Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Christopher Ronald Martin, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefFeb 24, 2022

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A:

United States v. Martin, 3:19-cr-00026-001, Judgment of the

United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa

entered February 25, 2020 ............................................................ 1

APPENDIX B:

United States v. Martin, 20-1511 (8th Cir.) (direct criminal

appeal), opinion and judgment entered June 7, 2021 .................. 8

APPENDIX C:

United States v. Martin, 20-1511 (8th Cir.) (direct criminal

appeal), Order granting petition for rehearing by the panel

entered August 3, 2021.................................................................12

APPENDIX D:

United States v. Martin, 20-1511 (8th Cir.) (direct criminal

appeal) opinion entered October 18, 2021 ...................................13

APPENDIX E:

United States v. Martin, 20-1511 (8th Cir.) (direct criminal

appeal) judgment entered October 18, 2021 ............................... 23

APPENDIX F:

United States v. Martin, 20-1511 (8th Cir.) (direct criminal

appeal), Order denying petition for rehearing en banc and

rehearing by the panel entered December 1, 2021..................... 25

Case 3:19-cr-00026-JAJ-SBJ Document 121 Filed 02/25/20 Page 1 of 7

Appendix A

APP. p. 001

Case 3:19-cr-00026-JAJ-SBJ Document 121 Filed 02/25/20 Page 2 of 7

APP. p. 002

Case 3:19-cr-00026-JAJ-SBJ Document 121 Filed 02/25/20 Page 3 of 7

APP. p. 003

Case 3:19-cr-00026-JAJ-SBJ Document 121 Filed 02/25/20 Page 4 of 7

APP. p. 004

Case 3:19-cr-00026-JAJ-SBJ Document 121 Filed 02/25/20 Page 5 of 7

APP. p. 005

Case 3:19-cr-00026-JAJ-SBJ Document 121 Filed 02/25/20 Page 6 of 7

APP. p. 006

Case 3:19-cr-00026-JAJ-SBJ Document 121 Filed 02/25/20 Page 7 of 7

APP. p. 007

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No: 20-1511

United States of America

SENT TO CLIENT

Aug 04 2021

by:

kelly_jensen

Appellee

Christopher Ronald Martin

Appellant

______________________________________________________________________________

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern

(3:19-cr-00026-JAJ-1)

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

Appellant's petition for rehearing by the panel has been considered by the Court and is

granted. The petition for rehearing en banc is denied as moot. The opinion and judgment of this

Court filed on June 7, 2021 are vacated.

August 03, 2021

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

____________________________________

/s/ Michael E. Gans

Appellate Case: 20-1511

Page: 1

Date Filed: 08/03/2021 Entry ID: 5061635

Appendix C

APP. p. 012

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 20-1511

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

Christopher Ronald Martin

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern

____________

Submitted: August 3, 2021

Filed: October 18, 2021

____________

Before LOKEN, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

____________

KOBES, Circuit Judge.

Christopher Martin challenges the district court’s1 denial of his motions to

suppress and his objection to application of the career criminal enhancement in

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). We previously affirmed. United States v. Martin, 999 F.3d 636

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Southern District of Iowa.

Appellate Case: 20-1511

Page: 1

Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Entry ID: 5087991 Appendix D

APP. p. 013

(8th Cir. 2021), reh’g granted and opinion vacated (Aug.3, 2021). After panel

rehearing, we again affirm.

Martin robbed a Sprint Wireless Express store in Davenport, Iowa at gunpoint,

making off with cell phones and tablets. Little did he know, he also left with a GPS

tracker, courtesy of the store employee. The employee called police, describing the

robber as “5' 7" tall, heavyset, male, African American with a grey ski mask, a blue

hooded sweatshirt and grey sweatpants.” D. Ct. Dkt. 67 at 2. The employee

described the getaway car as a dark-green Pontiac Grand Am or Grand Prix driven by

someone he did not see, and said the vehicle went north on Elmore Avenue. He also

reported that the robber had a tiny, silver handgun.

Officers responded to the robbery within minutes. The first on the scene

received a slightly more detailed description that the robber was 300 pounds or more

and carrying a duffel bag. Dispatch also began receiving location reports from the

GPS tracker, which updated every six seconds. The data, collected by a third-party

provider, directed officers to the intersection of Kimberly and Spring streets, about

1.5 miles from the store.

At the intersection, officers saw two cars: a white one and a dark-blue, fourdoor Ford Contour. There were two black male passengers in the dark-blue car, and

police noticed that the occupants were not looking around at the multiple squad cars.

When the dark-blue car pulled through the intersection and into a gas station, one

officer turned on his overhead lights.

After stopping the car, officers commanded the driver to exit the vehicle with

his hands in the air and to walk backwards toward them. After the driver was

secured, they did the same with Martin, who was in the passenger seat. The officers

-2-

Appellate Case: 20-1511

Page: 2

Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Entry ID: 5087991

APP. p. 014

then searched the car and found the stolen cell phones and tablets. Police detained

Martin and the driver of the car in separate squad cars.

Police brought the store employee to the scene for a show-up identification.

Police removed a handcuffed Martin from the squad car and pointed a spotlight at

him. The employee said he was ninety percent sure that Martin was the robber based

on build and clothing.

Martin filed motions to suppress the evidence gathered during the stop and the

out-of-court identification. The district court entered an order denying the motion to

suppress the stop and denied the second motion as moot after the Government said

that it would not use the out-of-court identification at trial. Martin pleaded guilty to

the lesser included offense of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to

a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and a conditional

guilty plea to interference with commerce by robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951

and possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),

924(a)(2), and 924(e)(1), preserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of

his motions to suppress.

At sentencing, Martin’s final Presentence Investigation Report identified him

as a career offender because of his prior convictions for: (1) Illinois armed robbery;

(2) federal bank robbery; and (3) Iowa robbery in the second degree. Martin objected,

arguing that two of the offenses were overbroad. The district court overruled

Martin’s objection and determined that he was a career offender.2 The court adopted

the PSR’s Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months. The district court sentenced

Martin to 180 months on Count I, 60 months on Count II to run consecutive to Count

At the sentencing hearing, the Government agreed that Martin was not an

armed career criminal, and the PSR was amended to remove the reference to the

armed career criminal enhancement.

-3-

Appellate Case: 20-1511

Page: 3

Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Entry ID: 5087991

APP. p. 015

I, and 120 months on Count III to run concurrent to Counts I and II, for a total of 240

months in prison.

II.

Martin argues police did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to

stop the car. He suggests police should not have relied on the GPS device and that

the description of the vehicle by the store’s clerk was not a match. On a motion to

suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal

conclusions de novo. United States v. Smith, 648 F.3d 654, 658 (8th Cir. 2011).

The Fourth Amendment secures the “right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” A

traffic stop is a seizure and “must be supported by reasonable suspicion or probable

cause.” United States v. Houston, 548 F.3d 1151, 1153 (8th Cir. 2008). Police are

permitted to make investigative stops of a vehicle if they have reasonable suspicion

that an individual in that vehicle recently committed a crime in a general area. See

United States v. Roberts, 787 F.3d 1204, 1209–10 (8th Cir. 2015) (applying

reasonable suspicion standard to stop of a vehicle several blocks from crime scene);

United States v. Juvenile TK, 134 F.3d 899, 900–04 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying

reasonable suspicion standard for traffic stop where officers received two dispatch

messages within forty-five minutes informing them that a vehicle had been involved

in criminal activity in the area).

“A reasonable suspicion is a ‘particularized and objective’ basis for suspecting

[criminal activity by] the person who is stopped.” United States v. Bustos-Torres,

396 F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Reasonable suspicion is

determined by “look[ing] at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see

-4-

Appellate Case: 20-1511

Page: 4

Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Entry ID: 5087991

APP. p. 016

whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting

legal wrongdoing [based on his] own experience and specialized training to make

inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available.” United

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). “Reasonable suspicion must be supported

by more than a mere hunch, but the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the

level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying the

preponderance of the evidence standard.” Roberts, 787 F.3d at 1209 (cleaned up).

The police had at least reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The GPS

tracker indicated that it was at the intersection of Kimberly and Spring. Martin argues

the GPS was unreliable. In support, he points to cases in which courts heard

testimony about the reliability and accuracy of GPS devices. See United States v.

Brooks, 715 F.3d 1069, 1077–78 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Espinal-Almeida,

699 F.3d 588, 610–12 (1st Cir. 2012). But those cases are about the admission of the

data at trial and do not address whether officers in the field can rely on third-party

GPS data while pursuing suspects. Considering the tight window of opportunity

officers have to locate a fleeing suspect, we find it reasonable for police to rely on

third-party GPS data.

Other factors also supported the officers’ suspicion. The intersection of

Kimberly and Spring is in the general area of the crime scene. United States v.

Robinson, 670 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir. 2012) (factors like the location of the parties

may support an officer’s decision to stop). When the five police cars arrived at the

intersection, they saw two vehicles. Police could reasonably rule out one because it

did not even remotely match the description given by the store employee. The Ford

Contour roughly matched the description. While the employee said the vehicle was

a coupe (the Ford Contour is a four-door), a Ford Contour has the same general shape

as a Pontiac GrandAm and Grand Prix. Plus, the color (dark green) is close to the

color of the Ford Contour (dark blue). Keeping in mind that the employee only saw

the car briefly after dark, it was reasonable for officers to believe the employee made

-5-

Appellate Case: 20-1511

Page: 5

Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Entry ID: 5087991

APP. p. 017

minor errors and that this was the car they were looking for. See United States v.

Quinn, 812 F.3d 694, 699 (8th Cir. 2016) (“We have held that generic suspect

descriptions and crime-scene proximity can warrant reasonable suspicion where there

are few or no other potential suspects in the area who match the description.”).

Police also noticed unusual behavior by the car’s occupants, who did not

acknowledge an overwhelming police presence. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

(irregular activities like repeatedly walking by the same store window can support

reasonable suspicion); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1989) (irregularity

of purchasing $2,100 in plane tickets with a roll of $20 bills could support reasonable

suspicion). The totality of the circumstances gave police at least reasonable suspicion

that criminal activity was afoot, so stopping the vehicle to investigate that suspicion

comported with the Fourth Amendment.

Martin also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the

use of the show-up lineup, which he says was unduly suggestive. The district court

denied the motion as moot after the Government committed that it would not use the

evidence at trial. While it may have been better for the district court to grant the

motion as unopposed or defer ruling until the issue was raised at trial, see Fed. R.

Crim. P. 12(d) (permitting deferral on a finding of good cause), any mistake of form

was harmless. The district court strongly suggested that it believed the identification

was inadmissible. This, combined with the Government’s representation that it would

not be used at trial, dissipated any reasonable concern that the identification would

be introduced as evidence. Plus, nothing in the district court’s ruling prevented

Martin from reasserting his challenge at trial. Any error was harmless. See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect

substantial rights must be disregarded.”).

-6-

Appellate Case: 20-1511

Page: 6

Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Entry ID: 5087991

APP. p. 018

III.

Last, Martin argues that the district court erred in finding that he was a career

offender and subject to an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. We review

application of the career offender enhancement de novo. United States v. Eason, 643

F.3d 622, 623 (8th Cir. 2011). A career offender enhancement is appropriate when

the offender is over 18, being sentenced for a crime of violence or a controlled

substance offense, and has “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of

violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Martin does not

challenge the district court’s finding that his current conviction and his previous

conviction for federal bank robbery are crimes of violence. See United States v.

Harper, 869 F.3d 624, 626–27 (8th Cir. 2017) (federal bank robbery is a crime of

violence). The question is whether one of his other prior two convictions should be

similarly categorized.

We previously held that Martin’s Illinois armed robbery conviction qualified

as a crime of violence under the “force” clause of the Sentencing Guidelines. United

States v. Martin, 999 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 2021), reh’g granted and opinion vacated

(Aug. 3, 2021). The Supreme Court later decided Borden v. United States, holding

that a criminal offense that can be accomplished with a mens rea of recklessness

cannot be a “violent felony” under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal

Act. 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1821–22 (2021). The Sentencing Guidelines’s definition of

“crime of violence” is so similar to the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony” that

“we generally consider cases interpreting them interchangeably.” United States v.

Brown, 916 F.3d 706, 707–08 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). We granted Martin’s

petition for rehearing to reconsider the enhancement after Borden. We think Martin’s

conviction for Illinois armed robbery still qualifies as a crime of violence under the

“enumerated offenses” clause of the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).

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APP. p. 019

The career offender provision of the Sentencing Guidelines defines “crime of

violence” as one that has an element of physical force against the person of another,

or is one of a list of enumerated offenses. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The enumerated

offenses include robbery. Id. at § 4B1.2(a)(2). But the analysis doesn’t end there.

We must decide whether “the state statute defining the crime of conviction

categorically fits within the generic federal definition of a corresponding crime of

violence.” United States v. Stovall, 921 F.3d 758, 759 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation

omitted). The “generic federal definition of a crime of violence means the sense in

which the term is now used in the criminal codes of most States.” Id. (citation

omitted) (cleaned up).

To decide whether Illinois armed robbery falls within the generic federal

definition, we start by “identifying the elements of the generic enumerated offense.”

Id. (citation omitted). We define generic robbery as “aggravated larceny, or the

misappropriation of property under circumstances involving immediate danger to a

person.” Id. at 760 (citation omitted). At the time of Martin’s conviction, Illinois

defined robbery as “knowingly tak[ing] property . . . from the person or presence of

another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force.” 720 Ill.

Comp. Stat. 5/18-1(a). Illinois defined armed robbery as a violation of Section 18-1

coupled with one of the following: (1) carrying a dangerous weapon other than a

firearm; (2) carrying a firearm; (3) discharging a firearm during the commission of

the offense; or (4) discharging a firearm that proximately causes great bodily harm,

permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person. 720 Ill.

Comp. Stat. 5/18-2(a).

The statute shows that Illinois armed robbery has the same elements as our

generic definition of robbery—misappropriation of property under circumstances

involving immediate danger to a person. Stovall, 921 F.3d at 760. Martin argues,

though, that it is possible to accomplish Illinois armed robbery without circumstances

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APP. p. 020

involving immediate danger to a person because one could commit the crime by only

using force3 against property.

The plain language of the statute forecloses Martin’s argument. Illinois armed

robbery requires either carrying a dangerous weapon, carrying a firearm, or

discharging a firearm. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/18-2(a). So armed robbery necessarily

involves immediate danger to a person because there must be a dangerous weapon

present. See Stovall, 921 F.3d at 760–61 (“While Stovall cites Arkansas cases that

potentially involve actions insufficient to constitute ‘violent force’ . . . —jerking a

victim’s hand, blocking a victim’s exit, cornering a victim, and grabbing a victim’s

dress—the actions are sufficient to constitute ‘immediate danger.’”).

Illinois case law further refutes Martin’s argument. The Illinois Supreme Court

held that armed robbery requires force “such that the power of the owner to retain his

property is overcome, either by actual violence physically applied, or by putting him

in such fear as to overpower his will.” People v. Bowel, 488 N.E.2d 995, 997 (Ill.

1986) (citation omitted). Illinois courts have repeatedly distinguished theft from

robbery by emphasizing that theft only requires “the mere physical effort of taking

the [property] from the victim’s person and transferring it to the defendant,” but

robbery requires force “to overcome the physical resistance created by the attachment

of an item to the person or clothing of the owner.” People v. Taylor, 541 N.E.2d 677,

679 (Ill. 1989) (citation omitted) (cleaned up); see also People v. Patton, 389 N.E.2d

1174, 1176 (Ill. 1979) (“where it appeared that the article was taken without any

sensible or material violence to the person . . . rather by sleight of hand and adroitness

than by open violence, and without any struggle on his part, it is merely larceny from

the person”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); People v. Campbell, 84 N.E. 1035,

The discussion of “force” here relates to the elements of an enumerated

offense; it is independent of the analysis for the “force clause” of the Sentencing

Guidelines.

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APP. p. 021

1036 (Ill. 1908) (“The difference between stealing from the person of another and

robbery lies in the force or intimidation used.”). If Martin was right and robbery

could be accomplished by only using force against the property itself, there would be

no distinction between robbery and theft.

Illinois armed robbery qualifies as “generic” robbery under the enumerated

offense clause. Because Martin has two prior felony convictions for crimes of

violence, we do not consider his Iowa robbery conviction. We affirm the district

court’s career offender enhancement.

IV.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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APP. p. 022

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________________

No: 20-1511

___________________

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

Christopher Ronald Martin

Defendant - Appellant

______________________________________________________________________________

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern

(3:19-cr-00026-JAJ-1)

______________________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT

Before LOKEN, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

This appeal from the United States District Court was submitted on the record of the

district court and briefs of the parties.

After consideration, it is hereby ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the district

court in this cause is affirmed in accordance with the opinion of this Court.

October 18, 2021

Order Entered in Accordance with Opinion:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

____________________________________

/s/ Michael E. Gans

Appellate Case: 20-1511

Page: 1

Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Entry ID: 5088002

Appendix E

APP. p. 023

Adopted April 15, 2015

Effective August 1, 2015

Revision of Part V of the Eighth Circuit Plan to Implement the Criminal Justice Act of

1964.

V. Duty of Counsel as to Panel Rehearing, Rehearing En Banc, and Certiorari

Where the decision of the court of appeals is adverse to the defendant in whole or in part, the

duty of counsel on appeal extends to (1) advising the defendant of the right to file a petition for

panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc in the court of appeals and a petition for writ

of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States, and (2) informing the defendant of

counsel's opinion as to the merit and likelihood of the success of those petitions. If the defendant

requests that counsel file any of those petitions, counsel must file the petition if counsel

determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the petition would satisfy the

standards of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a)

or Supreme Court Rule 10, as applicable. See Austin v. United States, 513 U.S. 5 (1994) (per

curiam); 8th Cir. R. 35A.

If counsel declines to file a petition for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc requested by the

defendant based upon counsel's determination that there are not reasonable grounds to do so,

counsel must so inform the court and must file a written motion to withdraw. The motion to

withdraw must be filed on or before the due date for a petition for rehearing, must certify that

counsel has advised the defendant of the procedures for filing pro se a timely petition for

rehearing, and must request an extension of time of 28 days within which to file pro se a petition

for rehearing. The motion also must certify that counsel has advised the defendant of the

procedures for filing pro se a timely petition for writ of certiorari.

If counsel declines to file a petition for writ of certiorari requested by the defendant based on

counsel's determination that there are not reasonable grounds to do so, counsel must so inform

the court and must file a written motion to withdraw. The motion must certify that counsel has

advised the defendant of the procedures for filing pro se a timely petition for writ of certiorari.

A motion to withdraw must be accompanied by counsel's certification that a copy of the motion

was furnished to the defendant and to the United States.

Where counsel is granted leave to withdraw pursuant to the procedures of Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), counsel's duty of representation is

completed, and the clerk's letter transmitting the decision of the court will notify the defendant of

the procedures for filing pro se a timely petition for panel rehearing, a timely petition for

rehearing en banc, and a timely petion for writ of certiorari.

Appellate Case: 20-1511

Page: 1

Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Entry ID: 5088002

APP. p. 024

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No: 20-1511

United States of America

SENT TO CLIENT

Dec 01 2021

by:

kelly_jensen

Appellee

Christopher Ronald Martin

Appellant

______________________________________________________________________________

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern

(3:19-cr-00026-JAJ-1)

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. The petition for rehearing by the panel is

also denied.

December 01, 2021

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

____________________________________

/s/ Michael E. Gans

Appellate Case: 20-1511

Page: 1

Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Entry ID: 5103215

Appendix F

APP. p. 025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.