desyrel. Taliani was not

informed of any potential side effects from the individual medications, nor any

potential side effects from the combination use of the prescribed medications.

Neither was Taliani provided any medication packet inserts containing any product

warnings of the use of these medications.

During pretrial proceedings, trial counsel presented the court with a request

that Taliani be examined for his 'fitness to stand trial' by a clinical

psychiatrist, and for his mental condition at the time of the offense. Trial

counsel advised the court that Taliani was being treated by a psychiatrist at the

time of the offense and there were incidents in the jail that indicated Taliani

was experiencing a "mental condition." Trial counsel also believed that a fitness

examination was necessary based on his own conversations with Taliani.

The trail

court granted Taliani's petition for a fitness examination. However, inexplicably,

the trial court's ordered fitness examination had never been completed. Dr. Robert

Chapman, a forensic psychiatrist, examined Taliani only for Taliani's "mental

condition at the time of the offense."

After a thorough /evaluation, and reviewing "all of the official reports,"

Dr. Chapman concluded, among other things, that Taliani was experiencing extreme

anxiety and appreared to be "quite confused, disorganized,and prone to intense

feelings of panic." Additionally, Dr. Chapman found Taliani feeling he was

"losing his mind" and reported bizarre and unusual sensory experiences and

confused thinking.

Based primarily upon Dr. Chapmah's report, trial counsel proceeded to trial

with an insanity defense,

and after approximately 10 hours of deliberations, a

jury found Taliani guilty of both charges. The trial court then sentenced

Taliani to an extended term of 70 years of incarceration for first degree murder

and a consecutive maximum term of 30 years of incarceration for-.the charge of

aggravated battery with a firearm.

After numerous post trial appeals, where Taliani faced severe obstacles,

Taliani's convictions remain affirmed, without any serious adversarial testing.

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SUCCESSIVE POST CONVICTION PETITION

On May 18, 2017, Taliani filed his pro se Application for Leave to File

a Successive Post Conviction Petitions(Appendix .0). Taliani brought his petition

claiming actual innocence based on the newly available — and retroactive —

affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication based on the unexpected, and

unwarned, adverse side effects of his prescribed psychotropic medications.

Specifically, Taliani claimed that it was not until 2006 that the Illinois

Supreme Court determined that the plain language of 720 ILCS 5/6-3 allows for

an involuntary intoxication defense when a defendant was under the influence of

an unexpected adverse toxic side effect of prescription drugs that were unwarned

by the prescribing doctor. (Appendix ,G, pg.53, 1121) And not until 2008 that the

4th District Appellate Court of Illinois determined that the affirmative defense

could be applied retroactively in a post conviction where the petitioner claimed

"actual innocence."

(Appendix 0, pg. 4, 1122)

Taliani's Application for Leave to File a Successive Post Conviction

Petition was accompanied with medical records from his psychiatrist.who

prescribed Buspar and Desyrel, drug interaction materials between Buspar and

Desyrel, medication infomration for each prescribed medication, medical reports

from the county jail's counseling provider, where it was determined that Taliani

continue with the prescribed Buspar and Desyrel, and Dr. Chapman's Forensic

Report. (Appendix G). Additionally, Taliani provided information from the

Food and Drug Administration that informs when Buspar and Desyrel are taken

together the combinationr,of the drugs can cause "serotonin syndrome."

Information that was not available at the time of Taliani's trial in 1994, and

was only "developed in the last several years." (Appendix, pg. 4-5, 111125-27)

Taliani claimed to have been suffering from symptoms associated with

serotonin syndrome at the time of the offense, including heightened irritability,

confusion, altered consciousness, and increased suicidal ideation. Taliani's

psychitrist never advised Taliani that serotonin syndrome was a risk associated

with the medications he was prescribing.

Taliani continued with this toxic

combination of prescribed medications while being housed at the county jail —

prior to the time Taliani was examined by Dr. Chapman — who undoubtedly found

Taliani "could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his

conduct to the law." Dr. Chapman was requested to examine Taliani for the sole

determination of his mental condition at the time of the offense, namely, his

sanity,at the time of the offense.

Taliani claimed that this new affirmative defense — made retroactive —

was unavailable at the time of his trial in 1994 and that Taliani should te

allowed to raise the new affirmative defense at a new trial as an actual

innocence claim. That a jury properly^instructed would not find Taliani guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt once a new trial was granted.

On July 28, 2017, the trial court denied Taliani's Application for Leave

to file a Successive Post Conviction Petition^ finding; "after reviewing

the documents submitted (Jy the defendant, that it does not support a claim of

actual innocence because it does not raise the probability that it is more

likely true than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him."

(Appendix F) A timely notice of appeal followed the trial court's order.

On appeal to the Appellate Court of Illinois Third Judicial District,

appointed counsel argued;

The Trial Court Erred When It Denied Steven Taliani Leave To

File a Successive Postconviction Petition Because Taliani

Presented a Colorable Claim of Actual Innocnece Based On The

Newly Available and Retroactive Affirmative Defense of

involuntary Intoxication Resulting From the Unwarned, Adverse

Side Effects of Prescription Medication.

(Appendix E, pg. 15-24)

Appellate counsel stressed, "at the time of the offense in 1994, the law

required involuntary intoxication to be the result of some external influence,

such as a trick, artifice, or force, in order to raise the defense.

Thus, had

Taliani tried to raise the defense of involuntary intoxication based on the

unwarned, adverse side effects of prescription medications, the trial court

would have correctly rejected it." (Appendix E, pg. 18-19)

Appellate counsel

emphasized the Illinois Supreme Court's expanded meaning of "involuntary" to

include, "the unexpected and unwarned adverse effect, is not a conscious effect

of the defendant's will, is not resulting from a defendant's free and

unrestrained choice, and is not subject to control defendant's will." (Appendix E,

Pg. 19)

When the Illinois Supreme Court's decision to expand the Unitentional

Intoxication Statute (720 ILCS 5/6-3) retroactivity attached due to the

application of a "substantive change in the affirmative defense."

On March 18, 2020, the Appellate Court issued its opinion (Appendix D,

pg. 1-13) affirming the trial court in a split-court decision.

Specifically,

the majority of the appellate court re-characterized Taliani's "new affirmative

defense claim" into a claim of newly discovered "evidence". (Appendix D,

pg. 8, 1125)

The majority acknowledged Taliani’s petition and supporting

documentation "may have shown" that Taliani suffered from unwarned side effects

of prescription medications at the time of the offense, including serotonin

syndrome, heightened irratability, confusion, altered consciousness, and

suicidal ideastion. (Appendix D. pg. 9-10, 1111 27-29)

However, the majority

found that it was "not apparent" that these side effects would have deprived

Taliani of the capacity to appreciate the criminality of shooting the victims

or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. (Appendix D, pg. 10,

1111 28-29)

In dissenting, Justice McDade found Taliani "has presented a colorable

claim of actual innocence such that he should have been granted leave to file

a successive postconviction petition that could have been tested at the second

stage.

That is, I do not believe "it is clear from a review of the successive

petition and the documentation provided by the petitioner that, as a matter of

law, the petitioner cannot set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence. tut

"That the allegations in the motion for leave to file a successive petition

and the supporting documentation indicate that defendant was suffering from

unwarned side effects of prescription medications at the time of the offense*

These side effects including heightened irratability, confusion, altered

consciousness, and increased suicidal ideation, if severe, these symptoms

could have deprived defendant of the substantial capacity to appreciate the

criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the

law such that the involuntary intoxication defense would apply. (Appendix D,

pg. 12, 1136)

Justice McDade would have reversed the judgment of the circuit

court and remand the matter for further postconviction proceedings. (Appendix D,

Pg. 13, 1137)

Taliani filed a timely Petition For Leave To Appeal to the Illinois

Supreme Court.

(Appendix G)

In Talini’s appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, counsel argued;

The Trial Court Erred When It Denied Steven Taliani Leave To

File a Successive Postconviction Petition Because Taliani

presented a Colorable Claim of Actual Innocence Based on

the

Newly Available and Retroactive Affirmative Defense of Involuntary

Intoxication Resulting From the Unwarned, Adverse Side Effects

of prescription Medication. (Appendix $, pg. 17)

On October 7, 2021, the Illinois Supreme Court filed their opinion in

this appeal. (People v. Taliani, 2021 IL 125891)(Appendix A)

The Illinois Supreme Court, like the Appellate Court, misstates and

re-characterizes a critical aspect of Taliani's Application for leave to file

a succussive postconviction petition.

The Illinois Supreme court states;

Petitioner acknowledged in the circuit court that an

actual innocence claim must be supported by "newly

discovered evidence..." (Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, 1146)(Appendix A, 1146)

Nowhere in Taliani's application for leave to file a successive postconviction

petition does Taliani "acknowledge" that an actual innocence claim must be

supported by "newly discovered evidence."

Likewise, the Court states;

"Petitioner claimed that this newly available affirmative

defense constituted "newly discovered evidence" for purposes

of his actual innocence claim." (Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, H46)

(Appendix A, 1146)

Nowhere in Taliani's application for leave to file a successive postconviction

petition does Taliani make such a claim.

This expansion of Taliani's

application for leave to file a successive postconviction petition is an

erroneous misstatement of the claim.

Within the Supreme Court's analysis the court states;

"First, we will acknowldege the irregularity of the claim

that petitioner has raised. (Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, H 63)

(Appendix A, U 63)

10.

The court continues;

"The case before us does not present a 'typical* actual

innocence claim. Here petitioner is claiming that newly

discovered evidence, i.e., evidence that he as involuntarily

intoxicated due to unwarned side effects of prescription

medication, persuasively shows that he did not have the

requisite mens rea when he committed the crimes for which

he was convicted. And, had he presented this newly discovered

"evidence", it is more likely than not that the jury would

have found that he was involuntarily intoxicated and, as a

result, he was not 'legally* responsible for the acts he

committed because he did not have the necessary mens rea."

(Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, 1165)(Appendix A, 11 65)

Mystifyingly, the Supreme Court finds;

"This is an unusual claim and appears to be one of first

impression. Petitioner has directed this court to no

cases from any jurisdiction, nor has this court's research

into the matter revealed any such cases, that have held

that a newly available defense, which might negate the

requisite mens rea element for the offense charged, may

provide the basis for a colorable claim of actual innocence

capable of being brought under the Post conviction Hearing

Act." (Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, 1166)(Appendix A, 11 66)

The court found, "for purposes of this case we will assume that it is

theoretically possible for a petitioner to claim actual innocence by

challenging either the actus reus or the mens rea elements.

(Talianij 2021 IL 125891, 1166) (Appendix A, U 66)

11.

Nevertheless, the Illinois Supreme Court found petitioner did not fit

within the framework of a freestanding claim of actual innocence.

And thus

affirmed the trial court's decision to denj petitioner leave to file a

successive postconviction petition.

Illinois state courts have denied Taliani the opportunity to file a

postconviction petition — and have a fair and complete hearing — to have

adversarial testing o'fi his claim tested.

Wherein, Taliani would provide

the court with expert medical analysis and opinions — to guide the court

on such a complex claim — necessary for the court to find confidently that

Taliani was in fact involuntarily intoxicated at the time he committed these

crimes.

■Petitioner now makes this timely appeal to the United States Supreme

Court with his Writ of Certiorari.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Illinois Supreme Court's decision is an erroneous

determination of the facts that conflict with United

States Supreme Court precedents in Schriro v. Summerlin,

542 U.S. 348, 124 S. Ct. 2529 (2004) and Bousley v.

United States, 523 U.S. 614, 118 S. Ct. 1604 (1998),

and the Illinois Court of Appeals in, People v. Alberts

383 Ill. App 3d 374, 890 N.E. 2d 1208, 322 Ill. Dec.

289 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 2008)

The Illinois Supreme Court has held the ingestion of prescribed

medication with negative unwarned side effects could satisfy the "involuntariness"

requirement of the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication.; (720 ILCS

6/6-3)(WEST 2006), People v. Hari, 218 Ill. 2d 275, 293, 300 Ill. Dec. 91,

843 N.E. 2d 349, 359 (2006)("An unexpected and unwarned adverse effect of a

drug taken on doctor's orders falls within the ordinary and popularly understood

definition ofl'involuntarily'.)

This expansion of Section 5/6-3 was further explored by the Fourth District

Appellate Court of Illinois in People v. Alberts, 322 Ill. Dec. 289, 890 N.E.

2d 1208, 1216 (ill. App. 4th Dist. 2008) where the Alberts court held that the

new rule announced in Hari, 218 Ill. 2d 275, 300 Ill. Dec. 91, 843 N.E. 2d 349

(2006) to be substantive affirmative defense, therefore fully retroactive in

its application.

13.

Illinois follows the rule that a decision that narrows a substantive

criminal statute must be given full retroactive effect in collateral attacks.

People v, Rodriguez, 355 Ill. App. 3d 290, 823 N.E. 2d 224, 229, 230 (2nd Dist.

2005)(citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-21, 118 S. Ct. 1604,

1609-10)(1998).

This is because such changes raise the possibility that a

defendant has been convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal.

The appellate court acknowledged, Illinois Courts follow the federal doctrine '

that any decision that narrows the applicability of a 'substantive' criminal

statute is fully retroactive,

"A rule is substantive rather than procedural

if it alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes."

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2523 (2004).

"New

Elements alter the range of conduct the statute punishes, rendering some

formally unlawful conduct lawful or vice versa."

Schriro Id.

In addressing the important distinction between substantive and procedural,

the United States Supreme Court noted that decisions regarding substantive

content of criminal statutes "necessarily carry a significant risk that a

defendant stands convicted of an ‘‘act that the law does not make criminal'."

Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620.

And, it is for that reason, a defendant should not

be precluded from relying on previous decisions interpreting statutes in a

collateral challenge to his arguably questionable conviction.

U.S. at 621.

14.

Bousley, 523

The Illinois Supreme Court's decision to expand Section 5/6-3 raises

grave doubts about the accuracy of the original judgement.

Grave doubts arise

with new substantive rules that raise the possibility that "a defendant stands

convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal."

Bousleyy 523 U.S.

at620.

It is undisputed that Taliani was ingesting the prescribed psychotropic

medications BUSPAR and DESYREL at the time he committed these offenses.

And,

to find that no evidentiary hearing would be necessary for the trial court to

determine Taliani has not raised a colorable claim of actual innocence due to

an unintentional intoxication of prescribed psychotropic medications is a

"fundamental miscarriage of justice."

In People v. Alberts, 383 Ill. App. 3d 374, 890 N.E. 2d 1208, 322 Ill.

Dec. 289 (ill. App. 4th dist. 2008), the court made it clear, that it will

require expert testimony presented at an evidentiary hearing to definitively

determine whether the side effects of prescribed psychotropic medications

rendered the defendant;.involuntarily intoxicated as required by statute.

Alberts, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 385 (Postconvicition petition should proceed to

an evidentiary hearing where the trial court can determine whether a Hari

defense can be substantiated.)

The Illinois Supreme Court relied primarily upon Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (Appendix A, pg. 15, fl 59) in their holdings, where;:

the Schlup court held;

15.

"In Edwards we stated that a colorable claim of actual

innocence requires evidence that -raises the probability

that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted the petitioner in light of the new

evidence."

Schlup Id. raises the "probability" — not certainty —

of what another

jury would do considering all the evidence both old and new.

Schlup Id. introduced "new evidence" in the form of videotapes and affidavits

from eyewitnesses, to prove his innocence of the murder of a fellow inmate.

Evolving stahdardsoof decency, as wellaas, modem practice, provides for

a more extensive review here.

Without adversarial assistance from Taliani's

expert representative — especially when the psychiatric opinions he proffers

are based on a much more extensive evaluation — the factfinder loses the

substantial benefit/of potentially probative information.

The result is a

much greater likelihood of an erroneous decision. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.

399, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).

Thene can be no serious quarrel with the fact that there is a reasonable

probability that the result of Taliani's trial would have been different if

the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication had been raised as a

defense, and the jury properly instructed with respect to the unwarned side

effects of the prescription psychotropic medications being ingested by Taliani.

16.

Theebasic requirements of due process include an opportunity to submit

evidence and opinions from Taliani's psychiatric experts that would reveal

additional scientific information into the prescription psychotropic medications

Taliani was ingesting at the time of the offenses —

and the side effects of

these medications that Taliani had succumbed to.

Insanity Defense vs. Involuntary Intoxication Defense

Trial counsel for Taliani raised an insanity defense based solely upon

Dr. Chapman's Forensic Report,

The insanity statute at the time of the offense

stated;

"A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if

at the=.timeeof such conduct, as a result of mental

disease or mental defect, he lacks the substantial

capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his

conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements

of the law." ,720 ILCS 5/6-2(a)(WEST 1994)

And, although the insanity statute appears to be the same standard required

by the involuntary intoxication statute, at the time of the offense the

involuntary intoxication statute stated;

"A person who is in an intoxicated or drugged condition

is criminally responsible for conduct unless such condition

... (b) is involuntarily produced and deprives him of substantial

capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct

or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."

720 ILCS 5/6-3(b)(WEST 1994)

17.

At the 'time of Taliani's trial in 1994, the law required an involuntary

intoxication defense to be the result of some external influence, such as

trick, artifice, or force, in order to raise the defense. People v. Rogers,

123 Ill. 2d 487, 508 (1988).

Of importance, acknowledging that the insanity statute and the involuntary

intoxication statute each contain similar standards — they do not contain the

same level of proof.

A defendant that asserts the affirmative defense of

involuntary intoxication — the burden of proof shifts to the State to prove

the defendant was not involuntarily intoxicated — beyond a reasonable doubt.

Moreover, here, the involuntary intoxication defense would require Taliani's

jury to be fully instructed on that defense, and the jury would have undoubtedly

be presented with new facts regarding prescription medications, their side effects

and how those side effects impacted Taliani's mental state, causing him.; to lack

the substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct

or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, at the time of the

offense.

18.

II.

The Illinois Supreme Court opinion fails to

contain any statement of fact relative to the

4th District Appellate Court’s holding in

People v. Alberts that the new rule the

Illinois Supreme Court announced in People v.

Hari contains retroactive application.

Of significant importance is the "glaring absence" of the Illinois

Supreme Court's mention of, or citation to

the People v. Alberts, 383 Ill.

App. 3d 374,|890 N.E. 2d 1208, 322 Ill. Dec. 289 (Ill. App 4th Dist. 2008)

court's holding that Taliani relies upon so heavily in his postconviction.

By ignoring the Alberts Id. court holding and perfunctorily rejecting Taliani's

claim, the court foreclosed developement of the record on Taliani's claim.

The Supreme Court did so*

court provided.

despite the significant concerns the Alberts Id.

This "glaring absence" clearly affected the Supreme Court's

conclusion.

Why does the Illinois Supreme Court make such a conscious effort to

avoid the holding in Alberts Id. ?

The Illinois Supreme Court's decision to avoid the holding in Alberts Id.

is patently Unreasonable, when Talianiis Leave To File a Successive Postconviction

is premised pn the Alberts Id. court's holdings.

19.

Taliani contends that the Illinois Supreme Court is being arbitrary and

capricious in determining to whom the court will apply the new rule announced

in People v. Hari

218 Ill. 2d 275, 843 N.E. 2d 349, 300 Ill. Dec. 91 (2006),

and the retroactive application of the new rule announced in People v. Alberts,

383 Ill. App. 3d 374. 890 N.E. 2d 1208, 322 Ill. Dec. 289- (ill. App. 4th Dist.

2008).

It is the direct impact of this arbitrary application of this new rule on

Taliani that raises Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution concerns.

The Illinois Courts were required to grant Taliani Leave To File a

Successive Postconviction Petition due to the expansion of Section 5/6-3

(involuntary Intoxication Statute 720 ILCS 5/6-3) anddthe complex issue presented.

Taliani's Postconviction would expand the record to assist the court, since it

is well known that "there exist a widespread and increasingly troublesome

discomfort amoung lawyers and judges confronted by a scientific or other

tchnological issues."

Jackson v. Pollion, 773 F. 3d 786 (2013).

The Jackson Id. court cited to Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co.

185 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) where the'Park-Davis Id. court stated;

"How long shall we continue to blunder along without

the^aid of unpartisan and authoritative scientific

assistance in the administration of justice?"

20.

Here, in 2021, Illinois Courts continue to blunder along without the aid

of unpartisan and authoritative scientific assistance, through evidentiary

hearings, in the administration of justice,

This blundering is cause for

the United States Supreme Court to set precedent in the case before it today,

by requiring the state trial courts to hold "full and fair hearings" whenever

the claim of. unnntententional intoxication is raised as an affirmative defense

due to the unwarned side effects of prescription psychotropic medications.

Additionally, because theelllinois Supreme, court was ’silent' as to the

Alberts court holding, it is permissible for the United States Supreme Court

to "look through" the last reasoned state court decision.

Yist v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797§ 803-804, 115 S. Ct. 2590 (1991).

The last 'reasoned court' here is the Thirds District Appellate<-Court of

Illinois which opined;

"in Hari, 218 Ill. 2d 275, 292-93, the Illinois Supreme Court held

that the involuntary intoxication defense was available to a defendant

claiming that he was involuntarily intoxicated due to an unwarned

side effect of a prescription medication."

The Illinois Appellate Court reasoned;

"We find that the drugged condition alleged here — and unexpected

adverse side effect of a prescription drug that was unwarned ty

the prescribing doctor, the [Physicianl'-s Desk Reference] or the

packet insert — is 'involuntarily produced' within the plain

21.

meaning of the involuntary intoxication affirmative defense statute."

(Appendix D, pg. 7-8, H 23).

In the instant case, the Appellate Court continued;

"In People v. Alberts, 383 Ill. App. 3d 374, 382 (2008), the

Fourth District held that... Hari announced a new rule because

it broaden[ed] the scope of the defense of involuntary intoxication

beyond the pljkin language of the statute and [did] not constitute

a mere application of existing precedent." The Alberts Id. court

further held that the new rule announced in Hari should be given

full retroactive effect because it was tantamount to a rule that

limits the conduct proscribed by a criminal statute. Id. at 383.

Based on the retroactive application of Hari, the Alberts court

held that the defendant made a substantial showing of a claim

of actual innocence based on his claim that he was involuntarily

intoxicated at the time of the offense due to the quantity of

psychotropic medication that he was taking. Id. at 380.

(Appendix D, pg. 8,

It was here

24).

that the appellate court "recharacterized" Taliani's claim

to one of "newly discovered evidence" (Appendix D, pg. 8, fl 25) when nowhere

in Taliani's Leave To File Successive Postconviction Petition (Appendix G)

does Taliani make that claim.

Taliani's Leave To File a Successive Post-

Conviction Petition (Appendix G) brought forth a "New Affirmative Defense"

Claim based on the unwarned side effects Taliani had succumbed to while

ingesting prescribed psychotropic medications.

22.

The Appellate Court confirms the allegations found in Taliani*s Leave

To File a Successive Postconviction Petition and supporting documentation

may have shown that Taliani suffered unwarned side effects of prescription

medication at the timeeof the offense such that the ”involuntarily produced”

component of the involuntary intoxication defense was satisfied. (Appendix D,

pg. 9,iifi 27).

Which should have been enough to allow Taliani to proceed in

filing his Postconvicition Petition, where the record could be expanded.

Instead, the court 'Raised-the-Bar1 for filing Leave To File a Successive

Postconviction Petition to inlcude scientific medical opinions as to the

’’degree” that Taliani lacked the ’’substantial capacity to appreciate the

criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements

of law.”

720 ILCS 5/6-3(b) (Appendix D, pg. 9, II 27).

Taliani verified the facts stated within his Leave To File a Successive

Postconviction Petition with a sworn Affidavit.

Taliani did all he could — to develope the factual basis of his claim —

at this early stage.

Because Taliani faced this ’far-too-high* of a bar to be granted Leave

To File a Successive Postconviction Petition, the record stands devoid of

scientific medical opinions that would be necessary to properly assess his

claim of unintentional intoxication due to unwarned side effects of prescription

psychotropic medications.

23.

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence ini the outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694,

104 S. Ct. 2052.

This determination cannot be made without more detailed

knowledge contained within a postconviction and a "full and 'fair hearing."

The Illinois State Courts have unreasonably applied this standard to Taliani.

Without a "full and fair hearing" to develope the record, the appellate

court merely created their own conclusions based upon speculation rather

than scientific medical opinions.

Without further exploration and adversarial

testing, Taliani has been deprived due process of law.

Again, Talaini filed for Leave To File a Successive Postconviction Petition

and the Illinois Courts have raised the bar for filing "Leave" by requiring

Talaini to present "scientific medical opinions" that would not be available

until Taliani proceeded to the second and third stages of the Post Conviction

Hearing Act — where a "full and fair hearing" would be conducted.

For these reasons Taliani should be granted an opportunity to advance

his claim of involuntary intoxication due to unwarned side effects of prescribed

psychotropic medications in further proceedings.

24.

III.

The affirmative defense of unintentional intoxication

due to unwarned side effects of prescription psychotropic

medications has not been fully settled by the United

States Supreme Court.

Under the expansion of Illinois' Involuntary Intoxication Statute (720

ILCS 5/6-3) and the retroactive application of the statute, Taliani has presented

a colorable claim of actual innocence due to the unwarned side effects of doctor

prescribed psychotropic medications,

The condition Taliani suffered was

extraordinary and one that the Illinois Courts gave only a cursory review of.

The record of Illinois courts' decisions show they did not conduct a "full and

fair hearing" on Taliani's claim by imposing too high a bar to Taliani in his

request >£cq: Leave To File a:.Successive Postconviction Petition.

Taliani provided

"scientific medical exhibits" in support of his claim, to warrant the filing of

Taliani's Leave To File a Successive Postconviction Petition.

Coupled with the

Food and Drug Administration's recognition of the unwarned side effects — by

their announcement to place "Black Box Warning Labels" on specific prescribed

medications, with these Taliani has adequately developed material facts to

obtain an evidentiary hearing for further exploration of his condition at the

time of the offense.

25.

Due to the substantial increase in mental health issues plaguing the

United States today, and the obscene amounts of prescription psychotropic

medications being dispensed — potentially without warning of serious side

effects — it was first in 2004 when the Food and Drug Administration was

faced with this concern, that they stepped in to require manufacturersrof

selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor antidepresant medications to add

"BLACK BOX WARNINGS11 to their product labeling, advising that studies have

shown an increase in suicidal thinking and behavior among those suffering

from psychiatric disorders.

Unfortunately, the Food and Drug Administration's 'warnings

were

too late for.Talaini, being that his offense occurred in 1994.

The affirmative defense of unintentional intoxication due to prescribed

psychotropic medications has been rarely used and has receive scant attention

in federal courts, making this issue of national importance for the United

States Supreme Court to address this claim today.

At a minimum, the United

States Supreme Court should set precedent here, by requiring state trial

courts to conduct "full and fair hearings" whenever they are faced with the

claim of unintentional intoxication due to the unwarned side effects of

prescription,psychotropic medications — and insodoing,

protecting the

citizens from being incarcerated for a crime "that the law no longer makes

criminal."

. 26.

As this.Honorable Court continues to hear arguments during this coronavirua pandemic, that pertain to vaccinations, and the mandates for and against

them,

the C6urt has also become aware of the mental health issues associated

with this pandemic.

And, coupled with therapy, many (too many) United States

Citizens will be prescribed psychotropic medications — without warnings of

potential side effects, potentially cuasing more harm than good.

Therefore,

it is in the national interest that the Court address Taliani's claim of

unintentional intoxicatiohndue to unwarned side effects of prescription

psychotropic'medications, and to provide an authoritative deterination for

future guidance on this very important issue.

27.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Steven A. Taliani, respectfully

requests the Honorable United States Supreme Court grant his Petition For

a Writ of Certiorari by entering that the judgment of the Illinois Supreme

Court be reversed and this cause be remanded to the state court for further

proceedings, including tut not limited to, a "fair and full hearing" on

Taliani 's claim.

The petitioncfor a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Steven A. Taliani

B62266 / P.0. Box 1700

Galesburg, Illinois 61402

DATED:

28.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this Petition For Writ of Certiorari

conforms to the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 33(2)(b).

The length of this Petition, excluding any items identified

as excluded within Rule 33 is 28 pages.

Steven A. Taliani

B62266 / P.0. Box 1700

Galesburg, II 61402

29.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.