Petition for Writ of Certiorari — John Raynor, Petitioner v. Dennis Walker, et al.

Supreme Court briefOct 15, 2021

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No. _________

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------JOHN P. RAYNOR,

Petitioner,

SKYLINE ACQUISITION LLC (“SKYLINE”)

AND DENNIS WALKER,

Respondents.

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The Nebraska Court Of Appeals

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------JOHN P. RAYNOR, pro se

5062 So. 108th St. #115

Omaha, NE 68137

(402) 939-8937

jp.r@cox.net

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska (Neb. Const., art. I, § 1-3)

coupled with the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.

Constitution (U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 1, Cl. 4) circumscribe the Nebraska Supreme Court’s discretion to disregard an appeal of a plainly Color of Law adjudication

by the Nebraska Appellate Court?

Is a Color of Law adjudication by the Nebraska

Appellate Court, the primary supervisory Court (appeal by right), coupled with the Nebraska Supreme

Court’s (appeal by permission) failure to address such

adjudication, an affront to the Due Process Clause of

the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (U.S.

Const., Amdt. 5, § 4), as applied to State Court action

under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 1, Cl. 3). Restating the

above in common sense and in common language –

Does Nebraska’s primary supervisory court, the

Nebraska Appellate Court, offend the Constitutions of

both the United States and the State, by arbitrarily departing from the primary statutory law, by acting without Subject Matter Jurisdiction and by mandating

Neb. District Court enter a judgment without Subject

Matter Jurisdiction by reason of the Internal Affairs

Doctrine; and further,

Can the Nebraska Supreme Court have the discretion to turn a blind eye to such action by the Nebraska

Appellate Court?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner John Raynor (“Raynor”) is the Petitioner.

Skyline Acquisition LLC (“Skyline”) is the holder

of the contested judgment.

Dennis P. Walker (“D. Walker”) is an indispensable

party.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

J. Raynor is a member of the Nebraska Bar Association and a member of this Court’s Bar.

RELATED CASES

Walker v. Probandt,

29 Neb. App. 704, 958 N.W.2d 459 (Neb. App. 2021)

Probandt and Raynor v. Dennis Walker,

Petition for a writ of Certiorari, No. 18-166, docketed

August 8, 2018, Petition denied October 9, 2018

Walker v. Probandt,

25 Neb. App. 30, 902 N.W.2d 468 (Neb. App. 2017)

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ......................

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ..............................

RELATED CASES ...............................................

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................

iii

INDEX TO APPENDICES ...................................

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

OPINIONS BELOW.............................................

JURISDICTION ...................................................

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,

AND COURT RULES .......................................

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .....

CONCLUSION..................................................... 23

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix A (“App. A”)

May 20, 2021, Neb. Sup. Ct. declining the Motion for Further Review ................................... App. 1

Appendix B (“App. B”)

March 30, 2021, Neb. Ct. App. Op. Walker v.

Probandt, 29 Neb. App. 704 (2021) (the “2021

Appeal’) ............................................................. App. 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued

Page

Appendix C (“App. C”)

May 8, 2018, Neb. Sup. Ct. declining the Motion for Further Review ................................. App. 16

Appendix D (“App. D”)

Sept. 12, 2017, Neb. Ct. App. Op., Walker v.

Probandt, 25 Neb. App. 30 (2017) (the “2017

Appeal”) .......................................................... App. 17

Appendix E (“App. E”)

Oct. 2, 2015, Neb. D. Ct. Mem. Op. & Judgment ................................................................ App. 46

Appendix F (“App. F”)

Aug. 8, 2018, Neb. D. Ct. Judgment, Mr. Probandt ............................................................... App. 65

Appendix G (“App. G”)

Mar. 12, 2020, Neb. D. Ct. Judgment, Petitioner (Raynor) ............................................... App. 67

Appendix H (“App. H”)

April 17, 2012, Bankr. Nebr. Clarification Order ................................................................... App. 71

Appendix I (“App. I”)

May 8, 2018, Case No. 18-166, U.S. Supreme

CT Writ of Certiorari denial .......................... App. 77

Appendix J (“App. J”)

April 28, 2021, Petitioner’s filing with the Nebraska Supreme Court – Petition for Further

Review ............................................................ App. 78

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Catlett v. Catlett,

23 Neb. App. 136, 869 N.W.2d 368 (2015) .... 13, 14, 17

Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v.

United States,

424 U.S. 800 (1976) .................................................20

Coker v. Coker,

2012 Ark. 383, 423 S.W.3d 599 (Ark 2012) .............19

Cummins Mgmt., Ltd. P’ship v. Gilroy,

266 Neb. 635, 667 N.W.2d 538 (2003) ............... 15, 16

Forster v. Milone (In re Forster),

22 Neb. App. 478, 856 N.W.2d 134 (2014) ...............14

In re Estate of Reed,

267 Neb. 121, 672 N.W.2d 416 (Neb. 2003)....... 20, 21

In re Neb. Cmty. Corr. Council,

274 Neb. 225, 738 N.W.2d 850 (2007) .....................11

J.S. v. Grand Island Pub. Schs.,

297 Neb. 347, 899 N.W.2d 893 (2017) .....................13

Lambert v. Lincoln Pub. Sch.,

306 Neb. 192, 945 N.W.2d 84 (Neb. 2020) ..............15

Midwest Renewable Energy, LLC v.

American Engineering Testing, Inc.,

296 Neb. 73, 894 N.W.2d 221 (2017)

(“Midwest I”) .............................................. 8, 9, 13, 14

Myers v. Neb. Inv. Council,

272 Neb. 669, 724 N.W.2d 776 (2006) .....................14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

North Carolina Utilities Commission v. F.C.C.,

552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977) ..................................18

Obergefell v. Hodges,

135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) .............................................19

Walker v. Probandt,

29 Neb. App. 704 (2021)

(the “2021 Adjudication”) .................................... 1, 13

Walker v. Probandt,

25 Neb. App. 30 (2017)

(the “2017 Adjudication”) ..........................................1

W. Ethanol Co., LLC v. Midwest Renewable

Energy, LLC,

305 Neb. 1, 938 N.W.2d 329 (2020)

(“Midwest II”) ............................................ 8, 9, 12, 13

Wetovick v. Cty. of Nance,

279 Neb. 773, 782 N.W.2d 298 (2010) .....................14

STATUTES, RULES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

Equal Protection Clause, Neb. Const., art. I,

§ 1-3 ............................................................... 2, 10, 11

Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const., Amdt. 14,

§ 1, Cl. 4 ............................................................... 2, 11

Due Process Clause, U.S. Const., Amdt. 5, § 4 ....... 3, 10

Due Process Clause applied to states, U.S.

Const., Amdt. 14 § 1, Cl. 3 ................................... 3, 10

Due Process Clause, Neb. Const., art. I,

§ 1-3 ............................................................... 3, 10, 11

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

The Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. Const., art. I, § 8,

Cl. 4 ................................................................ 3, 10, 22

The Supremacy Clause – U.S. Const., art. VI,

Cl. 2 ................................................................... 3, 10, 22

11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) .....................................................3

11 U.S.C. § 524(c) .................................................... 4, 24

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-301. Real party in interest .... 4, 8, 15

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-322. Substitution of parties .........4

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-323. Necessary parties;

brought into suit; procedure ........................... 5, 8, 15

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-501. Actions; how commenced ................................................................. 5, 15

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-155. Governing Law (Nebraska ULLC) ............................................. 5, 8, 9, 14

Neb. UCC § 1-103. Construction of Uniform

Commercial Code to promote its purposes and

policies; applicability of supplemental principles of law .................................................. 5, 9, 16, 21

Neb. UCC § 3-102. Subject matter ................... 6, 16, 21

Neb. UCC § 3-419. Instruments signed for accommodation ....................................... 6, 9, 10, 18, 21

Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112. Defenses and objections – when and how presented; by pleading

or motion; motion for judgment on the pleadings ...................................................................... 7, 15

Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1115. Amended and supplemental pleadings .......................................................7

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

Neb. Ct. R. App. P. §2-102. Court of Appeals .......... 7, 10

18-134 Moore’s Federal Practice – Civil § 134.01 ......18

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

OPINIONS BELOW

are:

The opinions/decisions at issue organized by Court

May 20, 2021, Nebraska Supreme Court declining

the Motion for Further Review. App. A.

May 8, 2018, Nebraska Supreme Court declining

the Motion for Further Review. App. C.

March 31, 2021, Nebraska Court of Appeals,

Walker v. Probandt, 29 Neb. App. 704 (2021) (the “2021

Adjudication”). App. B.

Sept. 12, 2017, Nebraska Court of Appeals, Walker

v. Probandt, 25 Neb. App. 30 (2017) (the “2017 Adjudication”). App. D.

Oct. 10, 2015, the Dawson County District Court,

Memorandum Opinion and Judgment (Petitioner).

App. E.

Aug. 8, 2018, the Dawson County District Court,

Judgment (Mr. Probandt). App. F.

Mar. 12, 2020, the Dawson County District Court,

Judgment (Petitioner). App. G.

April 17, 2012, Nebraska Bankruptcy Court Order.

App. H.

May 8, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court, Case No. 18166, denial of Writ of Certiorari. App. I.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

JURISDICTION

On May 20, 2021, the Nebraska Supreme Court

(“Neb. Sup. Ct.”) declined to consider Petitioner J.

Raynor’s timely filed Petition for Further Review from

the Nebraska Court of Appeals (“Neb. Ct. App.”). App.

A. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,

STATUTES, AND COURT RULES

Equal Protection Clause, Neb. Const., art. I, § 1-3 –

I-3. Due process of law; equal protection.

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law, nor be

denied equal protection of the laws.

Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 1,

Cl. 4 –

No State shall . . . deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.

Due Process Clause, U.S. Const., Amdt. 5, § 4 –

No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law; . . . .

Due Process Clause applied to states, U.S. Const.,

Amdt. 14, § 1, Cl. 3 –

. . . ; nor shall any State deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law; . . .

Due Process Clause, Neb. Const., art. I, § 1-3 –

See Neb. Const., art. I, § 1-3, set out above.

The Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, Cl. 4 –

To establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject

of Bankruptcies throughout the United

States. . . .

The Supremacy Clause – U.S. Const., Art. VI, Cl. 2 –

This Constitution, and the laws of the United

States which shall be made in pursuance

thereof; . . . shall be the supreme law of the

land; and the judges in every state shall be

bound thereby, anything in the Constitution

or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) –

A discharge in a case under this title . . . (2)

operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the

employment of process, or an act, to collect,

recover or offset any such debt as a personal

liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived. . . .

11 U.S.C. § 524(c) –

An agreement between a holder of a claim and

the debtor, the consideration for which, in

whole or in part, is based on a debt that is dischargeable in a case under this title is enforceable only to any extent enforceable under

applicable nonbankruptcy law, whether or not

discharge of such debt is waived, only if – . . . .

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-301. Real party in interest.

Every action shall be prosecuted in the name

of the real party in interest except as otherwise provided in section 25-304. An action

shall not be dismissed on the ground that it is

not prosecuted in the name of the real party

in interest until a reasonable time has been

allowed after objection for joinder or substitution of the real party in interest. Joinder or

substitution of the real party in interest shall

have the same effect as if the action had been

commenced by the real party in interest.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-322. Substitution of parties; death;

disability; transfer of interest.

An action does not abate . . . by the transfer of

any interest therein during its pendency, if

the cause of action survives or continues. . . .

In case of any other transfer of interest, the

action may be continued in the name of the

original party or the court may allow the

person to whom the transfer is made to be

substituted in the action.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-323. Necessary parties; brought

into suit; procedure.

The court may determine any controversy between parties before it when it can be done

without prejudice to the rights of others or by

saving their rights; but when a determination

of the controversy cannot be had without the

presence of other parties, the court must order

them to be brought in. . . .

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-501. Actions; how commenced.

A civil action must be commenced by filing a

complaint in the office of the clerk of a proper

court.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-155. Governing Law (Nebraska

Uniform Limited Liability Company Act).

(a) The law of the state or other jurisdiction

under which a foreign limited liability company is formed governs: (1) the internal affairs of the company; and (2) the liability of a

member as member and a manager as manager for the debts, obligations, or other liabilities of the company.

Neb. UCC § 1-103. Construction of Uniform Commercial Code to promote its purposes and policies; applicability of supplemental principles of law.

(a) The Uniform Commercial Code must be

liberally construed and applied to promote

its underlying purposes and policies, which

are. . . .

(b) Unless displaced by the particular provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the

principles of law and equity . . . supplement

its provisions.

Neb. UCC § 3-102. Subject matter.

(a) This article applies to negotiable instruments. . . .

Neb. UCC § 3-419. Instruments signed for accommodation.

(a) If an instrument is issued for value given

for the benefit of a party to the instrument

(“accommodated party”) and another party to

the instrument (“accommodation party”)

signs the instrument for the purpose of incurring liability on the instrument without being

a direct beneficiary of the value given for the

instrument, the instrument is signed by the

accommodation party “for accommodation”.

(e) An accommodation party who pays the

instrument is entitled to reimbursement from

the accommodated party and is entitled to

enforce the instrument against the accommodated party. An accommodated party who

pays the instrument has no right of recourse

against and is not entitled to contribution

from, an accommodation party.

Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112. Defenses and objections –

when and how presented; by pleading or motion; motion for judgment on the pleadings.

(h) Waiver or Preservation of Certain Defenses.

(3) Whenever it appears by suggestion

of the parties or otherwise that the court

lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter,

the court shall dismiss the action.

Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1115. Amended and supplemental

pleadings.

(a) Amendments. A party may amend the

party’s pleading once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served or, if the

pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted, the party may amend it

within 30 days after it is served. Otherwise a

party may amend the party’s pleading only by

leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party, and leave shall be freely given

when justice so requires. . . .

Neb. Ct. R. App. P. §2-102. Court of Appeals.

(G) Scope of Review. Further review by the

Supreme Court is not a matter of right, but of

judicial discretion. If the Supreme Court

grants review of a Court of Appeals decision,

the Supreme Court will review only the errors

assigned in the petition for further review and

discussed in the supporting memorandum

brief. The Supreme Court may limit the issues

to one or more of those raised by the parties

and may notice plain error at its discretion.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This controversy involves a trial before Nebraska

District Court, two appeals by right to the Nebraska

Court of Appeals (“Nebraska Appellate Court”) which

were adjudicated, and two Petitions of Further Review to the Nebraska Supreme (discretionary appeals)

which were denied.

The Petitioner contends that in two adjudications,

the Nebraska Appellate Court made fundamental errors which were dispositive including but not limited

to:

Without Subject Matter Jurisdiction, the

Nebraska Appellate Court ordered the

Nebraska District Court to enter a judgment against the Petitioner. Neb. Rev.

Stat. §§ 25-301, 25-323, Midwest I, Midwest II.

Without Subject Matter Jurisdiction because of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, the

Nebraska Appellate Court ordered the

Nebraska District Court to enter a judgment against Mr. Probandt. Neb. Rev.

Stat. § 21-155, Midwest I.

The Nebraska Appellate Court conflated

provisions of the Nebraska Uniform Commercial Code (“Neb. U.C.C.”) [Neb. UCC

§ 3-419(a)] to sustain a judgment against

the Petitioner under surety law in contravention of the plain language of Neb. UCC

§ 1-103, making the Neb. U.C.C. is the primary law, and Neb. UCC § 3-419, which

excludes the Petitioner from liability for a

promissory note due to his status as an

accommodation party. App. B, App. D. The

Nebraska District Court issued the 2015

judgment under the Neb. U.C.C. App. E.

Without Subject Matter Jurisdiction this

point is moot; however, its relevance is

the Nebraska Appellate Court’s departure from disciplined legal reasoning.

In supplementation of the above, the Nebraska Appellate Court’s adjudications [App. B, App. D]: (i) contravene Nebraska case law that establishes that without

Skyline Acquisition LLC (“Skyline”) as a party to the

proceeding after the 2011 Note assignment, the Nebraska District Court had no Subject Matter Jurisdiction [Midwest I, Midwest II]; (ii) contravene Nebraska

case law which holds Court actions without Subject

Matter Jurisdiction are void [cited hereinbelow]; (iii)

contravene Nebraska case law which holds that Neb.

Rev. Stat. § 21-155 of the Nebraska Uniform Limited

Liability Company Act codifies the Internal Affairs

Doctrine and deprives Nebraska courts of the Subject

Matter Jurisdiction necessary to adjudicate the alleged misuse of funds of an Oregon Limited Liability

Company by the Managing Member (Mr. Probandt)

[Midwest I]; (iv) nullified the efficacy of a final Nebraska Bankruptcy Court Order [App. H] (Discharge

Protection) which indisputably established Petitioner’s

status under the Neb. U.C.C. as an accommodation

party within the meaning Neb. UCC § 3-419(a) denying the Petitioner of the protection afforded by Neb.

UCC § 3-419(e); and (v) contravene stipulations by parties that the subject note is a negotiable instrument

within the meaning of the Neb. U.C.C. These errors

were made by the Nebraska Appellate Court and not

the Nebraska District Court.

Civil cases’ last appeal by right is to the Nebraska

Appellate Court which is the primary Appellate court

for civil cases and which is the primary court exercising supervisory authority over lower courts. Neb. Ct. R.

App. P. §2-102(G). The Nebraska Supreme Court has

discretion according to Neb. Ct. R. App. P. §2-102(G) to

hear a Petition for Further Review.

Petitioner asserts that the adjudications by the

Nebraska Appellate Court are arbitrary adjudications

made under the Color of Law without jurisdiction and

which conflict with Nebraska Law. Further, the departure from the Neb. U.C.C. intentionally nullified the efficacy of the Petitioner’s 2005 Bankruptcy Discharge as

interpreted by a final order of the Nebraska Bankruptcy Court [App. H] violating the Bankruptcy Clause

and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, Cl. 4, Art. VI, Cl. 2. The Nebraska

Appellate Court’s adjudications violate the Petitioner’s

right to due process rights which protects Petitioner

from arbitrary action by the Nebraska Appellate

Court. U.S. Const., Amdt. 5, § 4, Amdt. 14 § 1, Cl. 3; Neb.

Const., art. I, § 1-3. Petitioner further asserts that he

has been denied equal protection of the law under both

the Nebraska State Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 1, Cl. 4: Neb. Const., art.

I, § 1-3.

Given the unjustified departure from fundamental

legal precepts which deny Petitioner the equal protection of law and the due process guarantee that the law

will not be arbitrarily applied, Petitioner asserts that

U.S. Constitution and the Nebraska Constitution circumscribe the Nebraska Supreme Court’s discretion.

Vested with the authority to exercise the Judicial

Power of the State of Nebraska, the Nebraska Supreme Court cannot turn a blind eye to Nebraska Appellate Court’s adjudications in this case. This case

represents more than a simple case of abuse of discretion; rather, it represents an abject failure of the Nebraska Supreme Court to discharge its supervisory

authority under the State and U.S. Constitutions. In re

Neb. Cmty. Corr. Council, 274 Neb. 225, 231, 738

N.W.2d 850, 855 (2007) (This court also has inherent

judicial power to do whatever is reasonably necessary

for the proper administration of justice, and this includes supervisory power over the courts.)

Given this Petition rests upon the failure of the

Nebraska Supreme Court to act upon the Petition for

Further Review, the Petitioner hereby incorporates by

reference Appendix J, the last Petition for Further Review which was denied.

The Petition for Further Review, Appendix J, must

be examined in the context of all the evidence and law

that is available to the Nebraska Supreme Court, to

wit:

•

“ . . . we must take judicial notice of facts

admitted by Midwest Renewable in the

prior appeal which obviate the need for

evidence of a written assignment to

Vind.” Midwest II, 305 Neb. at 16.

•

“The Midwest Renewable Energy opinion

is a source of which the accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” Id., 305 Neb.

at 16 (Note omitted).

•

“In interwoven and interdependent cases,

we may examine our own records and

take judicial notice of the proceedings

and judgment in a former action involving one of the parties.” Id., 305 Neb. at 1617 (Note omitted).

•

“We have further held that we may take

judicial notice of a document, including

briefs filed in an appeal, in a separate but

related action concerning the same subject matter in the same court.” Id., 305

Neb. at 17 (Note omitted).

In the interest of justice, the Nebraska Supreme Court

must read the Petition for Furthered Review supplemented by the record, the facts, and the law submitted

to the Nebraska Appellate Court in the prior appeals.

App. B, App. D.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Fact and law, then known by the Nebraska Supreme Court, includes but is not limited to:

1. The Nebraska Appellate Court’s failure to revisit the Neb. U.C.C. in its 2021 Adjudication [App. B]

was without merit. Midwest II, 305 Neb. at 15-19.

2. As the recipient of the June 2011 Note assignment, Skyline is the only party that can maintain suit

thereon. Midwest I, 296 Neb. at 88 (the assignee is the

proper and only party who can maintain the suit

thereon); Midwest II, 305 Neb. at 5 (we concluded that

the judgment . . . was assignable and that “if [the]

judgment was assigned, then . . . Vind would be the

only party capable of enforcing or defending the judgment and judgment lien”). Without Skyline, as a party

to the proceeding, the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over the cause of action to enforce the note.

Midwest I, 296 Neb. at 88-92 (the absence of an indispensable party to a controversy deprives the court of

subject matter jurisdiction to determine the controversy and cannot be waived). Skyline is both an indispensable party and the real party in interest. Midwest

II, 305 Neb. at 5 (“We determined that Vind was an

indispensable party”); Midwest II, 305 Neb. at 10 (“We

conclude . . . that Vind is the real party in interest . . . ”).

3. “Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a

tribunal to hear and determine a case . . . A court action taken without subject matter jurisdiction is void.”

J.S. v. Grand Island Pub. Schs., 297 Neb. 347, 352-53,

899 N.W.2d 893, 898 (2017); Catlett v. Catlett, 23 Neb.

App. 136, 143, 869 N.W.2d 368, 376-77 (2015). Effectively, the Nebraska Appellate Court in the 2021 Appeal [App. B] determined that Court action without

Subject Matter Jurisdiction was voidable, not void.

4. The “internal affairs doctrine is codified under

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-155.” Midwest I, 296 Neb. at 83.

“The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict-of-laws principle which recognizes that only one state should have

the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs – matters peculiar to the relationships among or

between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders – because otherwise, a corporation could be faced with conflicting demands.” Midwest

I, 296 Neb. at 82-86 (recognizing that Corporate law

addressing the Internal Affairs Doctrine applies with

equal force to Limited Liability Companies). The Nebraska Appellate Court had no authority to order the

Nebraska District to enter a judgment against Mr. Probandt. App. D, the 2017 Appeal: App. F, the Probandt

Judgment.

5. The Mootness Doctrine applies whenever a

change in circumstances precludes the Court from

providing relief. Myers v. Neb. Inv. Council, 272 Neb.

669, 682, 724 N.W.2d 776, 792 (2006); Forster v. Milone

(In re Forster), 22 Neb. App. 478, 483, 856 N.W.2d 134,

142 (2014); Wetovick v. Cty. of Nance, 279 Neb. 773, 78384, 782 N.W.2d 298, 309 (2010). Without Skyline as a

party to the 2nd, the 3rd, and the 4th Amended Complaints, the Nebraska District Court was precluded

from providing relief to the Note enforcement cause of

action.

6. Nebraska’s Subject Matter Law and Court

Rules mirror Federal Subject Matter Law and Federal

Rules.

Without Skyline becoming a party to the proceeding within a reasonable period after the June 2011 assignment [Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-301, 25-323], the

Nebraska District Court had no Subject Matter Jurisdiction over the Note cause of action. See above, ¶ 1.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by

consent or waived. Cummins Mgmt., Ltd. P’ship v.

Gilroy, 266 Neb. 635, 638, 667 N.W.2d 538, 542 (2003)

(Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon

a judicial tribunal by either acquiescence or consent,

nor may subject matter jurisdiction be created by

waiver, estoppel, consent, or conduct of the parties).

Subject Matter Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the

Nebraska District Court’s error, i.e., Petitioner’s 2011

Motion to Dismiss for reasons that [the Bank] is no

longer the real party in interest should have been

granted. Id., 667 N.W.2d at 544 (“When, however, the

basis for the plea in abatement is the court’s lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, the court is obligated to

dismiss without prejudice, rather than to suspend the

action.”); Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112(h)(3) ( . . . the court

shall dismiss the action.); See above, ¶ 2. After 2011, to

reestablish the Note cause of action, Skyline had to instigate jurisdiction by filing a complaint. Neb. Rev.

Stat. § 25-501. The Nebraska District Court had no authority to continue the Note proceeding on the merits

after 2011. Lambert v. Lincoln Pub. Sch., 306 Neb. 192,

945 N.W.2d 84 (Neb. 2020) (“Whether a court has

subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue that

should be resolved prior to an examination of the merits . . . ”); See above, ¶ 2. Concerning the cause of action

over the expenditure of the Oregon LLC’s funds, the

Nebraska District Court never had and could never acquire Subject Matter Jurisdiction thereof. See above,

¶ 4. The Nebraska Appellate Court had no Subject

Matter Jurisdiction if the Nebraska District Court

lacked jurisdiction. Cummins Mgmt., Ltd. P’ship v. Gilroy, 667 N.W.2d at 544. Additionally, in 2017, the Nebraska Appellate Court had no authority to avoid the

application of the primary law, the Neb. U.C.C. Neb.

UCC §§ 1-103, 3-102.

In 2017, the Nebraska Appellate Court should

have been vacated the Nebraska District Court’s 2015

Judgment against the Petitioner with a mandate directing the Court to dismiss the case.

In the 2021 Appeal, the Nebraska Appellate Court

confirmed all the mistakes made in its 2017 adjudication. Subject Matter Jurisdiction law is basic and is

fundamental to every Judicial proceeding. As the primary supervisory Court, the Nebraska Appellate

Court knows Subject Matter Jurisdiction law, to wit:

Jurisdiction is defined as a court’s power or

authority to hear a case. Kuhlmann v. City of

Omaha, 251 Neb. 176, 556 N.W.2d 15 (1996).

Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a judicial tribunal by either acquiescence or consent, nor may subject matter

jurisdiction be created by waiver, estoppel,

consent, or conduct of the parties. Id. A

judgment entered by a court which lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void. Id. It is a

longstanding rule in Nebraska that such a

void judgment may be attacked at any time in

any proceeding. Id. This is true even if a party

attacks subject matter jurisdiction only after

being displeased with the decision of a district

court. See Paulsen v. Paulsen, 11 Neb. App.

582, 658 N.W.2d 49 (2003) (vacating judgment

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where

mother raised jurisdictional issue on appeal

only after custody was awarded to child’s father).

•

See Catlett v. Catlett, 23 Neb. App. 136,

143, 869 N.W.2d 368, 376-77 (2015).

It cannot be said that the Nebraska Appellate

Court’s misapplication of law was unintentional.

It has been said –

The doctrine of stare decisis is a fundamental

feature of the American common law system

of adjudication. . . .

The doctrine of stare decisis is supported by

principles that are central to American jurisprudence. Thus, stare decisis prevents the

courts from deciding cases in an arbitrary

way. It reflects the central idea that like cases

should be treated alike.7 One recent district

court decision explained that the doctrine of

stare decisis “is derived from considerations of

stability and equal treatment.” Among the

many reasons for adhering to stare decisis,

the Supreme Court has emphasized that

“[s]tare decisis is the preferred course because

it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and

consistent development of legal principles,

fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity

of the judicial process.” Because of the great

social utility of legal certainty and stability,

the Supreme Court continues to repeat Justice Brandeis’s famous words: “in most matters it is more important that the applicable

rule of law be settled than that it be settled

right.” And the Court has observed that “[r]especting stare decisis means sticking to some

wrong decisions.” At the most practical level,

“no judicial system could do society’s work if

it eyed each issue afresh in every case that

raised it.”

•

See 18-134 Moore’s Federal Practice –

Civil § 134.01 (notes, therefore citations

are omitted).

A deeper dive into the Nebraska Appellate Court’s adjudications would reveal the manipulation, the undermining, of the statutory test in the Neb. U.C.C. set forth

as Neb. UCC § 3-419(a) as well as extensive precedent

ignored to judicially engineered the result: holding on

albeit different causes of action, Petitioner and Mr.

Probandt liable directly or indirectly to Mr. Walker.

The Nebraska Appellate Court adjudications were

rogue. See North Carolina Utilities Commission v.

F.C.C., 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977) (“The mere fact

that a prior opinion exists is not sufficient in itself to

call the doctrine of stare decisis into play: otherwise

one rogue opinion could deprive the law of the accumulated expertise that stare decisis strives to safeguard.”). In Coker v. Coker, 2012 Ark. 383, 423 S.W.3d

599 (Ark. 2012), Judge Danielson dissented because

the majority did not overrule what “was quite clearly a

rogue opinion which changed the law and basically rewrote the applicable statute.” Id., 423 S.W.3d at 605.

“The Supreme Court of the United States has descended from the disciplined legal reasoning of John

Marshall and Joseph Story to the mystical aphorisms

of the fortune cookie.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.

2584, 2630, n22 (2015) (Justice Scalia’s Dissent). Disciplined legal reasoning was wholly wanting in the Nebraska Appellate Court’s adjudications.

The Nebraska Appellate Court’s adjudications are

under the Color of Law but are not of the law. The Nebraska Appellate Court adjudications were arbitrary

violating Petitioner’s rights as a citizen of Nebraska

and the United States due process rights and equal

protection of the law.

Twice, the Nebraska Supreme Court had an opportunity to correct the Nebraska Appellate Court’s adjudications and twice the Nebraska Supreme Court

declined to take up the matter. Petitioner asserts that

the Nebraska Supreme Court lacks the discretion to

ignore arbitrary adjudications by the Nebraska Appellate Court which violate the Petitioner’s due process

rights and rights for equal protection of the law. The

Nebraska Supreme Court has broad inherent powers,

to wit:

We have considered the issue of this court’s

authority on previous occasions. We have

stated: The inherent judicial power of a court

is that power which is essential to the court’s

existence, dignity, and functions. Such power

is not derived from legislative grant or specific

constitutional provision, but from the very

fact that this court has been created and

charged by the Constitution with certain

duties and responsibilities. The Nebraska

Supreme Court has been charged with administering the system of justice by exercising

managerial authority over the inferior courts.

Through its inherent judicial power, this court

has authority to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the proper administration

of justice, whether any previous form of remedy has been granted or not.

. . . we stated that when the Supreme Court

was created, it brought with it inherent powers, i.e., powers that are essential to the existence, dignity, and functions of the court from

the very fact that it is a court.

•

See In re Estate of Reed, 267 Neb. 121, 672

N.W.2d 416, 423-424 (Neb. 2003) (internal

citations omitted)

This Court has held unanimously that there is a “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Colo. River Water

Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817

(1976) (“The Court also says that federal courts have a

‘virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them.’ I agree.” Dissent, 242 U.S. at

821). When adjudications by Nebraska Appellate

Court are so arbitrary and so contrary to Nebraska

Law (case law and statutory law), it is inconsistent for

the Nebraska Supreme Court to possess inherent judicial power . . . which is essential to the court’s existence,

dignity, and functions [In re Estate of Reed, supra] and

simultaneously possesses the discretion to decline the

Petitioner’s appeals. It is incongruent for the Nebraska

Supreme Court to possess inherent authority under

Nebraska’s Constitution and simultaneously possess

the discretion to ignore violations of the Nebraska

Constitution as well the statutory designation that the

Neb. U.C.C. is the primary law [Neb. UCC §§ 1-103, 3102]. The Nebraska Supreme Court has the inherent

authority in the interest of justice to address the miscarriage of justice by the Nebraska Appellate Court in

the 2017 Appeal and the 2021 Appeal even if no Petition for Further Review was filed; therefore, the Nebraska Supreme Court lacks the discretion to decline

the Petitioner’s 2021 Petition for Further Review. App.

Additionally, the April 17, 2012, Nebraska Bankruptcy Court ‘Clarification Order’ [App. H] emanating

from Petitioner’s 2004 personal bankruptcy when

coupled with Neb. UCC § 3-419, Instruments signed

for accommodation, was dispositive of Note action. Petitioner is an accommodation party. The facts support

that Mr. Walker is an accommodated party. App. D.

Under the Neb. U.C.C. Mr. Walker bore the burden of

the note repayments as between parties to the Note.

Neb. UCC § 3-419(e). The Nebraska Appellate Court’s

adjudications couple with the failure of the Nebraska

Supreme Court to accept the appeals both transgresses

upon Petitioner’s 2005 Discharge as interpreted by the

Clarification Order [App. H] which is supported by the

Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const.,

Art. I, § 8, Cl. 4, Art. VI, Cl. 2. Petitioner’s only consideration for the Note was discharged debt. 11 U.S.C.

§ 524(c).

This Court should grant this Petition because the

Color of Law violations are blatant, indisputable, and

committed by Courts charged with the exercise of appellate and supervisory authority over lower courts in

Nebraska. A deceased friend of the Petitioner, a retired

law school professor that had the privilege of arguing

before this Court, repeatedly emphasized to the Petitioner “that facts make the case” (his “Legal Mantra”).

Implied in the Legal Mantra is the assumption that

the Court will follow the law. At the same time, the former law professor furnished me a mid-1980s document

of his creation that states in part:

Thy teachings are of enormity but only confuse.

Thy knowledge now so vast, ye can no longer

see.

Thy halls of justice are with so many books

filled, that none of thee knoweth what they

speak.

Thy priests of justice have unto thee like the

locust multiplied. But in their temple, thou to

thy confides, justice no longer resides.

The former Professor’s Legal Mantra and his spiritual

writings conflict. Based upon Petitioner’s experience,

the spiritual writings were forward-looking and now

apply to Nebraska Courts. This case establishes that

in Nebraska Courts “justice no longer resides.” Justice

is to be dispensed at the discretion of the Nebraska

Court and statutes and/or precedent are followed at

the Court’s discretion. A large segment of the population has lost faith in many Federal and State institutions including the judicial branch. The adjudications

of the Nebraska Appellate Court and the failure of the

Nebraska Supreme Court to act, in this case, do not

serve the image nor the integrity of the Judicial Branch.

This injustice must not be allowed to stand. Through

the acceptance of this Petition, in addressing the Nebraska Supreme Court’s inherent supervisory responsibility which limits its discretion, this Court is speaking

to the highest Court of every state and will make a

self-policing branch of Government more effective. It

will be a substantial step in restoring the integrity of

the Judicial Branch in the eyes of many doubters.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION

The Petitioner respectfully prays that this Writ of

Certiorari is granted.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN P. RAYNOR, pro se

Supreme Court No. 150527

(Admitted, 1982)

NSBA #15151

5062 So. 108th St., # 115

Omaha, Nebraska 68137

Telephone: (402) 939-8937

jp.r@cox.net

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.