Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Dennis Lee Shaffer, Petitioner v. Kansas
Supreme Court briefFeb 17, 2022
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No. ______________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________________________________________
DENNIS LEE SHAFFER
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF KANSAS,
Respondent.
__________________________________________________
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the Kansas Supreme Court
__________________________________________________
Petition for Writ of Certiorari
__________________________________________________
JENNIFER C. ROTH
Counsel of Record
RANDALL L. HODGKINSON
KANSAS APPELLATE DEFENDER OFFICE
700 S.W. Jackson Street, Suite 900
Topeka, Kansas 66603
(785) 296-5484
jroth@sbids.org
Counsel for Petitioner
__________________________________________________
QUESTION PRESENTED
Do the cumulative burdens of the Kansas Offender Registration Act constitute
punishment under the test set out in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), such that
retroactive application violates the Ex Post Facto Clause?
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED……………………………………………………………………ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………………….........iii
LIST OF APPENDICES……………………………………………………………………...iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………………….v
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI…………………………………………………1
OPINIONS BELOW…………………………………………………………………………...1
JURISDICTION………………………………………………………………………………..1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED………………...1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE………………………………………………………….........2
A.
The Kansas Offender Registration Act……………………………………..4
B.
Proceedings in the district court……………………………………...........12
C.
Proceedings in the Kansas appellate courts……………………………...13
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION………………………………………….15
A.
Lower courts are divided over whether retroactive application
of modern-day registration requirements violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause…………………………………………………………15
B.
Only this Court can put a stop to what lower courts and legislatures
have been using Smith v. Doe to justify for almost 20 years…………..17
C.
The decision below is wrong………………………………………………...17
D.
Now is the time for this Court to consider this important
and recurring issue, and this case is an ideal vehicle to do so………..25
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………….25
iii
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A:
Slip Opinion, State v. Shaffer, No. 119,738 (Kan. November 19, 2021)……………...1a
APPENDIX B:
Slip Opinion, State v. Shaffer, No. 119,738 (Kan. App. November 22, 2019)……….7a
APPENDIX C:
Slip Opinion, State v. Davidson, No. 119,759 (Kan. September 17, 2021)…………16a
APPENDIX D:
Slip Opinion, State v. N.R., No. 119,796 (Kan. September 17, 2021)……………….28a
APPENDIX E:
Slip Opinion, State v. Petersen-Beard, No. 108,061 (Kan. April 22, 2016)…………66a
APPENDIX F:
Slip Opinion, Doe v. Thompson, No. 110,318 (Kan. April 22, 2016)……………….108a
APPENDIX G:
Kansas offender registration act, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4901 et seq………...........175a
APPENDIX H:
Comparison of Smith v. Doe-era ASORA with 2011 KORA………………………..200a
APPENDIX I:
Expansion of Kansas offender registration act, 1993-present……………………..227a
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 62 A.3d 123 (Md. 2013) ................ 16
Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016),
cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 558 (2017)………………………..15, 18
Doe v. State, 111 A.3d 1077 (N.H. 2015) ........................................................... 16
Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008) ......................................................... 16
Doe v. Thompson, 304 Kan. 291, 373 P.3d 750 (2016)…………………………….8
Does v. Wasden, 982 F.3d 784, 792 (9th Cir. 2020)………………………………16
In Int. of T.H., 913 N.W.2d 578 (Iowa 2018) .................................................... 16
In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012) ............................................................. 16
In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014) ....................................................................... 16
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) .................................... 8, 13
In Int. of T.B., 489 P.3d 752 (Colo. 2021) .......................................................... 16
People v. Betts, __ N.W. 2d __, 2021 WL 3161828 (Mich. 2021) ...................... 16
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) .......................................................... 1, passim
Starkey v. Oklahoma Dep’t of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004 (Okla. 2013) .................... 16
In Int. of C.K., 182 A.3d 917 (N.J. 2018)........................................................... 16
State v. Buser, 304 Kan. 181, 371 P.3d 886 (2016)………………………...………8
State v. Davidson, __ Kan. __, 495 P.3d 402 (2021) ........................................... 9
State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4 (Me. 2009) ........................................................... 16
State v. N.R., __ Kan. __, 495 P.3d 16 (2021),
petition for cert. filed, Dec. 16, 2021 (No. 21-6719)……………..9, passim
State v. Petersen-Beard, 304 Kan. 192, 377 P.3d 1127 (2016)………3, 8, passim
State v. Redmond, 304 Kan. 283, 371 P.3d 900 (2016)……………………………8
State v. Reed, 306 Kan. 899, 399 P.3d 865 (2017)…………………………………9
State v. Shaffer, No. 119,738, 2019 WL 6223787 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019)………13
State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011) .............................................. 16
Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009) ................................................... 16
Constitution, Statutes, and Session Laws
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3………………………………………………………………1
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ................................................................................................. 1
34 U.S.C. § 20901 ............................................................................................... 2, 6
34 U.S.C. § 20915(b) ....................................................................................... 22, 23
42 U.S.C. §16901………………………………………………………………………….6
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5202……………………………………………………………..23
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5203 .................................................................................... 23
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6804(m) .............................................................................. 23
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6809 .................................................................................... 22
v
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4901 ...................................................................................... 1
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4902……………………………………………………………...12
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4903 ................................................................................ 6, 22
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4904 .................................................................................... 20
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4906 ...................................................................................... 5
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4908 ................................................................................ 5, 22
1993 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 253 ............................................................................... 4
1994 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 107. .............................................................................. 5
1997 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 181…………………………………………………………..5
1999 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 164 ............................................................................... 5
2001 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 208 ............................................................................... 5
2002 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 55 ................................................................................. 5
2006 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 212 ............................................................................. 22
2006 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 214 ............................................................................... 5
2007 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 183. .............................................................................. 5
2011 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 95 ................................................................................. 5
2013 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 127…………………………………………………………23
Other Authorities and Sources
Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, Registration and Community
Notification of Children and Adolescents Adjudicated of a Sexual Crime:
Recommendations for Evidence-Based Reform (2020)……………………..18, 21
Final Report on Sex Offenders: Recidivism and Collateral
Consequences (September 30, 2011)……………………………………………….20
Information Sharing and the Role of Sex Offender Registration and
Notification, Final Technical Report (2020)...………………………………....3, 19
Christopher Lobanov-Rostovsky, Sex Offender Management Assessment and
Planning Initiative Research Brief, Adult Sex Offender Management
(July 2015)…………………………………………………………………………......21
H.B. 2322 (2011) ............................................................................................................ 6
Testimony in Support of HB 2322, February 17, 2011, by Sg. Al Deathe ................... 6
Testimony in Support of HB 2322, March 3, 2011, by Nicole Dekat…………………...6
Testimony in Support of HB 2322, March 2, 2011, by Dave Hutchings……………….7
House Substitute for S.B. 37 (2011)…………………………………………………………7
Minutes of the House Corrections and Juvenile Justice Committee,
March 16, 2011……………………………………………………………………........7
House Journal 2011……………………………………………………………………………8
Senate Journal 2011…………………………………………………………………………...8
Prison Bed Impact Assessment on 2020 HB 2475, Kansas Sentencing
Commission, January 30, 2020……………………………………………………..24
Prison Bed Impact Assessment on 2022 HB 2515, Kansas Sentencing
Commission, February 3, 2022……………………………………………………..24
vi
Kansas Judicial Council, Report of the Judicial Council Advisory
Committee on Sex Offenses and Registration (December 11, 2020)……….2, 24
Ira Mark Ellman, When Animus Matters and Sex Crime
Underreporting Does Not: The Problematic Sex Offender Registry,
7 U. Pa. J.L. & Pub. Aff. 1 (2021)………………………………………………..2, 21
Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, "Frightening and High": The Supreme Court's
Crucial Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics,
30 Const. Comment. 495 (2015)…………………………………………………….18
Elizabeth Reiner Platt, Gangster to Greyhounds: The Past, Present, and
Future of Offender Registration, 37 N.Y.U. Rev. of L.
and Soc. Change, 727, 766 (2013)…………………………………………………..21
Lindsay Strong, The Kansas Offender Registration Act: Where’s the
Constitutional Limit?, 66 U. Kan. L. Rev. 787, 807 (2018)………………………3
vii
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Dennis Shaffer respectfully petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to
review the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The split opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court is unpublished at 499 P.3d
458. (Slip opinion included as Appendix A at Pet. App. 1a.) The opinion of the
Kansas Court of Appeals is unpublished at 452 P.3d 405. (Slip opinion included as
Appendix B at Pet. App. 7a.) The oral judgment of the state district court is
unreported. R: 13: 9.
JURISDICTION
The Kansas Supreme Court issued its opinion on November 19, 2021. Pet.
App. 1a. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3:
“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”
The entirety of the Kansas offender registration act, found within the Kansas code
of criminal procedure at Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4901 et seq., is included at Pet. App.
175a.
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State of Kansas retroactively imposed a Kansas Offender Registration
Act (KORA) obligation on Dennis Shaffer beginning in 2009, based on a conviction
from Missouri in 1994. This was possible because of Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84
(2003), which has emboldened the Kansas Legislature to enact seemingly limitless
expansion of KORA. The Legislature has made substantive changes to the
registration regime in 14 of the last 28 years, with almost every single change being
applied retroactively. See Pet. App. 227a for a year-by-year breakdown of changes.
At this point, there are over 22,000 people in Kansas who are registrants;
about half register because of a sex offense, with about 5,000 people each in the
drug and violent categories. Report of the Judicial Council Advisory Committee on
Sex Offenses and Registration, December 11, 2020, p. 30. “[N]o other category of
individuals who have completed their criminal sentence, including any term of
parole or supervised release, is subject to anything remotely similar” to the
“package of burdens” imposed by registration regimes. Ira Mark Ellman, When
Animus Matters and Sex Crime Underreporting Does Not: The Problematic Sex
Offender Registry, 7 U. Pa. J.L. & Pub. Aff. 1, 8 (2021).
There must be a limit to how far Smith v. Doe can go, and Kansas has
exceeded it. Smith v. Doe was decided before Congress enacted the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) in 2006, a federal law plus a series of
legally binding guidance issued by the Executive Branch, which consists of
requirements for states to implement in their own registries. 34 U.S.C. § 20901, et
2
seq. Since 2006, registration requirements in different jurisdictions, including
Kansas, have expanded exponentially, and the laws have become far more punitive.
Notably, Kansas is the only state that has fully implemented all 14 areas of
SORNA. See Information Sharing and the Role of Sex Offender Registration and
Notification, Final Technical Report (2020), pps. 49, 174 (found at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/254680.pdf). In the other 17 states that
are in substantial compliance, the legislatures tailored their registries to some
degree. Not only did Kansas fully implement all 14 areas, but it (1) went beyond
what SORNA requires and (2) applied the requirements to all types of registrants
(sex, drug, and violent). This makes Kansas different from every other state.
Additionally, since Smith v. Doe, there has been an explosion of research,
data, and studies on recidivism rates of people who have committed a sex offense, as
well as the efficacy of registration schemes. That evidence suggests that registration
does not create public safety—in fact, it undermines that goal. See Reasons for
Granting the Petition, infra, at 18-21. This Court would have two decades of new
information to consider when analyzing the Mendoza-Martinez factors. See, e.g.,
Lindsay Strong, The Kansas Offender Registration Act: Where’s the Constitutional
Limit?, 66 U. Kan. L. Rev. 787, 807 (2018) (“The Mendoza-Martinez factors most
affected by modern research would be KORA’s rational relation to a non-punitive
purpose and KORA’s excessiveness in respect to its purpose”).
Also emboldened by Smith v. Doe, the Kansas Supreme Court continues to
give limitless deference to KORA as a civil regulatory scheme with no punitive
3
effects, despite being presented evidence to the contrary. Fortunately, lower courts
taking the default position that Smith v. Doe controls over their state’s registry
conditions is waning. Since 2009, at least 13 state courts of last resort and the Sixth
Circuit have held that offender registration statutes cannot be applied retroactively
without violating prohibitions against ex post facto laws or cruel and unusual
punishment. See Reasons for Granting the Petition, infra, at 16; see also Pet. App.
64a (“Across the nation, courts are creeping out of the shadow of Smith and
declaring registration requirements punitive”).
Because of the increasingly punitive nature of offender registration schemes,
this Court should weigh in on whether KORA and similar schemes constitute
punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Although Smith v. Doe
provided a framework, the statutory scheme in Alaska in 2003 was too different
from the current landscape of offender registration requirements for its conclusion
to be the guidance that courts and legislatures need now. Next year, KORA will be
30 years old. Smith v. Doe will be 20 years old. Now is the time for this Court to act.
A.
The Kansas Offender Registration Act
1.
The Kansas Legislature created the first offender registry act in 1993.
The Habitual Sex Offender Registration Act required a person twice convicted of a
sexually violent crime to register with the sheriff in the county where he/she lived
for ten years. The information was open to law enforcement agencies only. 1993
Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 253. On April 14, 1994, the Legislature expanded the Act to
include people with first-time convictions and renamed it the Kansas Sex Offender
4
Registration Act. It allowed public access to registrants’ information; interested
parties had to go to the sheriff’s office to access the information. 1994 Kan. Sess.
Laws, ch. 107.
In 1997, the Legislature added people convicted of murder and manslaughter,
and people with convictions for certain crimes with victims under age 18. The Act
was renamed and has since remained the Kansas Offender Registration Act. 1997
Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 181. Since 1997, additional sex offenses have been added to the
definition of offender, and children adjudicated of certain sex offenses were added in
2002. 2002 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 55.
The Legislature broadened KORA further: in 2006, to include people
convicted of any person felony [where a finding was made that] a deadly weapon
was used,” and in 2007, to include people convicted of manufacturing, possession of
precursors, and drug distribution or possession with intent to distribute. 2006 Kan.
Sess. Laws, ch. 214; 2007 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 183.
2.
The registration periods for people convicted of sex offenses range from
15 years to lifetime, but most are lifetime. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4906.
Although the original act permitted registrants to petition for early removal,
now that process is expressly prohibited by statute. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4908; 1999
Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 164; 2001 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 208. 2011 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch.
95. Failing to comply with KORA is a mid-level felony or greater. Kan. Stat. Ann. §
22-4903; see also Reasons for Granting the Petition, infra, at 22-24.
5
3.
In 2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA), which was Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act. Pub. L. No. 109-248 (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. §16901, et seq.;
now at 34 U.S.C. § 20901, et seq.). As a result, the Kansas Bureau of Investigation
(KBI) formed the Offender Registration Working Group. In 2011, the Working
Group, in conjunction with the KBI, introduced 2011 HB 2322. The stated purpose
of the bill was to bring Kansas into “substantial compliance” with SORNA. See, e.g.,
Testimony In Support of HB 2322, February 17, 2011, by Sg. Al Deathe, Douglas
County Sheriff’s Office (“HB2322 blends requirements of the Walsh Act with all the
additional requirements the State of Kansas has added over the past three years”).
If Kansas did not substantially implement the requirements of SORNA by July 27,
2011, it would lose ten percent of its Byrne Grant monies. See Testimony in Support
of HB 2322, March 3, 2011, by Nicole Dekat, KBI. “[T]he KBI and the Working
Group” also sought “changes that are not SORNA issues,” including:
“[r]estructuring the severity levels for violations” in order to “treat repeat
offenders and absconders more harshly than first time violators” (i.e. firsttime would be a severity level six instead of the current severity level five;
second-time would be severity level five; and a third or subsequent
conviction, or a violation lasting more than 180 days, would be a severity
level three person felony);
“Expanding venue to allow jurisdictions to better deal with the issues of
noncompliant offenders”; and
“Requiring that, during an offender’s term of registration, no part of the
offender’s criminal record may be expunged. We believe that, because of the
great scrutiny placed upon registered offenders, their complete criminal
history should remain intact throughout the time they are required to
register.”
6
Additional components included allowing the court to require any person to
register for an offense not otherwise required in KORA, make registration lifetime
for anyone with two qualifying convictions (of any type), and requiring registrants
to sign a registration form because it was “necessary for the efficient management
of offender[s] under Kansas law and would provide necessary information for
prosecution for noncompliance.” Testimony in Support of HB 2322, March 3, 2011,
by Dave Hutchings, KBI. There were many more changes in HB 2322, with the
Group’s suggestions outlined in the testimonies.
Incidentally, SORNA has nothing to do with drug or violent offenses, yet the
Working Group applied all of its suggestions to all types of registrants. The
proponents did acknowledge that SORNA “requires a tiered duration of registration
of 15 years, 25 years, and lifetime registration,” but the Working Group “prefer[red]
to manage the program within a two-tiered system,” i.e. 15 years or life. Id.
The House committee that heard the bill did a “gut and go”, i.e. gutted a
Senate bill and put the contents of HB 2322 into it, thus creating House Substitute
for Senate Bill No. 37. Minutes of the House Corrections and Juvenile Justice
Committee, March 16, 2011, p. 2. H. Sub. for SB 37 passed the House; there were no
explanations of vote. Because the House used the “gut and go” procedure, the
provisions of HB 2322-turned SB 37 were never heard on the Senate side. In other
words, there was no hearing in Senate Judiciary, and the Senate as a whole did not
debate the bill. The Senate’s input was limited to three members who served on the
conference committee. Eventually both chambers adopted a conference committee
7
report. House J. 2011, p. 1028-30; Sen. J. 2011, p. 759-60. There were no
explanations of votes. The KORA overhaul became law.
4.
Eventually, a number of registrants challenged the application of the
2011 amendments to their situations, arguing that retroactive application of the
sweeping changes to them violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. After applying the
factors set out in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), to the 2011
KORA amendments, a majority (4-3) of one composition of the Kansas Supreme
Court agreed that the 2011 version constituted punishment for the purposes of the
Ex Post Facto Clause. State v. Buser, 304 Kan. 181, 371 P.3d 886 (2016); State v.
Redmond, 304 Kan. 283, 371 P.3d 900 (2016); Doe v. Thompson, 304 Kan. 291, 373
P.3d 750 (2016); Pet. App. 108a. (KORA, as amended in 2011, was punitive in effect
and could not be applied retroactively to any registrant who committed the
qualifying crime prior to July 1, 2011).
But on that same day, a majority of a one-justice-different composition of the
Court overruled those three cases and held that lifetime sex offender registration
was not punishment and, therefore, did not violate the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Petersen-Beard, 304
Kan. 192, 377 P.3d 1127 (2016), cert. den. October 3, 2016; Pet. App. 66a. The
majority cut and pasted the dissent from Doe v. Thompson and adopted it as its
reasoning and basis for decision, which was “a faithful application of federal
precedents requires us to find that the provisions of KORA at issue here are not
punitive for purposes of applying our federal Constitution.” Pet. App. 72a.
8
The following year, when faced with a strictly Ex Post Facto claim, the Court
did no new analysis or discuss the differences in situation, and simply pointed to
Petersen-Beard. State v. Reed, 306 Kan. 899, 900, 904, 399 P.3d 865 (2017)
(Petersen-Beard did not involve retroactivity, while Reed did; six months before his
time was set to expire, the 2011 amendments made Reed go from a 10-year
registration period to lifetime).
In August and October 2020, the Court granted petitions for review in State
v. Davidson and State v. N.R. Order, State v. N.R., No. 119,796 (Kan. August 27,
2020); Order, State v. Davidson, No. 119,759 (Kan. October 16, 2020). Mr. Davidson
had been convicted in 2002 of aggravated criminal sodomy and N.R. had been
adjudicated of rape in 2006 when he was a child; both had lifetime registration
periods and had been convicted of KORA noncompliance. Pet. App. 16a-17a, 32a.
The Court had not granted a petition about the retroactive application of the
Kansas Offender Registration Act since Petersen-Beard was decided.
On September 17, 2021, the Court decided Davidson and N.R. State v.
Davidson, __ Kan. __, 495 P.3d 9 (2021); State v. N.R., __ Kan. __, 495 P.3d 16
(2021), petition for cert. filed, Dec. 16, 2021 (No. 21-6719). The Court had not held
oral argument in Davidson. The Court did no new analysis in its Davidson decision;
it simply “reaffirm[ed] [its] holding in Petersen-Beard that KORA registration
requirements are not punitive in purpose or effect. Accordingly, retroactive
application of KORA provisions to Davidson does not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the United States Constitution.” Pet. App. 23a. The majority claimed that
9
“Davidson presents essentially the same arguments this court considered and
rejected in Petersen-Beard. He presents no new evidence or analysis.” Pet. App. 22a.
But as Mr. Shaffer discusses in the Reasons to Grant Review, the Court said it “had
the briefing in Shaffer and considered it when we decided Davidson.” Pet. App. 2a.
The majority—which included three members of the Court that reversed
itself on the same day in 2016—also commented that “[t]hough not discussed by
Davidson, the only change that has occurred since Petersen-Beard is that three new
justices have replaced three retired justices on the court. But ‘we should be highly
skeptical of reversing an earlier decision where nothing has changed except the
composition of the court. [Internal citation omitted.].’” Pet. App. 24a. The majority
“[kept] in mind that ‘[w]e do not overrule precedent lightly and must give full
consideration to the doctrine of stare decisis,’” and the dissent “[stood] firm in [its]
belief that the oppressive and onerous requirements of offender registration are
punitive. This case presents just another prime example.” Pet. App. 22a, 26a.
In N.R., the Court agreed the “affidavits establish that N.R. has suffered
personal harm, violence, mental health issues, and embarrassment because of
public dissemination of his registration information.” Pet. App. 40a. And the
majority “recognized that juveniles generally have a ‘lower risk of recidivism’ and
that ‘[p]lacing lifetime restraints on a juvenile offender’s liberties requires a
determination that the juvenile will forever be a danger to society’ and undermines
juvenile rehabilitation.” Pet. App. 41a-42a (discussing how it struck down as
unconstitutional the mandatory lifetime postrelease supervision for children).
10
But then the majority characterized N.R.’s use of “the ‘children are different’
analysis” as a “circular” argument and a “red herring” because postrelease
supervision and life without parole are “punishment”, “punishments”, or “sentences”
(emphasis in original), “[b]ut under the current state of the law in Kansas, the
KORA registration requirements are not punitive. See Petersen-Beard [citation
omitted]. Because they are not punitive, the KORA registration requirements are
not subject to the punishment analysis” set out in the Court’s opinions. Pet. App.
42a-44a. The majority held that “KORA’s mandatory lifetime registration
requirements as applied to N.R. are not punishment and, as a result, do not violate
the federal Ex Post Facto Clause or the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution[.]” Pet.
App. 47a.
The N.R. dissent began like this:
For more than 15 years I have been a proud member of a court that has
historically taken an unyielding stand against the degradation of rights
guaranteed by our Constitution. . . .
Today, I feel none of that pride. Today, the court eschews the United States
Constitution and the citizens it stands to protect for reasons I cannot
comprehend.
Pet. App. 50a. The dissent included research, data, real-world analysis, and a list of
cases from other states where N.R.’s situation was decided differently. Pet. App.
54a-65a. The dissent concluded:
N.R. is—very clearly—being punished by the Legislature’s “civil scheme.”
The majority’s refusal to acknowledge this is inexplicable. To put it plainly, in
the words of my recently retired colleague, the majority’s holding is “wrongheaded and utterly ridiculous. ... [I]n the real world where citizens reside,
11
registration is unequivocally punishment.” State v. Perez-Medina, 310 Kan.
525, 540-41, 448 P.3d 446 (2019) (Johnson, J., dissenting). Consequently, I
would hold that N.R.’s lifetime registration requirement violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause because it was enacted and imposed after N.R. committed the
actions that led to his adjudication.
Pet. App. 65a.
B.
Proceedings in the district court
The State charged Mr. Shaffer with one count of violating KORA. Pet. App.
8a. Mr. Shaffer opted for a bench trial, at which the parties stipulated that Mr.
Shaffer had a registration obligation due to a conviction for first degree sexual
abuse in June 1994 in Missouri. Pet. App. 8a (notably, this fact, nor the previous
one, are not included in the Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion; these facts come from
the Court of Appeals‘ decision). Mr. Shaffer’s trial exhibits included a letter from the
Kansas Bureau of Investigation, dated December 18, 2009, informing Mr. Shaffer
that
[o]n June 16, 2009, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that requirements
under the Sexual Offenders Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) now
apply to require registration even of offenders who were convicted prior to
January 1, 1995. Therefore you are now required to register in Kansas in any
County where you reside, work or attend an educational institution, per
K.S.A. 22-4902.
(R. 15: 146.)
Mr. Shaffer argued that retroactively imposing KORA obligations on him
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. (R. 13: 5-6.) The court
quickly ruled against the constitutional issue, and found Mr. Shaffer guilty as
charged. (R. 13: 6-9.)
C.
Proceedings in the Kansas appellate courts
12
1.
Mr. Shaffer appealed to the Kansas Court of Appeals. He detailed the
stark differences between KORA and the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act
(ASORA) at issue in Smith v. Doe, and analyzed how KORA implicates all seven of
the Mendoza-Martinez factors used in Smith v. Doe. Brief of Appellant at 17-31,
State v. Shaffer, No. 119,738 (Kan. Ct. App. March 25, 2019). See also Pet. App.
202a (a chart comparing ASORA statutes with 2011 KORA).
The Court of Appeals had no choice but to affirm Mr. Shaffer’s conviction:
“Shaffer’s argument is premised upon the conclusion that Petersen-Beard was
wrongly decided. Even if we would assume this to be true, we lack the authority to
overrule precedent established by the Kansas Supreme Court.” Pet. App. 15a. The
Court concluded “Shaffer has adequately preserved this issue and is free to seek
review by the Kansas Supreme Court and urge it to change its prior holdings. But
since we rely on the binding precedent, we cannot grant the relief he seeks.” Pet.
App. 15a.
2.
Mr. Shaffer filed a petition for review in the Kansas Supreme Court,
where he again argued that requiring him to register under KORA violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Appellant’s Petition for Review, State v.
Shaffer, No. 119,738 (Kan. December 23, 2019). On August 27, 2020, the Court
granted Mr. Shaffer’s petition as well as the one in N.R.; the Court granted the
petition in Davidson on October 16, 2020. Order, State v. Shaffer, No. 119,738 (Kan.
August 27, 2020); Order, State v. N.R., No. 119,796 (Kan. August 27, 2020); Order,
State v. Davidson, No. 119,759 (Kan. October 16, 2020).
13
As mentioned earlier, the Court had not granted a petition about the
retroactive application of the Kansas Offender Registration Act since PetersenBeard. Mr. Shaffer filed a supplemental brief using all 25 pages allowed, and
attached almost 70 pages of charts and legislative history. Incidentally, the State
did not file a response to Mr. Shaffer’s petition or his supplemental brief. The State
did not file a supplemental brief. At oral argument, the State did not challenge the
validity of the information Mr. Shaffer put in his supplemental brief. Oral
Argument at 36:37, State v. Shaffer, No. 119,738, March 31, 2021.
Five days after it issued its opinions in N.R. and Davidson, the Court ordered
Mr. Shaffer to answer why the Court should not summarily affirm his case because
“[i]t appears this [C]ourt’s ruling in [Davidson and Petersen-Beard] are dispositive
of this appeal.” Show Cause Order, State v. Shaffer, No. 119,738, (Kan. September
22, 2021). In his response to the Court’s order, Mr. Shaffer explained how he had
provided the Court with information and analysis it (1) did not have at the time of
Petersen-Beard, (2) could not have had, i.e. cases, research, and data that have come
out since Petersen-Beard, and (3) did not receive from Mr. Davidson or Mr.
Petersen-Beard. Response to this Court’s Order dated September 22, 2021, State v.
Shaffer, No. 119,738 (Kan. October 6, 2021). He also explained four reasons it would
be error for the Court to affirm his case on the basis of adherence to Davidson and
Petersen-Beard as precedent. Id.
On November 19, 2021, in a 6-page, unpublished opinion, the Court insisted
it had considered all of Mr. Shaffer’s arguments and authorities, yet “summarily
14
affirmed” Mr. Shaffer’s conviction, merely stating: “Simply put, the additional
information presented by Shaffer in his petition for review and his supplemental
brief does not change the answer to the threshold question decided in PetersenBeard and affirmed in Davidson: KORA is not punitive.” Pet. App. 5.
The dissent referred back to the dissents in N.R. and Davidson, also noting:
The majority here summarily dismisses the compelling arguments and
authority offered in Shaffer’s brief and attachments by simply stating it
offers nothing new or the cases relied on miss the mark. Apparently, other
States don’t share my colleagues’ assessment of Shaffer’s data and research
that the majority continues to reject. As I stated in my dissent in Davidson, it
is time for this court to join the ranks of the many other courts that have
rightfully recognized the punitive nature of registration requirements.
Pet. App. 5a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
A.
Lower courts are divided over whether retroactive application of
modern-day registration requirements violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause.
Mr. Shaffer acknowledges that only one federal court of appeal has
determined that SORNA’s registration requirements cannot be constitutionally
applied to people whose offense pre-dated the requirements, while at least nine
have rejected ex post facto or cruel and unusual punishment claims. Does #1-5 v.
Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 558 (2017)
(Michigan’s registry imposes punishment); see also Does v. Wasden, 982 F.3d 784,
792 (9th Cir. 2020) (reversing trial court dismissal of claims that Idaho registry was
punitive and violated ex post facto clause; trial court erred by “finding the outcome
15
of the Smith factors analysis controlled by precedent”); Pet. App. 72a-73a (for cases
rejecting the issue).
But since the passage of SORNA in 2006, at least thirteen state courts of last
resort have held generally that offender registration requirements cannot be
applied retroactively without violating constitutional prohibitions. See Doe v. State,
189 P.3d 999, 1019 (Alaska 2008); People In Int. of T.B., 489 P.3d 752 (Colo. 2021);
Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009); In Int. of T.H., 913 N.W.2d 578
(Iowa 2018); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W. 3d 437 (Ky. 2009), State v. Letalien,
985 A.2d 4, 26 (Me. 2009); Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 62 A.3d 123,
137 (Md. 2013); People v. Betts, __ N.W. 2d __, 2021 WL 3161828 (Mich. 2021); Doe
v. State, 111 A.3d 1077 (N.H. 2015); State in Int. of C.K., 182 A.3d 917 (N.J. 2018);
State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011); In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729
(Ohio 2012); Starkey v. Oklahoma Dep’t of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004, 1030 (Okla. 2013);
In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014).
The split is widening and will continue to do so as more courts “join the ranks
of the many other courts that have rightfully recognized the punitive nature of
registration requirements.” Pet. App. 5a.
B.
Only this Court can put a stop to what lower courts and legislatures
have been using Smith v. Doe to justify for almost 20 years.
Smith v. Doe and Petersen-Beard are “the current state of the law” in this
country and state, respectively. Pet. App. 36a. This presents “an uphill battle” for
registrants, to say the least. Pet. App. 40a. Time after time, lower courts do not dig
16
into the facts, arguments, data, and research put before them, and instead fall back
on Smith v. Doe.
That is what happened in this case, and Davidson before it. Instead of
digging into the research and arguments, the majority simply affirmed the cases on
the basis of Petersen-Beard, which in turn was decided on the basis of Smith v. Doe,
which was contrary to three other cases decided the same day as Petersen-Beard.
Pet. App. 5a, 24a, 76a-90a. Similarly, in N.R., instead of digging into the new
developments since Petersen-Beard, the Court presumed KORA wasn’t punishment,
as illustrated by putting words like “sentence” and “punishment” in italics. But
emphasizing words does not analysis make. Pet. App. 42a-44a. Without guidance
from this Court, what happened to Mr. Shaffer, Mr. Davidson, and N.R.—and to
people litigating their issues in courts across the country—will continue, “leav[ing]
one at a loss as to what, if any, condition KORA could create that the majority
would consider onerous.” Pet. App. 54a-55a. See also Pet. App. 227a (detailing the
expansion of KORA’s scope and requirements from 1993 to the present).
C.
The decision below is wrong.
1.
By sticking with Petersen-Beard and, therefore, Smith v. Doe, the
Shaffer majority ignores that Smith v. Doe was decided in part based on what we
now know is misinformation about adults who have been convicted of sex offenses.
Pet. App. 101a (for discussion of statistics, including Ira and Tara Ellman’s
“Frightening and High”: The Supreme Court’s Crucial Mistake about Sex Crime
Statistics, 30 Const. Comment 494, 504 [2015]).
17
We have seen other courts acknowledge this; for example, in Does #1-5 v.
Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016), the Sixth Circuit held Michigan’s version of
SORNA was punitive and could not be retroactively applied. To distinguish the
regulatory scheme at issue in Smith v. Doe, the Snyder court noted that the sex
offender statutes of two decades earlier were far more modest than the 2016
Michigan SORA. Id. at 700. In coming to its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit also relied
on empirical studies not available to earlier courts, which contradicted the
assumption that “[t]he risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is ‘frightening and
high.;” Id. at 704-05. See also Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers,
Registration and Community Notification of Adults Convicted of a Sexual Crime:
Recommendations for Evidence-Based Reform, 2020, Appx. B, “Legal Challenges
and Rulings,” pp. 16-19.
2.
Many proponents of ramping up KORA have claimed it was for public
safety. That rationale appears in Smith v. Doe and Petersen-Beard. See, e.g., Pet.
App. 87a-88a. But there is no definitive evidence that the registration regime does
that. In fact, there is evidence that registration decreases overall public safety. With
the exception of one article added here, all of the information below was presented
to the Court in Mr. Shaffer’s supplemental briefing.
As for SORNA, a 178-page report from February 2020 – titled Information
Sharing and the Role of Sex Offender Registration and Notification, Final Technical
Report (found at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/254680.pdf), does not
conclude that sex offender registration and notification schemes actually improve
18
public safety. The Report cites to “studies [that] have detected modest effects,
suggesting that [sex offender registration and notification systems] may be
associated with reductions in sex crimes under certain conditions [citations
omitted], while others have failed to find significant effects.” Id., p. 23. The report
says studies in 2010 and 2016 “concluded that SORNA’s conviction-based
classification system is ineffective in identifying those at highest risk of reoffending.” Id., p. 26-28.
Another federally-funded, DOJ-published report from 2011 contained even
stronger language, concluding that:
“Despite the fact that our legal responses to sex offenders, primarily sex
offender registration and notification (SORN), are based on assumptions that
those who commit sex crimes have no control over their sexual impulses and
will repeat their crimes again, relatively little research has found support for
such beliefs.”
“SORN is premised on the idea that by making information public about
identities, and residential locations, of known sex offenders, the public will be
better equipped to avoid situations in which these offenders have possibilities
to reoffend. The research evidence, though, does not support this belief.”
“There are also significant economic costs associated with [SORN], which
produce little or no increase in public safety.”
“Further, there is a well-developed body of literature suggesting that sex
offender registration and community notification has numerous costs in the
form of collateral consequences for both sex offenders and their families
[numerous citations omitted]. The importance of recognizing such collateral
consequences is centered on the belief that such potentially deleterious effects
on offenders may in fact contribute to sex offenders failing to register and to
the related potential for recidivism [citation omitted], rather than facilitating
community safety (the expressed purpose of SORN in the first place).”
Final Report on Sex Offenders: Recidivism and Collateral Consequences, September
30, 2011, pp. 1-2 (found at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238060.pdf).
19
If anything, registration requirements have the opposite effect on public
safety. The 2020 Information Sharing and the Role of Sex Offender Registration and
Notification, Final Technical Report explains many states’ rationale for not
substantially implementing SORNA and concerns expressed by state registry
officials are because the minimum requirements of SORNA have the opposite effect
on public safety:
“[I]mplementing certain SORNA requirements [that are conviction-based
rather than by risk assessment] would adversely affect the public safety
efficacy of their SORN systems by restricting their ability to direct resources
and attention toward those registrants who present more significant threats
to public safety.” Id., p. 10 (see also p. 28-29).
Constrained states’ ability to adjust registry requirements for those
determined to present minimal risk to the community. Id., p. 10.
Expanded the range of individuals subject to lifetime registration, which
constrained states’ ability to put focus on other offenders. Id., p. 10.
“[P]otential adverse public safety impacts related to the inclusion of
adjudicated juveniles …. [S]tates expressed concern the juvenile registration
might compromise the potential for these youth to effectively and safely
integrate into society, thereby increasing rather than mitigating risk. Id., p.
28-29.
Additional evidence that registration actually threatens public safety – for
registrants, their families, victims, and the general public – includes:
“[R]esearch has consistently shown that stable housing, secure employment
and prosocial networks are all associated with lower rates of recidivism and
increased desistence for people with a criminal conviction [citations
omitted]…. Creating unnecessary and ineffective barriers for registrants to
successfully reintegrate into society does not help registrants develop these
identified protective factors or promote desistance.” Association for the
Treatment of Sexual Abusers, Registration and Community Notification of
Adults Convicted of a Sexual Crime: Recommendations for Evidence-Based
Reform, 2020, Appx. A, p. 15 (found at https://www.atsa.com/policypapers/adultsorn).
20
Registration and notification are ineffective at preventing sexual abuse – one
study showed that “approximately 95% of prosecuted sexual crimes were
committed by men never previously convicted of a sexual offense (i.e., men
who would not have been on the registry).” Id., p. 10. See also Ira Ellman,
When Animus Matters and Sex Crime Underreporting Does Not: The
Problematic Sex Offender Registry, 7 U. Pa. J. L. & Pub. Affs. 1, 19 (2021)
(“One can’t have much impact on the overall incidence of sexual offenses by
concentrating efforts on a group that accounts for less than 5% of them”).
“In a review of eight individual surveys on [sex offender registration and
notification’s] impact on sexual offenders subject to it, Lasher and McGrath
(2012) found that 8 percent of sex offenders reported physical assault or
injury, 14 percent reported property damage, 20 percent reported being
threatened or harassed, 30 percent reported job loss, 19 percent reported loss
of housing, 16 percent reported a family member or roommate being harassed
or assaulted, and 40 to 60 percent reported negative psychological
consequences.” Christopher Lobanov-Rostovsky, Sex Offender Management
Assessment and Planning Initiative Research Brief, Adult Sex Offender
Management, July 2015, p. 3.
It may discourage reporting by victims for fear that “increased access to [the]
information created by registration and notification laws makes it more likely
that victims will be widely identified in their communities.” Elizabeth Reiner
Platt, Gangster to Greyhounds: The Past, Present, and Future of Offender
Registration, 37 N.Y.U. Rev. of L. and Soc. Change, 727, 766 (2013).
As for KORA specifically, Mr. Shaffer knows of no research, reports, etc. on
whether it is effective at public safety using any metric. All of this evidence (or lack
thereof) points to a different outcome for KORA than ASORA in 2003, but the Court
continues to follow Smith v. Doe.
3.
Smith v. Doe instructs us to look at the entire statutory scheme to
examine it for punitive effects. 123 S. Ct. at 1140. Mr. Shaffer respectfully contends
that in Petersen-Beard, Davidson, and his case, the Court did not dive down to see
how the scheme really operates. Instead, the Court “shrug[ged] its shoulders” at
21
what many registrants are required to do, and what can happen to them if they do
not comply. Pet. App. 54a.
But we must consider how KORA plays out day to day. There are so many
things we could look at (as shown in Doe v. Thompson and Pet. App. 227a), but to
pick just one, consider how violations are handled. As seen in this case, if a
registrant fails to timely comply with any duties under KORA, even
unintentionally, they can be charged with a felony. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4903. It
was not always this way, though. From 1993 to mid-1999, failure to register was a
nonperson misdemeanor. (In Kansas, most crimes are designated person or
nonperson, which has a number of impacts, particularly in creating a person’s
criminal history score in a future case. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6809.) In 1999, the
Legislature increased the penalty to the lowest-level nonperson felony. It remained
that way until 2006, when the Legislature doubled the penalty for noncompliance
and elevated it to a person felony. 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 212.
As of July 1, 2011, KORA noncompliance is a mid-level felony (akin to arson
or involuntary manslaughter, for example) for a first or second offense, and a high
level felony (akin to aggravated robbery, for example) for a third or subsequent
offense or a violation that lasts over 180 consecutive days. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 224903. In 2013, the Legislature created a new crime: unless a registrant has received
a court-issued waiver of payment (for which there is no statutory process after the
original finding of indigency), it is a Class A misdemeanor (the highest category) if a
registrant does not pay the $20 registration fee that is owed when a registrant goes
22
in for the quarterly registrations. It is a low-level felony if two or more $20
payments have not been paid. 2013 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 127.
A special sentencing rule makes all noncompliance violations carry a
presumptive prison sentence. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6804(m). Failing to comply is a
strict liability offense; the only other strict liability crime specifically designated by
Kansas statute is driving under the influence. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5202; Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 21-5203. It is normal to have a registrant who is facing more time for
noncompliance than what they faced for the offense for which they register.
All of this shows how KORA is punitive in effect. What’s more, here are some
real-life examples where people were prosecuted for violating KORA:
You forgot to register on time, get there two weeks (or less) late, and none of
your information has changed since your previous registration. What’s more,
they turn you away and tell you to come back another day to update your
information because they don’t take registrations on Mondays.
Your apartment burned down, which law enforcement knows, but you failed
to go tell them within three business days that you had to move.
You work in a county that is different from where you live and you failed to
register in that other county (but are compliant - and therefore all of your
information is on a public website - in your home county).
You are homeless and do not report as frequently as law enforcement tells
you to (which can be more than quarterly, because you are homeless).
You buy a new jet ski and forget to include it on your registration form.
You register while in jail and get out the next day. This happens during your
registration month. You don’t go in to register again during that month.
You permanently move away from Kansas to a state that does not require
you to register. You let the sheriff’s office know, but don’t write the KBI.
23
The conviction for which you register, which occurred years ago, involved the
person who is still your adult girlfriend.
The sheriff department calls you to say you are late on your registration that
month. You promptly go down there to fill out your paperwork, which makes
you compliant, after which they arrest you and charge you with a violation.
Again, KORA is punitive in effect. These scenarios do not make the public safer.
Furthermore, in this so-called “civil regulatory scheme,” people do not
experience civil consequences. For example, they are not fined if they violate. They
don’t lose their license to do business. Instead, they are charged with a felony
against the state, and risk losing their liberty. In 2018, 325 people were convicted of
KORA violations, with 116 of them going to prison. Report of the Judicial Council
Advisory Committee on Sex Offenses and Registration, December 11, 2020, p. 21. In
2019, 442 people were in Kansas prisons serving time for KORA registration
violations. Id. From about 2015-2020, the number of convictions for registration
violations increased by almost 65%. Id.
In FY 2019, 327 people were convicted: 123 went to prison and 204 went on
probation. The average length of stay in prison was 19 months. Prison Bed Impact
Assessment on 2020 HB 2475, Kansas Sentencing Commission, January 30, 2020.
In In FY 2021, 275 people were convicted (during a pandemic): 91 went to prison,
and the average sentence length was 28 months. Prison Bed Impact Assessment on
2022 HB 2515, Kansas Sentencing Commission, February 3, 2022.
How KORA noncompliance is handled and the penalties for it are a clear
indicator that KORA is punishment in effect.
24
D.
Now is the time for this Court to consider this important and
recurring issue, and this case is an ideal vehicle to do so.
Mr. Shaffer’s case is illustrative of an ongoing, national, constitutionally
significant problem. This Court’s review is the only way Mr. Shaffer and thousands
of other people in Kansas (not to mention other states and jurisdictions) have any
chance to receive consideration of the issues they present that are driven by
research, data, and lived experience.
The Petersen-Beard majority identified the “real question” in 2016 as “[a]re
there convincing reasons to believe the United States Supreme Court would view
KORA differently than it viewed the Alaska law in 2003 when it decided Smith?”
Pet. App. 76a. Mr. Shaffer presented reasons to the Court why the answer is yes. In
response, the Court summarily affirmed his case. Mr. Shaffer has presented reasons
why now is the time for this Court to answer that question with yes. To borrow
words from the Petersen-Beard dissent, “[we] [are clinging] to the belief that the
persons who have been privileged to serve on our nation’s highest Court will yield to
the facts and give a closer look at whether our statutory scheme is rationally
connected to the nonpunitive purpose of public safety and whether its terms and
conditions are excessive in relation to that public safety purpose.” Pet. App. 103a.
CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.
25
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Jennifer C. Roth
JENNIFER C. ROTH
COUNSEL OF RECORD
RANDALL L. HODGKINSON
KANSAS APPELLATE DEFENDER OFFICE
700 S.W. Jackson Street, Suite 900
Topeka, Kansas 66603
(785) 296-5484
jroth@sbids.org
Counsel for Petitioner
26
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.